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Classis Moralis Philosophiae
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Adjudicavit
H. Caledonis, Professor.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

OF

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY,

FROM KANT TO HEGEL.

FROM THE GERMAN OF

DR. H. M. Chalybäus,
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF KIEL.

BY THE

REVEREND ALFRED EDERSEHEIM,
FREE CHURCH, OLD ABERDEEN.

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MDCCCLIV.
NOTE
FROM

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.
 PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

The Publishers have much pleasure in being enabled to insert the following Note from Sir William Hamilton, with which they have been favoured:

"I have been requested by the Publishers,—as the character and even name of the Author of these Lectures may be unknown to many British Students of Philosophy,—to state, in what estimation Author and Lectures are held in Germany. I find no difficulty in compliance; and beg leave to say,—that to those acquainted with the Philosophical Literature of that country, it is known that Chalybaeus has, by more than one work, established for himself the reputation of an acute speculator, a fair critic and a lucid writer; and, in particular, that these Lectures are there universally recognised as affording a perspicuous and impartial survey of the various modern systems of German Philosophy, at once comprehensive and compendious. And, though the author be intimately familiar with the several schemes, both in themselves and in their polemical relations, he has, however, here skilfully avoided the tedium of detail; and this without thereby becoming superficial. The select character, indeed, of his audience,—a Dresden audience,—allowed him to accomplish this. For it consisted, as he informs us, of enlightened hearers,—partly state officials and practical politicians, partly men of letters and even distinguished literary authors,—who, without being philosophers by profession, had been originally trained in philosophical studies at the University, and were now desirous of information touching the more recent movements in the battle-field of meta-
physics. In Germany these Lectures are considered as popular, but not as superficial. They are viewed as even supplying a desideratum; and, in particular, are accounted an excellent introduction to a more extended and detailed study of the recent philosophical systems. Accordingly, since they were first published in 1837, at least four editions have appeared.—In this country the book, assuredly, will not be deemed too elementary.

"Though (and properly) not requested to express any opinion of the version itself, I cannot refrain from adding,—that having been led on to re-peruse all the first nine lectures in the translation, which I have also occasionally compared with the original, I am strongly impressed with its general fidelity and clearness. Indeed, with the exception of a few expressions, (and these I would demur to more frequently on rhetorical than on scientific grounds), this version of a work by no means easy to render adequately appears eminently worthy of approbation.—So much in justice touching the translation: of the translator I am wholly ignorant."

Edinburgh, November 1853.
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

In presenting a volume like the following to the public, a word of explanation may be allowed us. It is believed to be impossible and, were it possible, to be undesirable to prevent an acquaintance with the modern speculative systems of Germany. Although hitherto in a mutilated form, they have actually made their appearance in this country, and, if we mistake not, some of their principles may be discerned even in the views and mode of reasoning adopted by certain theological writers. Let them then be fully known, and that with all their consequences,—let them be impartially examined and truthfully judged. The cause of truth has nothing to fear from such an inquiry. It has to fear the surreptitious spread of principles, which, though at first adopted in their isolation, stand connected with all the rest in the totality of these systems, and frequently involve the most grievous consequences. It has therefore been not only to meet a literary requirement, but in the service of the truth, that this translation of a work was undertaken, which, however we refuse to identify ourselves with the views and speculations contained in it, is allowed on all hands to present a masterly, faithful, and perspicuous exposition of the views of Kant, Jacobi, Herbart, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schelling, and Hegel. If there is one thing more than another that the development of modern philosophy impresses on our own mind, it is the unsatisfactory character of the results obtained, where Logic alone is employed as the organ for
the a gnition of truth, as that by which, instead of that according to which we are to proceed. We may indeed feel ourselves held in the meshes of our own thinking, the mode of which Logic embodies, but we do not feel carried along nor convinced, in the way in which the intuitional a gnition of actuality convinces us. To be short—we feel now more than ever thoroughly convinced, that it is possible first of all to establish a Christian standing-point, and from that standing-point to furnish a complete and consistent Christian Anthropology—a Christian Psychology, Christian Ethics (in lieu of the common moral philosophy, which to us seems an impossibility), and also a Christian Metaphysics.

But our subordinate position as Translator forbids our entering at present into farther details. We beg the student to remember what difficulties have necessarily attended an attempt at the faithful and yet sufficiently perspicuous rendering of a work like the following; and we feel assured that we shall not appeal to him in vain. Notwithstanding all endeavours, we cannot doubt, but that faults may be pointed out—only we hope, that the difficulty of the subject will not be laid to the charge of the translation. Often words had to be employed which we knew were not classical English; sometimes even new words had to be coined; but the endeavour was at least always made to find terms, which other English writers had adopted before us, even though they did not always appear the most apt versions of German expressions.¹

THE TRANSLATOR.

OLD ABERDEEN, 15th November 1853.

¹ For example: The word momentum has been employed for want of a better term.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH GERMAN EDITION.

The following Treatise had its origin in a series of Lectures, delivered in Dresden during the winter 1835-36 before a circle of gentlemen, of whom the greater part were connected with the government, and all of whom took a lively interest in science—some being themselves highly distinguished in different branches of literature. The time, which they had passed at the different universities, had formed part of that period during which the philosophy of Kant and Jacobi had flourished. Pressure of professional duties had afterwards prevented them from keeping pace with this science and taking cognizance of the transactions about the highest interests of humanity in philosophy; all the more, that the altered terminology of objective speculation in the more recent systems had become difficult and unintelligible to those whose mode of thinking was in accordance with the former subjective direction.

If not to obviate, at least to diminish these difficulties, and at the same time to meet the demands of some junior cotemporaries, who had joined that circle—such was the task we had proposed to ourselves. The approbation with which these lectures were received when delivered, encouraged the author to print, and thus to submit them to a larger public, preserving however at the same time as much as possible the original mode of exposition. Hence the style of prelection was retained, hence also some repetitions which can scarcely be justified with regard to style, and occasionally digressions which may perhaps even weary some readers. It did not seem possible to alter this arrangement in subsequent editions, without injuring the original character and purpose of the book, the more
so as attention was more and more paid to the requirements of juniors, who were to find in this book a ready guide in their private studies; not indeed that they may rest satisfied with it, but to enable them, first of all, to find their way amidst the din of contending views, which join issue in our days, in order that, being thus incited and enabled, they may have recourse to the original sources. It has been our purpose, that the historical development should engage entirely the self-activity of the reader, and not anticipate at any earlier stage his later and more matured judgment; it was rather to lead him to make in his own thinking those personal experiences, which in general constitute a candid judgment and philosophical knowledge.

Our own philosophical conviction ensured us, as we thought, a free standing-point without those contending parties. It was to intrude itself as little as possible into the historical development, and only to be entitled to come forward with a few critical concluding remarks at the close, where the systems of the day cease to criticise each other, or where that criticism is yet sub judice. This was done, lest our very impartiality should appear but an ambiguous virtue, such as would lead the reader only to sceptical indecision, in order to leave him there to himself without help or advice; thus in fact rather deterring than encouraging him. But these critical additions may even in this edition not be looked upon as a laying the foundation for our own peculiar views; nor let it be fancied that the whole work had been composed for that purpose alone. Such a basis we have lately presented to the public in our "Sketch of a System of the Doctrine of Science, Kiel, 1846;" but it neither was nor is the tendency of the present treatise, which is rather perfectly independent of it and merely a faithful historical treatise, whose purpose without seeking it is only negative, viz. to assist in dispelling the delusion which at that time and in part still prevails, that, in the last shape in which it had appeared, philosophy was a science ready once and for ever, and perfected.

Next to impartiality, perspicuity was the first duty of our expo-
sition, and where, from the nature of the thing and the peculiar terminology, this was impossible, a careful limitation our second duty. It seemed only requisite to penetrate a little more deeply into the principles of the different systems; as for their further arrangement, it could only be dealt with in the way of a general characteristic, as it had not been our purpose to present an exhibition equal in all parts and extending also over the practical side, any more than to take a complete historical survey of all those different links which intervene and connect the different principal systems.

No objection of any importance has been raised against this impartiality and perspicuity, and this portion of the book, which is of chief importance, has apparently given satisfaction and that beyond expectation, however relative both the requirements of readers and the notion of a popularity, which is to meet the demands of all, yet without at the same time foregoing too much of scientific rigour. We have hence endeavoured, both in the second edition, which appeared in 1839; in the third of 1843, as well as in this fourth, to preserve as faithfully as possible the original character of the exposition and in part left it wholly unchanged, while we have aimed after a progress in the whole, inasmuch as the popularity which obtains at the first, will, towards the close, be found more and more to give place to a more rigorous exposition, so that the reader is supposed, as he goes on, to know much more than when he commenced. It is not only didactics, which allow of this mode of procedure, but the subject itself urgently requires it. Besides, since the date of the first appearing of these lectures, ten years ago, both the requirements and the mode of thinking of the public have undergone so thorough a change, that even now Kant's mode of viewing can no longer be assumed as that which universally prevails, but that we have rather to go back upon it, starting from another and a more recent one. If therefore it had, even in the third edition, seemed requisite, for the sake of our cotemporaries, more and more to complete our exposition of the system of Kant, and if the Author
felt himself even then induced by the change, which philosophizing seems about to take since the views of Hegel and especially since those of Schelling have become more known, to define more clearly the whole development of philosophy since the days of Kant, than had been done in former editions, it now seems our duty to direct attention more closely not merely to the most recent views of Schelling, but also to what is termed the second period of Fichte's speculations, and to add to the whole a short sketch of the philosophical views of Schleiermacher, which had been omitted in former editions.

The other sections have also undergone thorough revision, and thus the present edition may not improperly be designated as "thoroughly revised and enlarged."

THE AUTHOR.

KIEL, 1st January 1848.
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LECTURE FIRST.

INTRODUCTION.—A SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY—THE GROUND TAKEN BY SENSATIONALISM FORMING A POINT OF CONNEXION.

The proposal to deliver a Series of Lectures on the Progress and the leading features of modern Speculative Philosophy has from its very first announcement met with greater encouragement than I could have anticipated. This affords, I presume, proof sufficient that the desire for information on that subject is so deep and general, both amongst those whose academical education dates from a former (philosophical) period, and those who are only entering on their studies, that any want of success in the attempts hitherto made, to extend the secret of the latest philosophical school to a wider circle of educated men, cannot, at least altogether, be traced to reluctance on the part of inquirers. While some who preceded me may have been wanting in the requisite perspicuity and simplicity of diction; and others, in their anxiety to be generally understood, may have been deficient in thoroughness of scientific investigation; I have, at the outset, to confess my sense of the difficulty of taking as calm and complete a survey of my vast subject as I could have desired, in those few evenings which are allotted to me amongst you, and with the manifold other duties which my calling imposes.

But by far the greatest difficulty lies undoubtedly in the subject itself. The latest school has expressly characterised its philosophy as an esoteric science, which would at all times remain confined to the narrow circle of the initiated; yea more, which is also intended to be solely confined to them, inasmuch as what constitutes it Philosophy is, that it does not lay aside the veil which is impervious to the eye of the uninitiated—its scientific garb.
But let us not deceive ourselves with groundless expectations. It certainly holds true, that philosophy is such only as long as it retains its peculiar and strictly scientific form, and that we cannot be said to philosophise when we take a mere historical view of philosophical subjects, and fancy that, by the bare results (conclusions) of a philosophical system, we have learned to understand philosophy itself. Such expectation is as groundless as, for example, that of arriving at a clear idea of arithmetic by merely learning by heart certain calculated sums, say those of an interest table, &c.

All depends in the case before us on the self-activity, spontaneity, and freedom of thinking. Hence also the very manner of teaching this science differs from the communicating, the "tradere," of all positive knowledge. Nothing can here be positively put forth or infused; and, to adopt the expression of Socrates, this μανεύτω can only deliver the thinking of the student, in order that it may move freely, and move itself.

Philosophy stands not opposed to our common sense; but the demands of the former ever go beyond the common-place readiness of the latter; and much more is required of it than it is conscious of being able to accomplish. No person is to be permitted to inform himself, or to decide for us, and that too on any and every subject; nothing is to be believed, that we have not experienced in ourselves, i.e. inwardly in the consciousness; in short, nothing in the domain of philosophy is to be simply taken on trust; but, on the contrary, whatever is received is only to be allowed on the ground, that we ourselves have been convinced of its correctness, and that we ourselves know it.

Theoretical Philosophy then is just the view, attained to by one's self, of the manner in which we can know for certain any one thing; it is pre-eminently Science. On all such subjects as may actually be known, her task is not to assist mere opinion or belief, but to remove such, and to substitute in its place a knowledge on which reliance may be placed. While within her own province she tolerates no uncertainty, it must also be borne in mind that her domain extends only as far as knowledge itself extends; and hence, she should exclude everything which, in the strictest sense of the word, cannot be known, to which she can attach no other import than that of lying out of and beyond her boundary—the
transcendent—serviceable only to mark thereby her own boundaries.

But it is impossible to say beforehand—for on that point the different systems do not agree—wherein this peculiar kind of knowledge consists;—whether it have any necessary boundaries, and, if so, where these boundaries are. There are systems—and we shall by and by find that the most modern ones belong to that class—which do not allow the existence of any such limits in that which is essential. Yea, and every philosophy, even the most modest, endeavours at least more and more to enlarge these boundaries,—the end she has always in view being a more complete and enlarged knowledge. But as yet she has not attained to perfect knowledge, nor thus become that ἐπιστήμη at which Plato aimed; and hence she has still to content herself with the modest designation of—aim at and love of wisdom.

This love of knowledge is in truth born with us. Man is really not at liberty to philosophise or not as he chooses. Every one—to be sure after his own fashion—must and actually will philosophise, as it were, instinctively. It depends on himself how far he is to proceed, or how soon on this road he is again more or less to surrender himself to the love of ease or the power of habit. To quote the words of Lessing, "the point where they grow tired of reflecting is the end of reflection to a thousand for every one who acts differently." Yet withal, every one possesses at least a counterfeit of knowledge, which he calls his conviction, and in which he fancies he has got something that is genuine.

Meanwhile the multitude, at a distance from which true science prosecutes her course, hears only of the results of the philosophical investigation of the period which has gone by. These, as opinions imbibed, knowledge acquired, or principles adopted, but in truth only as belief handed down, do in their turn leaven the mass of the people, and occupy subjectively in every individual the place of personally-acquired conviction. To their possessors these stand now in room and place of Philosophy, inasmuch as a certain amount of personal activity is always requisite in order to appropriate them; however unsatisfactory to the observer, who occupies a higher standing-point, such procedure would prove. For—and here in our opinion lies the grand difference between the man of true scientific culture and what is termed the unlearn-
ed;—the man of scientific culture and of learning, in the true sense of the term, has once and for ever been severed from the element of blind faith. He wants to know that which others merely believe—to decide on that which others accept without examination; and in him we look for a personal decision, yea, the law itself will require such at his hands. The judge, the teacher, the physician—they all have to act upon their own personal conviction, and at this each of them is not only allowed, but in conscience bound, to arrive for himself. In so far then as they trace their convictions to ultimate and immediately certain grounds, they are Philosophers, and move within the province of that science which, properly speaking, is that which is scientific in all discipline.

I repeat it, that a man of science, of thought, and inquiry, has for ever parted with mere traditional belief and unreflecting assent; nor can he at any time be restored to his former conviction, peace and happiness, except through the medium of science.

First and foremost, this is seen to be the case in reference to belief, in the narrowest acceptation of the term, or to religious conviction. Yea more, the ideas of God, of liberty, and of immortality, are generally thought to constitute the chief contents of Philosophy, which is again looked upon as being the road that leads to a firm conviction on these all-important subjects. Thus philosophy becomes matter of the heart as well as of the head. Such at least should and will be the case with every one, who, having once parted with his educational creed, has, however, neither grown callous about that truth, which is both most elevated and pure, nor sunk to the level of an irony which could exclaim, "What is truth!"

At the very first, it was the tree of knowledge of which man partook. True, indeed, if its fruit was one denied to man, he should certainly never have meddled with thinking; but, from Adam downward, no further choice is left to us; we cannot any more desist from it, and must hence proceed, seeing it is now impossible to recede.

We feel no hesitation in stating that mere faith—we mean thereby a blind traditionary belief—has lost its hold on the mind of men of education, and that all attempts to discover a formula wherewith to conjure it back, will prove abortive. The vain endeavours in that direction may in fact be characterised as the torment of our days. Nothing will satisfy any longer, on subjects so solemn and
important, but a free, rational, and personal conviction. To restore to us such personal conviction is the province of Philosophy, both in her theoretical and practical departments. It is on grounds such as these—however dim our view of them—that we are so anxious to commit ourselves to her guidance, if we could only rely on her fulfilling the duties of her office. But, alas! the vast majority of men not only asks for truth at her hands, but at the same time prescribes what this truth is to be. Philosophy is to be the advocate, and the successful advocate, of their wishes or demands, and has to elicit a distinct decision in favour of the rectitude and holiness of such things as suit their particular convenience or advantage.

But even the most upright sometimes enter on the study of this science, only in order to find again that which they had lost, viz. their former educational creed. They seek rather after the old truths to which they had been accustomed, and whose effects they had felt to be so beneficent, than after that which is both more pure and more elevated. They long for the mild twilight; they feel pain, when philosophy sends forth a brighter light than their eyes can bear, and forthwith they pronounce this light a consuming fire.

But were it even so, that oftentimes, instead of light and warmth, philosophy but gave birth to gloom and cold, what can we do, who have once tasted of that fatal fruit of the tree of knowledge, but submit with courage to the ordeal mayhap of fire or of ice? Again, as we might have anticipated, most men raise at once the cry, that they have been deceived, whenever a given philosophical system—i. e. only as much as one step on that long journey—does not immediately lead them to the goal; yea, perhaps, to all appearance, instead of bringing them nearer thereto, only increases the distance between it and them. Few men have leisure to take more than one step during their lives. Thus, having rejected one or another system as false, they by and by, after having made a few abortive attempts, and by despairing of all philosophy, part company with her as their guide, and once more fall back on that belief, or non-philosophy, under whose guardianship, like children in their own home, they had formerly felt so comfortable and so happy. Alas! that when in after-life we return to the home of our childhood, not being able withal to return also to the childhood of our home, we feel always rather saddened than satisfied.
Thus is it also with every attempt to restore by artificial means the former simplicity of our faith—it is but a poetic dream, which serves only to bring before us in all the vividness of reality what beyond hope of recovery we have lost.

"A time there was, when Heaven's very kiss,
On solemn Sabbath seemed to fall on me,
When spoke the minster-bell devotion's bliss,
And prayer to God was burning ecstasy.
To those bright spheres I may not dare to strive,
From which the holy message doth resound,
Yet fraught with mem'ry of my youth, this sound
Hath power to rouse me still, and bid me live."

_—Faust, Act i. Scene 3._

Yet Philosophy will necessarily cease to be of general interest to men, when, like Faust, they have surrendered the hope of being able by her aid to lead clear and distinct proof on such subjects as those alluded to. This may serve to explain the remarkable change which, for the past thirty years, has taken place in the views and the confidence of the public, and that too after our science had previously for a long period been cultivated with deep interest and lasting satisfaction and consolation to the heart. Most of her admirers, however, forsook philosophy, when, by her silence, she owned, or at other times even openly declared, that, to explain nature both constituted the sole object of her desires, and indicated the extent of her powers,—yea, and when to this she added the sacrilegious attempt to drag the most elevated of all subjects within the circle of mere natural necessity. At that time no more was sought than acquaintance with a little Logic or Psychology, so much as was requisite for the desk (school) or the pulpit; and Metaphysics were just barely tolerated by a few students of Natural Philosophy and of Physiology. And now Plato's muse, arrayed in the garb of what was denominated Philosophy of Nature and of Pantheism, appeared, to men of education in general, but like a Somnambulist; they felt uncomfortable in her presence; and every one, who at all wished to preserve a Christian conscience, kept both his peace and at a distance from her.

But, lo! of a sudden she threw aside her fantastic dress, and, thus emancipated, appeared once more at the Lecture-table; but now as strict discipline—in fact as thoroughly bare and dry Logic. The disciple hailed this restoration of scientific authority, and readily
consented to be confined in the logical strait-jacket—for a German will even prefer such restraint to the loose and trailing garment. But, alas! Philosophy had also assumed a language so entirely new and almost foreign, that for a long time it was felt impossible to translate her teaching into one's own mode of thinking. Even philosophers \textit{ex professo} did not venture to interpret it with confidence, far less the general public; and, what the few initiated divulged in the curt, peculiar, and isolated phraseology, that was made use of, sounded like the ravings of madness, or like blasphemy. The misunderstanding and separation between science and life could scarcely have been carried to a higher pitch.

Yet, after all, it was the very men, who (as some have remarked) had been the means of shutting up Philosophy amongst inaccessible icebergs, that also propounded on the subject of the History of Philosophy—\textit{i. e.} on the successive development and connection of the different systems—a view, the truth and justice of which we feel it a duty to acknowledge, even although we are not at present in circumstances to enter on the consideration of the deeper grounds of the phenomenon about to be mentioned, and would perhaps account for it on very different principles from those laid down by Hegel.\footnote{Hegel's Hist. of Philos. \textit{Vide} Op. vol. xiii. p. 22, \&c. \textit{Phänomenology}, pref. p. 3.}

In opposition to the notion which had till then universally prevailed, that all former systems had been but so many abortive attempts to solve the world's grand riddle—that hitherto every one had taken that road to which chance or fancy had directed his steps—and that hence every one had in turn to begin anew from the beginning, seeing the only right way had never yet been discovered at all; in opposition to that notion which is partly yet received, we have, according to the view now stated, to acknowledge the existence of a very close, yea, of an organic connection between the different systems; inasmuch as it is found, that man's intellect has at all times, but more especially since the deliverance of Philosophy from the bondage, in which, during the reign of scholasticism, it stood to positive Theology, been progressing, and has without intermission been engaged in a process of self-development. It is just as when the individual first awakes to consciousness, the latter passes successively through certain stages—at first it rests satisfied with mere unreasoning sense-perception, but soon after
it wants to understand what is perceived, and enters on the sphere of the understanding, which brings an unexpected light, but with it doubts and contradictions also, into display; till, fairly entangled in the propositions thereof, it feels the self-imposed necessity of occupying a more elevated standing-point, where consciousness is in the last instance exalted to pure reasoning: as this is the psychological process in the individual, even so the whole species also, or the historical consciousness of men generally, passes through an analogous process, and in no particular does consciousness at every stage of mental culture come forth so decidedly as in Science.

If Hegel had looked upon his own system as the last and highest step,—as that perfection of consciousness beyond which no real or essential progress could any more be made,—he would have fallen into the mistake of many other eminent philosophers, who fancied that they had, each in his own place, arrested the course of the stone of Sysiphus. His disciples acted just like the faithful adherents of teachers in former times. They seriously proclaimed their imaginary triumph, but their boasting only recoiled both upon their teacher and the art.

In truth, however, the system of Hegel (like those of his predecessors) is itself only one step on that long journey, and as such forms part of the continued onward movement. If in this system, therefore, Philosophy has in her progress really firmly planted one foot, it now behoves her, resting thereon, to lift the other also in order to take a further step in advance.

Nought in the wide world of body or of spirit is stationary; and shall Philosophy alone form an exception to this rule? We see that all nature continually moves on; nor, if closely viewed, is its movement a continued repetition of identically the same things. The life of nature has its epochs, which constitute the history of nature in the strictest sense of the term, although these may succeed each other at a much greater distance of time, than that which intervenes between the epochs in man's history. Nature then has progressed, and is still progressing, in those vast creative periods, which, after they have long past by, fall partly within the range of our limited knowledge, being marked by strata and petrifactions on the surface of our globe, or by the change in position of the axis of the earth in reference to the polar star. The same no doubt takes place in the mind of man; and if proof be demanded
of us, we direct the inquirer to the testimony of universal history, however brief comparatively the period over which its record extends, or to that of the history of philosophy, though still more brief in its chronicle.

We observe that every object in the economy of nature presupposes what we would term its antagonist; the leaf on the branch seems to call forth another on the opposite side, as if to preserve the equilibrium. The same law manifests itself also in the growth of mind and in the organic development of consciousness. While progress in the formation of the whole is the aim, the alteration in the individual parts is due to the appearance of contraries; for it is noticeable, that, whenever any philosophical fundamental view was pronounced in a decided form, it also stood forth, ipso facto and necessarily, as one-sided. But immediately an opposite statement, roused up by contradiction, made its appearance, and criticism entered the lists on both sides of the question. But both these extremes only served to call forth a third view, to add a new sprout on the branch, which in turn was destined to pass through the same process of development. Whether and when this development shall result in that blossom, which would at the same time be its termination, we feel to be an enquiry to which, as yet, we cannot return a reply. Such an actual perfection of consciousness, were it attained, would also mark the end of the development within the reach of our species; and our globe, in its present form at least, would then have also served its purpose for the general economy of intelligences. Its ulterior fate would belong to a period yet future in the history of the world; nor shall we hazard any speculation thereon.

When the vast flood which during the dark ages covered the face of the nations had subsided, and political life was gradually raised to a new existence, Philosophy, as every other art and science, had to begin the rearing of a new edifice on the foundation which had previously been laid. The writings of the ancient sages had anticipated consciousness, and both interest and necessity equally pointed to Greek philosophy for instruction. But then the pupils were Christians, and the teachers heathens. The offspring of such intellectual union was necessarily very peculiar. At first, under the close superintendence of its mother (Theology), it was only by degrees that more liberty was gained, and thus
Philosophy was enabled to follow, without obstacle or constraint, in the wake of its Grecian progenitor. Historically speaking, we know only of Greek and German philosophy, the latter of which has originated in the midst of Christian cultivation. In fact, everything that strikes you as not having been handed down to us, but as really new in the appearance of re-organized Europe, may, in the last instance, be traced back to German parentage.

The opposition between the different philosophical systems, to which we alluded above, manifested itself even in Greece in the struggle between the systems of Plato and of Aristotle. During the sway of Scholasticism again, Nominalism and Realism contended for supremacy. Still later, we find the same again manifesting itself in the opposing views of Descartes and Locke. Descartes, well known as the propounder of the doctrine of Innate Ideas—a doctrine which recalls Platonism—appeared on the side of Spiritualism, and was succeeded by Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibnitz. Locke, as the great opponent of that system, had to stand forth as the advocate of Sensationalism. His successors were Condillac, Helvetius, and other Frenchmen, who secured a very general acquiescence in their views, advocated as they were in a language which at that time was most of all cultivated.

It would not, however, be correct were we to account for the general acceptance of these views merely on the ground of the influence of the language in which they were advocated, and of the position occupied at the time by French literature. The ground of the success of this philosophy was not merely an external one, but is to be found within the system itself.

The truth of the matter is that the Sensationalism of Locke may be characterised as embodying those very views which would most readily and naturally present themselves to every reflecting person. We might almost say, that all of us content ourselves with it for every ordinary purpose of our every-day life.

In addressing ourselves now more particularly to the task we have in view in these Lectures, we have first of all to look for some definite point from which to start in our inquiries: nor could any one be found more suitable for the purpose than these views of Locke, representing as they do, both that mode of thinking which is to be supposed as common to every intellect, that has not as yet far advanced in independent inquiry, and at the same time also a
stage which constitutes a distinct momentum in the historical de-
velopment. We do not intend to give any thorough exposition of
that system, because, as already stated, it is only to serve as a basis
by which the more readily to understand, and with which to con-
nect the after-development of philosophical inquiry; nor shall we
advert to it at greater length than is requisite for this purpose.

Locke\textsuperscript{1} lays it down as proved by observation and experience, that
the mind of a child is furnished with ideas of such things only as lie
within the range of his senses. Originally, the mind is like a sheet
of white paper, void of all characters (a \textit{tabula rasa}.) Gradually it
is painted upon, and furnished with representations of external ob-
jects that are traced upon it. All ideas of which we are con-
scious, without exception, have originally been conveyed by the
senses into the mind. There is no such thing as innate principles
which the soul receives at its being, and brings into the world with
it. In fact, our understanding is only the faculty which receives
ideas of every kind; and, in doing so, at the beginning at least,
is rather passive than active. Some outward object has to be
brought into contact with our mind by making some impulse or
impression on the organ, which the nerves or animal spirits con-
tinue thence to the brain; where, in turn, an image, representa-
tion, or idea corresponding to that object, is produced.

Accordingly, external objects are reflected in the consciousness
of man as in a mirror, or else affect the nerves of smell, taste,
&c. directly by means of dissolved particles. The same holds
true of the movements and changes within ourselves, for the
observation of which we have a peculiar sense, called by Locke
the \textit{Internal Sense}. In short, representations, of whatever kind,
may be ultimately traced back to some mechanical impression
conveyed to the mind through the medium of the body. These
impressions memory preserves in our minds; and, as occasion re-
quires, they are awakened and reappear.

But our understanding manifests itself immediately also as
the faculty of knowledge.\textsuperscript{2} For we examine the different ideas or

\textsuperscript{1} His chief work is \textit{"An Essay concerning Human Understanding,"} in 4 books,
Lond. 1690, fol. x. ed. London, 1731, 2 vols. 8vo. Translated into German by
Tennemann, Leipzig, 1759.

\textsuperscript{2} Our author employs in the original the term \textit{Urtheils-Kraft}, which literally should
be rendered power of judging. We have chosen, however, the expression \textit{"faculty of
knowledge"} as more in accordance with Locke's terminology; bearing in mind his dis-
tinction between judgment and knowledge, which latter alone implies certainty, being
founded on actual experience.—\textsc{The Translator.}
representations which are conveyed to our minds, we compare them, we connect those which are similar, and distinguish and separate those which are dissimilar. According to the similarity thus observed, we then arrange those innumerable particular existences into classes, as language would else not suffice to designate each of them particularly; and we apply the generic name of the class, without distinction, to every individual member that belongs to it. Thus general ideas arise, as is well known, from particular representations, from images of particular objects, by means of the abstracting and reflecting activity of our understanding. When, for example, we join together many similar existences in the idea of animal, we reflect in doing so only on those marks and qualities which all of them possess in common, and abstract from those which are peculiar to every single individual, and by which every such individual stands out as distinct from all the others. The former we call the essential, the latter the non-essential qualities or designations.

But we are not limited to representations of only definite objects, and of their properties. We have also ideas of the relations in which they stand to us and to each other, such as of their distance or proximity—i. e. of space, of time, of number, of unity, of multiplicity, &c. Thus, for example, the idea of infinity arises simply from observing that our mind is able to make an endless increase of quantity, by the repeated additions of portions of time or of space. In the same manner, to use an illustration, a mariner might fancy that the ocean had no bottom, when, having let down the sounding-line, he has not succeeded in reaching ground. An exactly similar view may also be taken of what are called moral ideas, and of those of substance and of causality, to instance these two more particularly, as being of special importance for our present purpose.

We observe different properties in one and the same object, such as its figure, bulk, colour, &c. All these are merely qualities, and must inhere, be supported by, and united together in, some one definite thing. Now this definite thing, which unites them all in itself, we call the substratum, the support, substantia; although we may at the same time be totally ignorant of what this substance is in itself, or irrespective of all these its qualities. In like manner, our idea of cause and effect just arises from observing such relations of things as fall within the range of our senses, where we notice how the appearance and disappearance
of innumerable objects may be traced to the operation of others which have either gone before or are supervening at the time.

All general knowledge then must, in the last instance, proceed from sensations, and be supported by actual experience, in the course of which we shall, by observation, be enabled to perceive any difference or agreement, and to derive from the latter the warrant for entertaining certainty.

It were indeed impossible to demonstrate that we really perceive objects which are external to us; but the fact is gathered from observation, and from the consciousness that there is an essential difference between our noticing things which are presented to us, and which we cannot see differently from what they really are, and our representing things to ourselves, where we may alter at will any part of the representation. We can therefore entertain certainty only when we observe, that, in our perceptions we have been both passive and not free (we have exercised neither activity nor choice). Had we ourselves called them forth by any faculty or power within us, we could then never feel assured of the objective existence and reality of objects. Again, it may easily be proved, that our perceptions or images of things do properly and correctly correspond, and are adequate representations of the things which are external to us, inasmuch as we ourselves must have produced them by our understanding, if they do not owe their origin to these external things. But the former is impossible, as the mind can only analyze all those representations which are conveyed to it by the senses, and again reconstruct their component parts in different new ways, so as to present another appearance from what is observed in nature; but cannot by any means derive from its own resources any one of those component parts. None who is born blind can, for example, have an idea of colours; none born deaf, of sounds, &c. As the mind can do nothing beyond separating (analyzing) and again recomposing that which has been furnished to it, it is abundantly evident that the origin of all our representations must be sought in the fact that things and their relations—not excepting even those of mathematics—do regularly affect (exercise a regular influence upon) us. But again, as all our knowledge is confined (limited) to experience, it follows also, that nothing can in reality be propounded as universally valid, seeing that experience neither has been, nor
ever is wholly exhausted. That which has never yet taken place may nevertheless happen at some future period, and thereby things become true which had hitherto been thought impossible.

We have thus endeavoured to trace the leading features of Empiricism or Sensationalism. We did not expect to bring before you any thing new in the foregoing sketch, but rather to shew you, that, while many of those natural suggestions which may occur to us, as we proceed, have been long ago propounded, they are at the same time not of such a character as to afford satisfaction, although the system we have alluded to was for a long time, even in Germany, the undisturbed foundation on which the edifice of philosophy was reared.

At last, however, Scepticism, which, while it never constructs for itself, pulls down whatever in a building is decaying and crazy, addressed itself to the task of examining into the state of this old edifice. To use the words of Kant—"The Scotchman, David Hume, struck a spark which might have served to kindle a flame, if it had fallen upon material susceptible of ignition."

But, ere we proceed, let us for a moment stay to inquire to what purpose this road was ever entered upon, or why any question as to the origin of our knowledge was ever raised? We reply, that the certainty of all knowledge depends on an answer to the last-mentioned question; its investigation constitutes hence also the subject-matter of all theoretical philosophy. Are we farther pressed to say, on what grounds we do not feel satisfied with the natural and simple explanation given by Locke, which even in our own days is almost universally adopted for all ordinary purposes? We rejoin, that we cannot remain satisfied with any view which deprives us of all absolutely certain knowledge (as we have already noticed, when closing our sketch of the system of Locke) by making the truth of all our convictions in the last instance to depend on impressions conveyed by the senses, and thereby on external experience. On this supposition we should neither be able to rely on any one thing with unshaken confidence, nor find within the whole range of our consciousness any one point which we could call stable or firm. Every thing in that variegated succession of

representations would pass on before us, and in us, without law or order, as if it were some continued juggle without any definite purpose. A system such as that would prevent us from inferring with certainty the existence of order and connection even in the world around us. Far less then could we rise with aught like confidence to the contemplation of that which is supersensual, such as the idea of God, of liberty, or of immortality. Such ideas could only be deemed fictions of our imagination, as neither proceeding from impressions made on the senses, nor warranted by observation of external objects.

It is indeed matter of fact that we are possessed of varied knowledge, representations, and ideas; but is there anything actually existing which corresponds to these our representations? Or, again, granting that such actually exists, are our representations exactly conformable to these external objects? A moment’s reflection will suffice to convince us that many, yea that the great majority, of sensuous representations cannot be said to be conformable to that which actually exists, in the manner in which this is commonly thought to be the case. Could it, for example, be said of colours, which are caused by the refraction of light, or of sounds, which are caused by vibrations of the air, that they have any actual existence out of ourselves? Are they not colours and sounds merely in our eyes or in our ears? Still farther, is it not evident that the sweetness or bitterness, the cold or heat, which we feel, are only the subjective conditions of our own selves? No person could imagine that sweetness has any existence separate from his tongue or from his organ of taste, or that the sense of cold is aught else, than his body being affected, or related in a certain manner. It is indeed true, that our being thus affected may owe its origin to something definite in nature, but that which at the time we perceive, on and in ourselves, is only the relation in which we ourselves stand to these powers in nature. What these properties of nature are in themselves, i.e. separate from our sensations, we are in the meantime wholly ignorant. The question then to which we have first of all to reply is still with reference to the origin of our representations. What is really their source? Are they produced in us and by our own understanding—something external being the occasion; or are they at least in part, really so caused by outward objects as to be perfectly con-
formable to them, and to present a true portraiture of these objects? Again, assuming the latter, how are we to convince ourselves, and to attain to the certainty that such is actually the case? Where are we to find a guarantee for it?

You perceive that this is the fundamental question, which necessarily precedes all further metaphysical inquiry. According to Locke, all our ideas may, in the last instance, be traced back to external objects. From these ideas the mind forms its general notions. Of these general notions our judgments, conclusions, all our logic, yea, ultimately our whole mode (system) of thinking and believing, is made up. The whole system depends then in the last instance on the foundation, viz. the correctness of the impressions conveyed to us by the senses. If any supposition cannot be traced to such an impression, both that supposition and all the conclusions drawn therefrom are merely so many fictions. To adduce an example: the fact, that there is a general connection existing between the objects and events around us, and hence, also, a general concatenation of causes and effects, we know only because we are able to point to such a connection in that which actually exists, and because we have ourselves frequently experienced it.

It was more especially this proposition which David Hume\(^1\) subjected to a searching examination. Do we actually see the connection between the two objects or appearances, of which the one is designated as the cause and the other as the effect? Obviously the answer must be, We do not. Not only does the internal connection, the hidden and mysteriously-operating power escape our observation, but we are at a loss to find any ground which, in every phenomenon we behold, should reveal to our understanding with certainty and necessity that cause which in every instance lies concealed. We are utterly unable to discover the cause of many thousand, yea, of the vast majority of, phenomena which we observe in nature. Still we always assign to them a cause, although it be one unknown to us. We say that nothing can happen without the operation of a cause, and appeal in proof to a law of the understanding, viz. that of the sufficient cause. But

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\(^1\) His principal philosophical work is "The Treatise of Human Nature," &c. London, 1738. 3 vols. 8vo.; re-cast, it appeared, as "Enquiry concerning Human Understanding." London, 1748 (contained also in his Essays, and translated into German by Tennemann.)
how can our reasonings be correct, if we arrogate to ourselves the power of transferring to the operations of nature the laws of our understanding? Above we had allowed, that our understanding is to own merely the certainty and reality of such things as, in the last instance, can be referred to experience; and surely we may reverse that proposition now, not by conceding to the understanding the power of prescribing to experience that, which the former à priori has declared to be true. Inasmuch then, as neither external nor internal perception reveals to us those hidden powers which operate in secret, it follows, that the law of cause and effect must have originally been derived by abstraction from the succession in time in which events usually take place. Thus we have become instinctively accustomed to assume the existence of a real and regular connection in what we see going on from day to day. But this supposed connection is neither necessary nor certain; for we observe fully as frequently irregularities in the ordinary course of nature. If then the general validity of this law, which is said to admit of no exception, were made to depend only on experience, it could not but appear fictions. For had we observed, even from the very beginning of history, the strictest regularity in the succession of certain events—such as, that the sun rose every morning—we would not be warranted to infer, from the repetition of the same phenomenon for thousands of years, the necessity of its continuing the same way in all time to come. Is it not conceivable at least that at one time the sun may not make his appearance at the hour when we usually expect his rising? Experience, at any rate, will not suffice to prove the impossibility of such an event.
LECTURE SECOND.

(KANT.)

In order to become sure of the truth of our representations, it was above all things necessary to make ourselves acquainted with their origin. Even Locke had felt called upon to make the attempt of inquiring into their origin; and thus to enter upon a criticism which, however different, yea, and opposite in its results, bore in its tendency the closest possible resemblance to the later undertaking, which is identified with the name of Kant. While Kant endeavoured, as we shall find in the sequel, to prove the certainty of outward objects from the subjective laws of thinking (the subjective necessity or requirements of thinking), Locke had, on the contrary, deduced the laws (the necessity) of thinking from these objects. Representations, which have not been called into existence by our own activity, must have been produced by outward objects. There are then of necessity outward objects, and those conformable to our representations, which are their portraiture, inasmuch as both the existence and contents of the representations would else be inexplicable. Our representations then are only truthful, if and in so far as they owe their origin to outward objects, and are not produced by ourselves. If we are to arrive at the knowledge of truth, our thinking must be strictly conformed to outward objects; and the impressions of these have to be carefully preserved from change, by, or the addition of, any element of our own. Such were the views of Locke.

Starting from the same principle, Hume proceeded to shew, that by these impressions we are only informed of the co-existence and the succession of objects. These individual impressions are distinct and definite, and must carefully be distinguished from each other. But we have no impression whatever of any essential con-
uction subsisting between them. Yet such would, according to the rule above quoted, be requisite in order to assure us of the reality of such a connection. Those powers, the existence of which we assume, and which we consider as the secret causes from which effects proceed, are after all only the creatures of our own imagination. In fact they are only proof and confession that we are unacquainted with the source of the phenomena. Cause, effect, and power are all ideas, which have no objective signification and meaning. Experience furnishes us only with the simple elements, which our memory strings and connects to each other. Hence, the connection which is usually designated as causality, is simply the result of habit, and owes its origin to the operation of our memory. As it does not originate in any thing objective, being only our own subjective addition to phenomena, it wants also necessarily all objective validity.

We know nothing, then, of general or necessary laws which fix the connection of things, or regulate the course of events in the world; all our calculations and expectations are hence based on a groundless supposition. Where certainty is necessarily out of the question, we are at best reduced to a greater or smaller amount of probability, according to the analogy afforded by series of events which frequently recur. Besides, how often does experience itself confute the supposition formerly referred to. How often does the course of events, breaking through all rule, subvert both all our assumed laws and the calculations to which they have given rise. But if it be impossible to discern the existence of a causal connection between empirical objects, how much less may we expect to trace it, as existing between those objects and a super-sensual cause? It is evident, then, that we are not warranted in inferring from them the existence of a Divine cause.

Thus we see how this scepticism undermined the very foundations of all philosophy, inasmuch as all argumentation and reasoning is at an end, where the necessary connection of individual things amongst themselves is denied, and a fathomless uncertainty takes the place of objective knowledge.

Hume had thus shaken Locke’s empiricism to its very foundations. Yet Hume occupied all the while the same ground as Locke, and by means of empiricism dealt that fatal blow to empiricism. Kant belonged at first to a school of metaphysics—
that of Wolf—which had incorporated the sensationalism of Locke into the system of Leibnitz. The philosopher of Königsberg, therefore, could not but feel that his own views were attacked and endangered by the speculations of Hume. This induced him to trace the matter to its source. For a long time he wrote nothing of importance in Philosophy. At last, in the year 1781, appeared his most celebrated production, the *Critick of Pure Reason*—a work matured in retirement, and destined to form an era in the history of philosophical inquiry.¹

While Locke and Hume had critically examined the origin of individual representations, and traced them to their source in experience, Kant, on the contrary, made the origin of experience itself the object of critical inquiry (investigation.) So vast an enlargement of the philosophical horizon would of itself prove that Kant occupied a much more elevated position than his predecessors. He fully understood, that empiricism, if once acknowledged as the foundation and principle of all certitude, must infallibly open the way for scepticism. Hume's objections, which had been drawn from that source, were therefore not to be set aside. On the contrary, Kant accepted them and acknowledged the correctness of the fundamental principle of that sceptic, that experience leaves us altogether uninformed on the subject of causation, or of the existence of any necessary connection in nature. But, while accepting this view, he made use of it in a manner totally new and unexpected. He found in it proof negative of an ideal and subjective certainty. "I am free to own," says he, "that David Hume was the first to rouse me from my dogmatical slumber, and to give a new turn (direction) to my inquiries on the subject of speculative Philosophy. Not that Hume brought light into that department of knowledge, but he struck a spark at which a flame might have been kindled, had it fallen on material susceptible of ignition, and had its burning been carefully maintained, and fanned to greater intensity." It is quite true that causality is a notion which we bring along with us and add to the phenomena, laying it as it were into them. This notion, then, is not an abstraction from experience, from

¹ In a letter to Moses Mendelssohn, he says: that "this result of the reflection of a period extending over at least twelve years, has been committed to paper in about four or five months, with every attention to its contents indeed, but as it were with the rapidity of flying, and with less attention to the diction of it, or to aiding the reader to understand it with ease."
a multitude of instances perhaps, and according to analogy; but mark, this leads us to a conclusion the very opposite of that at which Hume arrived. Hume argued, that the above notion could not be universally and necessarily valid, as owing its origin to our own selves, and not to things objective. But the very reverse holds true. Had it been drawn from experience, it would have been purely contingent, and devoid both of necessity and of universality; for experience varies with individuals and circumstances, and can at no time attain to that degree which we term perfection. Then only, can a notion be universal and necessary, when it arises from the constitution of our minds, from our reason—which is one, and is universal and common to all mankind. Experience is the product of two factors. In as far as it is produced by that factor—the laws common to human reason—it is necessary, universally valid, and removed from all contingency. It is in this manner that Philosophy meets a Scepticism, which would call in question the possibility of every science of universal validity. Hence also the celebrated passage in the preface to the second edition of the Critick of Pure Reason—"Hitherto it had been assumed that all our knowledge must take its direction from (be regulated by) outward objects. But by this supposition every attempt was rendered void to decide à priori by means of conceptions, to make out something, respecting these objects, and thus to enlarge our knowledge. Let it therefore be tried, whether, in the problems of Metaphysics, we shall not meet with better success, by assuming that these objects must be regulated by (take their direction from) our cognition. This would already accord better with the desired possibility of an à priori cognition of them, the which was to decide something with respect to objects, before they were actually furnished to us. The same takes place in the case under consideration, as in that of the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, unable to make way in the explanation of the motions of heavenly bodies on the supposition that the whole firmament turned round the spectator, tried whether it might not answer better, if he left the spectator to turn, and the stars at rest."

This explanation furnishes us in fact with an outline of that idealistic revolution, which, in its consequences, was of no less importance to Philosophy than that of Copernicus had been to Astronomy. It originated with Kant, was perfected by Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel, and is in our own days again brought back by Schelling to that point from which Kant started. We are not at present in circumstances either to determine the grounds of this retrogression, or to say, whether it had at all become necessary; thus far, however, are we even at present able to discern, that the Philosophy of Kant rests on two principles—the one idealistic and subjective, the other empirical and objective. But why did Kant, who declared it to be a fundamental truth that all Scepticism owes its origin to Empiricism, receive into his Philosophy once more that dangerous element of Empiricism side by side with the Idealism which he had so recently proclaimed?

Were the alternative proposed to our philosopher to decide, whether the thinking subject produces all that world of phenomena merely out of himself, or whether he receives it from objects without, he would reply, that neither of these two by itself would be sufficient, but that both had to co-operate for the purpose. From out of our understanding we bring and add the connections and the relations of the individual elements—and this he calls the form, while what is termed the matter of our sensations—that is, their material,—the elements of their contents, are furnished by the objects without us. Accordingly, it must be said that, if no external objects were existing, no phenomena could take place: and again, that, if there were no understanding to apprehend them—if these phenomena found no common uniting point in man—if there also they came and went loose and without any connection—then all experience would become impossible. Therefore, in case or if phenomena are actually present, they must submit to take their mould and direction from the laws of the understanding, if we are to possess any connected experience, or in general, any knowledge. But it is impossible to prove à priori by any law of our understanding, that both such phenomena and objects at the foundation of these phenomena do actually exist. À priori, we can only say how every possible experience will be constituted if it take place, (its quo modo); but not whether and that it actually exists (the quod). À priori, the notions only, and not the actual existence of objects,—their "essentia,"—only can be conceived; while, on the contrary, their "existentia" can never be proved à priori. "It is impossible to cull from the mere representation of an object its actual existence."
Here then we have before us the other and non-idealistic element in the philosophy of Kant. However the latter may appear to be the one which is alone real and certain, it is capable of indubitably informing us of truth only in those particular instances in which it is both present, and its presence is felt. But such truth can extend no further than the perception itself, or, in other words, only to the contingent existence of some definite finite object. This empirical element cannot, however, by itself convey to us any thing universal and necessary—any law. Though our experience were ever so long continued, were it ever so matured, it would still be possible—at least we might conceive such a case—that all of a sudden the very opposite of what we had hitherto observed might take place, as has been shewn when we adduced the example with reference to the rising of the sun. That which is to be immovably true—absolutely necessary and universally valid with and for all mankind—must depend on nought else than the original constitution and the laws of our understanding. Hence also, for example, the propositions in Mathematics are of such cogent certainty, not because they are abstractions from forms and relations in nature, but on the contrary, only because they rest on the subjective requirements of our thinking (the subjective laws of our understanding). It is impossible to foretell what may and will yet take place in nature. The only thing which we may know with certainty bears reference to the manner in which mankind will in all time coming view that nature, and what laws—speaking in general—they will there discover in operation—that is, as long as man shall remain man or retain the same constitution of understanding and reason. If this constitution is once coguized (known), we shall also be able to anticipate what man will henceforth and for ever look upon as true and certain. If—to illustrate what we mean by an example,—we were to compare the manner of conceiving things, common to all men, to an eyeglass ground or coloured in a certain way in the possession of which all men enter into the world, and were then to call this glass the constitution of the human mind, we would know for certain that all who looked through it could only perceive outward objects in that and in no other way; and every one of us—a philosopher for instance—might then infer, from his own manner of perceiving, how those that are like him will of necessity contemplate the same nature. It is
therefore from the subjective constitution of the mind alone that we are able, notwithstanding all the diversity and uncertainty of the individual events of experience, to determine what, as soon as they do take place, all mankind without exception must, necessarily and universally, look upon as truth.

Truth and certainty then are made to depend, not so much on the conformity of representations to their objects, as on the universality and necessity of certain representations and modes of representation with reference to the understanding of man in general. To be sure we are, according to Kant, only able to know how all mankind must necessarily represent to themselves certain things, and not whether these representations are perfectly conformable to the objects to which they are to correspond. Man must, however, remain satisfied with a certainty which pronounces what for him and the like of him must ever be irrefragably certain. And after all, what more do we require? True, man only knows how things appear to him. He merely possesses, and is cognizant of, their phenomena (appearances)—as it were, only the reflection of external objects in the mirror of his soul—refracted in many ways in its passage. He is only from his own side acquainted with the relation subsisting between himself and things without; he knows merely how himself stands related to objects, and not what those objects are in themselves, and irrespective of this relation, or how they may be constituted. For however we attempt it, and through the medium of whichever of our senses we endeavour to get into contact with objects, we always see and feel them only through the medium of our senses. Now, one sense may indeed serve to rectify the impressions of another sense, and thus the organ of touch, for example, may assist in this way that of sight; but we can never traverse the boundary of our senses, nor pass through them out of ourselves, nor draw the outward objects themselves immediately into our consciousness. We are not indeed to attempt to demonstrate the non-existence of objects in themselves, which beyond the possibility of contradiction make impressions on our senses; but we know nothing more about them than that they exist, and are the cause of the sensations of which at the time we are conscious. But of the objects themselves we possess nothing beyond those sensations, which are purely subjective, not indeed in the sense of being arbitrarily called forth,
but as being, so far as their character is concerned, really nothing else than certain conditions of our soul.

Having taken as it were this preliminary survey of the system of Kant, we deem it necessary, ere proceeding to a further investigation of its most important points, to premise that in the following sketch we propose strictly to adhere to Kant's own views. We shall carefully guard from mixing with it anything, however often it passes for the teaching of Kant, that dates in truth from his disciples and successors, more especially from the farther development of his practical philosophy, and the combination of the ideas of Kant and Jacobi.

The manner in which Kant proceeded in his critical inquiry may also be taken as one of its characteristics, indicating as it does the aim and end which in all his speculations he kept steadily in view. His criticism was, according to his own statement, aimed against everything like Dogmatism in Philosophy. By dogmatism we understand in general both all propounding and all receiving of tenets, merely from habit, without thought or examination, or, in other words, upon the authority of others—in short, the very opposite of critical investigation. All assertions for which no proof is offered are dogmatical. But Kant had at the same time the philosophical system of his day, viz. the metaphysics of Wolf, more particularly in view. True, this philosophy did not proceed on any proposition which had no other claim than that of authority; but it grounded on Mathematics and Logic as the method and organon of knowledge, and that, without having first of all investigated the claim to authority, or measured the extent (circuit) of these sciences themselves. But were it found, as on critical inquiry it actually proved to be, that such methods are only applicable to that which is finite—to that world of phenomena in time and space which falls within the range of our senses,—then the very attempt to extend this method beyond the boundary indicated, and by means thereof also to contemplate and comprehend that which is above mere sensation, would at the same time render sensuous (sensational) that which is supersensuous (supersensual), and finite that which is infinite. This manner of viewing the subject therefore would either lead us into contradictions, or else nothing infinite and unconditional would apparently exist, inasmuch as everything that might be deemed such, would ne-
cessarily resolve itself into mere phenomena—into sensuous and natural existence. Thus the road would be prepared for the advance of that dangerous Anglo-Gallic sensationalism, materialism, and naturalism; while pure theism and pure ethics would, speaking scientifically, become impossible. It was really and truly this—the cause of ethics—which impelled the philosopher of Königsberg to descend anew into those mysterious depths of speculative inquiry, not in order to prop up the hollow foundations of what had hitherto been vaunted and held up, nor to do homage to the mode of reasoning general in his days, but to oppose himself to it, and that with burnished armour and sharpened weapons.

It was with such views that Kant entered the lists against all Dogmatism, whether that of Wolf or any other. Too much weight must not be attached to that incidental statement of his, that, after investigating the means of cognition which we find within our reason, we may continue to proceed logically, or just in the same manner as before, a procedure which he designated as the introduction of Dogmatism indeed, but now in a warranted manner. For though these statements may seem to be contradictory, it must be borne in mind that to this concession he expressly attached the condition, that the speculations of our understanding be strictly confined to such things as lie within the limits of the world of phenomena. The contradiction into which he fell consists, in its wording at least, only in this, that while he professed neither to possess nor to know of any other method of cognition than the logical one—the which being only adapted to that which is finite, it follows, that what is infinite, must necessarily be beyond the reach of our ken, the existence and reality of the latter was nevertheless to become matter of certainty to us. Withal, we can readily see how, advocating the cause of ethics, Kant might have felt convinced that he had rendered fully greater service to mankind by clearly shewing the limits of our knowledge, than even by establishing the certainty of something beyond these boundary-lines. Although it were found impossible, by means of speculation, to surmount those barriers, he thought that even thereby the existence of something beyond it had been acknowledged, and that another road might yet be discovered by which to gain access thereto. Here then we have the double purpose of the Critic of Pure Reason; first, to destroy all scepticism within
the boundaries of the world of phenomena which falls within the range of sensation; and secondly, to indicate distinctly the limits beyond which every attempt at knowledge is both vain and unwarrantable.

To the first part of his task, Kant addressed himself in the following manner:—Experience brings before us, in the immediate perception, not only diversity in appearance but also this diversity as connected together in a certain manner, and thus forming things, or unities of different qualities, and again a number of these things, as in their turn connected among themselves, and forming a series of phenomena. In such a case, both the material and the form or, in other words, the connection (synthesis) are furnished (given). But these conjunctions we may at pleasure resolve into their component elements; nor do we thereby mentally perform any thing more than simply an analysis of parts, which we are again able to compound in the same way as when at the first we met them, without however thereby comprehending any thing with reference to the necessity of their co-existence (being joined) in the manner in which originally we had met them. Such necessity is then only seen and felt when we cannot conceive an object and its property or, in general, a logical subject and its predicate otherwise than as identical; as for example, "body" and "extension." The proposition, All bodies are extended, is essentially different from this other one, All bodies have gravity; insomuch as the conception of body contains in nowise that of gravity, while, on the contrary, every representation of corporeity implies that of extension also; so that, when we think of the one, we cannot but think at the same time of the other also. Such then are the essential features of the analytic judgment à priori. No difficulty or uncertainty exists here with reference to connection; in such cases it is necessary.

But those analytic judgments are merely explanatory, not amplificatory. They do not add anything to our knowledge, but only render more perspicuous what we had formerly known. But it is the grand aim of our inquiries, in a logical manner, to amplify and enlarge our knowledge beyond actual experience, yea and beyond all possible experience, even into the domain of that which can never be perceived by the senses, viz. those ideas of Liberty, of Immortality, and of a Divinity, which ever give to spe-
calculation its highest and most solemn importance. If, then, we were able to discover any means by which to render possible such amplificatory judgments à priori, and with logical certainty, we would thereby attain both the aim we had in view, and that which properly constitutes the task of philosophy. More especially, we should then perfectly understand the internal connection of things, and might perhaps even venture to hope, by and by, to bridge over the gulf which separates the province of experience from that which lies beyond its boundary.

It was with such views that Kant summed up the task of the Critick in the main question: "How are synthetical judgments à priori possible?" It will easily be seen, that, by putting this question, Kant meant, in his own peculiar way, to ask in reality nothing less than—how is any speculation possible? For what we term speculation is essentially nothing else than the eliciting of truth by means of such amplificatory judgments. To that question Kant replied in the affirmative, in as far as all within the range of possible experience was concerned; but in the negative, in reference to everything belonging to the sphere of the supersensual. The two first principal sections of the Critick, viz. the transcendental Logic and Dialectic, contain a detailed exposition of the grounds on which he arrived at this twofold conclusion. In general, they are as follows: All experience or connected consciousness would become impossible without the employment of such an à priori synthesis; but as such a thing as experience does actually exist, the supposition on which it proceeds (depends) must also be real and valid. But in every attempt to apply this synthesis to that which is supersensual, the very opposite of that result is obtained. By such procedure we not only do make no step in advance in that sphere, and do utterly fail in attaining either connection or unity in thinking, but also land ourselves in continual contradictions, and contravene all logic. The application of synthesis to these subjects must therefore be rejected.

Referring more particularly to Hume, we have, on the subject of that which lies within the range of experience, hitherto spoken only of the idea of causality, or that connection between cause and effect which, by the laws of our understanding, we feel obliged mentally to place into the phenomena around us. But this is not the only connection which we conceive we observe subsisting between the objects by
which we are surrounded. Thus, for example, they also stand related as essences and qualities (substance and accidents); and we might enumerate other modes of connection and other relations between objects, all of which have to be viewed as a transporting of our subjective laws of thinking into those objects. But it is of vast importance to us to be acquainted with all these modes of connection, in order to know exactly what portion of the different representations is due to ourselves, that is, to the activity of our own understanding, and what to sensations or to phenomena, and hence is derived from impressions by external objects. Now, according to Kant, we derive the contents, the material of the individual representations, from sensation; while the understanding furnishes the forms and relations in which they are brought into connection with each other, and are joined to the one united whole of experience.

Kant saw and felt that the most general and highest notions necessarily originate in something else than sensuous experience, and that, though in themselves only empty forms, they are yet universally necessary to all thinking and cognoscng. By this criterion of universality and necessity he conceived to have discovered (as shewn before) that they were subjective, and a priori contained in our faculty of cognition.

But these, the most general notions of relationship, such as cause and effect, substance and accident, &c. &c. must not be conceived as being ready-made, and a priori placed into man's consciousness previous to all reflection, or, in other words, as innate notions and ideas. The only thing innate to our minds are certain modes of procedure in cognizing and judging. If we actually come to know or judge any thing, we necessarily proceed to do it in that peculiar manner; and hence immediately, and, as it were, without any choice of our own, we view the things as standing related to each other, for example, as causes and effects, substances and accidents. Now we do this without any premeditation; and the child or the unthinking person, who has never for a moment reflected upon the abstract notion of these relations, proceeds in the same way as the philosopher. This manner of viewing things is simply the mode and the necessary law of our perception itself. Afterwards only, when reflection has been cultivated, and we turn our attention to the forms of our activity, we become conscious of it in abstracto, and then we designate it in language by substantives (ap-
pellatives). Our understanding itself is also capable of making these modes, the laws which regulate its own movements, the subject of observation, and of reducing them to certain abstract notions, which, however, may not be confounded with innate cognitions or ideas in the sense attached to them by Des Cartes or by Plato, but are themselves really the results (products) of abstraction on the part of our own understanding.

If we wish to be fully informed as to the character and number of these modes of connection, of which our mind is capable, and hence how many such general fundamental notions will be possible, we have (according to Kant) only to advert to the different kinds or forms of judgment with which logic makes us acquainted, inasmuch as to judge is nothing else than to connect one representation as subject with another as predicate. But logic informs us of twelve different forms or methods of judging. Hence we conclude that the mind is also able to compound the disjointed representations it possesses in twelve different ways or modes. These, then, are the original general modes of behaviour, or the laws of the understanding in its procedure. It is easy to trace them in every case. We have only to make abstraction in the different judgments, of all those things about which the judgment is pronounced, and to advert solely to the relation subsisting between the subject and the predicate. To adduce an example. We say, If it thunders, there has also been lightning. Now, this is the hypothetical form of judgment, which is evidently based on that relation, which, expressed in abstracto, is denominated that of causality—cause and effect. Again, if we say the lightning is electric, we have the categorical form of judgment. Here the relation of the subject lightning to the predicate electric is evidently that of substance and accident.

In this manner we attain by abstraction from the twelve well-known methods of judging the twelve fundamental notions of the understanding, viz. unity, plurality, and totality; affirmation, negation, and limitation; substance, causality, and reciprocity; possibility, actuality, and necessity.

On whatever subject, or in whatever way our understanding may be exercised, we cannot think otherwise than within these twelve forms or methods, which, as above indicated, may in abstracto be viewed as general relations, and, after the precedent of Aristotle, be designated categories. These indicate all the modes pos-
possible in the interconnecting (Synthesis) of thoughts. Every one of those thousand trains which, to use Goethe's words, "one step hits (strikes) in the network of our thoughts," may, according to Kant, ultimately be traced back to one of those twelve springs in the hidden mechanism of thinking.

But let us pause for a moment and look around us. Notice, the categories of which we have spoken are not laws of nature, in accordance with which external objects in nature are obliged actually to move or to act; they are merely the laws of that part of our nature which thinks, of our understanding, in accordance with which it has to proceed. They are, so to speak, the net in which the mind is entangled. Hence, these necessities imposed on our thinking (these laws of thought) or categories can only inform us how the relations in which objects stand to each other require to be thought; on that point, however, they pronounce with a universality and validity that applies to the rational thinking of all mankind, and which admits of no exception. It is in this way, as we have already noticed, that Philosophy effectually meets Scepticism.

Irrespective of those laws, which are nothing more than the methods by which alone it is possible to apprehend any given material, our understanding is, in and by itself, simply an empty and unproductive power. It only elaborates that which is furnished to it; and this material consists simply in sensuous intuitions. (Under the term "intuitions," Kant includes all kinds of perception, whether furnished by the sense of sight or by any other.) It is, however, plainly impossible, by any judgment of our understanding, to arrive at the knowledge, or to prove that objects actually exist, or what kind of objects they are. For however firm the proof, for example, that a circle is round, or that a triangle consists of three sides, it only amounts after all to this, that those figures cannot be conceived in any other way, but not that such a thing as a circle or a triangle does actually exist. The meaning of every judgment, of the categorical one as well as of the others, is only that if an x exists, then this x must also be = x, else it is impossible to conceive it at all. But to pronounce a thing conceivable is very different from saying that it really exists.

The actual existence of a thing can therefore never be proved simply by our understanding. It has to be brought forward in
and by experience, and can only be demonstrated by presupposing a phenomenon, which else would be inexplicable, or, in other words, we are always obliged to proceed empirically. It is experience we require to furnish the understanding with the material which it is to elaborate. Without this, and by itself, the understanding would remain void, merely engaged internally—i.e. with reference to its own activity, which is presented before it, as object. It requires therefore some material of actual experience to which to apply its forms, and such material the senses alone can furnish, or, as Kant calls the senses in their collective capacity, the faculty of intuition, which faculty fundamentally implies "the capability of being affected by sensuous objects."

It is matter of regret that Kant did not of set purpose address himself anew to an inquiry into the first origin of our sense-perceptions, the possibility of sensuous impressions upon the soul, the commonly entertained supposition of certain mental powers, &c. &c. On this point he took his start from those views of Locke, which were current in his days, and remained satisfied with having led negative proof of the existence of such intuitions in our minds, by shewing that the understanding is absolutely void, as long as it is simply left to itself. He treated the whole subject as transcendental, and yet, in the course of his investigations, he criticised and altered so much with reference to the original impressions, that little or nothing of them remained in the end. To quote the sentiments of Jacobi on the point: "without this commonly received view, it is impossible to enter into the system of Kant, and with it, equally so, to abide by that system. For, however opposed to the spirit of Kant's philosophy it may seem to declare of outward objects, that they make impressions on the senses, and thus produce representations, we are nevertheless at a loss to perceive how, without such a supposition, the philosophy of Kant could have found an access into itself, or have ever attained the length of propounding its peculiar doctrinal notions." ¹

Without investigating into the nature of consciousness, which in reality was the most important subject of inquiry—a defect which Carl Leonhard Reinhold was the first to feel, and to attempt remedying by his theory of the representational faculty—Kant accepted the notion of consciousness just as he found it, and only

¹ In the Appendix to the Conversation on Idealism and Realism. Works, vol. ii. p. 303.
enquired what portion of the contents, which are actually met in our consciousness, was sensuous and empirical, and what subjective and à priori. The origin of the latter he traced to the constitution of the mind; every thing besides was to be derived from external objects alone, and with reference to this our understanding is simply “receptive.” In every perception, receptivity and spontaneity are inseparably connected and co-operate together. The former furnishes the material, the latter the form of all experience.¹

But to return to our former question. Should we then wish to ascertain what portion of our representations is due to the one, and what to the other factor, or, in other words, to separate from that which is objective, that which subjectively we ourselves add thereto, in order to view the objective by itself, and so to speak with perfect truthfulness as it really is—a peculiar difficulty at once occurs to us, inasmuch as any pure or immediate apprehending by the consciousness of that which is furnished from without is perfectly impossible, without at the same time clothing in a subjective form what is thus furnished, with and in the very act of apprehending it. That such is the case, with reference to what are called the secondary qualities of objects (to which we have already alluded), such as heat, cold, colour, taste, &c. &c. requires no further demonstration. The primary qualities then (as they are termed), such as size, extension, duration, &c., at the knowledge of which we arrive mathematically, remain alone to be discussed.

But if, in the case under consideration, we apply Kant’s criterion of a-priority to the sphere of intuition, just as formerly we did with reference to that of the understanding, and hence arrive at the conclusion that, in intuition also, everything which possesses the characteristics of universality and necessity is only an à priori and subjective addition thereto, we shall feel obliged to deduct in this case also the form common to all sensuous objects, viz. time and space, from the material (contents) objectively furnished to us.

All attributes (determinations) then which refer to space and time, such as magnitude, situation, relative duration, succession,
are subjective additions—what we subjectively attach—but do not exist in the things themselves. The moment we experience by means of intuition any perception, we feel constrained to place it in a given space, and in a given time. These are the general forms of intuition existing in the soul, without which no intuition whatever would be possible. Being the conditions which precede the possibility of experiencing any perception, they must of necessity have been furnished à priori, and can no more than those general categories of the understanding be merely abstractions from experience. Space and time are the categories of sensibility which, although existing originally in the soul, are not to be looked upon, any more than the categories of the understanding, as ready-made notions, but as the modes in which the soul behaves (itself) when in a state of intuition. Kant does not, however, call them categories but general schemata, or forms of sensuous intuition, in order to distinguish them from those of the understanding.

The whole aspect and contents, the whole appearance of objects, as presented to our internal vision, is hence subjective, as far as its qualities are concerned, and we have nothing which we may consider as being the quality of the object in and by itself. What then is left us of all our sensations, of that material, which had as empirical been assumed? We answer, that, although neither the senses nor the understanding can in any way inform us about the real nature of those objects in and by themselves, with which we only become acquainted as in time and space, yet it is evident that we have on every occasion first to be informed, that these objects are present, and do actually exist before we can possibly be cognisant of the fact. Everything, indeed, is for us only phenomenon or appearance; but the fact that such a phenomenon is present, in other words, the existence or non-existence of a phenomenon or appearance, must be furnished to us à posteriori. The objects which we are to assume must exercise an influence upon us in so far, as to manifest their presence to us. However much or little the apparitions within us may correspond to outward objects, they have nevertheless to be called forth by something definite from without, even though it were brought about in a manner analogous to that in which the finger by its touch wakes from the chords the slumbering sounds. But let us keep by an illustra-
tion of which Kant himself makes use. Even according to the view generally adopted, the bright colouring of the rainbow will be viewed as merely a phenomenon with respect to ourselves, and in our own vision; while the raindrops are considered the actual and real outward object, which lies at the foundation of that phenomenon or appearance. But, if we consider that these drops are themselves again only empirical phenomena, then their round form itself, yea, and the very space also in which they fall, are nothing in themselves, but merely the modification or principle (foundation) of our sensuous intuition, while the object itself remains all the time wholly unknown to us. To add another illustration. Let us imagine that we look into a kaleidoscope. As you turn it round and round, you always perceive new shapes and figures. Yet the little coloured objects within the kaleidoscope remain always the same. Full well do we know, when we see now a rose and then a star, that the peculiar appearances presented in the arrangement and combination is not objectively such, and only due to the manner in which the glasses are placed, or in fact ultimately to the construction of our organ, (in this case = understanding). But supposing we surrender the combinations, are the elements at least which are combined, those little objects themselves, their colour, size, and nature, actually such as we beheld it? By no means. It has already been proven, that, with reference to colour, and in general the "qualitates secundarie," nought can be predicated of those objects beyond appearance (apparition, apparency), and, with reference to what appears to be objectively the most certain about them, such as magnitude, shape, number, &c., in a word, their mathematical qualities, without which they cannot be conceived to exist at all, these are on that very ground the more clearly shewn to be à-priorical and subjective. If then, at the close of what Kant terms Aesthetic (the doctrine of sensuous intuition), we again put the question, what portion of our perception is due to the objects themselves? the only answer which can be returned is, that nothing beyond the existence of a definite perception at a certain time and in a certain space, its now and its here, is derived from the objects themselves. The import of this mere "existence" without any definite cognition of that which exists, will appear in the sequel.

1 Crit. of Pure Reason, 1st ed. p. 45.
With these conclusions, which can scarcely be termed very satisfactory, we now turn from the consideration of the senses and of the understanding, to that of reason, the highest faculty of our souls, if possible to find there a more even and direct road.¹

Before entering on this subject, we feel it specially incumbent once more to remind you that we shall endeavour to expound the views of Kant, on the notions of reason or ideas, in strict accordance with his own teaching, and to avoid all those variations which they afterwards underwent under his successors, from a desire on their part to bring the import of these ideas, in a practical point of view, into accordance with the theory of their origin and logical use.

Kant himself employed the term reason both in a wider and in a stricter acceptation. In the more extended sense he applied it to our whole faculty of cognition. Thus, he termed his general investigation of that faculty, a Critick of Pure Reason. But, in the stricter acceptation of the term, a distinction is made between reason and understanding, and a distinct line of demarcation drawn between the two. This separation is not, however, so strictly attended to by Kant's followers in our own days. According to his view, the understanding is, in the strictest sense of the term, that faculty which, by its laws and regulations, brings order and connection into our sense-perceptions. Reason, on the contrary, in the strictest acceptation of the term, is that faculty which, by its laws, infuses again unity and connection into the varied application of the understanding.

The latter is accomplished by grounding the judgments of the understanding upon still higher principles, or, in other words, by drawing conclusions. In this view of the matter, the province assigned to reason is that of a faculty of concluding; this is what Kant terms the formal use of reason. Just as the understanding or faculty of judgment may also become conscious of the laws and forms which regulate its activity, and may reduce them to abstract notions or categories; so reason also, or the faculty of conclusion, may also become conscious of the rules and forms of such concluding, and may apprehend and represent them as abstract notions of a higher kind, i.e. as ideas, which serve the same purpose to reason, as the categories to the understand-

ing. These ideas of reason are just the very goal which the understanding had in view in all its aims, inasmuch as they exhibit to it the unconditioned—that absolute perfectness, the attainment of which is aimed after in human knowledge, and which the understanding, confined as it is to objects of experience, could never have discovered within its own empirical province. Every one of the judgments of our understanding, such as, for example, gold cannot be resolved or decomposed, remains ungrounded, and hence insufficient for the aim of our reason after perfect knowledge, till we discover the proposition which contains the ground of that assertion, and prefix it to the judgment in the form of a conclusion. To return to our example, we now say: all elementary substances are unresolvable—gold is an elementary substance—therefore gold is unresolvable. Perhaps the major proposition, all elementary substances are unresolvable, might in turn have again to be demonstrated, and a still higher and more general principle sought for it, and so on, till at last we arrived at a highest and immediately certain truth. This logical process, viewed in general, will be found to imply a tendency on the part of our faculty of cognition after attaining perfectness, the unconditional, or after absoluteness in all our knowledge.¹

Now, just as the number of categories of the understanding corresponds to that of the modes of connection between subject and predicate, so there are also as many ideas as we have ways of connecting together our judgments into conclusions, or forms of conclusion. But there are three such forms: the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive, in all which we proceed forwards by syllogisms. These three are then the methods of proceeding, and indicate the tendency of thinking after perfectness and absoluteness in knowledge, the realisation of which is sought in three different ways: the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive. In the categorical, this is done by aiming after perfectness of connection according to the logical relationship of subject and predicate (or substance and accident). In the hypothetical, the same is done by attaining to perfectness according to the relationship of ground and consequence; and in the disjunctive, according to

the relationship of parts and a whole. Reduce this threefold perfectness to abstract notions, and designate each by a substantive, and you have, in the first-mentioned case, that of the absolute substance or subject; in the second, that of absolute union or dependence of every single thing in a whole; and in the third case, that of the absolute idea and perfection of all possibility. Were we now to attempt transferring into reality that subjective tendency of reason after perfection which in this case it contemplates as its laws, and constitutes the goal for the activity of an understanding, which would else lose itself in single things, on the ground that, as it were, it gives to understanding its direction towards a definite end, and hence conceive these categories of reason realised, in the same manner as formerly we might have taken the categories of the understanding for the qualities of nature itself; we should then find in them, (1.) The idea of an absolute subject (which we specially conceive as the immortal soul.) (2.) The idea of nature or world (the totality of all conditions and phenomena); and (3.) The most perfect being, the Divinity, the ens realissimum, which is the absolute idea of all realities, or, in other words, excludes all negation and all defect. These three ideas would furnish then the principles for the three divisions of Metaphysics, viz. for a rational Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology; thus laying the foundation of a true metaphysics. But proof is first of all requisite to shew that these ideas which originally only indicate the forms and laws regulating the exercise of our reason, may also on that ground be with propriety referred to essences which actually exist, or, in other words, that, besides their logical and formal use in drawing conclusions (as indicated above), they also admit of what is termed a material application in theory. Practical Philosophy may indeed apply them in this manner. Hence those ideas become causality in our conduct, and stand forth as the ideals of virtue, justice, &c. On the farther development of this subject we may not however at present enter.

If we now continue our investigations into the relationship between reason and understanding, we find Kant himself distinctly propounding the twofold question thus (Crit. 1st edit. p. 305):—

"Can Reason be isolated (from the understanding), and would it in that case be itself still the source of notions and judgments, originating purely in reason, and by which it would stand in connec-
tion with objects (peculiar and exclusively cognisable by reason)"

The reply is as follows:—Reason is readily seen to be a separate faculty, different from the understanding, whose immediate concern is with sensibility, while that of Reason, on the contrary, is with the understanding, and hence the former may also be separated or isolated. While the understanding has experience assigned to it, Reason has only to do with itself, with rational thinking itself, and is exclusively occupied in perfecting our subjective consciousness. This will appear yet more distinctly if we compare and distinguish the objects with which each of the two faculties is engaged in its own sphere. The understanding has its notions and judgments, all of which are designed according to its categories. Properly and in themselves these are the subjective laws of thinking, which may and should, however, expressly and exclusively be applied to experience, and depend on the sense-world for confirmation and material. Reason, on the contrary, has to do with ideas, i. e. those representations which, as Reason knows and proclaims, do not derive their objects from any sensuous experience, but are purely the productions and syntheses of reason itself, and the correctness or incorrectness of which experience can neither confirm nor disclose. "Reason," says Kant, "is here occupied with itself alone, and ruminates on its own notions. All pure cognitions of the understanding have this peculiarity, that its notions are furnished in experience, and its principles may be confirmed in the same way. But the transcendent cognitions of reason are, with respect to their ideas, neither given in experience, nor can their propositions be either confirmed or refuted by experience. Hence any error also which may possibly here creep in, can only be discovered by pure reason."

The distinction then, which is often made between notion and idea, as if the former were due to experience, while the latter was an à priori cognition of supersensual objects, is not in agreement with the views of Kant. Neither of these two is due to experience—neither of them à priori ready-made, and given as abstract perception, or innate, in the consciousness. It is simply our

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1 The original is "sinnen-welt," world of sense, all that is sensuous,—that world and in the world which falls within the range of sensation.

2 Crit. p. 303 and fwg.; Prolog. 556, and fllwg.
original mental activity within its own definite forms and modes which is thus given, of which innate modes or laws in abstracto we form a notion or idea.

Thus Kant conceived he had irrefragably established, that, while we possessed indeed a faculty distinct from and higher than the understanding, and which had its own representations differing from the notions of the understanding, it was in no case possible to apply them to actual or real existence. Yea more, unlike the à priori notions of the understanding, they are incapable of being even established by any other means, and are in fact projected (planned) by Reason in the full consciousness that there is no correspondence between them and any object in actual existence. Kant himself considered it therefore the greatest service he had rendered to metaphysics to have pointed out the difference between the notions of the understanding and the ideas of Reason, inasmuch as the former have ever to be applied to experience, while the latter admit of no such application, which could only give rise to absurdities and contradictions in metaphysics.

After all then, Reason, in the sense of Kant, is only a purely formal and logical faculty of reflection in a higher power. Confined to these limits, there is really no essential difference between reason and understanding, just as ideas are, in their origin and application, nothing else than the highest notions formed by abstraction and reflection of the subjective activity of our faculty of thinking. For to what purpose, let us ask, does Reason project its ideas? and what use may, in the theory of cognition, be made of them? According to Kant, the latter is entirely confined to a regulative (not a constitutive) application to the tendency on the part of the activity of our understanding towards a knowledge which is to be more and more perfected, not without but within its own proper sphere, that of experience—a goal, let it be observed, which the understanding should ever seek to attain, though these efforts must ever remain unsuccessful. In the preface to his Critick of the Faculty of Judging, he expresses himself in the following manner:—"No other faculty than the understanding can, in the province of knowledge, furnish us with constitutive principles of cognition à priori, and the Critick (of Theoretical Reason) allows nothing to remain except what the understanding prescribes à priori as law to nature, and as the sum and contents of phenomena.
All other pure conceptions it relegates among the ideas which, though lying beyond our theoretical faculty of knowledge, are not therefore useless, or may be dispensed with. As regulative principles, they keep the dangerous pretensions of the understanding within proper bounds, and serve also to direct the latter towards a principle of perfection in the contemplating of nature, whereby though that perfection can never be attained, yet the ultimate purpose of all knowledge is promoted. What in general terms we designate as the Critick of Pure Reason, secures hence an undisturbed but sole (exclusive) propriety against all other rivals properly to the understanding, which has its own peculiar province, and that in the faculty of cognition, as containing constitutive principles of cognition à priori. Likewise has Reason, which contains constitutive principles à priori only with reference to the appetive faculty, had its proper province assigned to it."

But in fact the above demarcation renders it very difficult to say, whether reason dictates laws to the understanding, or stands in subservience to it. True, reason gives to the understanding its direction, but the latter in turn forbids reason to arrogate to itself any independent cognition in the sphere of actual existence. On the one hand, Reason is elevated above understanding, and prescribes regulative principles to it, by pointing to the goal for which it is to make, and at the same time to the boundaries beyond which it is not to pass, rendering it impossible to reach that goal itself. On the other hand, the understanding, which possesses the only instrument by which we can attain to cognitions of any objective validity, forbids reason to imagine that its ideas are something actually existing, and charges it with roving, whenever it unwarrantably presumes to attempt arriving independently and by itself at any knowledge. Hence Jacobi expresses himself with much pertinency on the subject in his work on the undertaking of Criticism to bring Reason to reason.1 "According to the treatise of peace drawn up by Kant, the following agreement has been entered into between the two. Reason is to forbid to the understanding all power of denying, and understanding to reason all power of affirming. Reason is to acknowledge and respect the understanding, and to be kept by it within positive limits. But the limitation of the understanding by reason is only to appearance and nega-

Op. iii. p. 82.
tive; and the former without surrendering its own peculiar activity, employs the ideas of reason for the purpose of enlarging as much as possible its own province. Reason occupies the upper, understanding the lower house. It is the latter which represents sensibility—the real seat of sovereignty, without the ratification of which nothing can possess any validity."

But, in order to prove that ideas cannot be applied to really existing objects, it was not sufficient to have shewn that they had a subjective origin. Such had also been traced in the categories of the understanding. It was necessary to prove, moreover, that the results of such an application of our reason were altogether insufficient and unsatisfactory. This task Kant undertook in the section which he terms the Dialectick of Reason. But that its use can only be formal and for logical purposes, will at once be rendered evident by the fact that contradictions and false conclusions immediately make their appearance, whenever objective truth is ascribed to these ideas; or in other words, whenever we conceive what they indicate as actually existing objects.

It will readily be seen that the very first of these ideas—the conception of substance (in the sense in which it was generally received, among others also by the Wolfian School), is nothing else than an empty logical notion of relationship which bears reference to the act of synthesis itself. Commonly every object is viewed indeed as a definite essence (substance) possessed of various qualities (accidents). Salt, for example, is a substance of cubical form, definite hardness, gravity, and white colour. But if we abstract from that essence these five (or more) qualities, which are conceived as inherent to it, and then ask ourselves what is now left, we shall find that, together with the accidents, everything else, yea the substance itself, has also vanished. Thus we perceive that what was designated as the substance meant really nothing else than the summing up and comprehending together, the synthesis of all these qualities in our consciousness, and not something out of it, constituting as it were their hidden substratum. The same takes place with it as with a whole, which disappears whenever the parts of which it consists are removed. There is only one essence which seems to be an exception to this rule, and where we apparently retain a pure subject and a real substance, even after abstraction is made of all the accidents. We refer
to the soul of man. Conceptions, feelings, &c. &c., in short everything which passes before or in the soul are its accidents. But as all these are only modifications and changes of the soul, itself must really exist and lie at the foundation, if these movements are to take place. Here then have we found, as it would appear, a real and pure subject, and that in ourselves, in our consciousness—a subject, moreover, be it remarked, which is immediately conscious of its own personality, identity, &c. &c. But according to Kant, more mature reflection will convince us that the fancied reality of this subject rests upon a conclusion which, although inevitable, is after all only a delusive one (a paralogism). We say that this conclusion is inevitable, inasmuch as in all accidents, changes, and determinations, we feel constrained to assume the presence of something which is undergoing change. Yet withal it is a wrong conclusion, inasmuch as we only arrive at the consciousness of mere modifications in this thinking and feeling subject. Be it observed that we never become conscious of this subject, or of the substance of the soul in and by itself, and that we only know its modifications, its varying feelings and thoughts—in a word, its accidents. The subject itself remains always entirely unknown, and is never the object of internal, far less of external, experience. The assumption of its existence, therefore, rests entirely on a conclusion of reason, which, however, is at the same time a fallacious conclusion of reason. The same then applies to this subject as to every other. We know as little of the essence of our souls as of that of material objects. If we abstract all our thoughts, feelings, &c., in short all the accidents, nothing remains beyond a void, a mere logical summing up of contents, which imports no more than the comprehending together in the consciousness of all those accidents; or, as Kant has it, is that form of apperception which cleaves to all experience, and accompanies it as the thought, "I think." But (continues he) though it be necessary to assume a common subject for the functions of thinking, which subject we call the Me, yet is it in itself only the thought of an abstract something, and with respect to its essence, altogether beyond the reach of ken. All the conclusions, therefore, by which immateriality, incorruptibility, personality, immortality, &c. &c. are attributed to it, are only so many paralogisms,

1 Crit. of Pure Reason, p. 431 ff.\textit{lg}. 
as transporting that which merely applies to the conception and thought: *Me*, which as such is indeed simple, into a *real* essence, supposed to lie at the foundation,—thus employing in our conclusions the logical subject in a double sense, which gives rise to the well-known fallacy, technically termed *sophisma figure dic tionis*. "It is evident," says Kant, "that the subject, which by the little word *I*, we prefix to thinking in the proposition: 'I think,' contains no quality whatever, nor any one thing that may be known. It signifies a something in general, the representation of which must of course be simple, as nothing at all is predicated of it, and nothing could certainly be represented more simply than by the conception of a mere something. But the simplicity of the *representation* of a subject is not equivalent to cognition of the simplicity of that subject itself, for abstraction is altogether made of those qualities when it is merely indicated by the expression *I*, which is wholly devoid of contents." A reasoning similar to that about the simplicity applies also to the conclusions about the other fancied qualities of that subject. In short, the *Me*, or that imaginary simple substance which is supposed to form the thinking, the substratum of thought, means in fact nothing more than "the function of synthesis," *i.e.* the activity of thinking itself, irrespective of any perception or object; hence only applies to the condition of all our cognitions, to that form of intellectual unity in the which they are joined together, and not to any one object that could be pointed out.

We have quoted these statements as of importance for our after investigation, when we shall notice the opposite application made of them by Herbart and by Fichte. With Kant this argumentation was, in the first place, directed against the Wolfian School, and proved the more telling, as that school attempted to demonstrate in this manner a reality and substantiality of the soul, which imported nothing more than the above simple essentiality.

Again, in reference to the second idea, that of the universe or of nature, which was to have opened the way for a rational cosmology, Reason demands absolute perfectness in the composition of the universe, according to quantity, quality, causality (relation) and necessity (modality.) If, as has been shewn, nothing could satisfactorily be proved with reference to the psychological
idea, the strange phenomenon is presented, with respect to the world, or to all in space and time, that here we may always, and with equal conclusiveness, demonstrate a proposition and its contrary—a thesis and its antithesis. These are the remarkable self-contradictions of Reason, or as Kant calls them, the antinomies of Pure Reason.

For, 1st, I can neither conceive that the world had a commencement in time, nor that it had no such commencement; neither that the world is limited in space, nor that it has no limits anywhere. I can, 2dly, conceive that any one substance may continually be divided and subdivided into smaller and smaller portions, without ever reaching a minimum, or something really indivisible. But again, I cannot conceive how this partitioning may be continued without termination, inasmuch as whenever we conceive the whole as a compound, we assume also the existence of particles (atoms), which must be viewed as being in themselves simple, 3dly, I am to conceive that every effect has a cause, and that every cause depends again on another, and so on, but have nevertheless in the last instance to stop at a first cause, which has itself no other cause, but is unconditioned, and absolute or free; 4thly, and finally, The highest cause of the universe, and which we assume as necessary to it, can neither be conceived as immanent or situate (lying) within the universe itself; as in that case the universe would have its cause within itself, or, in other words, the universe would, ere itself had any existence, have created itself; nor can this cause be conceived as extra-mundane, as out of and above the universe, and differing from it with reference to time and space; for in that case, so far from explaining, we altogether destroy any connection subsisting between the universe as an effect and its cause. The cause of the universe as properly the beginning of the universe would, like germ and plant, have to be conceived as connected in time and space with its product, or in other words, as immanent.

These contradictions will continually make their appearance whenever we attempt to transport the forms of the finite into that infinite to which our reason aims to attain, or else on the other hand, apply that which is infinite to the sum and contents of that which is finite, or to the world. In few words, we are harassed by these antinomies, having proposed to ourselves a self-
contradictory, and hence impossible task, viz. to conceive the infinite as finite, or else to conceive the finite as infinite. While attempting to represent that which is finite as infinite, we can never change its character. At every step we take it meets us as the finite, and we are thus involved in a *progressus ad infinitum*, in which we fail from the very outset, and will attain no more satisfactory result, however long we continue in our endless attempt. We only add always finite to finite, space to space, time to time, cause to cause, &c., but can never reach the end or perfection, inasmuch as that which we add is also in its nature only finite, or in other words, the same which we had already before. Thus our problem is always recurring, and to our task may be applied what Haller says of eternity:

I heap immensity of numbers,
To mountains millions thus array,
Then time I pile on time,
And world on world I lay,
Again, when from that giddy height
To thee I turn my anxious sight,
All number that is told
Increas’d a thousandfold,
Is not yet part of thee!

According to Kant we have to keep in mind and to confess, that, in speaking of the world, we have to do with that which is thoroughly finite, and into which hence we cannot without contradiction transport the form of that which is infinite, or ideas; to use his own expression, we cannot apply to existence and essence (object in itself) that which is merely form of phenomenon. Such procedure would, on the one hand, resolve the world itself into a mere apparition, without foundation or kernel, and on the other again declare this apparition to be essence in and by itself (*per se.*) But as, nevertheless, we cannot but assume such a fundamental essence, one differing entirely however from what is merely phenomenon, it follows that that essence, or the object in itself, irrespective of phenomena, must altogether remain beyond the reach of the ken of our reason. In fact, Kant would rather have wholly separated the essence which appeared from its form of appearance, than identified the two, in the fear that what is positive, infinite, and existing in itself, might thereby be entirely lost, and we thus again be precipitated into Naturalism and
Sensationalism. When, notwithstanding, Philosophy entered afterwards on that path, then Dialectick which Kant had represented merely as a play of sophistry, and confined to that chapter which treated of the world of phenomena, was also necessarily elevated to the rank of general method. Thus it came to extend its sway over the whole system, changing Philosophy itself into a mere philosophy of nature; and, while it dragged the whole subject-matter which engaged its investigations to the level of nature, at the same time also it elevated nature to that of the absolute. Kant had been unsuccessful in his search after a formula, by which to obtain the infinite in and with the finite, and at the same time to keep the two essentially united (together) without, however, identifying them. These observations, however, must suffice on the subject of what are termed the Antinomies of Pure Reason.
Kant had asserted that it was impossible to prove the actuality of our soul as a separate substance existing by itself, or, in other words, as a real subject, and that it was also impossible to conceive the existence of an all-comprehensive mundane system, or to demonstrate the being of a God. Any attempt in that direction, even though with respect to the first and third idea, it did not lead to contradictions similar to those we noticed with reference to the second, yet rests on false conclusions, and is hence logically of no force.

This is most clearly apparent with respect to the third idea, that of a God or of the all-perfect Being. To this subject we have now to direct attention. The idea of a God may ultimately be traced back to the disjunctive form of conclusion, in which we aim at attaining to absolute perfectness of the parts of a division, to the sum and contents of all that is possible or conceivable within a certain sphere. The hypostasis of this perfectness furnishes then the idea of an all-perfect Being (ens realissimum.) Kant terms this idea as implying the definitness of an individual being, a personality or personification, no longer an idea, but an Ideal, and designates it as pre-eminently the ideal of pure Reason.

But here also we have the same illusion as before. The idea under consideration is in reality nothing more than the disjunctive form of conclusion in abstracto. It is simply the logical conception of absolute perfectness, or of all those essential parts in general, which together constitute a whole in general, the notion of the highest conceivable unity in the fulness of the highest per-

1 A is either b, or c, or d; but a is neither c nor b; therefore A is d. For example, an angle is either a right, an acute, or an obtuse one, but it is not a right one, &c. &c.
fection, without any want or defect. But even this abstract notion—that goal for our thinking, which it is impossible to represent in concreto, and which possesses no more reality of existence than say the terms, correctness, goodness, beauty, truth, &c. &c.—has first to be realised, hypostatised, and personified by means of our imagination, ere we can construe it into what we generally conceive as implied in the term God.

It is indeed true, that the notion of an ens realissimum, as measure or ideal, constitutes the condition of all perfect cognition, inasmuch as we could attain no knowledge by merely negative notional determinations, unless some thoroughly definite notion had been both presupposed and existing in our minds, even an omnitudo realitatis, comprehending within itself the totality of all positive qualities. Without such a rule or ideal, the individual, determined, and separate objects could not sufficiently be judged and pronounced upon. This only becomes possible when we gain a view of them in all their possible references and relationships,—as the single things (the individual) in the whole. But though the requirement of our reason, to arrive at a perfect cognition of objects, presupposes such an idea, it does not follow that out of our own thoughts there is any existence and actual real essence corresponding thereunto.

There is here an allusion to what is termed the ontological argument for the being of God, which, since the days of Anselm of Canterbury, has frequently and in various forms been attempted. Some of Wolf's followers tried to sum it up in a formula in this manner. Amongst the predicates, contained in the conception of the absolute and all-perfect being (God), there is also that of existence. But existentia, actuality is the completing (complementum) of that which is possible (possibilitatis), and the all-perfect being is just the sum and contents of all that can be conceived as possible. Kant felt constrained to enter upon a criticism of this and the other proofs which are adduced for the being of a God. He does not propose to shew, as formerly in the antinomies, so here, that the Dialectick of this "Ideal of Reason," lands us in contradictions, but only that the proof which is led is of no logical value. There are, says Kant, just three modes of argumentation on this subject. Either we proceed upon some definite experience,—in other words, upon the evidence of design
in the arrangement of the world (this is the physico-theological argument), or upon experience in general (the cosmological argument), or, lastly, upon no experience at all, keeping simply by the à priori conception already referred to (the ontological argument). Nor did Kant in replacing afterwards these unsatisfactory arguments by something else, and grounding the point in question on our moral nature, designate this procedure as a demonstration, but merely as a postulate of practical reason. In reference to the ontological argument, it has already been shewn, by an investigation into the origin of the idea of an all-perfect being, that it is nothing more than the hypostatising of a logical law of thought, and does not imply an existence in itself.

But irrespective of this, it is easy to point out how illogically we proceed in such hypostatising. For it also can in the last instance be traced to a confounding of the logical with the real object, to which reference has already been made when speaking of the paralogisms. People have at all times kept talking about that existence which is absolutely necessary, but have never taken the trouble to inquire, whether and how it is possible to conceive a being of that kind. It is indeed easy enough to give a definition of the mere term, and to say that it is an object, the non-existence of which is impossible; but this does not advance us one single step with reference to understanding the conditions, which render it impossible to consider the non-existence of that object as absolutely inconceivable. But this after all is the very point on which we had wished to be informed, and which was to have been demonstrated by the argument in question.

Nor are the instances adduced to illustrate the subject any more satisfactory. They are mostly taken from mathematics; such as a triangle has necessarily three sides, &c. But let it be observed, that all these are only instances of the necessity of certain judgments, but not of objects and of their actual existence. If a triangle actually exists, then it must necessarily have three sides, or in other words, if the notion, triangle, be once conceived, it has also to be conceived as with three sides. But from this relationship subsisting in the judgment between the logical subject and its predicate, it does not follow, either that it is at all necessary to conceive that notion, or, if conceived, that it actually exists; on the contrary, from all such examples, it is evident that,
in order to demonstrate the necessity of an existence, we require
to have already assumed that existence; but it remains wholly
unproven whether such assumption be necessary or not. In
an identical judgment, such as the one adduced, where the
three sides—the predicate—is one and the same with the sub-
ject (the triangle), we cannot, without contradiction, take away
or destroy the sides and leave the triangle. But we may,
without any contradiction, either affirm or remove and destroy
both the terms together; in other words, the triangle itself is not
at all necessary. "The very same holds true with reference to
the notion of an absolutely necessary being. By destroying its
actual existence, you just destroy or remove the object itself with
all its predicates; and whence in such a case any contradiction?"
in other words, whence are you to derive any further necessity, to
conceive it at all? No alternative is left beyond the reply, that
though all this be true with reference to many other objects, there
are nevertheless subjectivities, and more especially one, viz. that
of the all-real being (the absolute) which it is impossible to destroy
in our thinking, and which hence must necessarily be left, even
though every thing else were removed or destroyed. But this
could only be asserted with respect to our thinking, and not to
any subject, which is affirmed as existing out of and beyond our
thinking—not even to the absolute being. For this subject is
either identical with our thinking, and then does not exist in and
by itself, or else it is not identical therewith, and then to destroy
or take it away will not involve any contradiction with our
thinking. "I ask you, is the proposition, such or such a thing
actually exists, an analytic or synthetic proposition? If the
former, you add by the existence of the object nothing to your
thoughts of it. But in that case, either the thought in you must
be the object itself, or else having first assumed, as within the
range of possibility, an existence, you have, it would seem, con-
cluded, from this internal possibility, the fact of its existence."
Notice how closely Kant here approaches to making the state-
ment, to which long afterwards Hegel, who had followed in the
same track, felt constrained to give utterance. It is to the
effect, that the absolute (God) is the being which both pre-emi-
ently has to be and is conceived, inasmuch as it is that which
thinks (conceives) within ourselves; thinking is identical with that
which is thought ("the thought in you, is the object itself"), or, thinking is itself the absolute, which latter can hence also not be destroyed, without at the same time destroying thinking itself. The ontological argument can therefore only succeed on the basis of an absolute Idealism or idealistic Pantheism, to which Kant however was entirely opposed. From his peculiar standing-point he could no more agree with such argumentation in reference to the infinite (God) than it would of course prove applicable to representations of finite objects. In both cases he recognises an essential difference between thinking and existence. God as actually existing (as essence in himself, per se), is as much external to our thinking as any other object. Thus, for example, a hundred dollars, as long as they are only conceived, are no more real for me than any portion of a real hundred dollars would cease to be actually present (to exist), if I did not conceive them. That which is real contains neither more nor less than that which is represented. "A hundred real dollars contain not a fraction more than a hundred possible dollars," for our representation would not be adequate to that particular object, if any particle of that which exists in reality were awanting in it. It is thus altogether impossible "to pick out" the actual existence of an object from its bare conception. For the former, something more, viz. an immediate perception of the object, is requisite. This, however, is impracticable in the case before us, and in that of all the other ideas, whose objects cannot be given in any possible experience. The latter has to do with that which is finite, nor can it ever attain to perfection; on the other hand, it is the infinite, the absolutely unconditional and universal, which is to correspond to ideas.

With the ontological argument the other two must also stand or fall. The cosmological argument, which Leibnitz calls that a contingentia mundi, is not entirely an a priori one, starting as it does from experience, and in fact from the object of all possible experience, viz. the universe. Proceeding on the fact that the existence of the world is only accidental, not containing its cause within itself, he infers the necessity of something unconditioned. To this Kant replies as follows: If the ontological argument were conclusive, we should stand in no further need of a cosmological one; but if the former be fallacious, then the latter also can carry
no conviction, inasmuch as it is based upon the ontological one, viz. upon the assumption, that an *ens realissimum* must necessarily exist. If the object, from the existence of which inference is drawn, is an accidental one, then its cause must also be something accidental—indeed just as much accidental as that object itself; and as the latter may cease to have existence, so the former also. This argument then does not point out a being necessary in itself (*per se*), far less the all-perfect one, which we call God. This would have required to have been already ontologically established. But again, if the being assumed were really a necessary one, then matters would be reversed, and the objects also would be necessary; in which case the argument would no more be required. Thus have we to conceive either that the world itself is necessary, and then we have no longer a particular and extramundane Deity, or else that it is accidental, and then there is no longer any necessity for an all-perfect divine Being. What is termed the cosmological argument is therefore after all just the ontological one covertly reversed, but no more conclusive than it.

Thus, as neither the conception of the all-perfect being in itself, nor that of accidental existence, is sufficient to found arguments on, nothing is left but to attempt drawing the proposed conclusion from a *definite* experience, more particularly from that of the interconnection and form of those objects with which we meet in the empirical world, which impresses us as exhibiting traces of design, and as well and wisely arranged. The argument drawn from this source is termed the physico-theological one. Now it cannot indeed be denied, that the world in which we move presents to our view so much variedness, adaptation, order, and beauty, that we are justly filled with wonder and admiration, and led to conceive that the first cause of all this arrangement must be an intelligence, and a will perfect beyond all comparison. "This argument deserves to be always mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the most perspicuous, and that which recommends itself most of all to the common sense of mankind." But still it cannot lay claim to absolute certainty. For first of all, this train of thought, which is derived from the analogy of human works of art, could only manifest God as the most wise author of the *form* of the world, and not of its substance or matter; in other words, as the architect of the universe, but not as its creator nor as an all-
sufficient original essence. To establish this latter position, we should still have to fall back on the cosmological argument; and, as by itself alone it proves nothing, we are again driven to the ontological one, which remains ever the ultimate basis of the whole argumentation. Add to this, that as in the case of the cosmological argument, so here also it would be matter of doubt whether we should not ascribe the continuously recurring design and wisdom of the events in nature—if such be really established by experience—rather to a law of life inherent in nature, and operating as it were blindly, than to a supramundane and intelligent first cause. But, if no such perfect and continuously recurring regularity be established—and in fact experience, as we have shewn, can never point out absolute perfectness—then the argument by which we were to have demonstrated the existence of an absolutely wise and all-perfect author of nature must also fall to the ground. Any imperfections which we observe around us would in that case have also to be ascribed to Him, and we could thus at best only represent him as a being relatively powerful, wise, and good. Lastly, we may say of all these arguments, that in and by them, determinations, which, as criticism has shewn, are only valid in the sphere of sensuous appearances, are, in virtue of the principle of causality, transferred to the super-sensual essence. Be it remembered, that the necessity of such synthetic judgments à priori depended only on the fact, that without them all experience would become impossible. But where, as in the sphere of ideas, experience neither does nor can take place, both this reason, and with it every apparent confirmation derived from it, fall to the ground.

The Critick of Pure Reason then proves, that what are properly the subjects of Metaphysics, viz. God, the world, and the soul (freedom, subjectivity), are altogether out of the reach of our cognition, and lie beyond the limits of our philosophical knowledge. Yea more, it also shews that originally, properly, and in truth, these ideas are merely the abstract signs of the mode in which men think, and are only borrowed therefrom; in other words, that they are forms, which having first abstracted, we next objectivize by what is termed the realistic (realen) application of our reason, and in fact personify. After all that has been said, we cannot therefore entertain any longer the slightest hope, by means
of speculation, ever to obtain the information, whether or not any super-sensual beings corresponding to these ideas actually exist. Yea more, if we advert to what has been pointed out as the natural origin and the primary import of these ideas, all stable foundation for a confident belief in the existence of such objects is in truth entirely taken away, and we should necessarily fall a prey to helpless and hopeless doubt, were we unable to find any other and firmer basis on which to ground them.

So far, however, from wishing to attack these objects themselves, or to charge them with implying contradictions, Kant directed his Dialectick only against the method which was to guide in attaining and demonstrating them. It is only this method which he declares to be of no scientific validity, and null and void, and which he charges with substituting in the room and stead of these objects—notions full of contradictions.

For the purpose of doing service to the highest interests of men, and of again rebuilding, though in a different manner, more firmly and beautifully what had been pulled down, Kant thought it now necessary to quit the sphere of philosophical knowledge, and to enter upon another one, viz. that of practical, rational faith. It is this part of his subject that gained for him amongst men of education generally an approbation and adherence, fully as extensive as the revolution to which the theoretical part of his system gave rise in the universities. The conviction of the reality of that which is supersensuous, attained in this way, was to be no less certain than the theoretical. Certainty was now to be the result, although not cognition; a certainty which differed however from knowledge in the proper sense of the term. Kant himself wrote a Metaphysics of Morals and a Critick of Practical Reason. He protested against any empirical apprehending and arriving at the fundamental principle of Ethics, and grounded it simply à priori, though for all that it was only to be viewed as faith, and not as properly knowledge or cognition.

"At last," says Kant, "a pure moral philosophy, purged of all empirical and anthropological addition, is to be produced." Whenever we receive that which is empirically furnished into its principles, we defile that which ought to be, by mixing

1 Introd. to Jurisprud. p. 15.
with it that which is, but is not as it ought to be: and thus corrupt morals, by elevating that into a law which ought not to be. And this was laid down as the grand point of difference between Kant’s Ethical system and that of every former philosopher, more especially that of Wolf. The latter did not start from an inquiry into the origin of the material, viz. whether it was à priori furnished by our reason, or else à posteriori by sensuous experience. Without any such criticism, it immediately made use of the material furnished by empirical Psychology, or in other words, addressed itself to the task of describing what men generally like and wish to do. From this, more or less general notions were again formed by abstraction, and thus there arose properly a system only of that which is commonly done. But this is just the systematising of what is generally approved and entertained.

In this attempt to find purely à priori both principle and determinations, Kant wished to apprehend and bring to light—and in this case as the principle of liberty—that innermost and highest principle of our soul, which it was felt impossible to grasp (lay hold of) as substance and as MÉ in theoretical reason. This principle he discovered, and thereby constituted a centre of gravity, not only for his own but for all subsequent philosophy. But from want of a speculative method, no further advance was made either in reference to more immediate determinations of that principle, or to the ulterior genetic deduction of its contents. As in the theoretical part of the system the supersensual and unconditional had all been assumed, and termed the “object in itself,” without, however, being more particularly defined or cognised, so now in the practical portion the principle of freedom remains completely void, undetermined, and abstract; it is brought forward without any assigned internal character or pre-established organisation, somewhat like a germ or spring, from which either everything or perhaps nothing might ultimately be found to proceed. Indetermined as in itself it is, it goes forth out of itself, and into that which is external, and hence gets its (formation) shape, as it were, only from that source. Its contents are only received from the other, i.e. the empirical principle. For as man’s inclinations and desires constitute these contents, it is impossible to gather, à priori or from any other source than that of the experience of what is actually felt pleasing or dis-
pleasing, what these impulses in men are, and whither they tend. But if this principle is to maintain its autonomy, or at least its autocracy, and not to become "heteronomical" in the contest with the physical determinations, it must never get so much entangled with that foreign material as to acknowledge it as belonging to its own proper nature. In fact it is only in the opposition and contest with that material that it can prove itself to be both an independent principle and freedom, and therein do virtue and morality really consist. The individual or subject is to have no other end in view than himself, or, in other words, the maintenance of his abstract freedom. We cannot prosecute any one objective purpose for the sake of that purpose, without thereby giving ourselves over to that purpose, and thus at the same time surrendering ourselves. For if the realisation of any object were to become the end and motive of our volition, then the subject would thereby assign also to that object a place within, where a deficiency had been felt, and thus subordinate itself, and descend to the level of being a means for something else, which in turn would become its lord and master. In order to be free, the subject requires wholly to set aside natural desires, and, as in duty bound, requires to practise that which is right only because it is right, and not because it accords with his inclination. But as we are not told what constitutes (the contents of) that which is right, or virtue, nothing but the negative definition is left, that virtue is freedom—deliverance and separation from all sensibility. Thus Kant's moral philosophy, following in the wake of Stoicism, banished the Me from the contest with natural inclinations and life, and into itself, instead of leaving it a positively and freely active power of nature. This principle of human freedom is indeed not one of individual selfishness. It enjoins quite generally never to desire or act in such a manner as to lower humanity in us to the level of a means, and hence no more in others than in ourselves. But this "law of the Categorical Imperative," as Kant termed it, being simply viewed as "law," was on that very account engaged in a continuous opposition against the external. It thus never really went beyond the category of Right, and attained not to that higher stage of freedom, to morality in the stricter sense of the term, which, however, was itself to be distinct and different from the sphere of Right.
Notwithstanding his proposal to establish a pure Metaphysics of morals à priori, Ethics, owing to the above-mentioned causes, still remained a mixed science—half empirical and half philosophical. Instead of being pure, it turned out to be what is termed applied-philosophy; nor could it, agreeably to the original project and tendency, assert its claim to be acknowledged as the climax and copestone of the whole system, including also theoretical philosophy, i.e. Metaphysics, or the doctrine of Cognition.

We think we are warranted to infer, that in this we discern one of those influences which gave to the current of philosophical investigation, after the time of Kant, its peculiar direction. The ethical principle, freedom, is in Kant's system the centre of gravitation, and the mainspring in all modern philosophy. Kant felt already the peculiar impediments and obstructions of that freedom. An empiricism which had never been penetrated through—a nature unknown and uncomprehended, stands forth as what is immediately furnished—an extraneous and dark object—in an attitude of powerful and defying opposition to that principle, and forms now a barrier to the will as formerly to cognition. Natural science has here to come to our aid, to break through that barrier, to throw light upon, and to render perspicuous, that dark objectivity. The philosophy of nature, though apparently exclusively engaged with totally different and profane objects, even with the "natura bruta," yet renders effectual service to the cause of Ethics, by preparing and opening up the way to freedom, so that this repudiated principle may once more be restored to the enjoyment of what rightfully belongs to it. We do not say that natural science is itself distinctly conscious of this its design and use; but we assert that were it not for that purpose, and the important interests at stake, it would really be of no greater value than as assistant to trades and playmate to curiosity.

Kant himself felt impelled by this mysterious presentiment. Natural science and anthropology had always been his favourite studies, and he wrote so much on these subjects, that his treatises almost equal in number those of Aristotle. At last he himself in his "Metaphysical Rudiments of Natural Science" opened a new road into that department of knowledge. But what is still
more remarkable, while he also divided his system of philosophy, as had hitherto been done, into two parts, the theoretical and the practical, he seems to have felt that a gap was still left, and hence inserted a third division under the name of the "Critick of the Judging Faculty." This section, which was to have formed only a connecting link between the two grand divisions of philosophy, contained, however, in fact, such a theory of the notion of final ends or purposes, as would have completely removed the subjectiveness of the theoretical division, and successfully made up for the abstractness of the ethical principle, if only Kant had seriously carried it out. Without being himself fully aware of it, Kant had in that portion hit upon the deeper point of union, which proved afterwards a new and fertile germ, even while his own immediate followers, deeply sensible of the discord which prevailed, for a long time unsuccessfully searched after one common principle for the two divisions of his system—the theoretical and practical philosophy. For, on the one hand, we might object; the theoretical section proves, that what has necessarily to be thought can on that very account be only subjective, nor can in any way either inform us of that which is the objectively actual in itself, nor correspond thereunto; on the other hand, again, the result of the practical section is that objectively something real must correspond to certain representations, and that just because they are subjectively necessary (as reasonable action would else become impossible.) Which of the two are we then to believe? Practice shuts up to the latter, while theory, to which we look scientifically to ground and establish it, abandons us here entirely. The practical faith theory therefore had to be placed on a basis entirely new, nor was there any connection between it and the theory of cognition. Such connection was afterwards attempted by Kant's successors, by various modifications—now in one, then in the other division of the system.¹

The Critick of the Judging Faculty proposes to remedy this defect in the following manner. The principle of freedom or practical reason must exercise an influence upon nature. But if it is to act as causation upon the course of those events which proceed necessarily and in accordance with their own laws, then the two provinces cannot be entirely separate from each other, or hetero-

¹ Comp. Schelling, Philos. Writings, I. p. 264.
geneous. Freedom and nature must consequently find somewhere a middle and connecting point for our minds. This mediation and connection is effected by feeling, whether of pleasure or of displeasure—in other words, by the very thing which was above declared to form a part of the empirical contents of the consciousness of reason, and on account of which Ethics was considered to be a mixed science. But this feeling is, properly speaking, a judgment, with reference to the adaptedness of all those objects which by the senses we perceive—partly for our own faculty of cognition—yet an immediate judgment, not one logically developed, but, as it were, anticipatory of reflective (thinking) knowledge; in other words, an aesthetical pleasure of an intellectual kind—and partly with reference to the adequacy and correspondence of the sensuous appearance of an object to its own proper essence or conception (notion), as judgment is pronounced on the extent to which an object comes up to what, according to its specific nature, it could or should be. This internal essence (the object in itself), which lies at the foundation of the objective appearances (pheno-
mena), is here viewed as if it were its own creator (the creator of its own self)—so to speak, as an artist, who, having a certain purpose in view, executes it intelligently and consciously. Artistic
ical intelligence is thus attributed to nature. Although in Kant's opinion, nature, which works blindly and from necessity, possesses no such thing, we may yet imagine that her operations are carried on with consciousness and design, in order thereby to explain her products. We, who are possessed of intelligence, may then desery an intelligence—in other words, our own nature, with which we are well acquainted—and, in this manner, come to understand nature, although it need scarce be said that all this is not in reality going on in nature. If Kant had not in this strange manner immediately taken away what he had just assumed—thus contradicting himself at every turn—the impossibility of knowing any essence in itself would have been removed, and the objectivity of nature would have come to be so thoroughly perspicuous, so related and associated with us, that even in Ethics we should no longer have looked for a constant opposition and contest with nature, but that man could have moved therein freely, without let or hindrance, as in his own and peculiar property and domain.

As it is our object not so much to give a detailed exposition of
Kant’s practical Philosophy, as to shew how and where its contents stand connected to the metaphysical basis, we may not enter into any further details on that subject. Enough has been said to point out where the knot lies, which all future Philosophy will have to attempt to unravel—a task which it is always to keep in view, if, with distinct consciousness of its peculiar end, it is to make any sure or steady progress. But let us, in conclusion, again ask—if it be really requisite entirely to banish empiricism from Philosophy, or at least from its principle, because leading inevitably to Scepticism, as manifested in the case of Hume—Why did not Kant apply all his energies to the removing of that root of all mischief? To exclude from the system of Philosophy, at least at the first, all the material which, having an empirical origin, is necessarily destitute of proof and doubtful, is a demand which since the days of Des Cartes, but especially since those of Kant, has more or less strenuously been always reasserted. It is argued that at the first we have to make abstraction from everything we know, or fancy we know, in order to discover a principle certain in itself, and on which we may then ground everything else. For whatever stands so connected with a principle that is certain in and by itself, as that it cannot be negatived without at the same time negativing that principle itself, must be as sure and irrefragable as that principle itself. This is the task which has always been propounded, and the accomplishment of which has always been attempted. But, on the other hand, it has also been always found impossible to get anywhere else than from experience that other element which was to be brought into connection with the principle above alluded to, or that which, according to Kant’s statement, was to be attained by synthetic judgment à priori.

And how could it possibly be otherwise? Can he that is born blind produce simply out of himself and à priori the conception of colours? or he that is born deaf that of sounds? If man is to know anything of objects in nature, must he not possess his five sound senses? and, moreover, is he not, from the very first moment of his life, in such constant rapport with the world without, as would not leave him time to produce everything intellectually within himself, even though he were able to do this? This psychological observation of itself cuts short all further questioning on the subject, and shuts us out from everything like originally pro-
ducing representations, confining us at best to spontaneous reproduction of impressions received from without. But yet another consequence might be deduced. Were it possible for man by thinking to produce purely out of himself (or as the expression runs, to produce from natural reason) every kind of cognition, what farther need then for a revelation and a training by means of a divine interposition, and external historical means? yea more, how could we any longer consider such to be even possible? There is here sufficient, on religious grounds, to arouse concern, and induce a timely return to empiricism. But the moral philosopher also, yea, and every kind of philosopher, might see occasion to pause even before making any actual attempt in the direction indicated. Even though previously he had felt that empiricism was the source of all mischief, and courageously resolved to banish it entirely from his philosophical system, how is he to manage to restore à priori, and purely genetically, all that multiplicity of things which empirical knowledge has procured for him? Even if this were practicable in the province of Ethics, it could never succeed in that of natural philosophy or of history. Or are we to attempt à priori to construct and invent the whole of natural and national history? And granting for argument's sake that it were possible for us à priori to discover at least those general laws which regulate nature with as much certainty as the mathematician those which bear on the mechanism of heaven and earth—what is to be done with reference to our knowledge of God? In order to attain to an à priori knowledge of the Deity, would it not be necessary to put ourselves in the place of God; or, in other words, would we not require to be ourselves God, or at least divine, if we are to find Him within ourselves, or to demonstrate His being out of ourselves? But if we men are that which is Divine, is there any room left for another Deity? And is not this Pantheism, or—what amounts to the same thing—naturalistic Pancomism? In truth it may be said that this mad attempt to transport ourselves into God, and God into ourselves, is that temerity in which Mephistopheles delighted:—

Follow that ancient saw, and hark to the serpent my cousin;
Soon methinks thy likeness to God shall fill thee with terror:

To incite philosophy to such an undertaking is just to entice it to
climb a giddy height, in order that it may the more surely be precipitated downwards and perish in the fall. Thus full scope will at once and for ever be given to a faith resting merely on authority, and we shall be left to choose between such a faith from despair, and despair itself. It seems then, that all who are properly intended, should cautiously endeavour to bring about a coalition between philosophy and experience, and hence lift a warning voice against that purely genetical method which could only be the consequence of the dangerous purpose above alluded to. The common sense of men, right and proper views on the subject, yea the purpose of philosophy itself—all seem to unite and to combine against the undertaking of an absolute Idealism, or—what amounts to the same thing—of a pure Monism, which would in reality be a self-producing, pure, and unmixed system of identity—it matters not whether under the form of Materialism or Spiritualism, of Pantheism or Pancomism.

And yet, since the days of Kant, philosophy has never given up its attempts to attain to a method purely genetical, and by means thereof to a system purely self-conceived. More faith has been attached to the principle of Kant, that empiricism leads to subjection to the senses and to servitude, than to the warning he raised against a Pantheism which would necessarily terminate in the same result. Along that road therefore did Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, boldly push on towards an absolute unity. Yet the warning was not altogether despised by others. The result of such presumption was anticipated. It had in fact been already exhibited in the case of Spinoza. The first thing then was to call for more caution, the next to become conscious that the standing-point thus occupied constituted in fact a crisis. In Kant's system the two principles of Idealism and Empiricism had been kept together after a dualistic manner. But as reason always tends after unity, one of two ways might be taken to attain that result. We may either acknowledge that the idealistic principle constitutes really and properly the root, and in a subjective manner keep to it alone, or else start from empiricism and hence from a multiplicity of objective beginnings and principles, in order to reach, from the opposite direction, that unity of consciousness which those Idealists had taken as their starting-point. The latter
view was most distinctly propounded by Herbart. Finally, an attempt might be made, while acknowledging the Dualism of Kant, to join together the two principles in one realistic Idealism, and thus, without properly forsaking the standing-point occupied by Kant, to develop at the same time this particular school. This was undertaken in turn by Jacobi, Leonhard Reinhold, and especially by Fries, each after his own fashion. Jacobi carried out this view rather negatively; as according to his system all knowledge immediately turned out to be a want of knowledge, and this again led to a faith from despair. The other two writers assayed the same thing, after a positive but withal again an empirical method, by establishing a psychological point of connection and union. Reinhold found this point in the representational faculty; Fries, on the contrary, following more closely Jacobi, in feeling and presentiment. Reinhold was the first to give utterance to the decisive demand for one principle in philosophy, and to conceive the idea—which proved to be so fertile a germ, and has ever and again been taken up, without being however as yet satisfactorily carried out—of throwing light and unity into the whole system by propounding a theory of consciousness, where the subject which perceives, the object which is perceived, and the perception itself which intervenes between the two, are accurately distinguished. He argued, moreover, that, on account of the actual existence and the character of our perceptions, it was necessary to presuppose in the subject both receptivity for the material that is objectively furnished, and spontaneity for the form of these perceptions, which is our own subjective addition to them. It has already been stated that Reinhold desired by this theory to come to the aid of Kant's system. In truth, however, he became the occasion of the laying of those new foundations on which Kant's building could no longer be preserved in all its integrity, having been the first to call attention to the necessity of one profound principle for all philosophy.

1 His merits, which have been too much overlooked, were first brought before the public by his son, Ernest Reinhold, in his Manual of the History of Philos. Gotha, 1830, vol. ii. sec. ii. p. 140, and following. Also by Schelling, in his treatise on the Me, as principle of philosophy. Tübingen, 1795, p. 32, and following. And by Herbart, in his Gen. Metaphysics, vol. i. p. 224, and following.

Besides, Solomon Maimon,¹ and Gottlob Ernest Schulze,² had exemplified that the Critick had not proved sufficient to make a full end of Scepticism, which made again its appearance, though under a new form.

But there was none of all who at that time made philosophy their study, who on the one hand ranged himself on the side of the Königsberg sage with such acknowledgment of his merits, and on the other hand, with such decision against him, as Frederick Henry Jacobi, the philosopher in Pempelfort.

In the name of all unprejudiced persons, he stood forward the advocate of those views which are natural, and that with so much force and eloquence, that his style—which was equally free from the stiffness of scholasticism, and the superficiality of the literature of newspapers and fiction—will ever remain a model for imitation. It must, however, be borne in mind that he scarcely stood in need of systematic rigour while expounding his untrammelled philosophical confession of faith—his conviction grounded on the immediate facts of religious feeling. It was only in his polemical appearances that he made any use of philosophical armour.

If we were in few words to indicate his peculiar merit, we should say that he felt that the soul of man did needs hide a treasure deep and mysterious, which, so far from having been exhausted, had as yet been scarce touched; and, although himself was unable to raise that treasure, he was yet successful in asserting its existence against all who were incredulous. Moreover, he unceasingly called the attention of his cotemporaries to this subject. In doing so, he only gave utterance to that which more or less distinctly was felt by men of education to be true. Hence the sympathy which was so generally accorded to his views; hence also the fact, that, consciously or unconsciously, the majority of men of education, even in our own days, are ranged on the side of his views.

Jacobi agreed with Kant, that all that the understanding is

¹ Excursions in the Province of Philosophy. Berlin, 1793, 8vo. Critical Investigations into the Soul and the Faculty of Knowledge and of the Will. Leipsic, 1797, 8vo.
² Enesidemus, or on the Foundations of Elementary Philosophy, as taught by Prof. Reinhold in Jena. Helmstädt, 1792, 8vo. (anonymously).
able to do, is just to give arrangement and form to the material, which is furnished from a different source—that the understanding is, however, at the same time able to watch its own function while thus employed, and lay it down as the laws of thinking, or as Logic. But this logic has, considered by itself, no contents, no material, and is hence utterly incapable of pronouncing on the character of nature in itself, or on anything else than merely the mode in which we elaborate the representations which are furnished to us.

But, with reference to the material furnished to us by the senses and the form given to that material, Jacobi distinguished much more accurately than Kant between what is due to the senses as the organ, and what to the understanding. He declared that the process, by which that which is given from without, enters our soul through the senses, and becomes sensation in us, was an impenetrable mystery. Suffice that it really finds access, and, in entering into our consciousness, at the same time brings the immediate certitude of having been furnished from without. But as for the certainty of its real presence, and that independent of any doing of ours, it is, according to Jacobi, so much above contradiction, as not to require farther proof. The understanding does not perceive the sensations, either before or during the time they are produced; but, once we experience sensation, we have already been affected, and it is thus rendered impossible to get at the mode in which it has been produced. The understanding as that faculty in man which observes itself, finds the representations, sensations, and feelings always ready made. They exist already before we are able to see how and whence they came. In fact our understanding perceives nothing in itself, until those representations and sensations are actually present and immediately furnished, i.e. in a manner wholly impervious to self-observation, although probably due to some mutual affection and action between the senses and external objects. True, this reciprocal action must ever be looked upon as being a miracle, inasmuch as any impression produced by a body upon an element of a spiritual nature, such as our soul, must ever remain inexplicable, being the mutual affection of two things, differing toto genere from each other. The only thing, however, which consciousness has to do, is to introduce distinction, distinctness, and order into
those troubled waters, into that chaos of sensations yet undistinguished.¹

Kant had indeed himself owned the fact of such a mutual action and affection between the senses and objects in themselves. He had acknowledged that objects somehow affect us; but he thought that what we felt in ourselves, as the result of their affecting us, was already mixed up so intimately and so thoroughly with the ingredient added by our own understanding (which in this case he called the faculty of imagination), that the multiplicity of sense-perceptions might now be looked upon as a perfectly subjective product which no longer corresponded to the object. In short, he had declared that all nature, to which by the senses we have access, is a subjectively necessary appearance or phenomenon. Jacobi thus found, that even in the province of sensibility the material was altogether wanting—the which, if the understanding was to have any basis at all, must, as being really and truly furnished, exist, and continue to exist.

Jacobi took then his stand upon the following proposition. The images or the whole multiplicity of representations in us are really and actually existing. This proposition he declared not only a fact beyond the reach of doubt, but also the necessary foundation for all further reflection. In this he brings forward the momentum of immediateness as constituting a foundation which, even though our thinking may serve as a connecting link, must still remain in our thinking, the foundation and condition of development. In the sequel we shall see the importance of this point, and, in the meantime, by way of anticipation, only notice that if, as Kant has it, the qualities and constitution of our sensations and representations can really for the most part be traced to and explained from the constitution of our understanding, or if, as Fichte has it, all the definite multiplicity of our representations in the last instance owes its origin to the activity of our understanding, then nothing original is left in our sensations, and the only principle we have before us is the constitution of our own minds—the only thing left as being true and really existing is the understanding—all that we perceive is the understanding, and it alone in its operations and effects; but not any objects or

¹ Kuhn. Jacobi and the Philosophy of his days, p. 283.
external world—in short, nothing real corresponding to the ideal portrait.

In order to preserve the certainty of the existence of a world out of ourselves, our consciousness must, in occupying this standing-point, also hold fast the immediate existence of our sensations and representations in external fact. We may not presume to account for them by the internal constitution of our understanding; for, if we do so, we make everything subjective, and only the product of reason, nor shall we be able to ward off any further the inroads of Idealism.

As Jacobi had thus secured undisputed possession of the principle of actuality in the province of sensibility, he next endeavoured to attain like success in urging the same claim within the higher sphere of reason. And in fact he had all along this end in view. His philosophical vision ever turned to that other world—to "things divine"—as its polar star. In his view reason was something wholly different from that logical faculty which Kant had, in his theoretical Philosophy, represented it to be. Jacobi thought that, just as our senses are a faculty by which we have immediate perception of what in the province of corporeity (of bodies) has existence for us, so reason is that sense or faculty by which we have immediate perception of that which, in the supersensual sphere of mind or intelligence, has existence for us. We are no more able to point out the how and the whence of those ideas which are actually in us, than formerly we were able to explain the how of our sensuous impressions; but that they actually and really exist is true and undeniable, and requires no further demonstration. Jacobi was able to argue on this subject against Kant in an irresistible manner. Did not Kant himself, he asks, acknowledge the real existence of these ideas in his practical Philosophy, and consider them as really that which is ultimate and most certain? Was he not justly satisfied with asserting the actual existence of the moral law (or what he calls the categorical imperative) as that which is most irrefragable? And if this be done in the theory of practice, on what principle could he possibly assert the very opposite with reference to the theory of knowledge? How could that, which was irrefragably certain

1 There is in the original here a play upon the words—"Vernunft von Vernehmen benannt." It is impossible to render this in English.—The Translator.
in the former case, possess no validity whatever in the last-men-
tioned one?

In fact Jacobi had here probed Kant's fundamental error. This consists in wishing to ground that which is immediately cer-
tain, that very thing which itself should serve as the basis for
everything else, again upon something still deeper, thereby only
making that former itself to shake.

We do not wish to be understood as agreeing with Jacobi as
to the correctness of what he designates as the first and the last,
viz. in the sphere of sensibility, sensation, and in that of reason
—the ideas of the good, the right, and the beautiful. We do not
say that he rightly indicated that which is actually the first and
fundamental prime fact in the consciousness; but his merit con-
sists in having declared that the characteristic, by which the true
foundation of all knowledge may be recognised, is actuality, and
addressed to Philosophers the following plain truth:—What-
ever you are to acknowledge as valid must be deduced from higher
grounds. You require that everything be demonstrated. But
what are you to do with the highest principle—with the last and
final truth? There you cannot proceed any further, and have after
all to stop short at mere actuality of existence. Even should
you fix upon an axiom, such as two things which are equal to a
third are equal to one another, as being the ultimate anchor of
truth, what does this imply? Do you say that this is actual
certainty which exists in the minds of all men as one of the laws
of thinking? You appeal then to the being, the actual existence
and presence of that law of thought. For that which actually
exists, and is immediately furnished to and forced upon us, as, for
example, our own existence or that of the laws of thinking, &c.
&c. can only be brought forward as something that exists; it
can only as it were be disclosed to our consciousness, but never
be demonstrated or logically deduced from higher and more general
propositions. But this mistake was an heirloom of scholasti-
cism—a kind of logical superstition—and was readily allowed to
be such by other contemporaries also, specially by Fries, who
termed it, in so many words, the prejudice of Kant,1 and who
strived to avoid that error by instituting anthropological investi-

1 New Crit. of Reason, vol. i. Preface.
gations into that which during cognition is actually going on in
the soul.

The demonstration that the logical and synthetic method, which
had hitherto been made use of, could not be applied to metaphy-
sics, is that by which Jacobi contributed to the advance of science,
and which may be singled out from among his many other merits
in the way of exhibiting truth, as being the greatest of all.

Profoundly did he trace the mysterious first source of those
sentiments (presentiments) of the most High and of the Divine,
which are in us, till he reached the point where that presentiment
makes itself manifest to us as immediate becoming conscious, or
as feeling. He did not agree with the doctrine of Kant, that the
presentiment was nothing more than the secret pressure of the logi-
cal fetters experienced in drawing conclusions. No; on the con-
trary, he designated it as being the peculiar treasure and hidden
riches of the human spirit. He thought, however, that if we
would not sport it away, we must preserve it without exercising
a sinful curiosity, and that it would happen to every one who ven-
tured to intrude into that sanctuary with the torch of knowledge,
as it did to the youth before the veiled image of Sais.

By manifold modes of expression sought he not to lift its veil,
but to point out its real existence. What he had formerly simply
termed faith, and afterwards feeling and inward revelation of that
which is Divine, he at last designated (as has already been stated)
by the name of reason in the strictest and most proper sense
of the term, in order to distinguish it from that which Kant had
termed the formal application of reason, and which in truth was
nothing more than a function of the understanding. It was at
no time Jacobi's intention to develope any connected system of
philosophy, nor could this have been the case, as, at the very out-
set of his career, when engaged in an examination of the views of
Spinoza, the conviction had already been forced upon him, that
all systematising, where any thing like strict demonstration is at-
ttempted, must necessarily lead to a system of identity, whether it
be that of Materialism or Idealism, of Naturalism or Pantheism;
and that the more any system is one of unity, keeping to rules,
and closely connected within itself, the more certainly does it turn
out one of necessity, and hence of Fatalism. But such a system
refutes itself, and cannot possibly be truth. Nothing then is left us but faith, which acknowledges a truth that surpasses our comprehension. But it is impossible to comprehend the assumption of an unconditional, just because such assumption does not disclose the connection between the unconditional and the conditional, although it refers with necessity the latter to the former. But we do not perceive or discover any necessary transition from the unconditional to the conditional. That which is general cannot be immediately made to descend into that which is particular; that which in its essence is one (the absolute spirit) cannot enter in into that which in its essence is not one (nature); or in other words, God, who as to His essence is a real conception, a spiritual and personal being, cannot at the same time be apprehended as merely a formal summing up, a comprehending and containing of those objects in nature which are separated from one another. We shall return to this point when treating of the views of Schleiermacher.

If Jacobi had attacked science in general, and that in its most vulnerable points, by these statements, which, although insufficient in that particular form, concealed nevertheless a deep presentiment of the truth, he had however intended that the rational faith to be substituted should not be one of authority merely—not a being satisfied with everything—a mere passive receiving and accepting—but one invested with powers of criticism, and with the right of refusing that which is irrational. In opposition to Claudius, he insisted, for example, most strenuously, that the chief point in religion was not the historical fact of the coming in the flesh of the Son of God, but conscience and personal feeling. On another occasion he dictated to his son these remarkable words: "Notwithstanding the insufficiency of philosophy, we must still continue to philosophize. Do this, or turn Roman Catholic; any third is impossible." But withal, he never succeeded in finding either for himself or others the solution of the enigma. Conscious thereof, he declared it an impossibility ever to discover it. In fact, the word "feeling" expresses more accurately that which he had in view, than the term reason which was afterwards employed. For, in feeling, a substantial indifferent unity is yet presupposed between him who feels and that which is felt, and our feeling is

just the primitive beginning of the resolution of this unity within us. While feeling, we have, according to Jacobi, that which is real, actual, and essential, still in connection with that which is ideal. Afterwards, in the reflection of the understanding, this element of reality vanishes entirely, and nothing is left us but what is ideal. For as in sense-perception, the external, which makes itself perceived, is both really existent and in itself perceived; while in the mere representation of a sensation, which is past, no such real relation between the subject and objects takes place any longer, but the subject alone is in itself for itself: so a similar difference exists in the higher intellectual sphere between feeling and thinking. Hence, as has already been observed, although Jacobi had applied the term reason to this feeling of consciousness of God, he looked upon reason as being only an organ for that which is supersensual, and did not consider it a faculty which was independently active and produced ideas, but one which merely received—a receptivity—in which at the same time, the object, viz. the things divine, are furnished and immediately present—an inward revelation, which he placed side by side with that by means of the senses, or the outward one. Not that reason produces ideas, as the understanding produces notions, which on that very account are not self-subsistent (independent) essentialities. It is only a quiescent intuition, which must necessarily precede any reflection on these points on the part of the understanding, and thus corresponds in the province of that which is supersensual to the faculty of intuition in the province of sensibility. Each after its own kind, they both presuppose—over and above our thinking—something which exists, something actual and real, that may be known, and without which our fancied knowledge would not be true, and our reason itself be a nonentity.

The fact that all knowledge has some truth, which really exists in and by itself corresponding to it, and every subject likewise some object which in and by itself is subject and personality, is that kernel which Jacobi endeavoured to bring out from all those integuments which cover it in our consciousness. True, he only succeeded in part in bringing it to light, but, however insufficient that which he exhibited may have been for the rigorous demands of science, yet his opinion, in opposition to the formalism of Kant, and to every kind of one-sided Idealism, was felt to be so appro-
priate and forcible, that we need not wonder that, notwithstanding all the abuse and scorn poured upon this "philosophy of faith or of feeling," it is continually being resuscitated, even down to our own days. However, instead of following on in a speculative manner after that presentiment of truth, Jacobi forestalled the matter, and set up this undeveloped form, as essential to truth, and indestructible, in opposition to all speculation, on the ground that all speculation necessarily led to an absolute Idealism, which, in the last instance, could only terminate in Nihilism and Fatalism. Jacobi himself fell into the mistake of fancying that that measure of his own consciousness exactly indicated the measure of the intellect of mankind in general. He conceived that philosophy had reached its terminus; nor did he open his eyes to the fact, that he destroyed his own cause in this manner. For, wishing to preserve the personality both of God and of man, he placed that which constitutes the essence of man, viz. his self-consciousness, into the middle, as being something merely passive both in reference to that which is above and that which is below—as something merely receptive, both with reference to things divine and things natural, thus making it a selfless medium, representing it not as a fixed star shining of itself, but as an empty space, in which two stars shine by and through each other. In order to ground more profoundly his views, he should certainly, in the first place, have hailed Schelling's modified system of Identity, which, in fact, laid a foundation, in accordance with Jacobi's own views, and in which that which is ideal, and that which is real, existence and thought, are identical before becoming separate and different. But Jacobi was turning old, and felt prejudiced against that bold new appearance. He saw in it only the ghost of Spinoza raised from the dead, which his formulas were no more sufficiently potent to exorcise. He soon gave place to a generation which by and by would not take the trouble to cull anything else from his writings, beyond the statement by which he had accused and attained, as under the name of science in general, that metamorphosis of philosophy, which, in the first place, had been requisite.

We quote from Hegel the following pertinent and beautiful passage about him (Vermischte Schriften, vol. i. p. 203.) "Jacobi is like a solitary thinker, who in the morning of his day has

found a very ancient riddle hewn upon an eternal rock. He believes in this riddle, but endeavours in vain to interpret it. He carries it about with him the whole day—he elicits from it meanings full of importance, which he moulds into doctrines and images that delight the hearer, and inspire him with noble wishes and presentiments (hopes); but the interpretation fails, and he lays him down at even with the hope that some divine dream, or the next waking, will pronounce to him the word for which he longs, and in which he has so firmly believed."

Thus we part company with Jacobi, gratefully acknowledging that he has at least taught us that there may be some contents in the consciousness, or, if you choose, in the soul, which is already potentialiter in our consciousness, even ere actual consciousness comes to know of it, and which, therefore, it may yet perhaps be more successful than hitherto in getting hold of some way or other, and in bringing from the obscure region of presentiment and feeling to the light of knowledge. Yet, is it natural that, notwithstanding all the warning, we cannot sit down satisfied with the undisturbed, i.e. the unphilosophical possession we have acquired, but must in the face of all danger continue to investigate and to enquire; for the philosopher may, as truthfully as the poet, say of himself—

"'Tis vain attempt the pressure to withstand,
Which in my soul by day, by night, alternates.
Were I to cease to dream or be a bard,
Life's self would then no more be life to me!
Then go and bid the silkworm spin no longer—
Though every thread he draws brings nearer death;
Yet from within he disengages still
Most precious texture; nor e'er forbears
Till thus he locks himself within his coffin."

LECTURE FOURTH.
(HERBART.)

We have shewn that Jacobi insisted on the statement that something actually exists—some essence—which cannot be merely conceived as through and through pure activity, but that something lay at the foundation both of objects and of consciousness, which is both real and existing, and the existence of which could not be derived from our thinking or acting, but contrariwise, from which our actual acting or thinking must itself be deduced. This he specially advocated against Fichte, as he had done before against Mendelssohn, who was a disciple of Wolf. He maintained that objects were not merely appearances (phenomena), that intelligences were not merely thinking, but that both enclosed as it were a kernel, a reality and essentiality, which, however, we are unable any further to cognize, or in other words, for which we cannot find an adequate act of thinking or a notion, because existence and reality always express in themselves something quiescent—something continuing and in itself unchanging; while thinking and knowing are in themselves activity and movement; or, in other words, the very opposite of the former. This proposition, which we add to our exposition of Jacobi's teaching, may prove afterwards of vast importance in our inquiries, when we come to see the tendency in an opposite school of Philosophy to annihilate everything that is quiescent, or in the strictest sense of the term, being¹ (not-becoming, not-acting), on the ground that, in order to understand that

¹ We should have preferred to render the expression before us, as well as the one in the sequel marked with an asterisk, by "is being," and again below "that which is being," but forbore, from an apprehension that it would fail to convey the meaning of the original. There is a difference in German between the expression "das Seiende," which is the one here made use of, and would literally be rendered "that which is being," and "das Sein," which we have sometimes rendered "being." "Das Seiende" is the "ens" or the "ινη," and "das Sein" the "esse" or the "esse..." We have also rendered them by "existing" and "existence."—The Translator.
being of objects, it must be transformed into notions, and at the same time elevated into something that is thought.

We premise here, by way of anticipation, a brief sketch (which will afterwards have to be continued and enlarged,) for the purpose of fixing on the point of view from which to institute our subsequent investigations. If we attain an accurate notion of that which exists *(being), or of substance, taking care not to connect or confound it with the notion of cause or ground, we find that substance, if thus conceived of abstractedly, signifies properly only that which is quiescent and changelessly existent—that which in its existence depends on nothing else, nor on which, properly speaking, anything else depends. If e. g. we represent to ourselves: gold, as a certain substance, is yellow, of a definite shape, &c. &c. we conceive these qualities as on, or perhaps in the gold, but as long as we view it in this way, we do not understand how the substance of gold is, for example, the cause of the yellow colour, nor do we as yet think in general of any causal connection between the substance and its qualities. It might perhaps afterwards become apparent, that the notion of substance and that of causality, or to name it more correctly, the notion of a ground, must always be connected together, yea and that both signify perhaps one and the same relation in objects themselves. But we would require to be first of all convinced that such is really the case; and the notion, substance, simply and by itself, does not inform us on this point. Strictly speaking, substance denotes nothing more than that something is non-accident, non-inherence, non-predicate—not merely a quality in and of some other object, but that it is itself that other object, the self-existent, the remaining, the independent—in a word, it implies exactly the opposite of dependence.

If, on the other hand, we were to join the notion of substance with that of ground; if we view whatever really is, at the same time also as operating, as effecting, and containing causality within itself, then everything would, so to speak, manifest itself to us as living. But, if we strictly abide by the logically abstract notion of mere existence, or more accurately of substance, without mixing up with it aught of the notion of ground; if we conceive the internal essence of objects as substances, and in this way only, then everything stands by itself and single, there is no such thing as
effecting; and even though one object should depend on another, this dependence is only an accidental and indifferent one—the object thus dependent neither owes its birth to that which supports it, nor does it find an explanation in the essence thereof.

This sketch is only intended to indicate the twofold direction into which the different systems after the time of Kant will be seen to diverge. Those who proceed in the first of these directions look upon the essence of things one-sidedly, as ground, as causality, or, to express ourselves plainly, as merely activity and movement, without at the same time discovering in that ground any substance which is active. This may be termed the dynamical direction (tendency), which, taking its start from Kant’s doctrine of nature, will, if consistently carried out, necessarily lead to Idealism. The other direction, on the contrary, viewed in one-sided abstraction, just leaves objects as substances which exist, and that without any internal movement or life, as so many atoms, which, if anything is to be produced (to become), require to receive an impulse from without. This may be designated the mechanico-realistic direction.¹

While the dynamico-idealistic direction had zealous and acute representatives in men like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the realistic one was not altogether overlooked. Jacobi had already inclined towards it, but it was reserved for John Frederick Herbart, thoroughly and decidedly to advocate that side of the question. Of course, we do not mean to say that Herbart’s philosophy was one of pure and complete mechanism or atomism; but simply that that fundamental view decidedly preponderated over the dynamical in his system. In truth, from a historical point of view, it will not be matter of indifference which of these two great directions we are first to study and to sketch. Fichte and Schelling had appeared indeed before Herbart on the arena; the “Principal Points of Metaphysics” of the latter were only put into the hands of the public so late as the year 1808. Besides, Herbart maintained, during the whole course of his life, a most decided opposition against both Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and displayed his strength and talents chiefly in the polemic against the dynamical direction. But as we only intend to expound the positive part of the system of Herbart, omitting all that is purely polemical, and

¹ Herbart’s Psychology, vol. ii, p. 506, and following.
chiefly directed against the philosophy of Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, and partly also of the Wolfian school, as comparatively of little interest in our days, we think we consult the interests of the student in proceeding to the review of his system as soon as possible after that of Kant, as that with which it stands in the closest connection, ere we enter on the long journey which we shall have to undertake in following out the speculative and dynamical direction, which latter we shall thus be enabled to continue without interrupting the close connection of these systems by the insertion of entirely heterogeneous views.

Kant had, Jacobi rightly objected, on the one hand undermined all sensuous experience, and transformed it into a mere appearance, and yet on the other had secretly based on it, and frequently referred to the "matter of sensations," as being the only contents and material of knowledge. Thus, the a priori and the a posteriori of Kant each presented a point which might in turn be followed out and fixed upon as a fulcrum. The idealistic school had, from conviction of the necessity of one absolute principle in science, selected the a priori, the absolute Me, as its fulcrum. Herbart, on the contrary, occupied an empirical standing-point. He acknowledged, that what is actually furnished from without, or in other words, that the non-artificial view of the world which is shared by all unprejudiced men of common sense, constitutes both the necessary and tenable basis for all farther philosophical investigations; while, at the same time, he discovered in that which is thus actually furnished, not merely one single, but a vast number of real principles, problems, and starting-points for philosophical investigation. When we begin to philosophise, the sum and the constitution of our ordinary views and convictions—that condition of the consciousness which may be assumed as common to mankind generally—is found as that which is present and immediate. Now we can only philosophise on the above, on that which is furnished to us. In other words, we can only rectify by reflection our representations, notions, and ideas, but can never create something out of one general and empty idea, which is termed the absolute, and which, on close investigation, is found to be only an empty abstraction of that which is furnished to us. Philosophy, according to Herbart, is hence nothing else than a scientific elaborating and rectifying of our
general notions, for the purpose of cognising that which is actually furnished to us. We propose and wish to understand nature both in and out of ourselves, and to have correct and adequate notions thereof. This is the end and aim of all reflection.

In the meantime, therefore, we have to assume and accept everything just as we find it presented in our consciousness. Here then we have the material which we are to elaborate. Not that we accept this material, viz. our innumerable sensations, representations and notions, as if we possessed therein what is really true, but only as that mass out of which the one connected whole of truth is to be formed. For, mark, if we were not to accept of it for that purpose, we should then have nothing at all left us either as a point from which to start, by which to keep, or after which to aim, in our investigations. Granting that many things are different in reality from what they appear to us men, there must be nevertheless some ground upon which that peculiar appearance proceeds. This ground will have to be discovered, and thus even such appearance necessarily leads us to search after truth. Hence mere appearance is not to be simply set aside or passed over, for we cannot have a proper notion of the essence of things if that notion does not at the same time account for the peculiar appearance. Even the natural appearance then, how much more that which is really true in our empirical cognitions, is really a test of the view at which we have philosophically arrived. In this respect, that which actually is forms not only the starting-point in all our investigations, but constitutes also the only means by which to verify and rectify the results at which we have arrived.

This is one of the fundamental propositions of which, in the meantime, we have to keep hold. The other principle is of no less importance, inasmuch as no empiricism can by itself be the criterion of truth, far less either constitute or be termed philosophy. On closer investigation then it will be found, that our ordinary notions of objects and their mutual connection, and hence the general notions, which are abstractions from that which is observed, involve more or less contradictions, and are hence not fit to be at once laid down as true, and elaborated into a system. These contradictions, which become most palpable in the highest and most general notions, when we attempt to apply and transfer them to that which really exists, had indeed been pointed out by
Kant in the paralogism and the antinomies. They were not unknown even to the ancients; and Hegel had gone so far as to declare, that they constituted the proper essence of the understanding, yea (as we shall see) and of existence itself; but as yet, however, they had never been treated in the right manner. Instead of seeking for means first to purge these notions themselves of all contradictions, and then to transport that which is furnished into them, these contradictions have been allowed to remain; and then some have lost confidence in the capability of our intellectual powers truly and really to cognize any thing at all, and others have come to call in question the real existence of the objects themselves, to which those notions, together with their contradictory elements, were to be applied. The first consequence of this rash procedure was necessarily Scepticism, the second, Idealism, inasmuch as the real existence of everything except our own thinking had been denied.

Having made these preliminary remarks, we address ourselves to a consideration of Herbart's system.

A moment's reflection on what are termed the secondary qualities of objects must, as we have already seen, awaken in us a doubt as to whether objects in themselves are really so constituted as they appear to us. Once this doubt is called forth, and we come to see that at least some of what are called the qualities of objects do not form part of these objects at all, but belong to ourselves, being the subjective modifications of our feeling and of our faculty of apprehending, Scepticism also progresses, defying all attempts to arrest it, till we reach at last the question, whether there is anything at all corresponding objectively to that subjective appearance, or whether, in general, any objects, in and by themselves, do really exist. At first, only the adequacy and truth of the qualities represented were called in question; but now, even the being or existence of the objects themselves becomes matter of doubt. The first might be termed the lower, the second the higher form of Scepticism.

Once we have advanced as far as that idea, Scepticism has reached its culminating point, and we come to remember, that, if we deny and destroy the existence of everything real, we destroy and remove along with it appearance also, yea, even our representing and thinking, the which nevertheless is the immediate ac-
tivity of that doubting itself. Thus we come back upon the proposition of Des Cartes; *cogito ergo sum*, or that the cogitare itself—this mental activity at least—is really existing. But the latter, as that which is ultimate, immediately certain, and which alone is left, is then also made a purely idealistic foundation, from which, and resting on which, an attempt is now to be made to throw a bridge across into the actual and real world. Whether or not this is possible, the idealistic systems have to shew. Herbart denies that such is practicable, and declares that the whole of this standing-point, so far from being correct, is only an erratic attempt of our thinking, in which we cannot but at once perceive our mistake, and feel ourselves compelled to return to that which is truth.

An Idealist, in the strictest sense of the term, has, as will be seen in the case of Fichte, in the last instance nothing left him beyond his own thinking; or in other words, beyond an activity without something, some corporeal or spiritual substance, which is active. But the question may be raised, whether it be possible at all to conceive any such pure activity existing and operating by itself alone; and again, even if it be possible to conceive this in an abstract manner, or, in other words, to separate in thought the essence which is active from its activity, whether it could still with any propriety be said of the latter, that it is or exists. In a certain sense, to be sure, we may and frequently do express ourselves in this manner; but in such a case a *something*, which is to be active, which is to think, &c. &c. is also at once missed, and the thinking and acting can, after all, only be conceived as being a certain state or determination of that essence, to which, properly speaking, being or existence applies. The above question, therefore, leads us to institute, in the first place, an accurate inquiry into the meaning of the term, *to be*.

Here then we have, first of all, accurately to distinguish, and that with more circumspection than is generally accorded to the subject, between *to be* (existence, *esse*, *existent*) and *that which is* (existing, *ens*, *existens*), the real, the actual, or *essence*. To *be* (existence), the notion which is of greatest importance for our present purpose, indicates (1st), that relation of an object to our thinking, by virtue

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of which it exists quite independently of our thinking, nor would disappear, even although it were no longer conceived either by ourselves or by any other human being. A mountain, for example, is, i.e. it remains and does not disappear, though I do not represent it to myself for a length of time. It never once enters my head to fancy that the mountain had ceased to exist during the time that I did not think of it. But that same independence which we ascribe to the objects which are, with reference to our representing them, an object must (2dly) possess with reference to all other objects, if we are truthfully to say of it, that it is. Thus, for example, we cannot declare of the sheen of the rainbow that it is (exists), or that it is something by itself, in the same sense as of the rain-drops in which the rays of the sun are refracted, and would say, that its sheen only exists by the sun, his relation to the rain-drop, and that of the rain-drop to our eye. In the same manner we cannot say of movement, distance, &c. and, in short, of everything which we ascribe to an object as its qualities, in as far as, strictly viewed, all these are merely notions of relation, that they are, i.e. that any of them is something in and by itself, as it does not at all exist in and by itself alone, but only on and in some other object, or for and by some other thing. The idea of being (existence, of the, to be) in the strictest sense, is equivalent to that of absolutely being (to that: to be absolutely), and excludes all relativeness, all dependence; for in as far as any object is not in and by itself, but rests and depends on some other one, of course it is not itself, and the notion of existence cannot apply to it. Any thing of which we say that it is (exists), must hence be considered as self-existent, as independent both of our own thinking and of conditions by other objects. The notion of being (to be) then indicates, according to Herbart, a wholly independent position, affirmation, although that expression is not to mislead us, as if this affirmation—viz. the existence of the object—were only due to our affirming, or, in other words, to our thinking. To affirm an object as absolute is equivalent to conceiving it, as not an object of conception, as not merely a representation; there is neither on our part an affirming, in the active and transitive sense of that verb, nor on that of the object a being affirmed by us, there is only neutrally—a self-existing and subsisting by itself; and it is this perfect neutrality with reference to being con-
ceived or being effected, which corresponds to the notion of exist-
ence (of the, to be). Thus Herbart apprehends existence, in the
strictest sense of the term, in which it is equivalent to absolute
existence. Hence existence (to be) only indicates a manner and
mode of affirming. If the word to be is here simply viewed as a
verb and an infinitive, we cannot fail at once to perceive that such
being is itself nothing, and only expresses the relationship of
something (to our thinking and to other objects), viz. its self-
existence, self-subistence. It may therefore in truth be said,
Being (bare existence, the, to be) is not (Sein ist nicht). The im-
port of this proposition is to call our attention to the fact, that
something must always be added, that we must always refer to
something, when we assert, that it is or is not (exists or does not
exist.) Being (bare existence) is by itself no more an entity than
running, standing, or hovering, would by themselves be. You always
refer to that which runs, stands, hovers, or in general is. It will now
be understood what is meant by saying, that a What, a something
which exists, a quale, is always necessary along with existence; 
and that we cannot speak of existence but only of that which
exists (is) as the real and actual. In so far as being or existence
is attributed to a something, it is a Reale—reality belongs to it.
But this logical distinction between the What, that exists (is)
and the existence (being) which is attributed to this What, must
not mislead us so far as to fancy that the What is something by
itself and separate from its existence (being), or again, that ex-
istence is something without the What. In reality that quale is
just that which exists (that which is), and that which exists (is)
the quale—one and the same thing; and by saying of a quale
that it is, or exists, we add no new ingredient to the notion
thereof; it remains, with respect to the totality of its contents,
the same thing that it had been before (as thing conceived), as
Kant had already clearly shewn in the well-known example about
the hundred dollars.

That which exists is thus always a quale, a something which is
viewed as existing (being). But it will be found that every quale
cannot be viewed as (absolutely) existing. Many qualities will
not allow of absolute position. At any rate science will have to
refuse existence (being) to many things which in ordinary life are
said to be, inasmuch as we have already noticed, that this notion
must be confined to the more precise (exact) determination of absolute or of pure and true existence (being); and we will by and by come to see in the nature and character of many things such contradictions to the notion of absoluteness, as will render the application of that idea to them impossible. It would certainly be impossible wholly to surrender the notion of reality, or to apply it to no one object. It must allow of some application to nature, else every thing would be represented as merely illusory and a non-entity. Yet may it not, without discrimination, be transported to all objects and their notions, inasmuch as, in the way in which we conceive them, they do not admit of being absolutely affirmed. We shall therefore, (1st), have accurately to determine what is to be understood by the notion of reality or of existence (in its application to objects); and (2dly), the notions which we entertain about that which actually is, at least those amongst them which are most comprehensive and important, and the reality of which we could least of all surrender, will have to be submitted to investigation, in order to find whether or not their contents (material) accord with that notion of absolute position, or in other words, whether or not they can be affirmed as existing or as actual, just as they are conceived. Should the decision be in the negative, they will have to be elaborated and determined, till they are fit to be affirmed by our thinking as existing, and that without at the same time involving a contradiction with itself.

The idea of absolute position or of existence (being) implies, first of all, that what is to be affirmed be, with reference to its quality, entirely positive or affirmative; in other words, that it contain no negation or limitation, which would again destroy absoluteness. For every negation is either the direct contradictory opposite of position, and hence the destroying (taking away) of existence, or else, as in certain respects contrary, it leads, as hypothetical and relative, to a similar result. A thing which does not exist by itself, but requires, in order to be, as it were to lean against another object, as, for example, appearance or lustre, which depends on some essence that appears or sheds lustre, can be said to possess only relative existence, i. e. not true existence, nor existence in the proper sense of the term, and hence it could not pass as being something real. Besides, it is impossible to conceive limi-
tation of any kind without a previous affirmation of something positive, which is to be limited.

The notion of absolute position implies, secondly, that what is to be affirmed have, with reference to its quality, to be conceived as entirely simple, i.e. in no aspect as a multiple, or as internal contradictions. For were we to conceive the Real as a compound of \( a \) and \( b \), one of two things would be possible, either \( a \) by itself as well as \( b \) by itself are absolute and real, in which case each considered by itself would be a simple Real, and then such composition is unnecessary, or else neither of the two considered by itself is real and absolute, and then their composition or mutual dependence cannot give rise to reality. Let us in such a case not deceive ourselves by the mere abstract notion of unity, in which we fancy we are able to join two different things, for such notion could only indicate a comprehending together in thought of two things which are already in themselves either real or non-real. If it be replied that \( a \) can only attain reality by \( b \) or \( b \) by \( a \), we should in thus reasoning have the self-contradictory notion of a *causa sui*; inasmuch as something would be affirmed which is only to call itself forth, and which hence would have to be viewed as not yet existent, and therefore could not produce any thing.

Thirdly, The quality of that which exists is wholly indeterminable by notions of magnitude; in other words, that which is existing can, as such, never be viewed as a quantum, i.e. as divisible and as occupying definite space and time (extended in space and time). Always let us bear in mind, that we speak of that which is in and by itself real. The Real may indeed be placed in universal space and time, but always only as in itself not occupying any one space, nor exposed to variation, just as the mathematical point may be placed in space, and the distance and situation (place, position) of other points be determined accordingly, while yet it cannot with propriety be said of that point that it is extended in space, or takes up (contains) any space. It does not contain in itself any space, and hence the predicate of space is quite foreign to its particular essence. The correctness of this view may even be deduced from our former proposition. For where we have magnitude (extension in space and time) there parts may also be conceived. These parts are to be viewed as parts of the Real, and hence themselves also as Real. Hence,
we should either have a number of Real (which is not impossible), in which case, however, every individual and simple thing would already be real, and no such composition be requisite for that purpose; or else the reality would only be due to the comprehending together of the individual things into a unity, in which case we encounter the dilemma above referred to. With reference to the notion of the Real in itself, we have therefore to deny time and space. This, however, does not apply to the relations which may subsist between a number of Real, inasmuch as these relations only appear to a third person, who, standing without, looks on and observes, but do not belong to the Real itself. In the same manner the essence of the mathematical point undergoes not the slightest alteration, although, and however many other points be brought into relation with it (by a geometrical). It is impossible to decide *à priori* on the question, whether many or only one Real do actually exist. According to Herbart's express declaration, there is nothing in the notion of the Real to exclude the idea of numerical multiplicity. That against which we have to be on our guard, is the placing (affirming) of a multiplicity of parts or qualities in one and the same Real, and hence the being in space and time (locality and temporality), as these notions do immediately imply infinite divisibility, which would thus be also transferred to the Real. But if we are not to conceive the Real as in any way divisible, it also follows that we may not represent it to ourselves as a Continuum. For the latter representation, that of a continuous magnitude, depends on conceiving that there are in the Real successively parts which, however, continually disappear and flow into each other. True, we only conceive these parts in this manner immediately again to destroy them, yet we employ, with reference to that which is simple and real, a procedure of thought, which, as has already been shewn, is not applicable to it, and which, as it only refers to time and space, we have improperly substituted to the Real as schema of existence. On the same grounds, our remarks about continuity are also applicable to the notion of *infinity*. This also only indicates a failure in our representation, which, in attempting to comprehend together the multiple (as parts of the Continuum), grows wearied, and cannot attain the termination of that act of its own. Existence (being) or absolute position, is a conception which once and
for all is ready (finished). A something, the affirming of which would never be wholly terminated, which is never to be entirely affirmed, would not be absolute, and the notion of existence (being) could hence no more be applied to it than to space considered as such—the infinite (merely representational emptitude), the infinite nothing— or to time considered as such.

Having begun by investigating and clearing the notion of existence (being), which is the firm and lasting fundamental element of all metaphysics, we may now fearlessly proceed to apply it to experience, or to those individual things, which are given a posteriori, in order to arrive, by means of that notion, at a correct conception of the essence of objects, or, as it were, through it to view them in their proper light. But let us always bear in mind that our notion of existence (being), or rather, according to the more accurate determination thereof to which we have attained, that our notion of absolute reality must never be confounded with that which is existing (that which is) or the Real itself. The objects themselves constitute the latter, while the former is only the way and mode of conceiving them. Were we to view being or existence as a quality in an object alongside of other qualities, and thus to make being the predicate of the actual, we would commit an error which Kant had already pointed out with great clearness, and which would render the whole of Herbart's system at once perfectly unintelligible. We shall afterwards see that the most recent philosophy of Identity, in direct opposition to this view, considers that same existence (being) as immediately itself the What, that exists, and recognises in it the essence of creative nature, life, and that which is itself immediately real. Herbart, on the contrary, as well as Kant, distinguished indeed between the notion of existence and other notions, and between the What, that is affirmed, and other objects; but the marks and characteristics of the notion as such are not those of What, and vice versa. Existence, which in itself is nothing else than position on my part, is by no means to be confounded with the qualities of the What—is not to be ranked amongst them, far less to be singled out as the first and essential quality of the object in and by itself. We are specially liable to fall into this mistake, when something that had been affirmed as real is shaken by doubt, and when under the constraining influence of experience, or of re-
reflection we recall (negative) what we had formerly unsuspectingly affirmed, or while we still hesitate whether to consider a certain object as real or as merely conceptional, in other words, whether we are to renew and confirm once more what we had at first affirmed, but anon recalled, or, what amounts to the same thing, whether we are again to negative the negation.

We are now able to appreciate the statement of the fundamental view, which unquestionably furnishes a key to the whole system (Metaph. vol. ii. p. 86). "The notion of existence indicates properly nothing beyond the confession that we have raised a question which, with reference to the object, is needless, viz. whether we are to stop short at the mere affirmation of an object. We are apt to fancy that we have declared something about the object, not understanding that as yet we are really only occupied with ourselves. It was indeed quite competent to compare the idea of the real object with ideas of a different kind. The former is to remain unlimited (without limits), the latter are to be kept within bounds lest these bare ideas be accounted for more than they really are. But if we take the first of these two opposite determinations for one, which is not only to be attributed to the idea of the object, but to the object itself, then by sheer confusion existence is transformed into a quality, and the error of the old school gets again its full scope. This error, it is well known, consisted in viewing the existence (being) of things as if it were really in them, or inherent."

Herbart means thereby to convey to us, that the import of a notion is not one and the same with the intellectual process of forming it, although it is on the other hand equally true, that there can be nothing in the notion which we did not first lay into it, by a movement of thinking, inasmuch as it would be impossible to know or assert aught about a something which is entirely unknown, unthought, or unconceived. Nor is it either possible or warrantable to attempt to escape from this condition of all speculation. "We are altogether enclosed (shut up) in our notions, and just because this is the case, our notions decide on the real nature of things.¹ If we were really entirely ignorant as to a something beyond (something transcendent) as to an In-itself of objects, we could neither presuppose nor be able even negatively to deter-

¹ Introduction into Philosophy, sec. 114.
mine it. But as soon as we view again this In-itself as a For-us, or as in itself identical with our notion, we destroy also the proper notion thereof. We are hence not to confound that which we understand by it with mere notion, and its notion is just, that it is something different from (the other of) every subjective notion about an actual mental activity (process of thinking). Thus while we possess a notion of the Real and the existing (being) we are to be careful not to confound our notion, i.e. the manner in which the object that is viewed takes shape in our minds, with that object itself. Herbart does not mean by all this to oppose the general principle, that we only transport into objects what we conceive in the notion. On the contrary, he acknowledges that principle, which the most recent philosophy of Identity has also adopted, as well as the school of Wolf—although in a different acceptance from the latter. But in this instance reference is made to a particular case. The notion of existence is confessedly the most abstract and empty of all. Hence Herbart could also deny on sufficient grounds that in it any mark (quality) of an existing object, any What or any immediate determinateness is found. Hence also we cannot by this notion predicate anything about an object. In fact were we just to conceive correctly and simply this notion, we should find that it asserts nothing, i.e. no quality, no What, but that on the contrary itself is ascribed to the What or the quale.

But whence and how, it may be asked, is this What got which is to be joined to existence, and which the notion of existence imperatively calls for, if it is to find any application? According to Herbart it is impossible to develope or analyse this What out of the bare notion of existence (being), but it is postulated by the latter, and derived by it from another source; it has to be furnished to it, and that immediately. The What is immediately furnished in sensation. It is that which is actual, and it would be even impossible in general, à priori, to demonstrate that anything at all did necessarily exist, if something were not already immediately given; far less could we à priori determine how much would require to be furnished, or what the character of that manifold would require to be, &c. &c. The multiple furnished in sensation imposes on us, in the first instance, and immediately to make positions, which, however, on more mature consideration,
have oftentimes to be recalled. As has already been stated, the general result which was in the first place arrived at by means of lower and higher Scepticism was, that it is necessary to affirm something. Next the question arose, how we were to affirm? Thence followed that the What, which is affirmed, cannot be of such a nature, nor be conceived in such a manner as to militate against the mode of affirming, and thus to cause our thinking to contradict itself, or to destroy again the affirmation itself, either wholly or in part. But withal are we as yet wholly ignorant as to the particular quality of that which in and by itself exists; for from the fact that it is something that is affirmed or positive, nothing (definite) at all has been cognized about it. We have as yet no means of pronouncing as to how it is in itself; we only infer that many and manifold Real require to be affirmed, and we do this from the variedness and multiplicity of appearance and phenomena on the one hand, and on the other from the simplicity of that which in itself is real, for one and the same Real could not give rise to different appearances, but divers Real will also appear diversely in divers connections.

Before proceeding, let us follow the phenomenon on part of its course, as far as this is practicable within brief space. At the outset, an unprejudiced and inexperienced person affirms many things which have afterwards to be recalled, yea more, he assumes everything to be real that, and just as, it appears to him. But on more mature consideration many things are found to be appearance only, and the person who observes, feels constrained to refer the latter to himself, as being his own representation; this is subjectively in him. That only exists and really exists which is not merely appearance, and it alone can be furnished (given). In the first place then, position had referred to all that by sensation we were conscious of; (Psychol. § 141); red, blue, sweet, &c., all were looked upon as being positive. But a little further reflection suffices to convince us, that these are only qualities, or inferences, and we now conceive that the objects in which they inhere, are that which is to be affirmed, and what is really existing. But our analysis does not stop here. We cannot fail to observe, that these objects are only combinations (aggregation-states) of a number of Real, and we now view their elements as what exists. "Thus the idea of existence recedes always farther behind that
which is furnished by sensibility, and longer and longer grows the road which leads from what is thus furnished, to the Real, which supports and explains the former. But to whatever degree of enlightenment we may have attained, we must find the idea of existence somewhere, otherwise every thing would be represented as nonentity.” As the last result of our analysis, we find that position comes back to that which is absolutely simple, and which indeed lies at the foundation of sensations, which, however, is never perceived as such (as absolutely simple), but rather as a tissue of manifold connections and combinations. That affirmation which had formerly been sceptically negatived, is now confidently repeated with reference to that simple alone.

If the question were put, why not stop at the results of Scepticism, we answer, because it is impossible for thought ever to stop short at what involves contradiction with itself. The contradiction to which we refer as here subsisting, lies in the fact, that in thinking the necessary idea of existence comes into conflict with those equally necessary abstractions from experience, which cannot be ignored. Granted that this actuality of experience consists, in the first instance, in nothing more than actuality of appearing; yet even such actual appearance, if once we recognise it as mere appearance, obliges us to affirm something real, inasmuch as appearance is that which cannot exist by itself, and only along with and by something essential. If, on the contrary, what is furnished did, just as it is given, present, both in reference to its matter and form (for we have not only simple sensations, but also their inter-connections furnished us), one harmonious whole, involving no contradictions, then our thinking and experience would be agreed, nor would there be any further necessity for rectifying the general empirical notions (those aggregates of experience which are comprehended together in the consciousness). But these empirical notions are, as they are psychologically brought about, themselves full of contradictions, and thus, while on the one hand we may not, without falling into the greatest of all contradictions, destroy (take away) all existence, we cannot, on the other hand, retain the single empirical notions exactly as psychologically we find them. This conflict then, and the elaborating of ideas which results from it, obliges us to have recourse to Metaphysics.

But before proceeding any further, let us for a moment pause
to take a survey of the arrangement of the system in general. A view of the Architecture of (construction and arrangement), and of the connection of this system, which in that respect differs from all that preceded and all that succeeded it, and more particularly from that of Hegel, will at once throw light on the method or methods pursued by Herbart in thus philosophising. While in Hegel's Logic, in his Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit, we have throughout a trichotomy (tripartedness) in the system, yet one bound together by one single principle, both with reference to form and to reality, and conditioned by one method extending throughout and ever recurring with the same rhythm,—we meet in Herbart a similar triplicity indeed, but one which wholly differs from that of Hegel, in this as well as many other particulars, that with Herbart the three principal divisions, Logic, Metaphysics and Aesthetics, are neither connected by one common principle of reality and form, nor acknowledge one general fundamental doctrine above themselves, which contains and explains such a (fundamental) ground-principle. That these three principal philosophical sciences cannot be deduced the one from the other, has to be acknowledged as a "fact (matter) of consciousness," not indeed immediately, but in as far as in the course of our investigation we critically discover, as matter of inward experience, as given, the self-existence (independence) of their principles. That with which Herbart prefaces his philosophy by way of "Introduction," and which his followers place side by side with Hegel's Phenomenology, constitutes no more than the latter a distinct part of the system, independent as to its contents, and essentially differing with respect to them from the contents of the remainder of the system, as well as grounded in the organism of the whole, such as might either be capable or was intended to serve for absolutely grounding all the rest; it is merely designed to prepare the person who is about to philosophise.

We shall by and by speak more particularly about Herbart's Aesthetics (as far as an exposition thereof accords with our general plan), and at present only remark, that by that term Herbart refers to practical philosophy. His Logic, we may, in all its essential points, assume to be sufficiently known already. We just remind the reader, that Herbart calls special attention to the fact, that while it has to do with representations, it is not
engaged with the act of representing, hence also not with psychological origin of them, but only with notions after they are ready and fixed or executed. Nor does it occupy itself about the things or objects which, in that which actually exists, may possibly correspond to these notions. It has exclusively to do with the relations into which notions enter to one another, as partly excluding and partly again finding themselves in each other. We cannot have any one notion more than once, but it may occur in different connections, in a different manner, i.e., as mark or quality: and then again it may, in fusion with others, appear itself as different, as another; but the elements or notions which give rise to such connections and combinations, are always assumed as being there, and as ready made. Even on this ground, Logic is unable to solve all the problems of Metaphysics. It only affords an atomic synthesis of notions, and can hence never be looked upon as the organon of philosophy in general. It shews only what may and what may not be combined, but it shews neither an original unity and fusion, nor has it any interest in connecting into a unity the manifold and divers, for which interest philosophy depends on another source. Logic only forbids that which is impossible in thinking, but does not urge to combine that which is possible. Its veto only is to be respected, but it cannot itself positively produce anything; it merely permits or forbids, but does not demand certain connections which must already have been given, if such demands are to be grounded in advance. An original genesis or affirmation is altogether beyond the province of Logic. Thus it holds true of Logic, as of Dialectics (as we shall more fully see in the sequel), that any one thing appears necessary, only when at the same time it is the presupposition or condition of something that is already affirmed; so that the one cannot exist nor be conceived without the other, and hence (to use Herbart’s expression) that which is to be presupposed is a necessary complemental notion of what has been affirmed, as, for example, if there is appearance, then an essence that appears must also exist; if passivity, then activity also, &c.

We have to remark in reference to Metaphysics, to which we wish to call special attention, that this term may be understood in a wider and in a stricter acceptation. In its wider acceptation it comprises, 1st, general, and 2d, special Metaphysics. The first of these occupies the place of what was formerly Ontology
(but in turn contains also a section which is designated as Ontology), and prepares the fundamental notions for applied Metaphysics, which is again divided into Psychology, Philosophy of Nature, (instead of Cosmology) and Philosophy (doctrine) of Religion. In its stricter acceptation, again, the term Metaphysics is equivalent to what has above been designated as general Metaphysics. We propose to employ the term more especially in this sense.

But in order to gain a satisfactory view of the process of thought pursued, and of the method employed in it, it will be requisite, first of all, to recall the psychological process which is involuntarily pursued by the natural consciousness. Starting from sensations or determinations which are empirically furnished, we next elaborate these into representations, and these again into general or collective notions, in which our consciousness comprehends together that which is common to different phenomena, making abstraction of that which is peculiar to each. But these notions can only be considered as abbreviations of experience, and meaning and validity can be assigned to them only in as far as they are viewed as tokens of the multiple which had been given, and we think at the same time of the single things which had been empirically furnished, and then been schematically comprehended together in these general notions. The point of importance is, that these single objects do really exist, and have really been furnished in sensation (inward or outward experience.) Else these general and collective notions would refer to nothing, and be only schemata drawn from schemata, and therefore could not be employed for the purpose of cognising that which is actual. Hence we have also to take care not to introduce here such general notions as perhaps are only the fictions or else the hypotheses of some popular philosophical system, as, for example, what are termed the different faculties of the soul; moreover such notions also as exclusively refer to logical relations of thought, as possibility, conceivableness, &c., or finally those which, while intended to refer to the objectiveness of the world, are at the same time so abstract as to offer no longer a point of connection for that which is furnished, as, for example, non-entity, infinity, and even existence becoming, &c. &c. It is, however, true, that general, and in this sense abstract notions, are requisite in Metaphysics, whose duty it is to enter upon the infinite multiplicity of the things which are immediately furnished for the
purpose of explaining them, inasmuch as with every object presented in experience a new problem would also be proposed, and thus its task be endless, if it were not to comprehend in general classes that which is thus furnished.

These general notions are more especially the following three: thing, matter, and the Me. Again, we have to contemplate the notion thing under a twofold aspect; for it appears in the first place as a compound unity of many marks or qualities, and in the second as variable. The notion of thing would also include matter, and even the Me also, if the former had not presented the peculiar mark of definite extension in space, and the latter the characteristic phenomenon of self-consciousness. It is more particularly the latter which alone opens up the world of immediate inward experience, from which—although with the greatest caution and never without sufficient reason—we are at liberty in turn to conclude as to the internal behaviour of objects in nature, which are wholly external to us.

So far then no obstacle has been encountered in thinking, but now, on closer investigation, unexpected difficulties arise, yea these three principal notions of thing, of matter, and of the Me, which were to have been applicable to everything actual, do themselves involve contradictions. They require indeed to be affirmed, as existing both on account of their origin from that which is furnished and their relation to it, but this affirmation, their existence, comes immediately into conflict with the multiplicity (plurality) and changeableness which these notions at the same time imply. These notions are furnished, being deduced from actual phenomena, nor can they be surrendered, inasmuch as we cannot by denying banish that which is actual, to which these notions refer. Yet, on the other hand, it is equally impossible to give up any part of the notion of the Real, as it requires to be conceived in itself as simple, purely positive, indivisible, &c., without thereby immediately destroying reality itself.

To find means to unite these two, to remove the contradiction, to make that which is furnished cogitable, and that which is cogitable suited to that which is furnished, is the task of Metaphysics, which, with reference to the thing manifold in itself and changing, is executed in the first section, or in Ontology; in the second, or in Synechology, with reference to matter, or the appearance of
the Real in space, time, and motion; and in the third section, or *Eidolology*, with reference to those peculiar phenomena which are met in our consciousness, or in the Me. Now if, as has already been shewn, 1st, starting in our investigation from that which is furnished, we come to acknowledge at last that there are contradictions in that which is furnished (or in the collective notions thereof), we will have to look upon those notions as so many different given problems, and to endeavour to elicit from such consideration the peculiar method of solving these contradictions in accordance with every one of these problems. But inasmuch as these contradictions, in whatever different forms they may make their appearance, have this common property, that each presents a conflict of existence (of the internal unity of the real essence) with the multiplicity of appearance in the *one* apparently simple notion, it is evident that it will be possible to reduce all the methods which are to be employed to one common formula, to which Herbart applies the specific term of the "*Method of Relations.*" The method of relations refers, then, to the fundamental problem of all theory and speculation. 2dly, Once this method is applied to the fundamental notions of metaphysics, they certainly do not retain the same form as when they were first submitted to it. For now we get a view behind all mere experience and appearance, even into the relation between the Real, or rather (as we shall find) into the relation subsisting between the many Real, which lies at the foundation of the appearance (the phenomenon)—a relation which, although it cannot be perceived by sensation, is nevertheless such that by means of it we are able perfectly to explain and to account for the empirical appearance (phenomenon.) For, when our investigation has reached this height, it must, 3dly, again make provision for making use of the cognitions thus gained as principles, cogitable and free of contradiction, for the further explanation of that which is furnished, i. e. for demonstrating from them, as principles, the possibility of proceeding with the requisite further deduction of the general laws and relations, by which what is furnished can be explained, and with which hence we are also able again to address ourselves to the world of phenomena. Thus the investigation takes, as above detailed, its start from that which is given, and after having risen to the supersensual, it again returns to that which is furnished, describing (to use Herbart's expression)
an arch, whose ascending portion however requires methods different from those of the descending. For, it started from a logical analysis of notions furnished; then, urged onwards by contradiction, it reached the method of relations in which analysis and synthesis join hands; and finally descended by a constructing synthesis to meet again that which is furnished, in order to assert the validity of the principles thus gained in the sections of applied Metaphysics, of Philosophy of Nature, and of Psychology.

We remarked above, that the method of relations addresses itself really to the fundamental problem of all Metaphysics, viz. the contradiction presented, in general, in the fact, that one essence is to be separated into manifold differences, and yet to remain all the time one and the same. It is the principle of the modern philosophy of Identity which, as we shall find, has also been expressed as the Identity of the Identical and the non-Identical. This contradiction is found first in the notion of the thing, with its many properties, or the problem of inherence. Gold, for example, is heavy, yellow, malleable, &c.: all these different properties make up the unity, the thing which we term gold. None of these properties by itself and alone is gold; yet if so much as one of the most essential of them were removed, the rest taken together would no longer constitute gold; and if all of them were removed, then neither gold, as the substance, nor anything else, would be left behind. The many properties, therefore, are (exist), and together are only a unity, the thing (exist together only as one, as thing); thus the latter is a unity, which is a plurality—an idea implying self-contradiction.

This contradiction comes out even more distinctly in the notion of the alterable thing (of causality.) A thing which alters, is, after its alteration, looked upon as being still the same that it was before the alteration took place. Had it wholly changed, it could, in fact, not be said to have altered, but rather that some other thing had taken its place. That which is to undergo alteration must remain essentially the same, and yet still not remain the same. This will strike even the dullest intellect, and the question forces itself upon us, How are we to conceive such a thing? in other words, How are we to solve this contradiction?

But further, the notion of matter, which is here exclusively viewed as the solidum that fills space, involves also a contradic-
tion, inasmuch as being a distinct quantum in space, it seems necessarily to consist of simple, not any further divisible and infinitely small particles, each of which particles, however, even on the ground that, taken together, all of them are to fill that space, must itself again fill space, and hence be itself again further divisible and not simple.

Nor does the Me present less difficulties than the other problems. For, that which we understand as constituting the Me is not the total complex of determinations, which are partly external and personal, but that deepest and innermost point of our self-consciousness, in as far as the latter knows itself as that which always remains the same and identical in all the multiplicity and change of passing conditions. The Me, then, is to be the simple in a multiplicity of determinations, the unalterable in unceasing alterations—thus involving a contradiction which places it at once along with the other two problems, with this peculiarity, however, in addition, that, unlike the former two, this problem lies not within the sphere of external, but exclusively within that of internal experience; and that while self-consciousness looks for the Real in itself, for that which properly constitutes itself, and which is to be that which knows, in opposition to that which is known, instead of finding such a pure subject, it describes rather in every such subject again only an object, and what is known. Special reference is here made to the idea of the absolute Subject-Object—the Idealism of Fichte being here met and refuted. To this point we shall have frequently to return in the sequel.

If these general indications have, in the meantime, led us to see that the most important ground-notions of Metaphysics involve contradictions which our thinking cannot tolerate, our next task must be to apply for the means which method offers for the purpose of solving them, and that without, however, destroying or falsifying the notions themselves. For we must be as careful to guard against this latter as against incurring self-contradiction in our thinking, or perhaps even, with Hegel, declaring contradiction, as it is, to belong to the nature of things. Were we to retain the contradiction, instead of urging thinking to proceed onwards, and thus forming properly the mainspring of Metaphysics, it would infallibly paralyze it, and be the "logical monster" which devours all thinking; contradiction evidently asserts that which is impossible.
LECTURE FIFTH.

(CONTINUATION OF THE FORMER.)

Our sense-perception represents indeed every object which is supposed to be externally bounded and existing by itself, or in other words, to be a unity, as at the same time in itself a multiplicity of predicates, but neither sense-perception, nor its handmaid, imagination, can inform us whether these different predicates indicate so many different elements, and real fundamental ingredients, which in the one thing assume the form of an aggregate, or only a multiplicity of appearance with internal simplicity of essence, or in what other way that relation subsisting between the unity and diversity is to be explained. Suffice it that real essences are represented as being, at the same time, both unity and multiplicity. This fundamental contradiction was, in the expression already quoted, summed up in few words as the Identity of the Identical and non-Identical, or, that $a$ is at the same time $a$, and not $a$; a proposition which, as is well known, stands in direct opposition to the very first axiom of formal Logic.

If we apply to Herbart with this problem, we are directed to the Method of Relations, which has already been alluded to, for the formula by which to solve this contradiction. Herbart himself gives first of all a popular explanation of this process of thinking.\(^1\)

"If the task be imposed on you to affirm one thing, which you can neither affirm as simple, nor cast aside, affirm it as manifold. But beware of afterwards parcelling out that plurality into units, for in that way the former difficulty would only reappear; but learn to understand that something may possibly be applicable to the manifold, in as far as there subsists a mutual connection among its parts, which could not rationally apply to that which..."

\(^1\) Eneyel. p. 302.
is individual, to single things." The same is expressed in another place by the following Schema: a contradictory notion (α), contains in itself the two members m and n, which are opposed to one another. Were we to do what under the pressure of these contradictions lies nearest, we should doubtlessly negative the unity α, which was to have united opposites, and yet does not succeed in this, or in other words we should disjoin it. But such disjoining would, in this case, run contrary to the problem, viz. the appearance (the phenomenon) which is given, and wholly destroy a necessary notion. This unity then (α) cannot be disjoined. We have hence to proceed further, and now negative the unity of that which is here opposed; one m alone cannot be equal to n; hence many must be affirmed instead of the one. But in contemplating separately each of these m's, we should again miss our mark, as the same contradiction would just reappear in every individual one of them. Nothing then is left, but to view the many m in another manner than as single, i.e. we must comprehend them together and come to the conclusion that n originates in the connection of the m, or what amounts to the same thing, that no one m singly, but only when joined to other m, is equal to n. So also binary stars which shine with united light, appear to the naked eye (the sense-perception) to be only single ones. Properly speaking, the eye does not see what is false; the appearance is that of one star, nor can it (our α) be negatived; but it may be denied that what we see is in itself really one star (m). By the telescope (the method) we distinguish two (or more) stars, and are now led to understand that the sheen which the naked eye perceived was due to the collection (the being together) of several stars; the lustre would no longer be one, nor in fact be such as it is, if these stars were separated from each other (were affirmed as separate).

It will easily be seen in what sense Analysis and Synthesis meet in this instance (Met. § 182.) An analysis of the contradictory notion discovers that its (real) elements are two or more. This fact is kept hold of, and the unity in which the empirical notion at first caused the plurality to appear, is now no more a unity of essence, but one of appearing or appearance—a shining

1 Princip. points I.; Psych. vol. I. p. 128; Metaph. vol. II. p. 50, following.
into each other; i.e. indeed an actual happening (occurring), but in itself not an essence that becomes otherwise, that changes. The connection or fusion in which certain simple notions are furnished (given) together, becomes a condition; a cannot be affirmed without b, nor b without a; thus neither of the two is to be affirmed by itself, but each becomes the condition of the other. But again, our thinking does not require to search for this specially required supplementary notion far away, nor by guessing, and beyond the limits of the notion which was originally furnished (given), (which to appearance only was simple, but in fact a compound one), or beyond its parts; it is found within the sphere of it, and in those elements which itself had formerly attained by an analysis of the notion.

We will in the sequel find that, in solving the same problem, Hegel also makes use of an analysis and synthesis; but the difference lies in this, that after having separated (analysis) the elements of the notion, Hegel comprehends them again together into one substantial unity; that whenever the above distinction has been made, we become immediately conscious that neither of the two moments can maintain itself by itself, but that both can only exist together, in and by each other—that they require to lean on, and to support each other. Herbart, on the contrary, while he acknowledges the same fact, only refers it to the phenomenon (appearance), where the different momenta merge into each other without being separated. But the substantial unities which give rise to that appearance (phenomenon) still remain behind that appearance, as being in themselves separate and self-subsistent Real (monads); nor do they condition one another really, i.e. they are only in an accidental manner together, but do not necessarily refer to one another; in themselves they only stand in a relation, they are not really conditioned by one another, but only in the subject who contemplates them (and hence, as far as they are concerned, externally), and in this subject (our thinking) the substantial unity of that (objective) essence is destroyed notwithstanding the unity of appearance. In fact, the methodical separation above referred to was just the destroying of the unity of essence, which was dissolved by affirming a number of \( m \), i.e. by affirming each one of them as in and by itself a substance—as self-existent or real. True, a re-uniting of them takes
place, but this is only a uniting with reference to the outward form; it is not a union of essence, and consists only in a being together (a collection) of a number of Real within and alongside of each other, and that with reference to place, but not to substance. Hence the comprehending together which takes place is not dialectically requisite, nor grounded in the unity of nature of the Real itself, but merely imposed by experience on the philosopher. The elements which have thus been separated and disjoined do not for their own sakes call for a re-uniting; being Real, they do not in themselves require to be placed into any relation, for they are self-existent, independent, shut up in themselves in as far as their essence is concerned, and it is only that notion as a whole, which, by virtue of its origin from experience, calls for a recomprehending together of its contents (moments).¹

Opponents might indeed object that such a view completely destroys objectively all unity of substance—all essential fundamental relationship (reference) in truth and reality. Its defenders may then, however, again turn round upon the philosophy of Identity, and reply that in that system elements did not exist by themselves, and independent of each other, simply because they had not been properly affirmed, i.e. as actually and objectively existing. If in our process of thinking we wish to conceive and to cognize that which really and actually exists, we will require to affirm that which we thought (conceived), the elements, as being really existent, i.e. as independent both of our thinking and of that of others, yea, and as independent one of another, else we have affirmed nothing beyond mere thoughts; we have affirmed thoughts as such, but not as symbols of that which exists; in a word, we have withal not thought (conceived) existence. If we had thought (conceived) that which we had proposed to ourselves (and we had proposed to cognize that which exists), we would also have affirmed the elements as existing; nor could we again draw back what had thus been affirmed into the unity of essence, without at the same time also perfectly effacing what we had thought, inasmuch as such drawing back were just again to destroy existence. If it is replied that we cannot affirm them as existing by themselves on account of their contents, let it be observed that this peculiarity of contents (their mode of being, existence, or of being affirmed)

¹ Metaph. vol. ii. p. 49 and 50.
is due to our having affirmed it in that particular manner. If we had made a correct affirmation, such as is requisite—if we are ever to come into contact with that which actually exists—we should have found that each thing may not only be kept by itself, but also be brought into such a connection as will fully supply the reality-ground which we had missed, or at least suffice to shew a substantial relationship in things, in accordance with that which is presented before us, and that in a manner not to set the laws of Logic at open defiance, instead of continually affirming only that which is thought (conceived) as thought (conception), whereby we always remain shut up and immanent in the absolutely fluid sphere of acting; or of absolute thinking—where our realities are not realities by themselves—are not nature—are nothing more than absolute spirit in the form of spirituality, but not in that of being otherwise, or in that of a world, and in short, are and remain only a Pantheism, whose texture consists merely of thoughts, an Acomism and absolute Idealism!

We do not pretend that a disciple of Herbart would be satisfied with the apostrophe which we have put into his mouth. Far less do we fancy that the philosophy of Identity would be entirely silenced by the statement of such objections. As yet we have not even heard what that school has to say for itself; far less can we presume to decide on the matter in dispute. We only wished to point out in the above the difficulties, and, perhaps, even the contradictions which meet us, in the hope of thus being able to contribute to the reader understanding of, and interest in, the subject, without, however, presuming in any way to anticipate or influence the judgment of the inquirer.

Having endeavoured to accomplish this with reference to the basis of the system under consideration, with a particularity sufficient for our purpose, we shall only dwell on the proper contents of that system, in so far as may be requisite, in order to give an insight, or at least a view of the manner in which, after starting from that basis, Herbart at last arrives at explaining what is furnished.

In this our enquiry we first of all come upon another auxiliary of the method, and one which must necessarily be of the greatest importance, considering the apparent impossibility for one and the same Real to appear differently, even though it stand in different
connections with other Real, without prejudice to the simplicity and essential unchangeableness of it.

This auxiliary is found in what are termed accidental views. The import of this term, by which certainly it is not meant to introduce into science accidental or happy hits, is, with reference to the above problem, that one and the same notion may, without any alteration of its essence, be often viewed as standing in very different relations to other notions. Thus, e.g. a straight line may be viewed as the tangent, or the radius of a circle, without having, however, ceased to be a straight line, and the same straight line. A tone may be viewed as a third, a fifth, a seventh, or an octave (of other tones), as being harmonious or discordant, without having, however, ceased to be one and the same tone. If tangent and radius are each viewed separately, they are indeed different notions, but they merge into one, if contemplated (thought) as contained in the higher and common one. It is not essential, but merely accidental to that higher notion of a straight line that it stands in such relations as to be either radius or tangent; these are only the qualities (marks) of it in our eyes, and may hence be with propriety termed accidental views. This auxiliary is very generally made use of in Mathematics, so much so that many problems could not be solved without it; and an analogous application thereof may be made in Metaphysics in the construction of notions, where the problems propounded themselves indicate its employment.

We now return to the consideration of those problems themselves, addressing ourselves first to those of Ontology, viz. to the thing with its different properties (relation of Substance and Inherence), and again, to the alterable thing (relation of causality and dependence). The question is here raised, In what way are we to view each (individual) separate and apparently simple thing? How are we to conceive it to be constituted in itself? We answer, as a complex or an aggregate of many simple Real, or of monads, which have entered into a more or less constant connection amongst themselves, so that from the fact of their being grouped together, which ever recurs in our experience, we had come to conclude that they were but one thing. Just as Herschel discovered some time ago, by means of artificial aids to vision, that some nebulae, which the naked eye had viewed as
simple stars, were in reality binary stars, or even clusters of stars; so Herbart finds whole clusters of simple substances or monads in the one thing.

We have all along made use of the term substances as the readiest, after our preceding consideration, for the purpose of denoting that which exists in and by itself. Herbart, however, does not make use of that term in this connection, and designates his Monads only as Real (real things), reserving the former expression for a relationship, of which we shall have to speak by and by. We further embrace this opportunity to state that Herbart carefully avoided making use even of the term Monads, perhaps, because it might have called up the remembrance of the Monads of Leibnitz, which certainly differ from his own, or perhaps because the term Monads have of late been frequently employed as equivalent with Molecules, which also differ from Herbart's Monads. Least of all would Herbart have adopted the name of atoms to designate the Real (real things)—of which he speaks—or allowed that his system was an Atomistic. We hence avoid also the use of that name, but must be allowed, for brevity's sake, to call the system a Monadology, although one differing in essential points from that of Leibnitz—a designation which we shall find more and more warranted as we study Herbart's Eidolology.

We might justly take objection to the above expression of clustre or aggregate for that complex of Monads, of which a single thing is to consist, if we were to stop short at the notion of a mere aggregate. Where a number of things remain constantly together, and where, as we have already seen, and shall more clearly see as we proceed, even these forms of connection have to be acknowledged as furnished in accordance with experience, and hence as pointing to an actual objective connection, we may not designate the latter as merely an aggregate, which always implies a kind of accidentalness in the being together (collection) of the individual elements—a mere external grouping together without any internal or essential medium of interconnection. In truth, it cannot be denied that we have to conceive the things that actually exist, as monads which are actually connected together. As they appear to us to be connected, so they really are; and, on the contrary, where they appear to us not to be connected, they really are not connected. But the question before us is not so much in
general whether, as rather how, the monads are connected with each other. As far as we have hitherto viewed and determined the notion of the thing, we have felt a gap not so much with reference to the being together (the collection) of its elementary ingredients in general, as with reference to the dynamical, and specially to the organical connection, which we fancy we perceive and deem necessary to presuppose among the parts or members of so many products of nature. We might, for example, ascribe to inorganic substances a mere external or mechanical connection—a conglomerate-like being together; but such a view could not apply to organic bodies. However this latter, the idea of life, does not fall within the range of our present subject.

Ontology can take a more enlarged view of the problem above referred to, only in the way of shewing how far the notion of the Real—which has already been fixed—allows us to acknowledge and determine a mutual influence of one Real upon the other—or, in a word, a relation of causality. We have already seen that the notion of that which is Real, implies nothing else than absolute simplicity, unchangeableness, and the not being considered as quantity, or occupying extension in time or space—in that absolute position which excludes all relativeness, dependence, and limitation of essence. But this our notion of the real we have to preserve inviolate. It is evident that of such essences we can only assert this, that a number of them are together, the which we see; but not why they are together, unless we were to search for the reason of it beyond all that is furnished, and beyond all Metaphysics—say in the practical portion of philosophy, or in the sphere of faith. Let us always bear in mind, that it is not the province of Metaphysics to sketch a Cosmogony, which is and always will remain

1 We may with propriety use the expression aggregate "with reference to that which is represented, but not with reference to the representing nor to its mechanism." (Herb. Psych. v. ii. p. 261.) "For, let us never forget, that the qualities are not connected together by any bond, nor are they joined together by any act of synthesis: but that all the representations of these qualities are joined (complicated) into one simple undivided act of representing, into one single total-force, simply on account of the unity of the soul and the always contemporaneous apprehension."

2 Psych. v. ii. p. 320. The category of cause can only be referred to the alterations of relation, but not to that which exists in itself. But in such a case it is also a necessary correlative, inasmuch as no alteration of that which is accidental (of the accident), to which description every alteration answers, can be conceived without its cause.
All that philosophy has to do is to reconcile that which is furnished, and its forms with the logical forms of thinking, i.e. to make it conceivable, but not to penetrate beyond that which is furnished into a province wholly inaccessible to us. We shall see in the sequel in what respect a further advance is here also possible. If it were required of Metaphysics to shew us à priori a general reason for the connection above referred to, that ground could be found nowhere else than in the notion of the Real itself. But here we would in vain look for such a bond to connect the monads amongst themselves into definite groups. The Real is that which is absolutely self-existent, and which stands in need of no other thing; being unchangeable, it cannot admit of any real influence on itself, nor can it, on the same ground, in itself undergo any alteration. Therefore, instead of assuming certain powers and influences, an activity and passivity in the monads, we have to confine ourselves to the statement, that inasmuch as the Real appears in certain continually-recurring groups, such relations must in themselves also exist; and we may then proceed to enquire, in what manner we shall, in the actual connections of the Real, have to conceive that relationship which is generally apprehended as that of Inherence. But this latter is at the same time also to be viewed as dependence, i.e. one of the Real is to be the cause which connects the others to itself. Now, causes may be immanent or transient. If any substance is conceived as an immanent cause (a reality-ground), then it is one and the same with its accidents or marks—its marks being only its form or appearance, and that one affirmed by itself. In such a case then the substance, although perfectly simple, would still be producing purely out of itself both the fact and the mode of its existence; it would be a causa sui, an absolute becoming—in other words, a self-contradictory notion. In fact this manner of representing has already been confuted by our above investigation of the thing and its marks. Transient causes, on the other hand, are those which consist in the exerting of influence by one object on the sphere of another, and thereby producing changes in the latter. At least two things are therefore here requisite, and the effect is not confined to that object which effects (affects), but extends to another one. But this representation cannot be received in the case under consideration any more than the former, inasmuch
as any really being affected of one real thing by another, stands opposed to the idea of absolute reality. Nor is it possible to conceive that such influence is brought about through the agency of forces which, like invisible arms, are affecting the essence and powers of one real thing, being as it were stretched out and extending to it out of and beyond another real thing. For, not only is it impossible to conceive of such forces without some real thing by which they are supported, but the slightest reflection will suffice to shew that the word power or force means really nothing else than that very effect which we had assumed and conceived as possible. An effect, suspended or still expected, is a possible effect, i.e. one cogitable but not actual; you assign a cause to it, though one which as yet is quiescent, i.e. again nothing else then that it is conceptional (thought), and affirmed in thought, hence as being possible; and such a cause is termed a power or faculty; but a cause which is not effective (producing effects) is a contradiction, as cause and effect are correlative terms.

But as all such explanations fail to afford any assistance, the question forces itself upon us, how one monad can in that assemblage of monads, which taken together constitute a certain thing, be looked upon as the cause of their being joined together; for one of the many must act the part of substance and ground, in order to explain the form of unity in the thing. And this is in fact of greatest importance, and requires to be explained, inasmuch as this unity is a phenomenon (an appearance) that is furnished. True, we might here reply, that the original coming together ought to be explained rather than and prior to explaining their existing and remaining together, as the former would throw light upon the latter. But with reference to the coming together, the following would have to be pre-supposed in giving the explanation demanded—(1st,) that the monads had not been originally together; (2dly,) space and time; (3dly,) motion—on the consideration of which notions we have not as yet entered at all. Our enquiry has therefore, in the meantime, to be confined to the causes of the unity of the thing, which unity is given in actuality. This appearance (phenomenon) owes its origin to the fact that one of the many real, which in their assemblage constitute the thing, occupies the place of a central point of union. But this Real may not, as has already been stated, be looked upon
as the innermost cause of the different properties which make their appearance in connection with it; nor are these properties (marks) simply the modifications of the one substantial real thing, for this would militate against the idea of the Real; but the presence of many Real together has to be assumed on this ground, that the real essence, which we term substance, cannot be charged with this, that plurality and unity contradict each other in the notion to which we have empirically attained. The many Real then, which lie at the ground of the properties or marks, are each, by itself, so many causes of a corresponding manifold appearing. But in that connection which is given no one Real appears by itself and alone (yea, a purely simple real could not by itself alone make its appearance—become a phenomenon at all; but they appear as that and in the manner in which they do appear, only in the given connection—not singly, but each along with the other. This complicated appearance of each one does of itself point already to another one, and this perhaps again to another one, &c. &c.; and if we now assume that one of these many occupies such a position amongst them, as that all the others in the last instance point to it, and like radii of the total appearance are joined together in it, as in a central point, we shall there have the uniting point of the manifold appearance presented, which will thus effect its unity. Hence this will occupy the place of the substance inquired after, while all the rest constitute the causes of those properties (marks) which make their appearance, and are in their turn by their position the causes of that one appearing as the substance. It is only in this sense, viz. with reference to the relations in which many Real stand to one another, that it may be said that the notion of substance implies at the same time also causality, but not in the sense put upon it by the Philosophy of Identity, where the idea of causality is shewn to be the more true and deep apprehension of that of substance, and the causal is substituted for the Substantial and the Real itself. Thus far in few words, just to show what difference there is here between declaring something to be the substance of a thing, and looking upon it as the one grand cause of all its properties, marks and appearances, and at the same time to indicate what with Herbart is the import of the term substance in its strictest acceptation.
In close connection with the notions of cause and effect is that of alteration, and it yet remains to address ourselves to the solution of this second problem of Ontology, viz. *that of the thing with its altering properties* (marks). Here, as before, when treating of the thing having *many* properties, we have, first of all, to purge the idea of alteration or of change of all the contradictions which attach thereto. In the former instance, the thing was to have been identical with the different properties attaching to it, while in the present, it is to be identical with the successive properties altering (changing) on it; it is to alter and yet admit of being, both during and after such alteration, still termed the same thing. If we conceive the thing to be a compound of many properties, as the summing up of which it is regarded, and that some of these properties change while others remain as before, and new ones are perhaps added, then that thing cannot be looked upon as being before and after such change the summing up together of the same properties, and hence cannot be termed any longer the same thing; for in such a case every property possesses equal claim to essentiality, as only all of them taken together constitute the thing.

It has already been mentioned that alteration may, according to Herbart, be conceived to take place in one of three ways, viz. from external causes, from self-determination, or lastly, as absolute becoming. But as the first of these three ways is the only one which is admissible, it is not difficult to anticipate the solution of our problem, and the peculiar view of the thing that undergoes alteration, to which it gives rise. It has been shown that the thing consists not of one real, but is a complex of many real monads; some of these remain, *i.e.* they exist in the thing which has undergone change in the same manner after as before that alteration had taken place, and these constitute the causes of what are termed the essential, *i.e.* the remaining qualities (marks) of the thing, while different monads have come to occupy the place of the other properties. As the causes of every change are thus always to be traced to the going and coming of as many real elements of the thing, it follows that the view that one single substance lying at the foundation of all phenomena (appearances) produces out of and on itself all these different effects, and hence alters itself, has to be rejected as utterly untenable.
In this sense then there is no such thing as internal altering, no self-determining, no becoming and living, no living essence; in themselves the monads are and remain unchangeable. With reference to their quality they do not become in themselves different, but are originally different one from the other, and do each preserve their quality without being subject to any change. The alterations in the thing which the given appearance points out to us, are produced only by the diversified external coming together and separating from each other of the monads—by their coming and going—the first motive of which Metaphysics is, however, no more capable of explaining than their being or not being together. Natural Philosophy is only able to determine on the further course of changes after a series of them in nature had been empirically observed. Metaphysics can only say that if such and such monads are joined together in such and such a manner, then such and such phenomena will ensue; or if such and such phenomena are given, such and such monads must have been joined together in such and such a manner. Having thus far informed us, it has accomplished its task, which consists in the explaining of what is given.

But this representation does not yet fully come up to experience, which, as it would appear, not only points out alterations in the external relations, but also in the interior of the substances themselves. In proof, we adduce the testimony of our own inner man, concluding, at the same time, that what holds true of one simple substance, that of the soul, applies equally to all other Real. Besides, if the coming together of different qualia really produces different phenomena, whose varied aspects are due to their qualities, we cannot but conceive that every single monad becomes itself necessarily cause of different apparition to other monads; and again, that these other monads exercise the same influence upon that one, so that the internal state of every single monad is to a certain extent and measure necessarily determined and altered by that coming together, and this according to the qualities of the other monads.

But again, an actual internal alteration within a monad would amount to a change in its essence, which, agreeably to our former reasoning, would be impossible. Such a change could hence only take place apparently, and not actually. The question then
arises, what is really going on in every one of the monads during that change? for the phenomenon that is given, informs us that something is going on, and this appearance has to be explained.

But we are able by means of the accidental views to arrive at such a conception of what goes on with the monad, when other monads, opposed in quality to it, meet with it, as involves no actual change in the original quality thereof, while, at the same time, it acknowledges an actual taking place. What is absolutely, the substance, is that which exists by itself, and is self-sustaining; this is implied in the idea of it. Everything, hence, that can possibly take place therein is confined to one kind—or rather to one analogon—of activity, viz. to self-preservation. For, inasmuch as the monads do in themselves differ qualitatively from one another, they will also stand differently related to one another; and as thus one and the same monad, a, is otherwise related to b, then to c, and again to c, then to d, &c., this varying relation, which takes its direction from the coming together with others, affords also different views of the quality of the monad which stands thus related, although it always remains in itself unchanged and unchangeable. True, the self-preservation would not cease under any circumstances, even though a monad were perfectly alone and by itself; but the mode of self-preservation will vary according to the relation in which its own peculiar quality stands to that of another monad. For evidently we may conceive the most different relations to subsist between different qualities. They may be opposed to one another directly or indirectly, they may be disparate (i.e. bear no reference to each other, such as cold and colour, sweetness and sound), they may be similar, or they may even be equal. Again, there may be a difference between them as to the degree of force requisite for self-preservation, as great as the difference in their qualities, and that not only with reference to one, but, at the same time, to many monads of different or of similar qualities, which themselves in turn stand in varied opposition to each other. There would be no necessity for any particular self-preservation in face of equal or of entirely disparate qualities, as such could cause no disturbance in the essence of the monad; on the other hand, those that are antagonists to one another, seem necessarily to exclude and destroy one another (which, however, could of
course not take place in this instance); hence the self-preservation of each one of them will, in such a case, appear increased and modified according to the nature of the opposition. These antagonistic states of the Real may therefore, in their together, be looked upon as so many forces at work, whose tendencies meet, on the other hand, with a corresponding resistance, and these two may, without attainer of the simplicity of the Real in itself, be made use of as being a sufficient ground for all actual phenomena. It is indeed true that no actual disturbance and change does in any one case take place in the essence itself which exists; but we conceive that this does not take place, because the monad preserves itself, and hence we do, after all, assume in thought (conception) the possibility of a disturbance; and this again causes the self-preservation, which is opposed to it, to appear as an activity and tension of the monad, specially called forth and stimulated, as it were, for its self-defence, although, if considered in itself, there is really all the while nothing going on in the monad which had not been already going on at every other time, viz. the perfectly neutral continuance of its existence. If any farther illustration be requisite, let us just bear in mind the different relationship of one and the same tone (note) towards others, with which it either accords or discords, or of one and the same colour towards others, as, for example, grey, which beside black will appear as white, and again, beside white as black. Self-preservation—this only act always continuing in itself the same, if thus we may describe it—will hence afford as many various views, will appear as a state of the monad altering itself as frequently as varied qualities meet together with it. The only particular, therefore, which may be singled out as not only apparently but actually going on in the essence of monads, is this self-preservation, to which, as the sole and last glimmering of activity, alteration, and manifestation of life, everything that can possibly take place in the simple Real, which is destitute of quantity, and in itself unchangeable, has in the last instance to be reduced. Thus much on the subject of Ontology.

The second part of Metaphysics, Synechology (from συνεχίς, connected together, continuous), is principally devoted to the problem of corporeal matter. Here philosophical investigation, which, in Ontology, had more particularly strayed behind phenomena and into the intelligible world, endeavours again to approach
to that which is immediately furnished, and to sensible phenomena. For, after what we have hitherto been told, we cannot help wondering how monads, which themselves fill no space, and, like the mathematical point, have no extension, nevertheless do, when compounded, constitute an essence, such as matter, which, to appearance at least, is extended. And even though we represented to ourselves such points most densely and closely packed together, and thus forming a mass in space, one characteristic (mark) of matter, which is generally attributed to it, its continuity,—would especially be still wanting. For when we say that matter, even in its smallest portion, always occupies a certain space, we conceive parts which do not contain in themselves any further discrete portions, but are simply, on account of their own proper extension, in themselves continuous magnitudes. But this involves, at the same time, a contradiction, as we are required to conceive, on the one hand, these portions which are not to be subdivided any farther, while, on the other, we should, nevertheless, be able to continue, at least in thought, this subdividing without ceasing, and without ever reaching a point where farther division would be impossible.\(^1\) Before we can lay down anything with reference to the possibility of matter, we will hence require more particularly to examine into the idea of continuity, which, whenever it is applied to what is real and we attempt to conceive real, continuous quanta, \textit{i. e.} matter, at once involves a contradiction.

But matter was conceived as a continuous magnitude, \textit{i. e.} as in itself, in its essence indiscriminately extended, only because we feel constrained to conceive it in general as extended in space, and because we find it empirically in that form. The contradictory element, then, that enters into the idea of a material Real, is derived from space (and as we will find from time also), which has been mixed up with the essence of the real thing. But if this element be carefully separated, nothing is found to remain beyond those monads, which are destitute of quantity, and it is impossible to perceive how a \textit{Continuum}, such as is presented in and formed by matter, could be made up out of these.

Kant had declared that time and space were only the subjective forms of intuition, and had thus denied their objectivity. But since we do not allow the correctness of the theory of these innate

\(^1\) Vide Herbart's Metaphysics, § 240, and following.
categories, we shall have to point out some ground in the objective world on which to account for these ideas of time and space, and that even though these forms implied nothing more than mere appearance to us. Every appearance indicates some relation in that which is objective, and specially one so general and unavoidable, as, that objects occupy space. Even this, that we are utterly unable to determine at will any one of those individually fixed time-and-space-relations of things which appear to us, but find them already determined in experience, proves that objective relations are lying at the foundation. To increase or diminish the magnitude or duration of an appearance, does not in the very least depend on us; we always get the appearance (phenomenon), the object within its determined limits; and the time-and-space-form is furnished (given) together with the matter of a sensation—the one as well as the other—as one whole. True, time and space are not immediately given in sensation, but still they are mediately furnished; as we would else not be capable of determining by observation the forms and the existence of objects. Now, even granting that we ourselves had transported time and space into the phenomena, it does not thence follow that, on finding out that such is the case, we would be at once obliged to retract what we had thus transported; on the contrary, constrained by our very thinking, we feel obliged to ascribe objective truth to them; they continue to assert their right to be considered as actual on speculative grounds, just because these categories manifest themselves as relations which require to be thought (conceived). "True, indeed," says Herbart,1 "a more close investigation will shew, that we are not to conceive the space-determinations, and what resembles them, as forming part of the original reality of every single individual (real) of things in themselves; but our thinking of isolated individualities will lead to no result. If we are to apprehend experience, we require to comprehend together the things in themselves. Here, then, we again find that whenever our thinking is thus engaged in comprehending together, we do, without fail, assume anew and independently of all sensibility, that same form with reference to space, and that we feel constrained to transfer it to the "ensemble" of things according to

1 Encyclopædia, p. 308.
definite rules, and that with full consciousness of the what and the how of our procedure in thinking; whence arises in Metaphysics the doctrine of intelligible space."

All this doubtlessly indicates objective relations, and the only question for us to answer is, how we are, without contradiction, to conceive them, and that so as sufficiently to account for that which is given; but we may not, as Kant has done, on that account declare that the whole of that relation is only subjective, or, in other words, that time and space are an illusion. It was therefore necessary, in order thoroughly to explain this important subject, to propound an entirely new theory of these forms of intuition, as they are termed, and this Herbart attempted to do by what he designates as a construction of the intelligible space. It is impossible for us to enter at any length on that subject, on account of its peculiar difficulty, extent, and mathematical mould; and we can do no more then observe, in general, that, without mixing up with it any intuition, or that empirical representation of space, which we already have, Herbart derives that notion by an abstract mathematical construction. Starting with a point, and taking it alone (in other words, something that expresses no space whatever), but still, by an atomistic joining together of point to point, he derives first a line—which is the first dimension—and so on the others also; while in Geometry, and in other metaphysical systems, a line is drawn by an onward moving in space of a point, or, in other words, in that space which had already before hand been represented. "Let us, for the sake of simplicity, only affirm two essences, and we have thus also only two localities. These are entirely separate from each other, but without any distance. They are by each other. Let us now keep hold of that by one another, and inasmuch as the locality is accidental, in as far as the essences are concerned, let us place one essence into the locality of the other, and a third point (the simple locality of the simple essence) will thereby be added to the second essence. The second point is thus situate exactly between the first and the third, inasmuch as no other transition for the latter two exists as yet, save wholly through the second one.

The same, if continued on the same ground, furnishes an infinite, rigid (fixed) straight line. ¹

We will not continue this construction: suffice, if what has been said will render intelligible what is to follow. The end has been attained, if, by what has been stated, the difficulty above alluded to has been removed with reference to the question, how it is possible to conceive that what is extended derives its origin from that which occupies no space, and that it is not at all necessary for us to transport space into the monads themselves, although the monads do, in their connection, present themselves to us as Continua. Space is, and remains entirely excluded, with reference to the interior of the monads, while it is nevertheless possible to conceive them as in space-relations. We have also, at the same time, here solved and explained the Antinomy of Kant, with reference to the divisibility of matter. This divisibility refers only to empty space as a Continuum; but this latter is empty, i.e. it is in itself nothing; it only is and indicates the relation in which the Real are represented amongst themselves. That this is really true, will be found by making the most simple thought-experiment. If we conceive only one single monad by itself, we are utterly unable to determine any locality in which it exists; it then exists in no one place, and we might say that it is wherever we are able to place it, and yet is nowhere in any one determined position. It only attains locality, and, as it were, comes to a standing still and stable, when we conceive a second point between which and itself there is to be a certain definite distance. Thus we place these two points into one common space-representation, and conceive them as connected together by one space.

This leads us now at once to proceed to the representations of standing still and of movement. Neither the one nor the other of these can possibly be observed on one single point, nor can we conceive of it in the case of one single point. Hence also neither of them can belong to the notion of what in itself is real, and both can only be ascribed to the relation in which many real things are conceived to stand towards one another. We are particularly apt to fancy that movement must be something that belongs to what in itself is real, or that it is some property of its essence. But from

¹ Chief points in Metaphysics, p. 228, in Herbart's Opuscules, vol. i.
what has already been stated, it will be sufficiently evident, that, à
priori, nothing of the kind can possibly be deduced from the notion
of the Real. It is not necessary to demonstrate the possibility of
the monads being in motion; for motion or standing still must be
given, if either of them is to be predicated of the monads. Metaphysics is incapable of demonstrating, either that the monads were
originally standing still, or that they had been in motion. As far
as their nature is concerned, they are neither the one nor the other.
Either of the two would be equally possible. It is hence impossible
to return an answer to the question about the absolute cause of
the motion—in fact, motion has in general no cause. The only
thing we can do is, when in a movement already given, or in a
standing still that is given, an alteration or transition from the
one to the other takes place, we may then enquire after the special
cause thereof, and look for an answer to it, but again, only from
experience, and from those sciences which are its handmaids.
"However, the space-relation which we should expect originally to
subsist between a multitude of substances which are mutually in-
dependent, is that of motion. On the other hand, rest would appear
infinitely improbable, inasmuch as it indicates only one possible
case amongst the innumerable possibilities of greater or less
celerity, viz. that in which the celerity is just equal to 0" (Met.
I. p. 430).1 A thing appears to us, as onlookers, to be in motion
when we are unable, in perceiving or representing it, to connect it
to something else, when it ever eludes such a connection with
another point which is conceived as standing firm and stable.
Hence do we require some other point or thing, which, in concep-
tion, is already taken as standing still, in order to represent a
thing as in motion: but we have already seen that this point it-
self could not be taken as standing still without a third one, and
again that third one in the same manner, and thus the whole
points to a texture—a network of relations drawn in conception
—for which nowhere in all space any absolutely first, firm,
or moveable point of connection, can be found; thus affording proof
that the whole representation only indicates a relative relation-
ship, and that one relating to the onlooker. No river will be
considered flowing unless banks are also given which stand still.

1 Here, then, rest is taken as a kind of motion, while, on the contrary, it is the pure
negation of motion.
When we drive in a carriage, we sometimes fancy that we stand still, and observe that the trees are in motion.  

What has been said with reference to motion, holds equally true of the elements of which that motion is a compound—we refer to space, and also to time, which is just the measure of celerity, and greater or less celerity, indicates nothing more than the peculiar manner in which we fail in the comprehending together and the fixing of one point to and with another one—it indicates the continual and continued escaping of the one out of that space in which we attempt to join it to the other point. Time, therefore, must also be looked upon as only a notion of relationship, and, just like duration, does not inform us in any way about the essence of what in itself is real, which is altogether destitute of the attribute of time.

To sum up in few words the results of the doctrine of intelligible space. Space is not, as Kant would have it, a merely subjective form of our sensuous representing, but, like time, it is a general abstraction from the objective relations of the single monads and things amongst themselves, but only with reference to an onlooker. It is hence an appearance indeed, but an objective one—one given, which is not only passing over from ourselves upon the relations of things, but also in the same manner passing over from them upon us. In its results, then, as our investigation has fully shewn, the intelligible space and the sensible space come to the same thing, but not in its grounds of cognition; the former has three dimensions like the latter; it bears reference to the relations and situations of the real monads themselves, just as the sensible (represented and psychological) space bears reference to the relations of things which are represented. In short, there is no difference between the two with reference to the thing—they both constitute one and the same notion. The union and separation of the Real in space, in which we have to conceive what in itself is real, corresponds entirely to the coming and going in the sensible space in which we desery essences.

Time and space having thus been set free, as it were, from the interdict under which Kant had laid them, and again restored to

1 Compare Hartenstein's very lucid exposition of Herbart's ideas in his Problems and Fundamental Doctrines of general Metaphysics, Leipzig, 1836.
Metaphysics, we now return to the principal subject of Synechology—
to matter. It will be remembered that matter had been considered
as an accumulation of point-like monads. The multiplicity of
these had given rise to the appearance of an extended Continuum.
If a definite number of Real are by each other with reference
to all the dimensions of space, they will, to the onlooker, give rise
to the appearance of an extended, or all of them will appear to flow
together into one extended essence. But this representation is
not yet sufficient to explain satisfactorily all the phenomena pre-
seated in the corporeal world. Especially do we feel the want of
a key to those phenomena in nature which we ascribe to the powers
of attraction and repulsion, which powers, in fact, cannot be ac-
knowledged at all in accordance with the system of Herbart. But
we learn beyond contradiction from nature, that many substances
are not accidental aggregates of real parts, but that their form,
the situation and number of their parts, their density, their inter-
nal and external structure, &c. &c. seem to depend on some in-
ternal process, or working and life of these substances themselves,
which will more specially be obvious when we think of organic for-
ations. This we commonly ascribe to certain powers, which,
according to the tendency of their effects, we reduce to attraction
and repulsion. But inasmuch as the word "power" does not
explain anything at all, as has already been shewn, we have to
substitute in room thereof some other ground—some other caus-
ality for their cohesion and formation. With reference to this point,
proof is first of all adduced to shew that the predicate of impene-
trability, which at one time was looked upon as an essential mark
of matter, does not belong to it—a fact which is at any rate allowed
by modern chemists. Just as it is perfectly possible to conceive one
mathematical point occupying one and the same place as another
one: so the monads also, which in this respect resemble the math-
ematical points, may be represented as the one in the other, in
one and the same space. In this respect also we see that there
is a difference between Herbart and former atomists.

But attraction and repulsion are, to speak correctly, notions
which can only bear reference to, and which presuppose impenetrable
elementary component parts; but if these are proven to be a
work of fiction, then no further ground for seeking refuge in those
hypothetical representations is left, and nothing remains but to
account for the appearance of that class of phenomena. Let us keep in mind that for constructing the space-relations we required nothing more than these two notions: the together and the not-together; from these, again, the notion of the imperceptibly-together, was, as occupying a place between them, as it were, derived of itself. This latter will now have to be considered as being a partial penetrating, just as the perfectly-together had to be represented as being a total penetrating. (If any person should here object that such a partial penetrating could not be conceived in the case of mathematical points, we would remind the objector of several geometrical problems, in which the geometer has recourse to the same fiction). The question now arises, what does actually take place in the Real where two are thus situated? We know already that the only thing which actually takes place is self-preservation. Hence, if the external grouping of things is to be derivable from the internal activity of the essences—and this is implied in the problem above given—it can have been effected by nothing else than by this self-preservation. If, then, attraction is to take place, we require to assume that the monad $a$ which attracts, is internally so constituted as to tend towards a penetrating into herself of the other monad $b$; the self-preservation in $a$ must be the ground of this state of matters, and must hence, to a certain extent, have already been called into exercise; the monad $b$ must therefore have penetrated already into $a$, although not perfectly, or else this tendency could no longer be called into play, and thus that relationship must have been entered into which we have designated as the (being) imperfectly together. Further, we have to assume that by such penetrating, although it be only partial, the whole of the monad had been stimulated into a state of self-preservation, inasmuch as it is impossible to conceive of parts in the simple essence of a monad (such parts can only be conceived in that space through which monads penetrate to one another); and thus an internal state is produced in the monad $a$, which does not correspond to its external relation, and to which only the perfectly-together of the two would really answer. One of two things is then requisite in order to remove that state of matters, viz.: either a perfect penetrating into each other, or a perfect separating from one another, on the part of the monads; one or the other of those two will hence also take place according
as the monad is able or unable to attain to the requisite degree of self-preservation. If it is unable to attain thereto, as, for example, if opposed at the same time by a number of monads of opposing quality, then it will have to appear to retreat, for, under all circumstances, it requires to preserve itself as a real, or (and this amounts to the same thing) it will appear to repulse those monads which are penetrating into it, while in the contrary case it will appear to attract them.

And here, before proceeding, we may as well return to the question with which we entered on the study of Synechology, How an accumulation of entirely incorporeal and spaceless monads can give rise to an essence, such as matter, which, to appearance at least, is extended, and how something visible, yea, and firm and rigid, can be produced out of something invisible, which, for sensuous representation, could only be a non-entity? Let us then assume, that a multitude of monads exists within a given space. As long as they are represented as separate, nothing at all will ensue, nor will anything be perceptible; nor would the conditions requisite for the formation of matter be given, if all those monads would be of exactly the same quality: they require rather to be of an opposite character, or there would be no ground for anything actually coming to pass (happening); moreover, these different monads require to be conceived as being imperfectly together. In that case self-preservation, and with it attraction also, would immediately ensue; and if no hindrance occurs, will then proceed onwards even to a perfect penetrating of one another. However, the monads would, in that instance, again constitute but one single mathematical point, and thus no matter would be produced. For the latter, repulsion also is requisite. In order at the same time to bring about repulsion, it is necessary to presuppose not only two monads, but more of them—three at the very least—in a state of being imperfectly together. We assume, then, that two monads, which are equal to one another, penetrate together into a third one which is opposed to them. This will actually take place if the self-preservation of that third monad is such that it suffices for these other two; but if it does not suffice, repulsion ensues, and it will repel the other two monads out of itself, and that just so far as its particular internal state requires. These two, or more monads, will now occupy a space, and present themselves as
molecules, which again accumulate in the same manner, and ultimately present a visible mass, which may be of the most different degrees of density, according as the internal qualitative antagonism, and the attraction which hence ensues, is more or less strong.

In the case under consideration, where the external situation of monads, the configuration, cohesion, rigidity, &c. of matter are looked upon as the consequence of the internal state (and not vice versa), an incongruency of the two states is indeed presupposed, but one which as such cannot continue. True, in a certain manner, those states are to correspond to each other, but they are at the same time also to antagonise each other. True, the higher or lower degree of self-preservation, which is called out in the imperfect being together of the monads, is in one respect indeed dependent on that external situation, in as far as it takes its direction from the more or less of their being together; it will be the weaker the less the former has penetrated into the latter. In this sense the internal is certainly conditioned by the external. But in that partial penetrating through of one another, what is actually coming to pass is still equally spread over all the portions of the monad, even over those which had not been penetrated through (at least we were forced to represent it in that way in accordance with the above fiction); hence, what is actually coming to pass, viz. that this state is the total one of the monad, and what follows therefrom, viz. the attraction or repulsion, is, in its principle, not a consequence of the together (which is only the condition), but follows rather from the simple nature and quality of the monad. Hence, as has already been stated, that incongruency of states cannot continue, nor be lastingly retained; as in conceptions, so in the phenomenon also, it is only the transition or the resolution of the contradiction into congruency; and this is implied in the above proposition, that the external situation takes its direction from the internal state.

The above described theory of attraction and repulsion, which, according to Herbart's precedent, we may illustrate by representing to ourselves a number of balls penetrating into one another, says in fact nothing more than this, that inasmuch as transitory powers, such as pass out of one real and through empty space, and operate upon other real, cannot by any possi-
bility exist, we can only conceive an immediate causality and reciprocal affecting, and by means thereof an affecting (action upon) of what is in the distance, i.e. of monads which are distant, and which either has or has not the mutual penetrating of monads into one another (the chemical penetrating through) for its consequence; a reciprocal action then, which is entirely owing to the self-preservation which had been mutually called forth, and the result of which depends on the quality and the quantity of the monads which meet with one another in space. Even upon the ground that reference is here made to a reciprocal operation (action) which depends fully as much on the mutual self-preservation of the monads as on mutual determinations, can the theory under consideration not be charged with embodying a pure mechanism.

But still it cannot but be felt a difficulty in point of logical rigour, which, however, Herbart inculcates most energetically throughout his writings, that alongside of that fundamental notion about the simplicity and absolute immutability of the Real, a kind of internal capacity of formation thereof is also asserted. For, after all, the monad is only constrained by given external occasions, by the together with other monads of opposite qualities, to produce those internal varying states which have been introduced into the monad under the name of self-preservation. In truth, it is difficult to understand how the fact that such states are maintained in the monad, even after the together has ceased, yea, and may continue within its power even to such an extent, as that it is able, memorialiter, to renew them, can be reconciled with the original simple quality of monads. True it is that experience obliges us to have recourse to such a supposition, and Herbart conceives, in accordance with his peculiar method, to have done enough if he had indicated a way in which to meet that requirement, without being obliged to have recourse to the theory of preformed germs and free organical self-development, in the accep-
tation of the dynamical school, whose theory he abhorred. The monad is simple, and remains simple; whatever might in this case be designated as development to an organism, is only an attracting and repelling of other monads by means of the above described process during the actual coming to pass. For our present purpose it will be sufficient, if by way of conclusion, we
assist the reader in representing the matter to himself by an illustration taken from the process of nutrition which goes on in the cellular tissue of plants and animals, which we transcribe from Herbart's Natural Philosophy, and that as much as possible in his own words. Let us first of all take a view of the lowest stage, where as yet no difference between animal and vegetable life is marked. If pure water evaporates, of course nothing else than pure water can remain behind. But if the water contained any foreign elements, they will, during the evaporation of the water, if they have been left as a residuum, gradually approximate one another. If these elements are heterogeneous, then they come perfectly together, and unite in a chemical manner immediately on being brought into contact, which in this case means as much as immediately on being brought into an imperfect together, i.e. the imperfect together, which is here the presupposed external situation (disposition) of the monads, cannot continue, according to the above theory of actual coming to pass, unless the internal state correspond to it; but in the imperfectly (being) together the internal state was one of self-preservation, called forth in all the parts; hence it became necessary for the monads to enter perfectly into one another, or, in other words, chemically to penetrate through each other. This, for example, is the case with reference to lime which water throws down when it boils. If the parts are homogeneous, and without any determination as to internal states, nothing ensues; but if they are homogeneous indeed, as to their quality, but at the same time in states of self-preservation, heterogeneous amongst themselves, owing to previous connections by virtue of their internal formability, which latter, as has been stated, may be assumed in them, then they come indeed together when brought into contact, but the penetration, which commences, is at the same time connected with a mutual impeding of their internal states, which impeding we will only be able perfectly to account for when we come to study Psychology, but which in the case before us, depends on the fact, that these internal states or self-preservations are in opposition to one another, which renders their perfect amalgamation, and hence the perfect penetrating through of the monads themselves impossible, or at least retards it. But a relatively deeper penetrating in will never-

1 Metaphysics, § 426.
theless occur in the case of a very imperfectly together, inasmuch as then every monad calls forth in the other the same self-preservation which takes place within itself, and hence we have now that ground of attraction with which we are already acquainted. This refers, however, only to supposed heterogeneous states; the quality of the monads themselves was to be homogeneous; and this homogeneity, where no attraction can take place, impedes in turn the penetrating in, which, in perfectly heterogeneous elements, would go on with unretarded necessity; time flows on, and oscillations which, according to the different circumstances, may be more or less rapid, take place between that impeding and the attracting self-preservation spoken of.

But if, as we may easily suppose, there are not only two but many more of those elements in the surrounding water, and these are sufficiently near to one another, there ensues a drawing onwards of them by means of mediate attraction, and a communication of oscillation on the part of the first two (or more) elements, which had been brought into that "rapproport" with each other. But, as the impeding increases the more deeply the elements penetrate into each other, while, on the contrary, the attraction becomes, in the same ratio, more powerful and quick, the more imperfect the together as yet is, it follows that the more distant elements which were only afterwards and mediatly laid hold on, will be more attracted, and will tend more from the periphery towards the central point than those from which the motion at the first proceeded; but as soon as, during the progress of that procedure in the elements, too many are attracted and accumulated, then some repulsion will again take place between them. Hence there is constant motion in that place of the water where what we have described is going on. How far then will this motion spread? Are there no limits within which it will be confined? Is there no definite form which is to proceed out of it?

"Assuming then, as we actually find it in nature, that round a couple of elements there are on all sides others like them, then in a spherical space, from the above-mentioned reasons, the others will first be drawn into the same place in which the procedure originated with the first elements, and afterwards gradually again be moved out of it in the direction of all the radii, just like the first ones. But this last movement never puts the elements at such a
distance as that any one of them would be entirely separated. For, first, there are here no grounds for any considerable celerity, as the oscillations depend on the gradual impeding of the internal states in every one of the elements; and, secondly, there always remains a ground of connection, as, according to the first supposition, every element represents something antagonistic with reference to the other one. Hence, while there is yet strong oscillation in the middle of that spherical space, gradually a quiet ensues all round about. Those elements which had already been going from within outwards, have attained to a greater equilibrium between their former and their present internal state, and hence they not only present attraction towards one another, but its result, a definite mutual situation, is less disturbed by oscillations, and attains more and more to a kind of stability and firmness, and that in measure as the water continues to evaporate. Add to this, that those elements which are in the middle are gradually set free from immediate contact with the other water, inasmuch as they are now surrounded by those other elements. But if what surrounds them is not perfectly uniformly shut off (and this could not be the case unless the situation of the elements originally given possessed geometrical uniformity), then here and there a communication with the water without is still left open, and hence the former process of attracting new elements from the middle is there still carried on; consequently there is also a renewal of the repulsion to all directions; and as a limit had already been assigned to the latter by a kind of firm surroundour, the integument becomes necessarily more dense and definite, inasmuch as the whole grows from within, as long as it continues to draw nourishment from without by such apertures."

"Let us now examine," Herbart goes on to say, "whether this description will suit one of the infusory animaules, as they are termed. We are unable to affirm with certainty that it is an animal; but no person will undertake to demonstrate that those microscopical objects which precede the green matter, deserve more the name of animals. So much is plain, that the slightest stimulus by something external—by light, or heat, or foreign elements, which perhaps might exist besides them in the same water, could and necessarily would alter both their movement and formation."
Having called attention to this kind of demonstration, which we deem characteristic of the system, and which acquires a peculiar interest the more Chemistry seems now-a-days to come back to the theory of molecules, and the further the microscopical discoveries of Ehrenberg, Caignard de la Tour, and others, are pushed, we leave it to students of nature, and especially to Physiologists, whether and in how far they feel themselves warranted to adopt these views, or are enabled to trace by means of them alone, and without acknowledging, in the various organisms, any immanent design or tendency to formation, the ultimate grounds in the explanation of the products of nature. We observe only, that the obscurity which will in great measure be felt specially with reference to the doctrine of the actual coming to pass, will only be satisfactorily removed in the last section of Metaphysics, in Eidolology and Psychology, to the study of which we shall now proceed.
LECTURE SIXTH.
(Herbart.—Continuation and Conclusion.)

Having determined matter or the In-itself of the material world and its time and space relations, we have now only to proceed to a more accurate investigation of the doctrine about the soul—which branch of the subject other works on Metaphysics would probably have designated as Pneumatology or rational Psychology. This flows as a postulate from what has preceded; for as yet the one point in which all appearance coincides as a totality of manifold elements to a unity, is awanting. This unity cannot be found anywhere else than in the Me. As everything in the system of Herbart is founded on what is given, so this enquiry also requires to take its start from an empirical basis, more especially from the intellect of man, as that, to which everything else appeareth (is presented), and which supports the subjective phenomena, whence also this doctrine is termed Eidolology (εἴδωλον).

If we had proposed to ourselves to marshal before the student the whole phalanx of Herbart's Polemics, and to exhibit not only the positive but also the critical portion of his labours, we should certainly find ourselves here at a great disadvantage by the ὄρθρον πρότερον, with which we are chargeable in expounding the system of Herbart before that of Fichte. But as we have it only in view to attempt expounding purely and simply the peculiar positive doctrines of that philosopher, without entering on all that extensive Polemic, which often serves only to obscure them, the historical prolepsis, to which we have pled guilty, cannot materially affect our delineation, far less can it give rise to a misrepresentation of the system.

The Me, to which every one refers as being himself, is, in the first instance, our person, and implies everything which belongs immediately to our body and to our spirit. But it is not that per-
sonal Me of which we are here to speak, and which, if it were to be fully and sufficiently indicated, would require a long series of predicates—an auto-description and auto-biography. We refer here rather to what is termed the pure or the absolute Me, at which we arrive at last after having in thought eliminated everything which is only state of our soul. That Me, which thus designates itself, is found in the inmost depth of our self-consciousness. It refers not only to the body but also to all the sensations, representations, wishes, in short, to all our activity as to something that belongs to it, that is connection with it, that proceeds from it; from it we say, as from the innermost and invariable central point of the essence, the connecting point of all thinking and doing. But this Me does not only represent to itself the outer world, but also its own self. If it puts the question to itself, what itself is, the answer is returned: I am that essence which represents to myself both the world and my own self. The Me represents itself; it has or forms an image of itself. Hence, the essential characteristic of the Me is self-consciousness; it does not discover any other within itself; it cognises itself, and knows about itself only as about a self-consciousness.

But is that Me really an essence, or is it merely self-consciousness? Knowledge—no matter whether it bear reference to ourselves or to other things—is only a certain state, an activity. But such cannot be conceived without some being which is in that state, or which is the author of that activity. So much then seems to be evident, that the Me must in itself also be something real. Add to this, that no man will look upon himself as being merely an activity—to wit, of something else; but that on the contrary, if there is anything at all which is immediately certain to us—if there is anything that is affirmed in and with us, it is beyond doubt this, that there is at the foundation of our personality one single essence which is self-subsistent, and remains always the same in itself in all the states through which it may pass. This being a fact that is given, we have to acknowledge that the Me is something real.

The Me then is indeed a Real, but one of many properties, of varying states, powers, faculties, activity, and passivity. Here we meet once more that contradictory notion of a thing with many and varying marks (characteristics), with which we are already
acquainted. But there is, moreover, in this instance a special contradiction in that notion of the pure Me, as it had been commonly apprehended, particularly since the days of Fichte. The Me is to be that which knows about itself, hence the subject to which its own portrait is presented as an object. This image, the object, is to be identically the same as the subject; it is to express or to exhibit the subject entirely—it is faithfully to reflect it; on this account Fichte had designated the Me as the absolute Subject-Object, or as the Identity of subject and object. But is it ever actually possible for that real essence, which produces this imaging by its activity, to contemplate itself immediately in its portrait? What is it that we behold in it? We answer, a Me imaged, a Me as object; but then it is exactly to be not object but the contrary; a Me beheld would be an object; or, in other words, it would just be not the Me itself but the Non-Me. Our beholding cannot behold itself—the eye cannot see itself; thus also with reference to the Me, it only beholds its portraiture as a portraiture, which exhibits one that holds, as a representing, that represents itself as that which represents, &c. &c., and thus it would be shut up to an infinite series of representations, at every turn representing itself, and might be compared to a row of individuals, of whom each one is looking at the other. Without involving a contradiction, it will therefore be ever impossible to declare that subject and object are one and the same; yea more, according to Herbart, this would constitute the highest and least cogitable of all contradictions.

But again, there can be no doubt that the Me is given just as it exists. It is hence no more possible to push it aside than to do so with reference to other phenomena that are given, but that notion has to be purged of contradiction, and the appearance of the Me in internal experience has to be accounted for. Here we avail ourselves again of the method of relations. We have seen that it depends on this, that a contradictory notion (in this instance the subject-object) is resolved into its component parts, and that something is predicated of the together of these component parts, which could not have applied to each of them, taken individually. In this case it is not the subject which represents, but only the object that can possibly be multiplied. True indeed, the method does not pronounce on that point, but the problem itself furnishes us with a directory for its application, as it
requires no farther explanation to shew that the object (the Me that is represented) is that which will have to be multiplied. The Me that knows, beholds itself in a thousand different states, as feeling, thinking, willing, &c. &c.—all which representations of ourselves we designate as our Me. Thus then the object has to be multiplied, and something is to be true with reference to the together of those many Me-objects, which could not possibly be true of any single definite representation of the Me, viz. that it is equal to the Me-subject. "We see now thus far at least, that (the essence of the Me) the Meity rests on a manifold objective basis, every portion of which is only accidental with reference to it, inasmuch as if one were removed all the rest of them would still serve to form a sufficient support for the Me. I affirm myself as this and as that other (I represent myself definitely now in this and then in that other form), but I am not tied to any one of them as long as I am capable of changing."—(Psychol. i. p. 104.)

But this is not yet a perfect solution of the enigma. It is only the first necessary step towards it. "Only then when a number of objects are represented, something about them appertains to him who represents them, viz. their being comprehended together into one representation, and further, that to which this gives rise. Hence, the modification sought after, by virtue of which something has to be noticed with reference to the various objects, which would not apply to any one of them taken singly, and which, on that ground, might perhaps belong to ourselves, must also be traced to the above. In that case the representation of ourselves remains indeed dependent on the representation of objects; it refers to them, but yet does not coincide therewith."

But the many objects, as merely a sum of the states or determinations which are represented, do evidently not yet suffice to exhaust the full idea of the essence of the Me or of self-consciousness. A subject which is wholly taken up, by turns, by varying feelings and intuitions, has not yet attained to distinct self-consciousness; it requires to be capable of opposing and distinguishing itself from all these states, as that which remains, as the identical in all these states. From the objects, from these individual states, guided out of and by them, we have to penetrate to our own selves; but we require also to be actually elevated above the being wholly taken up with that which is objective, and may not
remain entangled therein, in order that the essence of the Me may constitute a contrast to all those determinations which are attributed to the Me, and by virtue of which it may be distinguished from them, notwithstanding its connection with them. Our investigation may not take an opposite course, nor may we arbitrarily assume an absolute Me, which would itself call forth, with an absolute spontaneity, all determinations within itself; such a Me does not exist in reality, but is only a scientific abstraction. It is undeniably given and true, as every one of us will find by noticing what is going on in him, that in general we live first of all in objectivity, and are wholly taken up by it, and that we attain only gradually to self-consciousness; that every one of us evidently only comes to himself from the representing of that which is foreign and objective. Inasmuch as the consciousness of the pure Me, of the Self, does not at all exist previous to objects, but, on the contrary, objects exist before that consciousness, which is only an assumption to which we feel gradually constrained to have recourse—"the ground on which we are taken beyond the representation of the objective can only be found in the latter, and that which is represented must, in its multiplicity, be so constituted as itself to strike off the fetters, in which a subject would be held which would always cognize only objects, but never himself."—(Vide ut supra, p. 108.)

It follows, then, that the single definite representations must, in a certain manner, lead us beyond the representing of themselves, i.e. the single representations, not, however, by themselves and as individual ones, but in their together, must stand so related as that the one diminishes, i.e. impedes, yet without destroying the other, because, in the relation of impeding, that which is passively impeded necessarily still exists, and that just as much as that which actively impedes, whence we are able to account for memory where obscuring had taken place. In a manifold representing, there must hence be a mutual conditioning of one another, if self-consciousness is to be possible. Thus, for example, the representation of one colour excludes that of another—one sensation of taste or of touch another, and we soon attain to the conviction, if e.g. mention is made of it in Logic, that while it is indeed possible to conceive together, and to unite in one notion (as for example in that of a rose) disparate qualities, such
as red, fragrant, round, &c. which belong to spheres or series of sensation, which are wholly different, it is impossible to do this with reference to qualities which belong to the same common sphere (such as red, yellow, white, &c.) "This contradicting, impeding, or disturbing, brings motion into the soul, and not only motion but also formation."

By that theory of mutual impeding, on which the origin of the most perfect self-consciousness and of pure-thinking will, in the last instance, be accounted for, as well as all the modes and degrees of distinctness of consciousness, from below upwards, Herbart has set aside all the former theories concerning different faculties and powers in the soul, from which the different functions are derived—as, for example, a faculty of sensation, of feeling, of memory, of representation, &c. as embodying modes of explaining both unmeaning and irrational, while at the same time he stood forward one of the first vigorously to oppose those peculiar views in Psychology.

We have formerly, when treating of the problems of inherence and of causality, alluded to the self-preservation of two or of more Real in the face of one another. We had then only referred to self-preservation as directed against disturbances which would take place, if it were possible, that a real essence could actually be disturbed or destroyed, inasmuch as we had only treated of an antagonism of real essences. We had thus made allusion to disturbances which, in fact, never actually take place. But in the present instance, in Psychology, where we have also to advert to disturbances or impedings, matters are very different. There such impedings do actually ensue, inasmuch as in that sphere, in our consciousness, they no longer occur as between real essences but as between representations merely, to which absolute position cannot be applied at all, i.e. which are not looked upon as simple essences existing by themselves, as they depend for their existence only on the self-preservation of the soul, and which, hence, must be not only in themselves compounded in manifold ways, but also liable to be disturbed; in short, are of a totally different nature from the simple self-preservations of the Real themselves. With reference to the soul and its general and simple self-preservation, in the proper sense of the term, any individual definite mode of its self-preservation, or, in other words, any one definite repre-
sentation is only accidental. The self-preservation, as such, continues, however the soul may be determined in itself and by other things from without; the qualitative What of the soul is not touched thereby, and only the modifications (the states) of the general self-preservation do mutually modify each other. We will learn in the sequel how they require to modify one another, if self-consciousness is to be produced; but that they require to modify one another is evident, even on this ground, that all of them occur in one sphere, viz. in the one self-preservation of the one soul-monad, in which sphere all of them have their common and their substantial element; on the other hand, the fact that they have all part in the same common element will again enable them to stand forth one towards the other in a kind of relative independence, and to be in a certain relation towards each other as powers, although certainly only as such that are variable. It will hence be possible to look upon, and to treat them in a certain sense like the self-preservations of the Real; as we have observed it before, so here also they will be opposed, homogeneus, but at the same unequal as to strength or weakness, and hence impede, or else assist one another,—they will condition one another in the most diversified manner, yet in infinitely different ways, and constitute in their together a system partly confluent and partly discrete, as we shall see more clearly as we proceed.

If we have once admitted that pure self-consciousness presupposes, as its foundation, a multitude of different definite representations of the Me, and that this idea, as it is termed, has been abstracted as being the general one from all those many determinations of the Me, it follows also that the pure Me-subject, to which we refer, may not by any means be confounded with the real soul-monad itself, but that, standing related to those its determinations (the many Me-objects), joined together with, and yet distinct from them, it is not the real Me, the soul, but only in general the actual knowledge and self-consciousness, and that absolute position neither applies nor requires to apply to it; which position was, in the first instance, as we have seen, to have been predicated with reference to the notion of the subject-object. But Herbart does not stop short with simply viewing that pure activity, self-consciousness itself, as something not substantial and not abso-
lute; but just because absolute position cannot be referred to that multiple-one, he applies it to something more profound, even to that soul-mond which lies at the foundation, and within the do-
main, i. e. in the self-preservation of which we find the basis of all that activity. This, again, is one of those subjects where the doc-
trine of existence, which had found its confirmation in Ontology, is again brought before us as subject for enquiry. Without, however, entering anew on that point, we proceed to the consid-
eration of that "mechanism" which takes place in the soul between the individual representations themselves, and which is supposed to have the formation of consciousness in general as its conse-
quence.

If employed in the proper meaning, the individual represen-
tations may be designated as powers which resist, but do not destroy one another. It is indeed true that they do not remain perfectly unaltered in that resistance, but it is equally true that, with reference to their quality, they remain unchanged; their What, or that which is represented, remains the same object, whether it be presently represented or not. The thing that undergoes alteration is the degree of intensity, on which their vividness, distinctness, or obscurity depend. "The sum of the imp-
peding (or of the resistance), and the proportion of impeding, is that on which everything here depends. The former is; as it were, the burden which is to be distributed, which arises from the (oppositions) antagonisms of the representation. If we are able to indicate that burden, and are acquainted with the proportion in which the different representations yield to it, then an easy calculation in proportions will give us the statical point of every representation, i. e. the ground of its obscuration in the equili-
bruim." (Vide Psych. 14). But it would seem that innumerable representations would always, at one and the same time, take place in us, inasmuch as we always stand in relationship to innum-
erable other real things. This, however, is not actually the case, but one is always more especially present, and that representa-
tion is generally, as it were, engaged in a struggle with another one. For this we may account in the following manner:—The references to objects, and hence the representations, which correspond to these, have not all the same amount of strength; hence one of them, by gaining a prominence over the rest, weakens or impede
also the others. But it will readily be conceived that where there are only two representations, one cannot wholly suppress the other, even on the very ground that it is engaged in a struggle with it; however, amongst three or more of them one may be entirely pushed aside, and, notwithstanding all its efforts again to come forth, be rendered as inefficient as if it had no existence whatever. It does not follow, however, that representations thus suppressed have ever wholly disappeared; they only wait, as it were, on the threshold of wholly consciousness for the favourable moment when they may be enabled once more to rise up, that is, when the representation formerly dominant is again weakened, or some new one has come forward, which allies itself to the one which had before been thrust aside by virtue of some affinity of quality between them, and then makes its way with the forces of both combined. As before it was found practicable to calculate, according to the rules of Static, the equilibrium of the representations present in our consciousness; so in this case also the tendency of representations, which had descended beneath the static limit, and are again pushing upward, may be calculated according to the laws of Mechanics, or rather, this mathematical theory may be aptly designated as both a Static and Mechanics of the mind, although it is in this case impossible to speak of a law of inertitude, of a parallelogram of powers, of a lever, and of an antagonism between the force that moves and that which is moved, in the proper sense of the terms.

Those representations then, which had been thrust back, which are waiting on the threshold of consciousness, and of which it may be said that they have a tendency to emerge again, by the which, though unnoticed by us, they continually affect (operate upon) the representations present in our consciousness—those unconscious representations which are operating only in the dark are that of which we say, we feel it, without being able to designate it any more accurately; they are the feelings—and are clearly to be distinguished from sensations. As their tendency again to push forward is attended with more or less success, they manifest themselves as desires, and desire becomes volition, if it is joined with the representation, or hope of success; that is, with the hope of being able again to come forward as dominant and present sensation. This state is then the end in view, and all cog-
nate representations are concentrated towards the attainment thereof.¹

Hitherto, we have always spoken of representations as of *simple* powers (potencies); but from the very nature of the thing, it is evident that such will by no means be the common and ordinary relationships that subsists; on the contrary, all our representations are generally interconnected and mixed up in the most varied manner. All these connections are essentially of a double kind; they are either *complications* or else *amalgamations*. We say then, that such as are disparate (as it is termed), such as belong to different series, and are derived from different senses, complicate, as, for example, blue and round, sweet, yellow and soft, &c.; but that contraries, i. e. such as belong to the same series, amalgamate, as, for example, two colours, such as red and blue amalgamate into violet. Every object then, with a plurality of qualities, is a complication; in the number of amalgamations, we reckon more especially the aesthetical—harmonious or inharmonious relations. Such a whole complication or amalgamation presents then, with reference to impeding or tending, a total power, whose effects and calculation, however, will necessarily be much more complicated than that of simple representations; yea, more, it will soon be impossible to keep pace in our calculations with those manifold complexures; hence we have, in carrying it on, to stop short at the simple principal laws or rules.

We shall not attempt to penetrate any further into that labyrinth, in the exploring of which Mathematics can alone furnish us with that guiding line of Ariadne. Let it suffice to trace a little more narrowly the origin of what are commonly termed abstract notions, of the number of which is the Me also. The subject is so difficult, that we cannot go beyond a few hints. From what has already been stated, it follows—and in fact, apart from that, it is well known that there are, first, simple representations, viz. those of

¹ "If a representation is being permanently thrust forward against an impeding, so as not to give way to that impeding but to militate against it, it is termed a desire. For what is it that is sought in desire, but satisfaction? And what else is satisfaction but a perfected representing of what is sought after? Is there any enjoyment which is not an act of consciousness? A lively imagination procures enjoyment to itself, at least so long as it is successful in perfecting the representing, notwithstanding the impeding; and the vividness of imagination consists just in thus succeeding. Can, then, the question still be urged, how the understanding and the will can be one?"—Chief Points, sec. 13.
simple isolated sensations, such as red, round, sweet, &c., then compound representations and notions, such as those of every thing with a plurality of qualities—and lastly, also abstract notions which, unlike the former two, have no immediate sensible intuitions corresponding to them. That which is more remarkable than anything else, and at the same time furnishes the most difficult problem in the doctrine of man's intellect, while from its nature it is calculated to engage our interest more than anything else, is the genesis of these abstractions and ideas, and the answer which at the same time it implies to the question, how the subject, who thinks, arrives at making his own representing the object of his representing.

As in general there are no such things as special powers and faculties in the mind, so also there is no separate faculty of abstraction. Viewed psychologically, the development of our minds proceeds in general in the way to be indicated immediately. It is not at all necessary to enquire how the connection (Synthesis) of individual representations is brought about; originally it is furnished along with the representations themselves, and it is only gradually that the distinguishing takes place. "The child knows during the earliest period of its existence of no individual things, but only of whole trains which, even with reference to space, are only distinguished in the successive representing of them." 1 It is principally the movement of individual objects which, in the first chaos of representations, rends asunder their train (connectedness), and thus we attain, in representing, a plurality of objects. "In the beginning the table appears to be one with the floor on which it stands, and the top of the table with the feet that support it, but the table is moved off its place, while the top remains fixed to the feet. Whatever does not separate from each other, retains in our representation its original unity." "As now, these totalities and trains are resolved into separate objects, so by and bye these objects are also resolved into their qualities," &c. Once these individual objects are separated and disjoined from one another, certain "total impressions" are also formed of them, i.e. complexities, which are also termed "general notions" and generic notions (tree, man), in which what is similar in the part-representa-

1 Manual of Psych. p. 194, following—Psychol. as Science, sec. 117, following; sec. 132, following.
tions gains a preponderance over that which is diversified, inasmuch as what is similar is always again brought prominently forward by repeated apprehendings of similar objects, while that which is different is impeded even to permanent obscurcation, and repressed below the limit of consciousness, so as no longer to attain to an evolution of the whole series of the other qualities which are connected therewith. True, indeed, nothing can be actually cut off or lost in complexities, which are once formed; some of the part-representations (qualities) only may be impeded or obscured; but even those which are obscured always do, as we have already noticed, form, with those of which we are conscious, in themselves a total force, and when otherwise capable of freely developing themselves, all of them come again forward one after the other. These trains or series of connected representations, in which one and the same object, as, for example, a man has first been seen working in his garden, then reading a book, and again on horseback, &c., do again complicate and cross with other series, in which the same secondary representation, such as garden, book, horse, &c. occur, and that in the most diversified manner. They are hence also impeded by one another in the most diversified manner, while the representation of the man constitutes the central point where all these series again meet. If, then, any representation is to be eliminated out of its original connection so as to be capable of occupying, as it were isolated and undecided, a kind of middle position between divers other representations, and of being connected as subject to predicates, yet at the same time also distinguished again as subject from them, many such series are requisite, in all of which the same subject occurs, but at the same time also as many impedings (stoppages) of the remaining part-representations, which had originally been immediately connected with it as predicates.

It is indeed admitted, that all these are not yet abstractions in the highest acceptation, not logical and metaphysical notions, but that the formation of the total impressions which have hitherto been the subject of enquiry, and in which language contributes more especially its quota, depends in great measure on the accidentality of the successive apprehending of empirical occurrences. While, hence, it can, even on this ground, not lead to universal validity in science, it will nevertheless confirm the proposition, that
not only the material of sensation, as Kant would have it, but at the same time also the form of connections is given. But matters are quite different with respect to logical and metaphysical abstractions or notions. These, indeed, are also general notions, but pure ones, such as are entirely disjoined from the complications in which they occur, and in which the series, of which they remind us, are not displayed again to memory, in other words, where representing is not any more made imperceptibly to glide down into the fulness of their circuit. They are the artificial products of thinking, to which nothing that is actual corresponds, and are only called forth to serve as the goal for thinking, as "logical Ideals," very much in the same acceptation in which Kant had looked upon the ideas of reason as regulatives for the formal application of the understanding. In this case there is only room for the question, how it comes to pass that we conceive such Ideals, and approach more and more closely to them. This enquiry finds already, in part, its reply by what has preceded, in so far at least as it has been made evident, where really the seat of judging is, or at least what are its pre-suppositions.

For, all these notions have been so effectually stripped of all their relations, that they have in fact lost also all their contents. Thus, for example, having first deprived an object of all its qualities, nothing was left for the notion of the substance of it; the same may be said with reference to the Me, in the case of which nothing else was left beyond the bare notion of total reference, as a central and referable point for relation for the manifold Me-objects, which, in other words, is merely and properly an empty place, to which the manifold relations do all of them point as their end-point, or formal unity. But it has already been indicated how and why something real, even the soul (which on that very account appears in Psychology only as a substratum for activities), has, on ontological grounds, necessarily to be affirmed as under that point.\(^1\)

We shall only add here a few words with reference to that soul in its connection with the body, and with reference to life. The latter notion Herbart confines to a much less extensive sphere of phenomena in nature than is generally done in "natural philo-

\(^1\) Compare Hartenstein, Metaph. p. 471.
sophy." Above, when treating of the construction of matter, we had, by way of example, been called upon to notice the genesis of an object in nature, of which it may yet be doubtful whether it is to be looked upon as an animal, as a plant, or even as only a crystallisation. We may here, while going a little farther, connect what we have to say to the above. In explaining life, it is one of the requirements on which most stress has to be laid, that we are to be warranted in assuming that the self-preservation which had first been mutually called forth in the together of a plurality of real things, can continue even when that connection of the Real has been again severed. If it is at all possible to bear out an assertion such as the above (and this we leave undecided at present), it can, of course, only be done with any amount of evidence in Eidololology, where we had been led to assume in one and the same essence, a whole system of determinations, which are mutually impeding, holding, amalgamating, and supposing each other; in a word, a little world-totality by itself. If we then stop short at this result, that the soul-monad, with reference to its self-preservation, is capable internally of lasting formation; or in other words, is capable of containing within itself such states as may immediately, themselves again, under favourable circumstances, with other monads become the cause of a definite external formation and movement, we have, in the first place, got hold of a principle of assimilation and organisation, such as may again be still farther employed for the purpose of explaining the phenomena of life. Herbart says—"From the pre-eminent aptitude for becoming assimilated, by which organic substances serve as suitable and nourishing diet for other organisms which are yet in life, it becomes evident that the internal formation of the elements themselves continues even after they have been perfectly separated from one another. The existence of the higher plants and of animals depends, as is well known, mainly on this, that nourishment is prepared for them by lower organisms."¹

If we direct now our attention, in the first place, to the connection and the reciprocal affecting of soul and body, no such insuperable difficulties in conceiving it, as are generally supposed to exist, will, according to our theory, be found in it; and that even on this ground that soul and body are not toto genere opposed to each

¹ Psychol. ii. p. 456, following.
other, in the same way as what is corporeal and what mental. They consist, in fact, of one and the same fundamental essence, the Real; and the soul is only a monad, and that the one which occupies in the whole system of the person the place of the substance-mond. Again, with reference to the effects which, issuing from that monad, extend in the direction of the periphery to the members of the body, viz. the movements of the will, we have first of all to bear in mind, that there is no such thing as a special faculty of the will, but only individual determined motions within the province of the self-preservations of the soul, viz. the movements of such representations or self-preservations (states) as again tend to come forward and to be made free from the impeding in which they find themselves. We have, moreover, noticed, that corresponding to every variation in the internal state of a monad, there are also variations in the situation of those monads with which the former stands in the relation of imperfectly together, and that these changes in the monads by which it is more immediately surrounded, produce in consequence again other alterations in those that are more remote, and only mediately connected with the substance-mond. “But we know that the soul is in connection with the one end of the nerves, as that which in this case constitutes the general condition of all causality; moreover, that the nerve which presents itself to our view as a coherent filament, must necessarily be a chain of simple essences, which are in the relation of imperfectly together; finally, that we must look for this, that in such a chain the slightest change in the internal state of one essence will always exercise an influence on the disturbances, and consequently on the self-preservations of all the essences in that chain. This influence, then, may be continued along the nerve-filament, and spread through space (although not through empty space) without being in any respect itself of the nature of space.” In the same manner, the nerve is again connected with the muscles, and modifies their internal states; thus a change is immediately produced in the disposition of the muscular molecules, either in the way of approximating them to each other, or contraction, or else in the opposite direction, or relaxation.

After what has been said, it is scarce requisite to explain at any length how, on the other hand, external disturbances (from without) may be continued internally, reach the soul, and there become
representations, i. e. corresponding modifications of the self-pres-
ervation. If once what is termed spontaneous movement, and by
which what, in the proper sense of the word, is termed living is
externally distinguished, is in this manner accounted for, we have
also the clue to locomotion, and to everything else that is peculiar
to the corporeal phenomena of life. With reference to the seat
of the soul, which is so often discussed, Herbart expresses himself
as follows: "Probably the soul has no one permanent seat, as else
Physiologists would have observed some prominent central point
in the brain, towards which everything concurred. But that whole
middle region, in which, since a very long time, the sensorium com-
mune has been looked for, may furnish a place of residence to the
soul. It may therefore be allowed that the soul moves forwards and
backwards upon or rather within the Pons Varolii;¹ only let us not
go so far as to look for some channel (groove) for the purposes of
that motion, for no such groove is requisite, any more than the light
requires the pores of a transparent body, which it penetrates in the
strictest acception everywhere and in every direction. However,
it will be understood without any further comment, that when the
soul moves, this is not done because it wills (for it knows nothing
about it); but that here again, as before, its internal states in con-
nection with those of the brain must first be the cause and then
the consequence of its change of place, and that on account of
the necessity which everywhere prevails for a proper correspond-
ence between the external and internal state.”

In the motions which the soul produces in the nerves and
muscles, the proper mechanism remains wholly unknown to the
soul. Necessarily so, as that depends on the self-preservations of
other real things, with which, in the first instance, the soul is not
concerned. When the soul wills some one definite thing, it has
not, like an engineer, that part of the machinery in full view
which requires to be touched in order to produce the desired effect,
buts has only the representation of that effect itself before it.
What then, it may be asked, constitutes the middle link between
that representation of purpose, and the movement of the muscle
which is to bring about (to realise) that purpose? In actions

¹ The Pons Varolii is found at the base of the brain, and consists of a band of
white fibres arching across the upper part of the medulla oblongata, and entering the
substance of the cerebellum as the crura cerebelli.—The Translator.
which are to be consciously executed, and which alone properly
deserve the name, that momentum of connection itself would ap-
parently require somehow or other to enter the consciousness. It
consists in a definite feeling "which is connected with every bend-
ing or turning of our joints and members, whether voluntary or
accidental. This feeling is complicated with our volition, or rather
with those representations which constitute that which is active
in our volition, and in this consists the middle link for the con-
nection spoken of above." By this conscious feeling we bring all
our own movements—which, for example, in the child, and in the
unskilful artist, are at first wholly or in part non-spontaneous—
gradually under our control. Every movement of our joints calls
forth a certain feeling, and in the same moment the movement
also and its farther effect become externally perceptible; and if
afterwards the representation of that consequence which had pre-
viously been observed returns again upon us as desire, then, by
the same complication, that feeling which accompanied it is also
resuscitated; this, however, is itself immediately already such a
self-preservation of the soul, to which the definite states of the
nerves and muscles that are in that case requisite, correspond.

We conclude our exposé of the Psychology of Herbart with a
simile, chosen by its author, as being "the most luminous ap-
plication" of the principles which have been adopted in Psychology.
—(Psych. ii. p. 4.) We refer to the state. "The state," says
Herbart, "as a society which is protected by a power that lies
within itself, presents as complete a contradiction as the notion
of the Me, or any other of those metaphysical general notions to
which we have called attention; for this power is able to destroy
as well as to protect; and a society which was to maintain itself
by its own power, would necessarily also require to turn that
power against itself, which could only give rise to internal party-
strife instead of a firm connection of the state. That notion is
contradictory, and yet states do actually exist; it follows then,
that the above notion is not a correct expression of what actually
is; it hence requires to refer, in a manner not seen, to qualities
which had not been conceived as belonging to it, but which, not-
withstanding, do really belong there to, and tend to remove that
which rendered it contradictory. These points of reference are
powers of a psychological character in such a manner, that
the notion of the state is realised in measure as it contains, and has these powers in operation—we refer to *custom*, and the *mode in which affairs are conducted*, as well as the acknowledgment and understanding of the necessity of conducting affairs in that manner. But this necessity is in part internal, and in part external. The external necessity consists in the conflict with other governments or nations, which here corresponds to the self-preservation of the Real against all the other Real, and applies more especially to the wars in which a state requires to engage for the sake of maintaining its existence. As in the case of individual soul-monads, so in that of many states historically, the principal cause of development is to be traced to the above, "and, on investigation, it will be found that most states properly do not know what they would be, if they had been allowed to remain by themselves, if they had been left quite to themselves; just as the individual does not know what he would be if separated entirely from all society." The *internal* necessity again corresponds exactly to the psychological relations with which we had become acquainted under the designation of the Static and Mechanics of representations. "Those powers which are at work in society are unquestionably, as far as their origin is concerned, psychological powers; they meet together, in as far as by language and actions, they present themselves in the common world of sensibility. They impede one another in the latter; this is the spectacle commonly presented of conflicting interests and of social contentions." If here also we assume the imperfectly together as that which is original—say the patriarchal arrangement, or any similar one that immediately precedes civilisation in the proper sense of the term, we find already mankind united together into divers smaller or larger groups, which might perhaps be looked upon as corresponding to the total impressions or the representations of objects. But soon many very unequal forces will come into conflict. "The first thing that occurs to us in this instance are those *limits* (entrances) of the consciousness, which here appear under the shape of *limits* (entrances) of social influence. For from the calculations which we had above made, it is evident that a few *more powerful* personages, or else a few if assisted by a number of adherents, will and must succeed in rendering ineffective the endeavours of a much larger number of weaker, or else of
isolated individuals, whenever any struggle of all the powers, one against the other, ensues. But in that case there remains a pressure and counter-pressure amongst the more powerful personages, as if those weaker ones had not existed at all. Part of the activity of every one of them is, as it were, bound; and no one remains quite exempt from the impeding.” Those who were unable from the first to take any part in the union—in the historical development of states—because repressed beneath that limit (entrance), have continued the repressed (oppressed) class, and yet, like the representations which are obscured, are under all circumstances ever ready again to press forward; and thus they constitute a power (potency) which is secretly at work. Those which sink underneath the limit (entrance) “are obliged, on account of their requirements, to betake themselves to the class of applicants, and will be employed in serving; hence they join themselves to certain persons, who calculate on their services. As long, then, as the commonwealth (those which after the impeding are amalgamated) does not take an interest in them, they are the property of the former as of their masters; they are looked upon by them as serviceable property, and have no remedy left except to make the attempt to fly, without, however, knowing whither to direct their steps.” But even above the limit (threshold) of social influence, the equilibrium amongst individuals does not remain fixed. Some sink while others mount in the scale, and a few separate themselves, as those who are noble (pre-eminent), from the multitude, which is not taken notice of, from the vulgar. One of the former is again the most prominent of all—the prince; the personal feeling of those who surround him gradually merges in him; all attend to him, take their direction from his movements, and cleave to him; while he, finding them manageable, makes use of the advantage put at his disposal. This, then, is the mode in which the most ancient monarchies were established.

But this willingness, to be guided, has also its limits. The prince is concerned about his authority, which is specially threatened by those nearest to him, the nobility; hence he takes an interest in the common people, not so much in order to elevate them, as to amalgamate them amongst themselves into one total power; accordingly he grants a constitution to them, and makes them citizens. But we may not carry any farther that comparison
between the state and the psychological processes in the consciousness of the individual. It will be observed how closely those doctrines are connected, and how consistently such principles will in every system be developed.

In fact, when we state that the system of Herbart, in opposition to that of Hegel, was characterised by a prevailing mechanical view, we only adopt his own mode of expression. He says himself: "If I had not fully made up my mind before hand with reference to practical philosophy, it might easily have come to pass that I should have given way to dread at the sight of the psychological mechanism-like so many others who shut their eyes against it, as unable to look at the interior of the human mind, as to bear without terror a sight of the interior of the body."¹

But the above imposes the obligation on every one engaged in sketching Herbart's system, to say at least so much with reference to those practical principles as will suffice to bring out of ambiguous obscurity the connection—or to speak more correctly, the want of connection between these principles and the theories above detailed, as else any person unacquainted with them might entertain prejudices detractory of the moral purity and elevation of Herbart's practical philosophy; which, however, even his opponents have never impugned. But as this extensive field lies beyond the boundaries which, in general, we had assigned to our enquiries, we shall have to rest satisfied with a few brief notices on the subject. Herbart does not mean, as at first sight we might conclude from the above, that there are any hereditary peculiar privileges, inasmuch as he does not acknowledge the existence of any innate (hereditary) psychological forms, or of any original facts of the consciousness, or of peculiar faculties. Such privileges would, according to his jurisprudence, not be conducive to right, but to wrong, and to contention. In the same manner, Herbart rejects also any originally legislative moral feeling; he negatives the categorical imperative, "not merely because it also would belong to the innate forms, but because the moral feeling, together with the readiness to yield moral obedience which is derived from it, owes, as a total effect, its origin to the different

¹ Pschol. i. p. 79.
practical ideas, which in turn are produced by as many different æsthetical judgments,” as will immediately appear more clearly. The categorical Imperative of Kant was merely a formal command, while the principle of Herbart is not deficient in respect of material—of the What that is to be done. That principle is to be found in those will-less judgments of an æsthetical character, i.e. such as are wholly beyond the reach of arbitrariness, and which are pronounced in the consciousness on the subject of the relations of the will. We have already seen, that according to Herbart, there is no special faculty of the will, and that the Will is not a special, far less the substantial force, and that which is properly the Real; on the contrary, it is psychologically grounded in those representations which are tending again to press forward. Nor does he allow a transcendental liberty in the sense in which, as we shall see, Fichte employed that term, or in that by which it would be conceived immediately to coincide with the essence and the substantial Will, the root of all being in and by itself. But it must not be fancied that Herbart denied all moral or juridical freedom; on the contrary, he endeavoured rather to rescue those ideas from being resolved into a wholly abstract and indefinite independence, void of all contents, and traced this liberty rather in the pronounced (expressed) and perfected independence of a decided character. “Man is to know and to feel that he acts according to conviction, and it is this which constitutes the essence of internal freedom,” or internal freedom consists in “the one and equal power of judging and of deciding in exact correspondence thereunto.” Hence it consists in a being capable of, and includes as much a being capable of judging correctly, as of deciding and acting in accordance therewith. The common theories do not distinguish sufficiently between the two elements which it contains, viz. on the one hand, the arbitrariness of capability of acting, and on the other, the necessity and incorruptible obligation imposed on our judging. The volition realised in every particular case, is as much accidental with reference to the moral and æsthetical judgment of conscience as any deed with reference to the statute-book. It is on this account particularly that Herbart insists on decidedly separating between the principles of theoretical and those of practical philosophy, which are only again to come together, in the last place, in their results, but not in their starting-points. The
principles of Ethics are to be found in that *will-less* (involuntary) judgment of an æsthetical nature, which with logical rigour takes its direction from the moral Ideal, with which any given act of the will is compared. Theoretical philosophy, on the contrary, is only concerned with that which is actual—hence in Psychology with the movements of the will, or with that which is actually willed. We have to separate, then, what is purely object of cognition from that which cannot be understood without the æsthetical judgment above alluded to, nor may they, under the designation of liberty, be resolved into a unity of a law of the understanding, which both wills and executes itself, as is done by the philosophy of Identity. On the contrary, as the theoretical judgment knows neither of "good" nor "evil," so also the practical judgment does not concern itself with the enquiry, whether anything is actually executed; yea, whether it be possible to execute it or not.\(^1\)

If a number of representations are about simultaneously to come forward, and thus give rise to a conflict, we term it practical reflection, which is at last cut short by choice. Hence the general willing, the strength of decision, the character of a person will more particularly depend on this, that a certain mass of representations, a certain kind of images, have more particularly kept their ground and prominence, and thereby attained the mastery in the man's consciousness, and that they have, by continued repression, weakened other representations, or else at an early stage prevented their crossing, as it were, the limit (threshold) of the consciousness. The force of that reigning and ruling mass of representations, which prevails the longer the more undisputedly, constitutes the habit and the chief purpose of willing.

*Conscience*, again, may be traced to this, that by virtue of our self-consciousness we are capable of contemplating our own states, and of pronouncing judgment on them according to the ideas of the good and the beautiful; for the term conscience applies not only to the moral aspect of things, but also to fidelity in the carrying out of the rules of art, yea more even of those of prudence. According to Herbart, these ideas of the beautiful and of the good have their own original evidence in the consciousness of man; it is not requisite to subject them to the same elaboration and rectification as metaphysical notions; they may be immediately em-

ployed for the purpose of pronouncing valid judgments, whether of approbation or of disapprobation. It is not possible first to rectify them logically; they require to appear only in their purity and perspicuity; for it must be allowed that, in many individuals, they are often obscured and disfigured amongst the mass of other representations. The fundamental idea of all of them is, that of beauty (the ἀπλάτος, which includes the morally good.) All that the beautiful requires is to be set free from all those other representations which keep it back, or cast a veil over it, and to be represented in its original purity and distinctness, more especially to be guarded from being confounded with what is merely agreeable or useful, and everybody recognises and acknowledges it as something that abides, that is general and continuing, easily distinguishable from the satisfaction of changing desires. It is in general the province of practical philosophy to draw aside the veil and to exhibit the beautiful, and hence it may be designated as Æsthetics in a more enlarged sense than that in which the term is commonly understood. Æsthetics is a practical science, i. e. it addresses itself to that which is given with the measuring line of the idea of beauty which has been given to it. Hence it consists of a series of art-doctrines, which instruct the artist how to treat an object with which he is engaged, so as to make it to correspond to that idea, and hence to make it not displeasing, but well pleasing. But that which is moral is distinguished from all the other beautiful, as that which is not merely possessed as an object of great value, but which itself determines the unconditioned value of the individual.

It is matter of indifference with reference to the beautiful, in the stricter sense of the term, whether in general we aim at being practical artists, and hence at representing it. It is simply rule and law for the artist who executes, and æsthetical conscience constrains every one to submit to it, who has chosen that sphere. But, says Herbart,¹ There are also art-principles, whose precepts have the character of a necessary law for all mankind, on the ground that by nature, and in virtue of their whole existence, all mankind are constrained to elaborate that one definite object—we refer to one's self. The art-doctrine to which we allude is the doctrine of virtue. The latter is founded on what are termed

the practical ideas, of which there are many, from the number of which we single out more particularly five: (1.) the idea of internal or moral freedom; (2.) the idea of perfection (for example, of cultivation); (3.) that of benevolence or kindness; (4.) that of right; (5.) that of equity. Hence the relation to which in general we have to attend in ethics, which is particularly concerned about what is praise-or blameworthy, is that of the accordance between the will and the judgment in one and the same rational being. A person may either assert by the will what it repudiates by the judgment, or it may neglect by the will what it has prescribed to itself by the judgment; or, lastly, its volition and judgment may be in accordance. It is this harmony which immediately calls forth moral approbation, and constitutes the morally beautiful, virtue, conceived as an ideal, also the moral liberty which has been asserted. The idea of right may more particularly be traced to the arbitrary laying down of the accordant will of different men, and is received as a rule, whose purpose it is to obviate conflict. Its validity and sanctity depends on the reprobation of, and displeasure at strife; nor may it be based on any other foundation, without a dangerous confusion of ideas.¹

Lastly, with reference to the establishment of the interests of religion, Herbart conceived that he had rendered special service to that cause by reprobing the view of Kant, who considered that the idea of adaptation to an end was purely a subjective idea of reason, which man himself imputed to the course of nature—and by deriving that idea, together with all the empirical views and notions, from nature itself, or in exhibiting and (pointing out) the same therein, i.e. in our empirical representations themselves.² If the world is really presented to our view as one whole, exhibiting traces of design, then may we also legitimately enquire after the author of that adaptation, whom we shall discover to be a being above us, and not our own mode of looking, in which reason is transferred from man into external nature. However impossible it may be to ground in a demonstrative manner that belief in a governing Spirit, it still depends on the very same conclusion, and

¹ Herbart's Practical Philosophy has been more fully carried out by Hartenstein, in his "Fundamental Notions of Ethical Sciences," 1844. For a short view and a characteristic thereof, vide "Jena Literary Gazette, 1845; No. 16, and following."
is possessed of the same amount of certainty as the belief, which leads every man to the persuasion of the existence of other rational intelligences; for it must be said that we only behold forms and actions exhibiting traces of design on the part of our fellow-men, and it is only matter of belief that these proceed from rational thinking—a belief, however, so firm and convincing, that in point of certainty it surpasses by far all knowledge. It is allowed, that it is impracticable scientifically to carry out a cosmogony; but still, with reference to the domain of existences, the proposition must remain undisputable, that with reference to its substance, it is of created origin. To the substance belong accidents; but these may again be viewed as being singled out by prepared disturbances and movements from the infinite number of possible accidental views.” On the whole, however, metaphysics, which cannot boast of such general agreement as mathematics, and is still engaged in prosecuting its enquiries, may neither intrude into experience “nor into the feelings of those who live only in faith.”

It is evident that Herbart has not quitted the standing-point of Kant, in so far at least, as he also does not allow any cognition or knowledge (in the proper sense) of the qualities of that which exists, and of things, but like Kant, merely speaks of a cognition of phenomena. But inasmuch as the changing sensations, as well as their interconnection or form, are nevertheless immediately and undeniably given, and these, although in themselves only appearance, still presuppose something without the soul, which appears or is real, the existence of a real world, external to the Me, is also demonstrated, as well as that the soul stands in connection with that world. The origin of the sensations is no longer enigmatical, if they are once looked upon as self-preserved, while, however, from that self-preservation it does not follow that the sensations do exactly correspond to the qualities of the Real. On the contrary, they are rather purely subjective, and, in so far, appearance. Every monad exists, shut up in itself, with its sensations; another monad can never, within my soul-monad, transform itself immediately into my knowledge or sensation. This, then, is the sub-

1 Princ. Points, sec. 14. In Herbart’s writings there are only scattered aphorisms towards a philosophy of religion. But the philosophy of religion of Drobisch (Leipzig, 1840) proves how much may in this respect be done by means of his theory, which is essentially founded on pure ethics.
jective aspect of the system, which may not, however, be con-
founded with subjective Idealism. On the contrary, it stands
directly opposite thereto, in so far as with Herbart the difference
of sensations, i.e. of the relations of self-preservation, do in general
necessarily point to actual and real objects, to diversity in those
Real, and the latter again to a corresponding multiplicity of reci-
procal relations; while subjective Idealism, as we shall meet it in
the first instance in the case of Fichte, declares that objects are
pure self-products of the Me. Herbart, on the contrary, says,
with reference to his real world: we cognize only the relations,
but not that which stands in such relationship; our metaphysical
knowledge refers exclusively to the form and not to the quality, the
material of the Real in itself. That In-itself, continues Herbart,
is in fact of no moment to man at all; all that he can feel con-
cerned about is what objects are with reference to him; and this
is learned by continued and accurate observation in experience.
We cognize no substance whatever, nor, inasmuch as every sub-
stance is only cogitable as a quale, any quality whatever in itself.
"Within the circuit of our experience there is merely a portrai-
ture of the coming together, or of the becoming separated of such
unities, which amongst themselves determine the groups of unities,
according to which they are to appear unto us. Experience con-
sists merely in a texture of relations. That which is given con-
tains merely that objective appearance, which, while it is valid for
all spectators, can present no predicates of the objects themselves.
Yet how much have, for example, astronomers made out of that
appearance by a union of art and power! The generality of men
derives thence the ordinary prudence requisite in their transac-
tions, the satisfaction of their desires, and the means of alleviating
their sorrows. For all these purposes acquaintance with the true
qualities, and with what actually goes on in substances, is neither
requisite nor serviceable, nor of any influence. Living, as we do, in
relations, we stand in need of nothing farther. It is the meta-
physician alone who becomes aware what distance there is be-
tween what properly is the Real, what actually goes on, and our
ordinary circle of ideas."

True objective cognition of qualities and of what is actually
going on in and with substances, is thus not to be looked upon as

requisite for the purposes of ordinary life—suffice it, if we know, how any object is with reference to ourselves. But were we even to grant the correctness of this, in as far as the commonly followed purposes which give direction to our lives are concerned, it would be impossible in that manner to satisfy the higher end and tendency, the intellectual, and in itself highly valuable aim after the cognition of truth for the sake of that cognition itself, as well as those ethical and religious aims of the human soul, which are inseparably connected therewith. That modest declaration of the limited character of human reason which apparently becomes man so well—that rushing into the arms of belief, when and because the highest truths cannot be known and comprehended, leaves in all instances a sting in the soul, as well as a pang of doubt which cannot be hulled or soothed. It is not merely the pride of desire after knowledge that stings us, but rather an ill-disguised contradiction—a contradiction, we say, into which a definite philosophising has first entangled us, leaving us afterwards helpless, and that simply because it knows of no way of escape, and would now like to lay all the blame to the charge of human reason. The same occurs in the present instance. While Herbart endeavours to remove the contradictions in individual points from particular notions, he allows it to remain in the grand and the total. The general defect which extends over the whole of his metaphysics is, that the objective truth of a substantial and unitous connection is entirely awanting, while however we have it in ourselves subjectively—but only subjectively—and also address it as postulate to that which is objective, if our knowledge is to stand as to fundamental essentiality adequately related to existence. The relations of the Real, which are to make up for that difficulty, viz. repulsion, and specially attraction, resolve themselves again into a merely subjective appearance. An explanation is indeed furnished, as to how such appearance may be produced in us, who are the subjects, who observe, and—if the premises are granted—as to how it must necessarily be produced; but so much the less are we informed about the objective truth, the actual coming to pass. Too often is it the case, that we are to arrive at comprehending the phenomena by means of certain fictions—as for example, by representing to ourselves those spaceless monads as so many balls which partially or entirely pe-
nrerate into each other—but that, by means of which we are to comprehend the subject in hand, is pure fiction, and has hence again to be negatived, so that we might apply to those views, which refer to the cardinal point of the whole system, what Jacobi said with reference to the philosophy of Kant: "Without them it is impossible to gain an entrance, and with them equally so to remain in it."

The system assumed its outlines in the mind of Herbart in opposition to, and in conflict with, the Idealism of Fichte, in which he could not acquiesce. In direct antagonism thereto, Herbart is perfectly correct in insisting on objective real existence, and he will be able to maintain that position against every idealistic Monism. A second fundamental defect of that form of Idealism had been the entire absence of proof, and the inconceivableness of the procedure of an infinitely multiple material from the abstract ground of the Me; which, in fact, did not constitute a ground for such producing. In opposition to this, Herbart insisted on the proposition, that it is impossible to account for a multiplicity of phenomena on the supposition of one abstract factor. In doing this, he contended for an infinitely important fundamental canon, which both former metaphysicians and the modern system of Identity that succeeded them, had contravened, viz. that of a sufficient cause, by virtue of which that which is higher, more concrete, can neither spring and be derived from that which is lower, more abstract, nor can be circumvened by the assumption of a "potency," which is commonly laid at the foundation, and that neither in a real nor in an intellectually conscious manner, but, as we shall afterwards notice, as the indifference of the two forms of existence.

While then we cannot do otherwise than entirely assent to the former, and also to the latter point in Herbart's philosophy, we are nevertheless constrained to place him as the counterpart of Fichte on one and the same line with the latter, only, assigning to the two the opposite terminating points, so that they require to supplement one another; which, however, they are only able to do from a higher point of view. We have then to declare, that Fichte is just as much monadologist from the subjective standpoint, as Herbart from the objective one. The latter looks only from without at things, and hence everything appears to him as
existing object; yea, even his own thought-determinations present themselves after the manner of things. Fichte transfers himself immediately into the place of the thinking subject, is himself the monadic Me, and everything immediately transforms itself to him into pure thought-determinations; yea, the very objects do, as merely the thoughts of the subject, come forth out of it. But with both there is the same abstract and empty existence as ground and essence; so that Fichte has to acknowledge the plenitude of thoughts as being immediately present and given in the Me, and not produced by it, just as Herbart had to presuppose the fundamental elements of things as objectively unproductive. A "Cosmogony" can therefore not only not be deduced in the system of Herbart, it is in fact a contradiction, not only inconceivable, but also impossible, and hence the same would also necessarily follow with reference to a free creation. True, Herbart lays much stress on the fact, that in a world of monads which originally are represented as chaotic, there is not given any necessary ground for an orderly self-formation (spontaneous formation), which contains the traces of design; but, on the contrary, that if it had assumed any formation, it would have become the prey of accident, which cannot be allowed in this case; that consequently, the adaptation of the world to certain purposes which we actually observe, constrains us to infer an author thereof, who had that adaptation in view; but as we would be again obliged to conceive that grand cause as itself a monad, and as in general it applies to the monads or to the Real, that by virtue of "self-preservation" they do mutually determine and fill each other as to their state, only, in and by their together with others, a series of suppositions and assumptions is thus forced upon us, the which, if we were to transfer from finite things in an analogous manner to God, and we are warranted to do this by the idea of substance given in the system, would lead to a very inadequate idea of God and of His activity; in other words, one which we may not presume to apply to that highest Being, so that we are again reduced to non-cognisance and inconceivableness.

Herbart cannot relax in the slightest from the precision which characterises his apprehension of the idea of existence, as it alone gives rise to the contradictions which necessitate as their consequence the mode of solving them proposed by him, or in other words, the whole of his metaphysics, and which would no longer be
requisite if the idea of existence would admit of being in any way modified. This forbids us to look upon the internal states of real beings as anything more than appearance, which arises only for the onlooker, who beholds them in their manifold groupings. This appearance, then, is again reflected over subjectively, just as it exists in the Me of the onlooker, to the interior of the Real, where it is to be an internal state just as in the subject; and again, inasmuch as those states had formerly been apprehended only as the external relations of the Real amongst themselves, the psychological states of the subject also are only external relations of the representations amongst themselves. At the same time, the Me is, in this instance, in the subject, the common substance of the representation, and the latter only the inherents of the same, although they stand related towards each other like real beings. But if that which is actually coming to pass objectively, even the movement and combination of real existences, is to have its ultimate ground of explanation in their internal states, it is also requisite to transfer the total impression which refers to the interior of the subject, to the together of the objective group, to the complexedness, or to the object itself; and thus the form of the complexedness, or the together, inevitably becomes itself as much a unity as to substance as the Me. Hence there either exists no unitous self and self-consciousness, or else the unity-form of objects is as substantial as the subjective self—both of which are opposed to what had been assumed. Closely connected with this is what we have stated before, with reference to a plasticity (formability) of essences with reference to their internal states, as it were a memory of them; for either existences will then also appear isolated as a many-sidedness of states, which in that case cannot any longer be made to accord with the notion of a simple quale so rigorously adhered to, or else we must suppose an actual being together of monads, in order to call forth in them diversification and change.

All this and much more besides, which might be pointed out as so many unsolved difficulties, must in the last instance be traced to the principle and method of the whole system, at which we shall glance once more by way of conclusion. As a starting-point, we have not one single principle, but on the contrary, we are directed to an infinite multiplicity of commencements, and
that unity after which science aims, is only to be produced in the last instance, i.e. in the result. The whole system is directly opposed to a genetical one, such as a complete Idealism pretends to be; it is not that from our eye, as point of unity, is shed the lustre of that luminous orb, which images a multiplicity of objects, but the rays converge from many objective points in the eye, i.e. in the subject, there finding a point of union. Hence the unity is also only subjective, and not objective; it applies to knowledge, but not to existence. Thus, if any substantial unity were known, i.e. not merely conceived, but also assumed as existing in and by itself, or as truth, something that is erroneous would be cognised, or rather would be conceived; and hence something, a form, has to be affirmed in our thinking or our consciousness, which, however, may not be applied to objects—we refer to unity or thoroughly substantial connectedness. It is therefore consistent enough in Herbart to declare that what applies to the notion, as notion, does not apply to that which exists and is affirmed by that notion, inasmuch as a notion is a representation, merely an inherence and modification of the state of the subject, and hence exactly the opposite or the negation of that which actually exists objectively in and by itself; a confounding of the one with the other would inevitably lead to Idealism, and not leave us any real existence out of the subject. But in the same manner the whole relation might also be reversed. If every one of the objects that exist is real, and in itself self-subsistent, then there is no such thing as an all-comprehensive unity, no more in knowledge than in existence; every monad is absolutely shut up within itself, together with its representations, or by whatever other name we choose to designate its modifications—it stands isolated, as an Idealism in and by itself, nor can it possibly come to know aught about a real mundane unity out of itself, simply because no such unity has any existence. Even the appearance presented can prove nothing, for in such a case, we have again only the appearing itself of the monad in itself. The monad is the ground thereof, and hence purely productive, which again militates wholly against our supposition.

Herbart himself allows, that everything exists for us only, in so far as it exists in our knowledge. It follows, that we are to look for the attainment of certainty even in such objectivities as
are wholly separate from us, or else exercise no influence on us within the sphere of subjectivity, and by virtue of a logical necessity. Again, he requires, on the other hand, that such objectivity be actually in existence; for the insisting on such rigour in the idea of existence is equivalent to a negation and shutting out of every kind of resolving of objective truth into merely subjective thinking. As we have already stated, this is one of the features in the system, with reference to which it will ever be able, successfully and triumphantly, to maintain its ground against all Idealism, and every system of Identity. That system is wanting in point of truth, nor can it hence claim to be the true one, if it fails to acknowledge any existence as free, true, and self-subsistent existence by itself, and represents thinking as wholly and immediately identical with being (existence.) But what probation are we then to offer, or how are we to elevate that truth to certainty—logically, or empirically? If we are to attempt to do this in a scientific manner, we will, of course, require to proceed logically, i.e. by exhibiting the contradiction which a contrary assertion would involve. It is the province of knowledge to know that which exists, or else it is neither knowledge nor truth. And yet we do not discover in Herbart any distinct consciousness thereof, whenever we penetrate as far as that principle which, formally at least, is universal, viz. to the idea of knowledge or of truth. Occasionally he rejects even that principle as an unproductive one, and instead of essaying in the simplest analytical manner, whether anything could be deduced therefrom, or whether (to use his own terminology) that notion points again to definite supplementary notions, he maintains, that nothing can be done with it, unless we have again recourse either to the usual fancy about psychological faculties, or else to a hypostatising of the activity of thinking into the thinking subject.¹

On the other hand, Herbart proposes the following question: If all speculation and scientific interest is directed towards a unity, and rests on a tendency after such unity, is this unity to be merely a subjective one within the province of thought, or also an objective one of things; in other words, is it to be both the principle of science and the head of all nature?² To this it is replied,

² Ibidem, p. 131, and following.
that "in as far as a thinker conceives (thinks) the Real, he requires such unity; his observations of nature must be characterised by general connection amongst themselves; but in as far as to the enquiry, what he conceives, he has to reply: that which is real—that requirement is wholly removed, as it is everywhere to be traced not to the What, but simply to our thinking." Thus it seems, in fact, as if on the one hand we were subject to a necessity of thinking consisting in this, that we have to cognise the truth, and hence to conceive it, as it is; and that yet, on the other hand, we are unable to cognise and conceive truth as it is, without conceiving it differently from what it is. If it is Herbart's intention to convey in that manner, what Kant had taught, that the thought "I think" must necessarily accompany all our representations in order to elevate our thinking into self-consciousness, while that thought is at the same time serviceable, as corrective, against the confounding which is so apt to take place between Subjectivity and Objectivity, between Ideality and Reality—then such setting before us of the formal difference subsisting between a thought and that which is affirmed by it, acquires, as has already been stated, great importance—more specially in our own days; but this difference may not be transformed into being a material one, one with reference to the contents, nor be so enlarged as to comprehend this, that notwithstanding the existence of unity subjectively, that unity has, objectively, neither meaning nor validity.

We cannot but feel surprise, that on the one hand it is allowed, that in innumerable cases absolute position, the hasty attributing of existence, has to be recalled, as the What to which such had been ascribed, is not capable thereof; while on the other hand, however, we hear from the very first about qualities, and without any stricter determination, simple qualia are affirmed as real existences, which on closer investigation—and just because they are mere qualities—we find resolve themselves into relativities, and are consigned to Dialectics, so that, in the last instance, no other essence is left as truly existing by itself and independent, but such which themselves are Mc's or thinking subjects. Besides, it is in general remarkable, that like all the other modern philosophers, Herbart saw the inadequacy of the ordinary formal or analytical Logic for solving the highest metaphysical problems.
He traced the reason of this mainly to the fact, that Logic takes
the notions and the momenta of notions or qualities (marks) as
ready given, and then makes use of them in such a manner, that
withal we have only compositions and decompositions, but no
essential unity, either as result or supposition. In all this it fails
to disclose any substantial bond, any real ground, either for the
unity or the multiplicity; this ground eludes its grasp, and with
it that which is most profound in all the investigations of philo-
sophy. In the system of Herbart the place of Logic is occupied
by the method of relations, where problems require it. True, this
takes its starting point from an objective unity (the m in the a); 
but, inasmuch as, by resolving that m into a number of n, it makes
the m to be equal to the n, it destroys again objectively, and in
reality, that substantial unity, and only lets it stand subjectively
in the a, i.e. in the appearance or the phenomenon before us. In
truth, this method is just a bringing back and preparing of pro-
blems for the former logical mode of contemplating them, which,
however, had but a little before been set aside as insufficient.

Some other points, to which we might still advert, will be better
understood when once we have heard what the other party, the
Idealists and Monists, have to say for themselves. From what
we have had occasion to notice above, we cannot blame the candid
student of philosophy, if he turns only with whetted, not with
satisfied appetite for knowledge, to other masters, who hold
out to him full enjoyment, at least in promise.
LECTURE SEVENTH.

(FICHTE.)

The results of our first Lectures, to which the present one requires to be more closely connected, may be briefly summed up as follows:

While endeavouring to banish from philosophy every incorrect or undemonstrable assumption, all dogmatising, Kant had found, that we transport our mode of viewing, the subjective constitution of our faculty of perception and of thinking into the objective world; that we never come immediately, but merely through the medium of the categories of our sensibility and of our understanding, into contact with that world; and hence, that all experience, everything that presents itself to us as world, or occurrence in the world, is only the reflex within our consciousness of something external, that is wholly unknown, and is hence only appearance, as such necessarily manifests itself within us in accordance with the internal laws of the mind, a phenomenon (appearance) be it observed, from which we may, indeed, learn to know our own mental, or, if we may so term it, the optical constitution of the eye of our understanding, but not the nature and character of objects, as they possibly are in themselves.

However, objects external to us, and which are reflected, must necessarily exist, as else both our sensibility and understanding would be absolutely destitute of contents (material.) The understanding, which is the activity which impresses a certain definite form on that material within us, which arranges and gives it shape, and likewise theoretical reason also, which, in turn, brings order and systematic unity into that material of the under-
standing which had received its form, both, are in themselves absolutely empty and merely formative activities, with reference to a material which is to be furnished by sensibility. At the same time they are, however, capable of reflecting on those, their functions and operations, on their own activity, and of becoming conscious of it, irrespective of all material and in abstracto, of laying down their mode of procedure in the shape of rules and as Logic. But withal, we are too apt to forget, that in such a case we are engaged about no real contents, and with none other object than these faculties and their particular empty mode of activity; and thus we come to look upon those subjective forms of activity which had been comprehended into notions, even the categories and ideas, as if they were something real, or as laws, to which in actual nature, similar arrangements must be corresponding, just because we do subjectively think in that peculiar way. Hence, the notions which correspond to the categories of sensibility, viz. those of time and of space; again, those of the understanding, viz. substance, causality, &c.; and lastly, those of reason, viz. absolute subjectivity or intelligence (soul), the totality of phenomena or the universe, and the idea of a fundamental and original existence, of a sum and contents (comprehending together) of all that is real or of God—all these notions and ideas are produced simply by our objectivising, hypostatising, and even personifying the mode of procedure in our mental activity, which, however, our imagination is not warranted to do.

Such, then, is the result of Kant's Critick of Pure Reason. Jaccobi, on the contrary, had appealed to the actual existence of our sense-perceptions, as well as of the ideas in our reason, and rejected as inadmissible every genetic explanation of them. He had called attention to this, that just as it is impossible to account for, or explain the way in which sensible and bodily impressions affect our intellectual consciousness, while such impressions do, nevertheless, actually take place, and command our admission, and that just as they exist, so reason also is not a higher logical understanding, but also a faculty of perceiving, a higher sense, and ideas, are actually, i.e. just in a manner inexplicable, furnished to it. The principal result of his enquiries was, that he pointed out richer and fuller contents in the human intellect, which are perceived by reason, and gradually to
be unveiled by it. Hence, reason is to be looked upon, as being a sense, a faculty of perception, with which we are furnished in order to arrive, and that in an immediate manner, at the consciousness of the secrets of our own spiritual existence, of the nature and fulness of that, which both within us and in general is designated as intellect.

Thus Kant and Jacobi had indicated the double direction which philosophy might take. On the one hand, we might take images and ideas as an actual basis, and appeal to the undeniable fact, that we possess them—that they are really present; and again, to the equally undeniable fact, that they are produced within us, we know not how; and thus rear our edifice on that empirical foundation, constantly appealing to really (actually) given existence. This constitutes the realistic view, whose fundamental notion is that of real, unchangeable, and immediately existent different substances, and which we find most distinctly brought in Herbart, who, of all others, has hitherto carried out that tendency in the most consistent manner. Again, philosophy might attempt, as Kant had done with reference to the general notions of the understanding and to ideas, to genetically explain this origin, to demonstrate that the perceiving and thinking intellect of man is itself the creative originator of those notions, and to represent those notions as the products of reason. It was this tendency which, as tracing in the last instance everything to the living ground, was designated as the dynamic-idealistic. We shall now have to call attention to its development in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

While most philosophical writers made it for a length of time their aim to unite Kant’s Criticism with Jacobi’s Rational Faith, and to elaborate them into one consistent and defensible system—an attempt which had got its special impulse from Charles Leonhard Reinhold (who first resided in Jena, then in Kiel)—John Gottlob Fichte (born at Rammennau in Upper Lausitz, on the 18th May 1762, and for some time living in retirement in Switzerland), had, as Kant formerly by means of Hume, so he also arrived, through the sceptical writings of Solomon Maimon,

1 Notion of the Doctrine of Science, Weimar, 1794, Preface, p. iii.
and of James Ernest Schulze (Aenesidemus), at the clear conviction that philosophy had in no way as yet attained to the exalted position of an evident science.

In order not to mistake the whole of Fichte's undertaking, it is indispensably necessary to have a clear and adequate idea of the end and aim which that acute thinker and thoroughly scientific metaphysician had unceasingly in view.

In the introduction we have stated, that philosophy aims after knowledge in things, where formerly only belief or opinion had obtained. But such knowledge can only be attained by a thoroughly consistent system, which is reared on a foundation certain in and by itself (self-evident)—a system in which one proposition rests on another one, all of which are in the last instance capable of being traced back to that fundamental principle, as that which is immediately certain. If we succeed in constructing such a system perfectly, and set it up according to the necessary laws, philosophy, which is the love of knowledge, has attained its goal, and is no longer philosophy or love of knowledge, but actually knowledge, epistema, absolute science. It was after this that Fichte aimed, just as every other philosopher who has attained to a clear conception of philosophy. Impelled, like Kant, in his inmost soul, by the most powerful ethical self-feeling, he sought to bring philosophy to a termination, by substituting science in its place. Hence, he designated his system as "doctrine of science," the purpose of which it was, just to indicate in what manner a thorough and strictly scientific knowledge might be attained. Withal, he believed, yea, and was firmly convinced, that the material requisite, as it were the substances to be employed in rearing that edifice, had been completely furnished by Kant, and that nothing was awanting but arrangement, in order to exhibit that science which Kant had gotten, in the full triumph of irresistible conquest, as irrefrangible, and capable of most satisfactory demonstration.

The chief point to be attended to, naturally enough, was to reach that principle, which, although Kant had never distinctly enunciated it, nevertheless lay at the foundation of Kant's peculiar views. Kant had traced back everything to the internal a priori constitution of our faculty of thinking, and there grounded on a multitude of peculiarities and special laws, the categories, which
there lay in juxtaposition. But these partly antagonized each other; and, more particularly, it was impossible to attain to unity of consciousness, and to discover an absolutely first and ultimate principle, as long as two different sources for our knowledge were assumed, the one of which was to be sought within the depths of our own intellectual being, and the other without us, in the influences exerted by unknown objects. Fichte was firmly convinced that the great thinker had been only misunderstood, when it had been fancied that, by turns, Kant had ultimately rested with one foot on the sensible phenomenon, in order to ground the judgments of the understanding, and then again, with the other foot, on the \emph{à priori} constitution of the mind, in order to ground the phenomena. He did not conceive that it was warrantable to impute such duplicity, which disclosed the want of one common and deep foundation, to the master, and accounted for it simply on the score of misunderstanding.

He had really not the most remote conception, that while attempting to give the true import of the Criticism, he was imperceptibly forming another and a new system; nor would he open his eyes to the fact, until Kant himself formally protested, and that in the most decided terms, against Fichte's interpretation of his doctrine; first, in the "Intelligenz-blatt" of the General Literary Gazette in 1799 (in No. 109), and again in the "Hamburger Correspondent."

To express our opinion at once, and before we proceed: \emph{Fichte} has been misunderstood by almost all parties, and that not only during his lifetime, but in part even in our own days. By this we mean, that the opinion has been generally entertained that his Idealism was really of no importance, and that it was not worth while to give oneself the trouble of studying it. In attempting to study the philosophy of our days, his writings have been generally wholly left out, and yet \emph{it is there, and there only, that we can obtain the key to the understanding of all modern philosophers.}

To begin then: it is not quite erroneous indeed, but still is a distorted view, and a prejudice which operates as an obstacle, if we address ourselves to the enquiry with the judgment got by mere hearsay, that Fichte had felt convinced that he, that his own Me, only made and reflected the world, as it were, to himself;
that no such world did exist, and that, in fact, Fichte existed in the world-space by himself and alone, with his Phantasmagoria. Fichte says himself, with reference to this, "This is that senseless, ground—and foundationless Idealism and Egotism, which only offended courtiers and angry philosophers have falsely imputed to me." It was not in any way the intention of Fichte to deny the existence of the world; on the contrary, he acknowledges most fully the reality thereof, although on grounds different from those which are generally stated; yea, more, in the practical portion of his philosophy, he endeavours to shew and to account for that reality in the light of a higher necessity. But, again, he was far too consistent to allow anything to remain in the theoretical portion of his philosophy, which could not be strictly demonstrated from his principle. He did not deny an objective world, but he refused every explanation of our knowledge of it, which was grounded on the ordinary assumption of an external influence, and which, at the same time, would also surround our freedom and self-activity with external barriers. It was his desire to furnish a doctrine of science—he proposed to make it up of one piece, most closely connected together, in perfect unity; and this he could not accomplish in any other way than by maintaining himself strictly on the standing-point of subjectivity. Everything that can possibly exist or occur without us, occurs—as is very evident—just without us, without our consciousness; both the fact and the mode of its occurrence we can here throughout only come to know internally, within our subjective sphere. If the image that is pourtrayed within me is a reflex of that which is external, I am only capable of knowing this, inasmuch as my own internal nature and reason oblige me to assume and presuppose objects which thus affect me. I perceive that these phenomena exist within me. Whence are they? Either I have produced them myself, or something else than my Me has called forth and occasioned them in my Me; still, in either case, my Me also has been active at the same time. I am absolutely incapable of knowing anything else than what is present in my consciousness, as that which is known; if my reason feals obliged—i.e. obliged by its peculiar rational laws of thinking—to assume something external to myself, it is nevertheless evident that it is this same reason, i.e. again my Me, which conceives, presupposes, or as he
expresses it, affirms these objects without Me. This then is that
Idealism, so much cried down, which has been the object of so
much premature and cheap witticism, but which, nevertheless,
will clearly be felt by every one who reflects but a little on
the subject to be the only road which philosophy can consistently
follow out.

It is evident, then, that what the objects without us are to be,
must have been conceived in them by reason or by the under-
standing; just because we first presuppose them, we also pre-
suppose them as with certain qualities—in short, everything that
we ascribe to objects, and that is supposed to come to us from
them, has, first, been put by us into these objects by a conclusion;
and what is really true and original in all is simply this, that our
consciousness contains representations, and that our own under-
standing assumes certain objects, in order to be able to account
for the origin of these representations. Hence we have before us
an exclusively internal process and mechanism, viz. first of all,
images and representations, then the representation of objects
without us, and then the relation and reciprocal action of these
objects and those portraitures which is likewise conceived by the
understanding; in a word, we have nothing beyond images and
thoughts (conceptions), as the objects themselves, in as far as we
first conceive them, are also only something conceptional. Hence
it must be practicable to discover a thoroughly immanent and
subjective theory in that thoroughly subjective life and move-
ment, and to construct a thoroughly consistent system.

Such, then, is Fichte's fundamental position. From this it
will be evident, as we have already stated, that he did not at all
intend to deny the reality of things without us. Such was not his
aim. He merely insisted that all that we can possibly know of
things external to us, even their bare existence, is, after all, only
in ourselves; and that in so far as all this attains to consciousness,
it is only conception—only conceived (thought), and that con-
ceived by ourselves, or, in the case of every individual, conceived
by his own Me. Hence every one is only warranted in speaking
of his own Me; and philosophy itself, in general, is only war-
ranted in speaking of the Me in general.

The enquiry, whether Fichte, either during the course of his inves-
tigations, or perhaps even at the very outset thereof, should have
remembered and acknowledged, that his very standing-point (position) as subject necessarily already presupposed (implied) an objectivity, or an external world, which limits the subject and affects it, is one on which we shall have to enter by and bye. But so much is certain, that even after having discovered such an influence, which has to be pre-assumed, still the effect itself, as it manifests itself in the consciousness (and it is only in this respect that we can at all speak of it), can continually only be assumed as subjective, as something that is matter of sensation or of thought; and that we shall never be able to find means of conceiving reality without us in the same manner in which it exists, unless we had first discovered and immediately perceived in our consciousness itself, a Real and an essentiality; it is only in that way we would be able to suppose that which is internally perceived, externally also with the like quality. In other words, only in as far as we discover reality within our own souls, are we capable of having also information of realities without us in the same sense, that is by a kind of analogy or multiplying of our own real essence. Fichte felt as much concerned to find one single principle for theoretical philosophy, as to preserve also the same absolutely free for practical philosophy. If we adopt the views of Reinhold, and place at the foundation a Me that is determined by objective facts, which are matter of consciousness, we shall, when reflecting, be at once constrained to enquire after the condition of that passive state of being conditioned; that which conditions (the object) is then at once elevated above the Me, becomes itself the principle, and the Me ceases to be absolute and free. To these preliminary observations, we have only to add one thing. The views both of Fichte and of Schelling will be much more easily understood if we assume that there is such a thing as unconscious representations—in other words, determinations, modifications of the inner man, states of the soul, which exist, and are in the soul, or rather states, in the which our inner man is, before our consciousness perceives itself as in them. All throughout, Fichte proceeds on the supposition, that consciousness is only a becoming acquainted with that state which is already existent, when suddenly consciousness becomes aware, and perceives within itself those states and determinations, i.e. feelings and representations; it discovers itself as already in them, or
rather them in it, and as it is not conscious of having called them forth freely, and by its own activity, as in fact it is not conscious of having had any share in them whatsoever, it experiences them as passive states, i.e. as determinations caused, not by itself, but by something else, and although they be in fact affirmed by itself, still they are not as yet presented as such to self-consciousness.

Hence the question is never raised in the case of an unprejudiced and unsuspecting person, whether those representations had been produced by himself—no—such an one beholds objects, and believes that he beholds them; nor does he at all distinguish his representations from the objects. He does not remember that it is only possible for him to possess images of the objects, and he fancies that he is looking out of himself and beholding the objects themselves. The idea, that it is not possible for us to possess anything more than mere images of present objects, is one which is only called forth when we reflect philosophically.

The second step which is then taken, is to attempt comparing his representation with the object in itself, in order to find whether the representation is a correct one. But how is he to set about this? He shuts, as it were, his eyes, or turns them aside, keeps internally a firm hold of the image, and then looks again at the object, as he fancies. But, thirdly, he will have now more particularly to bear in mind that all the while he was doing nothing else than comparing representations with intuitions, and that the image in the intuition is just as much only a subjective image, as the image in the representation. Thus he had only been comparing images with images; and in fact nothing further had really been done by him than to enquire, whether in his representation he had, peradventure, altered anything in the original image which had existed as intuition in him. The idea to attempt a comparison between our representations and the objects in themselves, in order to see whether the two accord, depends in general on the unreflecting assumption, as if we were in any way able to arrive immediately at the knowledge of an object in itself. But are we really able ever to arrive at such knowledge in any other way than by representations thereof? But the fallacy which misleads us, is at once dissipated, if we keep a firm hold of that one proposition—the truth of which, indeed,
is so easily perceived, viz. that to wish to represent to ourselves objects as they are in themselves, amounts to nothing less than to demand to be able to represent objects to ourselves, without representing them: to wish to have a representation of objects without any representation of them.

Even the original intuition, in which, as long as I am engaged in it, I am unable to alter anything, and which is present to me without my consciously contributing in any way to it, after all, is, and remains merely a modification of my soul; and thus is something subjective. The only quality (mark) which serves to distinguish between an intuition that is given, and a free (spontaneous) representation, consists again only in my subjective consciousness, i.e. in this particular, that I feel conscious that I am not acting freely in the matter.

The whole question then turns on the point, whence that consciousness or feeling of non-liberty (non-spontaneity) within us, which, as we have seen, characterizes a present intuition, and serves to distinguish between it and a free representation?

The only reply which, in the province of subjectivity—and with reference to self-consciousness, we cannot pass beyond the boundaries of it—we can return to that question, is as follows: Our consciousness perceives, in the case of intuitions, a defect within itself, a negation of its individual self-activity, and hence the same consciousness—as everything must have its cause—presupposes other existences which are supposed to have determined or caused these intuitions. To make use of the expression of Fichte, the Me presupposes (assumes) something; it presupposes something external to itself, which it is not itself. Fichte says, it affirms a non-Me (not-self), and ascribes to that other being that activity and causality which it is conscious itself does not exercise. Hence the assumption or representation of objects, or Me's without us, is, after all, only a conception of the Me, an assumption made by the Me itself; true it is an assumption to which we are forced to have recourse, but only in the sense of being forced upon us by the peculiar subjective laws of thinking of the Me, viz. by the law of thought relating to a causa sufficiens, which law is, of course, again to be traced to the Me and to nothing else.

The real procedure in the consciousness is not, as is commonly supposed, that there are objects, and that to these objects our
representations are to be traced. In reality, matters go on as
follows: There are in us representations and images, which we get
in a manner, of which we are not conscious; and after that we con-
ceive objects external to ourselves, in order to account for the
origin of these images. Thus it is by his thinking that man
creates objects to himself; he represents them to himself, con-
ceives them as there; and only in that sense have they any ex-
istence for him. Besides, he conceives and arranges them at
every particular occasion, in such a manner as that they corre-
spond to the intuitions, or the intuitions to them; he fits them
out at every particular occasion with all the corresponding
qualities, in accordance with actual intuitions; he always con-
ceives the object exactly as his intuition is—or, to speak more
definitely, he objectivises his own subjective intuition; he affirms
it—although in reality it be within himself—yet now as without
him and before him. Thus the image in us was the first and the
immediate, and this image we have objectivised, i. e. placed with-
out us as an object. If now we enquire whence that first image,
even the intuition itself, arose, we are now no longer able to reply,
that it is due to objects, inasmuch as the very representation,
"object," is itself a representation, and that not even the ori-
ginal and first one, but rather the second, which has only been
affirmed by us for the sake of the subjective image. After I have
once, by reflecting, affirmed an object, I cannot again turn round
and say, that with reference to the object thus affirmed by myself,
I stand in a relation of passiveness; nor can I say, that as I find
myself to be, I am an effect of that object, while, on the contrary,
that object is rather an effect of me. This is the well-known
circle out of which philosophy can never get, as long as that
standing-point is occupied, and to the consciousness of which it
requires thoroughly to attain, as being a fallacy of common sense,
which at every turn meets and comes back upon us.

The sensation, the image, is actual in my consciousness; thus
far only and no farther am I warranted to pronounce—I do not
know how it has originated within me, nor how it has got into me.
There it is, ready made, and it has been brought about without
any free conscious activity of my Me; although, of course,
necessarily through some activity of the Me; for the Me must be
active in representing, yea, even in sensation also, or else it would
be dead, insensible, not representing, not life and spirit. It follows then, that the representation, or the sensation has, in the way in which it actually exists, originated from a non-spontaneous and unconscious activity of the Me. It will thus be evident, that underneath consciousness there is in our thinking or mental activity, a sphere which underlies consciousness, as its foundation, and that something is there brought about, that our soul is there put into a definite determination, before it had time to reflect on the state (condition) into which it is thus put; it finds itself already in that state in the moment in which it becomes conscious, in which it places over against itself that state, or rather itself as in that state, and makes itself the object of its own intuition. For, to reflect upon one's self, to become conscious of one's self, is nothing else than to have internal intuition of one's self, to make one's self the object, so that the subject that contemplates places its own self over against itself, as the object, which itself is—in other words it is an intuition of one's self by one's self, in which, as even grammatical usage informs us, one represents one's self to one self (se sibi) i. e. places one's self internally before one's self.

We have alluded to that deeper, unconscious sphere of our subjectivity, in which our thinking and cognising intellect—or to use Fichte's terms—in which the Me afterwards perceives itself, as (being) held in certain determinations, i. e. in certain sensations or representations. To deduce those determinations from the influences exerted by external objects, was felt to be impracticable, inasmuch as ourselves affirm these objects, for the very purpose of explaining by them those states, and hence would thus only reason in a circle; thus nothing is left us, but to say, with Fichte, that we have here come to the limit of our knowledge; this must be looked upon as the nature, as the law, or rather as the incomprehensible limit of the Me. Withal, so much is certain, that all sensations, feelings, or representations, even if they were occasioned by something that is without us, nevertheless, in the way in which they do exist and get into our consciousness, are, both as to their peculiar shape and essence, nothing more than determinations of the Me within its exclusively subjective sphere, which, although originally formed in a sphere that underlies the consciousness, are still always formed in accordance with the laws and with the nature of the Me. On this rests the important proposition, that even in the
very first sensible intuitions and images, there is already the form of the understanding; they are not the pure impressions of objects. If, for example, we even represent this subject to ourselves, as if the soul were like a stringed instrument, which but wants the touch of the finger in order to give forth sound, still the chord when thus touched, can only develop that sound which is already situate in it, and the whole instrument, that harmony of sounds which are potentialiter already situate therein, sounds which, as it were à priori, slumber in the chords; the finger that touches them cannot communicate to them ought of its own nature—on the contrary, from the sound of the chord we can only infer the internal condition or the nature of the chord itself; how much more then will all this apply to a thoroughly living and self-subsistent being, such as the human Me.

Thus, and without denying or removing the limits above referred to, it follows that from existing intuitions and conceptions we are only able to arrive at the cognition of the true nature of the Me, and that all these self-determinations are only a manifestation of its essence, i. e. that in general the fact that we see something determinate, and the manner in which we behold it, that the phenomenon which we take to be an object is, after all, only the reflex of our own internal laws of intuition, and at the same time also the product of them. Just as the small green, red, or yellow clouds, which our eye, when dazzled by the sun, sees for a short time floating before it, disclose only a certain internal constitution of the organ of sight, so the qualities also with which objects, yea, and the whole world also is imaged (reflected, presented) before us, only serve to disclose the internal constitution of nature of our own mental power of vision—of intelligence. It follows, then, that those determinations, the whole multiplicity of our inner world, which we had fancied we had got from without, does in all its determinateness, derive its origin from within, because these determinations are just the self-determinations of the living consciousness. The laws of life, situated in the consciousness and constituting its essence, in one word, the nature of consciousness it is that manifests itself (comes forward) as the obstacles and determinations of the free activity of our representational faculty. To make it possible, in general, to attain to consciousness, it is necessary that some definite consciousness, that
definite representations be attained; unlimited activity would lose itself in infinity—would not represent any thing at all—if it were not both capable and obliged to impede (obstruct, limit) itself, to cling, to keep hold, to cleave, and in its imagining, to modify into definite images—and all that in the most diversified manner. Every determination is a negation of the power of infinite thinking. It will now be evident, both that, and also in general, why our consciousness requires to be endowed with such a constitution, with such laws of life or immanent limitations to its essence. Its ground may, in general, be stated to be, that the taking place of a representation may become possible; that thus virtual consciousness may also be actually or by fact realised; that in general intelligence and consciousness may actually take place, without which, and without the product of which—we mean the whole phenomenal world—man would not be able to fulfil his proper vocation, which is a moral and practical one, and which, after all, is the all-important point. Thus is it à priori evident, that limitations are requisite; but to understand why they are of such a nature, and why, in virtue of them, and in individual cases, now one particular sensible object makes its appearance, and then another one, is as impossible as the knowledge thereof would be useless for the highest and the grand general purpose. Suffice it, that man finds at every moment both material and opportunity for action, and for fulfilling by such actions his moral vocation; it is only by this that single things acquire their importance, and that the whole finds its ultimate fundamental explanation. These, then, are what Fichte himself designates as the "inexplicable absolute limits" of theoretical philosophy, or of science; for here it comes into immediate contact with the boundary of practical action; and the latter was, even in his purely theoretical investigations, always felt the object of chief importance to Fichte, as a man of thorough practical turn. These absolute limitations of the intellect, or of the Me, occupy in the system under consideration, the room and place of every external obstacle, or that of the thing in itself, which Kant had assumed, and are distinguished from the latter only in this particular, that they are found not without, but within the Me; and hence, immanent in the nature itself of the subject, which latter remains, at the same time, perfectly free and independent of other things; and again, that these limits are also the secret
ground, the consequence of which is the imaging of those things in themselves, which thus, as Fichte said, had now by his exertions been eliminated, root and stem, from philosophy.

Having given this general sketch of the system, it now behoves us to enter, as far as requisite, into a delineation of its systematic disposition, at least in its main features. But here also we shall have first to rectify the mistake so commonly fallen into, as if Fichte had left his system in a full, elaborated, and firm form, such as had given satisfaction to his own mind. Generally, this is supposed to be contained in the first exposition which he gave of his views in the "Grundlegung der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre" (Founding of the Doctrine of Science), Weimar, 1794. But that work was only intended to be preliminary to a more matured elaboration of the system, and as a manual for those that attended his lectures; and so little did he subsequently feel satisfied with it, that he introduced a thorough alteration even in the phraseology of it, and employed in his later exposition no longer the celebrated, or rather the notorious terms, "the Me and the not-Me." In general, he felt convinced that his teaching was capable of being presented in the most diverse forms—as the perusal of the letters he addressed to Reinhold more particularly shews—and, in fact, when he died, he left it expounded by himself in at least five different forms, as may be seen by a perusal of his posthumous works, edited by his son.

But as that first representation has formed an era, as it were, and as in the sequel we shall frequently have to refer to it, we proceed to give a brief abstract thereof.

From what has been said, it will be evident that for the principle of all philosophy, for that which is immediate and the most certain and the first to us, we must necessarily look within ourselves, in the sphere of subjectivity, and not without us. But, according to Kant, we are as little capable of knowing any thing about the spiritual substance of our essence in itself, as about the substance of the world in general; yea, more, it might possibly turn out that the assumption of such a substance was entirely unfounded, inasmuch as it is something that in itself is unknown. Hence—(and this is a fundamental proposition)—we are not even warranted to make such a spiritual substance as the soul, or by whatever other term we may designate it, the starting or the
resting-point of the whole system. Thus Fichte declared himself expressly, at least during the first period. That which manifests itself immediately to us, is not an existence, nor a substance, but an activity—it is the representing, the internal imaging, the consciousness. Hence, when he employs the term substance, he refers thereby only to all change, as conceived in general; accident, on the contrary, is something definite, which changes in connection with something else that changes.\(^1\) Our consciousness is every moment engaged with some one definite representation, but we require to separate these single representations from the idea of consciousness in general, if we wish to apprehend the latter purely and by itself, as the faculty of conceiving (thinking) everything possible. It is by that succession of different representations which pass on, one after the other, as before an inward eye, that we learn that there is such an inward eye, which takes them all in, one after the other, which is really there, and which itself does not pass away along with those images. Hence, the consciousness may be looked upon as the central point in which all representations unite; it is the faculty, the power which perceives; it is not any substratum, but the activity, the perceiving itself. But this consciousness or intelligence, or the Me, is or becomes actualiter, what it is potentialiter, only by knowing about itself, by representing itself to itself (se sibi); hence, in a certain sense, it creates itself, knowing transforms itself into self-consciousness; and this is that primitive matter of fact which is immediately certain, and which does not stand in need of any probation by means of syllogisms or of any other argumentation.

This self-consciousness then, is effected by this, that the Me represents itself. Here we may distinguish, first of all, between the Me, as subject that represents and the Me as object, or the Me that is represented—between that which represents and the representation of it, while we see, at the same time, that with respect to their contents, both amount to one and the same thing. The Me is in this case intuition, both in the active and in the passive signification of that term, i. e. it is both the perceiving and also the perceived. Withal, however, that consciousness is as yet perfectly void, i. e. although the Me now knows about itself,

\(^1\) Doctrine of Science, New Edit. p. 73. Opera Omn. vol. I. p. 72.
that it consists in perceiving, it knows no more about itself; it only represents itself just as a beholding; but at the same time it represents as yet nothing that is beheld, but simply the activity, the bare beholding by itself.

Hence the first principle of the doctrine of science is as follows: A consciousness of one's self takes place, or the Me represents itself to itself—the subject Me presents to itself its own image as object, makes itself the object of its spiritual intuition; or as Fichte expresses himself: The Me affirms itself. This is the original act in all knowing. If we attend closely to this point we cannot fail to notice, that in reality the designation of "the Me," or at least that of "subject," does not, as yet, correspond to such a perceiving, which purely perceives itself alone, and not as yet anything else whatsoever. If, notwithstanding this, the above name and notion are actually made use of (and Fichte did make use of them), then evidently something else is, at the same time, affirmed along with that immediate assumption, viz. the not-Me. Hence Fichte also still continues in the above assumption, as follows:

The second act of the consciousness, immediately connected and inseparable from the former, consists in this, that the consciousness opposes its own self to everything else, that it distinguishes between itself as a definite representation and everything else which is not that representation; yea, more, that it only comes to know itself perfectly by that contrast. The Me affirms a not-Me: of which, however, it knows at present only so much, or in connection with which it does not as yet conceive anything more, than that this not-Me is the simple opposite of the Me, and hence is not the Me itself.

These two principles thus furnish antagonistic notions. These, however, are to be united in one and the same consciousness. The way in which this is accomplished constitutes a separate third fundamental law of thinking, viz. that of the mutual limitation of these two representations; the Me is, what the not-Me is not, and the not-Me is, what the Me is not. The two are required to be opposed to each other in the consciousness, and yet, withal, the unity of the consciousness is not to be destroyed thereby; the formula runs now in the following terms: the Me affirms itself as determined (limited) by the not-Me, i.e. the faculty of knowledge, which, as pure or empty consciousness, had formerly been con-
ceived as wholly indeterminate, has received into itself a determination, viz. the representation of a not-Me (of something else, of a world), but in such a manner, that withal it retains, at the same time, the consciousness of this, its own thinking; it has determined itself to a representation, conscious, however, that that representation, or inward self-determination, is only its own representation and a modification of its own self. The more consciousness is, as it were, absorbed and resolves itself in that representation of its own, the less does it attain to becoming conscious of its own activity, of itself, in the matter; on the contrary, the more it reflects upon itself as activity, the less does it penetrate into the definite representation, or into the object, which it represents to itself.

In truth all this is only the scientific form proposed by Fichte, for the above popular statement, that consciousness, representing, or inward formation and intuition, consists in pure productivity out of one's-self. But that consciousness implies, strictly taken, at the same time, in principle, although covertly, an external world, inasmuch as the Me, viz. the individual, definite or finite Me, constitutes that principle; on that ground, on the ground of its own nature, hence out of itself, it necessarily opposes itself to what is other, and again opposes to itself that which is other. Hence, in virtue of, and in accordance with the second principle, that other, or the not-Me, appears as a product of the Me—as an opposition which, indeed, is necessary and non-spontaneous, but still as an opposition, in making which the Me proceeds according to its own inherent laws of thinking; whence it also follows, that the subject itself, or the Me, will also be the mediate cause of all those peculiar opposing actions which result from that original opposition, and will, in the last instance, have to deduce them from its own faculty and its activity. It must be allowed, that the representing of objects, or not-Me's, on the part of the Me, always remains its own proper activity, even though that activity cannot be looked upon as a spontaneous one. True, it is not spontaneous, but necessary; that necessity, however, only arises from its own internal laws of thinking, from its nature, or from the original determination and peculiar constitution of its own self, so that the Me remains always entirely free, i. e. independent of everything else, of all external and foreign influences.
To what we have stated, we shall only add that passage from the writings of Fichte, in which his Idealism has come out most distinctly, and which is specially remarkable on this account, that from it we gather, at the same time, in what way he viewed the idea of existence, of the substantial, in opposition to the active and to thinking, and how the former notion gradually resolved itself, necessarily, in his mind, into the latter. 1 "Idealism accounts for the determinations of the consciousness from the acting of the intelligence. It represents intelligence as only active and absolute, not as passive; nor passive, as according to the postulate of that system it is that which is primitive and highest, which is preceded by nothing else by which we might be able to account for such a passiveness of it. On the same grounds, existence, in the proper sense of the term, or continuance, cannot be ascribed to it, inasmuch as this is the result of a reciprocal action (affection); while, however, nothing either exists or is assumed with which the intellect could be brought into such mutual action. Idealism views intelligence as an acting, and as absolutely nothing beyond that; nor is it even to be designated as something active, inasmuch as such an expression points to something continuous, which is possessed of that activity. But Idealism has no ground to assume such a thing, inasmuch as it does not lie in the principle thereof, from which all the rest requires to be deduced. Again, it is required to deduce definite representations from the acting of that intelligence, such as those of a world, existent without any doing of our own, a material world existing in space, &c. which representations occur, as is well known, in the consciousness. But it is impossible to deduce anything determinate from a being that is wholly indeterminate, as the formula for every kind of deduction, the proposition about the ground, cannot be applied in such a case. It would follow, then, that the acting on the part of the intelligence, which had been laid at the foundation, would require to be a determinate acting, and, inasmuch as intelligence is itself the highest ground of explanation, an acting determined by the intellect and by its essence, and not by something external to it. Hence the assumption of Idealism will be as follows: intelligence acts, but in virtue of its peculiar being it can only act

in a certain way; if that necessary mode of acting is then conceived as separate from the acting itself, it may very aptly be designated as the laws of acting. There are then necessary laws of the intelligence. This explains, at the same time, the fact of a feeling of necessity which accompanies the definite representations. It is not that the intelligence feels at such a time an impression from without, it only feels in that acting (thinking) the limits of its own being. In as far as Idealism makes that solely rational, definite, and really explanatory assumption as to the necessary laws of the intellect, it is termed critical or also transcendental. On the contrary, a transcendent (wholly groundless) Idealism would be a system which would deduce the definite representations from the spontaneous and wholly lawless acting of the intelligence; an assumption entirely contradictory, inasmuch as the proposition with reference to the ground, is, as has already been stated, not applicable to such acting."

In another place, we are told, "It is the very task of the doctrine of science to shew how non-spontaneous representations, such as seeing, hearing, &c. do in general proceed from one's own activity, or in other words, à priori to construct representations according to the laws of thinking. No ready-made existence is (in the doctrine of science) allowed to stand over; it does not tolerate any absolute and ready-made givenness (being-given)—yes, it tolerates nothing that appears to us as absolute, as object and existence. It discloses, on the other hand, the process of becoming, and brings to the light of consciousness the way in which we ourselves have produced a representation. Thus it dissolves, and as it were renders fluid (fluidifies) all existence; existence as that which is quiescent wholly disappears before it; it only observes and watches the making (the constructing) in which it is engaged, and thus recognises also all objects as its own products, viz. as those of the consciousness and of thinking." This and this only (says he further) is the mark, that in our philosophical investigations we are on the right road, if we have no longer the ready-made and objective existence in view, but only the process of becoming—when everything that exists is first inwardly being constructed before our vision; it is only in that manner that we gain an insight into the becoming and the being, into the inward and real life of the mind. If thinking and representing are
once apprehended as being perfect activity, if consciousness is wholly shut up within itself—if we abide by the proposition, that nothing can possibly get into it but that which is known, represented, self-formed—in a word—that which is ideal—and if, beyond contradiction, this is the product of the consciousness itself—then nothing is left but to declare that all representations, as well as all intuitions, without exception, are creatures of our own, and then to enquire within the Me for the ground on which objective reality is ascribed to the one and not to the other. Even existence—objective reality—can for us only be a conceived existence, a conceived reality—one conceived by us, and hence, in that sense, one self-produced. If we have once arrived at the knowledge of the law, according to which that construction and projection takes place, we are also obliged to admit, and that with perfect conviction, that objectivity and reality, yea, and existence itself, is only a subjective representation; we are acquainted with the optic laws, according to which that appearance is produced; but, in face of the higher consciousness, all objective existence wholly disappears as being actual; nothing is left behind as that which is really actual, except that activity within us, that only from which we took our start, viz. the subjective activity; there is only a thinking, representing, forming, an activity fixed to certain laws that are inherent to itself; these laws are nothing else than the unchanging method of that spontaneous and free activity, and that activity is itself the absolute, and that which alone is actual.
HAVING attempted, in our last Lecture, a general delineation of what is most important in the doctrine of science, as it made its appearance at the first, we shall now advert, as far as may be requisite to the practical portion of that system, and more especially to the enquiry how the transition is to be accomplished from the theory of cognition as described above, to a supersensual world, and to a religious faith or knowledge.

In accordance with the theory which, at that time, he had adopted, Fichte could not with any propriety utter, on that subject, opinions different from those contained in the well-known article which was suppressed by order of government, and which led to his removal from Jena.\(^1\) It is impossible to lead proof for the being of a God, from a contemplation of the world, as the latter is patent to the senses; nay, we cannot even infer from it the properties of God, inasmuch as, for the transcendental Idealist, that world no longer exists as a self-subsistent being, “it is nothing more than the sensized view—and that in accordance with certain intelligible laws of reason—of our own acting, as that of mere intellect within the incomprehensible (non-intelligible) limitations, in which we find ourselves confined.” While the common understanding of men regards the world as external and wholly independent, in as far as we are concerned, the Idealist beholds in it only the reflex of his own mental activity; hence he can no longer

\(^1\) In vol. viii. of the paper edited by Fichte and Niethammer (year 1798.) Op. vol. v.
view it as something self-subsistent; it, together with all that is termed objects in and by themselves, has been transformed into a product of his Me, although a non-spontaneous product thereof, inasmuch as his Me does, by virtue of its nature, feel itself constrained to affirm a not-Me, viz. that whole image of the world which stands over against him. It feels constrained to do this by a determination which, in a manner incomprehensible, is inherent to it, by the tendency of its being, by the determinateness of its nature, or by its limitation, as Fichte terms it. But the world which one's self has thus reflected (imaged) out of one's self, can on that very account be looked upon as nothing else than the manifestation and the effect of that inward determination of nature of the Me from which it proceeds. From this it is evident that it is impossible to infer from the character of that image of the world, which, properly speaking, is only a portraiture of the Me, the existence of a super-mundane Creator of the world in the same way as those do who look upon the world as something objective and actual. As the Idealist looks upon the world-image as being only his own product, so in answer to the enquiry after its creator, he can only turn within himself and there point to his own representational faculty and the laws of representation that are inherent to him. In that manner, then, man can never get beyond himself, nor attain that after which he seeks, viz. a God. The only Real, the ultimate ground from which, in his opinion, everything proceeds, is the subjective activity, the Me; and that which, to appearance, hovers before it, is, in as far as it is something known, again only a modification of that activity itself; for however near we may seem to be to the remark, that after all the shackles and limitations in which the Me is confined by nature, its determinations of nature, necessarily derive their origin from a power external to it and elevated above it, yet this view has already been set aside, once and for all, by the rejoinder that these very limitations, in as far as we arrive at the knowledge of them, are as something perceived, felt, or known, again subjective perceptions, and hence the products of the Me; and, on the other hand, in as far as they are not perceived, they in fact possess no existence at all.

It follows, then, that the only thing immediately real¹ is the

real power of the Me, as that which is doing and active, or rather that the Me is that very activity that is operating, that life; it is a creating of all activities from out of one's self, with reference to acts both of the will and of representation; that power knows, or at least is capable of becoming conscious, of all that it effects, and again it has effected all that it knows; for consciousness is impossible with respect to the things which we have not done ourselves. But it is one and the same power which at one time, in the aspect of its mere activity, is apprehended in the consciousness as operating (effecting), and again, in the aspect of its reflecting on itself, as knowledge, and hence is represented by turns as a real power, which, as such, operates without knowing it, and again simply and exclusively as knowledge. Becoming conscious consists just in the disjoining of what in itself is thoroughly one and undistinguished, into subject and object; hence, fundamentally, knowledge and existence are not separate, and merely become so afterwards in the consciousness; that which is separated, the original power, which in itself is not separated, is the absolute—in other words, it is the activity of man which is itself the absolute and the operating, which (images) reflects itself in every one of its acts. Inasmuch, then, as to the ordinary consciousness the actual deed, by which something definite is represented, seems to precede the consciousness of that something, or in other words, inasmuch as we are not capable of becoming conscious of any representation till after we have represented and called it forth within ourselves, but after that continue, as it were, to present that representation to ourselves, while we contemplate it—that activity seems, as it were, to require two different powers, we might term it, two intellectual hands, one of which seizes and presents, while the other feels and searches it. But if we forget that all this is done by one and the same power, we are apt to fancy the existence of two, and the object which is being presented (which, properly speaking, is nothing else than that very activity arrested in a certain act), seems to be the ground which determines our contemplating and knowing, yea, and our intelligence itself, and thus the subjective is made dependent on the objective; for, the proximate ground of its material determinateness is first found in that which hovers before it, and which, in the strictest sense of the term, it imagines; whence it follows, that
the subjective is looked upon as a mere passive taking up, as cognising, and not as active producing.

Thus the Me, or absolute activity, is in reality only manifested as the ground and origin of all its modifications; nor are we capable of declaring any thing else about it, than that it is spontaneity, and that its essence consists in self-subsistence, independence, and freedom from all foreign impressions and determinations; that all the determinations and limitations that occur in the consciousness only exist within itself, and are not caused from without; and hence that, as it exists, it is perfectly independent, and thus, at least negatively, free; and again, as every thing which appears to determine it, is again only produced by itself,—that it is also positively free.

But, continues Fichte, that spontaneous operation is on that account in itself not arbitrary, as it places before it an end; which, however, is not got from without, but is affirmed by itself. The Me itself, and my necessary rational end, constitute that which is supersensual and higher. Thus Fichte assumes here a subjective end, the self-formed aim of the Me, beyond which it is impossible to pass or to speculate. This he conceives as being the immediate rational nature, reason in concreto, as the proper and true essence of the human spirit, as the only realistic point which is met with in his system. To push the enquiry still farther, and to ask, why and whence such an aim? would amount to the same thing as if we asked why truth is truth—and why that which is incogitable is not at the same time also cogitable? In short, that self-formed aim is the innermost and deepest truth of our nature, that which most properly and peculiarly is our own, constitutes us, and is the object of our desire and volition. Whatever we seek after in virtue of this, we seek for our own sakes, and we would not choose anything different, even though we were able to do it. Hence it is not an aim that is forced upon us, but one which the Me proposes to itself; and while thereby it declares what it should do, it declares at the same time also what really it would do; it is thus a categorical Imperative, but one not coming from without, but from the innermost depth of one's own being—so to speak, it is the pressing and longing of one's nature after its development. On this account it is impossible to find a higher ground for it; the absolute ground is situate in the
Me itself. To make use of an expression of Leibnitz, the Me is always "virtuellement" more than it is "effectivement (réellement)"; it develops everything out of itself, because originally—potentialiter—it unconsciously contains already everything, at the consciousness of which it only arrives when it is being actually developed. All, then, that the doctrine of science does, is to exhibit the method of that self-development of the consciousness, shewing how it gradually comes to remember its contents. We shall by and by find that subsequent systems have enlarged and made absolute that view of the immanancy and propriety of design which, in the system under consideration, is subjective. By what we term self-aim (self-formed aim) we refer to those contents of one's self, in as far as these are not fully developed, but exist only potentialiter, and the thing of greatest importance is merely, that the Me rightly apprehend that aim which by virtue of its essence is proposed to itself, and then, as in the strictest sense of the term, it is activity and spontaneity, that it also realise and carry it out by actual deeds. If the Me does not apprehend, but, on the contrary, deny its self-aim, then it denies itself; for that aim is identical with its essence; hence the Me has co ipso to assume the possibility of carrying it out, inasmuch as to propose an aim to one's self amounts to this, to anticipate something as actual in the future, or in general to anticipate it as possible. Hence the proposition, that whatsoever we should do, we are also able to do. If, then, we neither can nor may doubt the possibility of carrying out all that our true, i.e. our moral nature demands, then the whole phenomenal world of sensible objects (which had hitherto only presented itself to us as a jugglery, both without any aim, incomprehensible, and a non-entity—and on that account deceptive also) attains, whenever the practical standing-point is occupied, also at once and thereby its aim, its significance, and the solemn importance of necessity, with which theory alone was incapable of investing it. Let it not be imagined, however, that even in that ethical point of view, there is a full restoration, as by the wand of an enchanter, of the ideas concerning actuality, as that reality of the objective world which determines the subject and renders him dependent on it, such as the realist and uninformed men generally take it to be. These views have been above refuted, and now to restore them would amount to a
giving up of the whole preceding theory, as both superfluous and false; it would be to destroy, on the practical standing-point, that which we had reared with such labour on the theoretical one. No—here we only become conscious of the purpose for which, in accordance with our nature, a world must necessarily present itself to our view: such appearance is the only means, or, in other words, is the condition of attaining our self-formed aim, inasmuch as without such appearance, definite action, which after all is our absolute destiny, would be altogether impossible. We are unable to conceive any activity in general, and hence that of the Me in particular, without the opposition (contrast) of a within and a without, of subject and of object, of something from which and something to which it is to be directed. It follows, then, that everything that is contained in that appearance, beginning from the aim which is absolutely self-formed, and ending with the crude material of the world, one and all—as, for example, my body—are so many mediating links in that appearance (phenomenon), and hence also themselves phenomena (appearances). The only thing which is really true and actual is our self-subsistence and freedom, the inherent barriers and limitations of which are only the form of human consciousness, that of the intellectual side of our activity. "True, in respect of their origin, these are and must ever remain inconceivable; but practical philosophy asks, of what importance can that possibly be to you? The import of them is the clearest and most certain thing that exists; they are the definite place which you occupy in the moral order of things. That which you perceive in virtue of them possesses reality, and that the only reality with which you are concerned, and which exists, as far as you are concerned; it is the continued interpretation of the behest of duty, the living expression of what you should do, seeing that (in general) you should do. Our world is the sensized material of our duty; this is what, properly speaking, is real in all objects, and the true fundamental material of all phenomena." "Hence it is neither without reason nor aim, that the world continually forces itself upon us as something Real. As incontrovertibly and truthfully as our own nature manifests itself in the behest of duty as conscience, so the reality of the world also makes itself known, as such, inasmuch as the highest aims of existence can only be carried out in it, and by means of it."
It will be seen that the reality of the world rests not on a knowing, but on a believing, which, in turn, springs from the necessity to carry out the behest of duty, and which without such a world could not be carried out. While, on the one hand, it is admitted that the whole world, which is the progeny of the original constitution of our own nature, is only the image and reflex of our hidden nature and its manifestation, it is evident, on the other hand, that, as a whole, it is a moral arrangement throughout, and one subservient to moral purposes. "This, then, constitutes true faith, and the moral order is the Divinity which we assume."

"But farther, this constitutes faith—wholly and completely. That living and operating moral order is God; nor do we either require any other God, nor are we able to apprehend any other one." In other words, we are in general not capable of perceiving anything divine beyond that order, which is lying in us, and operates in and by us. If we were perhaps to infer, that wherever order is manifested, we have to presuppose the presence of One who causes that order, we are attempting an inference, to which we are not warranted in the case before us;¹ for "such an inference is drawn by the understanding, and that exclusively in the sphere of sensible experience, for the purpose of connecting the fluid phenomenon to a permanent substratum, which is always corporeal. But in the case before us, we are to stop short at that which is fluid, at pure action; for this is itself the immediate, and in this case the exclusively valid Schema; and if we were to draw such an inference, we would in fact be seeking after, and inevitably obtain, a permanent (abiding) corporeal substratum for the pure acting of the Divinity." "If God is designated as a Spirit, we ascribe to him something extended in time (something that is lasting), for the purpose of fixing the multiplicity of action there as to its unity. The terms spirit and soul have only a negative meaning; they just imply non-corporeity, and no more than that. Such an expression is a shift to which we are driven in thinking, when we have first banished by thought everything sensible and permanent, everything material, and, after that, still

substitute something in the room of the subject, which is not properly to exist, and yet is to exist; but such an expression is wholly useless, in as far as it is to be employed positively and for the purpose of determining the Divine Being."

Again, that order, or law dominant, may and has to be conceived as absolute; nor does it stand in need of a higher ground of explanation. Were we to fancy that it is necessary to assume some personal being, which should communicate that law, and administer that order, we would be constrained again to presuppose in that personal being that same order, as will, as mode of operating, as holy power, or under some other abstract idea; and thus that law would always stand out as the first and the highest, as the absolute, which would have to be searched after and assumed. Besides, the assumption of a personal God, as it is generally made, is nothing more than Anthropomorphism, a transferring to God of human limitations and imperfections, and will ever entangle us in contradictions. Thus Fichte endeavoured to shew, that to conceive a divine consciousness, something personal and extra-mundane, was in fact only to make unwarrantable limitations, by which the Supreme Being is made finite and similar to ourselves, inasmuch as such notions do necessarily imply the representation of a substance extended in time and space, such as must be ever deemed inapplicable to Divinity. In general our thinking is schematic, i.e. constructive, pre-formative; we arrive at the consciousness of what is super-sensual exclusively under the Schema of action, of activity; while we attain to that of the sensible, under the Schema of extension, of corporeity. Hence we have, in accordance with the first Schema, to conceive God as an order of events; but on no account, as a form of extension; it is impossible to affirm of Him that He is a substance or a something; for, according to our system, that would be the same as to say that He is extented matter, and may be seen and heard," &c. "He is not existence, but pure action, i.e. he is the life and principle of a supersensible world-order, in the same way as I, a finite intelligence, am not an existence, but pure

acting—an acting, in accordance with duty, as being a member of that super-sensible world-order.” "All our thinking," continues he, "is really a limiting, and is termed in that respect an apprehending (conceiving) i.e. a comprehending from out of a mass of determinable, so that something always remaineth external to the boundary-line that has been drawn, and which has not been apprehended as in it, and hence does not form part (does not belong to) of the conception. Every reality which we apprehend is only finite, and becomes such by our apprehending it. Every thing, that is something for us, is such only in as far as it is also not something else, and every position becomes possible only by negation, just as even the word ‘determining’ implies nothing else than limiting.” It will be evident how closely Fichte approaches in these propositions to those inferences which of late, almost half a century after him, have been drawn with so much decision from them. He himself asserted at that time, though with less distinctness, that “God ceases to be infinite whenever he is made the object of a notion, whenever we propose definitely to represent and to apprehend Him in a notion.” If “God is to be designated as consciousness, then we draw around him the limitations (boundaries) of human consciousness; again, if these be removed, nothing remains but a knowing wholly incomprehensible to us, which indeed might suit well enough that which God really is, who, so to express ourselves, is in that sense purely consciousness, intelligence, spiritual life, and activity. But as it is impossible to apprehend this, it seems preferable to abstain wholly from making such an approximative notional determination: yea more, in philosophic strictness we are also obliged to do this; for every notion of the Godhead would necessarily be an idol.” It is hence impossible to furnish proofs for the being of a God, seeing that proofs are only mediate cognitions. But the belief in a super-sensual world is an immediate truth. Nay more, the Postulate of a super-sensual world-order is both the first and the only In-itself, which is given to man; it is the only truly absolute.

Let us now endeavour to characterise and criticise the system as a whole. To us the system of Fichte seems an Idealism, whose

1 There is here a play on the word "Begreifen."—The Translator.
tendency had originally been in the direction of explaining the notion of objective reality—as in fact all philosophy had hitherto been—only that, in this instance, it was coupled with a thoroughly clear conviction, that nothing objective, yea, that not even any immediate influence of something objective, could possibly penetrate into the consciousness, and that all acquaintance with the existence of something other, all intuition, representation, and imagining of an object, just amounted to a knowing about it, but could not be that object itself. The distinctness and clearness of that view rendered a rigorous Idealism inevitable, in accordance with which both the starting-point and the basis of all particular knowledge and credence had necessarily and exclusively to be sought for only subjectively in the consciousness. That consciousness, that mental activity, is the sole thing which immediately perceives its self within its self; and everything which it perceives is already in it as something represented, and is nothing more than the modification, or determination, or change of its self: the consciousness or the Me has itself for its object, nor has it any other immediate object besides its self; it is hence subject-object or self-object, and is quite alone with itself and for itself; it is necessary for it to look upon itself in that way, or else it again brings in that representation of an immediate influence on the consciousness from without, which had once and for all been set aside. It was the chief object and endeavour of Fichte to set aside, and that in the most rigorous manner, all such influence, and along with it, of course, all doubleness also and all Dualism; for if once that incomprehensibility and duplicity is affirmed in the principle, then all unity of explanation, and hence the whole of systematic philosophy, becomes an impossibility. In fact, it is the demand, as it is the import of all explanation and of all understanding, in the last instance, to explain everything upon one principle, to reduce the whole as a whole to the unity of consciousness.

It follows that the Me had to propose to itself to view all the modifications of consciousness, not merely as determinations, existing exclusively in and on itself, as the accidents are with reference to the substance, but that, at the same time—or rather solely—it had to acknowledge them as being the effects of the consciousness, as products and self-determinations of the absolute self-activity; all representations were to be apprehended, not
merely as something existing in the mind, but as an activity or as products, which had proceeded from the creative power of that mind itself; as something effected, they were to be explained (accounted for) purely by activity, as that which constituted their sole ground. It was necessary that the Me maintained the position, that itself alone was both the first and the only immediately Real, that it comprised the whole totality of conditions; that it was the sum and contents of everything, the entirely independent and free, i. e. the absolute creator for itself and of everything that was going on in it.

But here we come at once upon a difficulty in our way. If the Me be indeed the proper and true subject-object, in the manner indicated above, inasmuch as, according to the two first principles of the system, it affirms itself in the opposition to the not-Me, i. e. arrives first at the consciousness of itself only by, and in opposition to everything else, while no self-consciousness could possibly take place without such an opposition (antagonism)—it follows, that both the parts of the opposition, the Me and the not-Me, do with equal cogency require to be affirmed; that the not-Me would immediately disappear, if the Me were destroyed, and vice versa, that if the antagonistic not-Me were destroyed, the Me also would, at the same time, cease to be any longer distinguished as such in the consciousness, or, in other words, would cease to exist. The one as well as the other can only be retained in the consciousness together with its opposite, i. e. with the express consciousness of the antagonism, nor is there any ground for afterward pronouncing the not-Me to be any less absolute or necessary than the Me. But that very observation, that in general everything definite can dialectically be conceived and known only by its opposite being, at the same time, present in the consciousness, that wholly general law had indeed been now and then referred to by Fichte, by the way, but had neither been known nor applied by him in all its import, as Hegel had afterwards applied it. Hence, although Fichte's principle involved the germ of absolute Identity, or, as we may express ourselves now, of Realism, just as much as of Idealism, still, in virtue of the assumption and of the method, the objective-realistic momentum was, in the course of the system, either subjected to the ideal, or else the latter to the former; in other words, we have still a Dialectics, which involved in its prin-
ciple a Dualism, that had by no means been overcome, and which only led to an alternating, or at best, to a reciprocity of the two sides, but not to the Monism which had been aimed after; nor was this result obtained even when, as was afterwards done, the Me and its method were pronounced to be absolute; for this declaration, while it altered the name, neither altered the essence nor the thing itself.

Thus, there was no advance made beyond a one-sided subjective Idealism of the finite Me, and the questions force themselves anew upon us, whether human consciousness, that pure subjective activity which is immediately cognisant of itself, is capable of apprehending and of viewing itself as all-comprehensive operativity and as creator of all that presents itself to it and that it requires, or whether, on the contrary, immediately and by itself, it become aware that it is itself not that totality? Even Fichte himself allows that the latter is the case; inasmuch as it comes upon incomprehensible, absolute limits of its omnipotence; nor do we advance any further when we say that these limits or determinations are situate in us, that they constitute our own nature, and are not in something foreign and without us, which confines and limits us. This is of no importance:—To quote the statement of Hegel, "the Me remains a captive notwithstanding, whether it be held in the fetters of its own nature or in those of an external one." For the circumstance that it feels that these fetters are inexplicable arises from the fact that they are foreign to it, and cannot be deduced from the idea which the free Me has of itself. The Me, i. e. the thoroughly free activity, is to be wholly the first and the absolute, which affirms everything else, nor does it assume something that is higher, and from which it would have to explain its own existence and its qualities (properties); that Me, which was only to have been capable of looking at (viewing) itself, while it determined itself with an absolutely free self-determination—that Me, which of itself and alone produced everything, sees itself, after all, to be in the bonds of empiricism, perceives itself as determined by something which itself has not produced; these bonds are, moreover, to belong to its very essence, while its essence is to be the absolute, that which is thoroughly free. In other words, it belongs to the notion and to the essence of that which is absolutely free and self-subsistent to be not free and self-subsistent—an assertion "which
implies one of the most palpable contradictions."—(Hegel, ut supra, p. 127.) But, again, it is of the last importance to, and the highest requirement of, philosophy to break through these limits, and to comprehend that incomprehensible law of its essence which is imposed on the Me.

Again, it might more especially have been anticipated of a knowledge so purely subjective, which produces itself and its determinations absolutely from out of itself, according to the inherent laws of its activity,—which itself projects, and instinctively or of necessity visions into existence ("hinschant") the whole empirical world-image in a particular manner and not otherwise, and causes it to pass before itself, as the reflex of the internal constitution of the Me,—that such knowledge should and would be able to deduce in the most perfect manner all the laws of nature, as being the reflection of its own laws of representation,—in a word, that it would and should be capable of furnishing us with a complete speculative Physics (Natural Philosophy). But this is never attained—and that simply because those laws do always remain incomprehensible to the Me itself; the Me sees only what, according to those laws, it has to mirror, but never apprehends either their internal connection or their mechanism. It is hence unable to arrive at a successive genesis of the contents of nature; these contents are from the very first given to it, and are there; the laws of thinking are only formal categories of the understanding; all of them have, just as in the system of Kant, only a subjective import, and are destitute as yet of proper organic connection amongst themselves; hence their reflex also, in that which is visioned into existence by them—that which is looked upon as nature—can exhibit no productiveness. "As the product of the above Idealism, we have a domain of empty Empiricism, and of purely accidental multiplicity (manifoldness), standing over against an empty thinking. It is inconsistent to place empty thinking, as an active and real power, over against a nontentical image-world—as has been done in the practical portion of Fichte's system: for in affirming (placing) one real power, we affirm (place) also a relation to another Real, which latter Fichte had negatived."

In the above we have quoted the verdict of Hegel. Again we point it out as the unsolved contradiction, that Fichte had affirmed,
or rather had presupposed, and, without any further investigation, assumed by his Me only a finite Me, and hence one, which from the very first stood in antagonism to what is other—a view which in fact implied a psychological Empiricism, and contained a remainder of the system of Locke. If thus affirmed, it is impossible to conceive it otherwise than as immediately in action and re-action with other and equally real objects. But that finite Me is also at the same time to be truly infinite, and hence we are no longer to speak of a multitude of Me’s, which do really affect one another, inasmuch as the not-Me does not actually come out of and beyond the Me—as has been shewn before—but only remains a representation thereof, while again that not-Me includes the whole world. If Fichte had really arrived at the conviction, that nothing beyond the Me was real, and that the not-Me, the world, was in itself throughout a non-entity and only an empty appearance, he should, as Hegel¹ called upon him to do, have also admitted “that the Me was in the same way a non-entity; for, as finite Me, it is only capable of itself existing by this, that it is conditioned by the not-Me.” Thus—as Jacobi has expressed it—Fichte’s Idealism terminated in Nihilism. If, proceeding in a consistent manner, from the very beginning, the same dignity had been accorded to the not-Me, as the antagonist, as to the Me, the immanent development of the system would from the very first have reached its terminus, and thus have manifested itself as a compound Real-Idealism. The fundamental defect, then—judging it even from the standing-point of Fichte—lies in the incompleteness of its Idealism, inasmuch as in its very principle, thinking as being the subject—and yet without an object—was affirmed as that individual definite subject or Me. What warrant, we may ask, had Fichte to designate thinking, which he met actually there, the thinking by itself, or, in general, as his own thinking? What if, after all, it would turn out to be the absolute and unitous thinking which it had claimed to be?

LECTURE NINTH.

(LATER VIEWS OF FICHTE.—SCHLEIERMACHER.)

In the former Lecture we have sketched the system of Fichte in its original form. As such, it really constituted the connecting link between, and the progress from Kant to modern philosophers. Yea, more, it is the entrance and the key to the philosophy of our century. In the grand philosophical chain, the earlier system of Fichte ought to be considered as having been the task assigned to him, and which he actually performed, so that the thread, which was to be spun on, passed from that point into the hands of his junior cotemporary and disciple, Schelling, on whom also, from that time, the general attention of the scientific public was fixed. However, it is not only historical justice that requires it at our hands, briefly to delineate the progress which Fichte himself, in his later prelections, has made beyond the limits of his first doctrine of science, but we are obliged to do so, as the philosophical views of Schleiermacher, which have furnished a point of connection to some modern philosophers, stand in the closest relationship to the later teaching of Fichte. That second shaping of his views, which is generally designated as the realistic or practical period of this philosopher, is detailed in those writings of his which date from the year 1800 and down to 1812—specially in his treatise "On the Destination of Man," and in the three volumes of his posthumous works, edited by his son. (Bonn, 1834.)

We have stated it above, that there we meet with a completely new terminology and exposition of his former views. We add—
and this is of vast importance—that we have in that period an essential breaking through his former doctrine; so that, while he now goes beyond, he neither annihilates nor retracts, but, on the contrary, retains and preserves his former teaching.

Again, it is inaccurate, and that in a twofold point of view, to designate the turn in Fichte's views to which we refer, as his realistic period, and to place it in contrast to his former Idealism. For, first, Fichte had never been a subjective Idealist, in the sense in which, for a long time, though erroneously, he had been supposed to be: nor, secondly, was the period of which we are now speaking one of perfect Realism, to the renunciation of Idealism, but would more accurately be designated as one of objective or of absolute Idealism. Although, even during the first period, it was never meant to deny the existence of an external world in the sense as if the individual Me of Fichte had been represented as the only thing that existed and possessed certainty, but a system of Me's and not-Me's had been acknowledged, and at the same time a definite multiplicity (variety) of them, and a law elevated above all arbitrariness, and operating in and extending over all that had consciousness—yet Fichte seemed at that time only engaged in explaining that knowledge, and in establishing the truth of that which is known. Such was the more immediate and theoretical purpose which he had in view. This, however, was again grounded on a deeper final purpose. In his endeavours he had not only been actuated by a gnostico-contemplative interest in knowledge, as such, but rather by a deeper and ethical tendency, even to exhibit the absolute self-subsistence and self-activity, the freedom of the Me of man, its autonomy. It was on that ground he refused to allow the reality and causality of objects in the sense in which, according to the views of Sensationalists, they are that which fills the empty Me from without and from a foreign source with representations, which determines and in every way limits it; and he maintained, on the contrary, that, theoretically, that only could be known for certain, and, as it were, seen through, which had been produced by ourselves from out of the ground of subjectivity, and that nothing could be known or predicated about that which was entirely beyond its boundaries. From the beginning, Fichte had had in view the pure causality and prometheic nature of the thinking Me; only he did not contemplate the latter merely as the
final end of temporal development, but affirmed it from the first, so that the Me is made, from the very beginning, productively to "vision" objects "into existence." (Vide Opera, vii. pp. 304, following, 375, following; viii. p. 386, following; v. 434, following). Empiricism, again, reverses the whole matter; but the truth is said to be, that the ideal principle in the subject is the productive one,—that "the whole of the external senses, with all their objects, are only grounded in general thinking,—and that a sensuous perception is in general only possible in the thinking, and as something that is thought, as a determination of the general consciousness, but on no account as something separated from the consciousness, and possible by itself." Thus Fichte builds ever on his former principles, and abides by that foundation, while from thence he goes on farther to carry out and to give prominence to the realistic momentum, which undeniably is already to be found in the Me, and in the general nature of it. In general it may be said, that, unlike Locke and other Sensationalists, Fichte looks for the Real not without the Me and in things, but always only in the Me, and in the deepest ground thereof. Here, in the self-consciousness of the individual finite Me—one general universal self-consciousness gradually opens up before him—a Me in and by itself, or an absolute Me, in the broad ground of which all the individual Me have struck root, and to the unity of which they all go back, while purely apprehending their own essence. Thus an all-unity of the absolute, under and in all the particular, opens up before him, more or less, in the same manner as with Spinoza. While, therefore, he assumed a reality, and that one absolutely unitous, he continuously maintained that it was to be found only in the Me, and consisted in that creative moral will, which, from out of that point, projects the world and all its phenomena by means of those Me, which are infinitely variously endowed. That fundamental momentum of the Me, which opposes to (places over against) itself the not-Me—so he still taught, just as before—is the fundamental source of all existence—is itself and alone that which originally is real. But now we have, in addition, to distinguish between the particular, the individual or the finite Me, and the infinite or the absolute Me. "With reference to what we are in ourselves, we, the rational beings, are by no means that absolute existence; but we stand connected to it (we
hang on it) in the innermost root of our existence, inasmuch as without it we should not at all be capable of existing."—("Way to a Blessed Life." Vide Opera, v. p. 448.)

It must not, however, be conceived that Fichte looked upon that general or fundamental essence as a quiescent substance, or as dead (inert) matter in and by itself. No; in this respect also he abides by his former proposition, that "properly all existence, as such, must disappear, and that, in every case, we are only to apprehend thinking activity, action, and life." The absolute Me also, which he designates as "pure knowledge," "absolute consciousness," must be apprehended just like the Me of man, or, in other words, as pure activity; it is the all-prevailing, by itself-existent (objectively general) reason, which, although it does not consist in the knowledge of any one object, is the super-sensual (transcendental) ground of all actual knowledge, the active all-penetrating moral world-order—the law indeed, but the living, the absolute law, and which is termed the absolute and actual (real) will, on account of that never quiescing activity, in which it consisteth. However, the doctrine of science does not treat of existence in itself, but of the appearing of that existence, which in every respect and throughout is an imaging (formative) activity, an absolute imaging (forming), or "formative essence;" but existence itself is not an image, although every image points at once to an existence of that of which it is the image. Hence the doctrine of science is a doctrine of phenomena, and in that sense also, the doctrine of the most real experience, or of that which we actually witness and do; nor is there any other existence; "for existence means simply being in the understanding (Sein im Verstande), and the two are thoroughly identical; again, the understanding is not an understanding of nothing but of appearance (phenomenon); and this latter is again not the appearance (phenomenon) of nothing but of the absolute, and thus, by the connecting link of the understanding, existence is grounded in being, bears reference to the latter, and understands also in turn that relationship."—(Posth. Works, I, p. 360, following.) But do the human Me belong to absolute being or to the phenomenal side of it? They are that act of the understanding by which the two sides in the absolute itself are distinguished.—(P. 571.)

If the absolute be taken in and by itself, it is that unbounded
and undetermined, that infinite One, which is the same in all the Me; but at the same time, it is the ground, and the original ground of all and in all; the individual Me's apprehend themselves in it only as the manifold revelations (manifestations) of that which is grounded in Him; their existence is the function of letting that general enter into the state of oppositeness of the understanding, i.e. into reflection, which is peculiar to the Me, and hence of letting it enter into actual consciousness; hence it is in them first that being is distinguished from thinking; and they are themselves that judicative activity of the understanding, which, at the same time, is an infinite specification unto manifold contents. Thus the Me, as particularized, constitute, when taken together, the totality of the modes of revelation of the absolute, and from out of its own immanent "genius" every Me manifests that which, in its own place, in the total connection is that which is necessary and which should not exist differently, that which is commanded and is in accordance with duty.

That Absolute, then, is God, and "internally in Himself, God is One, and not many; in Himself He is one and the same without change or alteration." In as far then as we ourselves constitute that divine existence, no separation, distinction, or division, can take place. But, nevertheless, multiplicity of being occurs in actuality; hence the question arises, whence, and to what principle that manifold actuality is due? But the manifold, as such, is only appearance; true, it exists, but it is impossible to attribute to it, to the diverse, the changeable, as such the predicate being, which belongs only to the one that remaineth the same.—(Direction to a Blessed Life, Opera, v. p. 450.) "Hence that division cannot immediately coincide (belong to) with the above act of divine existence, and must necessarily take place external to it; yet in such manner as that this 'external' evidently appear immediately connected with that living act, and as necessarily following from it, and that the gulf between us and Divinity and of our irretrievable expulsion from the latter be not in any way connected with this point." The divine being does not enter wholly and undividedly into those points of liberty (the Me) which mutually exclude each other—it only enters one-sidedly into them; but beyond those points, and without being veiled by any cover which is only grounded in those points, it enters, just as it is in itself,
continuing to form into infinity, and in that form of on-flowing life which is inseparable from its life—which in itself is simple. This eternal on-flowing of the divine life is the proper, innermost, and deepest root of existence.” “It is the continuous, eternal, and unchangeable will of absolute reality, to continue to develop itself in the manner in which it necessarily requires to develop itself.”

Thus Fichte struggles in many ways to arrive at an adequate expression of the relationship in which the finite and free Me stand to that which is absolutely one. He thought to be able to establish the distinction between them by confining human consciousness (taking the word in its narrower acceptation) to the antagonisms and distinctions of the sensible phenomena amongst which the human understanding moves; of these it has a most thorough knowledge, inasmuch as itself produces them; but when it penetrates towards that which is behind, and more deeply into itself, when it searches into the root, it apprehends that where no distinction takes place, that ground where all his definite thoughts end, but from which, at the same time also, all definite thoughts proceed, so that, as Fichte said, according therein with Schleiermacher and with Jacobi, only an immediate feeling is now possible, but not a conceptional and thinking distinguishing. Inasmuch as the divine is the ultimate source of all rationally moral world-order, it is, indeed, in itself reason, but we are unable to clothe and to confine it in any definite form.—(Letter to Reinhold, vide Life and Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 305.) Withal he does not attribute consciousness to the absolute in and by itself, no more than he had done during the first period of his speculation. The ground of this is to be found in the fact that, in his view, the absolute was that fundamental momentum found in the Me themselves, that part of the Me—if we may express ourselves in such a manner—which, while indeed presented as the source and spring of activity, was, by itself and without the other momentum of the not-Me, without determination and indifferent. The Me, then, which think according to the laws of the understanding, occupy here the place of the activity of distinguishing reflection; they and their activity do therefore, in a certain sense, fall without that absolute point of indifference, although distinguishing proceedeth from the latter, and cannot be af-
firmed without it; or, in other words, as Fichte entertained, with reference to the finite Me, the view that it affirmed from out of an indifferent point all the multiplicity of representations (although the latter were always to be present together with the former, and the former with the latter); and as he then pronounced that point the general reality of the divine existence, this Divinity, to be consistent, could in itself be nothing else than that Momentum in the Me; hence it could, as little as the former, be affirmed without its second momentum, without an actual world of Me; it could not be conceived as creator previous to a world, and was only the immanent point of union and of reference to a world which, along with that Divinity, had to be assumed as also eternal. Thus it must be allowed, absolute causality is again set aside, and the same contradiction takes place as in the case of the finite Me, which, while it was to have been the absolute ground of all its determinations, was, along with its own proper existence, nevertheless dialectically dependent on determinations which are already existent.

If nothing can be deduced, as Fichte himself saw well enough, from such an abstract fundamental momentum, in and by itself; and the Me always finds itself shut up within "incomprehensible limitations;" it is, however, to propose to itself, with an activity which allows no rest, the task of breaking through these barriers for the purpose of setting itself free. Fichte points, psychologically and historically, to a progress in that unceasing work of destruction, and that one, according to a definite plan, and thereby he becomes the author of a grand philosophy of the history of mankind. Here (vide Direction to a Blessed Life, vol. v. pp. 510, following), we distinguish in general three standing-points (stages), or periods. First, the Me occupies the sensuous standing-point of felicity; for as every Me is a one-sided and partial existence of the divine all-being, and represents some one particular function of the divine will, it also apprehends itself first of all in that particularity, and looks upon itself as being a whole, by opposing itself to the other volitions, which are in the same way particular, and by thus asserting and claiming exclusive being. Hence its will is also not one with the universally divine will; on the contrary, it stands in antagonism and separation with reference to the latter. Thereby the Me is secondly brought to the
point of making a choice between the two volitions, and has to carry out a resolution as to whether it is to be determined in accordance with its own individual volition, or with the eternal one. This position, and the choice connected with the consciousness of the possibility of determining otherwise (liberum arbitrium) constitute the standing-point of the law. But, thirdly, this state of oppositeness will have to be destroyed (removed), in order that at last the stage of pure and of free morality, and with it that of blessedness, may be attained. Here the opinion of a possible self-subsistence (independence) of the individual will, with reference to the absolute one, wholly disappears; “the Me that has been, coincides wholly with the pure divine existence, and taking it strictly, we cannot even use the expression, that the divine will then becomes ours, inasmuch as in general there are then no longer two, but only one; there are no longer two volitions, but in general there is only one and the same will which is all and in all. As long as man still demands to be himself something, God does not come to him, for no man can become God. But whenever he annihilates himself wholly and to the very root, God alone remaineth, and is all in all. Man cannot produce a God to himself, but he can annihilate himself as that which properly is the negation, and then he sinks into God.” Thus the general harmony of blessed life, after which the system of absolute morality aims, becomes indeed a reality, and we have not any longer placed before us an absolute progressus in infinitum, but an aim and goal for general glorification, which has not improperly been compared with that which the Alexandrian gnosia, especially that of Proclus, had in view as the end of all things. “In the end—and where is the end?—(says Fichte)—everything must after all cast anchor in the secure harbour of eternal rest and blessedness; in the end the kingdom of God must come forth in its might, in its power, and in its glory.”

But if we compare this termination of the system with its beginning, we cannot fail to observe, that, in opposition to the former theory about the Me and about moral doctrine, Fichte now makes the Me wholly melt and disappear into the absolute. This radical self-annihilation, this “love” which gives itself up unreservedly, is here termed religion; but how vastly different is it from the former moral one, consisting in a “joyful doing of what
is right." If really it be the case, that even in this present life an all-prevailing will executes itself throughout the whole course of events by means of the Me, and of their representations, which are bound to necessary laws, how is it possible to ward off that Determinism which now lingers in the background, or how is it possible to reconcile it with human freedom? With reference to the man who is enlightened about what is truly actual, we are told "that in all that is going on around him, nothing takes him by surprise, and that, whether he comprehend it or not; he knows for certain that it happens in God's world, and that nothing can exist in that world but what will finally result in what is good. He knows of no fear with regard to the future, for what is absolutely blessed ever leads him onwards to meet it; he knows of no repentance, with reference to the past, for, in as far as he was not in God, he was nothing; and this is now passed, and he has only been born into life since his entrance into Deity; but in so far as he has been in God, what he has done has been right and good." But it has always remained obscure and doubtful how the human Me could have any self-subsistence and freedom, related as it is to the Absolute, and that because it had never been satisfactorily explained—and here lies the fundamental defect of the whole system—how either the finite Me, which in itself is simple and indifferently without any determination, or again, how the similarly abstract infinite Me could possibly be the ground of determination to a multiplicity which was to proceed from it, and to depend on it. It seemed necessary that objects or their images be from the beginning given to the finite Me; and on the same grounds also, that the whole world had from the very first been given to the latter (the absolute Me); nor is it possible to comprehend the possibility of a free creation, either with reference to the former or to the latter.

The weak side of the system of Fichte, as has just been indicated, consisted, beyond doubt, in this, that it was impossible to deduce from the abstract ground of the Me, the multiplicity of representations which, as the not-Me, were to have proceeded from it. From its reflexive character it was indeed always necessitated to distinguish the Me from the not-Me, and the not-Me from the Me, and to refer the two sides to one another; but this did not in any way explain how the contents of that Me, the infinite mul-
titude of objects or of images, were originally produced therein. In this state of matters no doubt it lay nearest, and was most natural, once more, to assume the existence of an actual world of objects, and of a real nature around and without us.

This was done by Frederick Schleiermacher, (born at Breslau in 1768, obit at Berlin in 1834.) Although, as a theologian, he belonged to the Reformed Church, he never wholly denied the influence of his early training in the midst of the community of Moravian brethren. "Piety (so he says himself) was the mother's womb, in the sacred gloom of which my juvenile life was nourished and prepared for that world which, as yet, was closed to it; my spirit breathed in that atmosphere, ere it had found its own peculiar sphere in science and in the experience of life." It is wholly out of our province to describe the importance of Schleiermacher, who introduced a new epoch in Theology, and we have to content ourselves with only inserting a delineation of his philosophy. Not that he either wished or intended to found a new system or a new school, but that the peculiar features of his philosophy constrain us to assign it a place after Fichte, as being in part a resumption of what that thinker had furnished, and as partly constituting a transition to those philosophical standing-points which succeeded.

Schleiermacher renounced, on the one hand, the unsatisfactory portion of Fichte's Idealism, which bears reference to the reality of the not-Me, i.e. of natural objects and of actual experience by means of a real reciprocal action between thinking and being, and in its stead, adopted once more Kant's view of the world, in which a sensational remainder of the philosophy of Locke had originally been left. On the other hand, he agreed in so far with Fichte, in the first period of that philosopher's teaching, that he assumed a self-active individual Me; and again, as was afterwards done by Fichte, he also admitted a real connection between that Me and a unitous and absolute original ground, while at the same time he brought it out even more decidedly, that this connection manifests itself in immediate feeling. But the fact of his assuming in our knowledge an empirical element, did not place him once more simply on the standing-point of Kant, far less on that of the Sensationalists. His views differ from those of the latter, in that he insists on the idealistic momentum in opposition
to the material one; and from those of Kant, in that he assumes
the possibility of cognising the nature of things in themselves,
inasmuch as he substituted an adequate knowledge of objective
validity in room and stead of the mere possibility of cognising
phenomena, and grounded such actual knowledge by means of a
universal ground-substance common to the Me, and to objects, in
and by which it becomes possible to conceive both a real affecting
of the mind by things, and of things by the mind, and hence, a
bringing about of knowledge in us by things of which we may
have experience, and also an objective efficacy of the will with
reference to objects.

That homogeneous fundamental essence, to which we have now
to direct attention, and by the assuming of which Schleiermacher
came into such close relationship to Fichte's later teaching, as
well as to Spinoza and to Schelling—that substance in which the
Dualism of thinking and of being is reduced to a unity in the
ground, has to be affirmed as the indifference of the two, of
reality and of ideality, i.e. as an essence in which these distinc-
tions are effaced, in which they either do not yet or do no longer
exist, so that the Dualistic antagonism is not a radical Dualism
which is traceable to two principles, but one which is only met
with in the world of finite beings. Hence Schleiermacher design-
nated his philosophical standing-point as that of the unity of Ideal-
ism and of Realism, and sought—probably entirely independently
from Fichte and Schelling, his attention being possibly first called
to it by Jacobi—a point of connection in the system "of the
holy and repudiated Spinoza," in which he fancied he had reached
firm ground and a foundation which would elevate him beyond all
the one-sidedness, whether of Idealism or of Materialism. He was
the more ready to seize hold, in the doctrine referred to, on this rest-
ing-point, as he could not but see that it contained the supposi-
tion necessary for his religious principle, his "feeling of absolute
dependence."

But, if in later years this predilection for Spinoza gave more
and more way to a platonistic view, as Schleiermacher entered
more and more deeply into the study of the original writings of
the former, it must be confessed, even with reference to Schleier-
macher's earlier views, that his mode of apprehending the doctrine
of substance differed at all times, and that in essentials, from that
of Spinoza. With Schleiermacher it is in a philosophical point of view only a means for uniting the monistic Idealism of Fichte with the Dualism of Kant. In his writings we never meet with the decided pantheism of Spinoza, which looks upon the absolute, the solely and exclusively existing substance as the essence of all things, and upon these things as only the forms—in themselves void of essence, and non-entitical—in which that substance, that which alone is eternal and divine, does exist, and which infers thence that a world as such, and as distinguishable from God, does not exist at all,—a pantheism which thus is wholly acosmistic. In opposition to these distinctive views of Spinoza, though perhaps involving some amount of self-contradiction, and the giving up of thorough consistency, Schleiermacher distinguished very distinctly between the existence of the world and that of the absolute substance, which latter he designated, with Spinoza, as God. For, according to Schleiermacher, the absolute substance, or the absolute, is, in the strictest acceptation of the term, a unity and an equality to itself, which excludes all distinctions, determinations; and actions, in which it is entirely impossible to make any distinction, and where, whenever we attempt to conceive it, all thinking (conception) arrives at its terminating point, inasmuch as we are only able to conceive (to think) that which is determined, formed and bounded off from other things. That which cannot be comprehended in any definite thoughts, and can only be enunciated negatively and with reference to what it is not, is nevertheless a necessary presupposition of all definite thinking, of all definite existence, and of all knowledge, as well as of all action of objects upon one another, and of that of intelligence upon material objects,—and is hence the postulate requisite for all knowledge and all efficacious willing. By this, however, he did not mean, like Spinoza, that the divine substance enters into all finite objects, and immediately constitutes their existence, taking them all together; on the contrary, all finite things, taken together, are and ever remain only the sum and contents of finite beings, and that sum and contents is the world. Hence the world is opposed to the infinitely One, just as the many to the One, and is in no wise identical with God. Schleiermacher most rigorously excludes from the infinite in itself every kind of difference, whether the material one of different objects amongst themselves, or the
cardinal which obtains between thinking and being, or between intellectuality and nature. It would be to make the infinite finite,—and hence it would involve a contradiction (contradictio in adjecto) if we were to look upon the Godhead as being immediately also the objects, or the objects, taken together, as being God. Thus, the world also obtains a kind of relative independence (self-subsistence), as being the totality of everything definite, finite, and changeable, although it necessarily depends on God and upon His existence.

Hence the individual Me are and remain unresolvedly self-subsistent in that general substantial medium, and that notwithstanding their actual negative dependence, and the absolute feeling of dependence. For, as the substance determines nothing, and only supports and unites what is in itself determined, the individual intelligences are principles, which determine themselves and other things, only that, to be sure, their determinateness and individual character must take its direction from the world-whole, whose integral members they are. But as infinite multiplicity is exhausted in that world-whole, and that multiplicity of individual existences, in their co-existence, is mutually determined by one another, and at the same time also by the whole, it follows that every individual Me has its definite mode of existence and of action necessarily allotted to it in a kind of pre-established harmony; every one of them has its specific calling, its function, its "talent" or gifts. While, on the one hand, Schleiermacher is, in this respect, quite a Determinist, he thought, on the other hand, that he was able to establish the individuality, personality, and self-subsistence of the Me, by that specific peculiarity which constitutes every Me the representative of a Momentum, which is necessary in the whole and for the absolute totality of it. To the objection, that such a view implied rather a non-independent particularity and defectiveness than a wholeness of every individual by itself, he replied, that every one of them had as much part in the absolute, the one and equal, as all the rest, and hence also in the general (universal) reason, whose very universality both demanded and presupposed such a multiplicity. Besides, every one was beyond contradiction in his self-consciousness and in his conscience sensible of his participation in the absolute, and of his dependence thereon. But here we must step forward as critics,
and add, that if that substantial unity in and by itself were not only the abstract one, if it had only another place assigned to it than merely that of a collective summing up of contents, in which the differences are not merely contained, and by which, as a basis, they are supported, then the general in subjective reason, in the self-consciousness, which corresponds to the former, would also be more than simply a formal summing up of all the separate and the particular, and the individuals would become true personalities. Schleiermacher had no doubt had this in view; for, according to his exposition, there would appear to be in the world much more of self-activity on the part of finite individual beings than of energetic operating on the part of God; and hence we have to apprehend not so much that—putting out of sight man's freedom—the absolute will be represented as alone effecting everything, as, on the contrary, that God will be degraded to a mere passive substance. But according to the view entertained by Schleiermacher, this would just take place, if ever the Godhead entered into the world as itself and immediately operating, for in that case it would, in the conflict of finite objects, also stand in a relation of passiveness (suffering). This incompatibility can only be eschewed by setting the absolute at a thorough distance from everything like activity, as well as like passivity.

But if the whole system is to prove satisfactory, the main point lies evidently in determining the relationship in which the Infinite stands to the finite Me. But on this subject we only meet with the following, as a general basis. Just as the absolute is in itself perfectly indeterminable, so we have to affirm it, in like manner, with reference to the relation in which it stands to the world; and as there all definite thinking and knowing arrives at its termination, i. e. as the absolute itself cannot properly be known, so neither can its relationship to the world be either known or cognised and expressed by definite thinking. But this impossibility of cognising it is not due to weakness in our limited reason, but follows from the very notion of the absolute, which in itself is perfectly without determination, and hence without consciousness, and also incapable of being known. Our ignorance on this is not of the same kind as our ignorance on other subjects. We cannot, for example, possess any adequate and wholly perfected knowledge with reference to the totality of mundane objects. This,
however, arises from the subjective ground of our individual limitation; an unlimited intelligence would be able to apprehend that totality,—yea, we also are, in the progress of our cultivation, continually approximating thereto, although we never actually attain it. But in the case above referred to, the ground on which knowledge is impossible lies objectively in the nature of the absolute itself. There cannot hence properly be any knowledge or apprehending on this subject; but there is a becoming aware of absolute existence, which is the minimum of a knowing that disappears into the indifference of non-distinguishability, and of a consciousness which emerges from the indifference and is in transition to difference, a becoming aware, to which, in the very act, there attaches, at the same time, still the indifference, by which we are capable, to some extent, to account to ourselves about that relationship. This becoming aware is feeling. Here Schleiermacher comes once more to the same result as Jacobi, though on different grounds; for the latter viewed feeling only as an imperfect, though immediate, apprehending of the activity of God, who, according to his supposition, was a personal intelligence, and not an indefinite substance. Feeling,—that is, not sensuous organic sensation, but religious absolute dependence,—is, in Schleiermacher's opinion, a mode of communication (connection) adequate to its object, on the ground that itself is the destroying (removing) of all definite distinctions in the object that is felt, and of the antagonism between subjectivity and objectivity itself. When we feel, the object does not stand over against us, but we are immediately one with it; especially the antagonism between knowing and willing is here also removed; in other words, knowing, on the one hand, makes a transition through the point of indifference of feeling, to volition on the other hand, and again, vice versa, volition to knowledge; for, if knowledge proceeds from an influencing on the part of objects, and volition influences objects by an affecting (effecting) on our part, it follows that there must here also be found in the subject a point of indifference lying between the two, in which these contrasts themselves coincide again with the absolute indifference. If there were no point of connection between volition and thought, where these two are joined together, they would necessarily be wholly separate, and an interval = nothing would intervene between all our acts of thought and of volition, and thus
the unity of our consciousness would be entirely rent in pieces.
But, as here exhibited, we have, in the indifference of feeling,
at the same time the continuous power (potency), both for ever
renewed determinations of the will, and for definite series of thoughts.
Hence, to the objection, that, if all differentiality and state of
antagonism is removed in feeling, every trace of consciousness
must also disappear, and feeling itself sink to (the level of) zero,
Schleiermacher replies by stating, that the subject apprehends
itself on its retrogress into perfect indifference, or else in its pro-
gress therefrom into difference in the moment of distinguishing
the two,—so that, in the latter, a minimum of the one extreme
is always apprehended together with the other, before it wholly
disappears. Yea more, he held, that there was no necessary
connection between the disappearing from the memory of that
momentum, and the entrance of knowledge and volition into the
world of antagonisms; that, on the contrary, during actual life
in the world, this feeling should, as permanent basis in the soul,
accompany all definite acts both of thinking and willing. The
feeling of absolute dependence, which constitutes the essence of
all religion, distinguishes itself from every other physical feeling
of a relative dependence on those external objects which determine
us; for, with reference to them, we still retain, at the same time,
always a feeling of relative freedom, inasmuch as we are conscious
of being able either to affect objects, and to allow them to affect
us, or not. But we can claim nothing of this kind in our rela-
tion to the absolute; with reference to the latter we are not
capable of willing, i.e. of being self-active: it is both impossible
and self-contradictory in any way to determine absolute existence,
inasmuch as in itself it is pure existence, and entirely excludes
determination; it is no more possible to will the absolute than
to cognise it. On this subject we can only speak of entire de-
pendence both with regard to ourselves and to all other objects, and
that one applying to all in the same way and sense. The feeling
of this dependence constitutes religion, with reference to the funda-
mental essence of which all men are equal to one another, differ-
ing only according to the degree in which the consciousness of
God is alive in them. Hence there may be many systems of
religion, and many theologies, according to the representations
which men self-actively form to themselves, both of the absolute
and of their relationship thereto; but that feeling constitutes in all these forms the proper religious element, being a reality essentially and vastly differing from every kind of theory, which can never constitute the essence of religion, as religion is not made up of mere thought or knowledge.

If, from the consideration of the above subject, we turn next to that of human knowledge and of science in the proper sense of the term, we meet, on the one hand, in Schleiermacher, that very high idea of philosophy, in virtue of which it is viewed as the central science, and—as Plato and Aristotle had viewed it—as elevated and extending above all particular sciences. It is not meant that philosophy produces, a priori, their contents (material), but that it determines the form of the latter, by harmonizing into one whole all the material that is furnished, by producing the all-encompassing connection of the particular notions, by critically determining the latter by the total connection,—and thus producing that systematic consciousness, the formal closing up of which constitutes philosophy. But, on the other hand, we have always to bear in mind that, like Kant, Schleiermacher employed the term knowledge in a limited acception. Knowledge may be presented in a two-fold light: 1st, as the way and mode of representing and apprehending objects, common to all men; 2dly, as referring to the existence of things, and including not a bare thinking, but a having cognised, and that in a way corresponding to the existence of objects. The knowledge first referred to is conditioned by the second, and that objective validity of knowledge includes also the universality of representing referred to. Schleiermacher lays therefore most stress upon the second particular, as the correct thoughts of all men meet in the objective truth of that which is thought. Thus, while the accentuation of the first criterion would, as in the case of Kant, have given to the whole system rather a subjective-idealistic character, the predominance of the second constitutes it objective-cognition-theoretical. At the same time, however, knowledge and all science in general has only the world, or, in other words, the finite antagonisms between thinking and being, and between the thinking finite existences (the Me), and again between them and the objects in nature allotted to it as its sphere. Hence, philosophy is, in the proper sense of the term, world-wisdom (Weltweisheit), nor can it ever
be perfected, as the experience on which it is based is never perfected, but ever tends unceasingly towards that goal, which it always infinitely approximates.

For, all proper knowledge is made up of two factors—an empirical one, which furnishes the contents (material) of our notions, just as Kant had explained it; and intelligence, which gives form to those contents, which without it would be a mere chaos. On the other hand, no more than merely a formal function can be attributed to the activity of thinking. To the theoretical activity of cognition, in general, the practical one of the will stands opposed, i.e. the activity of the Me, by virtue of which it transports its notional forms into the external world of objects, and incorporates them with it, so that these notions become in that case efficacious principles and notions of purpose (design). The particular real sciences have to elaborate the material for philosophy, by way of preparing it. These contents are originally furnished only as empirical material, and reason is originally not self-conscious before it elaborates that material; it only manifests itself operating, when, by means of the organising activity, it is wrought into nature by men as they act, when nature is animated with reason; so that this rational form again manifests itself to them as objectively apprehensible, and organised actuality becomes now symbol for the "symbolising," i.e. for the cognising activity of reason. Without that material, which can only be received through the medium of objectivity, philosophy would consist only in intercourse with abstract logical formulae. In order to become science, it requires, therefore, on the one hand, by making abstraction, to reduce the manifold material of cognition, furnished to it, to general notions, i.e. to proceed inductively; and, on the other hand, by judging, to deduce, dialectically determining, that material from the notional unity by means of antagonisms. The "formulae" found by induction, and the "Schemata" determined by deduction, are joined together, and constitute an intellectual intuition which both contains the material and is critically rectified. If philosophy were capable either of originally producing all the material from out of reason, or even of perfectly reproducing it with the assistance of what is given, it alone would, on the last-mentioned supposition, constitute science that had attained perfection, and, on the first-mentioned, it would be absolute science. This, how-
ever, it is incapable of, at least at present; it is only one side of
the truth, viz. the formal one, and only when it is wholly pervaded
by the material that is furnished, do we attain that highest form of
knowledge, which, in Schleiermacher's opinion, constitutes (intel-
lectual) intuition, and which he designates as artistic. In as far
as philosophy is engaged with the forms of thought as such, it is
Logic; in as far as by thinking it penetrates the material furnished
to us, and thus cognizes existence, and elevates it into knowledge,
it is Metaphysics: the latter is the fundamental science of Philo-
sophy. Again, Schleiermacher comprehends these two component
portions, the metaphysical, which bears on the general doctrine of
cognition, and the particular logical one, under one designation,
and terms them Dialectics. Every thing that may be known is
then subordinated to that general section. This again comprises,
on the one hand, nature, and on the other the sphere of conscious
action: in other words, Physics and Ethics; so that, in essential
points, the ancient division of Philosophy into Dialectics, Physics,
and Ethics, is restored.

In conclusion, we shall glance at the Theology and Ethics pro-
pounded by Schleiermacher—bearing in mind that he did not par-
ticularly treat of speculative Physics. At first sight it would
appear very difficult to find any point in the Metaphysics, the
outlines of which we have above given, to which Schleiermacher,
as a divine, could have connected any Christian theology, espe-
cially a Christology, inasmuch as the Godhead is represented as
so thoroughly shut off, as it were, and as in itself so thoroughly
without determination. In fact, Schleiermacher does not connect
his peculiar religious doctrine and creed with that objective prin-
ciple, so as scientifically to deduce every thing ulterior from it.
But, setting aside all speculation, à priori, he turns to the human
subject, and there takes his standing-point in the feeling of abso-
lute dependence. True—the latter is also essentially a general
and abstract one; but, at the same time, it is on that very ground
the more in need of being determined from some other direction,
and that in a historical manner. Schleiermacher transports us
then at once into that peculiar determinateness of religious feel-
ing, which the latter specifically has in the soul of the Chris-
tian, and this again serves continuously as criterion of what has
to be rejected as contravening, and, at the same time, as posi-
tive principle also of what requires to be pre-supposed as necessary condition, and hence of everything without which that feeling could not exist or be vigorous in us. Hence, the position which Schleiermacher occupies, is a psychologico-historical one, and his method critico-postulating.

But the specific Christian religious feeling and consciousness does not stop short at an abstract general feeling of dependence on higher powers in general, but, more accurately determined, it moves between the antagonistic points of consciousness of guilt, and hence of sin, and of certitude of reconciliation, and hence of grace. The former does not merely consist in the consciousness of definite actual iniquities, but more especially in the self-consciousness of impotence, of the feeling of dependence on account of the individual sensual will, so that our piety is too feeble to penetrate all the momenta in the conduct and direction of our lives and our whole view of the world. This state of feebleness as to the consciousness of God constitutes confession of guilt. On the other hand, the state of grace presents itself to the Christian's mind as that vigour and liveliness as to the consciousness of God in his soul, which is to overrule and to govern all the states of his soul, to give direction to his life, and to cause him to find himself reconciled in and by that consciousness, and delivered from the dominion of sin. Farther, such a state may not be looked upon as being either attained or attainable by man himself and alone, as by virtue of his essence he belongs to those antagonisms which prevail in the finite; no—in order to conquer the finite both in the particular and in the total, in the world—we necessarily require an infinite principle, which itself lies beyond the finite, a principle which requires to be imparted (communicated) to us. But the Christian knows that this communication is only brought about by the historical Saviour. Were we to assume that we become partakers of it by cultivation, and hence through the world, it could again only be through the church of Christ in the world, as the world itself, the sum and contents of all that is finite, is thoroughly polluted and sinful, and hence incapable of either elevating itself, or anything else, above that state. Salvation must proceed from a principle elevated above all sinfulness, and this was and is the person of Jesus, to which our traditionary knowledge points as being a definite historical appearance. He
alone communicates to us the liveliness of His consciousness of God, as in Him this consciousness of God did not merely gradually, more or less, but absolutely attain to a perfect penetration of His whole personality, and to a perfect governing of His whole life, on which account also He is capable of being a perfect model to us, of sacrificing Himself in love for men, and of still working and continuing to work, in the Christian community.

While Christian Dogmatics possess an infallible criterion of Christian faith and knowledge in that specifically definite feeling of piety, which indicates a real state within us, Christian Ethics also springs from the same principle, in as far as that consciousness of God, brought about by communion with the Saviour, is also the motive of a practical and specifically Christian direction of our lives. Hence Christian Ethics differs as much from general or philosophical Ethics, as the Christian doctrine of faith differs from Metaphysics.

Philosophical Ethics owes its origin to the universal self-consciousness of the will of man, and is a science that can be exhibited in a speculative form. On the one hand it pre-supposes Physics, as from the first man finds himself in a natural manner (way) organised to, or as a rational being—only that here reason and nature are as yet one in an immediately unconscious manner; its task consists only in this, by acting, to become always more conscious of reason, and again, by means of conscious (subjective) reason more and more to obtain the mastery over nature, i.e. it consists in the general purpose of reason to penetrate every particular in nature, to constitute it its own organ, to animate it, even until all nature on our earth-surface has entered into the service of reason, and the latter become the soul which governs that vast body—nature; an aim, we say, which Ethics must ever hold before us, but to which it never attains, as if that antagonism were actually removed, Ethics also would cease to exist, inasmuch as essentially it consists in the process and struggle of removing that antagonism, and its place would then be occupied by a nature thoroughly animated by reason, or, in other words, by general blessedness.¹

¹ The understanding of Schleiermacher's Philosophy has of late been much facilitated by Julius Schaller's Lectures on Schleiermacher, Halle, 1844; and by Weissenborn's Lectures on Schleiermacher's Dialectic and Dogmatics, Leipsic, 1847.
The task which in these Lectures we have assigned to ourselves, does not admit of our entering any farther on the study of his peculiar moral philosophy. Let us only add, that to Schleiermacher the merit is due of having pointed out the one-sidedness, arising from treating Ethics merely from the point of view either of the highest good, or of virtue, or of duty. He wished to have all these three points of view combined, while at the same time he laid peculiar stress on that of a doctrine of good, and looked upon it as that which contained the principle of all. In this he was chiefly influenced by the defectiveness of all the former expositions of this subject—including even those of Kant and of Fichte—all of which had throughout formulated Ethics into a doctrine of duties; but such a doctrine implies essentially the character of a dualistic antagonism between the subjective will and the objective law, which can never be wholly effaced into a perfect liberty, if the two are not originally one in the natural will. Though this may seem to threaten a Eudemonism, we may, on the other hand, not negative at once and in principle, all possibility of being able to ascend beyond the legal sphere of right, even till we reach perfect liberty in love; and it was this goal which Schleiermacher had principally in view in his religious Ethics. In general, as we have already remarked, the tendency of this more recent philosophy was to strengthen (confirm) the liberty of the individual. Kant, with his peculiar dualism, was unable to bring about this result in any other way than by denying of those desires which entangle the Me with nature, and by a stoical retreating into one’s self. Fichte, proceeding more energetically, preferred to annihilate the reality of objective nature into a mere mode of representing of the Me, though one necessary to it, rather than see aught taken away from the infinite principle of freedom, and thereby entered on the road to an absolute Idealism, which, in the hands of his successors, became a deification of the Me. Finally, Schleiermacher left the reality of nature untouched, but identified to such an extent the reason, which is immediately immanent therein, with the self-conscious reason of the subject, that there was danger of his Ethics becoming Physics, and of his Physics becoming Ethics.

With reference to the philosophy of Schleiermacher in general, the fact that it did not lead to any satisfactory result has, beyond
doubt, to be traced to the defective notion of God, which it presented. It has already been noticed above, that there was not so much occasion to apprehend that in that system the absolute substance would, by penetrating the whole world, appear as the exclusively energetic soul of it, as rather that, on the other hand, it would necessarily appear as if the finite Me's would, as it were, take possession of that formless substance, and, by virtue of their intelligence which was full of material, treat it as a passive substratum. But as Schleiermacher had once and for all declared, that this substance constituted the whole absolute, and that this absolute was God, he could not admit that this substantial fundamental essence entered in any way into the forms and the conflicts of the finite. Hence the existence of the world is only negatively conditioned by it, i. e. the absolute is that, without which no higher or more concrete principles can possibly either exist or operate, that which they require for their realisation and self-confirmation; but such a merely negative condition for other and positively determining principles, is nothing more than what, in the wider acceptance, is termed matter or substratum. But as from it alone a world could not proceed, it follows that if the latter does exist, it has to be pre-supposed, as from all eternity, in and along with the former, and hence without a free creation; and when Schleiermacher frequently states it "without God no world, and without world no Deity," the absolute seems as dialectically conditioned by, and dependent on, the finite as the latter on the former. If then, notwithstanding all his endeavours to prevent the absolute from entering into the finite, the Deity was not once more to become that powerless and passive substratum, and thus to descend below the level of all dignity; it seemed requisite to elevate it to be the alone mighty causality, the potency (potentia) of all becoming and the exclusive form-principle, and that at the expense of the self-subsistence of all finite creatures. Then only does the idea of the truly absolute not only seem to be preserved, but the last remainder also of the Dualism of a material and formal principle to be rooted up, if the absolute is not only in itself the Indifferent, but, at the same time, is as such the living principle of all difference, when, as all-immanently energetic in all things, it not only enters into an existing world of antagonisms, but more than that, when it originally produces them from out of
itself, or, in other words, when it unfolds itself into the totality of what actually is in the world, infinitely distinguishing and determining itself in itself. This entire revulsion of the views of the world hitherto received, seemed, and rightly so, to be the nearest and most necessary step that required to be taken, and it was the youthful Schelling who ventured on that bold and decisive undertaking.
LECTURE TENTH.

(SCHELLING.)

On the first stand-point occupied by Fichte, we had found that the following result had been reached: All our knowledge is a subjective activity; no person is capable of knowing or of experiencing more than what lies or what goes on within the sphere of his Me, i.e. of his self-consciousness, and everything that is going on there, is a self-activity of the consciousness. Whatever may exist external to that sphere—and, although we never become aware of it, we are on the practical standing-point at least, obliged to assume, that something does exist—whatever may exist without the Me, it can at any rate only be inwardly perceived by us, and can only be considered as object on account of inward reasons. But these grounds were entirely confined to the observation, which we made within our subjectivity, that our free activity is sensible of being somehow impeded; but it was a question, whether it is impeded by barriers and fetters, situate in the Me itself, or in another Me without us. Fichte had declared that even though we assumed that our free activity was impeded and determined by another Me, such assumption was again only a thought of ours, and was in theoretical philosophy nothing more than a subjective law of thought, by virtue of which we attribute in thinking just so much activity or capability of operating to the Not-Me, as we find impeded within ourselves, while we ascribe just as much free activity to the Me, as we deny with reference to the Not-Me. The Not-Me, as our representation, is produced by us in as far as we are mentally active, and on the other hand, the Not-Me
affects us in so far as we acknowledge ourselves to be passive, i. e. in as far as we negative activity in ourselves, and ascribe it to the Not-Me. In order to maintain the absolute unity of the Me, as principle of science, as well as—and this he felt to be of greatest importance—the absolute freedom of the Me, Fichte had placed those limits in the nature of the subject, not perceiving that by that very fact he had destroyed its absoluteness, and rendered it incapable to be the sole absolute principle of philosophy. Besides Fichte, as well as former philosophers, had left a circumstance, and that one of the most decisive importance, almost entirely unheeded, viz. the material or the contents of the Not-Me, the nature of those objects that were affirmed, which, as is self-evident, are of the most varied character, so that even on account of those specific contents it is impossible to assert anything about them in general, and without distinction, either with reference to their existence or their non-existence.

Schelling soon perceived the one-sided subjectivity of that knowledge, as it was termed. In fact, according to Fichte, it was only possible to know with reference to one's own ideal activity; nothing else could take place but a consciousness about consciousness, and a thinking of thinking. But to know is to be certain of the actuality of that which we perceive or represent to ourselves; hence we always assume in that case an actual something, which is to be known; a knowledge without something that is known, and which in itself, and irrespective of our knowledge, is actual, implies a self-contradiction, and would amount to a knowledge about nothing, or an empty dream. In fact with Fichte, (viz. in the original doctrine of science), only knowledge by itself alone, and nothing more, had existence; the only thing which actually existed was consciousness, i. e. thinking. Farther, this consciousness was not even to be conceived as existing, say in a soul or mind, but purely by itself as activity, as pure actual thinking, nor was anything besides to have existed, not even one who thought—(viz. a being, in which such thinking was to go on).

Let us now advert to what Schelling added to these views, and first of all during the first period of his speculation. He maintained, that if there was to be knowledge, there must of necessity also be something that is to be known, or in other words, that as
there was knowledge, there must also be existence. In this, however, he referred only to the antagonism between the finite Me and the external world, and not to a universal antagonism between thinking and existence, or between subjectivity and objectivity in the absolute. At that period, and for a long time afterwards, Schelling still declared that the absolute was universal reason. But it had, indeed, been shewn by Fichte that in general, or at least in the first place and immediately, we are only capable of knowing about our own existence, and hence that one’s own existence, in as far as it is reflected in the consciousness, or in other words, that self-consciousness was at any rate to be taken or rather to be preserved as the starting-point. Moreover it had been shewn, that all knowledge and thinking consisted in an inward objectivising, representing, presenting before one’s self, an inward detaching of that which is thought from that which thinketh, in an internal antagonism, and that this constituted the fundamental form of all mental activity. Hence we get by this inward separation or distinction a thinking principle, a central point, active exclusively from out of itself; and an action or tension proceeding from it, as it were a sphere, which is extended out of that point by the radii; that arises, which from one aspect is termed subject, and from another object. Both are in themselves one and the same essence, a subject-object; but we require to distinguish here between the point as that which is wholly active and producing, and the sphere, or the product. That point, which in itself and irrespective of its sphere, can only be looked upon as the pure, abstract Me, i.e. exclusively only as subject, and never as in itself object, is the absolute source and spring of all activity; everything which enters into the circumference which, as object, places itself as it were “vis-à-vis” to it, and becomes an object for the Me, comes out of that point, and proceeds therefrom. Hence all objects are such only as being thought (conceived); they only exist in as far as they are thought; but the Me exists in as far as it thinketh. The absolute ground of all that which proceeds from out of the Me, must lie in it; it is originally situate therein, although only in a possible manner, only potentially and not yet as being effected, i.e. not yet as realised actu. The Me is thoroughly life; it is an energy, which from out of itself calleth into existence what as yet had no existence, and just as we

1 Comp. Journal of Medicine, i. 1.
do not become conscious of a thought till we think it, so the Me also does not become conscious of all that which possibly lies in it as subject, till it objectivises the same, i.e. till it places it out of the centre into the circumference, till it forms it from out of itself.

If Schelling had thus first of all established the idea of a thoroughly real, and effectively active Me, or of an absolute subject, he had thereby also once more come to the antagonism, which above, with Fichte, had been lost in empty and one-sided knowledge. Something existed again which was to be known. But it must not be imagined that this something lay without the Me, as an external Me, or an object. No, it was again situate within the sphere of it, the object was indeed one immanent, but inasmuch as the activity of the subject had itself been apprehended as a real operating, the object also had, with reference to the subject, really proceeded out of the latter. This object was nothing else than the essence that had come forth out of the centre, the expressed nature of that Me itself; it was that expanded in time and space, which had formerly lain contracted and undistinguishable within the point of the Me. Every thing which, so to speak, lies, in undistinguishable contraction, originally potentially in the Me, just receives its expression by the spontaneity of that Me; as formerly it had existed only potenia, so now it exists actu, i.e. properly speaking, it is now only that it exists, and is there; for it is only improperly, or at least, not in the same sense that we can apply to potential existence the expression: it is, which we apply to the actual existence of the essence which has proceeded. That antagonism, then, which had formerly not been brought forward is now discovered between the absolute producing Me—the subject—on the one hand, and the product, the representation, the object—on the other hand. That Me, however—and this must ever be kept in mind—must, according to the results of Fichte's former investigation, not be conceived as, say, a material kernel, or a rigid existence—for then the absolute subject would be represented as an object, which, according to its nature, it can never be—but the true idea of the existence which belongs to the subject consists in conceiving that Me purely as activity, as productivity, as volition or willing, and, in the last instance, as energical freedom.¹

¹ Comp. particularly the dissert. in the Introd. to the Idealism of the Doctrine of Science. Schelling's Phil. Works, vol. i. p. 289.
This will also become evident in another manner. If, as we have seen, knowledge, in order to be true knowledge, and not merely empty thinking, or an idle phantasmagoria, requires to have something that is known, an object; it may not, on the other hand, however, be in any way separated from the object which is thus known, or from its material, nor be something wholly distinct from it. If knowledge is not to be different from the true being and essence of that which is known,—if, so to speak, it is wholly to penetrate, and inwardly to apprehend that essence, it follows that knowledge on the one hand, and its object on the other, or that knowledge and that which is known must also be of the same kind and nature; yea, more, a true knowing can only be knowing of itself, in unseparated unity of knowing and of what is known, of subject and of object; and in the strictest sense of the term, it can, after all, be only a knowing about one's self, a self-consciousness. Hence consciousness may not have the substance of the soul—if we may still employ that term—once more inwardly before itself as something different from itself, as an object impenetrable, standing as it were before it—at which it is to look from without, or above which it is to hover; but knowing and existence must essentially and in themselves be identical. Thinking is (exists), and is absolutely and immediately. No person who thinks can possibly doubt that thinking actually takes place (co-gitare est.) Here we have what Schelling terms the self-affirmation of thinking or of existence, in as far as all existence is in itself also actual or real existence, and hence the two are identical. Kant had, in his metaphysical rudiments of natural science, resolved matter into a play of active forces. Fichte again had wholly destroyed existence in the sense of conceiving it as something continuous, quiescent, which substantially solely possessed existence, or was objectively simply lying there; he had, on the contrary, shewn that existence is to be looked upon as through and through activity and life; he had pointed out this in the subjective Me, and hence exhibited that Me both as absolute activity, and at the same time also the antithetic rhythm of that activity or the method. The point to be adverted to is, that Schelling represented what Fichte had indicated as more ideal activity, as partly conscious and partly unconscious thinking, as being at the same time also, as to its essence, an actual and real activity; in other words,
Schelling pronounced it that the Ideal and the Real are, as far as their root is concerned, identical.

But it has already been stated, that Schelling recognised the practical momentum in the doctrine of Fichte, the practical Me, or the absolute willing and working (acting), as being the root above referred to, or the absolute (the fundamental Me); and here the theory of the immanent self-purpose, which Kant had pronounced in his Critick of the Faculty of Judging, found an excellent point of connection. If we really carry out that view, and look upon that immanent tendency or willing, which is in accordance with purpose as the first punctum saliens, from out of which everything is being carried into effect, then the real formation precedes the ideal one; it is first of all a life, it is that which we view as the corporeal side (aspect), which enters into actuality in the first instance by activity in general. Thus Schelling came forward as the one who comprehended together in a conclusion the premises given in the philosophy of his time, and as the first distinctly to utter, what had hitherto been the instinctive tendency of modern consciousness. With one grand effort he burst through all the obstacles and fetters of subjectivity, boldly enlarged the latter, the limited Me of Fichte, into the universal world-sphere, and thus by one step took his stand both in the Absolute and the Real.

But this must likewise admit of a definite theory. If we have first recognised that the absolute ground is absolute activity, the question next arises, what is the law or the form of that activity? in what rhythm does it move? We recognise by reflection the movement in time and space as that form. Time and space are the fundamental forms of our activity in general, and more especially also of intuition, which is the first or original mental activity, which is found in the consciousness. Representing in time and space is = intuition. According to Kant, time and space are those forms in which sensible intuition moves (proceeds.) If taken accurately, however, they are not forms, lying ready-made in the mind, or, as it were, spectacles put by nature on the mind, but (like the categories) only the mode and manner, according to which the Me makes intuition, hence the law of intuition peculiar to it; yea, properly, intuition itself, which only takes place in that particular manner. For, accurately considered, space is nothing else than activity enlarging and extending itself, the looking out
into the distant, the infinite (unlimited.) This would have no end, no limits, or that extending (space) would be a sphere without periphery, if time were not added as that limitation to the activity which is thus looking forth. "The most original measure of all space is the time, which an equally moving body (a movement) requires in order to traverse it; and vice versa, the most original measure of time is the space which such a body (for example, the sun) traverses during its course. Hence time and space are the necessary conditions of all intuition." Take away time, and the subject would be without form—intuition would go into the infinite without halting or terminating; and again, if you take away space or extension, no object whatever could be produced. Hence time is, as the measure and limitation of movement in space, something negative, while the measured space that is bounded within certain limits, i. e. extension itself, as the sphere, is something positive. Thus, then, intuition is possible by two absolutely antagonistic activities; one of these is of a positive, the other of a negative character, for the one extends, and the other limits, negatives. Thus the representation, the object, is the common product (result) of these two activities; what is termed its contents, it receives from the expansive, and its form from the contractive activity. The whole product is nothing else than a product of the original absolute self-activity.

If we have in this case recognised time and space as the original form of an activity, viz. of sensuous intuition, and that an ideal one, it will yet be much more evident to us that such is also the form of all real activity or of movement. For an activity (originally internal), which extends successively in space, impeded, as it were, in every point by time, appears, externally viewed, as movement; movement is a compound of time and space, and is that which externally corresponds to the succession of representations. Expansion and contraction will hence be found to constitute the form of what is termed material nature, which is externally beheld by us, or of the life of nature in general.

Thus, while Schelling had indeed retained as principle that theory of the Me, which Fichte had constituted the principle of knowledge, he had enlarged it at the same time into the Schema of the universe; yea, more, he asserted that all along he had looked upon Fichte's views as in accordance with the explanation
he gave of them, and that from the very first he had understood Fichte's system in that particular way. In fact, the very earliest writings of Schelling contain the most unmistakeable traces of it. The absolute Me is a summing up of all reality in general. The absolute, if really apprehended as the absolute, cannot be conceived otherwise than as one and all-comprehensive, and it is impossible to affirm two or more absolutes by the side of each other; this is imperatively required by the idea of reason, concerning totality and unity, which is the highest of all ideas. The Me of Fichte was that notion, which every man has of his own Me; it is only the Me of Schelling which is the true absolute, the universal, which every one finds both in and out of himself, even nature. The universe, which Spinoza had conceived as sole absolute substance, is in the case under consideration, presented under the form of the all-unitous, of the infinite Subject-Object, of the World-Me.

But if, instead of our soul, in which those ideal activities take place in the form already indicated, we now conceive the universe as the grand unity, as the World-Me, as being active in itself in the same manner, it will be readily understood how, by means of such movement in space and time, by means of such an activity of the All-Me in itself, all objects, all that exists, are produced, how everything attains its formation, just like the figures of sound in a medium that is in motion. We have seen before, that our own individual finite Me, which is only a part of the grand totality, is by virtue of its nature in itself so energetic and so living, as that in the play of those two activities inwardly, there is brought forth within us a real creation out of nothing, an infinitude of manifold intuitions. That multiplicity of determinations is not produced in us by the influence (action) of many outward objects or things in themselves, but is the product of the potential fulness of our nature. In truth, however, it is the universal world-nature, which works here in each of us, as one of its innumerable points, just as everywhere else. Hence also are we immediately cognisant of it; or, more correctly, it is universal nature, which here in us knows something about itself, apperceives itself; the nature, we say, which has organised itself into human souls, into humanity, and which, by means of these its organs cognises itself. We, of mankind are, as it were, only the innumerable individual eyes, by which the
infinite world-spirit contemplates itself. We do actually exist with reference to our inward essence; that is, all of us, taken together, constitute the world-spirit; but we are not actually, with reference to the form of our self-subsistence (independence), that is, in as far as we fancy that we are fundamentally something individual, independent, separate, and other than that universal nature-spirit. That which is fanciful and non-entitical about us is the conceit of absolute selfness (self-existence) which the individual entertains; for the term being (existence) in its full acceptation, can only apply to the universal life-force and power of nature, in the pulsations and successive formations of which our particular terrestrial organization also is one passing momentum.

But before we can proceed any further in this portion of the doctrine of Schelling, the Philosophy of Nature, we will require to examine a little more closely the theory of consciousness, and to make ourselves acquainted with the method, as on this all that is to follow is based, and more especially that, which in the narrower and more recent acceptation of the term, is designated as speculation.

The unreflected and unconscious action (working) of the power of life or of the soul—as it may be termed—occupies, as long as it is merely such, and knows nothing about itself, exactly the same level as the action (working) of those powers of nature without us, which are termed blind; and nothing constitutes a difference between the conscious and the unconscious activities, except that want of reflection upon itself, i. e. as will appear more clearly in the sequel, the want of freedom in those essences in nature, which are incapable of themselves repeating or of representing to themselves their own activity as self-activity. That blind activity is met with in the lower regions of human life, just as we see it universally spread in the objects of nature. The whole difference consisteth in this, that this activity of nature cannot contemplate itself, cannot itself become aware of that which it is and which it does; that the objects of nature cannot become objects to themselves, but are ever, in their activity, only looked at by subjects which stand without them, and hence that they are only objects to others. Man alone in all creation, as far as known to us, is not only subject but also object to himself; he is the only being which acts (works) and becomes conscious of itself in this activity; he is the sole absolute subject-object or self-object.
But if the knowing about one's activity were not originally, and in itself at the same time also that activity itself, if the actually stirring, moving, and creative life-activity within us, were not the same which also manifests itself only in higher potence (power), as sensation, intuition, and knowledge; and _vice versa_, if those mental functions, as they are commonly termed in the narrower acceptation, were originally and in themselves not those same really operative powers, then _self_-consciousness, in the proper sense, _i. e._ knowledge of _one's self_, in the strictest sense, could not possibly take place. It is, however, remarkable, that the common sense of mankind, and the instinctive logic of language, has designated what, on closer examination, turns out identity of knowing and being, by the compound term _consciousness_ (being conscious, conscious-being).  

If we are to possess _perfect_ self-consciousness, we have to presuppose, that self, or the existence which is to be known, coincides with the knowing, or that it is in itself one and the same; else there would still be an object, a dark kernel in the innermost of phenomena, which our knowing was not capable of penetrating; when our knowledge has come to understand that what we term existence or being is itself internally, and as to its true kernel, _i. e._ as to its true hidden contents, nothing else than the same play of activities which also constitutes knowing, then only it is, that the knowing and the known, or the ideal and the real, perfectly correspond to each other. Then only knowledge is truly such, and deserves that designation; and to such the well-known adage can no longer apply, that "into the interior nature penetrates no created spirit!" Nay—it does penetrate into and through nature; for everywhere in nature it only finds again itself. The assertion formerly brought forward, that thinking must be engaged with some real object, with an existence, if it is to be _knowing_ and truth, is not once more destroyed by that Identity, in as much as thinking is itself looked upon as real, as existence or actuality. It had only been destroyed by the view of Fichte, who opposed thinking as non-reality, as non-existence, to existence. If, notwithstanding all this, something vacillating

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1 The German word for _consciousness_ is conscious-being (Bewusstsein); and our author has availed himself of the term for the above argument. — The Translator.
and unsatisfactory seems still to lie in the matter, such is owing to the standing-point then occupied by Schelling, and to the philosophy of Identity (as it is termed) in general, and will be brought out in the sequel.

But let us, before proceeding, once more set side by side with these views the way in which the origin of knowledge, and its relation to objective existence, is generally conceived, in order to remove, if possible, by displaying the real import and the grounds of modern speculation, those barriers which are still felt by so many to be in the way of their understanding the latest philosophy. We should almost fear, after so many digressions, to tax any further the patience of the student, were it not that everything which will have to be expounded in the sequel depends on this point.

Let us once more recall our ordinary theory of cognition, as we had been taught it afore by Logic. Those manifold objects in the world around us make impressions on our senses, and produce intuitions, or images of themselves, in our faculty of perception. We have as many image-copies in our mind and memory, as we behold different objects. It does not concern us by what magic process they have entered our consciousness; suffice it—they are there. In order to introduce order and connection into that confused mass, we compare these different intuitions, we arrange them according to their similarity, and project general class-schemata, i. e. generic notions, for the purpose of guiding us in our arrangement. If then, on some future occasion, we perceive some new object, we may, indeed, at the moment be at a loss under what generic notion to arrange it. On closer investigation, however, we discover the corresponding generic notion, and as soon as we have found, and applied it to the intuition of the definite individual before us, or, in other words, have subordinated, in our judgment, the individual to that generic notion, we come at once to see light, we cognise and comprehend the matter. We meet with something, for example, on our walk; we examine it closely, we turn it and look at it, we notice it accurately; but—we cannot make out what it is. But if any one reminds us of the generic name, of the notion to which it belongs, and tells us, for example, that it is a shell, we immediately see light in the matter; the object which was formerly so myste-
rious is now known and comprehended,—we are conscious of it, and can say: Now we know what it is!

This, then, is the logical judgment in the act of recognising or of cognising, and thus far the psychological process has been accurately enough described in its essential points; nor is it intended in any way to invalidate this—only, we may not stop short at it, as is generally done.

Modern speculative philosophers tell us, however, that all this does not throw any light on that subject on which an explanation has been asked,—yea, more, it would almost seem as if the inquiry had not even been apprehended, which was, in what manner that first perception, intuition, or cognising, had been brought about? The logical arrangement of individual intuitions under notions is readily enough admitted, if both individual intuitions and general notions have previously been had in the consciousness; but then, how are these attained? This is the point in question. Properly, the difficulty does not consist in the introduction of order and connection into the multiplicity of all those images which are already cognised, and which are preserved in our memory, but in this: how even one single image attains to consciousness, or—if you choose—how an impression, a movement or determination of the organ of the soul, is transformed into something that is known.

Evidently the very first image of an object given to us occupies already the place of a common notion; as often as afterwards we perceive a similar object, we call it to remembrance, and compare and refer the latter to the former, while we recognise the second object as identical with the first, i.e. as being, at least in essentials, one and the same. But if the first given object thus becomes the prototype and the notion for all similar ones, how has that first one been cognised and perceived? How did we become aware and conscious of it?

The point under consideration is evidently vastly different from a logical judgment; it refers to a function of the mind which must precede all such judgments; it does not refer to representations and notions, which are found ready in the consciousness, and to our behaviour with reference to them, but to their being made ready,—in general to the origin of what are termed perceptions, and hence again to that fundamental question, which, from the standing-point of those to whom the inquiry is addressed, is gene-
rally expressed as follows: How do impressions of corporeal objects gain an entrance into our incorporeal souls? or, how does it happen that the mechanical impressions produced in the organ of the soul are all at once transformed into consciousness? Logic is of no avail here, even on the ground that it only introduces order into the representations which are met with, as ready and there. But that former question, with reference to the way in which they were produced, was at best superficially treated in some meagre psychological introductions to logical compendia; or, if it had been more fully discussed in special works on the subject, yet any correct explanation of it had been rendered impossible, inasmuch as it was deemed sufficient to account for that mental phenomenon by assuming "a mental faculty," and "different mental faculties" for all the different kinds of mental phenomena. Apparently it was not understood that this subterfuge was a mere verbiage,—just as, whenever we are told that a phenomenon is to be accounted for by a certain power which produces that phenomenon.

It is on this ground that speculative philosophers stand out as much against the former logical, as against the psychological, mode of explanation. They might just as well designate their own explanation a logical or psychological one, only in a totally different sense from that which commonly attaches to those expressions.

What, then, is the explanation which Schelling gives on the subject? In its essential features it is already to be found in Fichte's writings, who may be designated as properly the first discoverer—he himself receiving the impulse from Kant—of the speculative method. To Schelling, however, the merit is due of being the first to bring it prominently forward, and to give it its objective import. Hegel again has perfected it. Let us, however, confess it, by the way, that the internal mental process, as described by these writers, can never be demonstrated if we employ that term in its usual acceptation. It has rather to be looked upon as a general psychological fact, as an internal experience, and an immediate necessity. Every one must try for himself, whether he perceives within himself, and finds there a corroboration of what those writers assert, or not. They confess that it is impossible to demonstrate it to any one who does not
find it within himself. Everything here depends on this, that a man be possessed of as much mental agility and acuteness of self-observation as is requisite for it, for nothing else deserves the name of thinking but self-thinking.

It has already been stated, that we can only have immediate perception, understanding, and penetrating consciousness with reference to what we ourselves mentally are or perform. True, indeed, sensuous intuitions are, as has been shewn, also in us, but—even if they did originate on occasions from without—still they are as known intuitions or perceptions, at any rate, only the products of our own mental activity. (We do not say they are the products of absolute freedom, but only of activity in contradistinction to a purely receptive passivity.) Hence, sensuous perceptions, also, are in themselves already the products of our activity, although yet in a lower, and, as it were, instinctive sphere of it. We have seen that they were brought about by a mental expansion and contraction, or by space-and time-representing (a representing in space and time). First of all, and in themselves, they are unconscious and non-spontaneous products of the mind: for us they only become, i.e. these intuitions are recognised as our property, as being our own activities, by reflection, i.e. by this, that in producing them we attend at the same time to their production on our part, that we attend not only to that which is produced, but also to ourselves who produce it. Representations, which yet take place in us without such reflection, are termed intuitions or images, and while, as such, certainly determinations of our consciousness, they are as yet neither understood nor reflected upon—they exist, and we act in accordance with them, without knowing or reflecting, however, that they exist, or how we have attained them; on account of which we also necessarily look upon them as being not our own free product, but at once consider them something existent or objects. It is only when spontaneously repeating that same image, it manifests itself as the proper act of our own activity, that we term the intuition our representation—in the stricter acception of the term—and then in and with such repetition we also become conscious of our representative self-activity, inasmuch as we feel capable of calling it forth at pleasure, and of letting it drop again. That original intuition, and afterwards the representation, serves again as model
or Schema for similar intuitions, and is, by abstraction from all non-essential additions, in the manner already known, enlarged into a more and more general notion. Such, then, is the relation to which it stands to other intuitions. But the subject with which we are concerned is the relation in which it stands to ourselves; we wish to know how we gain possession of the intuition and make it our own, how we arrive at perceiving that we have it, i.e. how we become conscious of what had at first existed as blind determination in us. If we may employ such an expression, we want to witness the marvellous transubstantiation of a real soul-determination into a thought.

Intuition, then, is indeed an act of the mind, but one unreflected; an act of which the mind itself does not know that it is its own act. But this act is afterwards spontaneously repeated, by virtue of our own ability and activity; and now, as this is done spontaneously, with the self-consciousness that that object, that representation of ours, is only our own activity, our own consciousness, our own mind, i.e. that we ourselves are it. It is then only that we recognise the image as being our own activity, our own selves, as wholly perspicuous, and what formerly seemed to be a foreign object and existence hovering before us, is now a subjective object, a determination of our own selves, concerning which we understand, at the same time, that it is a self-determination on our part, as, whatever be the occasion of its presence in the soul, the whole portraiture is throughout nothing else but a formation of our representative activity, and a momentum of that activity arrested during the imaging or representing.

But we can only make the observation, that the image represented is merely a product of our own representing, as it were only thrust forward from out of the working centre of our Me into the sphere of it, if we distinguish between the image represented, as the product, and the act of representing, the producing. But whenever we repeat the act of representing, the product is of necessity again brought forward along with it; nor are we capable of keeping these two separate from each other. But if we again dive into and at the same time lose ourselves in the product, we learn nothing about our acting, and are again only in the unreflective state of intuition, out of which we had wished to be delivered, over which we had wished to be elevated, and which we
had wished to make the object of observation. Yet, it is matter of fact that the mind becomes conscious of its acting in abstracto. Consequently the human mind is possessed of the energy, of the talent, to deliver itself from its blind intuitions; hence success in that operation mainly depends on the freedom or self-agility (mobility), which is originally accorded to it; freedom is the most profound ground of self-consciousness. But this self-deliverance is only gradually attained. At first we succeed in distinguishing, in general, free representation from immediate intuition; there must be a difference between the two, in order to admit of distinguishing them, and in order to prevent our fancying that we actually perceive while we represent. We have seen above that that first definite empirical representation, whenever we are able to repeat it as representation, from memory and spontaneously, served as prototype or Schema for all similar intuitions; to speak accurately, the intuition once had, serves as model or rule for our activity, when it is again to be exercised in the same manner. The Schema or the notion becomes the rule, or indicates the way and manner in which our activity modifies itself; the notion is the representation of the activity by means of which we bring about the object—the intuition. We have thus, properly speaking, indicated in the notion the activity, as such, in abstracto, separate from the intuition produced by it, and this was the very thing after which we had aimed; we had proposed to become conscious of our activity, without again plunging, however, at the same time into the state of intuition. True, the notion always differs from the intuition, even in this particular, that it is more general, more indefinite, and without the addition of non-essential determinations, but still in cognition it would always coincide into one consciousness with the intuition, if we were unable to keep them separate in our minds, while still we unite them in cognising (an object). This keeping separate, while uniting them, is done in judging; and it is the latter which constitutes the perfection of consciousness. Animals have also notions, i.e. they possess general images, schemata; but they cannot judge, i.e. they cannot in cognising keep the Schema and the intuition separate, and on that account are they destitute of self-consciousness. For, while we judge, for example, "This is a tree," our present intuition, "this" (of the object), and the notion "tree" are indeed
identical—notion and intuition coincide, i.e. the modification which takes place in our mind, while it modifies itself into that definite image, and the notion, which, as has been stated, is the reflection on this its self-activity in it—these two, the product and the producing, are one; but yet they are at the same time also separated in the mind, i.e. the self-consciousness, that we cognise the tree, accompanies that act, and is not wholly extinguished. The mental product originates in intuition or by intuition; we ourselves are our product, our whole mental activity has descended into that product, and while in that state a point of support within ourselves is wanted in order to distinguish ourselves from our product. Such distinguishing (and consequently the continuance of self-consciousness during that time) is only possible if during intuition we still distinguish ourselves from the product of intuition; we say, if we distinguish between it and that which produces it, ourselves, our Me; but that Me again is itself only the productive activity, (for, according to Fichte and Schelling, the Me is thoroughly and in itself only activity); hence, if we distinguish between our activity and the product; but this side-look upon our activity constitutes the notion: hence the conscious cognising or understanding of any one object (of any intuition) is only brought about by judging, i.e. just as much by uniting, in the act of cognising, thinking and that which is thought, as by distinguishing the two.

But all those momenta of intuition, of distinguishing, of cognising, and of judging, are simultaneous in the consciousness; they only appear separated when observed and described, as it is impossible to observe or to describe anything otherwise than successively. In the actual procedure in the soul all these things go on at one and the same time; all these momenta do not succeed but pre-suppose each other, and it is necessary afterwards again to unite, even in theory, what had at first been unnaturally separated by the mental anatomy of abstraction. The capability of abstraction and of judging on which self-consciousness dependeth, can, in the last instance, be reduced to nothing else but the pure self-determination, or the freedom of the mind. This self-determination is termed the will; freedom is the pure form of the will; it is both the principle of consciousness as well as of free moral acting, and is hence brought forward as
the common principle both of theoretical and of practical philosophy.  

If what has here been termed notion has, as far as its origin is concerned, been declared a free activity of the Me; and again, as far as its contents (material) are concerned, as in the first instance only an intuition, repeated with self-consciousness, it follows that in the intuition also nothing can possibly lie for us which could not afterwards be also elevated into consciousness, i.e. into a notion, by means of free reproduction. In as far as we are incapable of doing this, intuition remains blind as far as we are concerned, i.e. it remains an unconscious state. But we are gradually elevated out of this state, as we are more or less enabled to transform it into clear notions, and that through the middle states of sensation, feeling and so on up to the clearest self-intelligence. Without any reference to, or reflection upon, ourselves, i.e. without any separation between the Me and its state, any perception which merits the name of consciousness is impossible. How would we be able even to suppose anything in the original intuition if we did this without consciousness, i.e. without reflection upon our Me, i.e. upon our own activity? It follows that there is always only just so much in the intuition, or that in perceiving we always only observe as much as we are conscious of, and hence as lies in the notion, which we possess of the intuition. If there were any thing more in it, it is evident that we could only become aware of it by notions, and hence that the notion is that within the province of consciousness, by which alone we are to keep; by means of it, i.e. in it alone we cognise, what is in the intuition, or what, as we express it, is in objects.

Such then is the import of a notion which is the re-objectivised image or portraiture of individual definite intuitions. Hence the notions are, on this standing-point of consciousness, still always more or less determined, individualised images, which occur in the consciousness as general representations, and are now consigned as such to the activity of abstraction, and hence to the well-known logical judgments. Such notional images or Schemata are indeed in a certain sense conveyed to us in an empirical manner; but this only implies that we first get hold of them as abstractions

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from the individual definite images of actual consciousness, or from the intuitions. But this does not imply that originally they have been conveyed to us from without by means of the intuitions; on the contrary, we cannot allow that those intuitions, of which they are abstractions, have been wholly derived from that source. The intuitions themselves are just images existent in the soul, or modifications of the soul, which, although occasioned by something external and at first unconsciously as far as the soul is concerned, are still self-actively produced by it. The notions originate empirically only in this respect, that they are repetitions or portraits of intuitions which actually exist in the consciousness, and about whose external or internal origin nothing has as yet been determined. We admit only, that the notions, as they appear in ordinary consciousness, are indeed abstractions from intuitions, and that while in the stage where self-consciousness is as yet not quite lucid, they are attended also only by an obscure sense of the self-activity of the mind, of which, in reality, they are wholly made up; for that the notions are really wholly made up of this, is perceived distinctly, only when we come to see that every notion just indicates the activity by which we have produced the intuition itself.

True, it is only practised philosophical consciousness which understands this. Even at first, already, and in sensuous perceiving, it is the determining activity of the mind which brings the images into their determinateness, as it were into their contours; it is the understanding which, within the sphere of perceiving consciousness, forms into definite images the positive activity of the Me, which in itself tends to go forth indefinitely. We have already alluded to that activity, which limits, determines, separates, and distinguishes, and here we meet with it once more, and more definitely under the designation of the understanding. But reflection itself becomes only aware of this afterwards, after the intuition is made, and, as already stated, the image exists previous to such reflection. If, therefore, we wish to become conscious of the mode of procedure observed in the first intuition, the object, the intuition, appears, of course, as the prius, as the prototype, in accordance with which activity must be arranged in the reproduction of the same representation; it appears as that from which the notion has to be got by abstraction, and from which for that purpose ab-
straction is in the first instance actually made in the ordinary em-
pirical consciousness, although the true procedure is exactly the
reverse, inasmuch as the object has actually been produced only
by the notion, and that because the notion is the mode of proce-
dure by which the object of intuition is in general at first produced.

Thus we see that, properly speaking, we extract in thinking by
means of abstraction out of the image which had been executed
in us, or out of the product, out of the intuition, gradually again
the notion of our self-activity, by which we ourselves had at first
projected, in an unconscious manner, the image itself. In this ab-
stractive and reflective process of thinking we resemble the painter,
who stands before a piece which, by means of his artistic in-
stinct, he had successfully produced—he scarce knows how; but
after having executed it he now dissects it with his understanding,
in order again to recognise in his own product the way and man-
nner of his activity, the artistic touches and the rules by which,
without being conscious of it, he had at first produced that piece.
All the representations and intuitions in us are on a small scale
similar art-products—executed not at will (non-purposely), and
which on the ground that they are not produced at will, we would
prefer to designate as natural products, the products of our own
nature; for, it is that inward creative nature which continually
places out of the centre-point of our being, and objectivises what
potentially lies in it. And thus the theory of consciousness here
detailed, leads us back again to the point from which we had started
above.

This exposition will at the same time show on what grounds
speculative philosophers hold in such low repute (what is com-
monly termed) the Logic of Aristotle. They reject it only in so
far as it is not suitable for the explanation of the fundamental
problem, as it always presupposes notions which are already made,
and then proceeds externally to combine or else to decompose, with-
out penetrating however at any time into their genesis. Hence,
they assign to it a more limited province and a definite subordi-
nate place in the system. In the room of Psychology or of Logic
they substitute as organon for the solution of the fundamental
problem, what is termed the speculative method, which, although
it may already be found in Fichte and Schelling as constructive
method, assumed a definite shape only in the hands of Hegel, and
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which is mainly based on what has so frequently and so keenly been attacked, viz. "intellectual intuition." The latter consists in that activity of the inward sense, by virtue of which a definite intuition is produced, while at the same time the way and mode of this producing is observed. Thus we listen as it were to, and overhear producing nature in us, and, so to express ourselves, come in upon it in its most secret work-room. Hence, that creative constructing in conception, in which the mind of men observes, in the first instance, its own laws, but at the same time along with those laws the products also which had been brought forth in accordance with those laws, constitutes speculation in the strictest acception of the term. But as the mind of men occupies the central point in the general nature-consciousness, or is himself that very consciousness to which the general activity of nature attains, it follows that, together with its own essence, the mind at the same time cognises also every essence and law, as well as all the definite contents (material) of the universal nature-or world-spirit in general; for every Real is through and through life, all life is intuition, and intellectual intuition cognises in intuition, and hence immediately within itself, that which is actual. We shall by and by be able to expound all this with more perspicuity; in the meantime, however, we can already see that what is termed intellectual intuition can signify and be only the general foundation for, and the condition which requires to be presupposed in speculation; by itself and alone it is the same as the immediate artistic producing, hence also this standing-point and the notion of art was for a long time supposed the highest; but as the latter both admits of and requires a theory, so intellectual intuition also a definite Methodic, without which it would degenerate into an unscientific play of imagination.

Hence speculation is in the first instance indeed idealistic, it is based on subjectively idealistic observations and principles, inasmuch as we are only capable of having an immediate, full, and penetrating (pervading) consciousness of ourselves, of our own thinking and working; that only do we feel to be perfectly clear and intelligible, both as to its essence and its origin, which we ourselves produce in conception (thought), but not that which as yet exists for us only in intuition as object, as a foreign essence which has to be looked upon as external. But the above exposition has
showed that there is mental activity in intuition already, that even in
the intuition or the visioning there of objects already, we form
those objects themselves—only at first unconsciously and not at
will—and that those objects are nothing else but the nature of
the subject, brought out, developed and objectivised from out of
ourselves, who are that subject. Hence we are also able to
obtain possession of the whole internal essence of objects, of all
objects in nature, or rather of our intuitions of them, even unto
the most profound root of their existence, and to render all objec-
tive existence perspicuous in its most fundamental essentials, if
only we bring to consciousness that which the understanding had
at first in unconscious intuition laid into it (assigned to it); for
according to the above, nothing else will be found to be contained
in it. Thus, as has been stated, the human mind penetrates by
means of intellectual intuition into the innermost depths of nature,
yea and wholly penetrates through it, for nature is the all-one,
and individual man only an integral part of it, and hence all the
other parts of nature are to him thoroughly one and the same
with what he is himself; his own essence, although individual, is
not merely an analogous portraiture or simile of the universal
essence, but belongs itself to it; and the essence of nature is
mind, although mind still slumbering and dreaming on many
lower stages of self-development; but all the activities of nature
are in themselves nothing else but the activities which objectively
are observed by us as movements, and which subjectively we
bring to self-consciousness within ourselves as activity of the
mind.

Thus we have cognised it within ourselves, what constitutes
reality, essence or existence in general. Existence is the life
which becomes immediately aware of itself; self-conscious life is
thinking, and thinking is self-conscious existence; being (exist-
ence) is that thought which itself immediately affirms its existence
(presence), which immediately apprehends itself, as there and in
life (absolute self-affirmation). Existence, reality or life, is that
universal nature which continually effects itself, the natura
naturans
which in unfolding gives form to itself, and which in all its forms
only manifests its own essence which is thus brought forward,
and its own life.

That life bound within itself, i.e. binding and forming itself,
which, in accordance with its nature, ever tends after self-development, and which within itself bears the tendency or the infinite longing after self-objectivisation, will hence be looked upon by us as what is truly real; and while as such it is real power-operation, it may indeed be designated as existence, yea, and as existence in general, still it may not on that account be conceived by any means as an existence quiescent in itself, or dead, or as containing in itself a quiescent, changeless substratum, a lifeless, substantial kernel. It contains within itself, or rather, it is, in its innermost and deepest point, the absolute Meity, the willing, referred to above; its innermost kernel is the living ground of subjectiveness, which brings, by an absolute self-development, everything out of itself, which, as potence or force, continuously transforms what is possible into what is actual, what is subjectively implied into what is objectively expressed. That eternal evolution constitutes nature, although that evolution is gradual; the eternal life potentiates itself in time from that which is more imperfect to that which is more perfect. It is indeed true that, potentially, i.e. as far as the possibility or the ground is concerned, that which existed at first was the most perfect—the most perfect power; but it only existed as power and as possibility, i.e. potentiá, while, actualiter, it only became more and more perfect from a state which actu was imperfect. If that which is most perfect had existed from the first in the whole of its expressed actuality, as a world full of objects, how could that which was most perfect have afterwards again transformed itself into that which is more imperfect? Hence the evolution of the universal essence of nature had from the beginning gradually to progress from that which is lower to that which is higher; hence also, we meet in nature with a certain self-perfectibility, an eternal progress or process, an elevating itself higher and higher from potence to potence, on account of which nature has within itself a history, a progressive course of life, which in the first instance the philosophy of nature is bound to exhibit. The highest goal and end-point of this evolution is that where the life which had at the first been blindly operating, becomes itself, in its fullest development, consciousness of itself. The law, however, or, to express ourselves in that manner, the rhythmical movement, by which nature elevated itself from stage to stage, remains the same in all
stages, only that in every later stage it is more highly potentiated than on those that preceded; everywhere, in the lowest as well as in the highest stage, it is the same mode of activity, to wit, a self-objectivising, first a bringing out of that which is situate in the subject, and then again a reflecting back on the part of the subject from those contents (that material) which had become objective, upon itself, a distinguishing between itself and its object, while, at the same time, it remains continually connected with that object, and is in fact the same essence with it—a polarising between subjectivity and objectivity, a pulsating of expansion and contraction, a going out of and a returning to one’s self. Such is the philosophical method which completely corresponds to the nature of the thing, and which, with Schelling, moves in quantitative antagonisms of a plus or minus of reality and ideality; and again, it is the same rhythm which is also the universal form of the all-unitous life of nature, and in which it operates unconsciously in the lower (materially real) stages, and again apprehends (understands) and comes to know itself in the highest stage (where it is potentiated into man). But inasmuch as that fundamental essence which has in man become intelligible to itself, after all recognises again its own life and essence in the rest of nature, as it were in all its members, and beholds there objectively that which it had subjectively immediately perceived within itself, within man, it follows that all knowledge has, as it were, two poles—subject and object, the knowing and the known; and hence there are properly only two fundamental sciences, or rather only two aspects of one and the same life from two different points of view: 1st, The philosophy of the mind, the self-consciousness of the subject—transcendental Idealism—the Idealism of knowing considered by itself; and 2dly, The philosophy of nature, existence or life, objectively considered from its real aspect and the self-development thereof, i.e., as the life of nature.

These two sciences have to supplement each other, and they presuppose one another, just as one pole presupposes the other, and hence it will not be possible to start from the one without being driven to the other. “This,” says Schelling, “and nothing else lies at the foundation of the endeavour to introduce theory into the phenomena of nature. A perfect intellectualising (spiritualising) of the laws of nature into laws of intuition and of think-
ing, would be the highest perfecting of the science of nature. The phenomena (the material) must wholly disappear to us, and nothing remain but the laws, the formal. Hence it is, that the more that which is in accordance with law bursts forth in nature, the more also does the veil disappear, the phenomena themselves become more spiritual; and at last they cease wholly. Optical phenomena are nothing else but a geometry, the lines of which are drawn through light, and this light is itself already of ambiguous (doubtful) materialness. In the phenomena of magnetism, every material trace disappears already; and as to the phenomenon of gravitation, which even naturalists thought they could only conceive (understand) as immediately spiritual influences, nothing remaineth except its law, of which the mechanism of the movements in the heavens is the carrying out on a grand scale. That theory of nature would have attained to perfectness, by virtue of which all nature would resolve itself into an intelligence. The lifeless and unconscious products of nature are only the unsuccessful attempts of nature to reflect itself, and what is in general termed lifeless nature is a non-matured intelligence, and it is on account of this that the intelligent character looks unconsciously as yet through the phenomena of it. That highest end, the becoming wholly object to itself, is only attained by nature in its highest and last reflection, which is nothing else than man, or, to speak more generally, which is what we term reason, by which alone nature returns perfectly into itself, and whereby it becomes manifest that originally nature is identical with that which we cognise in ourselves as furnished with intelligence and with consciousness."

Such were Schelling's views, at least in the earlier stage of his philosophical investigation. It is well known that a distinction is made between these, which are designated as the philosophy of Identity or also that of nature, and his later views. Were we to go seriatim, and with historical rigour through his writings, we might perhaps shew that they contain no less than three or four, and even five different modifications of his system. But viewing his philosophy as a whole, we have in the last instance only one essential difference presented to us, viz. that between his first natu-

1 System of Transcend. Idealism, p. 5.
ralistic and pantheistic, and his later theosophic views, which lead again back towards Theism. For our purpose, therefore, it will be sufficient to abide by the simple contrast thus presented. Add, that Schelling himself has frequently declared that he only recognised the exposition of his philosophic system, given in the Journal for Speculative Physics in the year 1802, as that which had attained to maturity, but that it also contained only the first part of his system, viz. the objective one, which is engaged with nature; and that while from the first he had kept in view, and had thought over his Philosophy of the Mind, which presupposed that of Nature, but did not contravene it, he had not as yet published it so fully; that indeed the former part of his system had already contained a more profound principle, but that it had hitherto been misunderstood, and not fully developed. On the contrary, inquirers had hitherto looked too exclusively to the naturalistic side, and had thus produced, by means of it, a mere system of necessity, &c. In the sequel, it will be our endeavour to show whether this was really the case. In the meantime, we proceed to study the standing-point of the "Philosophy of Nature."
LECTURE ELEVENTH.

(SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.)

Before continuing our exposition, it may be useful, in order to understand the better what is to follow, briefly to review the results of what has preceded. At the risk of incurring the charge of too frequent repetitions, we shall do this in the hope that while changing the form, the subject itself may the more clearly and satisfactorily be apprehended.

We shall never succeed in viewing nature as Schelling did, if, before attempting it, we do not get rid of that ordinary mode of representing, by which we perceive in all individual objects as many bodies or substances which exist by themselves, and are in themselves lifeless, although furnished with certain powers, by which they exercise an influence upon ourselves and others. It is indeed true, that every individual affects other individuals, and that all nature consists of such a mutual operation of its individual parts upon one another and upon themselves; but the interior of objects, their matter or material, as it is termed, neither is any such material, nor has it such powers as is generally fancied. What, we ask, would such a material be in itself, or by itself? How are we to conceive it, how are we to explain it? Here lies our chief difficulty. No—It is absurd to view it as a kernel in itself lifeless, and destitute of motion and only furnished, we know not how, with living powers. On the contrary, in itself and thoroughly, it consists of such powers, or to speak more correctly, of such activities, which meet in the space which the body occupies, which mutually hold each other, cause tension, and
thus produce that rigid substance which appears as body. It is said that matter is impenetrable, i.e. it resists external pressure, and this resistance which it offers to that which is external, is an activity within it, a tension, by virtue of which it occupies a certain space, maintains what it occupies, and prevents other bodies from penetrating in. Hence, we shall have also to learn to perceive, even in that which is lifeless and rigid, a tension and pressure of living activity, although one that is bound and kept back. Add to this, that this materialness only indicates the lowest stage in the universal life of nature, which develops itself with greater and greater energy, inward self-mobility and freedom in the higher stages, and especially in those of organic beings. Assume then, that this development from the lowest and most rigid existence of a stone upward to the play of thoughts in the head of man, is ever subject to one and the same continuous law of development and consists in a self-movement, which continually potentiates itself higher and higher, and you will be able to recognise and to represent in that universal self-movement and activity of nature, the law of the world, in the lowest stage, as conscious obscure tendency of nature, yet the same, which in the highest stage perceives and cognises itself, and is then termed reason. Nor let us withal lose sight of the main point, viz. that beyond that living tendency, movement and activity, there exists neither anything material nor real, in connection with which, or in which, these manifestations of force take place, but that the Real and the Material consists itself and throughout only in the play of those activities which mutually determine each other, and thus we will be able, even at this stage, to apprehend and understand the fundamental principle of the whole system, which is, that as far as its essence is concerned, every thing is one and the same. This essence, again, is in itself life; it is termed nature (natura naturans), in the sense in which it is conceived, as at first only potence, or as possibility, to become everything, but being not yet everything; it is termed World or Universe (natura naturata), in as far as it continuously becomes, or has become, what, according to its nature, it was destined to become. Both, however, nature as the ground, and nature as the appearing (phenomenon) of itself, are the same, are unutous, constitute a whole, are the absolute. There is nature expressed, i.e. all individual
natural existences depend on that nature as on their ground and essence; for, all of them are only the forms or shapes of that essence, which has objectivised and manifested itself in these forms; considered by themselves, they would be nothing else than mere shapes, i. e. in themselves only empty forms, without any contents or persistence; but in as far as that essence has entered into all these shapes and constitutes their interior, they also exhibit the absolute itself, and thus the absolute and infinite Being or existence is not at all separated from nature, nor above nature, nor without it (as if it were in heaven, and the latter upon earth), but the latter, these objects in nature and we ourselves—everything in and around us is that Omnipresent eternal Existence and Being in its development. Hence we are, so to speak, also capable of beholding, as it were on a small scale, the essence and the law of the absolute in the development of every individual thing; the individual is also at the same time a simile or a repetition of the whole.

The life-power appears in every individual germ of animals and of plants at the first as bound yet, and in a state of non-development, or in a subjectivity which as yet is shut up within itself. But this elasticity of life which, as it were, is compressed into one point, must set itself free from that state of bondage; it must, by its activity, extend itself out of that mathematical point, as out of its indifferent centre, and must thus in its development and in its product, which is the self-exhibition of its own essence, become object to itself: the power once set free, must, by its own working, go out into the periphery; that which had been originally virtuellement or potentially contained in that punctum saliens, only makes its appearance by the self-objectivising of its contents which had hitherto been shut up.

Thus, for example, the inquiring naturalist has, in the egg, the germ of the chicken presented to him, as an object which in itself, however, is also a subject, and he understands by objective intuition the process of development in the continuous transformation which proceeds exclusively from the interior of it, which contains that life-point; for the warmth brought to it from without contributes nothing else in the development except that it removes the rigidity of those bonds in which the living germ was held. Still less does the naturalist contribute aught in the matter; it is the interior, the germ, which effects itself in order to
become really and actu what as far as possibility and power—what as far as its nature is concerned, it already is. With blind instinct it effects itself: it does this without knowing how, as organising life, and just as if it had before it an idea or a model like which it was to become. But this idea or notion is not without, but is, as its original nature, within it: it presses out of that mere germinal form; it urges onward and assumes members until it has at last actually finished the formation of, and has objectivised that which it had in itself destination, possibility and power to become, that which it should be and would be, but which in itself it is not, and only becomes.

We have stated that the germ of the chicken in the egg tends to develop itself into a certain perfect formation, just as if it had a model set before it according to which it was to assume shape. But in reality the chicken had no such model presented to it, but its own internal nature prescribed these movements and formations: its own nature in this case as natura naturans in an individual definite natural being, in the genus chicken. Hence it is that Real itself, the real ground-and life-principle, which is reflected in the idea, though as yet in the undeveloped state of its being. It is that which gives definite direction to the activity, or rather which is itself that living direction and determination, although as yet only implicite, undeveloped, and in the original contraction of its being. It is thus that we recognise in the idea the inward determination of nature of every object which develops itself in life. If, during its development, the chicken knew anything about itself, or if an observer, standing without, were able to transport himself into the subjectivity, into the point of view of the object which develops itself—if, with his conscious activity, he were able to occupy the place of the life-germ which develops itself unconsciously he would have before himself, as if it were a type, an idea, a model, that idea of the life which is developing, that formation which it is only to assume, and he would have spontaneously to aim after it. At the same time, however, he would require again to remember that really and properly this type was only his own inward natural tendency, that the above notion was only his own internal determination presented to him as object of thought, and that the obligation to become something, which he feels as a should be, was just his own living nature, which mani-
fests itself in his feeling as tendency or pressure. It is evident how closely this is connected with the above delineated theory of cognition, and in what respect Kant's theory of purpose is here carried out, i.e. how it is elevated into an objective truth.

Hence we discover here, in the individual as well as in the general, a law at work, a blind internal necessity, which, however, appears as necessity only because we look at it from without and as objective appearance (phenomenon). It was necessary for the germ to elaborate itself into that which lay in it, unconsciously and blindly; it could not do otherwise. If we place ourselves in the position of that germ, and commence this working as our working, and just as agreeably to our nature it takes place, and that with the consciousness that we ourselves work (and not other things upon us), that same working will, from the subjective standing-point, appear to us in so far as perfectly free as we are capable to unfold without hindrance our own nature, for this constitutes our own willing, that which in the most proper sense is our own, or rather that which in the ground of our being we are ourselves. We said before, that a law manifested itself; but this law is not one forced on us; it is the desire of the germ after development; it is the moving force of its own nature; its working is the successive self-deliverance and self-satisfaction, and hence the manifestation of freedom; and thus are we even at present enabled to perceive in what sense liberty and necessity may import in themselves one and the same thing.

But we have already seen that the universal essence, nature, develops itself into those higher stages of self-consciousness of liberty only in an historical manner, i.e. successively in time and from stage to stage; and while, indeed, it is impossible to conceive a time, where the absolute existed alone, only as non-actual ground of nature, and without actual nature, without any world—for to such a ground, if alone and by itself, we could not ascribe that which is designated by existence—while, therefore, the world and the ground of the world, or that which from all beginning was the absolute, have both to be conceived as eternal, it is not meant thereby to exclude a successive perfectibility in the mode of existing of the world or natura naturata; but, on the contrary, on the above-mentioned grounds it is called for, and a process of
becoming, and that not once, but one continuing through all time, has to be assumed.

As the ground of the world had never existed without working (acting, operating), and as that working constitutes the existence of beings, or nature itself, it follows that, while making the attempt at a construction of the world, we require, first of all, wholly to lay aside the idea of a definite creation in time. In the same manner, while entering on the philosophy of nature, we keep in the meantime aside any idea about a God; while here engaged with the All-one, the Absolute, we prefer to think of nature, and reserve the term of highest being for a further stage of our inquiry. It is indeed true, that intelligence and consciousness manifest themselves not only in man, but everywhere in nature, but the observation is even at this point in its place, that consciousness and thinking—that which in the narrower acceptation we term intelligence—can always only manifest themselves in and on some real existence, only in connection with some real essence, and can never subsist in abstracto, alone, and by themselves, nor can move in a vacuum as it were as pure (bare) thinking. Setting aside, then, all premature ideas about a God, a Creator, and an Intelligence, we encounter, as already stated, in the first instance, as yet only nature in its most perfect, in its first, and so to say, in its crudest formation.

But nature works in the grand whole just as in every individual germ. As above, in the germ of the egg, we had assumed a blindly-operating power, a tendency which organised itself into actuality, just as if it had been acquainted with its destination; so here also in the total, there is a nature before nature, i.e. a tendency before formation—a law before execution—a possibility before actuality; hence a natura naturans before the natura naturata, or rather one always lying at the foundation in it, as powerful substance.

But it is impossible to attribute any existence to such a ground as long as it is bare potency or possibility, and before it has begun to work. It may indeed be conceived of abstracto, but separated from its effect (working), it cannot exist at all: that which is merely possible is not yet actual. An actual ground is an active ground; and hence we have no longer the pure notion of the bare potency by itself and alone, but that of the potency in
actu. But again, acting by itself and alone, exists no more than pure potence does by itself and alone; neither can acting without an active ground, nor a ground without acting, possibly exist; there is or exists only a working which contains the ground of its movement within itself; or there only exists a ground which is engaged in working. It follows that that which truly exists, that existence or being is a working which has its ground within itself, i.e. is an absolute working. Hence, in the first acceptation, nature was that which as yet had not existence = pure potence. But in the second acceptation, nature signifies the actual world which is visibly spread before us, or that universal existence to which as part we ourselves belong; and this actual nature is now no longer merely the above original potence in abstracto, but is potence and working unitedly, inseparably—it is the first Identity. These propositions, which, as far as known, Schelling does not recall even in his latest exposition, and which he only endeavours further to determine, are met with even in his earlier writings, and that expressly as fundamental principles.

That being, then, which we apprehend, in the meantime, quite generally and indifferently, consists in an infinite existence, i.e. in a continuous Ex-sistere—in an emerging and a coming out, of the ground in its effect. It is throughout activity, and that self-activity, for it has its ground not without itself, but in itself; it is both the ground and effect of its self. Hence the ground of the world is not external to it, nor is it previous to it, but in it. We are unable to assume any Creator who would have existed before the world; for it is only the fallacious conclusion that the ground must exist previously to the effect which could lead us to make such an admission. A ground which exists already by itself, and before it operates, is termed a cause; but if the question be raised with reference to the ground of the world, i.e. of being (existence) in general, it is evident that something else which exists already cannot be the ground of it, but something which does not exist; i.e. that original potence which, however, did not yet exist at all by itself, and qua potence, before it operated, and which therefore itself entered into existence only when operating, and which is not different from its operative existence, nor is to be preserved as isolated. It follows, then, that the world and its ground are both
equally eternal, for in as far as they are (exist), they are one and the same.

Thus, then, existence is the absolute, the originally primitive, and is in itself infinite working (operating) = nature. Again, potency, in as far as it has attained in nature to actuality, is termed subjectivity; and in as far as being or existence is conceived as that which has been effected by the former, it is termed objectivity. Existence, in as far as it is the ground of itself, is subjectivity: existence, in as far as it is, as it were, borne up or effected by that internal ground, is termed objectivity. In actuality these two are not really differing, but one and the same. Existence is and remains the Identity of subjectivity and objectivity: \( a = b \).

But let us now conceive that existence which we had hitherto apprehended as infinite and without difference, as in itself membered and determined into the greatest possible diversity. Then, every part, if considered by itself, or compared with other individual parts, will respectively appear to belong, one more than another, either more particularly to the subjective, or else to the objective side of the Infinite Being. True, indeed, in no one part of the universe shall we either meet with absolute pure subjectivity, or with absolute pure objectivity; for absolute pure subjectivity would be \( = \) to the mere original potency (which as such does not exist); and, again, pure absolute objectivity would be \( = \) to an existence which had no potency at all within itself, and hence to an impossible existence. That which is (exists) is both of these taken together; but it may be either the one or the other in preponderance, i.e. when compared with other parts, and hence only in the individual and the finite where comparison takes place, but not in the universal and in the whole, where there is an absolute equilibrium—an absolute identity.

But we must call further attention to that expression "in preponderance," as indicating a quantitative difference, in order to indicate the method by means of which we are to be able to understand the potentiating by which that which is lower is capable of membering itself into that which is higher, and, in general, that which is simple into that multiplicity and diversity which is exhibited in the numberless different objects in the world. Every difference in existence can only depend on a relative preponderance
either of subjectivity or of objectivity. If, then, we conceive existence in general under the schema of a line—

\[ a \quad C \quad b \]

The side \( a - c \) will represent the preponderating subjectivity, and the side \( c - b \) the preponderating objectivity of the total Identity, which is presented in the whole line \( C \), so that that letter indicates also at the same time the point of indifference, or the equilibrium of the two sides. But the whole existence is neither pure subjectivity at the point \( a \), nor pure objectivity at the point \( b \), inasmuch as we have seen that no existence whatever can be ascribed to these two notions; but both subjectivity and objectivity are everywhere spread. But, again, we may conceive the line \( a^c - b \) as divided into an infinite quantity of parts. In all those parts which are situated between \( a - c \), relatively more subjectivity would prevail than in those between \( c - b \); but in every single fragment of the line there would also be immediately presented again one pole with relative subjectivity \( a \) and again an antagonistic one with relative objectivity \( b \), and in the same manner also between the two a particular point of indifference, \( c \), which at the same time is also the expression for a totality—above absolutely, here in the individual, for a relative totality. Thus have we exhibited the possibility, \( i.e. \) the cogitability of the infinite becoming finite, although that becoming finite consists only in a distinguishing its self from its self; and hence in an activity of the infinite existence in its self, in which it always remains in and by itself one and the same essence.

Existence, then, is self-activity; but we men possess no other immediate knowledge of self-activity save the self-activity of our thinking. If, therefore, we wish to apprehend the self-activity of the absolute subject-object, of nature, we conceive that self-activity as a thinking, as a representing on the part of the absolute subject; hence we transport ourselves into the internal central point of the universe, and just as our thought-images are mere nonentical objects, so the thought-images, or the products of the universal spirit of nature, also are formations which, \( as \ such, \) possess indeed no essentiality in themselves; but as in reality they are only the spirit itself which has assumed form, the spirit which has entered into them, and exhibits itself as being in them, they are nevertheless also actual and real—just as our human thought-images
are also something, viz. the spirit which has assumed those shapes, and which, while we conceive them, moulds itself into those formations. Hence bare human thoughts have a claim to existence, just as much as real things without us. It is indeed admitted that our own thought seems to us, who think, to possess no reality, inasmuch as we are they who think it and who know that it would possess no self-subsistence without, and separated from, our thinking, in short, because we perceive the subjectiveness of our conceptional objects. In the same manner the Infinite being looks through the subjectiveness of all his creatures, i.e. through their identity with himself, and knows (if in general he is possessed of consciousness) that those formations which we term natural objects, and which we perceive without us, are only his own thoughts, and are not separated from him.

Hence everything real is subjective or objective activity, according as it either perceives itself or not; an activity which perceives itself, i.e. which is conscious of itself, is subjective for itself i.e. it is for itself also, that which it is in general; again an activity which does not perceive itself is only in itself; it is not for itself that which it is, it has not yet come to itself; it cannot perceive itself either as subjective or as objective activity. But in itself it is the same activity which also it is when it perceives itself. An activity which perceives itself appears to itself as self-activity; again an activity which is only perceived by the eyes of others, appears as objective movement. But we have already seen that there is subjectiveness in all things—in all nature; for nature is in itself absolute self-movement, but every individual part or every organ in that nature is not in its individuality capable of perceiving itself in this self-movement; there are individual beings in which that self-movement has not yet been matured into self-intuition, and which hence are affirmed with a preponderating objectiveness in comparison with others, which are also for themselves that which they are, i.e. in whom the self-activity of nature perceives itself.

But again, even before nature arrives at self-consciousness, it is already self-activity; we have already seen that the form or the mode of movement of that activity consists in a continuous objectivising of that which implicite lies in its subjectivity, and that this objectivising actually comes to pass; that it is a real objectivising
of itself, but this objectivising is not a free nor a spiritual one, i.e. the activity takes place, and may, perhaps, at the same time, also become object to itself, i.e. it may have inwardly, in a certain manner, intuition of itself, but it cannot as yet perfectly arrive at consciousness, because it has here in general been as yet affirmed with a preponderance of objectiveness, i.e. because, as yet, it is not self-subsistent and free, as in the mind of man; for we have seen above that it is only real and actual freedom or spirituality which constitutes the ground of self-consciousness. If anything is more effected than it effects (operates), it cannot be for itself, that which it is.

Hence the same takes place in the sphere of objectiveness as in that of subjectiveness, but only unconsciously; the activities of nature run parallel, and are the same as those of the mind, or of thinking, only that they do not take place qua knowing or thinking. In the theory of consciousness we had learned that the mental activity consists first of all in intuition, and that this intuition is a becoming of object on the part of the subject. The mind in intuition pours itself wholly forth into a definite form, and it is only when it perceives itself in this pouring forth or acting, when it has again intuition of its intuition, when it makes itself the object, that it has intuition of itself, becomes conscious of itself, and attains to the notion of that which it is. The same relationship which obtains here ideally and subjectively, is also met with in nature, but there really and objectively.

The original existence which, subjectively considered, is creative self-activity, can objectively be only contemplated as movement, and that as a duplicity of antagonising movements. To the objectivising activity by which, under the ideal aspect, the first intuition was effected, there corresponds under the objective aspect the expansive movement; again to the apprehending (comprehending) activity, which, in the above case, returns upon the subject, we have here the contractive movement corresponding; expansion and contraction are the two factors of material existence, or of matter. Matter is existence in its first form, the primum existens, the root of all things; but, however much it may appear as if it were lifeless and rigid, it has still through and through to be conceived only as the unity, or the polar tension of those powers or factors which are active in opposite directions. That these
powers which in the material world are active as expansion and contraction are in themselves the same, as intuition and apprehen-sion in the ideal stage, may also be gathered from the following. The expansive force has to be looked upon as the first positive factor, for it produces space and extension, or rather itself is an extending-itself, just like intuition. Again, this intuition, really and objectively considered, would lose itself into infinity, for the tendency of that activity is in the direction of the infinitely great. In the same manner the mental vision, perceiving or intuition, would go on into infinity, without ever coming to a limitation, to a determination and formation; such an unlimited mental intuition or thinking, produces only that which is without difference, empti-ness or space. Space is nothing else but the mere activity of per-cieving (intuition), objectively affirmed; the extending affirmed as extension. But to this positive activity a negative one stands opposed, even the limiting, confining, or impeding, and thereby also the determining and forming. It is to this activity that time corresponds. Time is the continuous negation of space, that which retards in the movement, the succession in activity; it affords measure and goal, it brings the tendency of thinking or of intu-ition back into itself, and forms it into definite contours and notions; in the same manner it affirms the real notion in the material world, i.e. just as that positive and space-producing activity is in the direction of the infinitely great, so this negative one is in that of the infinitely small; as the former is objectivising so the latter subjectivising, it tends back towards subjectiveness; if the former is the expressing of the hidden ground, the latter is the comprehending within itself, and the uniting into a definite sum of contents, and that both in the sphere of what is ideal and in that of what is real.

We may also say that this negative activity is the universal binding or the universal bond (copula) which extends throughout the universe. It is to it that all the contours, the formations, and the limits in nature are due, as well as all the contours of images and of notions in thinking; it is the comprehending within itself, the apprehending and uniting, and that in the grand total as well as in the individual. It is by it that the universe obtains unity, and the individual its boundaries, the universe eternity, and the individ-ual relative duration. But if this negative force were to exert
its influence alone, then all space would disappear, everything would shrink into itself and to a point, and again the many points would shrink into one mathematical point; again, if that positive force were to prevail alone, everything would melt into infinite emptitude; in either case nothing could exist. Hence neither of these activities exists ever or at any place purely and by itself alone, but each only in and with the other, although relatively there is a preponderance.

As relatively preponderating force in objective nature, it is termed gravity, and appears as matter. If we were to indicate the positive factor by \( a \), and the negative by \( b \), gravity or matter might be indicated by

\[ a + b \]

This prevailing negative principle is hence the mother (mater- ries) of all formation in the individual, of all becoming finite of positive and indifferent existence—as that which binds it is also that which creates, and hence, properly speaking, the alone Real or the Realizing; for the Real is not that which is bound (the contents, the material), but that which binds; the binding activity—the real notion—is that force which alone and truly is creative, and to which the persistence of all things is due. Although it may therefore sound like contradiction, when we here designate that which is negative, as the Real, yet that contradiction imme- diately disappears, whenever we remember that the negative here indicates the actual activity in its progression to determining and forming. United with the latter, and governed by it, although in a state of internal antagonism towards it, the positive factor \( a \), stands out now as the ideal one. This activity, although in it self tending towards the infinite, can here, where it has entered into the sphere of the finite, of gravity, exhibit itself only partially, in as far as it exhibits itself at all: i. e. in as far as it enters into opposition with the products of gravity. It occupies the relationship of subjective and ideal activity—of intuition—towards the objective real activity, and is termed in nature, light. Light is the thinking of nature, or rather the intuition of herself by herself: to us men, who occupy a higher stage, light appears still as a move- ment, which we behold taking place objectively; but this move- ment is to nature, and hence in objectivity in general, that which the thinking and the contemplating of ourselves is to us. The
light is the soul, the spiritual (although unconscious) activity of the world, a thinking which as yet fills a space, but is an intuition of itself in space. For, just as in the ideal sphere, or in the consciousness, sensuous representation was already a common product of a positive visioning there, and of the negatively limiting understanding, while becoming conscious, in the proper sense, was brought about by this, that we made again intuition of our intuition, that the activity of intuition again made itself the object, and thus elevated itself above itself—so is it here in the material sphere also. The positive activity, united with the negative one, entered into the product, and being, as it were, absorbed in it (matter), it was in that state not yet object to itself; but it elevates itself above itself, and makes itself in this its state object to itself; it has intuition of itself—light is that which gives light and manifests both itself and other things also.

We are, however, not to understand by light merely that phenomenon which manifests itself to us as fire, or as ray of the sun; nay, it is rather the sound (the internal tremulous motion of matter), the warmth, and only appears most perfectly as light, in the proper acceptation. But this activity is manifested in general in nature, wherever a separating itself and a setting free of the positive factor from the negative one occurs, as for example, in combustion, in chemical operations, &c. Every where that positively active essence manifests itself, which the ancients termed Ether, and which they considered as the positive and universally diffused original element. "The darkness of gravity, and the splendour of the luminous essence, produce, only when combined, the beautiful appearance of life, and perfect the object into that which properly is real, and to which we apply that name."1 Hence light bears in existing nature the relationship of subject; matter, that dark essence, bears the relationship of object with reference to the light: or more correctly, nature itself, the universal essence, stands here in the relationship of light and gravity, and as light, it is intuition of itself. It is the light which first envelopes the bond of gravity, which sets quiescence in motion, which constitutes in nature the inward life—to use the expression of Plato, "it

1 Vide Schelling's treatise on the Relationship between the Real and the Ideal in Nature, p. 36. (Reprinted with the treatise on the World's Soul, 3d edit. Hamburg, 1809.)
is the royal soul of the total, the universal world-soul." The whole formation of present nature has proceeded from the mutual struggle of light and gravity. It is on this account (we may here say) that nature has a true history, and this history of nature is the commencement of the history of the World, because an eternal progress takes place in it; but an eternal progress presupposes that a state more imperfect than the present one had formerly actually existed; there is no rational life without progress, and no life without struggle.

The process, into which light and matter had at first to enter, in order to form themselves into the World, and to put matter into its different forms, is the magnetic-electric-chemical one. The chemical process is the organic process, only arrested as yet; hence it is already the entrance to the third and highest potency to which material nature can attain, viz. to the potency of organic and self-subsistent life.

In the stage of materialness, up to which we have followed the development of the essence of nature, or in other words, in the stage of the finite, light presented itself as subjectiveness of the second potence, as an inward intuition, but as yet one blind and improperly so termed. On this stage, nature is to be considered as a being, whose soul or moving principle the light is; the latter subjects and rules over, matter, in as far as gravity permits of it; it is in this struggle that it develops matter and therein itself into that whole multiplicity of differences which, when considered individually, constitute finite, inorganic pieces, or lifeless objects, but when considered in the total, are the life-endowed members of the infinite body of nature, or of the whole material world.

In as far as gravity obtains in those finite objects as the uniting principle, and extends round and through all beings as the all connecting bond (as the bond around that which is bound), the individual parts manifest a tendency mutually to take hold of, and to hang on each other; hence, gravity manifests itself between the individual bodies as power of cohesion, or, what amounts to the same thing, as magnetism, i.e. as the expression of an original totality and unity of essence in every point of its existence. The universal bond endeavours to comprehend together all individuality, and thus to exhibit matter in general as a continuity, as one total. We may represent to ourselves, therefore, that totality
of material existence under the Schema of an infinite magnet, i. e. of a line, the poles of which exhibit existence; i. e. the coming forward of the expansive and of the contractive force in their activity.

But matter possesses actual existence, which fills space, only because, together with the negative factor, it also contains at the same time the positive factor, which has space for its result, and because in every point of the universal magnet which it exhibits, it is again matter, i. e. magnet, or because every individual part of matter, potentially, or in a possible manner, is, wherever it be, capable of constituting itself to an actual positive and negative pole, with a point of indifference, and because, hence, every portion, being itself matter, will, as well as matter in the whole, have the tendency to constitute itself, individually by itself, into a magnet, which tendency is more particularly rendered evident, in the tendency of the mass towards crystallization. Hence all particular matters, or bodies in the world, will manifest the tendency to form themselves for themselves into perfect magnets, i. e. to be self-subsistent as matters. In this respect, magnetism is the principle which affirms matter in general as one whole, and again, affirms in that total part-totals, or in other words, it is the principle of formation, of uniting within itself, and that both with reference to the total and to the individual.

But let us bear in mind, that all individual matters, or what appears to us as such, consist only in the relative plus or minus of positiveness or negativeness, by which they are distinguished as individuals from all other individuals, and preserve themselves in that antagonism; if then each one of them tends to constitute itself into a magnet, i.e. into a totality, that which is relatively more positive will withdraw so much negativeness from that which is relatively more negative—and vice versa—till it has placed itself, as it were, within itself, into an equilibrium, and as a total. Hence, different bodies will have a tendency to unite, to attract each other, while indifferent ones, i. e. such, where both are preponderatively either negative or positive, will repel each other, and thus the same law, which manifested itself above as magnetism, appears here, in the conflict of the individual with the individual, as Electricity. Electricity is the eternal universal bond, which manifests in the individual the imperfectness of every individual as such, and hence only the totality (completeness) of
two that are antagonistic, while magnetism, as the temporal bond,
endeavours to apprehend the totality (wholeness, completeness) in
the individualities. In electrical phenomena the antagonism of
negative and positive which is to be united is distributed amongst
two different individuals, and in the contact the one parts to the
other with that which it had as special by itself, and by which it
was something special and differing by itself. Two different
bodies, one of which is positive and the other negative, stand mutual-
ly in the same relationship, as the two poles in one magnet,
but in their separation from one anothor they stand electrically
related to each other, just as in their union they would stand mag-
netically related to one another. If they are united, then in the
contact one common point of indifferenre is produced, and they
exhibit again one magnet—one totality (wholeness). In that
whole line which had above been brought before us—as the Schema
of matter, and hence of the universal magnet—every individual
portion occupies its own place, either nearer to the positive, or
else to the negative pole: every individual portion is in itself,
again, a magnet on a small scale, but every such partial magnet,
considered as a whole by itself, stands again related to other
similar magnets as relative positiveness or negativeness, according
as in the whole magnet it occupies a place nearer to the one or
to the other pole. So to speak, there are magnets, relatively,
more positive and more negative, which, if they were brought into
contact, would together constitute again only the two poles of
one magnet, and electricity is that phenomenon. Hence, electric-
ity is the expression, or the exhibition of the duplicity of that
which in itself is one; magnetism is the expression of the unity of
two opposites; it is in one, what electricity is in two bodies.

The increase of cohesion in the parts of a body is at the same
time a becoming more perfectly magnetic on their part; bodies
become in themselves more perfect magnets, the more firmly they
are bound together into one whole (i.e. into a magnet); this
binding is the effect of the force of gravity on matter. Again,
the diminution of cohesion, or the resolution of the state of being
bound, is the effect of the positive principle, or of the luminous
essence. The luminous essence, as the solving and expansive
principle, is opposed to magnetism, which binds; it looses the bonds
of it wherever it is able to do so; but wherever the force of co-

hesion obtains the mastery, the luminous essence is expelled, and
manifests itself, when thus set free, as heat; hence in every elec-
trical process there is heat or even a development of light.

Inasmuch as magnetism exists, both in the total and in the
individual, only under the form of Identity, and electricity again
under that of Duplicity, it follows that the real law of nature,
viz. to be unity in antagonism, and antagonisms in unity, is not
perfectly exhibited either in magnetism alone, or in electricity
alone, and that the totality (completeness) of the dynamical pro-
cess (the identity of indifference and of difference) manifests it-
self only in that process which combines these two phenomena,
in galvanism or in the chemism which is based upon the latter.

Thus in the chemical process, a third, viz. a higher bond between
those two activities is produced, and in that third these two unite
or become equal, inasmuch as both are ruled over by it. To that
higher one they stand related like parts to the totality (whole-
ness), or like accidents to substance (substance is not different
from the accidents; it does not exist without the latter, and is only
the real containing-together and the bond of them). Hence mag-
netism and electricity constitute the chemical process, in which
however no absolute creating, but only a transforming takes
place; in it every part of matter loses as such its self-subsist-
ence and becomes object, as it were, the play of a higher activity
in nature, of one which has attained to greater liberty, or in other
words, of an increased self-mobility of nature. According to
Schelling, every chemical separation into a distinct duplicity con-
sists of a potentiating of matter into oxygen and hydrogen—all
chemical composition on the other hand is a depotentiating of
matter into the indifference of water. "In the sphere of gravity,
water, as the expression of that third bond of Identity, represents
in the proper sense most purely the original formation of matter,
as it is the chiefest of objects, from which all productivity pro-
cesses and into which it returns. From gravity, as the principle
of the becoming finite, it derives the capability of dropping, and
from the luminous essence it derives this, that in it also the part
is like unto the whole."

For, in the sphere of gravity in general, that which is properly
termed matter, i.e. the rigid, is the expression of gravity as such,

1 Vide Relationship between the Real and the Ideal, p. 42.
i. e. as potence preponderating in general above the light; again, the air is the expression of the luminous essence as such, i. e. wherever it prevails relatively in the sphere of materialness; for there the whole manifests itself developed in the individual, inasmuch as every part is absolutely of the same nature as the whole, while, on the contrary, the existence of what is rigid depends on this, that the parts are relatively different from each other, and are, as to polarity, opposed to each other.” Hence, water is the indifference of the two, and the true medium of material nature.

Thus far we have been engaged with the existence of nature, in as far as this existence is elementary, i. e. inorganic; although the latter is not a chaos, it is, however, yet deficient as to the individuation of the single parts, i. e. as to their organic formation; but nature tends throughout towards individuation. Its progress in the grand total has been a distinguishing of that which primitive was undistinguished, an unfolding of that which was undeveloped and comprehended together in the subjectivity, hence an individualizing into different parts, and again of these parts amongst themselves, yet in such a manner, that the positive essence remains eternally that which is unitous in each and all, just as nature itself surrounds, as an invisible and eternal bond, each and all, and unites them into a whole. Thus nature members itself in its existence in general into the world, i. e. into a totality (of parts) in the unity (of the grand whole): as that living self-memberment, its existence is its general self-aim. If nature is thus looked upon in general as one infinite organism, then every part of it is only serviceable to the whole, and has by itself no existence and no aim; but the aim of its existence is only to fulfil a definite function for the whole; each of them has thus its aim without itself; each is not self-aim, nor organism by itself. But inasmuch as nature, by virtue of its final aim, more and more perfectly to develop its own proper essence, and in that development to make it object for itself, tends always to greater and greater individuation of objects, even in the individual, it follows that it aims as much to exhibit relative totalities (wholenesses) in the individual as on the other hand it again swallows up all these totalities in the one grand organism, as being only part-totalities. Hence the universal bond manifests or affirms itself relatively again in the individual, and exhibits in the latter the form of
totality (wholeness). "But wherever this same higher copula affirms itself in the individual, there we have a microcosm, an organism, a perfected exhibition by one particular life of the universal life of the substance. It is that same unity which contains and provides everything, which moderates the movements of universal nature—those silent and continuous ones as well as the violent and sudden changes in accordance with the idea of the whole, and always brings back everything into the eternal circle; it is that same divine unity which, infinitely desirous of affirmation, also forms itself into animal and into plant, and which, if once the moment of its coming forward is decided, aims with irresistible power to transform earth, air and water into living beings, into images of its universal life." \(^1\)

Thus nature, or the universal essence, does not stop short at having potentiated itself to a luminous essence, but in this its new duplicity and activity it aims again to become object to itself; it aims to degrade light and matter, as they are engaged in a struggle with each other and have this struggle again presented to them, again into an object, to elevate itself as subject above that struggle, and to rule over it. But this is done when nature potentiates itself into life. As principle of life, as tendency after life or formation (and thus it may be termed in the first instance) it is already able to deal more freely with light and matter than formerly, while it was yet light, it had been capable of acting towards matter. Hence it becomes now = \(A\) of the third potence.

We have now to shew how nature in its development attains to that third stage. Above we had noticed nature in its activity as chemical process. This latter might itself be already looked upon as an organizing, but one which, as it were, continually miscarries, and this on the ground that there, in the continuous movement and metamorphizing of itself, nature is as yet perfectly detained and occupied in this fluctuating, just as the sea in a general ebbing and flowing, and hence is unable, as it were, to apprehend or seize itself at any point, as the fluctuating of every individual part obeys a law situate without each part. Hence nature does not arrive in any one of its products at that which it properly is, and which it wishes to exhibit; it presents itself nowhere as self-subsistent life in itself. It only succeeds in this, when it

\(^1\) Relationship between the Real and the Ideal, xlv.
manifests itself in the individual as self-subsistence, i.e. as organism.

Hence, the question before us is, how does the chemical process become an organic process? It will at once be evident that something must now enter into the chemical process which had not hitherto been contained in it; it will be equally evident, however, that this something can proceed from no other source than from the depth of infinite nature itself, i.e. that potentially it must already be existent. Something, however, must be added to the chemical process, and that first of all, because, if left to itself, it would soon return into quiescence, inasmuch as the two principles which aim after equilibrium and the action of which constitutes that process, would soon find their equilibrium and neutralize each other into a common product. Hence, the something spoken of above must make itself felt as a continuous external influence, in order to preserve the chemical process in the organisms (in plants and animals) by a continually renewed disturbance of the equilibrium, and thus to give persistence to the process itself. Thus, in organic life, two factors are again requisite; the one (consisting itself in a duplicity of factors or powers) within individually determined matter, the other without matter in general, being the ether which surrounds every thing—or which belongs to the universal positive essence of nature in general. To this positive factor, things stand related as that which is negative; in these the principle derived from gravity, the formative principle which determined the original proportion in the mixture (the material notion of the thing); prevails, as the living rule of formation, or as the maternal principle. But the other principle lies without the individual things; it is the principle which continuously stimulates, which maintains the process and develops it into actual existence in space. Hence it is the paternal, generative principle, and corresponds to the ether or the luminous essence. Thus, light, as positive factor, is the father, and gravity, as the negative, the mother of all things. The latter lies, as ground and formative notion, enclosed in the essence of individual things and constitutes the individual essence itself; it is a part-of that infinite potence which affirms itself in the finite.

But the ready-made and lifeless products, the things as matter that is formed (as that which is bound) are not of chief import-
ance, but the moving and the forming itself; it is not the product, but the producing which constitutes the life of nature, i.e., which is true nature itself; as soon as it has attained to a ready-made (neutralized) product, the caput mortuum also is ready, and life is at an end. All material nature, in as far as it consists of products destitute of movement, is only the spirit which has already died out in its products; formed material, in all its rigidity, is everywhere only a monument of a time that is gone by. It is the process which is of chief importance, for it constitutes the life, and life is the continuous existence; there is no other existence for the individual except that becoming in time; the form of that becoming or the law of that movement is the living self-exhibiting and the apprehending itself on the part of nature.

Thus, then, the life and existence of organic beings depends upon this, that the chemical process which is running out in them is always again renewed, that an antagonistic process is continuously opposed in them to the former process, and thus organic life is a process of processes, which, in their succession, do mutually anew call forth each other. The organizations with which we are acquainted, divide themselves into animals and plants. The plant exhibits as yet the organic process on a lower stage than the animal. The chemical process, which constitutes the so-called life of plants (vegetation), is a continuous decomposition into hydrogen and oxygen; the former as that which is combustible, remains in the plant (as carbonic acid), the oxygen is exhaled, and the organs of the plant, its leaves, are nothing else but their work indurated, as it were, during the function of exhalation. (In the same manner it might be said that a crystal is nothing else but as it were the coagulated movement of crystalizing.) Thus the plant always progresses to a state of greater deoxydation, and the product is at last that which leaves the body of the plant as a perfectly deoxydised combustible. Hence, the life of the plant can be maintained for a time only by this, that fresh oxygen is always supplied to it, which, by virtue of its nature, it is obliged to eliminate, and this is done by means of light; the light always develops in it fresh oxygen, and produces, among other things, thereby the well-known phenomenon of colouring, which disappears so soon as the plant is withdrawn from the light.

But in the animal process the very reverse of this takes place.
The nutrition of animals consists in a continuous receiving into themselves, and retaining in themselves, of oxygen. The life-air, (the oxygen gas) which the plant exhalates, is decomposed in the lung of the animal, i. e. it is received into the blood, distributed by the arteries, along with the blood, into the different organs of the body, where it is again absorbed, so that the blood flows back deoxygenised through the veins, there to receive anew oxygen from the air, and to recommence its circulation. It follows then that in the organs a kind of power of attraction must be maintained and a capacity for the oxygen which is to be absorbed out of the blood, if the process is not to be arrested. This continuous restoring of capacity in the organs, consists in the irritability with which they are endowed, and which manifests itself as mobility.

Thus, organizing nature itself has in the animal opposed irritability to the animal process, preventing thereby both the standing still of the latter or its exhaustion after a few breaths are drawn. It has thus united in the animal that which in other products appears only isolated. It has endowed the chemical process with an antagonism in itself, which, in one and the same subject, prevents its standing still. This will, in the first instance, enable us to understand the self-mobility which distinguishes the animal from the plant. The system of its movements is a mechanism shut up within itself; and just because it is shut up in one individual, it was capable of attaining free movement, i. e. self-movement. We say it was capable of attaining it, but the actual attaining it, depends on a third faculty of animal nature which stands opposed to irritability, just as the latter to the chemical process, (to the reproduction); we refer to sensibility, which first awakens in the animal. It is only in this triplicity of functions (and this part of the system was specially treated of by Eschenmeyer), that life manifests itself as an organic whole, shut up within itself. Irritability may be represented as tendency after movement, and as such, it occupies the place of the positive and expansive momentum. But, in itself, this tendency is without any determinations; it is as it were perfectly without form; it only receives its form and peculiar determination by the negative momentum which is here represented by sensibility. Again, the latter is wholly determined by the internal individual nature of the subject; for, it depends entirely on it, what peculiarity
every effect from without will assume with reference to the subject; thus, for example, the vibrations of the air are sounds only for the hearing ear, what is sweet is such only for the tongue, light is light only for the eye, &c., and thus all movements are what they appear, only in and for the organic being by which they are apprehended. It is only by the definite kind of reaction, which, in accordance with its nature, a being opposes to the impression, that the impression becomes that which it is for the being; it is only by a definite kind of reaction—hence by an activity in conflict with a passivity, by an internal specific movement, and that a spontaneous movement (at will); but the latter, we have seen, depends on irritability, and thus irritability and sensibility mutually determine each other, as, so to speak, the former furnishes the material, the positive, the latter the form, the negative, while only both of them together produce the formation, which may be considered as the peculiar life of organic beings. "If, in conclusion," says Schelling,1 "we comprehend together in one notion irritability and sensibility, we have the notion of Instinct, (for instinct is the tendency to motion determined by sensibility), and thus have we arrived, by a gradual separation and reuniting of antagonistic properties in the animal, at the highest synthesis in which that which is spontaneous and that which is non-spontaneous, that which is accidental and that which is necessary, in animal functions, are perfectly united."

1 World's Soul, p. 292.
At the conclusion of last Lecture, we had arrived at comprehending together the internal processes of animal and of organic nature, as the unity of reproduction, of irritability, and of sensibility. Animal nature is irritable, inasmuch as when stimuli are applied, self-movement results; by virtue of its organism being shut off, the animal appears here, in the first place, as perfect automaton; it is no longer only mechanically moved from without, like inorganic masses, but moves dinamically by its own impulse; and even though this self-movement were only to occur in consequence of a stimulus from without, it would nevertheless always be and remain a living, i.e. an organic movement of its own accord. Again, sensibility had been added and internally opposed to that irritability. But we may not, in the meantime, represent to ourselves this sensibility, as that which in man is termed the faculty of sensation; for the latter generally implies also the notion of consciousness, which we have not as yet deduced. By sensibility we understand here, in the sphere of objectivity, only a certain kind of movements which are opposed to the movements of irritability, so that if we consider the latter as positively expansive (increasing the capacity of organs), we have to look upon the actions of sensibility as negatively limiting and determining. Hence sensibility is the normative and determining activity of the individual; it imposes law or form to all the movements which proceed from irritability; it gives them that quality which they must possess, in order to correspond to the real idea of the whole,
or to exhibit that idea in time and space; hence it introduces into
the sphere of of irritability, and through it into the whole sphere
of reproduction, the specific mark of the genus, and expresses in
the being of the individual the idea thereof.

Hence sensibility and irritability combined give the idea of
instinct, i. e. of a tendency of nature which is determined by sen-
sation—by sensation—i. e. which however is here not yet a more
or less clear consciousness, as it only expresses what is material in
sensation, viz. that with which we had before already become
acquainted, as movements which are going on, and as determina-
tions which exist in the bodily organ. The student will bear in mind
that in the theory of consciousness we took our start from this,
that the unreflected and unconscious acting of the powers of the
soul occupies the same stage as the acting of what are termed the
blind forces of nature, and that nothing else constitutes the differ-
ence between conscious and unconscious activity, but the want of
reflection upon itself, which can only take place in a subject which
is actually in itself an individual subject, i. e. an organic whole,
and not again a mere portion of something else. It is only in
such a subject—as in the philosophy of nature we have already
elevated and constructed it from stage to stage—it is only in such
a subject, which constitutes by itself a living whole, and is endowed
with spontaneous movement, that the activity of nature has be-
come individual self-activity, and has attained a degree of self-
mobility and of liberty, where alone it is possible to execute the
last and highest reflection, and thus to elicit from the essence of
nature the striking flash of consciousness, i. e. the flash of self-
consciousness.

Irritability and sensibility, as far as we have hitherto become
acquainted with them, belong still wholly to the sphere of that
blind activity, which obtains also in the lower (animal) regions of
human life; they are in themselves void of consciousness. But
we have formerly seen that the act of becoming conscious consists
in this, that the activity which had at first wholly entered in, and had
as it were been absorbed by its product, separates itself from that
product, spontaneously repeats itself, has intuition of itself as
activity, and thus becomes self-object in the same manner in which
formerly it had only been object to the onlooker who stood without.
If, therefore, the activity, which takes place blindly and instinc-
tively, would in that manner within itself again make itself object, then the tremulous movement—that which had been felt—and which had been unconsciously present, would be transformed into sensation, which is the first stage of consciousness. As long as the activity of the living subject still enters wholly into its product, no real internal opposing of what is Ideal and of what is Real, of subject and object, and hence no consciousness can take place. The animal feels, but as in a dream; it does not feel that it feels, it does not perceive that it perceives.

The new stage to which the essence of nature only attains wholly in man, will again depend upon the same process, upon the same internal division and antagonising (the unity being at the same time preserved). Here everything which hitherto had only existed as objective, as the whole sphere of unconsciously operative nature, or in the last instance as subject-object, but in undistinguished penetration, passes at last wholly and immediately to the other side, viz. that of objectiveness, and leaves behind it only pure subjectiveness. The subject which during this process occupied the relationship of life, $A^3$, will now, in the stage of consciousness, have to be termed spirit, $A^4$; this subject stands as thinking cognition, or as idealistic momentum, now opposed to the whole former sphere as to that which is real and objective; it exists only as knowing, and has, as it were, everything else over against itself as world that is. On this stage we have entered into another region, that of the spirit, of which we shall treat more by and bye. Here it becomes, in the first place, evident that everything which now appears to us as objective, will on that very account be for the Real, and again that which is left behind as subjective, will for the Ideal, be a bare thinking and knowing as such. We now know that even that which has become objective is, in itself, and through and through, nothing but activity or movement; that which presents itself to the ordinary understanding as objective being, as the material or as the matter and kernel of phenomena, is nothing else than that self-activity of nature, which repeats itself so long for itself, until at last this its activity is presented to it in its pure form, or till that pure form itself and alone, which is the law of that activity which constitutes and determines everything, is presented to it; hence, until it cognises and perceives that everything that exists is only a deter-
mination of its activity, and a form of itself, and that itself, viz. creative nature, is one and the same with its form, and acts only in that form, i.e. is actual. At the conclusion then of this survey, we trust it will be sufficiently evident that the Ideal and the Real, which are viewed by the ordinary understanding as two incompatible antagonisms, or that knowing (thinking) and being stand really only related like the two poles of what is in itself one and the same indifferent, or that the the Real and the Ideal are identical in the absolute. Thus we have, through the course of our investigation, again returned to our starting-point, nor do we again require to repeat those parts of a former lecture which connect themselves with it.

If the result of natural science was, that all forces of the universe are in the last instance to be reduced to representing powers; if all producing and life, and hence if nature, which continually gives birth to itself, is indeed a dynamism—(not to say a mechanism) blind in itself, but a dynamism or an organism which, while it only exhibits unconscious thinking, exhibits it wholly in its reality, even the same spiritual kind of activity which in us men also takes place at first unconsciously and non-spontaneously, before in its own reflex it is presented to itself and becomes conscious—it follows, that on account of that very identity, every activity of nature will not merely appear to us as adapted to a design, but likewise be in itself really so adapted, and that, even though in itself it is blind, and has no representation of the purposes which non-spontaneously it prosecutes and attains. Throughout, nature acts (operates) in conformity to a design, but not with purpose, hence all its products will also be conformable to design, although not brought about by nature with the consciousness of such design, i.e. with purpose. Hence, it may also be said that nature acts (operates) rationally without consciousness, or, that the whole system of action and of life exhibited in nature, constitutes the existing reason; a proposition which Hegel afterwards extended over the whole, including even the domain of history, when he stated, “everything that is actual is rational.”

In the human consciousness, where knowing and being are

1 Compare Schelling’s Lectures on the Method of Academical Studies. Tübingen, 1803, p. 11 and following.
already separated, thought and purpose precede the action, and the action realizes that thought; the product is first ready as an idea, and then only as an object. But this is otherwise in nature, where the product is ready, although no clear conception of it has preceded; it is, so to say, produced in a manner unthought and instinctive, i.e. according to laws which, while they are the laws of thinking, are neither reflected nor cognized as such. While nature therefore exhibits to our view adaptation to design, and wisdom, this will have to be accounted for only on the ground that the unconscious activity of nature—the dream-life of the spirit of nature in its unconsciousness—necessarily harmonizes with the conscious activity; or rather, because the former is in itself the same as that which the latter has become to itself.

Here, then, lies the difference between the immanent adaptation to design and the external one, such as ordinary theology pro-
pounds it. According to the statement of our philosophy, nature is not to be viewed as the blind instrument, or as the lifeless matter, by means of which a self-conscious constructor of the world realizes definite and distinctly foreseen purposes, such as are foreign to matter in itself, and, as it were, only impressed upon it from without. Such a view would, on the one hand, constitute the God who was thus engaged, indeed an extra-mundane being, but at the same time only a constructor of the world, a Demiurgos, and not a true originator of the world, with reference both to its material and to its form; and on the other hand, the mass constituting the world would remain a lifeless substratum or chaos; it would be what it generally seems to a mind that is as yet closed, viz. a lifeless, powerless lump, only existent for the hand of the artist, with reference to which it is, however, impossible to understand how or by what power it had attained to existence thus by itself alone, as well as how or by what power it continued. Thus nature is deprived of every charm, which it only possesses for us, if we view it as a being homogeneous to our own selves and self-living, if we understand that in it a spirit moves and mysteriously works, although that spirit may be held in deep slumber, and which, like the soul of the infant, which resides within its body, is living and similar to ours in every respect, only that there every-
thing lies concealed, as yet, in the inward fulness of disposition (idea), while in us it has already disclosed itself into those vast riches.
Hence the sympathy with which the thinking observer looks on the slumbering child; hence the charm which nature possesses for the man who can sympathize, which no poets have more beautifully expressed than those of Germany, and amongst them none more truthfully than Ludovick Tieck, especially in some passages of his Phantasus, in his Zerbino, and in other pieces. But all the threads of this deep presentiment, both of fellow-feeling and fellow-understanding, are torn asunder, if unconscious nature is constituted the mere mechanism of an extra-mundane intelligence; if, as another poet expresses it, "a fiery orb moves soul-less, where before fulness of life had poured itself forth through creation."

"The attempt," says Schelling, 1 "to account for nature as a production adapted to design, i.e. realizing a purpose, destroys the character of nature, and in fact the very thing which constitutes it nature. For the peculiarity of nature consists in this, that while its mechanism is blind, it is in that mechanism, nevertheless, adapted to a design. If we destroy that mechanism, we also destroy nature itself. The charm with which, for example, organic nature is surrounded, depends on the contradiction, that while this nature is the product of blind natural forces, it is nevertheless throughout and throughin adapted to design. If nature is to us no more than an aggregate of lifeless objects, which chance has thrown together, or—and this amounts to the same thing—which a power extraneous to it has arranged, in order that we may find nourishment and support, then is it veiled to the vision of the philosopher as well as to that of the artist. It is to the inspired inquirer only that nature appears as the wholly and eternally creative original power of the world, which produces all things from out of itself, and brings them actively forth." 2

The immanent life in nature is just that unreflected mode of intuition which, although unconscious, yet acts (operates) like consciousness, and is, as blind tendency in nature, the more certainly operating according to design, that design and direction have not yet been set free, but, as it were, are yet held bound in the force. But if we are to have a clear notion of this unconscious acting of nature in and without us, and if we are to speak of it intelli-

1 System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 443, and following.
2 Treatise on the Relationship between the Arts and Nature. Vide Philosophical Writings, vol. i. p. 346.
gently, everything depends on this, that we resolve the difficulty how we are capable of attaining a conscious, or at least an analogous representation of an unconscious state or acting. In order, then, to be able perfectly to comprehend the acting of nature, it would be necessary to be able to exhibit within our own intelligence, a psychical phenomenon, i.e. such a mode of intuition, in which the Me, with reference to itself, acts at the same time consciously and unconsciously—unconsciously, in order to be equal to nature, and yet, at the same time, consciously also, in order to be capable of observing at the same time within itself that acting of nature. Such an activity would no doubt solve the whole problem of transcendental philosophy, and we would thereby come fully to know the secret which is presented to us in nature and in ourselves.

But this contradiction is actually solved to us by the existence within us of the productive power of imagination, and of poetic and artistic activity. The latter comprehends together within itself that which else appears only separated in nature and in thinking, viz. the identity of conscious and unconscious acting in the Me, and that with the express self-consciousness of that identity. Reflection and intuition, or the free thinking which observes itself, and again that dream-like surrendering of one's self to fancy, which seems to play with our mental powers—these two states seem incompatible—the one ever appears to recede in measure as the other proceeds, like the two vessels of which it is said—

"If from the one you strive to drink,
The other to the ground will sink."

It is only the poet or the artist who succeeds in this, and that in a wonderful manner; for, while he allows the nature of his spirit, of the divine genius within him, to work blindly, and yields to it, it is nevertheless himself who works, and that up to a certain degree in a manner forethought, according to ideas, and with purpose and arrangement. He feels inspired, i.e. like one possessed by spirits, a δαιμόνιος in the original sense of the term; he experiences within himself a tendency and a life, an infinite which tends to press forward and to exhibit itself almost without any doing of his, but is only able to accomplish this in finite and limited forms; he becomes conscious thereof, and expresses it with
strikingly truthful certainty; but he can never fully express it; in
the unfathomable creative depth of the spirit of a true artist, infi-
nitely much is always left behind. And every genuine work of art
must bear testimony of that contradiction presented by that which
in itself is infinite, and can never be fully thought out, but which
yet has to be comprehended within the limits of an intuition; of
that which is destitute of consciousness and incomprehensible, and
which yet is to be apprehended in an intuition; for every work of
art is spontaneous, and yet non-spontaneous; purposed and created,
and yet brought about as by a miracle; it is the product of what in
the sphere of conscious reason—bearing analogy to what instinct
is in the animal—is properly designated by the term *genius*.

In order to indicate yet more clearly both the difference and
the relationship between products of nature and of art, we shall
conclude this section with a passage from the classic oration which
Schelling delivered in the Academy at Munich in the year 1807,
"On the Relationship between the Fine Arts and Nature:"¹

"If art is to imitate nature, it has to follow in the wake of the
creative power of nature, and not merely slowly to take up
architectonically the empty scaffolding of its external forms, and
to transfer an equally empty picture of them upon the canvass.
It was only for the deep-thinking Grecians, who everywhere felt
the trace of the living and working essence, that nature could pre-
sent many true gods. If we look at things not with reference to
the essence which they contain, but with reference to their empty
form, they will not communicate anything to our mind or heart."
—"Look again at the most beautiful forms, and what is left, if
in thought you abstract the working principle from them? What
remaineth, then, but mere non-essential qualities, such as exten-
sion and relationship as to space? We ask, does the fact that one
part of matter is beside or without another, contribute aught to its
internal essentiality, or does it not? Manifestly, we must reply,
it does not. It is not the being in juxtaposition, but the *mode* of
it, which constitutes the form; but this mode can only be deter-
mined by a positive force, which rather acts antagonistically as to
the state of being without each other, which subjects the multipli-
city of parts to the unity of one idea, even from that force which is
active in the crystal, up to that which, like a delicate magnetic

¹ Vide Philosophical Writings, vol. i. pp. 347-357.
stream, gives, in human formations, to the portions of matter, such a position and such a mutual disposition, as makes perceptible the idea, viz. the essential unity and beauty."

"But if we are to apprehend it as living, the essence must, in its form, not only present itself to us, in general, as active principle, but also as spirit and as science, which realizes itself in its works. Every unity can only be spiritual both in its mode and in its origin, and what else is the aim of every investigation of nature, if it is not to find science in it? For that which itself is destitute of understanding, could not be objection of the understanding, that which is destitute of cognition, could not be cognized. True, the science by which nature works is not one similar to human science, which is immediately connected with reflection upon itself. No—in the former the idea is not distinct from the act, nor the plan from the execution. Hence it is that crude matter tends, as it were, blindly after regular formation, and assumes unwittingly forms purely stereometrical, which latter belong to the sphere of ideas, and are in that, which is material, themselves something spiritual. The planets have the loftiest mathematics and geometry innate in a living manner, and carry it out in their movements, without having an idea thereof. The same living cognition manifests itself more clearly in animals, although to them also it is incomprehensible. Hence, although we see them moving, as it were, unconsciously, we witness their performance of innumerable effects, which are much more splendid than themselves. We see the bird intoxicated, as it were, by music, surpassing itself in melodies full of deep feeling; the little creature, endowed with art, performing without practice or instruction, works of architecture—but all of them are directed by one all-powerful Spirit, which, while in them it shines forth in individual flashes of cognition, yet displays itself only in man as the sun in his full strength."

We have thus followed the dynamical process of nature in its onward course, up to the stage where the subjective had, as A of the fourth potency, attained to pure knowledge or to spirituality. On this stage, therefore, it is nothing else but knowing (knowledge); as spirit, therefore, it is from this point of view not any material substratum furnished with consciousness, but exists, being here at last purged from every thing material, in its perfect sub-
jectiveness merely as pure idealistic activity, as a knowing which has the whole real world of existence presented to it as something placed over against it, as existence; it has become the intuition of its own intuition. In terrestrial nature it exists as such only in the species, man. By this knowledge, the infinite, viz. that which is spiritual, the knowing of nature, and (in as far as man himself is a real product of nature), man stands over against himself; but it is within himself that a new process is opened up, upon which that which is ideal enters by itself and alone. For, in higher and higher instances, thinking makes again itself the object of self-intuition, or of thinking about itself. Thus, for example, the intuition or representation which in itself is already ideal, becomes, as thought-image, again the object of a higher self-intuition for the thinking subject; both theoretically and practically the total activity rises in the individual, from the stage of feeling and of sensation, to that of intuition, representation, appetite, and, lastly again, to reason, both in thinking and in doing, inasmuch as, by virtue of his innate nature, the individual also is unwilling to be held in any kind of bondage or of non-freedom; and thus, as a true psychology informs us, the spirit of man attains gradually within itself the stage of the most clear self-consciousness and world-consciousness, which elevation, as has before been shewn, is at the same time also a real self-deliverance of spiritual activity within itself.

During that period in which man at the first feels only his own self, and acts as a self-subsistent being, he is, as it were, at the greatest distance from God, as the central being, or he is, by his liberty, wholly separated from Him; but the perception of this also marks, at the same time, the commencement of his return. But the infinite, which exists in finite man as that which is Ideal, as knowing or as consciousness in him, and which takes part in his being finite, stands related to his practical liberty, as necessity, as law, and as conscience; thus an antagonism of necessity and liberty, and with it a new process, is called forth in man; this is the process of history. Man recognizes above his liberty a knowledge and providence, a spirit to which he is subject, and whose instrument he becomes. Being free, he perceives that power as yet as external to himself; and as self-subsistent being, he either opposes himself in his self-consciousness to it, or else
submits to it, but as yet as to an external power, and one foreign to himself. He does not as yet perceive the true relationship, viz. that he himself constitutes an integral part of that power, or that the absolute is not really separate from himself, but that the infinite also exists in him who is finite. This identity he does not as yet perceive; nevertheless, it ever obtains, and the infinite spirit acts in him, and through him; but, in the first instance, in such a manner, that man only occupies, as yet, the relationship of being only in part the organ, or being non-spontaneous in those magnificent things which the eternal spirit produces by him. It is hence by revelation in its different gradations, that the return is both introduced and performed; during this whole period the human being manifests itself as the instrument of the Most High. We have already seen that this was, in the first instance, the stage of art. The poetry, the inspiration, which here is active in man, is the infinite spirit, or it is the spirit of man himself, which manifests itself as the infinite, without being itself aware how it does so, or, in other words, which in the finite reveals its infinite aspect. Hence the first revelation of the infinite is art—a relationship which has more especially been brought to view in Greece. A second stage is that of religious faith, which while it indeed apprehends the all-unitous as the all-one in the highest abstraction of being, loses however sight in the last instance, of what is sensuous and finite, of every creature, by considering it as a mere momentum of the all-one, and as in itself thoroughly non-critical. This has been the case in some Eastern creeds, especially in Buddhism. Finally, the third and last stage consists in understanding the true relationship between the subjective and the objective, in absolute knowledge or in true philosophy, which unites the objectiveness of art with the subjectiveness of religion.

Here, then, we have, in the meantime, a survey of the arrangement of the system. In it, the grandest infinite world-drama unfolds itself as a history, whose commencement dates from the eternity that preceded the present creation.

But, before proceeding, we shall glance at Schelling's views, as far as hitherto they are known, with reference to the origin of finite beings in or from the absolute, i.e. with reference to the process which is generally designated by the term Creation. From what has hitherto been stated, it will be evident that his philo-
Sophy of nature cannot admit of any proper creation of objects, if such be understood to mean an effecting of objects, where the original essence calls them into existence, without, at the same time, itself entering into and remaining in them. If the absolute, which is all in all, were not also to enter into the creature, it would follow that the creature, in order to be able to exist independent of the absolute, would require to possess an existence by itself and a ground of that existence in and by itself, wholly independent of the original ground of the universe; in such a case itself would be absolute, and would stand opposed to the first absolute, and hence the latter would be confined and limited by the former, and be no longer capable of being looked upon as itself the infinite. If the identity of the two is to be preserved—and with it the whole speculative system—then the essence, which is originally 'one and absolute, must itself, in some manner or other, enter into the finite, and be inmanent in it; and thus have we before us the pantheism of Schelling, which, however, demands closer investigation.

First, with reference to creation, we would, according to the principles of the philosophy of nature, reverse the whole relationship, if, as is commonly done, we were to represent to ourselves, first the eternal spirit, and then the material world, as something that was consciously produced by it; on the contrary, in virtue of what has hitherto been stated, we shall have to assume, first, a real world within or without which afterwards the spirit as such elevates and develops himself. Matter was the primum existens, and the ground which again preceded it, i. e. not with reference to time, but which logically requires to be pre-supposed, was the potentia which as yet did not exist. The subjective rose in matter more and more victoriously from stage to stage, as life, light, and spirit, until it attained absolutesubjectiveness, i. e. pure ideality, to which everything else had become objective, i. e. now as much as real. Thus, in fact, spirit was not the first but the last which came forth, nor can we consider it in that sense as the Creator of the World.

The absolute subject, or the World-Me, is in its highest stage the world-spirit, which thus is in the macrocosm, that which human consciousness is in the microcosm. Just as the human germ, if once impregnated, unwittingly develops itself into a perfect organism,
and at last becomes conscious of itself, so infinite nature also
developed itself in the world, and entered upon the stage of spiri-
tuality, \( i.e. \) it came to know,—it objectivised itself in its own per-
fected work, that which at the same time itself always is and re-
mains. In the stage of spirituality, and hence in man, the activ-
ity of nature ceases to be really productive. As thinking it is
only ideal; it has become purely subjective, and on that very
ground its products are only subjective products, thoughts, ideas,
only formal repetitions of the really creative activity, yet without
that which is created, just because it repeats itself purely for it-
self, and enters no longer into the product; it is thus that as
thinking it is distinguished from the power of life which really, \( i.e. \)
externally and objectively, effects something. This activity exists,
by itself and irrespective of the product, as that purely ideal
activity which repeats itself ideally, or which observes itself, or in
other words, as knowledge, in so far as it is no longer ab-
sorbed and contained in the product itself as before it had been.
It exists as a \textit{particular function} of the life-activity, viz. as a
higher one (in higher potence), \( i.e. \) as Meity, or as self-conscious-
ness by itself, without however being in itself and really different
from the life-power, and as it were, another and second soul, side
by side with the first. Thus the individual human soul is both
the blind working and self-formative tendency of life, and is in a
higher function at the same time also self-contemplative, think-
ing or self-consciousness = spirit. Let us now attempt it, to
conceive, according to that analogy, also that universal essence,
the world-soul, to the productions of which all things, and our
human souls amongst the rest, belong as integral parts or as de-
terminations. We have hitherto become acquainted with it as
world-soul, as nature, which unconsciously effects itself. We
have seen that it rises in man to the stage of consciousness, inas-
much as nature has in this its last product that perfectly pre-
sented to it as object, which lay \textit{implicite} in its essence, and in its
potentia. Man is that thought of nature in which it represents
itself—he is the perfect portraiture of the absolute, for he is ab-
solute himself, \( i.e. \) he is free, he has within himself the principle
of Meity, and represents in this respect the absolute Meity of the
world-Me. Producing nature (\( i.e. \) the absolute) is in all the real
products of nature identical with those its products; nor is it in
any way separated from them; these products, the natural objects, do not exist at all by themselves, and as separate beings—they are only the activity of nature fixing itself (arresting itself) in its working (operation). Again it has been shown in the theory of magnetism and of gravity how in the universal fluidum such individual fixings or antagonisms can possibly take place. The absolute and the one is, in as far as it acts as material force of gravity, the universal bond, which both affirms in the universe every individual position by itself, and again connects them all together into one whole; it is that power which pervades, keeps, and supports everything, and which materially and really places every individual, as being bound together, within itself, or within its own sphere. In this respect the absolute, or that which being in itself originally one had differentiated itself into light and gravity, was also identical with the material world. In this potency of the merely real and objective sphere, there is no such thing as an individual being which exists truly and self-subsistently (independently). But here the absolute has not yet reached the termination of its process; that process consists in a necessity proceeding from the nature of the absolute itself, by which that which is potentially possible, the secret In-itself of the absolute, is always more and more objectivised, and made more and more something for itself. Hence that process attains to perfection only when the absolute has intuition of itself fully, i. e. as absolute, self-subsistently, and free creating, and has that intuition in its counterpart or in the world. But to this self-intuition it only attains on the stage of humanity, or—and this amounts to the same thing—on that of reason, which knows itself as such, in that of perfected self-consciousness, of self-subistence, and of freedom. It is hence only in man that the absolute becomes perfect subject, i. e. then it becomes actual knowledge, and is no longer mere real working. True, it is and remains indeed still at the same time real working in all the rest in which it acts as organizing world-soul, or as real life-principle; but in its higher function, as spirit, it is knowing, it has, as it were, the whole world over against itself as object, and comes at last to know itself perfectly (in philosophy), inasmuch as it perceives itself as the Identity of the two—as unconscious thinking in all real acting (working), as conscious thinking in all ideal acting.
We have said that the absolute attains only in man to true self-consciousness; for consciousness pre-supposes a spiritual portraiture of that which the spirit is in itself; the original essence comes to know itself only in the perfect reflex of its essence. But if that cognition is to be truthful, the portrait must perfectly correspond to the original, yea, in such a way, as that itself is the original which is perceived. But the absolute or universal nature, is, even in its blind activity, never any thing else, nor does it act otherwise, than as the very law of reason, and had hitherto been reason itself blindly acting; but nature, i.e. that reason comes no where to itself, in all the circuit of existing objects, save in man; hence man in general, i.e. the idea of man (not any individual man) is the first reflex of absolute reason, in which it perceives itself; for it was in man that the absolute first attained to that antagonism of knowing and being. Man himself exists as a personality, i.e. by himself as a free and absolute individual, merely in and by his self-consciousness. It is the latter only which separates him from the universal blind concatenation of nature, and thus his inmost being, by virtue of which he exists as, and which constitutes him man, is an ideal principle; in his inmost being he is nothing else but the actual self-consciousness, and it is this principle of personality and of subsisting for itself, which in the inmost ground of our being is that very absolute which separates itself self-actively, first in the form of one's own tendency of life, and afterwards as freedom and self-consciousness, from the universal concatenation of nature, and attains to perfection only in the genesis of human self-consciousness, which Fichte had already designated as the original power of the Meity.

But how are we to conceive this separating from the continuum of universal existence? We answer, the world-spirit continued in its eternal process, till it attained the stage of self-consciousness. But the becoming conscious of its self, consisted in an antagonizing of subjectiveness and objectiveness; the last object presented to it, in order that the absolute subject might perfectly recognize itself in it, was the idea of man, i.e. of reason—cognizing itself, or of reason qua such. That idea was the true counterpart of the absolute; but if it was really to represent in itself the absoluteness of the absolute, it required to be absolute itself, i.e. it could neither be represented as merely object to, nor as merely
**predicate** of the absolute (else it would not have portrayed absolute subsistence for itself), but it required to be affirmed in the absolute in such a way, as to be capable of existing by itself. As every thing is in reality thinking, and hence every thing that exists is either thinking or thought (subject or object), while that which is thought, is that which is dependent, and thinking is the absolute, it follows, that every thing depended on this, that what the God-head had originally thought, was so thought as to be capable also to be self-thinking, and that that which subsists for itself was also presented and represented as such. True self-thinking is subject, and thus the idea itself (that which is thought) becomes within itself that which thinks, *i. e.* that which is perfectly self-active and free, and with this act it begins to exist for itself. Thus everything which proceeds out of the unity of absolute existence, or which appears to separate itself from it, must possess in it already the possibility of existing by itself; but the actuality of separate existence, can only be found in that which is separated itself; and this separation can again only be ideal, and can only take place in the measure, that a being has been rendered capable of existing as unity to itself, by the mode of its existence in the absolute.

So much then for solving the chief difficulty with which we necessarily meet in every theory of creation, viz. the one above referred to, as to how anything can exist for itself, or be absolute, beyond that universal absolute. If that which exists, owes both its origin and continuance to that all-unitous absolute, if it has its root and draws its nourishment only in and from it, like a part in the whole, then may we also not apprehend it in any other way than as accident in a substance, nor has it any existence by itself. Again, if it is absolute for itself, then is it without the unity of the absolute, and there would thus exist a plurality of absolute, with reference to which there could not be any absolute, any supreme, or any bond, or else they would, in their connectedness, cease to be absolute. As long as we continue to contemplate only the series of selfless products of nature, this difficulty does not make itself felt, but it manifests itself in its full force, whenever we

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penetrate as far as the antagonism between human freedom and the freedom of the absolute. Hence this became to Schelling also the point of greatest difficulty. Round that Rock, by which the wrecks of so many former systems lie buried in the depth of time, we see him cantinuously feeling his way for a long time; the straight course of the vessel seems impeded, nor does it as yet appear certain how and in what direction it is again to set its sails.

The doctrine of all-unity, such as Spinoza, and in ancient times the Eleatics, had taught it, seems fully to exclude, if not every realistic and qualitative distinction, yet any proper subisting for itself, of that which is particular. On this subject Schelling expressed himself as follows in his Philosophical Investigations on the Essence of Human Freedom, published in the year 1809.

It is said, that, if the absolute is everything and if things are only the temporary forms which the absolute assumes, it is evident that properly things in themselves possess no essentiality; that then the absolute alone has existence, an absolute which continually, and in an inexhaustible manner, transforms itself, but that beyond it neither a material nor a spiritual world exists. Thus it seems, as if that system completely destroyed the individuality of all beings, and especially of men.

But, says Schelling, this is not the case. Things contain indeed within themselves something positive or essential, although not originally, but having only derived it. For, if we assume that the individual being is at the sametime also in itself of the infinite substance, viz. a particular modification of it, or what amounts to the same thing, that the infinite substance has so modified itself in any one of its points, as that its formation or modification appears as the individual thing, then the substance has to be conceived as the immanent ground in the individual being, by which that being continues in the same form. Still further, if we assume that the absolute or the substance continues not transitorily but permanently in some of those forms (which may also be termed notions, inasmuch as the absolute is something spiritual), for example, in the human spirit, then that form and the absolute, which continues in it, would also be permanently separated from the universal absolute. True, that particular form, and hence the existence of the individual being, is dependent on the absolute and
contained in it, inasmuch as it has its ground only in it. "But
dependence—so continues Schelling—does not destroy self-subsist-
ence, yea it does not even destroy freedom. It does not deter-
mine the essence, but expresses only that what is dependent,
whatever it be (in itself), can only exist as the consequence of
that on which it is dependent; it does not, however, express either
what it is, or what it is not. Every organic individual exists as
something which has become only by something else, and is in this
respect dependent not with reference to its being, but to its origi-
nation." "For example, it is no contradiction to say that the
son of a man is himself also a man. But if that which is depen-
dent and which follows could not be self-subsistent, then that state-
ment would imply a contradiction. In such a case we should
have a dependence without something that depended, a conse-
quence without something that followed (consequentia absque
consequente); and hence we should have no real consequence, i. e.
the whole notion would destroy itself. The same holds true with
reference to being contained in something else. An individual
member, such as an eye, is only possible in the whole of the
organism, while nevertheless it has a life by itself, yea and a kind
of freedom also, which is clearly shewn by its capability of being
affected by disease. If that which is contained in something else
were not self-living, we would have a containing without something
that is contained, or in other words, nothing would be contained." 1

Hence Schelling maintains in general, that the categories of
ground and consequence, and those of substance and accident, if
applied to the absolute and to the world, do not prevent us from
considering that which is looked upon as consequence of the ac-
cident of the absolute, as in another respect again itself ground
and substance; and by removing this logical impediment, he ende-
vours to open up a way for a theory of creation, according to which
man especially, although with reference to his essence his root is
in the absolute, is nevertheless, with regard to the form of his
existence, to be looked upon as absolutely subsisting by himself;
while, on the other hand, the absolute, although itself also entering
into all its productions, appears nevertheless (as to its form) as
the absolute, persisting by itself above and without those pro-

1 Vide On Human Freedom, p. 413.
ductions. He bids us carefully attend in this case to the meaning of the copula in a logical proposition. The latter does not imply an identity of subject and predicate. If, for example, we say that a body is blue, we do not thereby mean, that that body is nothing else but that which is designated by blue (blue colour), but we mean that amongst other properties which this body possesses it is also blue. In the same manner, when it is said that the objects are the absolute, or that all objects are the absolute, it is not thereby meant that the absolute is nothing else than these objects, but only that amongst other things the absolute is these objects also, while at the sametime we do not express what the absolute may be besides, or how its notion might be perfectly determined.

Thus it is not the intention of Schelling wholly to separate things, or even men, from the absolute with regard to their real essence, or to disjoin them from the connection of universal powers; on the contrary, he states that it is possible, i. e., that it is conceivable, that with regard to his real essence man is an integral part in the absolute, while at the sametime he continues in a form of existence which invests him with the character of the absolute, or of selfsubsistence; he is rightly termed a consequence and a modification of the absolute, but this he is and remains only in his one-sided relationship to the universal absolute; with reference to something else he is perhaps the very opposite, just as, for example, a son is the consequence of his father, while he himself may be also a father.

Hence, from the fact that we have to conceive man as according to his essence continuously integrating in the absolute, it does not follow that man in general and in every respect is not self-sustaining or not free. "No—continues Schelling—the very opposite follows. The immanency of the absolute in us, or our immanency in the absolute, is the only means of preserving our freedom."—"Most people, if they were sincere, would confess that, according to the character of their conceptions, individual liberty seems to imply a contradiction with almost all the properties of a supreme being, for example with Omnipotence. By liberty we assert a power unconditioned as to its principle, without and by the side of the divine power, such as, according to those notions, is inconceivable. Just as the sun extinguishes in the firmament the light
of all the heavenly orbs, so and much more does the infinite ex-
tinguish every finite power. If absolute causality be attributed
to one being; then nothing is left for all the others but uncon-
tioned passiveness. Add to this the dependence of all creatures
upon God, and that even their continuance is only an always re-
newed creation, in which the finite being is produced, not as some
indefinite and general essence, but as that particular definite
individual with certain thoughts, aims and deeds, and with none
other. It does not mend the matter to say that God restrains
his omnipotence, in order to enable man to act, or that he permits
man's liberty; if God were for a moment to withdraw his power,
man would cease to exist. Is any other reply to this argumenta-
tion possible save this, to transport man with his liberty, which
is inconceivable as in antagonism with omnipotence, into the
divine essence itself, and to say that man does not exist out of God,
but in God, and that his activity constitutes part in the life of
God?"—"Immanency in God and freedom, so far from implying a
contradiction, stand related in such a way, as that only what is
free, and in as far as it is free, is in God, while that which is
not free, and in as far as it is not free, is necessarily without
God."

But all that has been adduced contains as yet no direct demon-
stration that man stands thus actually related to the absolute; for
the above logical deduction merely proved that it is not impossible,
i. e. that it is not incogitable that man may be immanent in the
absolute and at the same time also self-subsistent, while the last-
mentioned quotations contain rather an apagogical than a direct
demonstration, inasmuch as they exhibit only the difficulties of
the ordinary doctrine of freedom, which indeed force us to enter-
tain an opposite view. This view, however, would then present
itself to us only as a postulate, or as an article of belief, for which
we should yet have to find the intelligible form and the solution of
the contradiction.

But apart from such a general logical formula, other and unex-
pected difficulties present themselves, more especially if we endeav-
our to reconcile this philosophical standing-point with the contents
of Christian theology. For, the latter views the freedom of man
at once from the aspect of sinfulness, and when we come to con-

1 Vide ut supra, pp. 403, 415.
template the latter with the assistance of Schelling, the doctrine of the immanency of things in God entangles us in other and yet more unresolvable contradictions, inasmuch as that doctrine seems to stand in conflict with the notorious imperfectness of the world, and especially with the existence of evil, and appears to deify everything, to designate everything as good, and thus wholly to deny all evil.

Here, then, a definite reply to the enquiry with reference to the closer determination of the pantheism could no longer be avoided. So much is evident, that Schelling taught an immanency of the absolute, and, in as far as we term this absolute God, an immanency of God in finite objects, and, hence, in a certain sense, an identity of the creature with God, although not in the sense of their being one and the same; for, even if we conceive, that the eternal power of nature which in itself is unitous pervades all the formations in the world and supports and preserves them as its forms, so that things themselves would be nothing without that power, it is not possible on that account to say, that all things taken together are God, or that the highest being is nothing else but the sum and contents, the collectivum of all existing objects. It must be allowed that, although the absolute being be also those objects and in those objects, it may, in another respect, nevertheless be much more than those objects, viz. spirit, i. e. absolutely rational knowing and willing. Have we not met with the very same thing in the human microcosm? The life-principle of our body and our intelligence together with conscience and reason are not two different souls residing beside each other, but form one and the same principle of personality; and yet, we distinguish it accurately, and often too accurately in its functions, and designate it in the one as spirit, in the other as tendency of life, sensibility, desire, &c. It presents itself and it exists as one and the same, both in the former and in the latter form, but it opposes itself also to itself, as it were in a polar manner, and elevates itself, as has been shewn above, in the process from the stage of blind instinct, up to that of purest reason, without, however, having ceased, even when it has attained to the highest stage, also to act at the same time still as blind instinct.

In the same manner, the absolute also may, in its lower potencies, for example, as light and as gravity, be the supporter or the
substance of the objects of nature, while, at the same time, in its highest potency, in its function of reason cognizant of itself and of freedom, it may also elevate itself above both the world and all creatures, placing the latter over against itself as objects, or placing itself in these objects over against itself. Hence, it is with full meaning that the name of Divinity, which, in the lower potencies, could not be attributed to the absolute, is ascribed to it only when it has attained that climax of spirituality, or in opposition to the creature.

If, therefore, by Pantheism we mean to convey no more than this kind of immanency of things in God, then Schelling's doctrine is indeed pantheistic, nor will the system be ever capable of renouncing that immanency, without at the same time renouncing and surrendering itself. On the other hand, the doctrine of Identity thus modified and more accurately determined is, as has been shewn, no more equivalent to Materialism or Fatalism, than Fichte's doctrine of Identity had been.

At the same time, Schelling's system contains considerable difficulties. For, apart from that first enquiry which is not yet taken up at all, whether a potentiating of that which is lower and more imperfect into that which is higher and more perfect is logically thinkable—it must at once occur, that that immanency of the world in God identifies the world, as to its essence and law, with the all-unitous, and hence with the highest and divine nature, whereby the world is declared absolutely perfect and reasonable,—an inference which is incompatible with the imperfections of men which empirically force themselves upon our notice, with their ills and their sins. Again, if nature has operated at first after a non-forethought manner, as merely (blindly) existent reason, or as nature in itself, and only after a certain process (in man) came to itself as the same reason, and became knowing reason, it follows that the whole system of the world would necessarily transform itself into a logical system of reason, into a purely logical mechanism or rationalism, according to which all being and all becoming existed not otherwise than as law with infallible necessity—an inference which Hegel afterwards followed out; in the last place, notwithstanding the difference which, on the stage of spirituality, may possibly prevail between the absolute and the world, yet the absolute itself is subjected to a process by which it
became the Godhead, which before it had not been; but a God who has become God, or any perfectibility in the Godhead, is a representation of Him against which even our feelings revolt, and which is expressly contradicted by the Christian religion.

If, therefore, Schelling's system is to be perfectly reconciled both with empirical life and religious feeling, if it is to correspond to the aim of philosophy, i.e. if it is to bring about the highest consciousness of the world, and thus to enjoy the triumph of universal conviction, it requires first of all to remove the above three difficulties which are most intimately connected with each other.

It is evident, if this aim is to be attained, that without depotentiating—if we may so express ourselves—the import of the system which had at first become known, it cannot well be presented as part-whole. As yet, its propounder has not condescended to express himself in writing on each of these points; as yet, the first of them only, the existence of evil, has been fully treated by him in his work on human liberty, with which we may compare the treatise which has appeared in 1812, entitled, “Monument of the Treatise on Divine Things.” With reference to the second point, we have his own categorical statement in the preface to a translation of a well-known work of Cousin, in which he declares, that he places his own system as a system of liberty and as a positive and historical doctrine, which goes hand in hand with experience and is in part based upon it, in direct antagonism to that empty logical rationalism, or to the system of necessity into which the commencement of his system, especially his Philosophy of Nature, had been transformed in the hands of Hegel. On the third point, viz. that reason demands a God who has not become God, but one who had originally been conscious, free, or in other words, a personal God, who is also to be looked upon as free Creator of the world—with reference to that point, we say, only the immediate followers of Schelling, especially Beckers, have expressed themselves in significant hints.

But, according to our view, all this shews also that Schel-

1 Victor Cousin, or French and German Philosophy, from the French by Dr Hubert Beckers, with a critical preface by G. Von Schelling, 1834.
2 Vide Dr Hubert Beckers on C. F. Goschel's attempt at proving a personal immortality, &c. Hamburg, 1836. We are only to refer with the greatest caution to that which has of late, since Schelling's appearance in Berlin, been communicated to the public, both in pamphlets and newspapers, both with and without authority.
ling's latest teaching is by no means directly opposed to that which had been formerly known, nor that it may be supposed that it has been reared upon an entirely new foundation; while, indeed, it assigns to the philosophy of nature, a different place and import in the system than that which it seemed to occupy formerly, yet the exposition for which we are still looking, will, if we are not much deceived, be in other respects, as to essentials, only a more scientific carrying out of that which had already been hinted at in some of his writings already published, and especially in his Investigations on Human Liberty, and that in so unmistakeable a manner.

An attempt to combine that, with which we have already become acquainted, with that which has of late been communicated, will therefore not appear presumptuous or anticipating, provided we always keep by that which is most general.
LECTURE THIRTEENTH.

(LATER VIEWS OF SCHELLING.)

In his Treatise on Human Liberty, which, in a speculative point of view, is the fullest work which we possess of Schelling's, dating from his later period or at least from the transition to that period, he says himself (p. 419) by way of summing up and closing his former system:—"A mutual penetrating of Realism and Idealism, such was the distinct purpose of my endeavours. The notion of absolute substance, which appeared in Spinoza as immoveable and lifeless (as it were the yet inanimate image of Pygmalion), obtained a living basis in the higher mode of contemplating nature, and in the recognition of a unity between what is dynamical and what is spiritual. Thus a philosophy of nature was produced which was indeed capable of subsisting by itself as mere Physics, but which was ever considered with reference to the whole of philosophy only as one part of it, and that the realistic one, and which only became capable of being elevated into a proper system of reason, by adding to it the ideal portion in which liberty obtains. It was asserted, that in the latter (in freedom) the last potentiating act was to be sought, by which all nature transforms itself into sensation, into intelligence, and finally into volition. In the last and highest instance, there is no other existence, save willing. Willing is original existence, and all the predicates of that existence apply to it alone, viz. groundlessness, independence of time, and self-affirmation. All philosophy aims only to find that expression."

But it is not enough merely to apprehend the absolute as the universal Me and as free willing, it is as important to shew that
the individual, that natural beings, and especially the individual Me of man, contain also within themselves this liberty as the ground of their own selves. This has already been done above by shewing the identity of the human Me with the absolute original essence.

But the positive essence of human liberty, as it manifests itself in immediate consciousness and in history, consists in this, that it is a faculty of good and of evil; every other idea, for example that of independence, &c. is only negative and informs us in no way about its proper essence. "But this," so says Schelling, "is also the point of deepest difficulty in the whole doctrine of freedom," and, as freedom is in general the positive notion of the essence in itself, it constitutes also in general the greatest difficulty in philosophy; for "it is impossible to understand how a faculty for evil can follow from God, who has to be considered as pure goodness. Hence, the derivation of human liberty from God cannot be a correct one, but it must, at least in as far as it is a faculty for evil, have a root independent from God." If the absolute or the free essence is in general also the immanent essence of things, and especially that of human souls, then one of two things is inevitable, viz. we must either transport evil into the infinite essence, into the substance of the Deity, into the original will itself, which would, however, completely destroy the idea of an all-perfect being, or else we must in general deny the reality of evil, which on the one hand is equally inadmissible and contrary to experience, while on the other it would again destroy the idea of liberty itself. True, some, as for example Leibnitz, do not entirely deny the existence of evil and of moral evil in the world, but they make it to consist only in a privation, in a want of goodness, and in a limitation of our power with reference to it; but this also does not diminish the difficulty, for we would again only be able to trace the ground of such a privation, or of such a limitation in creatures of that which is good, to the universal and original order of the world, and hence to the author of it. In short, in order to account, in beings created by God, for the faculty to a deed whereby God is resisted, another way from that commonly pursued must be taken. After all that had been said above, the immanency of the absolute in the finite may not be surrendered, but that part of the absolute or of the divine, which is immanent in the finite being, cannot be the whole ab-
solute essence of the Deity, nor can it be especially that, which in the absolute peculiarly constitutes that which is divine. But this leads us to a distinguishing something in God himself, which even in him cannot be designated as divine, or to an aspect of the absolute, from which if it be looked upon, itself is not divine; for, "if things are to be separated from God in some manner, and if their immanency is nevertheless to be preserved, then must they have their ground in that which in God is not God himself."

But what, we ask, is that in God which is not himself? or, from what aspect is it, that if the absolute be viewed it is not to be designated as God? This leads us to a new theory of the absolute, or at least to one modified differently from what it had been hitherto, the main features of which are also presented in the above quoted treatise. If we compare and combine with this what is known on this subject from other sources, it may, we venture to state, be accurately enough detailed in the following manner.

In answering the above enquiry it was intended to shew that no evil exists in God, but only in the creature, that moral evil exists in man alone. It is on this ground that the creature-world is to possess a certain kind of independence from God, by which it is to be capable of existing without participating in the will of God, or being obliged to express it only non-spontaneously. In general, only one first original ground, from which everything has proceeded and in which everything persists, can be assumed. This ground was and always requires to be sought in God—we say in God—but God, as he is, is not merely that original ground, but he has that ground within himself and is something else beside it. The world has the same original ground within itself and is that ground, and hence is in that respect the same with God; but the world is also not only that original ground, but something else beside that. Thus we have here two notions: original ground and existence. Hitherto we had only viewed these correlate notions in such a way as that we looked upon the world as the existence of that ground, and upon both together as God, who exists as world; the world was the existence of God himself in time and space; but by this God would—irrespective of his existence, of the world—come to occupy the place of mere ground, which we have found to be insufficient to express the true being of God.
God cannot be mere original ground, mere potence or power, but we have already developed that notion so far as to have been constrained to acknowledge him as freedom, as will, and as spirit; as true Deity, we have found, that in his existence and in actuality he is all that we have now stated. If the world constituted the existent God, it would require to be a thoroughly spiritual and perfect being, which can at least not be said with reference to our present world. Let us therefore, in the meantime, lay aside the existence and the character of this present world, and let us follow out the theory of the existence of God, by himself and as Deity, so that we may see whether we are able to find in it a point or a source from which to derive the existence of the world, without at the same time identifying it with the existent Deity.

"As nothing exists before or without God, says Schelling (p. 429), it follows that he must have the ground of his existence within himself; but this ground is not God, absolutely considered, i.e. in as far as he exists;" for the former is only the ground for God's existence and not yet at the same time that existence itself, although neither of the two can be conceived without the other, and the two mutually presuppose each other, so that with respect to time neither a priorus nor a posterius takes place. "But if the world is to be different from God, it would follow that the world must have arisen from a ground different from God; but as nothing can possibly exist without the absolute (which is in God), this contradiction can only be resolved by stating that the world has its ground in that mere original ground, which, while it is the ground of the divine existence, might also become that of things."

If with reference to that ground, with which we had become already acquainted under the name of absolute potence or of nature (naturans), we wish "to bring it nearer to us men, we may say, that it is the longing which that which is eternally one feels, to give birth to itself. Hence, considered by itself, it is also volition, but volition in which there is no understanding, and on that account neither self-subsistent, nor perfect volition," a nature which has not yet perceived itself and its destination in the consciousness; it is a blind tendency. "We refer, however, to the essence of longing considered in and by itself, which requires to be accurately looked at, although it has a long time ago been set aside by that higher which has risen from it, and although we are
not capable of apprehending it sensuously, but only by the mind and by thoughts,” i.e. abstractly and in one-sided separation and isolation from its necessary correlate—for a ground by itself can only be kept hold of in thought, in an abstract manner, in actuality it always appears together with and in its consequence, in existence. If this ground or tendency has manifested itself, if it has passed over into activity, it has manifested itself in its deed (in that which exists) and then it can, as subject and object, also become the unity of the two, or spirit and consciousness. But considered in itself, and irrespective of this existence, this ground or tendency is to be looked upon as that which is destitute of understanding, the same as the material In-itself in things, “the incomprehensible basis of reality, the remainder which can never disappear; that which, notwithstanding the greatest endeavours, can never be resolved into understanding, but always remains as the ground.” “Every birth is a birth from darkness into light; the seed must be concealed in the ground, and there die in darkness, in order that the fair luminous formation may spring and develop itself in the rays of the sun. Man is formed in the maternal womb, and it is only from out of the darkness of that which is destitute of understanding (from feeling, from longing, the glorious mother of cognition) that the luminous thoughts spring.”

Such then is the eternal progress of nature from darkness to light, from that which is undecided into separation, from the germ to its development. Thus have we first of all “a dark ground,” which we may consider as the common root both of the Deity and of the world, and which in itself will be neither of the two, i.e. neither actual Deity nor actual world; from which therefore it would be possible to deduce something which on that account would not necessarily be derived from the Deity itself.

In “the monument” which we consult in the first instance, the question is propounded to those philosophers who wish to affirm a divine intelligence and a moral volition alone and without any real ground, as at the top of the whole, “and as preceding everything,” whether that pure intelligence is also to precede the intelligence in God; whether a mere intelligence so empty and bare is capable to depend upon itself, or to exist as mere intelligence, “inasmuch as thinking is the exact antagonism of ea-
istence, and as the latter is what is full and thick, so the former, as it were, what is thin and empty. But that which is the commencement of an intelligence (within itself), cannot be itself intelligent, or else there would be no distinction; again, on the other hand, it cannot be entirely non-intelligent, just because it is the possibility of an intelligence. Hence it will occupy an intermediate position, i.e. it will act with wisdom, but as it were with innate, instinctive, blind, and not yet conscious wisdom, just as we often witness that men when excited give utterance to statements which are full of understanding, although they are not uttered with thought and consciousness, but as it were by inspiration.¹ We recognise here once more that which is absolutely identical, the Really-Ideal, as it is previous to any development, or as it requires to be presupposed previous to everything that has become, as that which is to be separated, or which is and which wishes to separate itself, but which on that very account requires to be first presented as being not yet decided, an existence which requires to be affirmed before all that which actually differs, and previous to which nothing else can be conceived, and which on that very account is now designated by Schelling with the term of "unpreconceivable,"² (unvordenklich—that previous to which it is impossible to conceive anything.)

But this unpreconceivable precedes not only all the real differences which have proceeded from it or are affirmed in it, but it anticipates even thinking itself; it is that which is positive and existent, and which all the endeavours of thinking cannot resolve into thinking; it is that which is originally existent. It is not a product of thinking, or in other words, it is not a creature of the intellect, just because it is not possible to affirm the thinking intellect as existing previous to it; on the contrary, it is uncreated, eternal, and existent at the same time with the thinking spirit. Nay more, in our psychological course of thinking, we have rather to apprehend thinking as proceeding from that existence than to derive that existence from a creative intelligence. In short, this existence is affirmed in God together with God, it is as much the real aspect or the original ground of God as it is also

¹ Amongst others Ch. II. Weisse has directed attention to that absolute ground in his treatise: The Philosophical Problem of our Days. Leipzig, 1842.
² Vide Monument of the Treatise, &e. p. 84.
capable of becoming the ground of the world; hence, although not itself God, it is divine, and it is capable of becoming the ground of a world, although itself is not already necessarily that world. Hence it has to be looked upon as the material possibility, the potence, of a creation in God, and will by virtue of its nature (the immediate Identity of Reality and Ideality) experience the longing to become that which it is capable, and which it ought to become, a longing, we say, which is not to be attributed to God as God—that eternal being who is above all—but only to that which in God is not God. That potential Ideal-reality or ideally-real potentiality, that ground full of longing, may therefore be now again designated by Schelling as the instinctively prevailing, apocryphal wisdom which as it were plays before God, and which, so to speak, shews to God the possibility of a creation which he afterwards freely resolves upon; only it is difficult to understand on what logically necessary ground we require in such a case to assume in God along with that realistic ground also an eternal intelligence, if that realistic ground is capable of being by itself and alone creative potence, without the activity of the intelligence being therein called for. Has it nothing else to do in the matter but to look on?

All we have to do, continues Schelling, is to exhibit in its process of becoming "that play of wisdom," or the genesis of the world of ideas, in which God perceives the prototypes of creation, the whole scale of species, while at the same time we keep the Deity, as that which is above all, separate from that process, although it is taking place in God himself, in the ground of the Deity, and although in the special sense he is only God by it, becomes God the Father. This original ground full of life is, however, not to be confounded with the Father himself, inasmuch as this ground is only the begetting potence—the σπέυσα τοῦ Ἱανό. This process takes place in God and for him; God is indeed the ultimate ground and the ultimate design of it, but this real region in God has at the same time its own life.

It is this process which Schelling now seeks to make intelligible by his more recent "Doctrine of Potence," which, if we rightly understand it, is to occupy the place of a general theory of cog-

1 Universal Gazette by Germans and for Germans, I. i. p. 94
nition of the absolute, such as is to lie at the foundation. The Philosophy of Nature had hitherto occupied that place in the latest systematics. But this philosophy of nature, as Schelling himself had before exhibited and published it as the first part of his system, received thereby an amphibological meaning, and it was difficult to understand whether it was really to exhibit pan-
theistically the originating process and the essence of actual nature, the potentiating itself of \textit{natura bruta} up to the absolute spirit, whether it was meant that God originated from nature; or whether that exposition had indicated only the development, the psychological procedure of subjective thinking, which is looked upon as logically necessary, by which thinking was at last to ob-
tain possession of the idea of the absolute, but which, when it had once arrived at what was the true positive beginning and original source of real creation, was again to be thrown down, as it were, like a scaffolding in order to progress from that unpreconceivable to a theory of free creation. So said Schelling. Hegel on the contrary was and remained of an opposite opinion.

Before entering into the exposition of the latest system of Schelling, we require to explain and to separate it from Hegel's way of apprehending the philosophy of nature, and that as Schelling himself has detailed it.\footnote{\textit{Fide} Victor Cousin, &c. p. 13.} "That philosophy"—so says he,—"to which of late it has been most distinctly objected that it accords with the views of Spinoza (\textit{i.e.} the philosophy of Schelling) had in its infinite subject-object, \textit{i.e.} in the absolute subject, which by virtue of its nature objectivises itself (becomes object), but again comes victoriously out of every objectivity (finiteness) and only goes back into a higher potency of subjectivity, until at last, after having exhausted all its possibility (of becoming objective) it re-
ains as subject victorious over all; in this, we say, philosophy possessed indeed a principle of necessary progression. But if that which is purely rational, and only not to be not thought, is \textit{pure} subject, then \textit{that} subject which ascending in the manner supposed, progresses from every objectivity only to a higher sub-
jectivity, the subject with \textit{that} determination is no longer merely the not to be conceived, the purely rational, but this very deter-
mination was \textit{empirical} and forced on this philosophy by a living apprehension of actuality, or by the necessity of securing to itself
the means of progressing. One who has appeared of late (Hegel) has removed this empirical by substituting in room of what is living and actual, and to which former philosophy had attributed the property of going over into its antagonism (the object) and of returning from it again unto itself, the logical notion to which by the strangest fiction or hypostatising he has attributed a similar necessary self-movement.—He was obliged to preserve the principle of movement, for without it, it was impossible to go on, but he changed its subject; as already stated, the logical notion became that subject, and it was the first assumption of a philosophy, which pretended to assume nothing, that this pure logical notion possessed as such the property or the character, (for the subjectivity of him who philosophised, was to be wholly excluded) of itself to pass over into its antagonism, in order then to pass back again into itself; a supposition which may be made with reference to what is living and actual, but which can neither be conceived nor imagined, but only asserted with reference to the mere notion.—This attempt to return to the standing point of Scholasticism with the notions of a realistic philosophy which had already been far developed (for it had been continued ever since the days of Des Cartes) and to commence metaphysics with a purely rational notion, which excluded every thing empirical, although the latter had itself not been found or rightly cognized, and the empirical, which had at the outset been set aside, was again introduced by the back-door of the idea becoming otherwise, or becoming untrue to itself; this episode in the history of modern philosophy, if it has not served to develop it any farther it has at least served to shew anew, that it is impossible to get at actuality with what is purely rational. Just as all those forms, which are designated as a priorical, properly include only what is negative in all cognition, (that, without which, any cognition is impossible), and not that which is positive, (that by which it originates), and as thus the character of universality and necessity, which they bear, exhibits itself as being only a negative one, so also can we recognise in that absolute Prius, which, as the entirely universal and necessary (as that which is everywhere not, and which in nothing is, not to be thought), can only be that which is itself existent (aorò τι ὑπ’), merely that which is negatively universal, that without which nothing exists, but not that by which some-
thing exists. But if the latter is enquired for, i.e. if the positive cause of everything is enquired for, and hence positive science also, it is easy to perceive that it is impossible to attain the positive beginning (which, however, contains within itself the negative one) either in the way of empiricism alone (for this does not reach as far as the notion of the universal essence, which notion by virtue of its nature is à priorical and only possible in pure thinking) nor in the way of rationalism (which on the other hand is not capable of going beyond the mere necessity of thinking)."

But to those things which require to be added to the à-priorical thinking, continues Schelling, neither an empirical psychology belongs nor an empiricism, such as the French and the greater part of Germans have hitherto come to understand it, viz. a sensationalism and a system which denies everything universal and necessary in human cognition; but an empiricism taken in that highest sense in which it may be said that the true God is not the mere universal essence, but at the same time also a particular or an empirical being. In the same manner, a uniting of the two will then also take place, in a sense in which it could not hitherto have been conceived, into one and the same notion from which, as common source, both the highest law of thinking, all the secondary laws of thinking, and the principles of all the negative, or, as they are termed, of the pure rational sciences are derived, as well as on the other hand, the positive contents (matter) of the highest science, which alone properly (sensu proprio) deserves that designation.

We could not avoid making this long extract, inasmuch as, besides it, we possess no other authentic document of Schelling's with reference to his later views, wherein he expresses himself with equal decision about the whole essence of philosophy, and its position both towards empiricism and towards science viewed as a whole. That which at the conclusion is designated as science properly so called, is positive philosophy itself, while that part which is to precede it and which is to derive all the principles of the pure rational sciences from one common source, is, to appearance, a universal theory of cognition or doctrine of science.

But the confession expressed in the commencement of the passage we have quoted, appears to us specially remarkable, bearing as it does that the assumption of a pure subject without or rather in the formally rational movement of thinking, is "an empirical
determination to which we are forced by the necessity of securing to ourselves the means of progressing;" doubtlessly it is termed empirical, because that postulate, which was indeed made by rational thinking, could not be satisfied by it, and was fulfilled by "the living apprehension of actuality," in which postulate the living, that immediate, came forward as positive principle.

If we now attempt, ourselves to follow on in that wake for a little, it appears to us that Schelling felt it first of all an obstacle in his way, that if we have a purely rational system, i. e. a system of metaphysics like that of Hegel, which exhibits a series of categories, which are in the first place indeed the forms of the understanding or of reason, i. e. the way and the mode of thinking which has been derived from a thinking which reflects upon itself, while afterwards they are also at the same time objectively to be the forms and modes of existence—inasmuch as thinking is looked upon as identical with existence, and hence are not to be mere subjective categories of the understanding, as Kant had it, but at the same time are also to be viewed as the categories of nature, and "in fine" of the spirit, "in summa" of the universe, and are thus at the same time to indicate the species of essences themselves—we say that such a system of metaphysics or of objective logic would soon prove that it was impossible to progress from a lower category to a higher one, or to develop with necessity one notional sphere from another.1 If a whole notion or the idea of the species is once present in our thinking, either as given or as presupposed, it is indeed possible to fill it up with those determinations which are necessary to it, or to fill up the logical circuit with logical contents (material), as the latter consists only of those necessary conditions, which cannot be not thought, under which that total, the species, may be affirmed; but this logical procedure does not conduct us beyond that given generic notion, and if a higher notion were to take place, it would again require to be given, or else to be produced in some other way by means of some other method than that rationalistically-logical, which Hegel designates as the dialectic method. In order, therefore, to arrive at the Supreme, the Supreme must already exist in some way or other

1 Journal of Medicine, vol. i. No. 1, § 51. "There is no such thing as an ascending of cognition to God, but only an immediate cognizing."
à priori in the reason, it must exist potentialiter; reason must "à priori be in possession of the absolute Prins." We shall afterwards, when treating of Hegel's Phenomenology, have occasion to return to this point. Meantime we only call attention to the fact that this explains why reason is designated, in the system of Schelling, as a mere faculty of cognizing and not as a faculty of knowing, and how, according to this fundamental view, it is necessary to say that the reason of the different ages must have first elevated itself realiter from stage to stage, or rather that it must have been realiter elevated and set free, ere, reflecting upon itself, it could have apprehended itself as that which it is at present; again that a real, a historical process, one that takes place in itself, was requisite, if that which barely exists is successively to become manifest to itself as something higher in knowledge. It will easily be seen that in this manner, a momentum of experience or a momentum of immediate is received into the philosophical development, and that one which neither is nor can be found in a purely logical "rationalism." We do not indeed mean to say that we shall on that account have to stop short with Schelling at that discovery, to make immediately use of it as a proof of the impotency of the pure science of reason in general, simply point out the necessity of such a complement of science and at once receive and elaborate the latter. We may, on the other hand, be induced by this discovery to entertain the hope to find in reason itself another and a more comprehensive method, to find in it, we say, a power of genesis, so that after all it would be capable freely to develop itself out of itself, only in another way and from another principle than that which had hitherto been assumed. We shall see that Hegel's intention was in the direction of that genesis; it is another question whether the method which he found out is sufficient for it, and whether the principle laid at the foundation, viz. the identity of thinking and of being is a correct one—nor shall we enter at present on this subject. If, as Schelling critically characterizes it, it is really only negative, and does not get beyond the logical necessity, then Schelling would indeed be right in stating, that, even after Hegel, "philosophy had yet to anticipate a great revolution, which will, on the one hand, afford a positive explanation of actuality, without, on the other hand, withdrawing from reason its grand right,
viz. that of being in possession of the absolute Prius, even of that of the Deity.”¹

In the same manner Schelling declares now also, that reason or thinking by itself and alone, without empiricism, is indeed capable of apprehending the notions or the essence (essentia) of all things, even of the highest being or of the Deity—the quomodo aliquid sit—, but not actual existence (existentia); that it always apprehends only that which may be and how it may be, but not that it is, quod sit; the latter must always somehow or other be given, and even the supreme being must give or reveal himself to us, if we are to be certain of his existence: à priori, we cannot prove from our thinking that God exists, but only conversely that that which exists is divine; and the question is then raised, how and in how far, that which exists is God himself or else is not God himself, and only that in God which is not God. As soon as we say of a being that it exists, we interrupt thereby the continuity of our thinking and of this existence; there is then no longer any identity of thinking and of that existence; hence, thinking or the notion can in no manner reach the existence of the object itself; on the contrary, it would immediately destroy it, if it were to identify its act of thinking with the being of that object. Hence rational thinking serves only for proving the possible capability or non-capability of being, the objective possibility, but not the actuality—a proposition by which Schelling retraces his steps towards Kant, although we may not on that account say that he has thereby thrown himself into the arms of subjectivism; it would rather seem only to be the necessary consequence of a system which will not be entirely pantheistic.

Let us, after this digression, return once more to the system under consideration, and first of all to the doctrine of potence, which is not a new doctrine of nature, but belongs rather to theology, and is to render it intelligible, how, from all eternity a real momentum had existed in God, in union with the spiritual one. This real and existent is affirmed as the Prius, not indeed as to time, but in the logically dialectic construction. For, existence is that with which we have to begin and which cannot be

¹ Vide Victor Cousin, &c. p. xviii.
preceded by anything, not even by thinking, as existence can proceed from nothing else — neither from non-existence nor from thinking, nor from any mere potence. It cannot proceed from thinking, for it precedes every thought, and hence is that which is "unpreconceivable;" if we are to think, something must exist which is to think. But again, this existence is not the abstract eleatic iv or ὀ, it is not the materia prima which would only be the potence of existence, so that, with reference to existence, the mere potence of existence would exist, an assertion which is not cogitable. On the contrary, existence must be presupposed, and that from the very beginning; an existence with all its modes like the substance in Spinoza's philosophy. This direct and immediate existence which had never previously existed potentia, is that which exists actually and purely unpreconceivably, in actu puro existentiae. It has not been produced by a notion that was existent, but is original in the strictest sense; it is what Divines term the ascitas; but it does not yet come up to the full idea of God; another momentum is requisite for this, viz. that this existence includes also the potence; the latter is not to be left out, and has to be affirmed together with the existence, but not before it. The fact that it cannot be affirmed previous to existence, does not prevent its being affirmed subsequent to it; the idea of existence is not in opposition to that addition, although it does not necessarily require it. Common negative philosophy commences with potence, with that which as yet is not existent and only possible; but such a potence cannot be affirmed, nor can it be retained; it must immediately pass over into existence actu, it cannot be conceived without the latter, although existence can be affirmed without it. Hence, such a potence, if affirmed as principle, appears as non-free, while existence does not appear such. We are able simpliciter to affirm an existence which contains a potence within itself in an undeveloped manner, for that which is possible may be affirmed as not yet existential in and along with something that exists, but not by itself and alone as the bare existing of mere possibility. Hence, says Schelling, necessary logical thinking à priori or negative philosophy constrains us indeed to acknowledge that the absolute has to be affirmed as existing without any beginning, but not to attribute to it a potence awakening within it; this is in the meantime only a hypothesis which may afterwards be confirmed on other grounds:
it is only logically possible but not necessary; we can only proceed to it from the first thesis and by "free thinking;" "positive philosophy does not proceed by necessary thinking." (Thus, if we mistake not, Schelling expresses himself, and we understand him to mean that while there is no necessary progress from that which is more abstract and lower, to that which is more concrete and higher, there is such a progress from the latter to the former, inasmuch as these constitute its presuppositions; but Schelling seems to require an empirical ground à posteriori for that ascending.)

Again, if existence has, as we assume, received into itself the potence of its own self, it now appears as the first A in the second potence (A²). Thus the first existence becomes the power of its own self, potentia potentiae, for the possibility to pass from actual existence into mere potence constitutes true potentiality and liberty; that which exists acto may now either continue in its (first) existence, or it may from out of it return into mere potence in itself; there is nothing now to force a passage into existence, as it had been the case when we attempted to affirm potence in the first place. That which exists has already in its existence a firm resting-point, such as it requires for its capability, and it can now pass into potence or not. This possibility exhibits to that, which eternally exists, an existence or rather another mode of existence, which it may will and choose; but thereby that first existence becomes now also an existence that is willed, such as formerly it had not been, and this other existence appears as something accidental, which may or may not exist. While potence shews to that which is held in pure existence the object of a possible volition, the former becomes conscious of itself, as Lord (master) of an existence which as yet is not, and at the sametime becomes thereby free from the state of unpreconceivable existence, over which it is Lord, or gets free from itself.

But what is that other merely possible existence which presents itself to the Eternal? Let us term it B in distinction from the first and pure existence A, which is thereby now no longer merely pure existence, but is in possession of existence = A²; it is essence, and this only is that which natura sua is necessary; as such it can only be apprehended in opposition to what is accidental. On the other hand the existence of B will in the meantime be only something possible and accidental, i.e. something which also might not be;
it is the former alone which is what is termed the ens necessarium, the latter is the contingens. Necessary existence could not manifest itself to be necessary existence as long as it was unpreconceivable existence. It is only capable of thus manifesting itself in connection with what is accidental; but it requires to prove itself, and that as necessary. It is a general law that nothing is to remain undecided; but it is the law of the Deity itself, and appears only external to it so long as the Deity itself is yet conceived as pure existence. But with reference to time we are not to conceive it in this manner, but the eternal being sees himself from all eternity (without any time) as a capability of being by his mere volition; that affirmation was merely a thought of the moment. Hence it is in reality the will which is what is first, and thus the momenta are reversed in their order of rank; blind existence manifests itself as what is impotent, that which is capable of existing as that which is positive and which constitutes the principle. This being capable of existing which is elevated above both, contains the power of God and the true idea of God; it is only thereby that he has elevated himself into his idea, and that he is that which is above all, spirit. Thus he is A³. It is this third possibility of existence which manifests itself to him as that which should exist, as the final design and the self aim of the whole. God is that all surpassing and free spirit, who elevates himself even above that in which he is spirit, who is not bound even to himself as spirit (to the form of spirituality or of thinking), who looks upon himself as spirit also only as a potence of himself. This is that which truly is above all, God; it stands related as notion to what is the actus purus of what is existent, but it does not precede the latter—existence precedes it. When that which exists unpreconceivably elevates itself to that which naturâ suâ is necessary, it elevates itself into its idea; it becomes that which it ought to be; this only is God, which as essence does not stand in need of existing. To be Lord over one's existence constitutes the idea of personality—to be Lord over all existence constitutes the idea of absolute personality. We have to conceive the Deity as such from the very beginning. From all eternity God perceived himself Lord to suspend his unpreconceivable existence, in order that by means of a necessary process it might become self-willed and thereby only divine existence.
Thus, then, we have a personal Deity above and before any actual world, a God who does not stand in need of the world, in order to attain therein to existence and to self-consciousness. But in the above we have, with reference to the world, only shewn its possibility and not its actuality; its possibility lies as yet shut up and concealed in God. What, we may now ask, could have induced God to let this possibility become actuality, i.e. to create the world? We answer, it was not on his own account, nor because of the necessity of a logical process, nor yet was it with the necessity of a blind physical process; for God knows beforehand what will take place, and does not require to be only informed about it. On the other hand, we may not represent creation to ourselves in the ordinary manner, as a placing of the world from out of the idea into actuality. In truth, creation consists in a process in God, viz. in the suspension and the successive restoration of the existence which is actu necessary; between these two momenta lies the world. God does not divest himself into the world; he does not become the world,—those only are constrained to assume this who conceive that he had before only existed in himself or potentia, as to the notion. He elevates himself rather out of the world into his divinity, he suspends his world-existence and returns into himself; before, as actu necessary existence, he had been so divested. However, at the same time, God does not suspend his actus in order to come to himself: this he is already—but from an objective ground, viz. in order to let an existence, different from himself, attain to existence in the place of the first existence. Thereby accidental existence enters into actuality, and we have here again to remember that which had above been affirmed as B; to this B, to the potence, existence is accorded by the will of God for this purpose, that an accidental existence, different from himself, may in the last instance be wholly penetrated by the necessary existence. This B has to be conceived as pure potence, i.e. as spontaneity or as volition, which was at first different from the understanding and a formless tendency of the will opposed to it: it is only potentialiter understanding, and hence it always requires more and more to potentiate itself from blind volition into understanding; it is the potence of life, as in the very beginning in God; it is the potence of divine life. It was within the option of the Deity, who was Lord of all the
three potencies, to let the manifold positions, which these might occupy towards each other, pass by way of trial and in image (in the idea or the vision) before himself. This B, as it were, as a possibility playing before him (Maya, Mater, world-nurse, Materialia) presented itself to him as potence of a blind existence, as natura naturans, to him we say as the Creator, bringing about his knowledge of a world, yet future. At first, void of consciousness, it returns by and bye gradually into itself, comprehends itself together to internal potentiality, and thus becomes at last for itself, self-conscious, or understanding. Owing to this its purpose, it is designated in the Proverbs of Solomon as Chochma, or wisdom. Just as even in God we require to place pure existence previous to intelligence, so here also and everywhere consciousness can only arise from that which is unconscious, and God himself cannot produce anything that is immediately conscious. Light produces itself only out of the bosom of darkness; an understanding which has actually become, has for its beginning that which is destitute of understanding. (We may, however, observe, that this seems directly to contradict the canon formerly propounded, that that which is higher cannot be deduced from that which is lower.) In its lower stages nature takes (bears) only the impress (stamp) of understanding, in man understanding has as such fully burst through, it has become actu that which blind existence had formerly been only potentiâ.

Hence the design of the process lay in this, and it was on this account that such a rational existence might be produced which might, together with God, know about its existence—it was on account of such a knowing which would know along with him, and hence in order to see himself known and acknowledged by something else,—it was only on this ground that God could have willed and instituted the actual process which is termed the creation of the world, but which is nothing else than a suspension of the immediately immanent activity of God in that, which in him is not himself, while he himself stands as causa causarum above the world-process in such a manner, as that the latter, or the actuality of nature, consists only in a tension of the three potencies towards each other, as a plurality of causes. God had these within himself even before creation, but he was the one who acted in them; they had not been placed freely in activity towards each
other. Hence the actuality of the world or creation consists in letting the separation and tension of the potencies come forward out of the unity of the original projection. God himself has, as it were, stepped back, and stands now negatively related towards them: he is, indeed, that without which they could not even now exist, but they are now that which positively operates, as spontaneous powers. That this becoming actual of the world has taken place we know à posteriori, inasmuch as we apprehend ourselves in an actual world; but it cannot be deduced with logical necessity, it is not a necessary act of the absolute, and can hence, as in general every free action, not be comprehended à priori, but is certain because we see before us such an actual nature which progresses through middle stages and develops itself into spirituality. Hence, as already stated, the motive of God in creating is this, that while he knew himself as the Lord of existence, there was yet something wanting to him, viz. the becoming known; this desire to become known constitutes a grand characteristic of all higher natures; and hence we need not hesitate to attribute this requirement to the Deity, who in himself is without requirement. The purpose for which God had willed the above exhibited process is, that the potence placed without him might, along with himself, become cognisant about all creation.

If for a moment we may venture to interrupt this exposition, we may take the opportunity of expressing our assent to this last idea of Schelling, viz. to this, that, undeniably penetrating beyond the limits of his former philosophy of nature, he now seems to feel that the ultimate key to the enigma of the world is not to be sought in the physically and blindly operating laws, nor in the categories of nature, but in the ethical categories of liberty. Evidently (what is usually, although unsuitably, termed) moral necessity occupies now the place of physical necessity; for the requirement to know one's self acknowledged by others is, beyond doubt, an ethical motive, and can only take place in a personality; it would imply a contradiction with the idea of a personality, although not with that of a physical perfectness of power, if that which is conscious of itself and acknowledges itself, should or would not have others also to acknowledge it. At the same time, we cannot suppress the remark, that even this ethical category, viz. that of personality of right and of ego-city, does not yet constitute
the highest category, capable of setting in motion and concluding the process. Even this feeling of ego-city in the best acceptation, which in itself is warranted, is not yet the volition of truth in itself, which is absolute and perfectly free from requirement; it is not yet perfectly disinterested love, for it does not will the creature, the object, for the sake of that object itself; its purpose is not yet a purely objective purpose; as yet it has only its self-satisfaction in view, and the creature is to serve as the means of it; it is to become the throne upon which the glory of the Deity is to be raised. But this does not yet imply the ultimate and perfected bestowal of freedom on the human personality; and the more the latter remains a mere means, the more also is the Deity yet bound to means and hence non-free, and remains such, because the will of the Deity as yet binds itself down (connects itself) only to the purpose of power, and indeed here of potentiated power, viz. of acknowledged power. The latter must indeed remain in the ground undestroyed (in potentii), although acknowledgment and certainty of being acknowledged, as without such a certainty and truthfulness of personality the third also would be impossible, viz. the volition of truth, which absolutely affirms objectively the purpose, or wise love; yet still this third must be added, or rather, as final purpose of the whole, it must have lain at the foundation as being the first, if everything which has to be solved, when we speak of the purpose of the world, is to be solved perfectly, clearly and satisfactorily. We may scarcely have another opportunity of bringing forward these remarks in a connection of thoughts so well adapted to place them in their proper light as this passage, in which Schelling himself leads us so closely to the point to which we have here referred. We plead this as excuse for the interruption of our exposition, of which we now resume the thread.

Schelling distinguishes this world-process with its potencies, which takes place in God, from God himself, and on that account the first potency is not yet to be confounded with God the Father; it is only the begetting principle in him—the natura gignens; in the same manner, the second potency is indeed the Son, but not immediately and only after the first potency, matter, has been subjected, conquered and brought into form by the second, and, as it were, has expired—finally, the Spirit is the third potency, which as
the final purpose in the whole process, as that which properly was to become and to exist, had been all along in view as final purpose. These three potencies are the Elohim, from all eternity, and not created, but as persons they are only actual after the completion of the process in which the original imaginative or pre-mundane and immanently divine world was contained, inasmuch as it contains within itself in definite succession of stages all ideas or generic notions. Hence this harmonical world was produced by the co-operation of the three potencies, and in it the potencies are intertwined in an harmonical manner; they surrounded those contents, and were maintained by it in their harmonical relationship. But the sum and contents of all the potencies of nature, the totality of all the genera, and that in perfect organization and unity—such we all know is man. Hence that sum of contents was and may be termed man in general, Admon Kadmon, as it were, surrounded and hedged about by the potencies—in paradise—himself destined to preserve the potencies in that subordination and harmony which ought to prevail. Hence God, the three potencies of nature and man, all in harmonical unity, such was the first creation, which may not be confounded with the present order or rather disorder of things. Such a representation renders a monotheism possible, and that one which alone deserves the name of a true monotheism. Neither Theism nor Pantheism alone can be designated as such; for, if viewed accurately, both of them come to one and the same thing. If the Theist says: there is only one God, he affirms always at the same time in thought also a world, which is not God, but he leaves their relationship wholly undetermined; thus without observing it, the world becomes wholly independent in that system, yea, and becomes itself an absolute—a God by itself; and thus we have then two Gods side by side with each other; but again this duality is denied in this vicious theistic monotheism, and hence the two melt inevitably into one, and we have a pantheism. Again pantheism, especially as we find it in the case of Spinoza, constitutes one momentum of the Deity, viz. substance or blind existence, into the whole of the Godhead; but according to our exhibition, the universe is indeed in and with God only one, or God as substance is only one; but a true monotheism alone opens up to us the proper understanding; we only mean to say by it, that beside the true and sole God none else is
God in the same sense, we only mean to set aside Dualism or Tritheism or Polytheism in the common sense, the multiplication of what is one and the same notion; but we do not by any means assert that God is in general the purely sole being and that there is nothing beyond him, or (and this amounts to the same thing) that every thing that exists is God, whereby pantheism would be affirmed, inasmuch as while admitting many existences, we would then conceive them only as themodi existendi of the one. This identification arises only, if we do not distinguish that which in God is God, from that which in God is not God; in the first sense God is the sole, but everything which God is (in the second and wider acceptance) is not that God (in the first acceptance). With reference to the universe, the total, we have indeed to say that it is the one, and that this one is Divine, or that it is God in the wider acceptance of the term; but we must progress from that which eternally exists to distinctions within him, and then say that something is therein which by itself is God. As has already been stated, we are unable in thinking to progress from the idea of that true God to the other universal existence, we only succeed in the reverse, and attain from unconceivable existence to the idea of God. And here lies the characteristic difference between the positive and the negative philosophy, for while the former progresses from existence (Existentia) as that which is to be altogether presupposed, to the notions of thinking, the negative philosophy endeavours to attain from thinking to existence, or, as Kant had expressed it, it endeavoured to pick out existence from mere notion. Negative philosophy was necessary, so to say, it was requisite to carry it to its extreme, in order to render the necessity of a positive foundation evident, and to manifest itself as merely negative. Hence it is only to be looked upon as historical pro-paedeutics for positive philosophy; it is only the ascending or regressive portion of the road upon which human thinking had to enter; once arrived at the top, we must now take hold of the positive principle, we must seize on it in order to possess it, we must wish to possess it, nor can it be infused into rationalistic thinking; once more it must be seized in order to get from it further, as it were, down on the road to empirical actuality. But this coming back and returning is not a treading again of the same stations or of the same series of categories by which we
had ascended; for in that case we should arrive at the absurd result that God creates man, and that then created man causes the animals, that the animals cause the plants, and the plants caused the ground to proceed, &c. No—from those principles we have now to follow on the historical road and to keep it in view, that the gap, which exists between the accredited commencements of the history of the world (of historical time) and those premundane commencements, be filled up, and that the whole process of evolution is to become one connected history, comprehensible and explanatory of everything, even of present nature and of the constitution of the world.

But as on account of the whole constitution of the empirical world, but especially on account of the evil and the sin in it, it is impossible to declare this present world identical with the God-immanent and eternal creation—as on the contrary the present world exhibits the most unmistakeable traces of a violent disturbance and of a course of events which only gradually leads back to the old order, and that both in the province of nature and in that of history, it is evident that even on these grounds we should be constrained to assume a violent subversion of that divine original world; and even though it be impossible to demonstrate it as unconditioned necessity—and in general this logical reign of constraint is here at an end—yet have we in it the only means, to effect not only the actual freedom of creature-man, but also the true free personality of those premundane potencies, the realization of their personality as such.

Such a subversion therefore, which may in the last instance lead to what is good and to what should be, will not have to be looked upon either as willed by God or as brought about by God, but at the same time, as being a means to an end, it will not have to be viewed as not willed by him. There is a vast difference between that which is evil and that which is only that which is not good; the former is that which should altogether not exist and which hence ought never to have attained to existence; the latter again is only that which is not yet that which should be, or the final purpose itself. Such then was that revolution which took place, not indeed against the will of God, but neither by the will of God; it did not proceed from God as God, it was not willed by him but neither was it not willed, in other words, it was allowed, because
he perceived in it the possibility of final good. There is in God also that irony which brings forth from a deed the opposite of that which had been intended—for his thoughts are not our thoughts, and the thoughts of man were not his thoughts, when that universio took place by the original man, by which that which was all-one, unum, became a versusum and a perversum. For, Adam destined to be the preserver of the paradisiacal life-unity which was bound together in him, sought notwithstanding after a free relationship by himself towards God; it was sufficient for him to know himself as capable, in order also to do that which he was able to do, viz. to disturb the relationship of the potencies; he wanted to be for himself, and hence excited the first potence from that ground in which as supporter, as substance, as \( \pi\tau\sigma\nu\epsilon\iota\mu\nu\sigma\nu \) it had been held down in him, and actuated it again to an \( \textit{actus purus} \); if this had perfectly succeeded and if God had allowed it, creation and man himself would have been wholly annihilated. But God would not have this and prevented it by his will, which, however, in this case could not be a direct, but only an indirect volition, for God could properly only continue to act negatively, \( i.e. \) with his non-will, in this disturbance. Thus man placed the potencies again into strife or tension; he himself, who had excited within himself the original ground, lost the dominion (of the spirit) over himself and over the potencies of nature. Of this immediate dominion he was deprived by the "fall," but, as we shall see, only in order to attain through it by means of a struggle to true glory, from an unmerited to a merited free glory.

The second potence is the Son, but now in his humiliation; he has now to contend with the first potence, which has become unbounded, with matter, he is the world's soul, whose it is anew to organize this material, but also by this gradual subjection again to bring himself to himself, to spiritualize and to personify himself. He is the Logos active in the world, even before the appearing of Jesus, but then in his ecstatic being; he has again to bring back into its limit, into the ground, the power of the first potence which has been given over to him in order to be conquered, and thus in the last instance again to give up to the Father this power committed to him, all which, according to Holy Writ, he executes with free obedience. This perfect bringing back will only have been executed at the end of the world; but
mankind has already passed through the first period, the pre-Christian, even down to the decision of the victory, yea, and through part of the post-Christian period also, and it progresses in the latter towards the perfected reign of the Spirit, towards a universal kingdom of God, which as yet is in the distant future.

Hence the history of the world divides itself into those two great sections of time, viz. before and after the manifestation of the Son; its deepest understanding consists in apprehending that manifestation and the mythological process in the consciousness of the nations which had preceded it; but the latter is only the gradual becoming (origination) of the former; hence revelation cannot be comprehended at all without mythology. The philosophy of revelation and that of mythology constitute together the inseparable contents of the system of positive, historical philosophy, which is thus essentially the philosophy of history, but of a history not within the ordinary limits of what is historical, but one reaching from the beginning even to the end, from eternity to eternity.

Hence mythology exhibits the process of human consciousness from the absolute, but must not be one-sidedly apprehended merely, as if that consciousness of the nations had consisted in perfectly groundless and inexplicable error and ignorance, in a subjective state, such as did not correspond to any real relationship to the universal, to nature; but this consciousness possessed a certain relative truth for those times and for those nations and relations of nature. Men actually lived and moved in the tension of the universal potencies, and these pressed within the consciousness of man forward from natural existence to self-subsistence and spirituality, from ecstatic objectivity to subjectivity. True, the mythological consciousness is not the originating (becoming) self-consciousness of God himself, for "God himself" moves intact (untouched) and freely as above the world, so above that process; but it is a process which is at the sametime process of the world and of consciousness, and the result of which is the restored self-consciousness of man and with it also of the true consciousness of God in him.

The same potencies are active in him, and attain one after the other to dominion, as in the first creation; for together with the restoration of the potencies to their glory, the true consciousness
of God on the part of mankind is also to be restored. This is done in corresponding periods of the history of the world and of the history of religion, in which the different nations of old had each to play its own part. The first period is that of the dominion of unbounded existence, of the first potence, which had got possession of the consciousness of man, and which kept it prisoner in magic. Corresponding to it we have the astral religion or Zabism, and at the sametime also the mode of life of men who then moved about as nomads, without boundaries and without aim, without being connected into a state or being separated into particular nationalities, like the scattered host of stars in the sky. The siderical movement indwelling in all was the ground and the object of worship; they were immersed in that movement, and it was the immanent law of their life, hence such a worship was for them a necessity; for this cosmical potence held them captive and kept them together, till the crisis of the separation of nations took place; till that period the divine appeared as Uranos, as King of Heaven.

But before the second period obtains, and the first potence is perfectly exactuated or subjected by the second, it is engaged in a struggle with it; it is only gradually that it yields and becomes plastic, and this transition from the dominion of the first principle to that of the second, is expressed in the mode of representing common in antiquity by a becoming feminine of the first; the Uranos becomes now Urania. The unbounded and undetermined essence of the first is only apprehended in definiteness by the addition of the second; the mighty power of siderical movement which had been but dimly apprehended, is now succeeded by the worship of the queen of heaven, who, under the name of Mylitta, had more particularly her well-known service in Babylon, to which Herodotus alludes.

But the second potence is always only means and not end; the end, the third, that which properly should be, is already brought into view by the entrance of the second in every period of the process, and is anticipated by the religious consciousness. This third, which lies at the foundation of the prehel- lenic mythology, is Dionysos. But before it attains to actual entrance, before this idea attains dominion in the souls, a protracted struggle, as we have already stated, takes place in his-
tory between the first and the second principle; the first principle revolts anew against the second, and assumes again the masculine shape; it appears in the first instance once more as the Baal of the Phœnicians, of the Carthageniens, &c.; the latter does not indeed as yet recognise the other God, but has this other God exclusively beside himself as Moloch, as Cronos, and thus the third, free and delivering principle cannot yet make its appearance in its freedom; it is as yet suffering, it is an oppressed son of the Gods, as is first shewn in the idea of Hercules, who has not yet proceeded so far, as to attain dominion. At last Cronos also becomes female, becomes Rhea, which is the magnæ mater of the many Gods, just as Urania had indicated the consciousness, when Uranos—the one power of heaven, had melted into the many material stars, i.e. had become objective. As long as the consciousness itself had yet been enraptd into the absolute, into the dominating potence, and had been identical with it, monotheism prevailed; but this immediate monotheism was not the right one; just as that formless potence in itself was brought into form, was subjected to the organizing power and degraded to be the material of it, so now it becomes in that form an object to the consciousness; the consciousness comes out of it, makes itself free and stands over against it. Hence the human self-consciousness is the result of this theogonic process which is designed for this purpose; but it is also the causa finalis, not only the hearth but also the deeper ground of that theogonic process, by which spirit, as such, again attains dominion in the world; it is the third potence which in that struggle gives again birth to itself and presses forward into the light of existence.

Even the Egyptian and the Indian mythology are a transition to this giving birth, which is accomplished in Grecian mythology. But we have to distinguish between the popular Grecian polytheism and its true understanding, even that meaning which the mythical process had in the mysteries, for the latter were properly engaged with the birth and dominion of Dionysos, and exhibited as it were the kernel thereof. Dionysos, the coming and victorious god, is the god of the human consciousness—he is the deliverer of it from the real powers, and invests spirit with dominion over nature. He and Demeter are at the same time the deities of agriculture and of the culture of the vine, but this is not to be taken as super-
ficial symbolizing, but the consciousness of man finds itself as much in itself in the Grecian sedentary life, which was ordered in the state and according to laws, as formerly it had been without itself in the nomadic movement in Zabism.

The peculiar meaning of Grecian mythology, which distinguishes its contents from that of the former, is that here the third principle, viz. spirit, attains again to dominion. The Grecian Divinities are no longer merely real potencies—they are formal potencies of a spiritual kind; reality resounds (re-echoes) as it were only in them, but no longer governs the consciousness. The first potence has there been fully brought into quiescence—it has become invisible—Hades. The realistic principle is here already confined into its In-itself and has been subjected; it is now again under all, as the ground and the basis of the total multiplicity of Deities; all Olympus rests on it. But the dominant form of multiplicity stands opposed to it as to the sole real ground, the substantiality of all; it is no longer an individual God, who, with his power, stands shut out from all the rest, but it is in all; and thus in the Grecian consciousness the idea of unity stands connected in a compatible manner with the multiplicity of formal Deities. This, which constituted the essence of Grecian mythology, was summed up in the mysteries. There it was exhibited, not as traditional teaching, but as history presented to intuition. That which properly constituted their contents was that potence which, as causa finalis, had from the beginning properly effected the whole process, even Dionysos in his historical metamorphosis. At first, or in the form of the first material potence, he was Dionysos Zagreus, who, when brought back into what he was in himself, became Hades and was also termed so, who, by surrendering his formless sole (exclusive) domination, becomes the founder of all riches (Pluto) both in nature and for man; hence this Dionysos is the bestower of all gifts. But between the first and formless unity and the third, the living and reconciled beauty with all its riches of forms—the period of what is termed the Theban second Dionysos intervened, a time of fierce struggle between that god and the material gods belonging to a period which had gone by. Orpheus, Pantheus, and others, who, as adherents of the old principle, opposed the advent of the God, are now torn to pieces. Finally, the third
victorious Dionysos is the joyous, triumphant, blessing and blessed Iacchos; he reconciles the yet mourning consciousness (Demeter) to the multiplicity of gods, both the latter and the unity of this principle, form and matter are joined together in the beauty which assigns measure and aim, and in which Grecian life had attained to a first and youthful freedom from the constraint of nature.

But in the mysteries Iacchos was only exhibited as an infant; it appears that in contradistinction from Zagreus, the god of the past, as well as from the present multiplicity of Gods, he was conceived as yet only as the god of a future period, and that thus with deep meaning a truth, which was yet to come, was mystically pointed at. But mythological consciousness could at best only anticipate, it could not know that truth. Hitherto religion had only been a religion of nature which had grown of itself; it had not been revealed religion. The latter must, with reference to its contents, not only be a doctrine as to actualities existent long ago, it must be an event, an act. But the founding of Christianity was such an actuality, which then took place. God had allowed the subversion from the first only because of this act which was now to take place, viz. because of redemption; it is the purpose for which everything had hitherto prepared; but on that very account the pre-Christian consciousness could not know anything about redemption, nor could any human consciousness attain to it, as long as this matter of fact did not historically actually take place.

It will be easy to understand from all we have stated, that the philosophy of revelation, upon which we cannot enter any farther, goes back to a literal interpretation of the holy Scriptures, from the most difficult passages of which often a wonderful meaning is elicited from this point of view, although it would be difficult to assert, that such a mode of interpreting always leads to results corresponding to those of what is termed orthodox Christianity. A priori, it is here asserted, the council and the work of redemption can no more be apprehended or comprehended by reason than that of creation. Revelation has super-rational contents, and must have it, or else it would not be revelation,—it would not in reality reveal anything to human reason; but it is not on that account entirely incomprehensible, as it does not militate against reason; but we must be willing to apprehend it,—we must say
with Anselm: "Credo ut intelligam;" and then, what seems at first sight objectionable to the understanding will find its place and import as necessary in the total. Many things, which a superficial Rationalism had thrown aside as mere accommodation, will now appear as that which is deepest; as, for example, the doctrine about Satan and the evil angels. The latter is most intimately connected with the natural resistance offered by the material principle against allowing itself to be led back from actual reality into that state in which it had been, or into potentiality. Satan has also been termed the principle of negation, and he is that principle, always engaged in a resistance against the formative and measure-giving potence, and, if he were able to accomplish it, he would destroy all form and reduce the world to nonentity. But as potence and if kept within bounds, as he actually is, as long as the will does not give itself over to him and thereby procures existence to him,—in short, as potence he cannot be awanting in the divine economy. By the subversion this principle had become universally dominant, but it had, on that very account, not attained personality; it only attains the latter, or rather a counterfeit of it, when it is put into extreme tension, being, as it were, closely bounded in by the antagonistic potence. Hence these powers appeared fiercest at the time when they were brought nearest to subjection; and what is recorded with reference to the frequent appearances of demoniacs and of temptations at the time of our Lord and his apostles, may thus not be set aside by a flimsy interpretation. Satan is not a creature—his essence was contained in one of the eternal potencies; but he does not appear from the beginning as evil, he only became this; in himself he was and should be the solicitating principle, which was to bring out and to cause the evil to appear, and not the evil itself; he cannot, as it were, tolerate it, that naïve and ignorant innocence should be in the enjoyment of happiness without having deserved it. He may, on this account, not be simply mocked or vituperated; we should rather be on our guard not willingly to accord him place or existence; for by himself he has no existence; he only exists in and by the will which surrenders itself to him; but he is the principle which always longs after existence and which creeps in unobserved. Even now its perfect expiration in
the world has not yet been accomplished; he will only be fully conquered in the day in which there will be but one Shepherd and one flock, and in which the Son will again give up the dominion to the Father.

We close this exposition by making a double reservation. First of all, we claim to be allowed to correct any misunderstanding which, considering the defectiveness and want of distinctiveness in those sources from which we had to draw, may have crept in; secondly, that, although this system has been placed before that of Hegel, nothing may be deduced in the meantime with reference to its rank. We gave it that place merely in order to render our exposition more easy; for, once we are fairly engaged with the doctrines of Hegel and with his mode of expression, it would be difficult again to return to Schelling. We have indeed thereby exposed ourselves to the inconvenience of detailing a philosophical view which, as of later date, goes beyond the system which we shall now have to expound, and which had evidently assumed its shape in opposition thereto. However, we shall have an opportunity of comparing the two when closing this volume. In the meantime we may rest satisfied with calling attention once more to the theory of potencies in the whole, i.e. to the theory and method by which, from the lowest, from formless matter, every higher is derived, up to the highest intelligence and to liberty. We have already seen before, when expounding Fichte's and Schleiermacher's views, that such a theory seemed requisite in order that the absolute, the all-one substance, might not appear as lifeless substratum and as powerless passive matter, which would imply a contradiction against the idea of its divinity as being the absolute principle of unity. Hence it required, somehow or other, to be in itself already animated (spirituated). But this was done by apprehending it as potence, as real possibility, as δύναμις, somewhat in the same way as Aristotle had done. But in order really to animate this substance and to exhibit it alone as the begetting and the bearing principle, it is not sufficient to affirm it as the mere possibility of a further development which is taking place in it. Such might be also quiescent, might remain what it was, and would seem to stand in need of a second principle external to it, in order to excite it to the metamorphoses of
formation. Hence, in order to be consistent, if this commence-
ment and this evolution is once assumed, something else is re-
quisite, viz. a necessity, lying in such a principle in and by itself,
to develop itself; it is only if such necessity has been shewn, that
the scientific requirements of such a conception are perfectly
satisfied; and it was this task which Hegel proposed to him-
self.
**LECTURE FOURTEENTH.**

(HEGEL.)

The first impression which Schelling's philosophy of nature had produced on the age was, that to the greater part of his junior associates in philosophizing it seemed a splendid, and even a dazzling phenomenon, while others, especially the more aged, considered it an extravagant phantasmagoria. While Savants, like Oken and Steffens, explored natural science in the spirit of Schelling with such eminent success, Hegel, who, like Schelling himself, started in the first instance from Fichte, undertook to reduce that, which by the vision of genius the author of the modern philosophy of nature had discovered and sketched in an aphoristic manner, into the stable form of a regular scientific system. In this he undertook indeed a much more difficult and uninteresting task than the other numerous adherents of Schelling, who, as Hegel expressed himself, luxuriating in the new light, "hastened only to the enjoyment," and withal in their haste had almost again upset the lamp itself. In fact, the newly opened organ of philosophy (intellectual intuition) was so much exposed to being confounded with poetic fancy, that the abuse which non-scientific enthusiasts made of it brought modern philosophy, which was in general termed the philosophy of nature, into great disrepute with those who were more calm. By his rigour Hegel has successfully opposed this tumultuous proceeding; and whatever opinion we may otherwise entertain as to his merits, all candid and impartial persons will always acknowledge that, by his systematic procedure, he arrested the mischief, that he called forth once
more German scientific seriousness, and shewed that, in order to discover truth, we are not, as it were, in thought, "to start on adventures." In fact, the system of Hegel has of late years attained an influence so universal, that it is at present impossible to converse on any philosophical subject without having thoroughly studied and understood this system; wholly to ignore it on account of the unsatisfactory character of its results, or to attempt pressing towards the end by side ways, which do not conduct through it—such an undertaking could only be assayed by self-satisfied ignorance.

True, Hegel himself felt convinced that on all essential points he was agreed with Schelling, and, as already stated, he had only intended to give scientific form and stability to the doctrines already enunciated, i.e. to constitute them into perfected science. But even in his first work of larger extent, in his Phenomenology of the Mind, it becomes evident that essential points assume there a different outline from what they had done with Schelling; and, if the latter has recently declared that he agreed as little with Hegel, as Kant of old had done with his disciple Fichte, we can in the present instance not refuse to allow Hegel the merit of having consistently pressed on in accordance with the common first idea, while it is at least dubious, whether the first inventor has remained faithful to his own original plan, which had at the first not comprehended with equal foresight all the parts of science.

We have formerly referred to what Schelling had termed his method of intellectual intuition, and we have endeavoured under its guidance to ascend that standing-point, which is also the point of view from which Hegel contemplated the world, and from which he commenced his speculation. However, the latter has not only commenced from that point, but has once more treated that ascent itself in a scientific and systematic manner, and has expressed his theory on the subject in the "Phenomenology of the Mind." This book is at present looked upon as being the Propedaestics, which is to bring consciousness in a systematic manner to the same elevation, which we had formerly attained in an historical manner.

But before proceeding to this, let us once more transport ourselves to the earlier standing-point of Schelling. Schelling had apprehended the absolute, which Spinoza had termed the universal substance, or that being which forms from out of itself the in-
finally many objects, or forms itself into the infinity of objects which constitutes the world—we say that he had apprehended this world-ether, which has to be conceived in itself in the first place as simple and without determination, as not a lifeless substance into which life and movement are breathed only from without—say by a higher spirit, but as itself the living and general original essence of all things. In order at the same time also to express in that idea the most universal fundamental law, the original type or rhythm which it follows in all movement and life, he declared that the absolute was the unbounded eternal subject-object, i.e. that living which, by virtue of its own nature, continually translates itself from the state of subjectiveness into that of objectiveness, again returns from objectiveness as from an elastic tension into itself to subjectiveness, but in such a manner that its new state becomes always, after the return, one enriched and increased both in internal determinations, as well as in liberty to determine itself, hence that ipso actu by its working, i.e. by the working out (effecting) of that which potentially (implicite) lay in it, it becomes by and by that for itself (pro se), which in itself it had the capability to become. Undeniably this contained already the main features of a pure Rationalism and of an absolute Idealism, which Hegel afterwards attained by keeping by this rhythmical movement of thought and proclaiming it as constituting all reality. On the other hand, it was possible continuously to retain something original and something which, in all movement of thinking, would remain unresolvable, viz. that identical basis of the Real and the Ideal; and such without doubt had been Schelling's opinion from the first. Let us, however, bear in mind, that in his system we have met with propositions, such as, that all movement and activity—all motion of life, even that of nature, was only an unconscious thinking, or that it took place in the form of thinking; that the more that which is in accordance with law manifests itself in nature itself, the more its working also appears spiritual; that the optical phenomena are already entirely a geometry, whose lines are drawn by the light, and that that theory of nature would be perfected by virtue of which all nature would resolve itself into an intelligence; finally, let us bear in mind, that all this life which works unconsciously, although according to a purpose, comes in the last instance to itself in man,
i. e. that it comprehends itself as being absolute rationality, on
which account the absolute and the universal was designated as
absolute reason which exists objectively or is impressed every-
where and attains in man to consciousness of itself. If to this
we add, that everything that exists, that all those objects which
apparently remain stable in their forms, that matter in general
consists only in forces, that the forces themselves consist only in
life and activities—nothing is left in the end but a universal self-
forming in accordance with law—a natura naturans, which in its
inmost being can be nothing else but a tending and living, a press-
ing and stretching, a shaping and forming according to an inher-
ent law of nature, and that this law of nature is all in all, that it
is absolute reason, or rather that the absolute itself is living rea-
son. Everything, which had hitherto been yet conceived as the
being in which reason is inherent, now disappears and nothing
remains but a law, a universal mode of operating or necessity of
nature, an In-itself, which would have to be looked upon as a
wholly empty abstractum if it had not self-activity, the absolute
life, or in other words, if it had not to be acknowledged as much
as really practical as logically formal. We have, so to say, a
living law which fulfils itself, or an absolute power which at the
sametime and in itself is its own law, which is a logical world-
order, as formerly in the case of Fichte we had a moral one.
Everything that exists is nothing else but the actual self-forming
of reason, everything is movement and activity; this doing and
living constitutes the inmost essence of things, and this living is
the form of thinking, or more correctly, it is actual thinking
itself. Hence, that which formerly always hovered before us as
a substantial being, lying at the foundation, is now wholly dis-
solved and at last disappears entirely, inasmuch as we cannot
represent to ourselves that essence, either as a supporter of life,
like matter, in itself lifeless and only animated by movement, nor
as anything else than the actual energy of thinking itself, with
reference to which it remains in the meantime doubtful, whether it
has to be assumed from the very beginning and at once as the
perfected active system of thinking, as absolute spirit, or whether
it has to be apprehended as a thinking at first empty, abstract,
and only gradually filling itself up and thus has to be subjected
to a history or to a becoming (origination) in itself. But in either
case we have from the very commencement an absolute activity, and that not merely one determined, but also necessary as to its absolute form of movement—one that could not be otherwise. But how shall we be able to express in the most concise and at the same time in the most characteristic way the form of this activity as the universal form of existence and of thinking (which it has already manifested itself to be)? Hegel indicates it by the term "absolute notion," which he substitutes in place of Schelling's subject-object, by which he expresses at the same time, that the universal activity—thinking—'is the substance, that it is something which can in no manner be separated from its form; but if this activity of form itself is as it were to be exhibited in its most kernel, the latter will manifest itself as the immanent infinite negativeness, an expression the meaning of which will become by-and-bye evident.

Although Schelling had proceeded to declare that the absolute substance was also the absolute subject-object or the world—Me, beyond which there was nothing else which determined it, but which determined and formed itself absolutely as the living universal original essence, and although Hegel had expressed himself in the same sense, as is well known,² to the effect that it was of main importance "to apprehend and to express that which is true, not as substance (viz. not as lifeless substance, like that of Spinoza), but also as subject," yet even this mode of apprehending will at once serve to shew that these two thinkers occupy no longer the same standing-point. Notwithstanding that explanation, Schelling stands still before the absolute substance, and views it contemplatively. By virtue of his method he is engaged in intuition; Hegel, on the contrary, stands in the substance and is itself the substance, or it is his immanent thinking, and his method is thinking immediately itself in logical movement. To Schelling both subjectiveness and objectiveness are objective, and hence both appear as something real, and the difference is only quantitative; Hegel's substance, on the other hand, is the ideal and the self-determining

¹ Vide Encyclopædia, § 86. "If Me = Me, or even intellectual intuition is taken really only as the first (the most immediate, the principle of the system), yet is it in this bare immediateness nothing else but existence; just as, vice versa, pure existence is no longer that abstract existence, but as containing within itself the mediation, is pure thinking or intuition."

unity, the notion, and the differences of it are now logically different determinations.

But this Identity of thinking and of being had, as Hegel stated, as yet only been presented as an assertion and not yet been proved. In the case of Kant, there was yet a dualism; in that of Fichte a subjectivism; while at the same time immediately and before-hand an objectiveness and infiniteness beyond that Me was also recognised, just as much as that subjectiveness, inasmuch as Fichte had viewed his Me before-hand as subjective and finite—an assertion which necessarily involved the above-mentioned consequence. This dualism, which had thus never yet been conquered, was now at once comprehended together by Schelling into an absolute unity, into an Identity of the Real and the Ideal. This statement, which as it then appeared, seemed in the meantime not proven and, as Hegel expressed it, as it were "discharged out of a pistol," was now to be demonstrated and to be exhibited as necessity. Let it be noticed that in this Hegel also started from the Dualism of ordinary consciousness; in this case a Monism into which the former should melt was the end in view, doubtlessly in order again to come forth from it as a world of antagonisms. Thus the "Phenomenology of the Mind" which undertook this task, was to form the first, as it were, the analytical point of the system.

But—and this reflection we are capable of making before-hand—if the Phenomenology had actually become the first and fundamental part of the system, then, inasmuch as Phenomenology itself had yet an assumption, viz. that Dualism, the latter would also have become the basis of the whole system, which thus, like that of Kant, would have received a double principle, an empirical and an a priori one, an objective and a subjective one; hence that system would not have been purely grounded within itself, but also rested on some point without it. Besides, Phenomenology itself shews, that, in the shape in which it is presented, it comprehends in fact not a portion which is to be definitely bounded off, but the whole contents of the whole system, although unequally executed. In fact, it contains the system in its first shape. Hence, its original position required thus far to be changed, that, especially the first third of it, obtained only the import of a Propaedeutics for the philosophizing subjects of our time, while as a whole it
stepped forth out of the connection of the system and delivered its contents, in a new elaboration, to the different parts of it.

In Phenomenology as Propædeutics the philosopher occupies in the first instance the stage of common non-philosophical consciousness; in other words, he transports himself into the ordinary mode of sensuous intuition; in memory he passes, as it were, once more through the formative epochs of philosophical consciousness, and shews how and by what necessity it was urged on from stage to stage. But evidently this necessity lies in this, that a difference obtains between every subordinate stage of cultivation and the mind, as it is then already as philosophical consciousness, which difference becomes contradiction, inasmuch as in all the stages of cultivation it is always the one identical subject which appears as unequal to itself, i.e. as different from what it is in itself. This being and not yet being, while still it ought to be, urges on the process, even until the contradiction is removed, i.e. until the mind has attained perfect self-agnition and self-certainty. But the stages which are found, in one and the same and in universally necessary manner, in every subject which is cultivated up to the philosophical standing-point of the present time, have at the same time constituted the general fundamental views of different ages, and the standing-points of the different systems of philosophy, so that Phenomenology may be looked upon as much as a psychological history of cultivation of the individual subject, as also as a history of philosophy compressed together into essential brevity, in which the names, the dates, and every other accidental addition which had been intertwined with the systems, when historically they made their appearance, have been omitted, and nothing is exhibited but the pure progress of the process of cultivation itself.

This process of cultivation passes through (percurs) three main periods, which may be designated, first, as Consciousness in general—secondly, as Self-consciousness—and thirdly, as absolute Consciousness or Reason. Each of these three stages contains again within itself as many gradations, and the relationship of all these progresses amongst themselves is such, that the consciousness not only progresses from those that are lower to those that are higher, in the manner above indicated, but that it brings along with it and retains also on the higher stage the mode of intuition and of thinking of the lower, inasmuch as the latter does not fully dis-
appear, when the higher stage has obtained, but is subsumed, received into it, or, as Hegel says, is sublated. This sublating has the double meaning of tollere and of conservare, and indicates exactly what we wish to express, viz. the taking up and the retaining under a higher point of view of a mode of intuition, which had itself hitherto been the point of view from which the world had been looked upon—so that this mode of intuition, together with all its contents, becomes now itself again contents (matter) and object of the consciousness. Thus, for example, the natural consciousness considered at first all things as stable, continuous, and self-subsistent beings, afterwards as self-less, transient, and non-entical phenomena, and finally, as necessary determinatenesses, grounded in the universal essence; but thereby, that first mode of intuition is at the same time explained in the higher consciousness, it is vindicated up to a certain degree and continued, having its definite value assigned to it. Let us now endeavour to trace the course of this phenomenological cultivation in its chief momenta.

It is not only the child in the first glimmering of reflection, nor an untrained person, but even a philosophically educated man, who, as often as he opens his eyes and looks into the existent world, finds himself, at least for moments, in that immediateness towards objects, which ever requires anew to be conquered and to be mediated. The first look is always more or less destitute of consciousness, and in it objects, and that innumerably many and diverse objects, appear to us certain indeed as to their existence, but not understood and not comprehended as to their ground and essence. True, we think that with this look into the world we receive at once into ourselves an infinite treasure of cognitions, but this appearance owes its origin to the fact that, as grown up and educated persons, we ourselves are already endowed with a treasure of ideas and cognitions, with which, at the moment, we bring everything new into connection. It is not easy to separate from pure intuition, that which is already situate in the soul as known, cognized, and comprehended, and which amalgamates itself immediately with the intuition. But if we were accurately to distinguish that which had at first been alone existent in the act of intuition as such, we would find, that at the first sight we neither know nor can say aught with reference to an object, save that it is
there, and that it is something existent—a "There" and a "Now." The object neither reveals to us at the first moment any greater fulness and diversity, nor is there in us a representation of it drawn and endowed with such determinateness, as afterward takes place.

Hence, in the first intuition, or on the first stage of sensuous consciousness, we can pronounce nothing else about the object than simply this, that it is. Hence, we ascribe to it a being. But it is soon found that this being is nothing else but a being-there, a being-here, or a being-now; that it stands connected with that particular moment, that it is transitory and not a true being; for partly the same experience which had shewn us just before the being of an object, shews us soon after the having disappeared of the same—as for example, when we had said it is warm, or it is light, we are soon constrained to own that it is no longer warm, and no longer light—partly that the being which we ascribe to the object itself, independently of our seeing, hearing, or feeling, exists rather only in and with the sensation; for heat or light, and in general every quality of that kind, indicates only an affection of our own sensibility; hence a determinateness which is rather in us than in itself or objectively.

Thus, this objective being of the first stage, that of sensuous certainty, and this immediate certainty has resolved itself. Those qualitative differences, which had constituted objective being, we require to take upon ourselves, they are subjective rather than objective. But—we now continue—objectiveness itself is not destroyed by this; and granting even that the differences are within ourselves, yet that, on which the differences are felt by us and which calls forth these sensations in us, the thing in itself, remains always something objective, something that is, and something that has to be assumed. If the single qualities possess no objective truth, we select now in their place that which is true from out of these qualities, and term this function perception;¹ true, the qualities cannot be by themselves, but they must be inherent in an object, which constitutes their common substratum. This is the second stage of consciousness, which for a time rests satisfied with this

¹ There is here in the original a play on the word Wahrnehmen—perceiving, literally, taking true—which cannot be rendered in the translation. The Translator.
new discovery of certainty. But from former systems, we are already acquainted with the dialectics of the thing and its properties, which exhibits itself now again in such a manner, that, just as before we were obliged to recognize the qualities as inferences of ourselves and to take them upon ourselves, we are now also obliged to take upon ourselves the thing in itself, i.e. we are constrained to confess that we are the thing or the subject itself, to which they inhere; for that on which the qualities are, must certainly be the same as that which has the qualities, which latter we ourselves had been.

Thus the consciousness or the subject itself has become both the place and the supporter of that many-coloured world of differences, which had at the first presented themselves in immediate certainty as an objectively being world; thus the whole has become subjective, and the subject has become one whole, a totality of determinations. But thereby the consciousness itself has at the same time become an object with many qualities, which are as much or as little self-subsistent, as the object in itself. For in the dialectics of this relationship it is found on the one hand, that we are not able to remove that which is common or the thing and the essence in itself, without at the same time destroying the qualities, and that on this account we must allow either both or none at all to remain in position, and on the other hand also, that as soon as we affirm the one as a self-subsistent being, we destroy thereby the being of the other, and vice versa.

This relativity and bearing reference or this living and restless reflecting itself into itself constitutes the third stage and the result of this first process; there the consciousness has recognized itself, its own nature; it has become aware of itself, as reflection, i.e. as understanding. But by virtue of the connection with the two preceding stages, the nature and the essence of things or of objects, as they had at first hovered before the consciousness, is thereby at the same time also unveiled and penetrated. It had been found, that the subject itself required to be looked upon as a thing with many properties, and that it is in itself that reflection; hence we cannot either say or know anything else about objects than that their being is in itself also this reflecting. When the understanding recognizes its own nature, it has thereby also unveiled the nature of things; the charm is removed from
the vision of the student of Physics, and the old complaint may
never be raised again, that no created intelligence can penetrate
into the interior of nature, and that we have to rest satisfied with
the external husk; on the contrary we say with Goethe:—

Nor husk nor seed in nature see—
For there the twain together be!

This transition and turning over of simple objectiveness in itself
into the unfolding of properties and the returning of the latter
into the first-mentioned simplicity, out of which at the same time
they anew give birth to themselves, this continuous living process
constitutes the essence of things. The hidden powers, from which
formerly the phenomena had been derived, import no more than
that form of internalness or of being-in-itself, which however hides
nothing else and contains no other secret, than what always
comes forth; for power is merely the abstract expression for the
latency of that, which, when manifested, constitutes the phenome-
on, or for the Identity of all the diverse, which, while it enters into
the phenomenon, is and remains also at the same time the In-it-
self above referred to, and that just because the In-itself is the
appearing itself. The In-itself or the essence is the essence that
appears and determines itself in internal and inseparable unity.
Thus both aspects are at one and the same time, and if the essence
by itself is to be distinguished, as that which in the change re-
mains equal to itself, from that change, it imports only this remain-
ing equal of the process itself—the law. If then we seek for a
super-sensual world within or behind this actuality, it can only
be apprehended as that In-itself, as a realm of forms of standing
laws, which however abstractly and by themselves alone are not
anything that is, but are only this continuing the same of actuality.

Consciousness has indeed hitherto always moved in the repre-
sentation of a distinction between itself as subject, and a world
as object, but it has at the same time also recognized the_Iden-
tity of the two. Thus the difference would not be an actual and
qualitative, but only a formal one, i.e. the being of nature, which is
entirely the same as the consciousness, is only the consciousness
reduplicated in the representation, or is only the representation
which the subject has conceived about itself and has placed over
against itself as something that is. In again putting ourselves
into connection with the progress of our above development, we become aware, that gradually the subject had been constrained to take upon itself all objective being and thus to recognise that which had formerly been represented as objectively being, simply as its own subjective doing; putting away gradually all objectiveness, it has in the last instance retained itself, and it has recognized in general and in everything first of all only its own doing and being. Thus self-reflection has attained a standing-point, where all that is external to the subject disappears in the first instance, and where in itself it is exclusively with itself. If the first standing-point of consciousness, where it had yet fully relied upon the being-in-itself of objects or upon the thing in itself, may be characterized as that of Kant, we recognise the present standing-point, where the consciousness exclusively possesses itself and may hence be termed self-consciousness, as that of the subjective Idealism of Fichte.

Thus in knowing about itself or in self-consciousness, thinking has penetrated indeed into the kernel of its self, and is in itself a totality of subjective determinations for itself; but the question may be raised as to what it possesses in all this, and as to the manner in which it thinks these determinations. By virtue of its origin from immediate consciousness it has indeed taken into itself this form of immediateness, but there in the interior itself it has not yet at once wholly conquered it. As yet, the category of objectness has only been subjectivized; the subject has indeed returned into itself, but it has not yet thoroughly mediated within itself its own thought-determinations, which are yet met within it as immediaté. Thus, self-consciousness is held in a peculiar amphiboly within itself. As it has not yet for itself perfectly resolved objectness, i.e. as it knows itself yet more or less as a thing, and as things are only finite individualities, which presuppose other things without themselves, it follows, that for the self-consciousness also objectively self-subsistent things arise continually anew, while it negatives them. Self-consciousness is placed as a middle state between the lower and the highest consciousness; as long as it is self-consciousness, it is also the continuous process of mediation and is without rest engaged in the task of restoring itself as victorious subjectiveness out of objectiveness. This doing constitutes it, it is the essence of it, and itself continues
only so long as this task continues; it has in it its self-certainty, it feels and preserves itself only as that activity or as that process. While therefore it has always to deliver itself from objectiveness, it requires also this objectiveness, necessarily and by its own nature it relates to it; as reflection that knows itself, itself is this state of reference and this amphiboly. While therefore the Me or the subject is this reflection itself, it is the necessity as much to affirm as to destroy the self-subsistence of things; whenever these appear as affirmed and self-subsistent, the task is also proposed to the Me, to negative this self-subsistence, in order that it may prove itself as that which affirms and as self-determination, but in the same manner, if they are destroyed, the task is again proposed to let them be affirmed once more.

The process of self-consciousness progresses also in definite stages, and this doing, which has just been referred to, is first of all the desire, viz. to remove the selfish being of objects, not to allow them to oppose barriers to it, viz. to the selfish Me. Thus the Me becomes practical, it feels wants and requirements and undergoes labour, in order to subject objects to itself by their elaboration and digestion, by their assimilation and intus-susception, to transform them wholly into itself, to make them the organs of its volition, or, what amounts to the same thing, to organise itself into the objectness and to behave with reference to it as with its body and its property. Thus, the self-subsistence of natural objects is destroyed and they are anew degraded into accidents and qualities of the subject; but from the Dialectics of objectness we know, that this self-subsistence of qualities is again produced in the same way, as it is destroyed; and this is found here also, where the satisfying of desires alternates with their being called forth again, in the same way as above the appearing and disappearing of the thing in itself in and with its qualities. The difference consists only in this, that this practical process presupposes the corresponding theoretical one, for the ground of the desire is feeling.¹ The Me is here indeed now placed at the same time upon the practical standing-point, while in mere consciousness it had only occupied the theoretical; but this distinction does not obtain for the consciousness, as in practice we have as much to do with sensations as in theory, and hence with the momenta of consciousness,

¹ Compare Encyclopædia, sec. 359.
viz. with the becoming aware of self-satisfaction or of want, and
the will makes no difference, for in the theoretical as much as
in the practical process there exists a tendency or a volition to
destroy the negation or the barrier of objectiveness, only that
there this tendency is immediate, while here it is reflected and it-
self already falling into the consciousness. As Spinoza had
already said, willing and thinking are in themselves the same, be-
ing and thinking, apprehended as activity, are in themselves iden-
tical.

It may indeed be difficult for one that looks upon actuality with
unprejudiced mind, at this point to agree with philosophy, yea
even to follow it, and in fact we have here arrived at a point, where
even Fichte's Idealism returned to Realism. It will be difficult
to convince ordinary consciousness, that hunger and thirst, cold
and heat, are only things, which may be removed by a process in
the subjective self-consciousness. If it depended only upon energy
of self-determination, then any person, who was in want, or ex-
posed to the danger of perishing by hunger or thirst, or to be
burned to death, would have the means of escape at hand. But,
in order to assign their right position to such objections, with
which what is termed common sense meets us, we must here keep
strictly by the connexion, out of which such reflections tear us by
violence. If we speak of the negation of objectiveness, we refer
just to the difference of sensation and of mere representation, but,
notwithstanding that difference, both are states of the conscious-
ness; whether the finite Me is capable or not freely to determine
itself in every situation of life, is a different question. Further,
we have to bear in mind that the subject, if it resolutely executes
and wholly percents this its subjective idealism, stands thereby
immediately again in the midst of reality, inasmuch as there would
then be no longer any distinction between the real and the ideal, or
the ideal would at the same time also be real, and the real in the
same manner ideal; finally, let us remember that even a fancied
danger, for example in a dream the danger of falling, distresses
us no less than an actual danger; and thus we find that a repre-
sentation of which we do not know, that it is a mere representa-
tion, possesses no less reality for us than the real itself, or more
correctly, that the real itself can only be a practical momentum
for us in the representation, or only in as far as it is known, believed
and felt, but not in as far as it enters in no wise into our consciousness. As already stated, self-consciousness is, by virtue of its nature, always in this amphiboly and hovers between a real and an ideal world, itself is that ambiguity, and the will is that "divine irony," to allow the objective to be at the same time and not to be. This it is, which as the secret of dialectics belongs to the Esoterics. Common-sense either does not reflect at all, and its intuitions are taken for things; thus it is simple consciousness, or what is termed world-consciousness, or else it reflects and is conscious, that it has representations which as being its own are not the things, but it assumes at the same time, that by them things are cognised, as they are, and thus it is the naïve synthesis of idealism and of realism. But the philosophizing self-consciousness of this stage, will, in one direction, require to be scepticism and in another subjectivism. It is this dialectics, which has intellectually to be lived through, in order that the synthesis of the understanding of man may become certain of itself; for if it had not this amphiboly behind it, it would not be certainty; this (in our opinion) is just the standing-point where dialectics finds a momentary warrant.

But self-consciousness is not yet done with itself. Hitherto we had only viewed it as opposed to selfless nature; its contents (matter) were its determinations, hence determinatenesses and not selfnesses, that which objectively are not persons, but objects of nature—things; thus the subject was also warranted in proclaiming itself as the power of things, as lord and master of nature. Amongst objects, self-consciousness could not as yet discover its compeer; hence it could also not have found itself entirely, or it could not find its compeer, because it had not yet wholly apprehended itself. As long as the person knows about itself only as about a thing, it has in itself no representation, which it would be capable of objectivising and wherein it might recognise something else as being a person. Self-consciousness as personality awakens together with the recognition of another self-consciousness as person, and vice versa. The question may be raised, from which side this potentiating will first proceed. Hegel exhibits this as a procedure in external historical form, which however is fully as much internal, but which cannot be brought about by itself in one isolated subject, and only amongst many who stand
in reciprocal action, yet in such a manner, that in it both attain at
the same time in themselves their self-consciousness, which is now
juridically personal. This he terms the process of recognition,
and carries it out in such a way that in the meeting together of
subjects, which are at first to each other only objects of conscious-
ness, like every other natural object, a life-and-death struggle
ensues, which, however, may not terminate in the actual anni-
hilation of one of them, inasmuch as that which is to be attained
would thereby be just negatived, viz. the consciousness of free per-
sonality, which even the stronger has to recognise in the weaker,
inasmuch as he is man and hence his equal, and which he may not
violate without also violating himself. This constitutes the Dia-
lectics of the idea of right, which is beset by many difficulties, but
here makes its appearance in its ultimate foundation.

In this process every Me has by itself, and as single indivi-
duality, obtained the recognition of its liberty and self-subsistence,
and that on the part of all the others, while in its turn it recog-
nizes them as its compeers or as equal to itself. This then con-
stitutes the "universal self-consciousness," the positive knowing
of one's self in another self, each of which possesses as free indivi-
duality, absolute self-subsistence. Thus all are in themselves
and for themselves in their acting and in their self-consciousness
free for themselves—an atomistic plurality of Me's, while, at the
same time, all are as much the equal and may as to their essence
not be qualitatively distinguished from each other; hence they
will also now feel themselves as universal spiritual substance,
and in increased dispositions of love and of patriotism become aware
and manifest themselves as this substantial unity, more especially
in the family and in the nation.

"But thereby the third and highest sphere of consciousness is
now attained, even the consciousness of the absolute or reason,
and reason is that substance of all subjects. Inasmuch as the
individual finite Me on its part recognizes itself there also as that
universal, it also recognizes, that, what it formerly took to be sub-
jective determinations, are in this common substance the determi-
nations of the universal; for every Me together with its contents
belongs to this universal substance, and in the latter everything is
objective as well as subjective. In itself it is objective, to itself
and subjectiveness as well as objectiveness have only meaning
and import in the antagonism of the finite Me's towards each other; what there is subjective in the one, is objective to the other, and vice versa; but in the universal Me everything is subjective in it, and again all the subjective is objective mutually amongst each other. The same relationship now takes place in the absolute world-Me, that subjective Idealism had been in the finite Me; as there there had been only internal subjective or thought-objects, so in the absolute Idealism or Monism this distinction between the Ideal and the Real is removed; everything is as much real as ideal; and thus, what Phenomenology had assigned to itself as goal, has been perfected and attained, "that what is true is to be apprehended and expressed not as mere substance, but also as much as subject."

This rational thinking, which is now no longer without the substance and has intuition of it, but is itself the substance, i.e. is the subject which has intuition of and determines itself, constitutes the truth of all knowing, in which being and thinking are no longer without each other, in which being is no longer object for thinking, but thinking is itself the object of thinking, and is on that account termed being, while in itself it is the thinking itself, which is thought by thinking, reason objectivized to itself, which perceives and determines nothing beyond itself. Thus it is the νέης τῆς νόησης of Aristotle, the thinking which thinks itself, or the truth which knows itself, absolute Idealism which in itself is absolute Realism—an Identity, in which these antagonisms have coincided, in order eternally to beget themselves again, without, however, thereby affirming a duplicity of principles; for the begetting of antagonisms, or more briefly the antagonizing to itself, absolute negativeness itself, is the one and absolutely self-moving principle.
LECTURE FIFTEENTH.

(HEGEL—CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.)

HITHERTO we have followed the progress of Phenomenology in order to address ourselves now with the principle, which we have gained and proved, viz. the Identity of thinking and being, to the system itself. And here we feel it almost necessary to communicate the circumstance, that Hegel begins both the whole as well as in general all the principal sections of the system with a preliminary schematic survey of the division or arrangement, while at the same time he never omits to add the express declaration, that this anticipating has only the value of an historical reference; that it is to determine nothing in advance with reference to the end and the aim of the investigation, and is hence to be looked upon as nothing else than, say a table of contents printed before; for if it were looked upon as belonging to the thing itself, this would stand opposed to the demand, that philosophy is throughout to abstain from all prejudging, and quietly to wait until the methodical development leads it on with necessity. It may not assume anything, and must hence begin with the most abstract of all—with the most empty, yea with nonentity itself, and it can only leave it to the power of the method, as to how this commencement is to continue to develop itself, and of its own growth to form itself into a more and more concrete and perfect organism. Hence it is evident, that the beginning of the system differs from that of Phenomenology. In the latter it was the consciousness placed into the midst of actuality, it was the intellect which in itself had already been philosophically trained, and now transported itself
back into the beginning of its training, which got into a kind of tension by this making abstraction from itself; here again it is a purely objective commencement—an empty being, destitute of determination, to which the philosophizing subject is on no account to approach too closely, and with which it is not to mix itself up. True, we know already, that in itself it is the identity of being and of thinking, but this our knowing beforehand lies, as phenomenology itself, by which it had been attained, beyond the system and beyond the thing; abstract, immediate and objective being is expressly designated as that commencement; nor may we think or mix up along with it anything else; every thought as to a definite goal or to an already given final purpose, is to be laid aside.

Hence, in order not to transport something into the system which, according to the view of the originator, does not lie in it, we have also strictly to abstain from all bye-thoughts and assumptions, and, while starting from the first and most simple category, from the lowest and "worst" being, we are simply to commit ourselves to the genetic power of the method. If notwithstanding this we look in advance at the whole, beginning, middle and end, this may not be done according to the view of Hegel in order, in a surreptitious manner, at once to receive into the commencement the end or the aim, but only in order to procure in the meantime a survey, so as the more easily to find our way.

In Phenomenology we had already learned as much about the method as to find, that everywhere the thing or the idea makes its appearance at first in its immediateness, in its In itself, that then it judges itself or discedes into its antagonism, and finally again joins itself together out of these antagonisms. From this method we gather also the universal arrangement of the system. The absolute, the being-thinking or the idea has to pass through the three momenta, and to manifest itself first as idea in and for itself; secondly, in its being otherwise or in objectiveness and externality; thirdly, as the idea which, from its externality, has returned into itself. Under the first aspect it is the pure logical idea, thinking, in the narrower acceptation, as such in and for itself; under the second, it is the idea in its externality, in the having fallen from itself into a without each other in time and space—nature; and under the third aspect, it is mind. Thus, the whole of philosophy, or the thinking which apprehends itself
perfectly in thinking, consisteth of three principal sections: Logic, which with Hegel has manifestly the same meaning as metaphysics, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of the mind. For, if we contemplate the material objects of nature as such, as they are in themselves, we, who contemplate, understand indeed what they are in themselves; we know their internal essence; but they themselves do not know themselves, they do not exist for themselves, but only for others: the essence which works in them, and (as we know) thinks in them, the absolute idea, is veiled in them to itself—it does not apprehend itself; it is only there, without being as it should properly be, viz. for itself; hence nature is the idea in its being otherwise. Directly opposed to this state of nature is the state of the idea, as that of abstract, pure thinking, where the idea is only with itself and not in a being otherwise, or where as yet it has the being otherwise in itself (as thought-objects). Although, as such, it believes at first, that it apprehends itself as subjective thinking merely in its subjectiveness and that it has nothing in common with objective and actual being, yet the untruth of this view is soon manifested in that very sphere of its thinking, and it comes to see, that the essence and working, the actual and the true, are nothing other than or different from it, and thus, being directed to it by its own thinking, it apprehends itself at the conclusion of Logic, as subjective and objective doing, or as that which alone is truly actual, that which and as it is in itself—viz. as Mind. Hence the mind is the return from the being otherwise to the being in and for itself; and this conclusion, which eternally returns into itself, is the synthesis of the logical and of the natural course, which constitutes the third part of the system—the Philosophy of the Mind.

In each of these three principal divisions the same rhythmical movement is also repeated and produces a similar tripartition. Logic is engaged (a) with the first immediateness or with being; (b) this judgeth (divides) itself into the antagonism of essence and of existence, and these come together (c) into the notion, with which we have in the meantime already become acquainted, both in its real and ideal import, as the living circuit of momenta which concludes itself within itself.

The same may be said of the philosophy of nature also. It divides itself into Mechanics, i.e. the doctrine of the external re-
lation between the many individualities, where each appears as a whole and as self-subsistent; into Physics, which corresponds to the logical category of the essence, and into Organics, which comprehends the real notion as immanent self-aim, or into the process of geological, vegetable and animal life.

Finally, the philosophy of the mind develops first of all the being of the subjective mind, or what is commonly understood by Psychology; again, when, in the manner which has been essentially expounded in Phenomenology, the individual has attained to the consciousness of reason, the objective mind, i.e. this very rationality, is exhibited as also externally organized in the social life-union of men; while finally at the close of the whole it perfects itself, in absolute science, into the general intellectual process of art, of religion and of philosophy, which constitutes the ethereal life of the mind itself.

Each of these nine divisions of the system is again in the same way methodically subdivided into three momenta, and these again into other three, and so on—the only exception being in the philosophy of nature where we have a division into four. Although it might appear in this systematics, as if a more and more determinate and special individuation of the particular had been kept in view, and as if the particular were only determined and comprehended from the whole, yet, if by the whole or by the general we understand a final aim expressed from the very commencement, this is not the case, and the development continues to run along the thread of the individual categories, so that what is more concrete seems to be born from that which is more abstract—what is higher from that which is lower—what is more perfect from that which is more imperfect, and that wholly by virtue of the method, i.e. by means of negations, and that to all appearance without any thing else being requisite for impregnating it, whether such be empiricism or pre-assumed final purpose. The system and the method rests satisfied with the declaration, that the category of the commencement, or abstract being, contains already implicite or in itself all the contents after which we are to aim, and that by virtue of the identity of this being with rational thinking; and, with reference to everything else, it points us to the logical experiment of the development, which we now propose to prosecute, as far as this is possible in a short compass.
Logic commences with the most simple of all abstractions with *pure being*. True, we are indeed aware that this being is identical with pure thinking, or that it is thinking in itself; but, as here presented to us, it does not yet manifest that such is the case; nor do we become aware, that being, which here hovers before us, is just the reflex of that thinking, which objectifies itself in it. Thinking has a highly mobile and self-determining character, but at first sight nothing of this appears in being; however, this will soon manifest itself, if we look attentively at it and observe what is going on; for we are to do nothing else, but simply to observe the transformations of being. The latter stands related to thinking, as the predicate to the subject in the logical judgment—it expresses (predicates), what the subject is; it is for the perceiving Me the perceived Me; it is to the seeing eye the reflex of the eye in the mirror. Just as the latter cannot perceive its own form and movement immediately, but only in its image in the mirror, and just as the latter gives back accurately only that, which the former had visioned into it; so this objective being also will by and bye manifest the whole subjective nature of thinking.

But first of all, let us ask, wherein consists this being, or what do we perceive in it? We can only say, that as yet we do not distinguish anything in it—nay more, that we are not even capable to distinguish it from an empty and pure naught. We attribute being as predicate to all possible objects—to all qualities, yea to all thoughts without any distinction, *i. e.* we say of everything that it is, that being belongs to everything, however not in that peculiar acceptation, as if we had thereby meant to say, that it is self-subsistent, eternal, absolute for itself, but only in the general and wholly undetermined signification, in which the logical copula is employed with reference to everything possible. If we separate all the other predicates, by which objects are more accurately determined, nothing remains in the end which we could predicate with reference to everything without distinction, save that common being, which however in fact expresses nothing. Hence, this being is the pure want of determination—it is thinking, which thinks nothing, it is intuition which looks straight before it without perceiving anything; it is just as if we were staring into the sky, of which we could not even say, that it was blue, or that it was not the earth, or that it was not ourselves, as we had here purely made abstraction from everything.
else, had forgotten everything else, and hence possesses nothing with which to compare this objectiveness, and by which to determine it by way of distinction.

Hence although we had thought, that in being we possessed something stable and self-subsistent, and more especially the exact counterpart of naught, yet do we in this manner become aware and are forced to make the confession, that in fact this being—is naught. Hence being and naught are identical, i. e. the fancied being has transformed itself in our view into naught or has manifested itself as naught; it has wholly become naught. Let it not be thought, that naught is merely the limit of being, so that being would be here and naught there—that the one commences, while the other terminates, while both exclude each other; no, it is one and the same, eodem loco et tempore; whether we term it being or naught, we thereby refer not to two but to one and the same. Thus we have here the contradictory contradiction itself as affirmed and existent, while formerly it had in logic been looked upon as an absolute impossibility, viz. that being and not being are the same. And yet so it is. It is just this contradiction or this actual contradicting of itself which is, it is the motion of thinking, absolute negativeness, the continuous opposing or resisting itself (se sibi), the dividing and judging, the sub-objectiveness of the Me in itself.

But thereby we have just attained what we had sought and what had necessarily to follow; for lo! we have now the mobile nature of thinking itself before us, and that in its first and purest mode. Without observing it, itself has become the object of our intuition, and appears now as becoming (origination). In origination being and naught are sublated, i. e. they are at the same time preserved and contained. For, if we analyze origination, it is found that it consists in a coming to pass-disappearing and a disappearing-coming to pass—that it is a continuous transition from being into naught and a continuous coming over from naught into being.

Here then we have the first trilogy; the unity of being, of naught and of origination, or, of position, negation and limitation; only that, as already stated, we may not conceive the latter as any external bounding, but as the internal distinguishing itself of that movement, or as this fluctuating and hovering between being and not-being. At the same time this first methodical thesis, antithesis and synthesis, the latter of which consists in a process or a flowing which
gradually determines itself more and more accurately, furnishes us
with an example or a schema for all those which are yet to follow,
and we shall understand them the more readily, if we look back
upon that simple movement of thought.

Hence that which had at first appeared as simple, pure, and
nothing saying being, has now already become more determined
in itself. As the result of the former process, we have now found
and as it were again laid it down as a product, that the being to
which we had referred is more correctly and determinately to be
designated only as *existence*. Existence is being here or being
now, it cannot yet be more accurately indicated than as only a
demonstrative *being-this*, just as in phenomenology also it had
at first been presented to us as object. Thus it is that which may
be said with reference to every determined being or *something—
with reference to each and every* something, *i. e.* it is that general
predicate which states that it is just only something there or
present.

But this mere existence implies also at the same time the dis-
appearing, the continuous ending, which was involved in origination,
and, by virtue of its predicate of merely being-this, every some-
thing is a *finite*. That which distinguishes it from every other
finite, is a mere quality, yea, accurately considered, itself is only a
quality, and that term implies in its most general signification
nothing else than a being-not-so, or other, *viz.* as an alterum
(another). We would not be able to observe its existence at all,
we would not be capable of at all distinguishing *something*, if at
the same time or successively something else (an alterum) would
not also be present, by which alone it can be distinguished or
rather objectively distinguishes itself, for it is *only on that account*
that we distinguish it. Returning again to our former example,
we can now say that the sky is blue, for it is not something else,
(an alterum), it is not for example green, like the earth. But,
irrespective of all examples, in general and logically according to
the above *finiteness* has to be stated as being the character of that
which exists, which at the sametime also implies changeableness.

But existence or the determined positive something and again
on the other hand its negation, the limit or finiteness, have now to
be joined together into a synthesis. But inasmuch as the alterum
of the something is itself also an alterum, or inasmuch as some-
thing is always again bounded by some other, that which is finite by that which is finite, we arrive now at an endless finiteness, a continually progressive being otherwise, which does not come to a termination, and hence appears as infiniteness. True, finiteness and infiniteness are generally taken to be antagonisms, which wholly exclude each other and which can only by turns have place in our thoughts. But thereby nothing would be presented to the intuition but an endless alternating of position and negation or a mutual bounding of each other of the finite and of the infinite, a progressus in infinitum, which Hegel terms improper infiniteness; for it will readily be seen that we have not conceived true infiniteness, if we make it to stop at that place or point of time, where finiteness commences, so that the former is as it were on this, and the latter on that side; as soon as the one is bounded and removed by the other, infiniteness becomes itself again finiteness. What is requisite is just such an identity of the two, as had presented itself in origination as the synthesis of being and of naught. Hence true infiniteness and at the sametime the truth of existence—and thus at the sametime also of being which is resolved in it—consists in this, that the infinite is apprehended as continuous transition into qualitative determinatenesses, and that from one into the other, so that thereby it does not go out of itself, but comes in itself together with itself. It is this self-transforming itself; for just because it is through and through determinateness or finiteness which distinguishes itself from itself, every individual one of these determinatenesses has, when it extinguishes, become by this extinguishing the contrary of itself, i. e. it has become not that, which formerly it had been, or it has become that, which formerly it had not been, but which that, which had formerly been external to it, had been; again, this other one was exactly not that, which the first had been, or exactly that which the first has now become, so that each had now mutually become the other, or taking it in the whole—and this constitutes true infiniteness or alteration—universal origination is again there, only with this difference, that it is a definite, qualitative origination—a determining itself in itself, or to use the term employed by Jacob Böhm, a quiesling.

Herewith the second phasis of being is also executed, and its result is deposited as a quiescent precipitate, but only immediately
to begin the process anew. This result is independent existence (being for itself, Für-sich-seyn). Independent existence (being for itself) is just that infinite reference to itself, which manifested itself in the infinite as immediate self-determination. There is here no longer anything external and other, to which the infinite should refer; the infinite must be the total, and can only refer to itself; it can no longer distinguish itself from any alterum but only in itself; itself is that through and through mobile relating. Thus that which is for itself (pro se) appears in the first place as unit, as simplicity in itself, which excludes again every other. We recognize in this the now unveiled nature of being, viz. that, what we had really meant by being, is this being for itself (independent existence), this relating to itself and not to other, this not resting and not being dependent upon other, in short is self-subsistence. It is the being, which for example the atomist ascribes to his atoms or monads; negatively expressed, it consists in entire independence from everything else, positively expressed, in entire being for itself (pro se) and gravitating in itself.

But we have to bear in mind that in this being for itself existence and infinity are sublated, hence that it is not the abstract being which the atomist would like to keep hold of, but which he cannot preserve from the process of becoming and of transition into other, into which it is irresistibly drawn, in order finally to arise again out of it in this more definite form. Every being is in itself that which all the others are, or each, considered by itself, would become the all in itself and hence again the universal contents, which had just been represented as being without it; and this dialectic phenomenon is the process which here also begins anew. If we consider a unit by itself, it is the excluding and repelling of every other unit from itself; for the positive relating to itself, this attraction or contraction in itself, the keeping itself together in itself or self-preservation is at the same time the repulsion of what is other. Let us observe in a substance a number of molecules in motion. As each of them draws towards and into itself those portions of the fluid which surround it, the latter will appear to separate from the other molecules, to go away from each other in opposite directions, and hence to repel each other, and that same movement which appears as repulsion, constitutes at the same time also the being attracted. Hence attraction and repulsion
are identical, and in this identity the first relating to itself as well as its negation (repulsion) have again joined together in the process; those antagonisms are not to be conceived as two forces or two principles which work through each other and which together constitute matter, but dialectically as one and the same, as that negativeness of which they furnish the most accurate portraiture.

The being for itself (independent existence) finishes the first part of the doctrine of being, or as it is termed quality. We have followed it through the momenta of every individual thesis, in order to furnish at the same time examples of the dialectic method. As this method moves between the momenta of every individual category, so also between those categories themselves, and we shall now proceed somewhat more rapidly.

Quality, as it had in the last instance been exhibited in independent existence, was the being of things themselves, cognized in its truth; the distinctions of objectiveness, which we term matter, consist in qualities, they are themselves through and through qualitative, quality is identical with being. But this identity has now to be negatived. The negation of quality, however, is not entirely negation, so that thereby the abstract naught would again take place, but it is that definite negation, i.e., it is only the exact opposite of quality or of that immediate unity of quality and of being, so that this unity is that which is removed, whereby the quality is affirmed as indifferent and distinguishable from being, that is however from qualitative determined being—in other words, quality manifests itself as quantity. Quality itself has passed over into quantity; quantity is the same as that which quality had in the last instance shewn itself to be, its attraction and repulsion passes here into the two momenta of continuity and discretion, which in their mutual relation constitute all arithmetic. The determined quantity—the being greater or smaller is something by which the specific quality of objects and these objects themselves do not seem to be at all changed; we may take more or less of one and the same, without thereby transforming the qualitative nature of the object into another. Magnitude is, with reference to its nature, that which is externally determinable; every magnitude exhibits itself at once as definite magnitude or as quantum. But the difference of magnitude is in general and entirely only the limit. This limit or determinateness of quantity may—and we assume this
as known from the study of mathematics—be either an extensive or an intensive determination of magnitude, the latter of which is termed degree, a determinateness, which, indeed, does not in itself indicate an internal determination of the essence or of the nature of some thing, and is only measured and determined by external determinations, which themselves are also only quantitative, for example $10^6$ of cold or the tenth degree is only that intensity with reference to the ninth or the eleventh degree, &c., but which has already approached more closely to quality, which above in quantity had seemed to have wholly disappeared. Thus, for example, cold is in general only cold, and heat in general only heat by its degree, and hence by quantitative determination, and we have now to see how by the change of quantity the quality becomes at the same time also different, and again by the change of quality the quantity also; thus, for example, by a change in the degree of heat the ice becomes fluid water, and again the water passes into vapour.

Thus degree, as a quantitative determination with which a certain quality is to be connected, manifests itself in truth, as the determinateness of measure. But measure is the relation of two quanta to each other, and this is most clearly and most perfectly seen in the relationship of potence, in the number of the root or square. Thus in the midst of quantity, which seemed to treat of a thoroughly external and indifferent relation of numbers to each other, we find that thoroughly determined and unchangeable relations of quanta to other quanta present themselves to us, and for example the cube root is no longer an external measure, but an internal law of growth or of increase, according to which even what are termed infinite magnitudes may be determined. Hence the fundamental relationship of quantity in general, which had just manifested itself as continuity and discretion or as unity and plurality, manifests itself in the last instance most definitely in the relationship of potence, where we count no longer by quantis as such, but by their relations (exponents), whereby this abstract category attains again arrangement within itself, yea the greatest determinateness, which allows it to appear anew as the expression of quality, or rather again to collapse with the latter. Thus, amongst other examples, it is clearly seen in the stochiometrical designations of chemical productions that the quality is
immediately dependent on quantitative relations, or rather that it consists in these, and that what is specific (quality) is of a quantitative character, is an inward measure, a relation to itself.

Hence as quality is determined by quantity and the latter by the former, and as the one becomes changed along with the other, we have here again the well-known progressus in infinitum; for, each relationship of quantity, which goes beyond a definite specific measure, would give rise to another and a new quale, and by continued increase this would pass again into another, and so on to infinitude. But this process into the infinite finds here, as everywhere where it takes place, its resolution in this, that we reflect on the act itself which takes place along with it. For here also nothing else really takes place, but this alternating or going and coming between two antagonistic determinations, a reciprocation, which although ever so frequently repeated will never lead to any result and imports the first time just as much as the last time. Hence this movement itself is the synthesis which is to be kept hold of—the thought which was actually thought, that which is true; and thus the category of measure also, as a relating of two quantitatively-qualitative determinations to each other sublates itself in and by itself to the movement of reflecting. It is the same movement which had already taken place as attraction and repulsion in being for itself, and again in quantity as continuity and discretion; but here, in measure, it has objectively become perfectly clear by the thing itself, inasmuch as measure exhibited itself immediately as a relating of the two sides, which, however, are in themselves the same, viz. quanta; hence as a self-relating of that which had been related, so that quantity manifests itself now as a simple relating itself to itself, and hence as having returned into quality or as being identical with it.

But with this Identity, we have attained a new and higher logical stage. Quality, quantity and their synthesis, the process of measure, perfect the first logical cycle—the sphere of being in general. Its result was the movement of reflection in itself, which, if objectified or affirmed constitutes essence. Phenomenologically considered, we have now passed from the stage of immediate intuition to that of the understanding.

If hitherto everything, which we had considered, seemed to lie beside and without each other or successively to give room to each
other and to disappear, so soon as anything new took place, just as in sensuous intuition, if one, for example the clear sky, makes its appearance, the other, viz. darkness, disappears, without the one however being the ground of the other, or being capable of preserving itself present in and along with the other, this relation-
ship of externality is now changed into its opposite, viz. into the being in and along with that which forms the counterpart, and the relations which we have now to consider are rather the concrete identities of two momenta, which exist at the sametime in, with and by each other. Formerly intuition had still been immediate, i. e. itself had not yet been objectivised—the perceiving subject did not perceive intuition itself, but only its determinations, the ob-
jects; but now it beholds at one and the same time both intuition or determining and also its determinations, and both objectively, and the objectivities, which now take place, are or indicate that very objective unity of determining and determinateness.

In essence a more profound insight into the nature of the absolute, or of that which is purely being, is accorded to us, and we no longer stop short at enunciating it immediately as being or as existence, but now term it essence, by which we indicate that double nature—that internal state of antagonism, which is now expressed both in the thing and even in those appellations, which we shall henceforth make use of, when referring to the absolute. For, the latter are thoroughly notions of reflection, relative or correlative notions, correlata which bear their referens, their antithesis not only in a hidden manner merely in themselves, but also present it expressly for themselves. Hence the determinations, which the essence assumes, are of another kind and have another character than those in the sphere of being. There these determinatenesses or qualities had been immediately the What, which is, disappears and becomes an alterum (other); while here the determinations are affirmed by the essence itself, inasmuch as itself discedes into them, is in them its own reflex; for, inasmuch as none of these antithesis, as for example cause and effect, can possibly be without the other, they appear the one conditioned by, and dependent on, the other, nor does any one of them admit by itself of absolute position—\(a\) is only through \(b\), and \(b\) through \(a\); hence in this catego-
ry, properly speaking, true being, being for itself and true self-subsistence are wanting and are only found again in the
third sphere, in that of what is properly termed notion; here there is properly only an appearing and not a true being. The essence manifests itself in the first place as the reflecting itself, as the activity of self-polarization, as that of opposing itself in itself, as that of dividing, or as this negativity which however as yet takes place immediately and in itself. Hence we may say that the essence of things is the understanding of nature, it is the same acting as the understanding in us, viz. a distinguishing itself—a reflecting, an inward mirroring again or appearing within itself.

We have now to consider more accurately the peculiar character of all the determinations of reflection which are here brought forward. We have seen, that as correlata each of them has subsistence and being only with and through another, and not by itself alone. This being conditioned of the one by the other is generally not sufficiently attended to by the understanding. By virtue of its nature, by which the understanding distinguishes everything, it affirms them also as distinct and self-subsistent essences towards each other, not remembering that, if thus placed isolated, none of them can maintain itself. This is the self-contradictory character of all determinations of reflection, which, notwithstanding their internal unity, preserve still the appearance of isolated self-subsistence towards each other, inasmuch as in the first place they are still derived from the category of mere existence; but it is also in the category of essence, that that appearance is to be perfectly removed and that these determinations of reflection are by virtue of Dialectics, i.e. of their own sublating themselves in thinking into each other, to be transported into the sphere of what properly and in the closer acceptation receives the name of notion.

The antagonisms here alluded to refer to the definite antagonism of indifference and difference, of identity and distinction, of matter and form, of internal and external and especially of positive and negative in general. True, by essence we conceive generally in the first place the substratum which has in itself certain determinatenesses or that which lies at the foundation of it. But these determinatenesses, shapes and forms cannot subsist, they cannot be separated and for themselves alone; by themselves they are mere appearance, but with reference to the essence they are its appearing. Hence they may not be separated from the essence; all appearance that is presented must also have for its ground
something real or essential, or, as Herbart had expressed it, there must be as much real as there is appearance, which latter always points to the former. Thus, even according to the ordinary mode of representing, the appearance may not be separated from the essence, nor be in any way exhibited as something that is independently. The question is only as to how we conceive this connection—whether as close and essential, or merely as superficial.

The simple, as essence, is taken in the first instance as the positive, as that which is by itself, while the determinateness presents itself as the negative, as that which in itself is not and is only affirmed by the other, viz. by the positive. But it had already been shewn, and even Herbart had made use of this dialectic expression for the notion of being, that the positive is only thought and determined as the not-negative, as the negation of negation; just as the negative again is only conceived as the negation of the positive. But if we were to separate the negative from the positive and to assert, that the positive is not at the same time negative, while, however, we leave and allow the negative actually to exist, at least as appearance, that appearance, which exists without the positive, would require to subsist by itself and hence be itself again something positive; thus is it found that, inasmuch as this negative is at the same time positive, the positive stands in it at the same time negatively related; that is in general as much as, that in actuality these two determinations are sublated into Identity. Hence both of them refer by themselves, by their own notion, to each other, and can only be comprehended through each other, or each through and along with the other. Hence the essence, which properly is thought in connection with them as that which is, is that very relating and reflecting; this negativeness, which is thought and represented, is the true object, the nature of things, the interior, the essence, the thing in itself.

Affirming and negativing are the two determinations, which most properly belong to the category of the essence, and they are dialectically repeated (as above being and naught) in all the modes of apprehending and in all the expressions which here occur. Thus, for example, in nature also universal matter is apprehended as the positive and form as the negative. Matter is thought to be that, which is in itself simple and self-subsistent, and form or shape that which is negative and non-entical. But more accurately con-
sidered, matter itself appears as self-subsistent only on the
ground that it is no longer thought simply, but is reflection in it-
self, i. e. is in itself at the same time ground and existence, and
hence as existence or actual matter contained already on or in it-
self that determinateness or form, which was to be separated from
it as determinateness of form. The same holds true with refer-
ence to the expressions power and manifestation, and again with
what is understood by inward and outward; all these are only the
apprehensions of a relation of the thing itself, such as takes place
in itself, and hence are subject to the same dialectics which
had been applied to the positive and negative.

In order to overcome all these abstract antagonisms of the un-
derstanding, Hegel starts first of all from the side of the essence
and shews, how it necessarily resolves itself wholly into pheno-
mena, leaving no firm substratum behind it and consisting
wholly of this activity of appearing. Then again, on the other
hand, it is shewn with reference to this appearing, that it is
not an empty appearance, void of essence, but that it is rather
one and the same as the essence, viz. a real and actual existence,
or the existing itself. Thus in the last instance the same be-
comes always again manifest, which had been stated at the outset,
that it is in general reflection, which lies at the foundation of these
antagonisms and which operates in them, i. e. that it is that,
which is designated as the essence itself. It is this antagonizing
and relating to itself in these antagonisms, in short, it has the
same import as the copula in the judgment, and this whole sphere
corresponds objectively most exactly to the logical judgment sub-
jectively. The copula stands in the judgment between the subject
and the predicate, and hence it shuts out from each other these
two momenta, which in the notion had been still immediately one;
it separates them; but at the same time, as its name imports, it
is also the connection or rather the relation and unity of them,
and the essence manifests itself here objectively as this double
function.

Thus it manifests itself in the first place as Identity, and as it
is thought as an Identity without any distinctions, just as the
essence is commonly conceived only as simple ground, from which
certain determinations come forth. But even the well-known
proposition with reference to an adequate cause (ratio sufficiens)
demands, that this ground contain in a definite manner that which is grounded upon it—ideally, potentially, as to possibility, &c. Hence that which is grounded, the consequence or the phenomenon, is involuntarily immediately placed into the ground. But, as here this developed multiplicity of determinations would be immediately again present, its ground would again be awanting, or it would be a phenomenon without a ground, i. e. a mere appearance, and this again cannot be affirmed as existing, as real, without the ground or the essence, so that reflection finds itself in the last instance constrained to desist from all attempts at separation and to recognize the formulae, in which it endeavoured to accomplish the self-subsisting of the two sides, as being dialectic.
LECTURE SIXTEENTH.

(HEGEL—CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.)

In that contest, in which thinking is entangled with dialectic necessity in the category of essence, it is especially the relation of possibility and actuality, which the understanding views with interest, nor may it be viewed as proof of its incapacity, when it refuses to acknowledge the momenta of this state of antagonism as being thoroughly identical. Without doubt it is a certain ethical instinct by which it is animated in endeavouring to preserve at least possibility by itself and not to allow it to turn over of its own accord, and as it were blindly, into actuality. It feels that there is here a point of support of which human liberty seems to stand in need, as the possibility, but not the necessity of manifesting itself. Still it is in vain, that we endeavour in this sphere to get free from the power of Dialectics; like Proteus it flies from one shape into another, but everywhere it is found that within reflection no individual momentum affords a safe resting-place—that each passes irresistibly into its counterpart, or rather that each is already in itself the other.

Thus, in the last instance, here also nothing else is left but the contradicting itself in itself, this living negativeness, i.e. reflecting, in which the nature of rational thinking has become object to itself, and in which therefore the law of nature, as in the play of physical phenomena it is objectively presented to us, has to be recognized as the immanent proper nature of the understanding, and again these laws of the understanding or categories (as they have been termed by Kant), as the Natura or as actuality itself.
Thus all subjectivism is overcome, but at the same time all subjectivity by itself surrendered into the phenomenon: nature conceals no more, than the human understanding in itself a something which cannot be unveiled or a profound secret; the veil of Isis is lifted; nature—and this we had already learned in phenomenology—does not possess an interior, which does not become an exterior, interior and exterior, power and manifestation of power are one and the same in one act, because in truth it is only a continual actually manifesting itself and remembering, i.e. because in fact it is only actuality, this actual working or the process itself, which we designate as the actual.

Actuality, which manifests itself as the truth of the essence and of appearing, is in itself the absolute relationship and appears as necessity, as long as the aspects of this relationship themselves are yet considered as self-subsistences. These however are, by virtue of their internal Identity, not capable of maintaining themselves as self-subsistent, but are subject to constraint. Actuality, as all categories, appears first of all in its immediateness, i.e. in the sense in which we generally take that expression when we think of the existent world, of nature, &c. By virtue of its origin from that relationship (of essence and of appearing), actuality is indeed always a relationship, but as it were as quiescence of the relating to itself, i.e. it is substantiality and accidentality, and the unity of this relationship constitutes the substance. Substance is the same as necessity, the inevitable being obliged to turn over and to turn round, the contradiction or the negativeness of the essence in itself. Hence substance and accident are indeed opposed to each other, but the same holds true with reference to this antagonism as with reference to that of essence and appearance. The substance is the totality of accidents, and the accidents are nothing else but the manifestation of the substance, which latter is not a formal or external summing up and circuit of the accidents, but the passing into those determinations, and hence the form-activity itself, in which transition it coincides (collapses) with itself or returns into itself. Hence substance has with Hegel a more fully developed meaning than in other systems, in which it was in part still taken as the lifeless substratum, in part as that which as abstract essence, as that one formless aspect or basis, has already been overcome. There substance is already the permanent process
or the absolute turning over of form and of contents (matter) into each other; it is the same process, which actuality, which absolute but immediate working is also; but working is a working out (an effecting) of something, a determining, separating, forming, and that which is formed or the contents (matter) may itself not be separated from this power of forming. Every thing that is formed appears by itself as self-less, as accidental, as nonentical and as disappearing into the substance as into a dark shapeless abyss. Such was the ancient oriental fundamental intuition of the absolute, which Spinoza had again brought forward and which may rightly be designated as Pantheism or Pancomism, and which finds its counterpart in Leibnitz, who substitutes in the place of mere accidents monads, self-subsistent and free individuals, whereby, however, the substance is degraded into something entirely passive.

With reference to this formless abyss of substance or to the dark ground (non-ground) it would be incomprehensible, how it is to attain a definite shaping and forming of itself. Hegel is right in feeling that the lead-like substance of Spinoza wants everything like commencement and ground of movement, and he substituted in place of it the necessity of movement, even restless negativeness. This amphibilous power is the always actual working, making and determining, which actuality had already been, and has hence to be acknowledged as causality.

In as far as the accidents are not to exist in the substance merely casually, but the substance is to be the ground of them, which as substance determines itself, it is cause, i.e. the original thing, in the signification already indicated, viz. the substantial Identity or real possibility which has to be conceived as continuing as such and as immanent in actuality; for if the internal force were withdrawn from the effect, the latter would immediately collapse; and if that force were not working, then would it be without force, a non-force, or no force at all. There are no contents in the effect, which are not in the cause, and again there is nothing in the cause, which does not work (effect). In representing finite things cause and effect are generally looked upon as two different existences; first, we have the lightning and then the thunder; it rains first, and then it becomes wet. But

1 There is in the original a play on the word Ursache—cause, which, if analyzed means: original thing—Ur-sache.—The Translator.
even a superficial consideration will teach us, that the effect cannot
be separated from the cause by any interval of time; the same
rending asunder and movement of the air which the lightning is, is
also already the vibration of the air, which the thunder is, and where
there is rain, it must also be wet. The duration of time in the
succession has in itself nothing to do with the relationship of cause
and effect—every cause works the proximate effect, i.e. its own,
and that immediately, and this again the following, and so on. Thus
we come here again upon the well-known progress into infinitude,
without ever reaching backwards as far as an original cause, or
forward to a final effect. We have already met with this pheno-
menon, in Kant’s philosophy, under the name of antinomy; all
these relationships of reflection and dialectic antagonisms of the
category of essence are of the same kind. But in this reflecting
we have not only to see to it, that the distinction is actually made,
and hence in this case, that what is effected is as it were repelled
by the cause, but also and fully as much, that the Identity of the
two, or what had formerly been designated as the common substance,
be preserved. If in the infinite progress we only proceed from
cause to effect, and again from this effect as from a new cause to
a new effect, which again is the cause of another effect, that which
is immediately contained in the relationship of causality remains
wholly unnoticed, viz. that something is and is termed a cause,
merely in as far as it has an effect or effecteth, and on the other hand,
that something can be designated as effect only in as far as it has
a cause; and hence that the relationship bends over into a recipro-
city, so that thus the effect is as much the cause of its cause and again
the cause the effect of its effect; and hence that both are the same.

The relationship of causality goes into the progressus only
because and if it remains unnoticed, that the one of the two mo-
ments always appears first as that which is immediately present,
and only on that account as the cause, while the other appears as
brought about (mediated) and affirmed, and on that account as
effect. But in truth that first immediate is itself already affirmed.
Before we had for example affirmed, that the wet is the effect of
the rain—but we might as well affirm that it was the cause of the
rain—all depends on where we are to begin. Humidity eva-
porates, forms clouds, which again dissolve themselves into rain, and
the rain makes wet; hence humidity is as much cause as effect;
and in the same way the rain and also the clouds, every link in
that chain is in itself this two-partedness (bipartition) or amphi-
bolically. The same may also be applied with reference to the Me, as
subject-object. The Me-object, or the Me that is perceived, is
indeed that which had originally been affirmed by the Me-subject,
but, inasmuch as it presents itself as immediateness, it acts as
cause; i.e. the Me is only a Me by the not-Me, the subject is
only such by the object, although the not-Me and the object had
only been affirmed by the former and had not existed previous to
the subject. That, which in a hidden manner had been affirmed,
manifests itself as that which affirms or as cause; but it is also
equally seen that the object had been rather that which is affirmed,
or the effect; and thus the relation is turned hither and thither—
first one link is brought about by the other, and then the reverse,
so that now the two are mutually brought about (mediated), and
neither of them is any longer immediately existent.

In fact the perfectly manifest causality has thereby become
reciprocal action (reciprocal effecting, reciprocation), and that
reciprocation or the mutual bringing about is hence the reality
of what had formerly been one-sidedly apprehended as causality.
“In reciprocal action,” says Hegel, “the infinite progress of
causality is sublated in a true manner, inasmuch as the going forth
in a straight line of causes into effects and of effects into causes,
is bent round in itself and bent back into a relationship shut up
in itself.” Thus e.g. it is said in pragmatical dissertations,
that the character of a people depends on its constitution, while
again that constitution is derived from the character of the
people, until we come at last to see that the two are mutually
conditioned by each other.

This relationship however is and remains as yet still a relation-
ship void of notion, as long as the two aspects are yet assumed
as separate substances, the one being passive or active about the
other, and working externally and mechanically upon each other.
If at the sametime the internal Identity of the two is not kept
hold of, that reciprocal action also cannot be understood, which in-
comprehensibility has especially made itself felt as to the reciprocal
action of body and soul. It is only understood, if that which is
usually represented as a mere relationship, as it were the empty
middle or the distance between the two members, is rather affirmed
as the substantial energy of the distinguishing itself, or as the realistic indifference, which separates itself towards its two aspects,—i.e. as that, which is the energy of absolute negativity, in which we have therefore again the now unveiled or affirmed necessity or the substantial Identity in its original reality and activity.

But the truth of this necessity is freedom, and the truth of the substance is the notion, i.e. "the self-subsistence, which the repelling from itself into distinct self-subsistencies, as this repelling identical with itself and this reciprocal action remaining by itself is only with itself."

Thus we have reached the third division of Logic, the doctrine of what Hegel terms speculative notion. We do not require to remind the student that, with this term, another and much more determinate meaning is here connected than ordinarily, where by notion every abstract form of thoughts is understood, which is void of contents, a formal summing up, a class of beings, or in short, that which in general is indicated in language by appellatives. This vague meaning has here given room to a very determined and peculiar one, which requires now to be more closely considered.

It will become most evident what a notion is, if we study it with reference to self-consciousness, or in connection with the Me; for, "in as far as the notion has attained to an existence which is itself free, it is nothing else but the Me or pure self-consciousness." Three momenta may here be distinguished. The Me as pure Me is, first: thinking in general, thinking in itself, or the potence of thinking; it is, secondly: definite (determinate) thinking, i.e. it thinks something, it has an object or determinate thoughts, it is in some one determination, for it is actual thinking, only when it thinks something definite; and inasmuch as thinking and thought are an inseparable unity, self-determining thinking is, thirdly: individuality or Me. But the sphere of the notion is not limited merely to self-consciousness; nay more, the latter, the self-conscious notion, is itself already a gradation or further development of the notion itself within its sphere into a higher existence, which is more adequate to its nature. In nature it is in general that which is organic, that which bears within itself its self-aim and its power of development or of production, which corresponds to notional being. But the three portions of
Logic, the doctrine of being, of essence and of the notion, cannot well be declared to be the metaphysics of the inorganic, of the organic and of the intellectual; this would be a distorted and incorrect view; according to Hegel’s own explanation, it is the abstract representation of space and time which corresponds to being, filled up space and filled up time to essence, and finally the whole as an organism and life to the notion. Thus the doctrine of the notion opens to us rather the higher standing-point, from which also that which is lower has to be viewed and where alone it appears in its true light, just as the naturalist still allows, in a certain sense, the division into organic, animate and inanimate beings, although, having viewed the universe from a higher and the true point of view, they have recognized and enunciated it, that all together constitutes only one grand organism, only one universal life, and “that nothing in nature is lifeless.” Only then can anything appear as lifeless and inorganic, if it is torn out of the connection—if it is considered no longer as momentum of life and as form of shaping of the universal, but as isolated and as thing by itself. But in fact—this mode of viewing is the ordinary and that which obtains in the commencement; it also prevails in the two first spheres of logic, but the Dialectics of these spheres is at the same time also the further development to the higher and the true apprehension of being—viz. to that of the notion, where that lower existence also is again contemplated and is not wholly dissipated, but placed in its true light.

Hence that is really actual which, as to its inward nature, is capable of subsisting itself and of appearing as individual by itself. At the first, in the sphere of being, we had indeed also individualities presented to us, but these were not what are properly termed individual beings in themselves, but only finite determinatenesses, qualitics which are abstractly kept hold of by themselves, hence mere determinations, and thus that which is affirmed, dependent and conditioned, that which as change passed over and passed irresistibly into what is other. In the sphere of essence again that which is was seen as distributed to two sides and in two determinatenesses, which reciprocally conditioned each other, which, as each had its essence without it, were under the necessity of collapsing (coinciding) and had thus in themselves only an apparent self-subsistence, only appeared. Finally, in the notion,
this relativeness of being has become absolute true being for itself, and this self-being has exhibited itself as absolute actuality, as actual working, which at the same time relates to itself and preserves itself, as such an individuality, in working. Hence each individual, in as far as it is individually for itself, has also the power to become, to be and to remain such; the individual is a whole, a totality for itself, the determinatenesses of which are self-determinations; self-determinations, in the change of which the self, viz. that power or the universal, does not itself change and pass away, yea and cannot pass away, just because it is the universal and not individual determinateness. Hence that which is in accordance with notion is eternal, but it is only eternal in as far as it is universal and that nature itself; again, what in it is individual and particular determinateness, is subject to change, for it is mere modus existendi. But of this hereafter. In the meantime we see, that the essence as notion, has rather taken into itself than separated from itself all multiplicity, or at least the power of it, and hence that it has not in itself become abstractly simple, but in that sense rather concrete. In general we find, that, in order to exhibit an individual being as persistent, as truly being and as lasting beyond all change, that being has not to be conceived as qualitatively simple, that all difference and multiplicity is not to be conceived out of it by means of abstraction, but that we have rather to go on in an opposite direction. Hence this individual, which every existent notion is, is on that very account not abstractly simple, but includes rather the power for all possible determinatenesses, and, in as far as it attains to existence, is itself in these determinatenesses, and hence itself also always something determinate. Hence the individual is as to its fundamental essence or as to its identity with itself at the same time and always the universal, and as to its determinateness at the same time the particular. Thus universality, particularity and individuality are the three momenta of the notion, and exist in it as a unity. The universal is the same as the genus in the logical definition, the particular as the differentia specifica or the kind, and the individual as the defined object itself.

But the notion, as it exhibits itself to us in the first instance and before we proceed to develop it any farther, is now again first of all an immediate ground; it corresponds to the immediately ex-
istent principle of life or of organization in organisms, before it has attained the state of realization or of self-exhibition. But even as such ground it is already a potentially full, a concrete and self-determining ground—with reference to what it is to work and to become, it is immanent self-aim. Thus it is still existent and to be considered in its subjectivity, as subjective notion, i.e. as what, according to its nature, it is indeed in itself, but has not yet actually constituted itself. Hence it hovers here before our thinking as itself immediately this formal thinking; it is yet the thinking of the observer; the observer has indeed found what the notion is in itself, and he beholds also in things without him a notional being, but the notion which these objects contain in themselves, has not yet attained to consciousness in them; while, therefore, the thinker thinks that notion, he thinks and observes his own thinking, and in it the nature of true being or of the notion in general, but in the first instance only, as to how the notion formally is in itself, without respect to its reality.

The second point to which we have to attend is, how this subjective notion gives existence to itself, how it exhibits itself in its objectivity as the realistic notion, which has proceeded out of its internality and has passed into existence. Thus it has its proper existence, it is, and is actually for itself; as indeed, according to its nature, it can in general not be without existence. At the same time, however, it is in this state also immediately and at first still wholly absorbed in its own existence; as formerly, it had been wholly subjective, it is now wholly objective; it is not yet for itself that which it is, but only for the observer; as animal and vegetable soul, as creative life it is yet immediately sunk into the body, spread in it and absorbed by it; it is internally and externally, soul and body in one. But this internality is only the universality, while the externality or corporeity is only the determinateness of one and the same notion; the latter has already become also existent as body, what it had been as mere ground, and this becoming or self-realizing continues, until the notion is perfectly realized—but in itself already it is free and that which is for itself, hence it also becomes such perfectly—it becomes a perfect being for itself of that, which it is in itself—i.e. it attains self-consciousness, and conscious freedom of self-determining. It becomes and is this, and so only exists perfectly, is
thinking, self-cognisant notion in this its bodily and, at the same
time, objective existence; thus the notion is subject-object; or,
according to Hegel's terminology, idea.

After this general survey, we return once more to the notion. The notion, in its closer acceptation, considered purely as to its form, yields, what is commonly termed, *formal logic*, but which should properly be called subjective logic; hence, this has a sub-
ordinate position here in the system. It is shewn, how the notion
separates itself into the judgment and again coincides (collapses)
in the conclusion to the totality of the momenta. We pass over
this section of "subjective logic," observing only, that while the
whole known matter of ordinary logic is here exhibited, this is done
under an essentially different arrangement and in a wholly new
light. For while ordinarily the different notional relations, forms
of judgment and of conclusion are taken up out of the practice of
thinking generally without any immanent principle and are enumerat-
ted one after the other, the exposition tends here rather
towards developing, in this subjective sphere also, the momenta
of formation of thinking as the same genesis necessarily continu-
ing to determine itself, which also repeats and exhibits itself in
the other parts as logical activity of form that has become ob-
jective.

The momentum of universality is the notion as the substance
which, in all distinctions, remains equal to itself—the thinking,
or infinite negativeness itself. Particularity is *determinate*
universality, the kind, or what Plato had termed ideas; the identity
of particularity and of universality constitutes individuality. The
universal is only *actual* as individual, i. e. the species exists only
in examples or individuals, of which each represents the whole
species, so that the individual is the universal. Hence the notion
is an immediate and inseparable unity, although not an abstract
or empty one. The differences, which *in themselves* are in it, ap-
pear in the judgment, and become, so to say, logically existent.
The judgment declares: the subject is the predicate; *e. g.* this
individual (Cajus) is mortal. Here the copula appears at first to
express a *diremption* of the momenta; but it expresses also fully
as much the identity or the substantial bond—and this is seen in
the conclusion, where the copula unfolds itself into the determi-
nate middle notion, which is the common ground or that, in
which these two momenta are identical, viz. the common kind: man; Cajus is mortal on the ground, that he is a man. Neither of these three termini or momenta is by itself; Cajus (the individual) is the same, as here man, and man is the same, as mortal; hence each has in itself the distinction of universality, particularity and individuality, which is as much affirmed as it is also again removed by the three judgments, of which the syllogism consists, so that the conclusion exhibits the now expressed unity of the notion or the course and process (the bringing about, the mediation) of the notion in itself—the result of which is the now cognised consistential unity, in which neither of the three momenta subsists by itself, but each only by means of the other; so that what is, or the whole, exists always and immediately at the same time. Hence, the result is again an immediateness, which results from the removing of the mediation, i.e. a being, which in itself is identical with the mediating itself in itself, or which itself is the latter.

Here then at the termination of subjective Logic we have arrived once more at the turning over of what is merely subjective into what is merely objective. The being of the notion is a being in itself and for itself, which is a thing that takes place in and for itself and is hence again objectivity. The notion is that in which immediateness and mediation are the same, or in which notion and being, essentia and existentia, are identical, in which subjectivity is immediately objectivity, and thinking is being. This passing over of pure subjectivity or of the notion into pure objectivity necessarily takes place, inasmuch as the notion is recognised as absolute negativeness, or as that which determines itself and is self-subsistent. It is the same as the transition from the notion of God to the existence of God and the letting itself go on the part of logical idea into the actuality of nature, a passing over of subjectivity or a changing itself immediately into objectivity, or the becoming manifest of the identity of the two in themselves, the same act of reflection which phenomenologically had constituted the transition of consciousness into self-consciousness, or the immediate faith in the objectivity of that which is represented into the becoming aware of subjec-

1 Logic, III. p. 171.
tive Idealism, which same act here turns over into a becoming aware of subjective Ideality as objectivity; for where only subjective determinations are presented, this subjective objectivity is at the same time the sole objectivity, which exists in general, and cannot be distinguished from one that is externally real.

Thus are we suddenly removed from the sphere of subjective Logic into the realm of objectivity, into the "doctrine about the object," which runs into "mechanism, chemism and teleology," (mechanical powers, chemical powers and design.) The contents (matter) of what is termed objective Logic, of the doctrine of being and of essence, must here return again, although apprehended from a higher point of view; for it is here only that the whole, the totality, is presented as notion, i. e. in its truth. We are now acquainted with what lay at the foundation of that finiteness and isolateness of bare changing phenomena, viz. the substantial unity of the notion; we now know, that the latter is the ground which in itself is working; but the notion itself had immediately entered and changed into the whole fulness of its determinatenesses, it had become the soul of its members, without being in this membering yet soul for itself, i. e. intelligence; thereby it had lost its being for itself and must now restore itself again from this corporeity or naturalness, i. e. from objectivity, to subjectivity in itself for itself. As mere formal totality (universalty) of members it has become estranged from itself and enters into a relationship towards it as towards something other and external, for all nature is through and through that externality, the being without each other, the being in time and space, and thus everything in it stands externally related to each other, and this standing related constitutes mechanism, which must have a place in the sphere of logical thinking as well as in nature, for the latter reflects itself into the former, and in general there is not anything, which is not also thought or known in an adequate manner.

In mechanism the influence of one object upon the other appears in such a manner, that in it both objects remain as self-subsistent that, which they are, but at the same time communicate to each other a determinateness. Thus one and the same determinateness is here continued from the one over into the other. The essence of objects stands here related only as the abstractly
universal, in itself indeterminate, but determinable element, which is the same Identity in all; the form of individuality of external objects is wholly non-essential and cannot offer any resistance to that determination which penetrates through them. Thus individual bodies are penetrated by heat, magnetism, electricity and in general by the imponderable agencies, shewing thereby that their passive determinableness by external communication is only grounded in the identity or universality of their essence; yea common sense even acknowledges the validity of the rule, that it is only like which affects like. The Identity or the universal essence manifests itself therefore here as that aspect, from which objects have an existence which is open to other objects.

But notwithstanding all this communication objects remain on the other hand at the same time also individual and persist in their self-subsistence, or restore again in the universality that individuality, which belongs to them as notions; in other words, they react. By this, however, we do not mean that they destroy the effect, but rather that they propagate it in themselves and accept it as their own, so that the working spreads into the objects, breaks asunder into the objects or undergoes particularization in them. Thus the universal is broken asunder in the objects, and each object retains in itself its part of it, and maintains itself as individual by destroying within itself the influence as a universal one. The latter becomes now centrality in it and thus constitutes the individual self-subsistence of objects; but the action has thereby at the same time also passed into quiescence—into a being for itself of the individual objects, which now owe that which they are or their mode of being only to that communication from without, in such a manner as that this quality appears not as one derived from the nature of the object, but as one put upon it from without by something foreign.

Thus the object manifests itself on the one hand as that which is void of determination, universal, and as that which stands related passively, non-elastically and non-self-subsistently; while on the other hand it has at the same time a self-subsistence which cannot be broken through by what is other. The same contradiction or difference, which is here manifested by the individual object, objects possess also in general amongst themselves—we allude to that of self-subsistent individuality and non-self-subsistent universality.
That which is greater and stronger comprehends and penetrates that which is weaker, by taking it up and constituting one sphere with it. But still it conquers the latter only in so far, as it also opposes some resistance; had it been entirely passive, porous and non-self-subsistent, no relationship towards it would have been possible. A ball may indeed penetrate through a firm board, but not through a loose cloth which hangs in the air. But in truth it is again easy to perceive, that a passive object preserves itself by this and only in as far as its essence is identical with the force which acts upon it (an aspect which had formerly been represented as its exposure), hence is itself universal and has capacity for that which is communicated; but it succumbs to the force with all those particular determinatenesses, which are not corresponding to it (as for example the board with its hardness and immoveableness), which it cannot receive into itself and make its own determinatenesses or predicates, in which it cannot shew itself as the subject. Hence the force is something foreign to an object only with reference to this its second aspect; as the universal it is the power, which is not foreign even to the individual object, but which rather constitutes the proper substance of it, in which it feels itself as in its property and where it has its subsistence or definite existence, and that because and inasmuch as the individual object is itself an essential determination of the universal. Thus the mere external individuality, which does not depend on any universally essential difference, that is, the individual exemplar perishes indeed as such, but what is universal in them persists as essential determination and renews itself continually in individuals.

We have already seen that the self-subsistence and unity of individual essences, which as objects consist of a diversity of determinatenesses, appears in the sphere of mechanism as their central point (centrality). This multiplicity and diversity, as being a without each other in space, manifests itself as an accumulation of many objects distributed through the sphere, which are dependent on the centre and find in it their point of union or relation. That which presents itself here as a power of attraction of the centre, extending through all these objects, e. g. in the atmosphere of our globe which bears all its creatures, is in fact only that momentum of universality or of Identity of essence, of which all these manifold formations consist, as for example terrestrial creatures are
only the determinations and specifications of the terrestrial essence itself. The earth as a mundane body is an individual, it is a notion, i.e. something universal which at the same time is in itself something manifold and definite, while still it remains an individual, one whole, because all its parts together relate to each other, and thus constitute a unity, which appears in the material world as centrality. These determinate individual parts stand again related towards each other as totalities, as objects without and beside each other and on that account as pushing, pressing, &c. with reference to each other. But this relation does not obtain between these peripherical objects and the central body; for the latter constitutes them—it constitutes their essence, and all of them consist essentially of the universal essence of the central body and are in it in quiescence, they rest in it upon themselves. Such central bodies may no longer now be termed mere objects, their determinations, the whole multiplicity of essences, which the central body has in itself as its own modifications, are immanent in it, or as universal essence it is immanent in them and is their determining principle.

But just because as essence it is spread through the individual objects which are for themselves non-self-subsistent, and because as essence itself exists yet in the form of a being without each other in space, all those objects participate also not only in this essentiality, but also in its form, and hence contain each again a centre in themselves and are as relative centra or individuals placed, as to space, without that first absolute centre. Thus the latter represents again the logical universal notion, to which the former are subsumed as kinds or particularities, and as these relative individualities centralize themselves in themselves, refer to that which is essential in them, they relate thereby to that in them which is universal, which however was again only that universal centrality. In this way they form, logically considered; also a conclusion, in which the relation upon itself is at the same time a tending after an absolute central point, which manifests itself in the material world as centripetal force, or as the identical gravity of the central body, towards which the peripheric individuals tend, as their subject, while they maintain themselves at the same time as subjects.

But thereby mechanism has already become free mechanism;
the different objects have their essence in the universal penetrating essentiality, which in the separation maintains itself identical with itself, in gravity, and hence are subjects which are not subjected to a purely external mechanical pressure, but rather only to a law. But every law in the proper sense is as much an internal as an external power, i.e. as much the proper power and the proper willing, as it is the duty of the individual. Thus, e.g. in the state universal laws are indeed in the first instance felt by the individual as commands and orders, as foreign and external volition or as coercion, yet it is seen, that, inasmuch as the laws are rational, they express properly only the universal volition of all, in which therefore every individual has his own part, or recognizes his own will and free self-power. The same holds true of nature also. The world is one great whole, one real notion. We have seen, that it lies in the nature of the notion not to remain an abstract and empty universal, but that its existence consists in the particularization, and the actual world is that particular. In the being of nature it is the universal gravity which particularizes itself; this universal relating upon itself and contracting itself, which also relates upon itself in every point, which affirms in itself relative centra, subjects, and does not cease even in them to relate upon itself. But it is just in these individual subjects, that nature succeeds in coming first of all out of the rigidity of parts, that are separated in space, to free fluidity and unimpeded mobility, which, as we shall see, potentiates itself afterwards further into spirituality.

But the universal does not yet exist as contrast to what is corporeal, but is as its fundamental essence omnipresent in it, and constitutes the nature and power of all determinatenesses, although not yet for itself, but only as immanent law of nature. The centre has here descended into its periphery—it has spread into the whole, and while as notion it still remains the total relation to itself as the whole, it has in the parts placed itself into tensions with itself, or rather these parts themselves are only the actual tensions of the universal in itself. But as tensions they are antagonisms and contrasts, and hence definite, qualitative determinatenesses or differences, which tend against each other and wish back into unity with each other. Hence centrality is now the relation of these objectivities which are negative and in tension towards each other, and free mechanism has passed over into
Chemism, i.e. the separating itself (judging itself) in the sphere of objectivity. The chemical relationship corresponds again entirely to the judgment in subjective and to the category of essence in objective Logic. The chemical element is not, like the individual in the mechanism, something that is, a totality for itself, but only a difference, a determinateness, which immediately manifests its one-sidedness and non-self-subsistence, which points to something other and hence belongs again to necessity; for, while the whole, to which it belongs, is also a universal and destitute of form, it is not anything individual, but a notion, the momenta of which are distributed to two different objects. Hence it tends out of this existence, which is not adequate to its In-itself or to its notion, back into a unity with itself, it always wishes to make itself in existence a real whole, and it does this with irresistible and most necessary force of nature. Not only do the phenomena and laws of chemistry, in the proper sense of the term, belong to this class, but this logical fundamental relation comprehends also everything which in general occurs in Physics as elementary, meteorological, magnetical, electrical and finally as chemical process.

Mechanism had only been the first and wholly external form of objectivity, which forces itself even upon the empirical observer; but too frequently we stop short at it and transport it to spheres, for example those of life and spirit, to which it does not belong, or in which it is at least only subordinate, for in nature mechanism prevails only in the wholly abstract relations of matter. The same holds true of chemism with which, as has been observed, the further import of dynamism, as opposed to mechanism, stands connected in Logic.

But in general we might well wonder, how these notions as well as that of life are presented in Logic, if we were not bearing in mind, that contents (matter) and form, that which is thought and the mode in which it is thought, are never to be separated, and hence that logic is at the same time also metaphysics or the doctrine of cognition, and that the doctrine of the notion is specially also that of comprehending. Both in mechanism and in chemism the logical form has to be recognized, which imparts rationality to objective

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1 There is here in the original a play on the words: Begriff and Begreifen—notion and notioning or comprehending.—The Translator.
nature and which alone makes it intelligible for our understanding as a logical necessary relating. This logical form or this understanding of nature is the form of conclusion, in which the momenta of objectivity appear, whether they are looked upon from their quantitative aspect as mechanism, or from their qualitative as chemism. As in the conclusion every terminus may in turn be looked upon as medius, which both separates (judges) and unites the other two, so this becomes also manifest in the momenta of mechanism, especially in what is termed the mechanics of the infinite—in absolute mechanism—which, however, repeats itself also in the individual. For example, we may consider the central body, the world-space and the bodies of the periphery as termini, whose identity is gravity, \( i.e. \) attraction and repulsion. This latter, materiation or nature which is without itself as to space, this negativity, appears as the medius or as the judgment which tends into its two extremes, and hence as that which is universal and which affirms; or else the momentum of particularity, the individual bodies themselves, may be considered as centra, which, however, by virtue of their material nature have equally their centre without them and which hence are by this their interior connected to each other, or finally the whole is considered as an individual, whose centrality relates to non-self-subsistent objects through a medium; which unites in itself their centra as non-self-subsistent momenta. Even in ordinary consciousnesses now the attraction of the earth, then the gravity of the body that falls, and then again this movement itself as the identity of the two is assumed as the cause of a fall; even in that case now the one and then the other is affirmed as ground, while however we only express the same thing by it, viz. the connection or substantial unity of the two in themselves.

In chemism the object has or is a definite quality; but as notion it was not only to have been a determinateness, but the totality of determinations; hence it contains in itself the contradiction of its actual existence and of its being in itself, and endeavours to remove this contradiction. Just as above in mechanism the falling body had its centre of gravity without itself, so it has the chemical alterum without it, and is attracted towards it by what is termed its affinity. The ground of this attraction, to which it is subject, is the identity which both extremes are in themselves, the indifference, which has been put in tension into
differences. Here also now these extremes may appear as that which acts or as *medius terminus*, and then again the substantial identity itself.

But the process of chemical differentiating, neutralization and reduction, yields as result the destruction of the externality or of the objectivity of the momenta themselves. That objectivity consisted in the immediateness, in which they had been found as existent. As cause and effect were sublated into reciprocal action, so here also with reference to the differences which had been first met with as immediate; in their relating they manifested themselves only as non-self-subsistent momenta, which tended back into their identity: thus the latter was recognised as produced, mediated or affirmed by the former; but thereby this latter is again recognized and presupposed as that which is original, as that in which alone the differences could have their ground, and by which themselves had only been affirmed and mediated. In this manner, the immediateness which constituted the objectivity is taken away with reference to both sides; both sides are mediated, the one by the other, and the only thing which is now existent is the self-mediation of the total in itself, and thus the notion itself is again exhibited as living unity, and the latter again as self-mediation and this again as self-objectivization or self-realization. But this constitutes the living organism. "The notion, which has thus sublated all the momenta of its objective existence as external momenta and has placed them into its simple unity, is thereby perfectly set free from the objective externality, to which it only relates as to a non-essential reality; this objective free notion is the design."

When we speak of *designs* (ends), we are not to view them merely as certain representations of a rational being, which it wishes to realize and for which it employs certain materials as means. We refer here to the immanent design, in the acceptance, which Kant was the first to reintroduce into science in his Doctrine of Nature and in the Critique of the Faculty of Judging, having borrowed that term from Aristotle—to which we have already referred, when expounding Schelling's views. The immanent design manifests itself in essences, which are as yet in the germinal form, and in the first instance as the living tendency to grow, to develop themselves, to expand bodily and mentally,—in
short, to realize or to become actually that which as to their capacity, talent, potence or internal determination, they may and should become. The execution of this design constitutes the organic process or life.

Thus the design or the subjective notion is, as essential tendency and longing to affirm itself externally, set beyond all transition, i.e. only as notion and self-aim—not as bare substance and cause—the essence preserves itself during all its changes as that which it had been from the first, and does not pass into any thing else; it is thus only, as has already been shewn before, that it has all change in its power and that in disceding it does not degenerate into an externality of mechanical parts, void of connection, and is not given up to that decay, to which all previous forms of being had become a prey. But in as far as the design is still subjective—and such it is again in the first place—it is immediate, and stands itself within the sphere of immediateness or objectivity, it is yet affected by externality and has over against itself an objective world, to which it relates. The design is here as yet itself in the commencement of its process—is as yet in itself, is subjective and has yet to realize itself as design. As living it is also something particular and individual, and hence relates yet necessarily to something else (to an alterum) which, with reference to it, is indeed in itself something finite and non-entical and is also treated in this way by it, but is still something external. Life, as immediate self-aim, is the negating of this externality, of objects, of means of life; it is this self-confirmation which continually endeavours to remove the contradiction, which consists in this, that that which belongs to the life of the individual, that over which it has power, wishes still to maintain itself as foreign and self-subsistent, which state of separation is felt by the individual as want and requirement, as hunger, as thirst, &c. Hence life is the labour of this continuous negation of externality, and this negating constitutes its self-aim in which it has and feels itself. But just because in itself it is only this, itself cannot be, if at the sametime also that externality is not; negativing would cease, as soon as there would no longer be anything to be negatived; the perfected negation of objectivity would be its own negation. Inasmuch, then, as in itself it is necessarily or dialectically related to externality, i.e. is itself yet external (body) in itself,
it requires always again to restore objectivity, which, like desire by satisfying it, ever grows anew. Only the immediateness, which is found present, is removed by the movement of the design, in order to affirm it as determined and affirmed by it, by the notion itself, hence only, in order that, in this removing and affirming, the subject may satisfy and prove itself as self-activity. Hence the true final purpose is in the last instance the liberty of the subject, to exhibit itself as subject victorious over all.

The definite finite subject finds immediately objects in the sphere of finiteness, to which it has to impart its own internal determinateness, which it has to make equal to its subjective design, i.e. it treats them as means. That which is employed as means is indeed a thing existent and found there, but is not looked upon as final purpose, but as a being in itself without value, which we may use as a merely mechanical or chemical object, and which neither can nor ought to preserve itself self-subsistently against the activity of the design. Hence the object has the character of being wholly without power with reference to the design and of being obliged to serve it. The latter is its subjectivity or soul, to which it stands related as its external members; for "be that can pay for six horses may run on four-and-twenty legs," while the infant has at first not even the power of its own legs. Even one's own members, as long as they maintain their externality towards us, as if they were external objects, and are not yet themselves penetrated by the subjective design, are not yet our property.

But as the purpose relates here still to a definite, natural, and finite object, itself also is definite, finite and hence external. It requires, in order to be negation and that definite negation, also that definite object and hence a medium or a series of means, as all are finite, in order to come successively through them to the totality of all; itself is not yet the executed design, but only the commencement, which always arises again when it is past, i.e. the designs become always again means; the subject, which executes, is always only in its course through that series, which is a progressus in infinitum, it is in itself the continuous mediation.

But thereby this progress also is itself sublated, and is changed as process into the design; for life has itself for its purpose, it enjoys itself as continuous activity of mediating and wishes to be
such. Man employs the plough as a means for agriculture, agriculture is again a means for sowing, sowing for the fruit, and the latter as the design and the product of the whole process is itself again consumed. It is means of life, and life itself consists and passes on in this restless mediation; hence it is a process going back into itself, and the latter is the activity relating to itself, the now executed design or the self-executing final purpose; and thus the execution or the mediation is in the whole or in the absolute not different from the purpose, the two are identical. Hence, as to its contents (matter), the design is nothing else but the chemical and mechanical relationship, or it has the latter for its contents, they are subjected to its dominion, or, as has been shewn, return by themselves into the purpose, which lies at the ground of them, and which thus includes the whole plenitude or the totality of finite designs as a continuing process of nature. This is the all-prevailing order and conformity to law and to design, which constitutes objective reason eternally existent in nature. This total contents appears now as continuing in the constant realization of the purpose, and the teleological process, by which nothing comes into the world, which in itself had not already been in it, is "a translation into objectivity of the notion which exists as notion; it is found, that this translating into something other that had been presupposed is the coinciding (collapsing) of the notion through itself with itself." "Hence it may be said with reference to the teleological activity, that in it the end is the commencement, the consequence the ground, the effect the cause; that it is a becoming of that which has become, and that in it that only which already exists comes into existence," &c. The causa efficiens, instrumentalis and finalis, are now the perfectly affirmed three momenta of the notion or the three termini of the conclusion, and have manifested themselves in this circuit as living unity, that had become perfectly expressed in itself.

Hence the executed or absolute final purpose does not go beyond itself to a reduplication of itself, nor does it affirm as its final purpose an object as that which is equal to itself, but it is in itself the objective design, i.e. the absolute selfish activity of design relating to itself, or the whole as self-aim is again immediately in itself the truly objective purpose, because it is the per-
fected subjective purpose in the same sense in which the absolute subject is also in itself the absolute object. The Dialectics, exhibited before, repeats itself here again, viz. in the reciprocal action of the notion in itself with itself as identity of subjectivity and objectivity. Objectivity had indeed appeared as the first-given and the immediate; but the activity of the subjective design consisted in sublating this immediateness, not indeed the contents of the objective world, but only its form or objectivity. Thus that side had, in the first instance, been sublated by the subject, but only in order itself again to affirm it; it was to continue what it is, but only to be penetrated by the subject which penetrates into it, or, what amounts to the same thing, receives it into itself and makes it its own. The subject or the design is a conqueror who is concerned about nothing else but being acknowledged; in the territories brought under subjection the old laws and manners are continued, and the prince himself rules only according to, and is directed by them. But inasmuch as the subject has (as living body) thereby also gone out into externality and now contains it in itself, it has the latter for its own proper contents, it is through and through filled up with this real externality. Hence the synthesis of these two momenta, of subjectivity and objectivity, is here also, as all the other syntheses, the movement of turning over into the two kinds of forms, where, as already stated, the matter remains the same, while the activity or the becoming is this form-activity, which as such is distinguished from its other form, viz. from immediate existence—for it is only the latter which constitutes external reality—and knows itself as the identity of the two. As the identity of subjectivity and objectivity, the notion is now idea.
LECTURE SEVENTEENTH.

(HEGEL—CONCLUSION.)

We have now progressed as far as the idea, i.e. the identity of subjectivity and objectivity. The idea is the highest truth, and all the other lower standing-points of Logic are sublated in it. Truth is thinking which knows itself as being, or thinking which has as being become for itself and which knows itself. In absolute truth thinking and being are perfectly identical, as had already been shewn at the close of Phenomenology. Like every synthesis, the idea also is a process,¹ inasmuch as the identity of notion and of objectivity, which constitutes it, is only by this, exists and preserves itself only by this, that it is dialectic, i.e. the negativeness which maintains itself as substance or principle, viz. as continual negativing in all the antagonisms which it percurr, while the notion gives itself objectivity and again recalls itself from it to subjectivity. Hence properly the expression: unity of subjectivity and objectivity, of infinitude and finitude, of thinking and being &c. is inadequate and false, in as far as we mean thereby a quiescence or neutralising of the two sides. On the contrary, the idea is essentially restlessness, it is process. Although we see, that the idea occupies as absolute synthesis the place of origination, yet Hegel expresses himself in another place in such a way, that origination seems only to apply to the side of materiation and of external actuality, and that the latter has, as finiteness and transitoriness, for its ground as internal being² the notion, which is equal to itself—a

¹ Vide Encyclopaedia, § 215.
² Logic, III. p. 241.
view which is, indeed, retained by a portion of his followers, but which, if consistently carried out, would derange the whole methodical fundamental schema of Hegel, and which must again be sublated by this, that the notion is the substance of the phenomenon, and the substance is, as we know, absolute negativity, the actuality of judging itself. True, in the idea notion and reality, or subjectivity and objectivity must be distinguished, but in such a manner, that the idea is itself this distinguishing or this absolute judgment, viz. into a subjectivity, which by itself would be abstract, and into an objectivity, which by itself would be a diversity destitute of ground and of unity. Objectivity is the realization of the design, or that in which the subject realizes itself—an objectivity affirmed by the activity of the design which, as being affirmed, has its persistence and form only as penetrated by its subject. As objectivity it is externality, and hence itself a momentum of the notion or the aspect of finiteness, of transitoriness and of appearance, which constituted the immediateness of existence, from which the notion ever ascends victoriously, or which it sublates into itself, so that it ever perishes in the unity of the notion, in order to proceed once more from it, as again affirmed by it.

While the idea is this process, it is such in the first place again only immediately; in its own reality, which is adequate to it and correspondent to the design, it is not yet for itself, but at first only in itself as notion; it is yet the immediate process of self-realization, i.e. it is life; as notion it is in this external working and living only the omnipresent soul poured forth into the totality of its members and the universal membering or organising itself. Thus itself enters into the dividedness, i.e. exists as separate, living individuals. But as absolute negativity, or as the universal soul, it consists as much in the removing as in the affirming of this form, and is hence the process of the genus which preserves itself as genus, while the individuals, as being indifferent, always perish and go back into the universal, which is in all of them the same unit. Whenever the universal notion realizes itself, it enters into corporeity, which by virtue of its nature is a without each other—a multiplicity, a thorough objectivity in itself; from this realization the notion has again to recal itself to unity, to being in itself, i.e. to ideality.
Death or the removing of this being without itself or of reality into ideality is thus the second momentum of the process, as the first had been the immediate being affirmed of it. This second, or the translating of reality into ideality, constitutes cognition.

In cognition the subject (spirit) has become understanding (spirit); as understanding, the idea exists freely by itself, for it has only itself for its object, or objectivity itself for its notion; it has become this pure identity with itself and this substantial unity, which is now a pure distinguishing of itself within itself. It has the whole fulness of objective being within itself for itself, as objectivity indeed, but this objectivity is now its own and no longer a foreign one, shutting itself up against it and an external one, bounding it; it has objectivity within itself as a subjective objectivity, inasmuch as it has penetrated it and cognised it as affirmed by itself, as an objectivity indeed, but, as we had seen in teleology, as one which cannot assert firm self-subsistence with reference to the universal substance. As life the idea affirms indeed objectivity from the very commencement, but without knowing about its affirming; hence, when it becomes cognition and reflects, objectivity is presented to it as existent and given. This form of immediateness of the world, which properly is a deception and the universal error, from which the mind of man has to get free, is now removed by cognition. Cognition is itself this successive removing. It is only at the close of the process that the absolute subject—and every individual subject is, as truly cognising, in its own internal substance itself this universal subject,—has perfectly come to itself and pre-supposes itself as universum, and in the first place indeed as external universum, but as already intelligible, understood and penetrated by the notion. It is now understood, how at the very commencement of the logical process, when the subject was yet only immediate intuition, certainty, intelligence and knowledge of truth, in general consciousness could have existed, inasmuch as the absolute identity of thinking and of being had always been existent in itself, which has now also become, and been cognised as certainty for itself.

True, cognition in the closer application or theoretical cognition is only one aspect of the process; but it manifests itself also as identical with its other aspect, viz. the practical or volition, as had already been shewn in Phenomenology. As cognition has
as theory *truth* for its product, so the practical process that which is *good*. The identity of subjectivity and objectivity or of the ideal and the real is eternally in the idea and in itself; it is on this account that from the first the subject attains cognition with the belief that his cognition is true, and that it apprehends the world and that a true and actual world. But as this identity is at first one not yet known by the subject, the *tendency* exists to affirm it, or, expressing it negatively, to exhibit as non-entical and to destroy the dualistic antagonism, which in itself is non-entical. As long as the subject stands over against an objectivity, and the latter against the subject, as long as ideality and reality stand in an exclusive manner over against each other, *both of them* are finite; but the subject has to deliver itself from this finiteness and one-sidedness and to subject objectivity to itself; this is done by means of a reception into thinking of the existent world, or, what amounts to the same thing, by infusing thinking into it, *i.e.* by putting rational design into objectivity; both are in themselves one and the same process; but, viewed either from the one or other aspect, it appears as different, or as theoretical and practical. This gradual assimilation of the given material constitutes the training of the understanding, which Psychology and Phenomenology have specially to carry out, and Logic has here only to exhibit quite in general, the mode and way of this process, *i.e.* the *method* of this cultivation of the understanding, viz. the logical analysis and synthesis as it is termed.

Parallel with this merely intellectual, and not yet absolutely rational theoretical acting we have on the other hand what is practically intellectual, or volition, which is to make of the world that which it ought to be. "The immediate, that which is found present, is not looked upon by volition as a stable being, but only as an appearance, as in itself non-entical. Here the contradictions occur, with which we are engaged on the standing-point of morality. In practical respects, this is in general the standing-point occupied by the philosophy of Kant and also by that of Fichte. What is good is to be realized; we have to work at it, to produce it, and the will is only the good which manifests itself; but if the world were as it should be, the activity of the will would thereby cease. Hence the will itself requires also that its design be not realized; the finiteness of the will is thereby rightly ex-
pressed." Hence we have here the same process, which had already been presented to us before in teleology as the process of mediation, which mediation was purpose for itself—or as life; but the solution of the contradiction, or the synthesis of the two sides, consists here in this, "that the will returns in its result to the assumption of cognition, and hence in the unity of the theoretical and of the practical idea. Volition cognises the design as being its own, and intelligence apprehends the world as the actual notion; such is the true position of rational cognition." As already stated, naught is changed with reference to the matter; that which is removed and changed "constitutes only the surface, not the true essence of the world; the latter is the notion which is in and by itself, and thus the world is itself the idea." The good, the final purpose of the world is only, inasmuch as it always produces itself; what is good, and what is rational, is always actual, and everything that is actual is rational, inasmuch as it, viz. the world itself, continually affirms itself as purpose and continually produces itself as activity or process.

Such then, in conclusion, is the absolute idea, the unity of the theoretical and practical idea, or of the idea of life and of cognition; it is the life which knows itself in its rational necessity, and the latter the truth or actuality which knows about itself. By itself the absolute idea is the pure form of the notion as this fluid or living self-moving and self-determining. This pure form is the method, as it has moved and membered itself through the whole course of the system, and has filled itself up with determinations. The methodical movement, this immanent necessity or negativeness is the principle, which, as the soul, prevails through the whole organism of science, which contains in itself and is itself true being, and it is in the last instance also again the result; it is the notion as judgment and conclusion, the thinking in its self-movement, reason, the eternally genetic, restless becoming (origination) in and out of, and to itself.

We have expounded the contents of Logic, which constitutes the kernel of the system, as fully as the purpose of these Lectures admitted of it. With reference to the second and third portion of the system, the philosophy of nature and of the mind, we can only endeavour to exhibit its systematic position with reference to Logic.
and to characterise its contents by bringing before the student their results.

It seems most difficult to discover a necessary transition from Logic to the philosophy of nature, and this is the point to which the opponents, and Schelling at their head, are wont to direct their most strenuous attacks. According to the opinion of Hegel, Logic has again returned in its final result into the notion of the method, which had from the beginning been its soul and its presupposition. This methodical process, together with its whole potential contents (matter), or the logical idea, exhibits itself now in turn again as an In-itself, or as the In-itself in general, which is not yet actual, but has only to pass into actuality. It becomes now the new and indeed the universal thesis of the universal process. But when we say: not yet, we do not thereby mean that the logical has yet somehow or other to be placed before the reality of time, nay, the latter is only together with the former and the former is eternally together with the latter, as will immediately be seen. Hence, here also, as in every particular part of the system, the transition of the thesis into the antithesis is an unreserved turning over, a metamorphosis into its being otherwise, viz. into the direct antagonism of the logical being In-itself and by-itself or of non-actuality into actuality, i.e. into the absolute being-without-itself of nature,¹ from which it will again have afterwards to take itself back into the unity, which however, like every synthesis, is this process itself as an eternal demitting and at the same time recalling itself—spirit.

Logic had, indeed, already treated of this being otherwise and this being estranged to itself on the part of thought, which constitutes the immediateness of nature, and it was the very original, from which Logic had to set itself free. Hence we should have expected that this doctrine had been fully exhausted in the principles of it, and that natural objectivity had, as to fundamental essence, been resolved into the notion; but "as the object is there indicated as to its thought-determination, we have yet to treat of the empirical appearance, which corresponds thereto, and to shew that it actually corresponds with it."² The whole connection,

¹ Encyclopaedia, § 244, 247.
² Encyclopaedia, § 246.
however, does not admit of viewing the philosophy of nature
say only as Logic applied to a given empirical material, nor yet
as a further carrying out and arranging of logical principles into
the detail of natural genera and species; but the import of the
being of nature is systematically to be only apprehended, as the
universal judgment into which the absolute notion discedes in
itself. As little would we attain the meaning of the system, if we
were to view Logic already as an actual thinking, as a divine self-
consciousness—apprehending it in a theistical manner—which
maintains itself by itself behind or above nature; for this would
anticipate the conclusion, that the absolute only comes to itself
within the process of nature itself and that in man, or, in other
words, that it attains there self-consciousness. Hence, if it is said
with reference to Logic, that it is the absolute or God as it were
previous to the creation of the world, we have to add: and, at the
same time, before his self-realization, although he is never not
actual, i.e. is as world eternal. Hence real and actual being does
not belong to Logic in itself; it is not actual anywhere else than in
the thinking of men; by itself it is an abstraction, it is the being-
in-itself, which it is difficult to define, a realm of laws, a shadowy
world of forms void of essence,—the same, which in the case of
Kant the existence of categories had been as of non-innate, not yet
ready notions or ideas; and just because it is such, it is not
and cannot be by itself, but only in identity with the actuality of
the world, so that we are not so much to look for, or miss, a transi-
tion from the logical mind to nature, which in and by itself does
not at all exist, as rather only to perceive this identity. Neverthe-
less, this In-itself remains in full force in nature, which, by virtue
of its notion, is a being, in itself thoroughly objective, external and
that has discedes into its momenta, remaining active as it were
in the back-ground or in the depth; for, "nature may, indeed,
be looked upon as a system of stages, of which one necessarily
proceeds from the other (the higher species from the lower), but
not in such a manner as that one is naturally produced out of the
other, but in the internal idea which constitutes the ground of
nature. The metamorphosis applies only to the notion as such,
inasmuch as its change alone constitutes development."1 "On

1 Encyclopaedia, § 249.
the contrary this very externality is peculiar to nature, to allow
the differences to separate and to make their appearance as indif-
ferent existences."

With reference to the contents of the philosophy of nature, it
is, indeed, found that here, on account of that separateness and
externality, the categories of quantity precede those of quality;
and that on the same ground the antitheses are not simple nega-
tions of the theses, but are themselves antitheses of two members,
insulauch as the thesis itself, maintains a continuous existence
along with and beside its negative determinateness; but as to
the rest we meet here again the logical division and development
of the categories, although with names changed and partly
derived from the empirical designation. The arrangement
coresponds to the momenta of the notion; the universal is here
the absolute without-each-other, space with its negation, time, and
their synthesis, motion; the whole of this doctrine, which corre-
sponds to the logical quantity, bears the name of mechanics.
Absolute mechanics (the mechanics of the infinite), which corre-
sponds to the category of measure and contains the general prin-
ciples of astronomy, leads to qualitative, i. e. to physical determi-
nateness. Together with the externally quantitative relations of
the heavenly bodies, their qualitative nature also is given, viz. as
to the fundamental essence, the light and its negation, darkness
(shadow.) The former manifests itself in the simple luminous
body, the sun; the latter, partly in the lunar and partly in the
cometary body, i. e. partly in the wholly rigid matter, partly in
the cosmical matter which is dissolved into a vaporous mass. The
synthesis of both is the planet catexochen, the Earth, which is
viewed as "body of individual totality," in which rigidity is
resolved by the separation into real differences, and this resolu-
tion is kept together by its own centrality (the individual point
of unity). These liberated differences are the elements, not the
chemical elements, but those which are commonly so termed, pro-
perly processes, which continuously pass into each other and con-
stitute the life of the earth, that is, the meteorological process.
But the earth itself, as real unity, as subject or ground of the
elementary process, enters into antagonism with this change of
forms, while it again wages war with the binding gravity of the
matter of the earth. Matter separates itself in itself according to
the specific gravity of its differences, and the different degrees of density and cohesion make their appearance in it; elasticity, sound and, finally, the resolution of specific form into the formlessness of ponderous matter, heat, are the manifestations (phenomena) of this antagonism. But by heat and, in the last instance, by the process of combustion those elements, which had formerly been bound together, discede into a totality of individual forms, which are by themselves and constitute as such the object of the third portion of physics. The immediate shape as such, the simple difference, which from absolute formlessness, the point of indifference, tends into extremes, constitutes magnetism; the latter however is, so to express ourselves, only the abstract shape of shape itself, viz. the simple activity of the immediate differentiating itself, which, if it has passed into its quiescent product, becomes a crystal. But if the antagonistic poles of magnetism particularize themselves into positiveness and negativeness, this constitutes the phenomenon of electricity; finally, the neutralization of this tension in different relationships constitutes the chemical process, and its products are what are termed chemical elements.

Both the removing and the affirming of these real contradictions or tensions, has its ground in the identity of essence, to which, as to a substantial unity, they all belong and which is itself living negativeness. Thus here also, just as before in Logic, the external reciprocal action passes into Organics or Biology. Here the process occurs as the total life of the globe or the organization of the earth—the geological process—which, however, appears as an evolution which is past, which has attained to quiescence and continues only in the latest formations. Then the individual or particular life bursts forth in vegetable nature; but the plant itself is as yet only an individuum which consists of many individuals, and every individual branch is a new addition, a plant growing and repeating itself on the plant,—individuality has not yet attained the mastery over particularity. Organizing unity, which penetrates everything, which as such reflects itself at the same time in itself and becomes subjectivity for itself, soul and self-feeling, constitutes the third, viz. the animal process—life, in the narrower acceptation of the term.

The animal process of life consists as much in a forming of
one's self for one's self and out of one's self to an individuum, as, in relation to inorganic nature, in an assimilating or mediating with the world without and that both theoretically by the senses and practically by nutrition. The teleology of the mediation is here repeated in both directions. But both processes, viz. that of formative individuation and that of mediation, are synthetically united into the process of the genus (the generic process). For, inasmuch as the individual life is related to the universal substance, it finds the latter not merely without itself and in inorganic nature, as in a sphere foreign to it, but, as it is its property, its own internal element, common also to all individuals and in which they live, the individuals are as genus a substantial unity in it, which genus-substance may itself be viewed as the universal, which realizes itself and exists in the many individuals. Hence, while the individual goes into itself by virtue of its self-feeling, it comes together in this interior with that which is generically universal. But, inasmuch as in the externality of the process of nature this coming together of the genus remains in itself also only an external process—the process of copulation—and immediately discedes again in its product into the difference of sexes, so that only the genus itself maintains itself, not the individuals, and continues as that process of originating and passing away—that, which has internally come forward in it as the working-ground, viz. the genus or substantial universality itself, life as such has attained to independent existence. We have now reached the same transition, which Logic had to make, when from the objective notion it progressed to the idea,—here, however, it is the passage from nature to mind, and in the system from the philosophy of nature to that of the mind.

The philosophy of the mind, which constitutes the third and concluding portion, divides itself into the philosophy of the subjective mind, where, besides Anthropology, the contents of Phenomenology, which had formerly been developed as propaedeutics, find their systematic place, again, into the doctrine of the objective and, finally, that of the absolute mind. By "objective mind," Hegel understands the rational organization of the idea of right, of morals and of politics, which has become objective and real. For Phenomenology concludes in its last theoretico-practical portion, which is specially termed psychology, with the idea of
happiness, i. e. with that of a representation of the gratification of all impulses brought about by the reflection of the understanding. In this universal purpose the particular volitions of the many join together into one rational common volition, in the realization of which every individual also finds his particular purpose and his individual gratification, and hence his freedom. This universal objective will constitutes "the objective mind" in general. Free will realizes itself, first, as individual, i. e. as person, by which, however, we are not to understand merely the mental and bodily personality, in the stricter acceptation, but everything which also belongs externally to the perfect organization of the individual liberty; hence, more particularly, property, for everything, which is thing, is pre-established as a will-less member of man, to become means and instrument to him, so that he possesses himself only in this circuit, that he possesses there only his own capability and power. But again, this free will reflects itself also, at the same time, out of this externality and actuality into itself, and is in the former also for itself. This is the right of the subjective will— the morality—of being also particularly for itself and individually determined. It will be seen, that morality has here a subordinate and ambiguous meaning. A moral disposition, which would shut itself up within itself, would result in non-activity, and hence pass itself into immorality,—for its contents (matter) is that which is right, and what is right must be practised and realized. Right and duty are thoroughly correlate. There is no such thing as duty, on my part, which has not the right of another corresponding to it, and vice versa. There is no such thing as a distinction between the duties of rectitude, in the narrower acceptation, and what are termed the moral duties of the conscience and of love. Right and morality do not stand related to each other as stages, but as aspects or momenta,—the former is the objective, the latter the subjective; but their contents are one and the same, and in general there is not in the subject any ethical contents which ought not to be exhibited in life and to be realized, nor any sanctity of the inner man, which ought not also to become sanctity of deed. Hence both aspects attain truth only in their synthesis, viz. in that which Hegel specially designates as obtaining morals, as prevailing morality (social morality.)
Social morality is the substantial, universal and rational will as the actuality which corresponds to its notion, it is willed and executed necessity, which, as that self-realized act of the mind, constitutes existent freedom. The family, civil society and the state, are the momenta of this objectively and really existent rationality. In it the mind is the free substance, the universal, which has its actuality in the individuals and is connected together in that particularity, which constitutes the particular spirit of a people, or national peculiarity. By virtue of that particularity, which the universal mind still exhibits in every period and in every nation in which it realizes itself, it is always held within a limit (barrier), from which it endeavours successively to deliver itself by the cultivation of the particular nation. But, as nationality, i. e. the existence of a people as particular and definite, is essentially connected with this limit or barrier, the nations themselves perish in this process of deliverance. Each has its right to exist and to prevail only in its own time and as link in this succession. The world-spirit does not consider all its members as on an equal footing of right, and only the nation which prevails in each period is that which is absolutely in the right against all the others,—the latter are not recognized as equals by the nation, which is dominant. Thus nomadic nations are not esteemed as sovereignties by those which are settled and civilized; and those which have remained on lower stages of civilization are termed barbarians and are treated as such,—war is waged with them, and they are subjugated. In the absolute idea every nation occupies a place, according to its worth and capability in virtue of its life-principle. Hence the nation which is most capable is also actually in the right,—in the right of the more powerful, and power constitutes its right, both ideally and really,—physical power and rational right coincide here.

If a people is forced to submit to another, this is only the actual and necessary consequence of the fact, that the principle or the idea, which animates it, is in the absolute mind or thinking a rationally subordinate category, and one which has to be negated by the higher category. "The history of the world is the judgment of the world."

But as individual nations are by virtue of their individuality and particularity, which stands connected to physical relations, still
held within the barrier of naturalness, it follows that the absolute world-spirit has not its actual totality and universality in any one individual nation. The absolute has yet to put away these deficiencies and antagonisms of finiteness, in order to be for itself as a knowing about itself as about the absolute mind, or as actual truth. The subjective mind, as it has manifested itself in Psychology, and the objective mind, as exhibited in jurisprudence, are the momenta of the absolute which is their identity and reality. The whole of this sphere of the absolute mind may be termed religion, the knowing of the absolute substance about itself; but in the special and proper sense the latter has to be limited to one, and that the middle, of the three stages, which constitute this knowing; for this knowing is itself a process and that the absolute one, which percurrs the forms of immediateness, of being for itself and of being in and for itself.

The immediate form of this knowing is that of the intuition and representation of the mind, which in itself is absolute, the form of beauty. There the Deity or the mind is yet sensibly appearing to itself, it is the immediate unity of mind and of nature. There the momentum of universality is yet abstract for itself; it has its matter only in natural determinations, and hence itself belongs again to finiteness, it becomes finite and particularizes itself objectively into the particular deities of places and of nations, into polytheism. Here the absolute has its subjectivity or its consciousness only in the inspiration of the artist and of the prophet, in a non-free pathos, which strives to express what is highest, but as yet feels itself only as urged on, as the instinctive pressure of genius. This is art, which produces indeed what is highest, but as it were blindly, i.e. immediately; for the nature of the idea of beauty consists in this, that it and its product are yet immediately one, that the idea appears yet immediately sensuously, and that the two are as it were yet growing up together in a natural manner. But fine art as this non-antagonistic consciousness of the absolute or the religion of art and of beauty urges beyond this stage, on account of that very want of separation. Inasmuch as the subject does not possess itself for itself and in distinction from the external, finite, non-entical phenomenon, but only along with and by the latter, it must appear to itself as non-entical; its self-feeling dies in the non-entity of its finite existence, inasmuch as it had
only been the self-consciousness of one individual and not that of
the genus, which amidst all change ever preserves itself.

The latter is brought about by the life in the state, where the
individual will is subjected to the will of all, whereby the indi-
individual self-consciousness sinks into its universal substance, viz.
into the moral mind, out of which the living memberment of indi-
vidual subjects is ever anew brought forth, as the substance has its
actuality only in this membered form. Hence the absolute is
itself this revealing of itself in the many subjects, which again
know themselves to be identical with the absolute, which in them
attains being for itself and self-consciousness. This is essentially
"revealed religion," viz. a relationship of the absolute to itself,
the self-consciousness of the Deity about himself in men. But as
this knowing occupies yet here the stage of rational self-conscious-
ness, i. e. of reflection and of representation, it still concedes to the
momenta of its contents self-subsistence towards each other; men
conceive God as a Being who exists for himself and themselves also
as being freely for themselves. But this implies a contradiction, in-
asmuch as, together with this self-subsistence, Identity also obtains
in the religious consciousness, and the subject feels himself expressly
dependent on the Deity, and hence as much negatives as affirms his
self-subsistence and freedom. But this contradiction must be re-
moved and is removed, inasmuch as the religion of the mind, Chris-
tianity, thinkingly penetrates and develops the true doctrine of
reconciliation, which it already contains, but enunciates as a mys-
tery, and the representation of the incarnation of God and of what
is termed the Trinity in the Unity, which constitute the specula-
tive kernel of this "absolute" religion, and thus elevates faith into
knowledge, and religion into philosophy.

Here we have again the three momenta of the notion, which
pass into each other in a threefold conclusion and mediate them-
selves into a unity. Universality may be apprehended as the ab-
solute essence (the Father), which mediates itself by the world-
actuality (the Son as the momentum of particularity) into identity
with itself (into Spirit); in the same manner the Spirit also may be
brought forward as the concrete Identity or unity of these two
sides and, finally, the middle also or the meditating process it-
self, the world-actuality or the Son, as being the Mediator. Thus
philosophy fully resolves the rigid self-subsistence of the momenta
of the absolute, which religious consciousness yet places over against each other, into the living stream of the absolute process, which is the true form of the notion, in which thinking has overcome all antagonisms and has attained to reconciliation with itself, i.e. to absolute spirituality as to truth which knows itself. Hence this notion of philosophy, as of the idea which thinks itself, is "what is logical, with that meaning, that in its concrete contents as in its actuality it is proved universality. In this manner science has returned to its commencement and the logical result, as what is spiritual, which has proved itself as the truth which is in and for itself."
LECTURE EIGHTEENTH.

(CONCLUDING REMARKS.)

If we succeed in gaining a general view of the system of Hegel in its totality, we come to view the Epicycloid of its categories, which bends back into itself, as the universal spirit and again this spirit in the last instance in the absolute idea, as the truth which eternally thinks itself. Perfected Philosophy stands now no longer without and before the universe, but is true being itself, which has attained in it perfected self-consciousness; the antagonisms of Reality and Ideality are in the absolute itself only the internal self-distinguishings of the absolute; the whole may as much be designated an absolute Idealism or Realism, and we have hereby attained, what we were to have attained, even the self-agnition of the All in itself, which penetrates everything and which has this its point of self-penetration in the consciousness of mankind and knows about itself in the science of it, so that man knows in his science at the same time himself as the all-penetrating and absolute knowing. And what beyond this could be attained, what higher standing-point of Philosophy could even be conceived? That which is absolutely highest seemed now to be attained, and Philosophy, at least and its grand and total, perfected, and whatever was left could only bear reference to details. Hence Hegel's workmen assembled in order to celebrate the grand conclusion of a building which had occupied centuries. The admonition of exoterics was, fifteen years ago, generally despised, although they reminded the disciples that that feast had already been frequently celebrated and that the same shout of
triumph had been successively raised by those who had heralded the philosophy of the different schools. For the founder of every new system would necessarily cherish also the conviction, that he had put the copestone upon the building; but besides it had to be said with reference to this most recent system that, as it had constituted the idea of absolute progression the principle and the law of the world, it put the irony upon itself, when it claimed absolute stability. Hence it had been augured that this pretended new copestone would again turn out the same, of which it is said—

"But when he fancies
Now to have set it securely on high, down tumbles the burden
Quick, and with noise the deceptive stone from its summit has rolled."

But although this was not allowed, it soon became apparent, as a matter of fact, inasmuch as a schism manifested itself within the school itself as to the authentic interpretation of the teaching and opinions of Hegel. His followers divided into a right and a left, into Hegelians and young-Hegelians, while a weak centre was left in the middle, which in truth was properly only the idolon of Hegel—the corpus of the works which had been left behind. For as with every other great philosopher, so here also in the case of Hegel, it shewed itself that he had possessed a profound treasure of truth, part of which only had been elaborated, formed and systematically wrought out, while part of it was yet left behind without having been brought into shape. After Kant it had been the task of philosophy, to overcome the subjectiveness of that standpoint and to press onward to an actual knowing and willing of objective truth. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, had all undertaken that task, and the latter had executed it methodically. But if it seems, as if everything was thereby attained, we shall immediately find, that this penetrating from subjectiveness to objectiveness has been accomplished at the sacrifice of subjectiveness; and thus a third problem is yet left, even the concrete connecting of the two sides, so that objectiveness may not to be extinguished in subjectiveness, as it had been done in the case of Kant and of Fichte, nor subjectiveness perish in objectiveness, as with Schelling and Hegel, but each occupy its own proper place. Without doubt such had been the purpose and design of Hegel. If then we keep by this deeper contents, we must, in order to bring it out, perfect the form; but if
we keep by the form of Hegel, as the left of the School hath done, we shall have to eliminate every thing which, strictly taken, does not resolve itself in it, and hence to quit both Hegel’s intention and, if we are consistent, even his principle and standing-point also. The necessary consequence—and such has already manifested itself—will be a one-sidedly objectivistic neo-Spinozism, wholly opposed to that deeper subjectivity after which Hegel had aimed, but which, on account of this one-sidedness, may be again fully as much apprehended as subjectivism and may then terminate either in empiricism or in scepticism, and which thus performs in the view of all onlookers the proper criticism of the original system as such, i.e. of its scientific form. For it is not a philosopher’s intention and design, such as he keeps for himself or only states, which constitutes him a philosopher and secures his influence upon science, but the logical forms, which he elaborates, and the *systematie* dominion, of which he possesses himself, constitute what is philosophical in him. As none had insisted more upon this unity of matter and form, than Hegel himself, his system must also be understood and judged according to it.

At first that system was looked upon as orthodox, in opposition to the rationalism of Kant, more especially as it revived once more the doctrine of the Trinity, which had been set aside; it pretended to celebrate behind the veil of its terminology the mysteries of Christianity in a purer light. But criticism rent that nimbus asunder, and the assemblage of the initiated separated, partly into such who openly professed themselves non-Christians and who seriously and avowedly wage war with the Church, partly into such who, being undeceived, wholly renounced Hegelianism, and have of late sought satisfaction from Schelling, or else—and this constitutes the greatest number—have returned to the critical standing-point of Kant, finally into such, who fancy they may continue where Hegel had stopped short, and who still recognize in the system as its true contents—a theism which accords well enough with Christianity. In former Lectures, when expounding these views, we have shown how and in what respect a certain amphiboly allows this mode of apprehending, only that thereby we come into collision not only with the method and the systematics of the whole, but also with its principle.

It must indeed be admitted, that philosophy may and ought to
view with indifference what are termed the consequences of a system, even though these consequences involve us in differences with ecclesiastical orthodoxy; for granting, that Christianity is the pure truth, who will answer for it, that the orthodoxy which prevails at any one time is equivalent with pure Christianity? Mayhaps a philosophical system, which opposes orthodoxy, might turn out more Christian than it; and in fact history proves it, that it has been philosophy which as the most active servant in the laboratory of the Church has incessantly been employed in the process of purifying its dogmas. But of all consequences there is one, which it does not admit; viz. inconsequence or the contradiction, by which a system negatives itself—a system we say, i. e. a certain form of philosophy, not philosophy itself. If we were to succeed in proving to that philosophy, that tota quanta it rests only upon contradiction and that as philosophy it has its existence exclusively in it, that existence would certainly thereby only turn out an apparent existence or an existence of apparency, which (as every appearance must have some ground) would further resolve itself into this, that philosophy was only engaged with that which, considered by itself, has only an apparent existence for itself, i. e. with the sensuous world of phenomena, or with nature in the stricter acceptation, whereby indeed a certain sphere within true cognition is assigned to it, while at the same time it would become requisite to add to it also something else, even the sphere of positive faith or religious truth, as a necessary basis. But all this could again only be asserted from the logical principle of contradiction and on account of that principle, and hence might again be claimed by philosophy rather as something demonstrated or as philosophema, and thus as property of philosophy—in short, if this dispute is not to degenerate into a logomachy, philosophy must, if a radical distinction is still to be preserved, either constitute contradiction (the contradictio), that which distinguishes between it and faith—whereby however it surrenders itself; and with Aristotle we shall have to leave this sophisticism without disturbing it, as itself proves, that nothing can be proved; or else, if philosophy respects the contradiction and wishes to be rational, faith would require to take that contradiction under its protection, in which case, however, it would, with its credo quia absurdum, make but few proselytes in our days and would negative itself as
Protestant orthodoxy fully as much as the above sophistick negatived itself as philosophy. Hence an absolute antagonism cannot prevail between the two, but only a relative difference; and if in general matter and form are inseparable in all thinking and knowing, the hope is still left us in the meantime, that, if once philosophy has together with the true form also found the true matter, and theology the true form for its true matter, we shall actually possess a unitous truth reconciled in itself, and that this truth will also be certainty. Till then, however, theology would be as much in the wrong in shutting itself up against philosophy, as philosophy in proclaiming itself absolutely perfect, while as yet it possessed only a contents (mere nature), at which if it stop short, it would have to declare the specific contents of Christianity only a retrograde movement in the development of humanity, an episode in the history of the world which is happily past, although at the same time such philosophy would be incapable to comprehend those specific contents.

If, therefore, in strict consistency with Hegel's method, the more advanced portion of his school necessarily and confessedly do not assume the existence of a personal God either without or within the world sinking the same into the knowledge of men—if, further, the hope of an individual continuance of the soul after death is derided as a sensuously selfish illusion—and, finally, the contrast between good and evil is indirectly destroyed by considering evil as necessary, and good as relatively good, according to time and circumstances, and both as passing into each other—yet these results, however fearful, would in themselves not constitute a refutation of the system, but only the loudest possible appeal to proceed to its criticism. But the criticism of a whole system as such, cannot refer to individual points: the fate of a system does not depend on individual errors, which may occur here and there in its texture, but on its totality, on its systematics, as the latter is the demonstration of the principle; and the more consistent a system is, the more summary must the issue be which we join with it. It cannot be gathered from the principle by itself and alone, what lies implicite in it, nor can it be gathered from its method, to what use it may be turned: every principle affords a definite method adequate to it and admits of developing out of it definite contents; it refuses that which does not lie in it. But all this
only becomes manifest in the explication—in the system; and in this sense we may say, that the consequences or the results of a definite philosophy are its criticism, i.e. if by its results we mean the total organism both as to its contents and its circuit. With reference to the latter, it exhibits itself most immediately in the historical connection and finds in the history of philosophy the measure of its relative value. For a principle may be warranted, in as far as it is principle for a part of the systematic total organism, for example, abstract being, the idea of life, &c; while at the same time it may be wholly unwarranted, if it assumes to be the fundamental principle of the whole. All the principal categories have one after the other historically come forward as principles of philosophy, and all have, in accordance with their peculiar character, produced systems more or less comprehensive. Every nation and every age has its spiritual principle, i.e. it has attained a certain stage in the spiritual development, which an after-philosophy brings to consciousness and receives into the organism of the whole, assigning it its proper place. What appears last in the system simultaneously as the fulness of matter, has successively made its appearance in history; hence, every historical standing-point constitutes a part of the system, and the last comprehensive system includes the total contents of history; if therefore the historical principles loose in the system, where they appear as subordinate, the absoluteness, to which in their time they had pretended, it is also requisite that every system which elevates itself above those which have preceded it, establish its right by subjecting and organically receiving into itself those principles, or else it will be looked upon as itself a one-sided consciousness, or else as a lower consciousness, which had already existed before. Hence, history also exercises a certain criticism with reference to systematics, just as the latter with reference to the former, so that we would be right in looking with distrust upon any system which would transport us back to the standing-point of Aristotle or to the mode of thinking of Christian antiquity; but, in order to perceive this, we require to compare and hence to possess a comprehensive historical acquaintanceship and to be capable intellectually to penetrate these systems, a point to which our age has at last advanced; so that it is only at present that all the necessary requirements both for a criticism of what has preceded and
for an acknowledgment of what peculiarly animates our age seem to be at our disposal. Whether therefore we apprehend the task of criticism from the systematic or from the historical point of view, now, that history and speculation scientifically penetrate each other, it could only be accomplished comprehensively from a survey of the whole and not from any one principle, unless that principle be itself the idea of the totality, of the systematics, of the organism of philosophy, or whatever way we may choose to designate it, which, taken accurately, is nothing else but the idea of the absolute design.

After these general remarks, we return once more to Hegel. If we connect with them the statement made above, that philosophy cannot be attacked by any article of faith lying without it, this security cannot be founded on anything else than on the positive idea of philosophy itself, which implies, that it contains its point of gravitation within itself. A system which is not based upon itself, but depends upon some other resting-point without itself, whether such be contained in positive dogmas or in empiricism, could not claim to be treated according to that privilege of philosophy, but would itself renounce it. True philosophy will indeed neither exclude empiricism nor the contents of the Christian faith, but rather receive them into itself and demonstrate them—yet it will not take its start from them. Whenever a system is convinced either of resting upon the above or in general upon any assumption (such as is not the assumption of itself, i.e. exclusively of its own notion), it would thereby refute itself as philosophy. Hegel's system claims to be the philosophy; hence, above all, it must stand the test of being without any assumption.

But here we come at the first upon the suspicious circumstance, that Hegel deemed it necessary in his systematic consciousness to give a phenomenological grounding to the principle of Logie, to being-thinking—a grounding, which itself takes its start and commences with the dualism of empirical consciousness. True, that dualism is again to be sublated into the monism of thinking, the empirical momentum is gradually wholly to disappear from the contents, yet is it not entirely to disappear, but only to be sublated. We will not enter upon the question, whether this attempt is successfully made, and whether, if successful, along with the immediateness which is to be mediated, the mediating,
i.e. the essential contents themselves, would not at the same time also wholly disappear and the whole become nihilistic—this we leave in the meantime undecided, as we feel in nowise concerned about vindicating the dualism and empiricism in the principle; but we ask, how Hegel could feel warranted to make the antagonism of sensuous consciousness, as something original, his starting-point? We ask, Is this originality anything else than an historically-psychological one, or has it any other import for philosophy than that of being excorteric or propædeutic? Why start from the Dualism of actual consciousness, which evidently is already an assumption? Why not rather start from a Monism? In order that it may not be again “like shot out of a pistol.” But is Dualism less so? Philosophically viewed, Monism is what is original, or the unity of the notion; while Dualism is what is second, or the judgment, into which the original notion discedes. Now Hegel does indeed always stop short at judging, as being the original (the negativeness in itself); but with what propriety? Has this consequence been only derived from that semi-empirical commencement, or, vice versa, is that commencement (which is itself treated as a mere assumption) a consequence of this, that the judgment is what is logically original, or the principle? With Hegel the method occupies the place of principle, as well as of result, at the end; it is all in all; but whence that? Is it perhaps also grounded upon that impure empiricism of its commencement? Still, after all, the system itself treats, although in contradiction therewith, everywhere the notion, the unity, as that which is original, as the thesis, and affirms it everywhere first of all as what is immediate, and then only the judgment as what is second.

Hegel himself seems to have discovered this contradiction and on that ground to have eliminated Phenomenology from the system, in order to commence from a purely monistic principle, after having cast aside all empiricism. But the question may be raised, whether, although setting himself free from that form, he has not essentially, i.e. as to the whole method, remained entangled in it, and whether, without observing it, he has not embodied the same assumption in the system itself. That such was the case, the principle itself or absolute negativeness seems to bear testimony. Negativeness is nothing else, but what was termed by others the
faculty of judging, the movement of diremption, or the separating itself, which as immediately proceeding out of itself, constitutes origination and, as contradicting itself in itself, constitutes necessity; a turning and fluctuation, which, so to express ourselves, must have a hypomochlion under it and cannot, as it were, hang freely in the air. This origination, although everywhere making its appearance only as the third, viz. as synthesis, manifests itself nevertheless with Hegel as being in truth what is original in itself, whereby the form of immediateness or the being of the notion as unity is degraded into an untruth, yea, and declared an error. Everywhere the being in-itself resolves itself into a being for itself in the sense, that such an In-itself, as had seemed to exist, had never existed, the In-itself is itself not an existence, but an origination or actual activity. Hence, there is either no In-itself at all, not even as such in origination, or else all Logic, which is the In-itself of the whole system, is also as such for itself, i.e. is itself actual thinking, present for itself as such (as subjectiveness) within the actuality of the world; which view, however, is that of a Platonising theism, and stands in open antagonism with the Aristotelism of the system of Hegel.

But if the system stands here in contradiction with itself, we find that this contradiction lies in what had been constituted the principle, viz. in the absolute negativeness, which, as diremption, is deficient in itself as to an inseparable point of unity, or in which unity does not preserve itself as ground and origin, so that only a variation of unity and of antagonistic duality is present and acknowledged, but not a fundamental unity, which is indestructible and continuing in the antagonism. This is expressed by common sense, when it is maintained, that it is impossible to conceive motion in and by itself alone without a something, which moves, or in general motion without something that is quiescent. Without such a fundamental unity negativeness itself is annihilated as that which it should be, viz. as contradiction and necessity, inasmuch as a duality can only be a contradiction and hence also restless negativeness, if and because it preserves in itself at the same time the unity and immediateness of being, but not if itself is made the all-unitous immediateness, which would be logically impossible. As pure abstract principle for itself negativeness and necessity destroys itself, i.e. it can only be, if it preserves in itself
the fundamental essential identity as its own ground, and hence if it is apprehended not as principle, but only as momentum of the principle; this implies that necessity in general is not the absolute, but indirectly, that what is free is the absolute principle, yet a free, which subsumes necessity as momentum, without however being identical with it. In such a synthesis being and origination will not neutralise each other to a lifeless unity, inasmuch as mobile origination is itself synthetically joined with being, and not a quiescent determinateness or quality; so that now being and origination manifest themselves as the true essence (although not in the sense of Hegel), or as the notion (essentia). The naught, which Hegel places at the commencement of his Logic, side by side with being, or rather into which he makes being to change, could in this place, i.e. as negation of being-thinking in general, only be what is termed the nihil negativum or that naught, which is not to be conceived at all, if it is to be rightly conceived, in such a manner, as that in the principle itself, by turns, thinking and not thinking would take place, or that by turns the principle itself would be and not be, as it were flicker up and extinguish. But in fact that naught is with Hegel only an heirloom of the Schema of Fichte, viz. the not-Me, by which a naught is not indicated, but another Me (a Me, only not our Me) and hence the reduplication of the real Me is rather affirmed, than its annihilation. This could indeed be said with reference to the determinate individual and finite Me of Fichte, but not with reference to the absolute, to which Hegel has transported this schema.

But what applies in general to the principle of what is termed absolute negativeness, viz. that it is no more than the momentum of the judgment, which already pre-supposes a notion, which is to judge itself, will also have to be asserted with reference to Dialectics—taking the term in its proper and definite sense—in which we can also only perceive this momentum of the method and not the whole speculative method. The notion which has to be pre-supposed or which has to be given before-hand, in order to be capable of progressing to the activity of judgment, is the definite genus, which however is at first only conceived abstractly (without any expressed contents), a definite, more or less high category of essence in its immediateness or in its being. But the latter moves only according to its own nature dialectically within itself; but in virtue
of that nature or of its own notion it does not get beyond itself and
to a higher genus, but only fills itself up with its own contents,
(matter), i.e., with the lower notions of genus or categories, which
are necessary to it as the pre-suppositions and conditions of its own
existence, or the non-existence of which would also destroy its self,
just as the triangle could not exist, if it did not contain within it-
self as its premises, space, line and angle. Hence dialectics, as
the necessary movement of thinking and determination, rests
again upon the proposition of the contradiction, viz. that, what is
affirmed as existent, cannot at the same time be viewed as not
affirmed; but qua genus or category or notion, the whole is
affirmed or pre-supposed, and thereby that which is essentially
particular must also be necessarily affirmed; but this necessity,
or the contradiction which would arise, if it were not to take place,
pre-supposes already itself the previous affirmation of the notion,
without which itself would not be existent. Hence a definite goal
is always already set to dialectics, as itself is only set in motion
by that pre-supposition, and that goal is the definite notion of
genus, within which it arises, and which is thus for it the pre-as-
signed goal or the purpose towards which it aims, or which as causa
finalis properly only calls it forth. But we maintain, that dialectics
is not capable to produce the latter originally genetically, but that
it rather produces dialectics and is itself that which is originally
extant. Hence it is impossible, that a dialectical method can exist
which would start without any pre-supposition purely only from the
lowest category and which would look on at the way in which the
latter would potentiate itself beyond its own essence to higher ge-
ergna; with Schelling, we feel the want of this power in the mere
notion in that sense, in which we had formerly opportunity to deter-
mine it (in our thirteenth Lecture), when speaking of the Treatise of
Cousin, while we differ from Schelling in this, that we do not feel
that this circumstance at once throws us back upon the necessity
of an empirical basis for philosophy. No—we perceive in it only the
higher necessity, to apprehend the absolute notion as the original
and immanent self-aim, which itself constitutes our spiritual es-
sence, as the ground, which phenomenologically leads philosophising
thinking victoriously out of every lower category of essence up
to absolute spirituality and freedom. But this absolute notion,
from which philosophy ought to take its start or which as prin-
ciple unfolds itself into the system, is none other than the notion of philosophy itself. 1

It is on this ground that this process succeeds so well in Hegel's Phenomenology, as there reference is from the first made to the philosophising subject, which is pre-supposed; itself is that which philosophises and is as such in itself from the very commencement beyond all natural existence, with which it only engages by its representation, without however surrendering itself. But when Hegel apprehends the categories of nature really objectively, i. e. where he thinks them, as they require to be thought, if they are really to be the real world, or in other words, in his philosophy of nature, he himself confesses it, "that they are a system of stages, of which the one cannot be produced from the other in a natural manner, but in the inward idea which constitutes the ground of nature." Thus he confesses himself, that the mind is obliged phenomenologically again to have recourse to its own subjectiveness, to descend into itself, as into the absolute idea, in order there to light ever anew its torch of Prometheus, whenever we are to progress from lower to higher notions or categories. This implies, however, that the human intellect must somehow be already in possession of the highest idea, if it is to find its definite contents by regressively descending into the necessary conditions, without which that idea itself could not exist; but it cannot attain to the highest idea from below upwards through the series of stages of these conditions, as without self-deception it can never succeed in producing that idea, as it were, artificially by the help of any method, at any rate not by that of the negatively dialectic method. If the categories of nature, when thought really objectively or in their true relationship to each other, such as corresponds with actuality, do not conduct us necessarily from below upwards, as Hegel himself confesses, how then could this possibly take place in that portion of Logic, which bears the name of objective and is engaged with these categories of nature? What we mean is, that there also the apparently objective progress is not truly and really objective, but secretly phenomenological, such as results only from the final purpose which is known and willed

1 The attempt systematically to carry out the system of pure philosophy from this its own peculiar principle, has been presented to the public by the Author in his "Plan of a System of the Doctrine of Science." Kiel, 1846.
beforehand, viz. from absolute subjectiveness, although Hegel does not confess this, but proposes to go to work purely objectively and genetically. But if, on the one hand, we remove this final purpose, i.e. the subject, the person who philosophises, who is already active and ready, and if, on the other hand, without allowing ourselves to be blinded by the potentiating appearance of Dialectics, we keep solely by objectiveness, we can only find in an empirical manner the necessary progress of thinking from one category to another, and we cannot but attain the conviction; that without empiricism no such progress would take place. So, amongst others, Schelling also seems to view the matter, when he wishes to prove in this way that experience is a necessary postulate for philosophy as a system. The same we find even with Aristotle, more or less consciously. The latter also does not point out and furnish any necessary transition and connection of the categories from below upwards; he takes them up individually empirically, and then arranges them. Hegel takes objection to this and traces the want of an organic unity in the whole system, to which the above gives rise, to the fact, that Aristotle was unacquainted with the principle of absolute negativeness, the which alone dialectically mediates the progression. But there is no immanent necessity, urging upwards from genus to genus; every principle (every generic notion) yields and exhibits in life that which it contains; then it proceeds to the reproduction of its own species, nor does it bring forth anything better than itself had been. The lower generic notions in and by themselves do not contain any absolute contradiction, as such would involve the impossibility of these genera, so that as such they would not be capable of existing even for a moment, far less of forming a concrete and persistent system of nature.

Thus much will suffice, to establish the statement, that Dialectics, such as Hegel had elevated to be the method of Philosophy, does not constitute the whole, but only a portion or a momentum of the speculative method. Dialectics is utterly incapable of originally affirming and commencing, it can only come after such affirmation and exhibit that, which requires to be affirmed along with the first affirmation, that which, if not affirmed at the same time, would destroy even that which had been

1 Vide Trendelenburg’s Logical Investigations, vol. i. sect. 3.
affirmed; thus it has in truth a critical value; but by itself alone, without a positive momentum it sinks into a negative doing, which even Aristotle had already characterised with perfect truth as sophisticism. We shall here attempt to indicate that which characterises true speculation, only in as far as this may be requisite for explaining the deficiencies of the above methodies. From our above exposition it is evident, that the speculative method affirms at the same time the commencement and the end; to express ourselves plainly, it affirms at first the circuit of the notion, in order then, being constrained to do so by this circuit, to fill it up with that matter (contents) which belongs to it, and which implicit lies already in it, i.e. it takes its start from the abstract notion of purpose, and that both in establishing the individual categories as well as in projecting the whole system of the science of truth in general. For if it were to affirm at first only a part or a momentum of it, it would indeed dialectically attain to the filling up of that portion, but not beyond it and to totality. But this unity of commencement and termination, what else, we ask, can it be, but that very unity of the notion and indeed first of all of the notion of philosophy, of the love of wisdom itself? Thus purely from out of itself, i.e. starting from its abstract notion, and wholly unconcerned in the meantime about everything else, it grows up and mediates itself as pure doctrine of science wholly out of itself, it is its own ground, it is its own means and its own end; it is its own Phenomenology or Teleology. But its further progress consists in this, that abstractly indeed, yet all-comprehensively, as it makes its first appearance, it judges itself also into its most general and most comprehensive momenta, i.e. into the proximate distinctions of the total contents, which will constitute the principal portions of the system; each of these, however, is itself again a notion or a sphere of categories, which executes the same judgment in itself and thus particularises and determines itself. Thus determining and judging progresses from that which is more comprehensive into that which is particular, while, however, the total remains in force, unremoved as substantial unity and as ground working through, and at last comes forward again, as containing in itself those particular contents, as concrete unity of essence. Thus the system takes its start from the strictest monism and has specific
individuation for its goal; it finds its scientific warrant in that rigour alone, in order to attain this purpose. But we shall not attempt to delineate in this place the main features of a new system and return to that of Hegel, in order to exhibit in it also the traces of such a teleology, as that which tends to come forth, which presses into the light, but which he himself had as yet mistaken and despised.

We remind the reader again of what had been said by the way before (in the fifteenth Lecture) with reference to systematics. When we came to the commencement of Logic we called attention to the fact, that Hegel prefixed, both to his system as a whole and also commonly to the individual principal sections, a table of contents or a schematic survey of the arrangement, which, however, he always accompanies with the notice, that it is not to be taken as an anticipating or a determination of the purpose of the end. However, the tri-partitions into which in the meantime the universal notion disceeds would, as they are presented, appear also by themselves as dialectically and methodically warranted, if Hegel had only had confidence in them and had not been fettered by an almost superstitious dread, to determine anything beforehand with reference to the goal. For why, we ask, is dialectics not to prove good as much in the most general and comprehensive notions, as in those which are most special; and why is it only to be allowed to do in limited narrowness, that which it had not been warranted in doing above in the most comprehensive survey? Such a determining which anticipates by what is universal that which is special and thus determines it in advance, would constitute what we designate a method affirmative of the purpose; but thereby the whole system would attain an essentially different character from what it now has, where, so to say, the categories run on along a thread and the lower category is to produce the next highest out of itself by the negation of itself—by a negation, we say, which as a contradiction of itself in itself, or as an inward impossibility of being that, which and in the manner in which it is, exhibits the principle of necessity in the greatest torture of constraint that could be conceived. But this cannot be, as in this process every principle, while it works, always negatives itself and looses itself, by turning over into its counterpart. Notwithstanding the demand which is ever sounded anew, to pre-
serve that which had been existent, and to think it along with that which is higher as the condition of it, yet that which is higher attains itself to existence only by a momentary decease of what had preceded, nor is it evident what properly constitutes objectively the genetic power of transubstantiation—for such, and not a metamorphosis only, it really is—unless the thinking subject itself interposes. Evidently that which had preceded is only extinguished on account of the method and of the systematics, and that which succeeds occupies the place that has been vacated, after the predecessor has disappeared. Thus a movement of continual negativing is presented, which is like that made by those who work at the tread-mill, who always tread on, but do not get from the spot, because at every step their basis gives way, so that this working, viewed from a distance, seems either to be without result and without aim, or else to have been undertaken merely on account of the motion itself.

It is easy to recognise in this picture the fundamental category of the whole system; where, as in physical life and well-being, the means is also at the same time the end, this category is in its proper place; but where the mediation tends towards the existence of an objective purpose, and hence where it is truly affirmed, as that which it is, viz. as mere means, this method and systematics is inadmissible and contrary to the design. If we agree with Hegel, that contents (matter) and form cannot be separated, we must also add, that by virtue of its form this system does not get beyond those contents, which constitute the idea of life and the eudæmony of temporal existence; but all the higher ideas and purposes can, as soon as they are drawn into this form, appear themselves only as life, as this sensuously-soulish actuality, even as the category of substantialness, which throughout the whole system is never really overcome, everywhere makes its appearance in the last instance as the restless movement of the process, and mediation appears as the purpose itself.

But, it may be asked, does the system of Hegel wholly ignore the category of purpose, and has it not in its progress itself a teleology? We answer, it has. But the subordinate and mistaken position assigned to it involves, that the purpose is only taken as subjective and selfish. Hegel does not know the import of the objective purpose, i.e. of love; the tendency of the whole system,
as taking its start from a dualism, it necessarily towards an absolute monism; it devours and digests selfishly every thing that is self-subsistent into that unity of absolute substance which is never satisfied, while a system, which takes its start from monism, would have the opposite direction, i.e. the tendency to affirm truly objective self-aims. The former meets with the same fate as every philosophy, which, in order to be quite certain as to the warrant of what is empirical, assumes at once into the principle the empirical dualism of a subjective Me and an objective world; this can lead to nothing else than to a monistic subjectivism, one, which, in order to possess itself, passes over into immediate objectivism, empirism and eudæmonism, but, as is well known, does not find even there a resting-place, but remains eternal origination, which never attains to reconciliation in itself; far less to having the thought and volition of affirming an object on account of that object itself. Theoretically considered the cognition, which is here aimed after, is only a cognition on the part of the subject about its own being, and hence only a subjective cognition, self-consciousness of the understanding, which however thinks the existence of objects as a not-being for themselves of these objects, i.e. as non-truth of objective being. And as thus the system wants the true notion of objective being, this deficiency reacts again upon the being of the subject; the latter also is not properly a being, but only an origination and appearing. With reference to the accurate and firm apprehending of the idea of objectiveness of being, Herbart's system possesses that, in which the system of Hegel is wholly deficient, only that in its turn the former excludes all origination. It is on this account, that with Hegel the understanding is and remains, as theoretically so also practically, the dialectics and necessity, as much to destroy as to affirm what is objective, hence a cognition and volition, which has not any true being for its object and contents (matter), which possesses no objective truth—a proposition which Hegel exactly reversed into its contrary, just because he never gets beyond the dialectics of the understanding nor ever penetrates to the idea of truly concrete truth, in which what is objective possesses also subjectiveness in itself and is only on that account that which is true, which may be cognised, and not merely thought. It is altogether foreign to the system, that an object could be willed and demitted by the absolute subject into true subjective being for itself,
i. e. to true liberty, in other words, that in the personal self-sufficiency of the subject it might be affirmed as objective purpose, while on the other hand we feel, that this just constitutes the most essential truth both of cognition and of what is good and hence the sole true principle of ethics and affirm it as the goal of philosophy in general, which by its name and notion declares itself beforehand not only a volition (φιλια) of cognition, but also of practical wisdom (σοφια).

That on the other hand which is here designated as morality and is prescribed to man, is only a sacrifice of selfness into the abyss of the absolute substance, which, being itself absolutely without love, does not at all warrant the duty of this sacrifice; for what is termed the goodness of this Deity consists in satisfying its activity by incessantly affirming individuals, while its love consists in possessing itself in them, and its justice manifests itself as the power to exhibit every thing that had been affirmed in its non-entity, i. e. again to annihilate it, according to the principle of Mephistophiles; "that everything that originates, deserves that it perish again."

Verily the god of Plato was preferable to this modern Saturn, who devours his children; for, when he had created self-subsistent divine beings, he said: "I am he that formed you and the father of those works, which, having originated by me, are undissolvable, if so it pleases me; for everything that is connected may be solved, but it is wrong, to wish to solve that which is beautifully framed and well persistent; hence also, since ye have become, ye are not indeed immortal and wholly unresolvable, yet are ye not to be solved nor to have death assigned for your portion, possessing as ye do in my volition a firmer and a mightier bond, than that, by which, when ye became, ye were bound together."

The fundamental schema of Hegel: Being—Naught—Origination does not correspond with the schema of objective teleology: Principle, Means and End; on the contrary origination or the process, i. e. the means, is substituted in the place of the end as an eternal mediating itself. Hence the system cannot develop itself in such a way, as that the ground (the principle) would become self-thinking subjectiveness for itself in opposition to a definite objectiveness, but has and retains as Idea also its proper contents only on and in objectiveness, which thereby is no more some-
thing for itself than the ground; everything lies merely in the
medium of origination, which, as proceeding from an empty ground,
goes out into a nothing void of essence, produces nothing, and
only reproduces itself as an equally non-entical producing. This
is the circle, or, more accurately viewed, properly only the oscillation
between two extremes, the alternating or the change, in which
the absolute does not so much move, as it rather constitutes that
change; as already stated, it is the perpetual turning and bending
from necessity, that necessity, which only is as eternal turning
round or turning over. True, the momentum or the aspect of the
subjective ground is indeed in the absolute, as the system exhibits
it, to be Logic in itself (as it were God before the creation of the
world), and this statement of Hegel’s is in part still retained by
his former followers; but still in virtue of the whole systematics
this logical ground is not thinking in the signification of actual
intellectual activity for itself, but it is only actual in the sphere of
the actuality of the world, i.e. in as far as men think in the
world, as God has consciousness and spiritual existence not for
himself, but in man, and men are God, in as far as they think and
will the universal and that which constitutes the universal, the
rational. It is but an imagination of the religious standing-point,
for man to objectivise and hypostatise this his own thinking,
which however, as the left portion of Hegel’s school has lately exhibited with perfect consistency and perspicuity, is only an anthropologically-psychological standing-point, a mode of sensuous representing, which is removed in philosophical thinking and shewn to be untrue. Thus, instead of having advanced the farthest, this philosophising has unmistakeably returned in essentials to the standing-point of Kant, and criticism, in as far as it had been subjectivistic, has thereby finished in the most unexpected manner its circuit; for we remember, that that critique had also looked upon the ideas of reason as hypostases of the mere mode of subjective thinking, which could not be theoretically justified, personified laws of thinking without any objective truth or being, as not cognition of what is true, but only a belief, the truth of which Kant had indeed wished to ground in another manner, viz. ethically—while here it wholly dissolves into nothing as deception, a point which would in the historical progress of philosophy have been impossible, if the author of the Critique had succeeded in what
he wished and what he had recognised as necessary, viz. in elevating the ethical categories of freedom into a "metaphysics of morals," i. e. into peculiar and those the highest fundamental notions, which, as it were, are to close and crown the system of the doctrine of science.

In conclusion, we return once more to the systematics of the whole. As already stated, Hegel had at first cherished the intention, to exhibit in Phenomenology the first part of his system; had this been done, Logic would have formed the second, and the philosophy of nature and that of the mind would have constituted together the third part. In that case Phenomenology would have an ascending, analytically regressive tendency, i. e. one going back to the proper principle; Logic would, as it were, occupy the culminating point of the whole or be in the middle, while the last portion would, as that which Weisse and others term Real-philosophy, have represented the synthesis of the two former, and at the same time the reduction or return into the commencement of the first portion. But afterwards another arrangement of the system was chosen, Real-philosophy was divided into two portions, the latter of which, the philosophy of the mind, was made the reduction into Logic. Evidently two kinds of fundamental views run here through each other, viz. the dialectic reflection and the tri-partition of the notion; but the former has not allowed the latter to attain a thorough penetration of objective teleology; the subjective design or the ground had once more to vanish into the mysterious In-itself, into that being which is above or before, into that ineffable abstractum, the spiritual personality of God lost its existence, and as the In-itself had only to attain it, it found it immediately in the actuality of the world, whereby the latter however obtained in-Real philosophy an equally ambivalent place and import, flowed together into a simple unity with that In-itself, whereby the whole became a monism destitute of subjectiveness and hence in reality that Spinozism, which Hegel had in his Phenomenology proposed to overcome. If we contemplate the system, as it is presented to us, we are, when entering upon its contents, only able to discover in it a threefold repetition. Phenomenology is the system in its first formation, its second elaboration is that of Logic, its third that of the philosophy of nature and of the mind; each commences from the beginning and is wholly
carried out, but the transition from the one into the other is, as Schelling had first expressed it with reference to the connection between Logic and the philosophy of nature, neither perspicuous nor founded; for, in our opinion, we cannot trace in it a transition or a progress, but only a transformation. If Hegel had stopped short at his first view, Logic would without doubt have occupied more decidedly than it now does—the place, which Aristotle assigns to the philosophia prima, *i.e.* it would have climbed the culminating point of the whole and have constituted itself that, which in our days a universal doctrine of science must be, *viz.* a grounding of the principles of all sciences or of all individual disciplines as they are termed, such as is based upon the notion of absolute truth and gravitates in itself, so that these individual sciences would send their streams, drawing them from it as the origin of all science, into all directions.

We have just referred to that mysterious "In-itself," to which by virtue of systematics the logical mind had been again degraded, and have already above confessed it, that this In-itself seems to us only a new term for the old notion of *potence*. In fact we have seen, that it is just this obscure particular, the interpretation of which divides the two sections of the school, *viz.* the theistical and the naturalistically-monistic. It is the same particular, which also constitutes the antagonism in principle between Schelling's latest and Hegel's original mode of philosophizing. If we consider the theistical mode of apprehending as that of Hegel, we may say, that Hegel apprehends this fundamental In-itself as Ideality and Schelling as Reality; it is on this account that Hegel's original followers object to the system of Schelling, that it makes spirit originate from matter, while they themselves have for their principle absolute spirit as the eternal reason. But if we attend on the one hand to the indecision, with which the idea of reason which "is in itself" is employed, and on the other hand to the continuous holding firm of "negativeness" and of the method, we are constrained, if at this stage already a decided opinion with reference to the position of these two systems is asked, to declare without reserve, that Hegel seems to have penetrated only in so far beyond the standing-point of the first and of the second philosophy of nature, that he recognized the absolute as *spirit*; for as we have already taken the opportunity of observing, that Hegel stands no longer before
but in thinking, so we find also, when viewing the pure result of the whole and not adverting to the methodological contradictions in particulars, that an absolute monism of thinking is that, which seems to remain in the last instance as the absolute and the one, as that which alone truly is. But though we were to look upon this result as of very great, yea, and as of decided importance, we cannot help adding on the other hand, that to us there yet seems to be a want, viz. that this absolutely idealistic monism is not recognized as that, which it is, viz. as Idealism and subjectivism of the absolute, but that at the same time, and as the same it has also been declared to be the actuality of the world. Without doubt the merit is due to Schelling, that he has recognized this, so that we are again constrained to say, that by this consciousness Schelling goes beyond Hegel and is right in declaring, that all philosophy had hitherto only been a Propædeutics destined to conduct consciousness to this point, and that it had only there apprehended the true real principle for a positive deduction, from which a wholly different mode of philosophizing, viz. a progressive one, according to the categories of creative freedom, has now to be commenced.

In fact we have here brought into view a system, which, starting from a Deity existing in himself and having the latter for its principle, endeavours to comprehend the creation of the world as the free act of the Deity, a task, which alone seems rightly to indicate the true contents (matter) of our modern Christian, and no longer only of the antique, pre-Christian thinking and willing. And though we will not conceal it, that it seems impossible to us to discharge this task in any other way, than by virtue of the ethical categories and announce this the more confidently, the more we feel convinced, that the method, which leads to this goal, the teleological method, is none other than the dialectically logical, which has attained in itself to wholly definite perfection (completion of formation), yet will we, as is due, abstain from any definite judgment with reference to the works of that great master, until they are perfectly and authentically presented to us.

We close with a general historical survey. As when criticising the last system, we had found that a philosophy which has attained to having a comprehensive systematical consciousness of itself, does not admit of being attacked by criticism in any other way, than that of attacking the systematics in general, neither can
a perfect criticism and reflection about the present standing-point of philosophy be in general obtained from any one system alone, not even from the last system, nor can it be looked for from those who have that system only, or perhaps its most recent precedent, in their mind's eye. A perfect and clear consciousness thereof, can only be gained by contrasting the philosophy of the middle ages and ancient philosophy, and hence by a survey of the whole process of development of the culture of the human mind. History, but now philosophically understood, is here reinstated into its province. Hence, in order perfectly to find our way, it is indeed requisite to enlarge the horizon more than the standing-point, which we had chosen, allowed us to do. We have only passed through a comparatively small, although a fertile portion of the total development, we mean its last modern phase, and have learned from it, that it is and ought to be of fundamental and essential importance to our thinking, to discover and to understand ground, means and end, and that both in the individual and in the total. All the three momenta were to be one, but at the sametime they were also to be distinguished and each was in its own place necessarily to be that, which that position warrants. To discover the formula of this relationship has, as the whole history of philosophy teaches us, been the task proposed from Pythagoras to Hegel; the human mind has always studied, even without having clear consciousness of it, with the intention to find that formula, in order to possess it for itself. But it has only by degrees succeeded in elaborating the methodics and together with that form the appropriate matter also. Method has itself its development and its history, but the latter coincides everywhere both with the principle and with the system or with the objective result. Pre-Christian antiquity, Grecian philosophy stood in that idea; but in its immediateness that idea is only the idea of beauty. There the ground is still the soul-essence, the end is yet immediately the phenomenon, actuality; life is the means, but as

yet life is itself everything, hence also the purpose, nor can it here be otherwise, inasmuch as the ground irresistibly resolves itself and perishes in the appearance, and the appearance in the ground, and neither of them is in itself for itself, whence also neither of them can be the purpose, and nothing else is left us, but to affirm the resolving and perishing, this mediating movement, as the purpose, although it is thereby entangled in the contradiction and cannot as life sustain the dignity of being the absolute purpose, but passes immediately into the progressus in infinitum, into what is absolutely to be, i.e. into an infinite ending.

Human self-consciousness cannot rest satisfied with this. Whenever it reflects upon the true import of this category, it is thereby placed into the most painful contradiction, into the negation of itsf. Antiquity had stood in this idea at first without reflection, just like a child, which does not think of death, because it has life still before it, and indeed in the first instance has to live. But it was impossible to stop short at this. The contents of this idea, its truth, does not afford lasting satisfaction, for it does not admit of affirming as end that, which in itself is only means. Ancient consciousness sunk, and Christianity brought forward the true purpose; but thereby in the first place, a dualism was presented and a relation of two, viz. the purpose as product and the ground as producing, man on the one side and the Deity on the other; the thought-process of mediation commenced therefore anew, and this time necessarily in a negative direction, i.e. by resolving and reconducting these doubts into unity, which was, however, on the other hand, not to restore again the pre-Christian result.

Suckled with Grecian milk, philosophy addressed itself within the ancient, i.e. the Greek church, first of all wholly objectively to the problem of the Deity. It transported the formula of Plato, the idea of beauty, to the Deity, and then elaborated the dogma of the Trinity, but as yet wholly objectively determined and not yet placed into its proper relation towards the world and humanity and on that account also only as dogma and not as philosophema. It lost sight of the world and of itself, so engaged was it with that subject; oriental Christianity, wholly engrossed with objective contemplativeness, felt within itself so much the less stimulus to activity as the external national and state-relations were not calculated
to awaken self-consciousness; nay, the subject fled rather from actuality and from itself into super-mundane objectiveness, as into a welcome place of safety and lost itself into the incompre-
hensible depths of the Deity. The Christian Hellenist did not perceive the one-sidedness of his standing-point; whenever he re-
ferred the category of his consciousness to God and at the same 
time to man also, the latter fell as a non-entical accident back into the substance of the Deity, from which the grace of faith indeed, but not the notion of philosophy, could again elevate it.

It was only by the infusion of Germanic blood into European society, that a more vigorous self-feeling was attained. In the first place it appeared mixed up with the Grecio-Roman as the Romanism of the middle ages, and that both in language, manners and mode of thinking. But soon the aspect of humanity, what is anthropological, as it is termed in dogmatics, was prominently brought forward in the philosophy of the occident, yea more, it was even continued up to Pelagianism. The restored energy of the subject, of man and that of the individual, of personality, asserted its rights, and as it attained possession of a temporal property in the state in opposition to the Church and maintained it by its activity, so scientifically also it gained once more pos-
session of nature, it derived from the Arabs the science of mathe-
matics and of physics which had been lost, and finally it rescued the Grecian originals from the dust of the convents and at last the whole treasure of antiquity from Italy and Byzantium, in order again to elaborate art within its self, and with it the Callocagathy of the Grecians under the form of a novantique humanitas. Its fruit was the victory of temporal activity, increased up to the holiness of works, and of individuality, although of an abstract in-
dividuality, in nominalism.

The third and properly Germanic period dates its commence-
ment from the Germanic universal spirit. If since the days of Augustine and Anselm the elaboration of subjectiveness had been continually progressing, while it had at the same time been en-
gaged in a struggle with ecclesiastical Realism, which would have suppressed this individual atomism, it was now the task of the Protestant world, and this task is not only the most difficult, but can only be perfectly performed in a scientific manner, to recon-
cile and to bring to unity that objectivism of first Christianity with
the subjectivism of the middle ages. In as far as the Protestant faith has in its most vigorous representatives become aware of its origination, it has always dogmatically kept by that task; but philosophy, in order to mediate scientifically, had to urge on the antagonism to its culminating point, i. e. to the most distinct antithesis, and as philosophy it was quite right in keeping by subjectiveness and exhibiting if possible the subject as much as possible as the absolute. Hence in Fichte as well as in Herbart we meet with the atomism of the finite Me's; as far as their matter is concerned both contain the same, although their mode of exhibiting it be opposite—the one subjective and the other objective—hence we may again gather what is really the deepest ground of atomism, and what that secret interest, which has at different times called it forth in vigorous souls in opposition to a pantheism, which makes everything fluid; nor can we trace this interest to anight else than to an ethical ground, the ground of individual self-feeling. But in opposition to this subjective or objective atomism, monism had also to retain its proper province; the subject of Fichte, if perfectly apprehended as a totality shut off within itself, passed in the hands of Schelling and of Hegel, partly as objective realism, partly as objective spiritualism, and in both cases into pantheism, and in our own days we have at last so far advanced as clearly to recognise in these forms and phases the task in which it had hitherto been engaged with more or less consciousness of the final purpose, which comes forth from the whole in unmistakeable perspicuity.

In conclusion we return once more to the observation, which has already twice been made in the course of our development, viz. to the question, whether on the one hand it is not a wrong assumption on the part of the philosophizing subject, such as it only attempts under a kind of want of reflection, when it seeks to elevate itself into the standing-point of the absolute, and as it were to occupy in absolute cognition the place of the Deity, and on the other hand whether this bold attempt is not necessarily put as a demand to philosophy, if in general it is to be philosophy at all and not to rest satisfied with only a relative certainty. We find that Hegel replies to this problem by assuming a pantheistical identity of man and of God, in which, at least if strictly and conscientiously carried out, the Deity attains only conscious-
ness by virtue of human agnition—a solution which indeed perfectly accounts for absolute knowledge in us, but comes up so much the less to the religious representations, and let us add, the philosophical idea of the Deity. With Schelling however, if we mistake not, we find at present a wholly different, yea, and an opposite tendency, to solve that difficulty; a system is attempted, in which empiricism is to be installed in that province, which it must possess, if we are to understand the cognition of the absolute by us men by means of revelation, and if it is to be accounted for by the personal relationship, in which God stands to man. For this development we still look with expectancy, in the meantime resting satisfied with the view, which in our opinion is as free from mystical transcendentalism as it is satisfactory in its simplicity, which neither blinds by its lustre nor is wholly deficient in light and warmth—the view, according to which we possess in our reason the means and the warrant of our cognition of the absolute, because in virtue of his love, which affirms objective purposes, God attains and has attained in us these his purposes, whenever we recognise in him the holy and the sanctifying spirit; and the latter we recognise in that, which our own essence ought to be and is, when it is, as it ought to be, i.e. when it has attained in itself to a reconciliation free of contradiction, to a freedom from contradiction both in thinking and willing. If this purpose of the absolute is realized in us, the absolute is also recognized and understood, not only as to his eternal being as spirit, i.e. not only as to what are termed his metaphysical properties, but also as to his will and his eternal purposes, but he is then understood as objective truth, and not again destroyed by identification. This is not the place to shew, how such understanding may be attained by way of a speculative method, or is scientifically possible; we only point it out, how from this standing-point also absolute monism and atomistic monadism have each their province assigned to them, and hence how in the meantime the position seems warranted, which we thought it necessary from the first to assign to the system of Hegel and to that of Herbart in the consciousness of the present, while at the same time we point it out as the problem both of the present and of the future, to mediate these standing-points, which theoretically may again be reduced to the most simple formula of becoming and of being.
From the very first we have indicated, that dualism in the principle was the root of all evil, *i.e.* of all the unsuccessful sophistical torture; it is only an absolute, which truly determines itself and is in the strictest sense monistic, although in no way abstract, which, by virtue of its all sufficient perfectness of power, is capable to progress to an affirmation of objective purpose, which is elevated above all egotism, able to create from love for the object, which may not be dualistically given to it nor originally be placed by its side, but the existence of which must be grounded in its volition. It is only thus, that the ground can maintain itself for itself as ground, and it is only when the ground is capable of doing this, that it can create in such a way as that what is created is for itself, remains and is immortal; for so wills it he, who himself is immortal, *i.e.* elevated above death and above our life. Faith is immediately in possession of this truth, but only a cognition which is adequate to its idea can know it as truth; man is himself a self and hence he seeks after certitude of himself, which again he cannot attain without certitude of the Deity, *i.e.* not without knowing the Deity, as that which knows; for if the Deity does not will and know him as such, neither can he know himself as such, and therefore both must be in his cognition at the same time, as truth of cognition and as cognition of truth. We see, that with Hegel a vast section of history in the sphere of the intellect has reached its termination, and we recognize in him, in this respect, the one who has perfected a great philosophical past, as in fact his own philosophical consciousness declared itself as turned backwards towards the past and not towards that which is to be, the future. "It is only in the maturity of actuality, that the Ideal appears over against the Real, and that the former builds up the same world, apprehended in its substance, in the shape of an intellectual world. When philosophy paints its grey with grey, a form of life has become old, nor can it be made young by grey in grey, it can only be cognized; the owl of Minerva starts on its flight only when the twilight comes in." It is the evening star, which we see twinkling in this philosophy; yet cherish we the hope, to see it once more, and that as morning star!

The realm of spirit is not shut to view,  
Thy heart is dead, and dim thy sight!  
Awake, oh friend! unwearied rise anew,  
To bathe thy breast in morning light!
B  Chalybäus, Heinrich Moritz
2741  Historical development of
C363  speculative philosophy