PLATO'S REPUBLIC
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INTRODUCTION

Analyses of the Republic abound. The object of this sketch is not to follow all the windings of its ideas, but to indicate sufficiently their literary framework and setting. Socrates speaks in the first person, as in the Charmides and the Lysis. He relates to Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates, and an unnamed fourth person, as we learn from the introduction of the Timaeus, a conversation which took place "yesterday" at the Peiraean. The narrative falls on the day of the Lesser Panathenaea, and its scene, like that of the Timaeus, Proclus affirms to be the city or the Acropolis, a more suitable place, he thinks, for the quieter theme and the fit audience but few than the noisy seaport, apt symbol of Socrates' contention with the sophists.

The Timaeus, composed some time later than the Republic, is by an afterthought represented as its


b Cf. Proclus, In Rem P. vol. i. p. 17. 3 Kroll. Cf. also Laws, 705 a.
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sequel. And the Republic, Timaeus, and unfinished Critias constitute the first of the "trilogies" in which Aristophanes of Byzantium arranged the Platonic dialogues. The Timaeus accordingly opens with a brief recapitulation of the main political and social features of the Republic. But nothing can be inferred from the variations of this slight summary.

The dramatic date of the dialogue is plausibly assigned by Boeckh to the year 411 or 410. Proof is impossible because Plato admits anachronisms in his dramas.

Socrates tells how he went down to the Peiraeus to attend the new festival of the Thracian Artemis, Bendis, and, turning homewards, was detained by


\[b\] Proclus tries to show that the points selected for emphasis are those which prefigure the constitution and government of the universe by the Creator (In Tim. 17 e-f). His reasoning is differently presented but hardly more fantastic than that of modern critics who endeavour to determine by this means the original design or order of publication of the parts of the Republic. Cf. further Taylor, Plato, p. 264, n. 2.

\[c\] Kleine Schriften, iv. pp. 437 ff., especially 448.

\[d\] A. E. Taylor, Plato, p. 263, n. 1, argues that this is the worst of all possible dates.

\[e\] Cf. Jowett and Campbell, vol. iii. pp. 2-3; Zeller, vol. ii. pt. i. p. 489. Arguments are based on the circumstances of the family of Lysias, the presumable age of Socrates, Glaucon, Adeimantus and Thrasyvulus, and the extreme old age of Sophocles.

\[f\] The religion of Bendis may have been known at Athens as early as Cratinus's Thraittai (443 B.C.), Kock, Fragmenta, i. 34. Mommsen, Feste der Stadt Athen, p. 490, cites inscriptions to prove its establishment in Attica as early as 429-428 B.C. But he thinks Plato's "inasmuch as this was the first celebration" may refer to special ceremonies first instituted circa 411 B.C.
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a group of friends who took him to the house of Polemarchus, brother of the orator Lysias. A goodly company was assembled there, Lysias and a younger brother Euthydemus—yea, and Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Charmantides of the deme Paiania, Cleitophon, and conspicuous among them the venerable Cephalus, crowned from a recent sacrifice and a prefiguring type of the happy old age of the just man. A conversation springs up which Socrates guides to an inquiry into the definition and nature of justice (330 d, 331 c, 332 b) and to the conclusion that the conventional Greek formula, "Help your friends and harm your enemies," cannot be right (335 e-336 a), since it is not the function (ἐργον, 335 d) of the good man to do evil to any. The sophist

a See Lysias in any classical dictionary. He returned to Athens from Thurii circa 412 B.C. Polemarchus was the older brother. He was a student of philosophy (Phaedr. 257 b). Whether he lived with Cephalus or Cephalus with him cannot be inferred with certainty. Lysias perhaps had a separate house at the Peiraeus (cf. Phaedr. 227 b). The family owned three houses in 404 B.C. (Lysias, Or. 12. 18), and Blass (Attische Beredsamkeit, i. p. 347) infers from Lysias, 12. 16 that Polemarchus resided at Athens. Lysias takes no part in the conversation. He was no philosopher (Phaedr. 257 b).

b A noted sophist and rhetorician. Cf. Phaedr. 266 c, Zeller, i. pp. 1321 ff.; Blass, Attische Beredsamkeit, i. pp. 244-258; Sidgwick, Journ. of Phil. (English), v. pp. 78-79, who denies that Thrasymachus was, properly speaking, a sophist; Diels, Fragmente, ii. pp. 276-282.

c Blass, op. cit. ii. p. 19.

d Apparently a partisan of Thrasymachus. His name is given to a short, probably spurious, dialogue, of which the main thought is that Socrates, though excellent in exhortation or protreptic, is totally lacking in a positive and coherent philosophy. Grote and others have conjectured it to be a discarded introduction to the Republic.

c f. 329 d, 331 a with 613 b-c.
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Thrasymachus, intervening brutally (336 b), affirms the immoralist thesis that justice is only the advantage of the (politically) stronger, and with humorous dramatic touches of character-portrayal is finally silenced (350 c-d), much as Callicles is refuted in the Gorgias. The conclusion, in the manner of the minor dialogues, is that Socrates knows nothing (354 c). For since he does not know what justice is, he cannot a fortiori determine the larger question raised by Thrasymachus's later contention (352 b), whether the just life or the unjust life is the happier.

Either the first half or the whole of this book detached would be a plausible companion to such dialogues as the Charmides and Laches, which deal in similar manner with two other cardinal virtues, temperance and bravery. It is an easy but idle and unverifiable conjecture that it was in Plato's original intention composed as a separate work, perhaps a discarded sketch for the Gorgias, and only by an afterthought became an introduction for the Republic. It is now an excellent introduction and not, in view of the extent of the Republic, disproportionate in length. That is all we know or can know.

The second book opens with what Mill describes as a "monument of the essential fairness of Plato's mind"—a powerful restatement of the theory of Thrasymachus by the brothers of Plato, Glaucon and Adeimantus. They are not content with the dialectic that reduced Thrasymachus to silence (358 b). They demand a demonstration which will convince the youth hesitating at the cross-roads of virtue and

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a Cf. infra, p. xxv, note b.
vice (365 a-b)\(^a\) that it is really and intrinsically better to be than to seem just.\(^b\)

It is Plato's method always to restate a satirized and controverted doctrine in its most plausible form before proceeding to a definitive refutation.\(^c\) As he himself says in the *Phaedrus* (272 c), "it is right to give the wolf too a hearing."

It is also characteristic of Plato that he prefers to put the strongest statement of the sophistic, immoralist, Machiavellian, Hobbesian, Nietzschean political ethics in the mouths of speakers who are themselves on the side of the angels.\(^d\) There is this historical justification of the procedure, that there exists not a shred of evidence that any contemporary or predecessor of Plato could state any of their theories which he assailed as well, as fully, as coherently, as systematically, as he has done it for them.

In response to the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus, Socrates proposes to study the nature of justice and injustice writ large in the larger organism of the state, and to test the conceptions so won by their application to the individual also (368 e, 369 a). Plato, though he freely employs

\(^a\) Cf. my *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 25, n. 164.

\(^b\) Cf. 362 a with 367 e.

\(^c\) Cf. my *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 8: "... the elaborate refutations which Plato thinks fit to give of the crudest form of hostile theories sometimes produce an impression of unfairness upon modern critics. They forget two things: First, that he always goes on to restate the theory and refute its fair meaning; second, that in the case of many doctrines combated by Plato there is no evidence that they were ever formulated with the proper logical qualifications except by himself."

\(^d\) Cf. 368 a-b.
metaphor, symbolism, and myth, never bases his argument on them. The figurative language here, as elsewhere, serves as a transition to, a framework for, an illustration of, the argument. Man is a social and political animal, and nothing but abstract dialectics can come of the attempt to isolate his psychology and ethics from the political and social environment that shapes them. The question whether the main subject of the Republic is justice or the state is, as Proclus already in effect said, a logomachy. The construction of an ideal state was a necessary part of Plato's design, and actually occupies the larger part of the Republic. But it is, as he repeatedly tells us, logically subordinated to the proof that the just is the happy life.

It is idle to object that it is not true and cannot be proved that righteousness is verifiably happiness. The question still interests humanity, and Plato's discussion of it, whether it does or does not amount to a demonstration, still remains the most instructive and suggestive treatment of the theme in all literature.

There is little profit also in scrutinizing too curiously the unity or lack of unity of design in the Republic, the

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*a Cf. my review of Barker, "Greek Political Theory," in the Philosophical Review, vol. xxix., 1920, p. 86: "To say (on p. 119) that 'by considering the temper of the watchdog Plato arrives at the principle,' etc., is to make no allowance for Plato's literary art and his humour. Plato never really deduces his conclusions from the figurative analogies which he uses to illustrate them."

*b Cf., e.g., Rep. 544 d-e, and infra, p. xxvi.


*d Cf. 352 d, 367 e, 369 a, 427 d, 445 a-b, 576 c, and especially 472 b with 588 b and 612 b.
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scale and proportion of the various topics introduced, the justification and relevance of what may seem to some modern readers disproportionate digressions. The rigid, undeviating logic which Poe postulates for the short story or poem has no application to the large-scale masterpieces of literature as we actually find them. And it is the height of naivété for philological critics who have never themselves composed any work of literary art to schoolmaster such creations by their own a priori canons of the logic and architectonic unity of composition. Such speculations have made wild work of Homeric criticism. They have been applied to Demosthenes On the Crown and Virgil's Aeneid. Their employment either in criticism of the Republic or in support of unverifiable hypotheses about the order of composition of its different books is sufficiently disposed of by the common sense of the passages which I have quoted below. For the reader who intelligently follows the

a Cf. my review of Diesendruck's "Struktur und Charakter des Platonischen Phaidros," Class. Phil. vol. xxiii., 1928, pp. 79 f. : "In the Introduction to the Republic, Jowett writes, 'Nor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great work to which the mind is naturally led by the association of ideas and which does not interfere with the general purpose.' Goethe in conversation with Eckermann said on May 6, 1827, 'Da kommen sie und fragen, welche Idee ich in meinem Faust zu verkörpern gesucht. Als ob ich das selber wüsste und aussprechen könnte.' Or with more special application to the Phaedrus I may quote Bourguet's review of Raeder, 'Cet ensemble, on pensera sans doute que M. Raeder a eu tort de le juger mal construit. Au lieu d'une imperfection d'assemblage, c'est le plan même que le sujet indiquait. Et peut-être est-il permis d'ajouter qu'on arrive ainsi à une autre idée de la composition, plus large et plus profonde, que celle qui est d'ordinaire acceptée, trop asservie à des canons d'école.' "

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main argument of the *Republic*, minor disproportions and irrelevancies disappear in the total impression of the unity and designed convergence of all its parts in a predetermined conclusion. If it pleases Plato to dwell a little longer than interests the modern reader on the expurgation of Homer (379 d-394), the regulation of warfare between Greek states (469-471 c), the postulates of elementary logic (438-439), the programme of the higher education (521 ff.) and its psychological presuppositions (522-524), and the justification of the banishment of the poets (595-608 c), criticism has only to note and accept the fact.

Socrates constructs the indispensable minimum (369 d-e) of a state or city from the necessities of human life, food, shelter, clothing, the inability of the isolated individual to provide for these needs and the principle of the division of labour. Plato is aware that the historic origin of society is to be looked for in the family and the clan. But he reserves this aspect of the subject for the *Laws*. The hypothetical, simple primitive state, which Glaucon stigmatizes as a city of pigs (372 d), is developed into a normal modern society or city by the demand for customary luxuries, and by Herbert Spencer’s principle of “the multiplication of effects,” one thing leading to another (373-374). The luxurious and inflamed city (372 e) is then purged and purified by the reform of ordinary Greek education, in which the expurgation of Homer and Homeric mythology holds a place that may weary the modern reader but is not

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b 677 ff., 680 A-B ff.

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disproportionate to the importance of the matter for Plato's generation and for the Christian Fathers who quote it almost entire. Luxury makes war unavoidable (373 e). The principle of division of labour (374 b–e) is applied to the military class, who receive a special education, and who, to secure the disinterested use of their power, are subjected to a Spartan discipline and not permitted to touch gold or to own property (416–417).

In such a state the four cardinal virtues, the definitions of which were vainly sought in the minor dialogues, are easily seen to be realizations on a higher plane of the principle of the division of labour. It is further provisionally assumed that the four cardinal virtues constitute and in some sort define goodness. The wisdom of such a state resides predominantly in the rulers (428): its bravery in the soldiers (429), who acquire from their education a fixed and settled right opinion as to what things are really to be feared. Its sobriety, moderation, and temperance (sophrosyne) are the willingness of all classes to accept this division of function (431 e). Its justice is the fulfilment of its own function by every class (433). A provisional psychology (435 c–d) discovers in the human soul faculties corresponding to the three social classes (435 e ff.). And the social and political definitions of these virtues are then seen to

b Cf. 433, 443 c and Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 15–16.
c Cf. 427 e with 449 a, and Gorgias, 507 c.
d There is no real evidence that this is derived from a Pythagorean doctrine of the three lives. There is a considerable recent literature that affirms it. It is enough here to refer to Mr. A. E. Taylor's Plato, p. 281, and Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 296, n. 2.
fit the individual. Sobriety and temperance are the acceptance by every faculty of this higher division of labour (441-442). Justice is the performance by every faculty of its proper task (433 a-b with 441 d). These definitions will stand the test of vulgar instances. The man whose own soul is inherently just in this ideal sense of the word will also be just in the ordinary relations of life. He will not pick and steal and cheat and break his promises (442 e-443 a). Justice in man and state is health. It is as absurd to maintain that the unjust man can be happier than the just as it would be to argue that the unhealthy man is happier than the healthy (445 a). Our problem is apparently solved.

It has been argued that this conclusion marks the end of a first edition of the *Republic* to which there are vague references in antiquity. There can be no proof for such an hypothesis. Plato’s plan from the first presumably contemplated an ideal state governed by philosophers (347 d), and there is distinct reference in the first four books to the necessity of securing the perpetuity of the reformed state by the superior intelligence of its rulers.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}}\text{ Cf. my paper on "The Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic," University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology, vol. i. p. 194: "Utilitarian ethics differs from the evolutionist, says Leslie Stephen . . . in that ‘the one lays down as a criterion the happiness, the other the health of the society. . . .’ Mr. Stephen adds, ‘the two are not really divergent,’ and this is the thesis which Plato strains every nerve to prove throughout the Republic and Laws."}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{b}}\text{ Cf. infra, p. xxv, note b.} \]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{c}}\text{ Cf. 412 A with 429 A, 497 C-D, 502 D. Cf. also the "longer way," 435 D with 504 B-C, and further, The Unity of Plato’s Thought, note 650, and the article "Plato’s Laws and the Unity of Plato’s Thought," Classical Philology, October 1914.} \]
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The transition at the beginning of the fifth book is quite in Plato's manner and recalls the transition in the *Phaedo* (84 c) to a renewal of the discussion of immortality. Here Glaucon and Adeimantus, as there Simmias and Cebes, are conversing in low tones and are challenged by Socrates to speak their mind openly (449 b). They desire a fuller explanation and justification of the paradox, too lightly let fall by Socrates, that the guardians will have all things in common, including wives and children (449 c, cf. 424 a). Socrates, after some demur, undertakes to expound this topic and in general the pre-conditions of the realization of the ideal state under the continued metaphor of three waves of paradox. They are (1) the exercise of the same functions by men and women (457 a, 453 to 457); (2) the community of wives (457 c); (3) (which is the condition of the realization of all these ideals) the postulate that either philosophers must become kings or kings philosophers.

The discussion of these topics and the digressions which they suggest give to this transitional book an appearance of confusion which attention to the clue of the three waves of paradox and the distinction between the desirability and the possibility of the Utopia contemplated will remove.* The last few pages of the book deprecate prevailing prejudice against the philosophers and prepare the way for the theory and description of the higher education in Books VI and VII by distinguishing from the many pretenders the true philosophers who are those who are lovers of ideas, capable of appreciating them, and able to reason in abstractions.† Whatever the meta-

* Cf. 452 e, 457 c, 457 d-e, 458 a-b, 461 e, 466 d, 471 c, 472 d, 473 c-d.
† Cf. 474 b, 475 d-e, 477-480, 479 a-b.
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physical implications of this passage a its practical significance for the higher education and the main argument of the Republic is that stated here.

The sixth book continues this topic with an enumeration of the qualities of the perfect student, the natural endowments that are the prerequisites of the higher education (485 ff.) and the reasons why so few (496 a) of those thus fortunately endowed are saved (494 a) for philosophy from the corrupting influences of the crowd and the crowd-compelling sophists. b

In an ideal state these sports of nature (as Huxley styles them) will be systematically selected (499 b ff.), tested through all the stages of ordinary education and finally conducted by the longer way (504 b with 435 d) of the higher education in the abstract sciences and mathematics and dialectics to the apprehension of the idea of good, which will be their guide in the conduct of the state. This simple thought is expressed in a series of symbols—the sun (506 e ff.), the divided line (509 d), the cave (514 ff.)—which has obscured its plain meaning for the majority of readers. c For the purposes of the Republic and apart from disputable metaphysical implications it means simply that ethics and politics ought to be something more than mere empiricism. Their principles and practice must be consistently related to a clearly conceived final standard and ideal of human welfare and good. To conceive such a standard and apply it systematically

a Cf. The Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 55-56.

b Cf. 490 F, 492 ff.

c Cf. my paper on "The Idea of Good," The Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 16 ff. and 74, and my article "Summum Bonum" in Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

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to the complications of institutions, law, and education is possible only for first-class minds who have undergone a severe discipline in abstract thought, supplemented by a long experience in affairs (484 a, 539 e). But it is even more impossible that the multitude should be critics than that they should be philosophers (494 a). And so this which is Plato’s plain meaning has been lost in the literature of mystic and fanciful interpretation of the imagery in which he clothes it.

From these heights the seventh book descends to a sober account of the higher education in the mathematical sciences and dialectic (521 c ff.). The passage is an interesting document for Plato’s conception of education and perhaps for the practice in his Academy. It also is the chief text for the controverted question of Plato’s attitude towards science and the place of Platonism in the history of science, but it need not further detain us here. This book, in a sense, completes the description of the ideal state.

The eighth book, one of the most brilliant pieces of writing in Plato, is a rapid survey of the divergence, the progressive degeneracy from the ideal state in the four types to which Plato thinks the tiresome infinity of the forms of government that minute research enumerates among Greeks and barbarians may be conveniently reduced (544 c-d). These are the timocracy, whose principle is honour (545 c ff.), the oligarchy, which regards wealth (550 c ff., 551 c), the democracy, whose slogan is

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liberty, or "doing as one likes" (557 b-e), the tyranny, enslaved to appetite. In this review history, satire, political philosophy, and the special literary motives of the Republic are blended in a mixture hopelessly disconcerting to all literal-minded critics from Aristotle down.

In the first two types Plato is evidently thinking of the better (544 c) and the worse aspects (548 a) of Sparta. In his portrayal of the democratic state he lets himself go in satire of fourth-century Athens (557 b ff.), intoxicated with too heady draughts of liberty (562 d) and dying of the triumph of the liberal party. His picture of the tyrant is in part a powerful restatement of Greek commonplace (565 a-576) and in part a preparation for the return to the main argument of the Republic (577 ff.) by direct application of the analogy between the individual and the state with which he began.

In the ninth book all the lines converge on the original problem. After adding the final touches to the picture of the terrors and inner discords (576-580) of the tyrant's soul, Plato finally decides the issue between the just and the unjust life by three arguments. The just life is proved the happier (1) by the analogy with the contrasted happiness of the royal (ideal) and the unhappiness of the tyrannized state (577 c ff.), (2) by reason of an argument which Plato never repeats but which John Stuart Mill seriously accepts (582-583): The man who lives mainly for the higher spiritual satisfactions has necessarily had experience of the pleasures of sense and ambition also. He only can compare and judge. The devotees of sense and ambition know little or nothing of the higher happiness of the intellect and the soul.

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(3) The third and perhaps the most weighty proof is the principle on which the Platonic philosophy or science of ethics rests, the fact that the pleasures of sense are essentially negative, not to say worthless, because they are preconditioned by equivalent wants which are pains. This principle is clearly suggested in the Gorgias, Meno, Phaedrus, and Phaedo, and is elaborately explained in the psychology of the Philebus. It is in fact the basis of the Platonic ethics, which the majority of critics persist in deducing from their notion of Plato’s metaphysics. These three arguments, however, are not the last word. For final conviction Plato falls back on the old analogy of health and disease, with which the fourth book provisionally concluded the argument, and which as we there saw is all that the scientific ethics of Leslie Stephen can urge in the last resort. The immoral soul is diseased and cannot enjoy true happiness. This thought is expressed in the image of the many-headed beast (588 c ff.) and confirmed in a final passage of moral eloquence which forms a climax and the apparent conclusion of the whole (591-592).

The tenth book may be regarded either as an appendix and after-piece or as the second and higher climax prepared by an intervening level tract separating it from the eloquent conclusion of the ninth book. The discussion in the first half of the book of the deeper psychological justification of the banishment of imitative poets is interesting in itself. It is something that Plato had to say and that could be

b Cf. supra, p. xvi, note a.
said here with the least interruption of the general design. But its chief service is that it rests the emotions between two culminating points and so allows each its full force. Whether by accident or design, this method of composition is found in the *Iliad*, where the games of the twenty-third book relieve the emotional tension of the death of Hector in the twenty-second and prepare us for the final climax of the ransom of his body and his burial in the twenty-fourth. It is also found in the oration *On the Crofim*, which has two almost equally eloquent perorations separated by a tame level tract. In Plato's case there is no improbability in the assumption of conscious design. The intrinsic preferability of justice has been proved and eloquently summed up. The impression of that moral eloquence would have been weakened if Plato had immediately proceeded to the myth that sets forth the rewards that await the just man in the life to come. And the myth itself is much more effective after an interval of sober argument and discussion. Then that natural human desire for variation and relief of monotony for which the modulations of Plato's art everywhere provide makes us welcome the tale of Er the son of Arminius (614 b), the "angel" from over there (614 d). And we listen entranced to the myth that was saved and will save us if we believe it—believe that the soul is immortal, capable of infinite issues of good and evil, of weal or woe. So shall we hold ever to the upward way and follow righteousness and sobriety with clear-eyed reason that we may be dear to ourselves and to God, both in the time of our sojourn and trial here below and also when, like victors in the games, we receive the final crown and
prize, that thus both here and in all the millennial pilgrim's progress of the soul of which we fable we shall fare well (621 c-d).

This summary presents only the bare framework of the ideas of the Republic. But we may fittingly add here a partial list of the many brilliant passages of description, character-painting, satire, imagery, and moral eloquence dispersed through the work.

They include the dramatic introduction (327-331) with the picture of the old age of the just man, prefiguring the conclusion of the whole work; the angry intervention of Thrasymachus (336 b ff.); the altercation between Thrasymachus and Cleitophon (340); Thrasymachus perspiring under Socrates' questions because it was a hot day (350 d); the magnificent restatement of the case for injustice by Glaucon and Adeimantus (357-367); the Wordsworthian idea of the influence of a beautiful environment on the young soul (401); the satiric description of the valetudinarian and malade imaginaire (406-407); the eloquent forecast of the fate of a society in which the guardians exploit their charges and the watchdogs become grey wolves (416-417); the satire on the lazy workman's or socialist paradise (420 d-e); the completion of the dream and the first of three noble statements of what Emerson calls the sovereignty of ethics, the moral ideal, the anticipated Stoic principle that nothing really matters but the good will (443-444; cf. 591 E, 618 c); the soul that contemplates all time and all existence (486 A); the allegory of the disorderly ship and the riotous crew (488-489); the power of popular assemblies to
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corr upt the youthful soul and all souls that have not a footing somewhere in eternity (492); the great beast that symbolizes the public (493 A-B)—not to be confused, as often happens, with the composite beast that is an allegory of the mixed nature of man; the little bald tinker who marries his master’s daughter, an allegory of the unworthy wooers of divine philosophy (495 E); the true philosophers whose contemplation of the heavens and of eternal things leaves them no leisure for petty bickerings and jealousies (500 c-d); the sun as symbol of the idea of good (507-509); the divided line illustrating the faculties of mind and the distinction between the sciences and pure philosophy or dialectics (510-511); the prisoners in the fire-lit cave, an allegory of the unphilosophic, unreleased mind (514-518); the entire eighth book, which Macaulay so greatly admired; and especially its satire on democracy doing as it likes, the inspiration of Matthew Arnold (562-563); Plato’s evening prayer, as it has been called, anticipating all that is true and significant in the Freudian psychology (571); the description of the tortured tyrant’s soul, applied by Tacitus to the Roman emperors (578-579); the comparison of the shadows we are and the shadows we pursue with the Greeks and Trojans who fought for a phantom Helen (586 B-C); the likening of the human soul to a many-headed beast (588 C); the city of which the pattern is laid up in heaven (592 A-B); the spell of Homer (607 C-D); the crowning myth of immortality (614-621).

The Republic is the central and most comprehensive work of Plato’s maturity. It may have been com-
posed between the years 380 and 370 B.C. in the fifth or sixth decade of Plato’s life.\(^a\)

The tradition that the earlier books were published earlier can neither be proved nor disproved.\(^b\)

The invention of printing has given to the idea of “publication” a precision of meaning which it could not bear in the Athens of the fourth century B.C. Long before its formal completion the plan and the main ideas of Plato’s masterpiece were doubtless familiar, not only to the students of the Academy but to the rival school of Isocrates and the literary gossips of Athens.

Unlike the presumably earlier Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Euthyphro, Meno, Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydemus, the Republic is a positive, not to say a dogmatic, exposition of Plato’s thought, and not, except in the introductory first book, an idealizing dra-

\(^a\) Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 78, n. 606; Zeller, Plato\(^4\), p. 551, discusses the evidence and anticipates without accepting Taylor’s argument (Plato, p. 20) that the quotation of the sentence about philosophers being kings (Rep. 473 c-n, 499 B-C) by the author of the seventh Epistle proves that the Republic was already written in the year 388/7.

matization of Socrates' talks with Athenian youths and sophists.

Aristotle cites the Republic as the Politeia, and this was the name given to it by Plato. In 527 it is playfully called the Kallipolis. The secondary title η περί δικαιων is not found in the best manuscripts, and, as the peculiar use of η indicates, was probably added later.

But, as already said, we cannot infer from this that the ethical interest is subordinated to the political. The two are inseparable. The distinction between ethics and politics tends to vanish in early as in recent philosophy. Even Aristotle, who first perhaps wrote separate treatises on ethics and politics, combines them as η περί τα ἀνθρωπίνα φιλοσοφία. He speaks of ethics as a kind of politics. And though he regards the family and the individual as historically preceding the state, in the order of nature and the idea the state is prior. The modern sociologist who insists that the psychological and moral life of the individual apart from the social organism is an unreal abstraction is merely returning to the standpoint of the Greek who could not conceive man as a moral being outside of the polis.

In the consciously figurative language of Plato, the idea of justice is reflected both in the individual and the state, the latter merely exhibits it on a larger scale. Or, to put it more simply, the true and only aim of the political art is to make the citizens happier by making them better. And though good men

\textit{Politics}, 1264 b 24. The plural also occurs, \textit{ibid.} 1293 b 1.


368 d-369 a. It is uncritical to press the metaphysical suggestions of this passage.

\textit{Euthydemus} 291 c ff., \textit{Gorgias} 521 d, \textit{Euthyphro} 2 d.
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arise sporadically, and are preserved by the grace of God in corrupt states, the only hope for mankind is in a state governed by philosophical wisdom (473 b), and the ideal man can attain to his full stature and live a complete life only in the ideal city.

The larger part of the Republic is in fact occupied with the ideal state, with problems of education and social control, but, as already said, we are repeatedly reminded (supra, p. xii) that all these discussions are in Plato’s intention subordinated to the main ethical proof that the just life is happier than the unjust. Ethics takes precedence in that the final appeal is to the individual will and the individual thirst for happiness. Plato is to that extent an individualist and a utilitarian. Politics is primary in so far as man’s moral life cannot exist outside of the state.

There are hints of the notion of an ideal state before Plato. And the literary motif of Utopia has a long history. But it was the success of the Republic and Laws that made the portrayal of the best state the chief problem, not to say the sole theme, of Greek political science. In Plato this was due to an idealistic temper and a conviction of the irremediable corruption of Greek social and political life. The place


b Meno 99 E, Rep. 493 A.


e Of the immense literature of the subject it is enough to refer to Alfred Dorens’ “Wünschräume und Wünschzeiten” in Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg, 1924–1925, Berlin, 1927; Fr. Kleinwächter, Die Staats Romane, Vienna, 1891; Edgar Salin, Platon und die griechische Utopie, Leipzig, 1921. An incomplete list collected from these essays includes more than fifty examples.

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assigned to the ideal state in Aristotle's *Politics* is sometimes deplored by the admirers of the matter-of-fact and inductive methods of the first and fifth books. And in our own day the value of this motif for the serious science of society is still debated by sociologists.

The eternal fascination of the literary motif is indisputable, and we may enjoy without cavil the form which the artist Plato preferred for the exposition of his thought, while careful to distinguish the thoughts themselves from their sometimes fantastic embodiment. But we must first note one or two of the fundamental differences between the presuppositions of Plato's speculations and our own. (1) Plato's state is a Greek city, not a Persian empire, a European nation, or a conglomerate America. To Greek feeling complete and rational life was impossible for the inhabitant of a village or the subject of a satrap. It was attainable only through the varied social and political activities of the Greek *polis*, equipped with agora, gymnasium, assembly, theatre, and temple-crowned acropolis. It resulted from the action and interaction upon themselves and the world of intelligent and equal freemen conscious of kinship and not too numerous for self-knowledge or too few for self-defence. From this point of view Babylon, Alexandria, Rome, London, and New York would not be cities but chaotic aggregations of men. And in the absence of steam, telegraphy, and representative government the empires of Darius, Alexander, and Augustus would not be states but loose associations of cities, tribes, and provinces. Much of Plato's sociology is therefore inapplicable to modern conditions. But though we recognize, we must not
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exaggerate the difference. The Stoic and Christian city of God, the world citizenship into which the subjects of Rome were progressively adopted, the mediaeval papacy and empire, the twentieth-century democratic nation are the expressions of larger and perhaps more generous ideals. But in respect of the achievement of a complete life for all their members, they still remain failures or experiments. The city-state, on the other hand, has once and again at Athens and Florence so nearly solved its lesser problem as to make the ideal city appear not altogether a dream. And, accordingly, modern idealists are returning to the conception of smaller cantonal communities, interconnected, it is true, by all the agencies of modern science and industrialism, but in their social tissue and structure not altogether incomparable to the small city-state which Plato contemplated as the only practical vehicle of the higher life.

(2) The developments of science and industry have made the idea of progress an essential part of every modern Utopia. The subjugation of nature by man predicted in Bacon’s New Atlantis has come more and more to dominate all modern dreams of social reform. It is this which is to lay the spectre of Malthusianism. It is this which is to give us the four-hour day and will furnish the workman’s dwelling with all the labour-saving conveniences of electricity, supply his table with all the delicacies of all the seasons, entertain his cultivated leisure with automatic reproductions of all the arts, and place flying machines and automobiles at his disposal when he would take the air.

This is not the place to estimate the part of illusion in these fancies. It is enough to observe that in dwelling too complacently upon them modern utop-
ians are apt to forget the moral and spiritual pre-
conditions of any fundamental betterment of human
life. Whereas Plato, conceiving the external con-
dition of man’s existence to be essentially fixed, has
more to tell us of the discipline of character and the
elevation of intelligence. In Xavier Demaistre’s
Voyage autour de ma chambre, Plato, revisiting the
glimpses of the moon, is made to say, “In spite of
your glorious gains in physical science, my opinion of
human nature is unchanged—but I presume that your
progress in psychology, history, and the scientific
control of human nature, has by this time made
possible that ideal Republic which in the conditions of
my own age I regarded as an impracticable dream.”
Demaistre was sorely embarrassed for a reply. Have
we one ready?

Living in a milder climate and before the birth of
the modern industrial proletariat, Plato is less haunted
than we by the problem of pauperism. And his
austerity of temper would have left him indifferent,
if not hostile, to the ideal of universal luxury and ease.
It was not the life he appointed for his guardians, and
the demand of the workers for it he has satirized in
advance (420 d-e). If we add to the two points here
considered some shades of ethical and religious feel-
ing, associated with Christianity, we shall have nearly
exhausted the list of fundamental differences between
Plato’s political and social thought and our own.
The Republic, if we look beneath the vesture of
paradox to the body of its substantive thought, might

*Cf., however, Pöhlmann, Geschichte der sozialen Frage
und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt, who, however, in
the opinion of some of his critics, exaggerates the industrialism
and industrial problems of Athens.

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seem a book of yesterday or to-morrow. The conception of society as an organism, with the dependence of laws and institutions upon national temperament and customs, the omnipotence of public opinion, the division of labour and the reasons for it, the necessity of specialization, the formation of a trained standing army, the limitation of the right of private property, the industrial and political equality of women, the reform of the letter of the creeds in order to save the spirit, the proscription of unwholesome art and literature, the reorganization of education, eugenics, the kindergarten method, the distinction between higher and secondary education, the endowment of research, the application of the higher mathematics to astronomy and physics—all this and much more may be read in it by him who runs.

A critical interpretation would first remove some obstacles to a true appreciation interposed by captious cavils or over-ingenious scholarship, and then proceed to study Plato's ideas (1) as embedded in the artistic structure of the Republic, (2) as the outgrowth of Plato's thought and experience as a whole, and of the suggestions that came to him from his predecessors and contemporaries. The Republic is, in Huxley's words, a "noble, philosophical romance"—it is a discussion of ethics, politics, sociology, religion and education cast in the form of a Utopia or an Émile. The criticism of Plato's serious meanings is one thing. The observation of the way in which they are coloured and heightened by the exigencies of this special literary form is another. Plato himself has told us that the Republic is a fairy-tale or fable about justice. And he has warned us that every such finished composition must contain a large measure of what in contrast to
the severity of pure dialectic he calls jest or play.\textsuperscript{a} Within the work itself the artistic illusion had to be preserved. But even there Plato makes it plain that his chief purpose is to embody certain ideas in an ideal, not to formulate a working constitution or body of legislation for an actual state. An ideal retains its value even though it may never be precisely realized in experience. It is a pattern laid up in heaven for those who can see and understand. Plato will not even assert that the education which he prescribes is the best. He is certain only that the best education, whatever it may be, is a pre-condition of the ideal state (416 b-c). Somewhere in the infinite past or future—it may be in the barbarian world beyond our ken—the true city may be visioned whenever and wherever political power and philosophic wisdom are wedded and not as now divorced. He affirms no more.

It is a waste of ink to refute the paradoxes or harp upon the omissions of the Republic in disregard of these considerations. The paradoxes are softened and explained, the omissions supplied in the Politicus and the Laws, which express fundamentally identical ethical and political convictions from a slightly different point of view and a perhaps somewhat sobered mood.\textsuperscript{b} To assume that differences which are easily explained by the moulding of the ideas in their literary framework are caused by revolutions in Plato’s beliefs is to violate all canons of sound criticism and all the established presumptions of the unity of Plato’s thought.

The right way to read the Republic is fairly indicated

\textsuperscript{a} Phaedr. 278 e.

\textsuperscript{b} Cf. my paper, “Plato’s Laws and the Unity of Plato’s Thought,” Class. Phil. vol. ix., 1914, pp. 345-369.
by casual utterances of such critics as Renan, Pater, Emerson, and Émile Faguet. The captious attitude of mind is illustrated by the set criticism of Aristotle, the Christian Fathers, Zeller, De Quincey, Landor, Spencer, and too large a proportion of professional philologists and commentators. "As the poet too," says Emerson, "he (Plato) is only contemplative. He did not, like Pythagoras, break himself with an institution. All his painting in the Republic must be esteemed mythical with the intent to bring out, sometimes in violent colours, his thought."

This disposes at once of all criticism, hostile or friendly, aesthetic or philological, that scrutinizes the Republic as if it were a bill at its second reading in Parliament, or a draft of a constitution presented to an American state convention. The greater the ingenuity and industry applied to such interpretations the further we are led astray. Even in the Laws Plato warns us that we are not yet, but are only becoming, legislators.

In the Republic it suits Plato's design to build up the state from individual units and their economic needs. But his critics, from Aristotle to Sir Henry Maine, derive their conception of the patriarchal theory of society from his exposition of it in the Laws.

He embodies his criticism of existing Greek institutions in a scheme for the training of his soldiers, supplemented by the higher education of the guardians. But we cannot infer, as hasty critics have done, from 421a that he would not educate the masses at all. The banishment of Homer is a vivid expression of Plato's demand that theology be purified and art moralized. But Milton wisely declined to treat it as a serious argument against the liberty of unlicensed
printing in England. And nothing can be more preposterous than the statement still current in books of supposed authority that the severity of dialectics had suppressed in Plato the capacity for emotion and the appreciation of beauty. The abolition of private property among the ruling classes is partly the expression of a religious, a Pythagorean, not to say a Christian, ideal, which Plato reluctantly renounces in the *Laws.* But it is mainly a desperate attempt to square the circle of politics and justify the rule of the intelligent few by an enforced disinterestedness and the annihilation of all possible "sinister interests." All criticism that ignores this vital point is worthless.

The same may be said of the community of wives, which is further, as Schopenhauer remarks, merely a drastic expression of the thought that the breeding of men ought to be as carefully managed as that of animals. It is abandoned in the *Laws.* The detailed refutations of Aristotle are beside the mark, and the denunciations of the Christian Fathers and De Quincey and Landor are sufficiently met by Lucian's remark that those who find in the *Republic* an apology for licentiousness little apprehend in what sense the divine philosopher meant his doctrine of communistic marriage.

It is the height of naïveté to demonstrate by the statistics of a Parisian crèche that the children of the guardians would die in infancy, or to inquire too curiously into the risks they would run in accompanying their parents on horseback to war (466 f, 467 f).

\[a\text{ Rep. 416, 462-463, 465 b, Timaeus 18 b, Laws 739 b-d.}\]

\[b\text{ Cf. supra, p. xv and infra, p. xlii.}\]

\[c\text{ Even Newman, for example, seems to accept the Aristotelian objection that such a military caste will tyrannize. See Newman's *Politics of Aristotle*, vol. i. pp. 326 f.}\]
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The comparison of the individual to the state is a suggestive analogy for sociology and at the same time a literary motif that is worth precisely what the writer's tact and skill can make of it. Plato's use of the idea is most effective. By subtle artifices of style the cumulative effect of which can be felt only in the original, the reader is brought to conceive of the social organism as one monster man or leviathan, whose sensuous appetites are the unruly mechanic mob, whose disciplined emotions are the trained force that checks rebellion within and guards against invasion from without, and whose reason is the philosophic statesmanship that directs each and all for the good of the whole. And conversely the individual man is pictured as a biological colony of passions and appetites which "swarm like worms within our living clay"—a curious compound of beast and man which can attain real unity and personality only by the conscious domination of the monopolical reason. The origination of this idea apparently belongs to Plato. But he can hardly be held responsible for the abuse of it by modern sociologists, or for Herbert Spencer's ponderous demonstration that with the aid of Huxley and Carpenter he can discover analogies between the body politic and the physiological body in comparison with which those of Plato are mere child's-play.

It is unnecessary to multiply illustrations of such matter-of-fact and misconceived criticism. Enough has been said perhaps to prepare the way for the broad literary common-sense appreciation of the Republic, which an intelligent reader, even of a translation, will arrive at for himself if he reads without prejudice and without checking at every little apparent oddity in the reasoning or the expression.
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The proper historical background for such a broad understanding of Plato’s political and social philosophy is Thucydides’ account of the thirty years’ Peloponnesian war, which Hobbes translated in order to exhibit to England and Europe the evils of unbridled democracy. Thucydides’ history is the ultimate source of all the hard-headed cynical political philosophy of Realpolitik and the Superman, from Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and Hobbes to Nietzsche and Bernardi. And in recent years the speeches which he attributes to the Athenian ambassadors proposing to violate the neutrality of Melos have been repeatedly rediscovered and quoted. They are merely the most drastic expression of a philosophy of life and politics which pervades the entire history and which I studied many years ago in a paper on the “Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides,” a some of the ideas of which are reproduced apparently by accident in Mr. Cornford’s Thucydides Mythistoricus. The moral disintegration of a prolonged world war is the predestined medium for the culture of this poisonous germ. And the Peloponnesian war was a world war for the smaller international system of the Greek states. It was for Greece that suicide which our civil war may prove to have been for the old American New England and Virginia, and which we pray the World War may not prove to have been for Europe. The analogy, which we need not verify in detail, is startling, though the scale in Greece was infinitely smaller. In both cases we see an inner ring or focus of intense higher civilization encompassed by a vast

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outer semi-civilized or barbarian world of coloniza-
tion, places in the sun, trade monopolies, and spheres
of influence. In both the inner ring is subdivided
into jealous states whose unstable equilibrium
depends on the maintenance of the balance of power
between two great systems, one commercial, demo-
cratic, and naval, the other authoritative, dis-
ciplined, military. The speeches of Pericles and
King Archidamus in Thucydides analyse, contrast,
and develop the conflicting ideals and weigh sea
power against land power, as the speeches of rival
prime ministers have done in our day. I merely
suggest the parallel. What concerns us here is that
to understand Plato we must compare, I do not say
identify, him with Renan writing about la réforme
intellectuelle et morale of France after the année
terrible, or, absit omen, an English philosopher of
1950 speculating on the decline and fall of the
British Empire, or an American philosopher of 1980
meditating on the failure of American democracy.
The background of the comparatively optimistic
Socrates was the triumphant progressive imperialistic
democracy of the age of Pericles, and the choric
odes of the poets and prophets of the imaginative
reason, Aeschylus and Sophocles. The background
of Plato, the experience that ground to devilish
colours all his dreams and permanently darkened his
vision of life, was the world war that made shipwreck
of the Periclean ideal and lowered the level of
Hellenic civilization in preparation for its final
overthrow. The philosophy which he strove to
overcome in himself and others was the philosophy
of the political speeches in Thucydides and of those
bitter disillusioned later plays of Euripides. His

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middle age fell and his *Republic* was conceived in an Athens stagnating under the hateful oppression of the Spartan Junker dominating Greece in alliance with the unspeakable Persian. The environment of his old age and its masterpiece, the *Laws*, was the soft, relaxed, sensuous, cynical, pococurante, *fin de siècle* Athens of the New Comedy, drifting helplessly to the catastrophe of Chaeronea—the Athens which Isocrates expected to save by treaties of peace with all mankind and shutting up the wine-shops, and which Demosthenes vainly admonished to build up its fleet and drill its armies against the Macedonian peril. When Plato is characterized as an unpatriotic, undemocratic, conservative reactionary, false to the splendid Periclean tradition, we must remember that Pericles' funeral oration had become for all but the fourth of July orators of Plato's generation as intolerable and ironic a mockery as Lowell's *Commemoration Ode* and Lincoln's Gettysburg address will seem to America if democracy fails to unify us into a real people. His philosophy was "reactionary" in the sense that it was his own inevitable psychological and moral reaction against the sophistical ethics of the Superman on one side and on the other against the cult of inefficiency and indiscipline which he had come to regard as wholly inseparable from unlimited democracy. This reactionary aspect of Plato's political and social philosophy has been vividly depicted, though perhaps with some strained allusions to the democracy of contemporary France, in Faguet's five chapters on the hatreds of Plato.

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The equivocal labels radical and conservative mean little in their application to minds of the calibre of a Plato or even of a Burke. What really matters is the kind of conservative, the kind of radical that you are. As Mill says, there is a distinction ignored in all political classification, and more important than any political classification, the difference between superior and inferior minds.

As a thinker for all time, Plato in logical grasp and coherency of consecutive and subtle thought, stands apart from and above a Renan, a Burke, an Arnold, or a Ruskin. But as a man, his mood, inevitably determined by his historical environment, was that of Matthew Arnold in the 'sixties, endeavouring to prick with satire the hide of the British Philistine, or of Ruskin in the 'seventies embittered by the horrors of the Franco-Prussian War and seeking consolation in the political economy of the future. We may denominate him a conservative and a reactionary, in view of this personal mood and temper, and his despair of the democracy of fin de siècle Athens. But his Utopian Republic advocated not only higher education and votes, but offices for women, and a eugenic legislation that would stagger Oklahoma. And so if you turn to Professor Murray's delightful Euripides and his Age, you will read that Euripides is the child of a strong and splendid tradition and is, together with Plato, the first of all rebels against it. Suppose Professor Murray had written, Bernard Shaw is the child of a strong and splendid tradition and, together with Matthew Arnold, the first of all rebels against it. I think we should demur, and feel that something was wrong. We should decline to bracket Arnold
and Shaw as rebels to English tradition, despite the fact that both endeavoured to stir up the British Philistine with satire and wit. As a matter of fact, Plato detested Euripides and all his works, and generally alludes to him with Aristophanic irony.

If we pass by the terrible arraignment in the Gorgias of the democracy that was guilty of the judicial murder of Socrates, the political philosophy of the minor dialogues is mainly a Socratic canvassing of definitions, and an apparently vain but illuminating quest for the supreme art of life, the art that will make us happy, the political or royal art, which guides and controls all else, including music, literature, and education. This conception is represented in the Republic by the poetic allegory of the Idea of Good and the description of the higher education of the true statesman which alone lends it real content. The matter is quite simple, and has been confused only by the refusal to accept Plato’s own plain statements about it and the persistent tendency to translate Plato’s good poetry into bad metaphysics.¹

The metaphysics of the Idea of Good will be treated in the introduction to the second volume. Here it is enough to quote Mr. Chesterton, who, whether by accident or design, in a lively passage of his Heretics, expresses the essential meaning of the doctrine in the political, ethical, and educational philosophy of the Republic quite sufficiently for practical purposes.

"Every one of the popular modern phrases and ideals is a dodge in order to shirk the problem of what is good. We are fond of talking about ‘liberty’; that, as we talk of it, is a dodge to avoid discussing

¹ Cf. my article "Summum Bonum" in Hastings’ Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.
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what is good. We are fond of talking about 'progress'; that is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. We are fond of talking about 'education'; that is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. The modern man says, 'Let us leave all these arbitrary standards and embrace liberty.' That is, logically rendered, 'Let us not decide what is good, but let it be considered good not to decide it.' He says, 'Away with your old moral formulae; I am for progress.' This, logically stated, means, 'Let us not settle what is good; but let us settle whether we are getting more of it.' He says, 'Neither in religion nor morality, my friend, lie the hopes of the race, but in education.' This, clearly expressed, means, 'We cannot decide what is good, but let us give it to our children.'" So far Mr. Chesterton.

Plato's Idea of Good, then, means that the education of his philosophic statesmen must lift them to a region of thought which transcends the intellectual confusion in which these dodges and evasions alike of the ward boss and the gushing settlement-worker dwell. He does not tell us in a quotable formula what the good is, because it remains an inexhaustible ideal. But he portrays with entire lucidity his own imaginative conception of Greek social good in his Republic and Laws.

The doctrine of the Idea of Good is simply the postulate that social well-being must be organized not by rule-of-thumb, hand-to-mouth opportunist politicians, but by highly trained statesmen systematically keeping in view large and consciously apprehended ends. The only way to compass this, Plato affirms, is first to prepare and test your rulers by the severest education physical and mental, theoretical and
practical that the world has yet seen, and secondly to insure their freedom from what Bentham calls "sinister interests" by taking away from them their safe-deposit vaults and their investments in corporation stock and requiring them to live on a moderate salary and a reasonable pension.

This, or so much of it as may be translated into modern terms, is the essence of Plato's social and political philosophy.

But Plato's Republic, whatever its contributions to political theory or its suggestiveness to the practical politician or social reformer, is not a treatise on political science or a text-book of civics. It is the City of God in which Plato's soul sought refuge from the abasement of Athenian politics which he felt himself impotent to reform. The philosopher, he says (496 d) with unmistakable reference to Socrates (Apology 31 e) and apology for himself, knows that no politician is honest nor is there any champion of justice at whose side he may fight and be saved. He resembles a man fallen among wild beasts. He is unwilling to share and impotent singly to oppose their rapine. He is like one who in a driving storm of dust and sleet stands aside under shelter of a wall and seeing others filled full with all iniquity, must be content to live his own life, keep his soul unspotted from the world, and depart at last with peace and goodwill and gracious hopes. This is something. But how much more could he accomplish for himself and others, Plato wistfully adds, in a society in harmony with his true nature. And so he plays (it is his own word) with the construction of such a state. But when the dream is finished, his epilogue is: We have built a city in words, since it exists nowhere on earth, though there may be a
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pattern of it laid up in heaven. But whether it exists or not, the true philosopher will concern himself with the politics of this city only, of this city only will he constitute himself a citizen. As Emerson puts it, he was born to other politics. The witty and cynical Lucian mocks at this city in the clouds where Socrates lives all alone by himself, governed by his own laws. And I have no time to answer him now, even by enumeration of the great spirits who have taken refuge in the Platonic City of God. It was there that St. Augustine found consolation and hope in the crash and downfall of the Roman Empire. And fifteen hundred years later an unwonted glow suffuses the arid style of Kant when he speaks of the man who is conscious of an inward call to constitute himself by his conduct in this world the citizen of a better.

But to those political and social philosophers who disdain a fugitive and cloistered virtue and ask for some more helpful practical lesson than this, Plato’s Republic offers two main suggestions.

The first is the way of St. Francis: the acceptance of the simple life, which by a startling coincidence Glaucon, in reply to Socrates, and the Pope, in remonstrance with St. Francis, designate as a city of pigs. But if we insist on a sophisticated civilization, a fevered city as Plato styles it, we shall find no remedy for the ills to which human nature is heir so long as our guiding principle is the equality of unequals (558 c) and the liberty of every one to do as he pleases. The only way of political and social salvation for such a state is self-sacrificing discipline, specialized efficiency, and government administered by men whom we have

a Matthew Paris apud Sabatier, Life of St. Francis, p. 97 "vade frater et quaere porcus (sic)," etc.

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educated for the function and whom we compel to be unselfish.

We shall not wrong them by this suppression of their lower selves. For they will find in it their highest happiness and so apprehend the full meaning of old Hesiod’s saying that the half is more than the whole. All this, though often confounded with the gospel of the strong man, is in Plato’s intentions its diametrical opposite. Plato’s strong man is not, and is not permitted to be, strong for himself. And finding his own happiness in duty fulfilled he will procure through just and wise government as much happiness as government and education can bestow upon men. Plato never loses faith in the leadership of the right leaders nor in the government of scholars and idealists, provided always that the scholarship is really the highest and severest that the age can furnish, the idealism tempered by long apprenticeship to practical administration, and the mortal nature which cannot endure the temptations of irresponsible power held in check by self-denying ordinances of enforced disinterestedness.

Such scholars in politics and such idealists, and they only, can do for us what the practical politician and the opportunist who never even in dreams have seen the things that are more excellent, can never achieve. Think you (Rep. 500) that such a man, if called to the conduct of human affairs and given the opportunity not merely to mould his own soul but to realize and embody his vision in the institutions and characters of men, will be a contemptible artizan of sobriety and righteousness and all social and human virtue? Will he not like an artist glance frequently back and forth

\[a \text{ Cf. Rep. 419, 420 b, c, 466 b-c.}\]
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from his model, the city in the clouds, home of the absolute good, the true and the beautiful, to the mortal copy which he fashions so far as may be in its image? And so mixing and mingling the pigments on his palette he will reproduce the true measure and likeness of man which even old Homer hints is or ought to be the likeness of God.

THE TEXT

Convention requires that something should be said about the text. How little need be said appears from the fact that the translation was originally made from two or three texts taken at random. The text of this edition was for convenience set up from the Teubner text, and the adjustments in either case have presented no difficulty. I have tried to indicate all really significant divergences and my reasons. That is all that the student of Plato's philosophy or literary art needs.

The tradition of the text of the Republic is excellent. The chief manuscripts have been repeatedly collated, and the Republic has been printed in many critical editions that record variations significant and insignificant. The text criticism of Plato to-day is a game that is played for its own sake, and not for any important results for the text itself or the interpretation. The validity of a new text to-day depends far more on acquaintance with Platonic Greek and Platonic thought than on any rigour of the text-critical and palaeographic game. Nothing whatever results from the hundred and six pages of

Cf. the work of Alline referred to supra, p. xxv, note b.
"Textkritik" in the Appendix to Professor Wilmowicz's *Platon*. Adam repeatedly changed his mind about the readings of his preliminary text edition when he came to write his commentary, and with a candour rare in the *irritabile genus* of text critics withdrew an emendation which I showed to be superfluous by a reference to the *Sophist*.

The Jowett and Campbell edition devotes about a hundred pages of costly print to what are for the most part unessential and uncertain variations. As I said in reviewing it (*A.J.P.* xvi. pp. 229 ff.): "There is something disheartening in the exiguity of the outcome of all this toil, and one is tempted to repeat Professor Jowett's heretical dictum, that "such inquiries have certainly been carried far enough and need no longer detain us from more important subjects." There is really not much to be done with the text of Plato. The game must be played strictly according to the rules, but when it is played out we feel that it was hardly worth the midnight oil. The text of this edition must have cost Professor Campbell a considerable portion of the leisure hours of two or three years. Yet, as he himself says at the close of his interesting, if discursive, essay: 'Were the corruptions and interpolations of the text of the *Republic* as numerous as recent scholars have imagined, the difference of meaning involved would be still infinitesimal. Some feature of an image might be obscured, or some idiomatic phrase enfeebled, but Plato's philosophy would remain uninjured.'

"Of the twelve passages which Professor Campbell regards as still open to suspicion (vol. ii. p. 115), only two affect the sense even slightly. 387 c φριττειν δὴ ποιεῖ ὦς οἴεται, for which our editors read xlvi
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ὡς οἶον τε (which they refer to q, and the correction of Par. A by q, not to Par. A, as hitherto), rejecting Hermann's more vigorous ὅτε ἐτή and not venturing to insert in the text L. C.'s suggestion, ὡς ἐτεά. In ix. 581 ε, τῆς ἱδονῆς οὐ πάντα πόρρω, there is no real difficulty if we accept, with nearly all editors, Graser's τι οἰώμεθα and place interrogation points after μανθάνοντα and πόρρω. Professor Jowett would retain ποιώμεθα and take the words τῆς ἱδονῆς οὐ πάντα πόρρω as ironical; I do not care to try to convert anyone whose perceptions of Greek style do not tell him that this is impossible. Professor Campbell's suggestion, τῆς ἄληθινῆς, of which he thinks ἱδονῆς a substituted gloss, does not affect the meaning and supplies a plausible remedy for the seemingly objectionable repetition of ἱδονῆς. But it is, I think, unnecessary. The Platonic philosopher thinks that sensual pleasures are no pleasures. Cf. Philebus 44 c ὡστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτής τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοητεύμα οὐχ ἱδονὴν εἶναι. The difficulties in 388 ε, 359 c, 567 ε, 590 δ, 603 c, 615 c are too trifling for further debate. 439 ε ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τοῦτο is certainly awkward. L. C.'s suggestion, οὐ πιστεύω τοῦτο, with changed reference of τοῦτο, equally so. 533 ε ὅ ἂν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω σαφηνεῖα ὅ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ is impossible, and the ingenuity is wasted that is spent upon it in the commentary to this result: 'An expression which may indicate with a clearness proportioned to the mental condition that of which it speaks as existing in the mind.' All we want is the thought of Charmides 163 ν δὴ λοι ὃ μόνον ἐφ' ὃ τι ἂν φέρῃς τοῦνομα ὅτι ἂν λέγης, and that is given by the only tolerable text yet proposed, that of Hermann: ἀλλ' ὅ ὅ ἂν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω

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σαφήνευσιν ἀ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ (ἀρκέσει), which is ignored by our editors and which is indeed too remote from the MSS. to be susceptible of proof. In 562 B the unwarranted ἵπερπλοῦτος, which B. J. defends more suo, may be emended by deleting ἵπερ or by L. C.'s plausible suggestion, ποῦ πλοῦτος. In 568 D L. C.'s suggestion, πωλουμένων, is as easy a way as any of securing the required meaning which grammar forbids us to extract from ἀποδομένων.

"Of the 29 passages in which the present text relies on conjectures by various hands, none affects the sense except possibly the obvious παινῶν for πᾶσιν (494 b and 431 c), Schneider's palmary καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα for καὶ ἐτὶ μάλιστα, 554 B, Graser's τί οἰώμεθα, 581 D, Vermehren's χαίρων καὶ δύσχεραινών, which restores concinnity in 401 e, and L. C.'s διὰ τοῦ bis, 440 c, for διὰ τὸ, an emendation which was pencilled on the margin of my Teubner text some years ago. The others restore a paragogic ν or a dropped ἄν or an iota subscript, or smooth out an anacoluthon. Professor Campbell himself suggests some fifteen emendations in addition to the one admitted to the text (vol. ii. p. 123); three or four of these have already been considered. Of the others the most important are the (in the context) cacophonous ἀξίως, 496 A, for ἀξιόν which is better omitted altogether, with Hermann; ἐγγύς τι τείνων τὸν τὸν σώματος for εἶναι, 518 D, which is clever and would commend itself but for a lingering doubt whether the phrase had not a half-humorous suggestion in Plato's usage; and ἃ νοκ (sic q) . . . ἀλλοίων τε [Stallb. for τοι] φήσεις, 500 A. It is unnecessary to follow Professor Campbell in his recension of the superfluous emendations of Cobet,
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Madvig and others not admitted into the text. The man who prints an emendation that is not required but is merely possible Greek in the context is a thief of our time and should be suppressed by a conspiracy of silence. I could wish, however, that our editors had followed Hermann in admitting Nagelsbach's ἐτὶ ἀδύναμία, supported by a quotation from Iamblichus, for ἐπὶ ἀδύναμία in 532 B.C. ἐπὶ ἀδύναμία βλέπειν 'to look powerlessly,' i.e. 'to be without the power to see,' as our editors construe, after Schneider, makes large demands on our faith in the flexibility of Greek idiom, and Stallbaum's 'bei dem Unvermögen zu sehen' is not much better. Moreover, the ἐτὶ adds a touch that is needed; cf. 516 ἀ πρῶτον μὲν, etc. For the rest, all this matter, with much besides, is conscientiously repeated in the commentary, though exhaustiveness is after all not attained, and many useful readings recorded in Stallbaum or Hermann are ignored. I have noted the following points, which might (without much profit) be indefinitely added to. In 332 ἐν no notice is taken of the plausible προπολεμεῖν approved by Ast and Stephanus. In 365 ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ, which has sufficient ms. authority, is better than ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ. The thought is: 'I shall profit nothing from being just (even) if I seem the opposite.' What our editors mean by saying that ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ is more idiomatic I cannot guess. In 365 δ, καὶ (οὖν Jowett and Campbell) ἣμιν μελητέον τοῦ λαυθάνειν, I think the consensus of the mss. could be defended, despite the necessity for a negative that nearly all editors have felt here. The argument of the entire passage would run: There exist (1) political clubs ἐπὶ τὸ λαυθάνειν, and (2) teachers of persuasion
who will enable us to evade punishment if detected. But, you will say, we cannot (1) elude or (2) constrain the gods. The answer is (transferring the question to the higher sphere), as for gods, perhaps (1) they do not exist or are careless of mankind, or (2) can be persuaded or bought off by prayers and ceremonies. Accordingly, we must either (1) try to escape detection, as on the previous supposition, before the gods were introduced into the argument, or (2) invoke priests and hierophants as in the former case teachers of the art of persuasion. The logic of καὶ ἢμιν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν is loose, but it is quite as good as that of εἷ μή εῖσίν as an answer to θεόνος οὔτε λανθάνειν δύνατον, and it is not absolutely necessary to read οὐδ', οὕκοιν τί or ἀμελητέον. The καὶ of καὶ ἢμιν indicates an illogical but perfectly natural antithesis between ‘us’ on the present supposition and the members of the political clubs above.

In 378 ι our editors follow Baiter in punctuating after γρανωί. The antithesis thus secured between παῦδα εὖθυς and πρεσβυτέρους γιγνομένους (ἀν γενομένου;) favours this. The awkwardness of the four times repeated ambiguous καὶ, and the difficulty of the dative with λογοτοιεῖν and the emphasis thus lost of the triplet καὶ γέρωνα καὶ γρανῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρους γιγνομένους, are against it. 397 a, L. C. accepts Madvig’s (Schneider’s ?) μιμήστειν for διηγήσεται, adversante B. J., but διηγήσεται seems to be favoured by the balance of the sentence: πάντα τε μᾶλλον διηγήσεται καὶ . . . οὐδὲτε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμεῖσθαι. 442 c σοφὸν δέ γε ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει τῷ ὁ ἢρξε τ’ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρῆγγελλεν ἔχον αὖ κάκεινο, etc. Our editors seem to feel no difficulty in the τῷ ὁ, etc., nor do they note the omission of 1
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τφ by Par. K and Mon. A simple remedy would be to omit the τφ before δ and insert it after παρηγ-γελλεν, reading τφ ἐκεῖν. In 451 A-B, in reading ὁστε εὖ (for οὖ) με παραμυθεί, our editors, here as elsewhere, over-estimate the possibilities of Socratic irony. 500 A. In arguing against the repetition of ἀλλοίαν in a different sense, 499 E-500 A, our editors should not have ignored the reading of M, ἀλλ' οὖν (recorded, it is true, in the footnotes to the text), which, with the pointing and interrogation marks of Hermann, yields a much more vivacious and idiomatic text than that adopted here. Moreover, ἄλλα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι fits the defiant οὖκ αὖ δοκεῖ above much better if taken in the sense 'contradict us' than in the sense 'change their reply.' In 521 c Hermann's ὁδὸν ἑπάνοδος (after Iamblichus) is the only readable idiomatic text here. Only desperate ingenuity can construe the others. In 606 c the text or footnotes should indicate Hermann's δῆ (for δὲ), which the commentary rightly prefers."

These observations are not intended as a renewal of Jowett's attack on text criticism or an illiberal disparagement of an indispensable technique. They merely explain why it was not thought necessary to waste the limited space of this edition by reprinting information which would interest a half dozen specialists at the most and which they know where to find in more detail than could possibly be given here.

The Republic has been endlessly edited, commented, summarized, and paraphrased (cf. supra, p. vii). The chief editions are enumerated in Ueberweg-Praechter, Die Philosophie des Altertums, 12th ed., Berlin (1926), pp. 190 ff. Schneidewin's edition is curt, critical, and
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sagacious. Stallbaum’s Latin commentary is still useful for idioms and parallel passages. The two most helpful editions are English. The great three-volume work of Jowett and Campbell was critically reviewed by me in *A.J.P.* vol. xvi. pp. 223 ff., and from another point of view in the New York *Nation*, vol. lxi. (1895) pp. 82-84. Adam’s painstaking and faithful commentary does not supersede, but indispensably supplements, Jowett and Campbell’s. Apelt’s German translation is, with a few exceptions, substantially correct, and the appended notes supply most of the information which the ordinary reader needs.


The best manuscript is thought to be Parisinus graecus 1807 (ninth century), generally designated lii
have lost my voice. a But as it is, at the very moment
when he began to be exasperated by the course
of the argument I glanced at him first, so that I
became capable of answering him and said with a
slight tremor: "Thrasymachus, don't be harsh b with
us. If I and my friend have made mistakes in the
consideration of the question, rest assured that it is
unwillingly that we err. For you surely must not
suppose that while c if our quest were for gold d we
would never willingly truckle to one another and
make concessions in the search and so spoil our
chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching
for justice, a thing more precious than much fine
gold, we should then be so foolish as to give way to
one another and not rather do our serious best to
have it discovered. You surely must not suppose
that, my friend. But you see it is our lack of ability
that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far
more reasonably receive from clever fellows like
you than severity."

XI. And he on hearing this gave a great guffaw and
laughed sardonically and said, "Ye gods! here we
have the well-known irony e of Socrates, and I knew
it and predicted that when it came to replying you
would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather
than answer any question that anyone asked you."
"That's because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and
so you knew very well that if you asked a man how
many are twelve, and in putting the question warned
him: don't you be telling me, fellow, that twelve

589 E, 600 C-D, Crito 46 D, Laws 647 C, 931 C, Protag. 325 B-C,
Phaedo 68 A, Thompson on Meno 91 E.
a Cf. Heracleit. fr. 22 Diels, and Ruskin, King's Treasuries
"The physical type of wisdom, gold," Psalms xix. 10.
b Cf. Symp. 216 ε, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers iii. p. 277.
μηδ' ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μηδ' ὅτι ἐξάκις δύο μηδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία: ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαί σου, εἰς τοιαῦτα φλυαρῆς· δῆλον, οἷμαι, σοὶ ἂν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρινοῖ τῷ οὕτῳ πυνθανομένῳ. ἄλλ' εἰ σοι εἴπεν· ὁ Θρασύμαχε, πῶς λέγεις; μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ἃν προεῖπες μηδέν; πότερον, ὃ θαυμάσῃ, μηδ' εἰ τούτων τι τυγχάνει ὅν, ἄλλ' ἔτερον εἴπω τι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; τί ἂν αὐτῷ εἴπης πρὸς ταύτα; Ἐδειν, ἐφη· ὅς δὴ ὁμοιον τοῦτο ἐκεῖνω. Οὐδέν γε κωλύει, ἂν δ' ἐγώ· εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔστων ὁμοιον, φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον, ἢπτὸν τι αὐτὸν οὔει ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαυνόμενον ἐαυτῷ, εάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπεγορεύωμεν εάν τε μή; Ὅλλο τι οὖν, ἐφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις; ἃν ἐγὼ ἀπείπον, τούτων τι ἀποκρινεί; Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἃν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μοι σκεψαμένῳ οὕτῳ δόξειν. Τί οὖν, ἐφη, ἂν ἐγὼ δείξω ἐτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης βελτίω τούτων; τί ἅξιοις παθεῖν; Τί ἄλλο, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ ὁπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδότι; προσήκει δὲ ποὺ μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο ἅξιώ παθεῖν. Ἡδὺς γὰρ εἰ, ἐφη· ἄλλα πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότισον ἀργύριον. Οὐκοῦν ἔπειδὰν μοι γένηται, εἴπον. 'Αλλ' ἔστιν, ἐφη ὁ Γλαύκων.

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a In "American," "nerve." Socrates' statement that the παθεῖν "due him" is μαθεῖν (gratis) affects Thrasymachus as the dicasts were affected by the proposal in the Apology that his punishment should be—to dine at the City Hall. The pun on the legal formula could be remotely rendered: "In addition to the recovery of your wits, you must pay a fine." Plato constantly harps on the taking
is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won't accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, 'Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth, or what do you mean?' What would have been your answer to him?" "Humph!" said he, "how very like the two cases are!" "There is nothing to prevent," said I; "yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don't?" "Is that, then," said he, "what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers?" "I shouldn't be surprised," I said, "if on reflection that would be my view." "What then," he said, "if I show you another answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve?" "Why, what else," said I, "than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer." "I like your simplicity," a said he, "but in addition to 'learning' you must pay a of money." "Well, I will when I have got it," I said. "It is there," said Glaucon: "if money is all that of pay by the Sophists, but Thrasymachus is trying to jest, too.
πάντες γὰρ ἧμείς Σωκράτει εἰσοίσομεν. Πάνω γε, οἶμαι,
Ε ὡς ὅς, ἢν Σωκράτης τὸ εἰσόθος διαπράξεται,
αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δὲ ἀποκρινο-
μένου λαμβάνῃ λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχη. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν,
ἐφην ἔγω, ὁ βέλτιστος, τὸ ἀποκρίνατο πρῶτον
μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, ἔπειτα, εἰ τι
καὶ οἴεσαι περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἰῆ,
ὅπως μηδὲν ἔρει ὃν ἥγεται, ὥπ' ἀνδρός οὐ φαύλου;
338 ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν· σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς
εἰδέναι καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποιεῖ, ἀλλ’
ἐμοὶ τὲ χαρίζων ἀποκρινόμενον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς
καὶ Γλαύκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

XII. Εἰπόντος δὲ μου ταῦτα ὁ τε Γλαύκων καὶ
οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδεόντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν· καὶ ὁ
Ὀρασύμαχος φανερὸς μὲν ἢν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν, ἢ
εὐδοκιμήσειν, ἦγουμένος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγ-
κάλην· προσεποιητὸ δὲ φιλονεικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἔμε
εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. τελευτῶν δὲ ἐξυνεχώρησε,

Β κατείτα Αὐτὴ δὴ, ἐφὴ, ἢ Σωκράτους σοφία, αὐτὸν
μὲν μὴ ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων
περιόντα μανθάνει καὶ τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀπο-
διδόναι. "Οτι μὲν, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν
ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἶπες, ὅ Ὀρασύμαχε· ὅτι δὲ οὐ μὲ
φῆς χάριν ἐκτίνειν, ψεῦδει. ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὅσην
δύναμαι· δύναμαι δὲ ἐπαινεῖν μόνον· χρήματα γὰρ
οὐκ ἔχω· ὥσ δὲ προθύμως τούτῳ δρῶ, ἐὰν τὸς μοι
dοκή ἐμ λέγειν, εὖ εἴσει αὐτίκα δὴ μᾶλα, ἐπειδὰν
C ἀποκρίνη· οἶμαι γὰρ σὲ εὖ ἔρειν. "Ακοῦε δὴ, ἢ

a "Grudging." Cf. Laches 200 b.  
b Cf. Cratyl. 391 u.  
c Socrates’ poverty (Apol. 38 a-b) was denied by some later
writers who disliked to have him classed with the Cynics.
stands in the way, Thrasymanchus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates.” “Oh yes, of course,” said he, “so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies.” “Why, how,” I said, “my dear fellow, could anybody answer if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess to know, and secondly even if he had some notion of the matter, he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn’t give any of his suppositions as an answer? Nay, it is more reasonable that you should be the speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don’t be obstinate, but do me the favour to reply and don’t be chary of your wisdom, and instruct Glaucon here and the rest of us.”

XII. When I had spoken thus Glaucon and the others urged him not to be obstinate. It was quite plain that Thrasymanchus was eager to speak in order that he might do himself credit, since he believed that he had a most excellent answer to our question. But he demurred and pretended to make a point of my being the respondent. Finally he gave way and then said, “Here you have the wisdom of Socrates, to refuse himself to teach, but go about and learn from others and not even pay thanks therefor.” “That I learn from others,” I said, “you said truly, Thrasymanchus. But in saying that I do not pay thanks you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able. And I am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack." But that I praise right willingly those who appear to speak well you will well know forthwith as soon as you have given your answer. For I think that you will speak well.” “Hearken
δ' ὅς. φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον ὑπὶ ἄλλο τι·
η τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐξαυτέρων. ἀλλὰ τὶ ὑπὸ ἐπαυλεῖσ; ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἐθελήσεις. Ἐὰν μᾶθω γε
πρῶτον, ἐφην, τὶ λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὕτω σδα. το
τοῦ κρείττονος φῆς ἐξαυτέρων δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ
tοῦτο, ὥ Ὑφανομαχε, τὶ ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ πο
τὸ γε τοιόνδε φῆς· εἰ Πολυδάμας ἧμῶν κρείττων
ὁ παγκρατιαστὴς καὶ αὐτῷ ἐξαυτέροιτα βόεια κρέα
D πρὸς τὸ σώμα, τοῦτο τὸ σητόν εἶναι καὶ ἦμῖν τοῖς
ηττοσκν ἐκεῖνον ἐξαυτέρων ἁμα καὶ δίκαιον. Βδε-
λυρὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἐφη, ὥ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταῦτη ὑπο-
λαμβάνεις, ἥ ἃν κακουργήσαις μάλιστα τὸν λόγον.
Οὐδαμῶς, ὥ ἀριστε, ἤν δ' ἐγὼ· ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον
eπε, τὶ λέγεις. Ἐιτ' ὑπὸ ὅιδοτε, ἐφην, ὅτι τῶν
πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννοῦνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται,
aἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκὼν

For this dogmatic formulation of a definition cf.
Theaetet. 151e.

To idealists law is the perfection of reason, or νοῦ
dιανομῆ, Laws 714a; "her seat is the bosom of God"
(Hooker). To the political positivist there is no justice
outside of positive law, and "law is the command of a
political superior to a political inferior." "Whatsoever
any state decrees and establishes is just for the state while
it is in force," Theaetet. 177d. The formula "justice is the
advantage of the superior" means, as explained in Laws 714,
that the ruling class legislates in its own interest, that is,
to keep itself in power. This interpretation is here drawn
out of Thrasymachus by Socrates' affected misapprehen-
sions (cf. further Pascal, Pensées iv. 4, "la commodité du
souverain." Leibniz approves Thrasy machus's definition:
"justum potentiori utile . . . nam Deus ceteris potentior!").

The unwholesomeness of this diet for the ordinary man
proves nothing for Plato's alleged vegetarianism. The
Athenians ate but little meat.

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and hear then," said he. "I affirm that the just is nothing else than a the advantage of the stronger. b
Well, why don't you applaud? Nay, you'll do anything but that." "Provided only I first understand your meaning," said I; "for I don't yet apprehend it. The advantage of the stronger is what you affirm the just to be. But what in the world do you mean by this? I presume you don't intend to affirm this, that if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and the flesh of beeves c is advantageous for him, for his body, this viand is also for us who are weaker than he both advantageous and just." "You are a buffoon, d Socrates, and take my statement e in the most detrimental sense." "Not at all, my dear fellow," said I; "I only want you to make your meaning plainer." "Don't you know then," said he, "that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others democracy rules, in others aristocracy?" "Assuredly." "And is not this the thing that is


b Cf. 392 c, 394 b, 424 c, Meno 78 c, Euthydem. 295 c, Gorg. 451 A δικαιος ιπολαμβανεις, "you take my meaning fairly." For complaints of unfair argument cf. 340 d, Charm. 166 c, Meno 80 a, Theaetet. 167 e, Gorg. 461 B-c, 482 e.

c This is the point. Thrasymachus is represented as challenging assent before explaining his meaning, and Socrates forces him to be more explicit by jocosely putting a perverse interpretation on his words. Similarly in Gorg. 451 e, 453 b, 459 d, 490 c, Laws 714 c. To the misunderstanding of such dramatic passages is due the impression of hasty readers that Plato is a sophist.

d These three forms of government are mentioned by Pindar, Pyth. ii. 86, Aeschin. In Ctes. 6. See 445 d, Whibley, Greek Oligarchies, and Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 62.
toúto krateí en ekásti tò polèi, tò archon; Pánv ge.

Ε Τίθεται δέ γε τοὺς νόμους ἐκάστη ἢ ἀρχή πρὸς τὸ αὐτῇ ξυμφέρων, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικός, τυραννίς δὲ τυραννικός, καὶ αἱ ἀλλαὶ οὕτω θέμεναι δὲ ἀπεφήναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, τὸ σφίσι ξυμφέρων, καὶ τὸν τούτον ἐκβαίνοντα κολάξουσιν ὡς παρανομοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικοῦντα.

τοῦτ' οὖν ἐστίν, ὡ βέλτιστε, ὁ λέγω εὖ ἀπάσαις 339 ταῖς πόλεσι ταύτων εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστηκύνας ἀρχῆς ξυμφέρουν αὐτῇ δὲ ποιν κρατεῖ, ὥστε ξυμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρέιττονος ξυμφέρον. Νῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἔμαθον δ' λέγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθές ἡ μή, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. τὸ ξυμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὡ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι· καίτοι ἐμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίμην.

Β πρόσεστι δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι τὸ τοῦ κρέιττονος. Συμκρά γε ήσις, ἐφή, προσθήκη. Οὐπω δηλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη· ἀλλ' ὃτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτέων εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δηλον. ἐπειδή γὰρ ξυμφέρον γε τι εἶναι

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a kratei with emphasis to suggest kreitton. Cf. Menex. 238 d, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 43. Platonic dialectic proceeds by minute steps and linked synonyms. Cf. 333 Α, 339 Α, 342 c, 346 Α, 353 e, 354 Α-Β, 369 c, 370 Α-Β, 379 b, 380-381, 394 b, 400 c, 402 d, 412 d, 433-434, 486, 585 c, Meno 77 b, Lysis 215 b, where L. & S. miss the point.

b On this view justice is simply τὸ νόμιμον (Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 12; cf. Gorg. 504 d). This is the doctrine of the “Old Oligarch,” [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 2. Against this conception of class domination as political justice, Plato (Laws 713 ff.) and Aristotle (Pol. iii. 7) protest. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy. 48
strong and has the mastery in each—the ruling party?" "Certainly." "And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their—the rulers’—advantage and the man who deviates from this law they chastise as a lawbreaker and a wrongdoer. This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states—the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere, the advantage of the stronger." "Now," said I, "I have learned your meaning, but whether it is true or not I have to try to learn. The advantageous, then, is also your reply, Thrasymachus, to the question, what is the just—though you forbade me to give that answer. But you add thereto that of the stronger." "A trifling addition perhaps you think it," he said. "It is not yet clear whether it is a big one either; but that we must inquire whether what you say is true, is clear." For since I too admit that the just chap. ii.: "We only conceive of the State as something equivalent to the class in occupation of the executive government" etc.

Thrasymachus makes it plain that he, unlike Meno (71 e), Euthyphro (5 ff.), Laches (191 e), Hippias (Hipp. Maj. 256 ff.), and even Theaetetus (146 c-d) at first, understands the nature of a definition.

Cf. Laches 182 c.

For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 b, 470 b-c, 487 e, 493 a, 500 b, 505 d, 514 b, 517 c, 523 a, 527 c, Lysis 203 b, Soph. O.T. 327.
kai égy όμολογώ το δίκαιον, σύ δέ προστίθης καὶ 
αυτό φης εἶναι το τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δέ ἁγνὼ, 
skepeteōν δή. Σκόπει, ἔφη.

XIII. Ταύτ’ ἔσται, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ. καὶ μοι εἶπέ· 
οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσι δίκαιον φης 
C εἶναι; Ἡ Ἐγωγ. Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοι εἰσὶν οἱ 
ἀρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἡ οἰοῖ τι καὶ 
ἀμαρτεῖν; Πάντως ποι, ἐφη, οἰοῖ τι καὶ καὶ ἀμαρτείν. 
Οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν 
ὀρθῶς τιθέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τινας οὐκ ὀρθῶς; Οἶμαι 
ἔγωγε. Τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα τὸ ἔξυμφεροντά ἐστι 
tιθέσθαι, ἐαυτῶς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀξύμφορα; ἡ 
pῶς λέγεις; Οὐτως. “Α δ’ ἄν θωνται, ποιητέον 
τοῖς ἄρχομένοις, καὶ τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον; Πῶς 
D γὰρ οὐ; Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιον ἐστι κατὰ τὸν σὸν 
λόγον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἔξυμφερον ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ τούναντίον τὸ μὴ ἔξυμφερον. Τί λέγεις σὺ; 
ἔφη. “Α σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοι γε δοκῶ· σκοπῶμεν δὲ 
βέλτιον. οὐχ όμολογηται τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοῖς 
ἀρχομένοις προστάττοντας ποιεῖν ἅττα ἐνίοτε δια-
μαρτάνειν τοῦ ἐαυτῶς βελτίστου, ἃ δ’ ἄν προσ-
tάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄρχομένοις

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"For Plato’s so-called utilitarianism or eudaemonism see 457 b, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 21-22, Gomperz, ii. p. 262. He would have nearly accepted Bentham’s statement that while the proper end of government is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the actual end of every government is the greatest happiness of the governors. Cf. Leslie Stephen, English Utilitarianism, i. p. 282, ii. p. 89.

b This profession of ignorance may have been a trait of the real Socrates, but in Plato it is a dramatic device for the evolution of the argument.

c The argument turns on the opposition between the real (i.e. ideal) and the mistakenly supposed interest of the rulers. See on 334 c."
is something that is of advantage—but you are for making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger, while I don’t profess to know, we must pursue the inquiry. “Inquire away,” he said. XIII. “I will do so,” said I. “Tell me, then; you affirm also, do you not, that obedience to rulers is just?” “I do.” “May I ask whether the rulers in the various states are infallible or capable sometimes of error?” “Surely,” he said, “they are liable to err.” “Then in their attempts at legislation they enact some laws rightly and some not rightly, do they not?” “So I suppose.” “And by rightly we are to understand for their advantage, and by wrongly to their disadvantage? Do you mean that or not?” “That.” “But whatever they enact must be performed by their subjects and is justice?” “Of course.” “Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his advantage.” “What’s that you’re saying?” he replied. “What you yourself are saying, I think. Let us consider it more closely. Have we not agreed that the rulers in giving orders to the ruled sometimes mistake their own advantage, and that whatever the rulers enjoin it is just for the subjects to perform? Was not that

\* Cf. supra 338 e and Theaetet, 177 d.
\* Τί λέγεις σοί; is rude. See Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 1174. The suspicion that he is being refuted makes Thrasy-machus rude again. But cf. Euthydem, 290 e.
\* Cf. Berkeley, Divine Visual Language, 13: “The conclusions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own concessions.” See on 334 d, Ale. I. 112-113. On a misunderstanding of this passage and 344 e, Herbert Spencer (Data of Ethics, §19) bases the statement that Plato (and Aristotle), like Hobbes, made state enactments the source of right and wrong.
Socrates is himself a little rude.

Cf. Gorgias 495 d.

Cf. Laches 215 e, Phaedo 62 e.

It is familiar Socratic doctrine that the only witness needed in argument is the admission of your opponent. Cf. Gorg. 472 a-b.

τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν is a term of praise for obedience to
admitted?" "I think it was," he replied. "Then you will have to think,\(a\) I said, that to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger has been admitted by you to be just in the case when the rulers unwittingly enjoin what is bad for themselves, while you affirm that it is just for the others to do what they enjoined. In that way does not this conclusion inevitably follow, my most sapient \(b\) Thrasy-machus, that it is just to do the very opposite \(c\) of what you say? For it is in that case surely the disadvantage of the stronger or superior that the inferior are commanded to perform." "Yes, by Zeus, Socrates," said Polemarchus, "nothing could be more conclusive." "Of course," said Cleitophon, breaking in, "if you are his witness." \(d\) "What need is there of a witness?" Polemarchus said. "Thrasy-machus himself admits that the rulers sometimes enjoin what is evil for themselves and yet says that it is just for the subjects to do this." "That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasy-machus laid it down that it is just to obey the orders \(e\) of the rulers." "Yes, Cleitophon, but he also took the position that the advantage of the stronger is just. And after these two assumptions he again admitted that the stronger sometimes bid the inferior and their subjects do what is to the disadvantage of the rulers. And from these admissions the just would no more be the advantage of the stronger than the contrary." "O well," said Cleitophon. "by the advantage of the superior he meant what the superior supposed to be lawful authority, and of disdain for a people or state that takes orders from another. Cleitophon does not apprehend the argument and, thinking only of the last clause, reaffirms the definition in the form "it is just to do what rulers bid." Polemarchus retorts: "And (I was right,) for he (also) . . . " 53
Socrates always allows his interlocutors to amend their statements. Cf. Gorg. 491 b, 499 b, Protag. 349 c, Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 18.

Thrasymachus rejects the aid of an interpretation which Socrates would apply not only to the politician’s miscalculations but to his total misapprehension of his true ideal interests. He resorts to the subtlety that the ruler qua ruler is infallible, which Socrates meets by the fair retort that the ruler qua ruler, the artist qua artist has no "sinister" or selfish interest but cares only for the work. If we are to
for his advantage. This was what the inferior had to do, and that this is the just was his position." "That isn't what he said," replied Polemarchus. "Never mind, Polemarchus," said I, "but if that is Thrasy-machus's present meaning, let us take it from him in that sense.

"XIV. So tell me, Thrasy-machus, was this what you intended to say, that the just is the advantage of the superior as it appears to the superior whether it really is or not? Are we to say this was your meaning?" "Not in the least," he said; "do you suppose that I call one who is in error a superior when he errs?" "I certainly did suppose that you meant that," I replied, "when you agreed that rulers are not infallible but sometimes make mistakes." "That is because you argue like a pettifogger, Socrates. Why, to take the nearest example, do you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we say literally—we say that the physician erred and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these in so far as he is that which we entitle him never errs; so that, speaking precisely, since you are such a stickler for precision, no crafts-

substitute an abstraction or an ideal for the concrete man we must do so consistently. Cf. modern debates about the "economic man."

For the idea cf. Rousseau's Émile, i.: "On me dira ... que les fautes sont du médecin, mais que la médecine en elle-même est infaillible. À la bonne heure: mais qu'elle vienne donc sans le médecin." Lucian, De Parasito 54, parodies this reasoning.

ἀμαρτάνει. ἐπιλειπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν ὦν ἐστὶ δημιουργός· ὥστε δημιουργὸς ἡ σοφὸς ἡ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἀμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ἦ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι γ' ἂν εἴποι, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἦμαρτε καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἦμαρτε. τοιοῦτον οὖν δὴ σοι καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀκριβεστατὸν ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει οὖν, τὸν ἄρχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστὶ, μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν, μὴ ἀμαρτάνοντα δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ τῷ ἄρχομένῳ ποιητέων· ὡστε, ὅπερ εξ ἄρχης ἐλεγον, δίκαιοι λέγω τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμφέρον.

XV. Εἶνεν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· ὁδὸν σοι συκοφαντεῖν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Ὅτι γὰρ μὲ εξ ἐπιβούλης εὐ τοῖς λόγοις κακουργοῦντά σε ἔρεσθαι ως ἡρόμην; Ἐν μὲν οὖν οἴδα, ἐφη· καὶ οὐδέν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν με λάθος B κακουργῶν, οὔτε μὴ λαθῶν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναοι. Οὕτε γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαμι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. ὦ μακάριε. ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ αὕθις ἦμιν τοιοῦτον ἐγγένηται, διόρισαι, ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἄρχοντα τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα, τὸν ως ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἦ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, οὖν νῦν δὴ ἐλεγες, οὐ τὸ ἐξυμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος δίκαιον ἔσται τῷ ἦττοι ποιεῖν. Τὸν τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ, ἐφη, λόγῳ ἄρχοντα ὄντα. πρὸς ταῦτα κακουργεῖ καὶ συκοφαντεῖ, εἴ τι C δύνασαι· οὐδέν σου παρίειμαι· ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἶός τ'

1 ὃν probable conjecture of Benedictus: mss. δ.

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a Cf. 365 D.
b i.e., the one who in vulgar parlance is so; cf. τῷ ῥήματι, 340 D.
56
man errs. For it is when his knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong—when he is not a craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician made a mistake and the ruler erred. It is in this loose way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you a little while ago. But the most precise statement is that other, that the ruler in so far forth as ruler does not err, and not erring he enacts what is best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, even as I meant from the start, I say the just is to do what is for the advantage of the stronger."

XV. "So then, Thrasymachus," said I, "my manner of argument seems to you pettifogging?" "It does," he said. "You think, do you, that it was with malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I asked that question?" "I don't think it, I know it," he said, "and you won't make anything by it, for you won't get the better of me by stealth and, failing stealth, you are not of the force to beat me in debate." "Bless your soul," said I, "I wouldn't even attempt such a thing. But that nothing of the sort may spring up between us again, define in which sense you take the ruler and stronger. Do you mean the so-called ruler or that ruler in the precise sense of whom you were just now telling us, and for whose advantage as being the superior it will be just for the inferior to act?" "I mean the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word," he said. "Now bring on against this your cavils and your shyster's tricks if you are able. I ask no quarter. But you'll find yourself unable."
Otei yap av, elrrov, ovtecd /jiaurjvai, caare gvpeiv €in)(€(,p€LP Xeovra koi avKO(f)avTelv Qpaav-fxaxov; Nw yovv, ej)r, eTrex^lp-qaas, ovhev wv Kai ravra. "ASrju, rvj 8', iyd), rGiv tolcovtov. dAA'

€1776 /jLOi-tcii OLKpL^eL Xoycx) laTpos, ov dpTi eXeyes, Ttorepov XRVI^^'^'-^'^V^ eariv •^ rcJov Kap,v6v-Tiov depanevTijg; Kai Xdye top tu> ovtl larpvov ovTa. N\rvevTCov, €(f)rj, depajrevT'qg. Ti Se Kv^epvqrrjs; 6 opdcos Kv^epvqrrjs t'auTcSi^ ap^oiv D esteem η ναύτης; Nauτών άρχων. Oýdeν, oîma, toúto υπολογιστέον, òti πλεί εν τῇ νη', ούδ' έστι κλητέος ναύτης· ού γάρ κατά το πλείων κυβερνήτης καλείται, άλλα κατά τήν τέχνην και τήν τῶν ναυτῶν άρχην. 'Αληθῆ, ύφη. Ούκοιν έκάστω τούτων έστι τι έμυμφέρον; Πάνυ γε. Όυ καί ή τέχνη, ήν δ' έγώ, ἐπὶ τούτω πέφυκεν, ἐπὶ τῶ το έμυμφέρον έκάστω ζητείν τε καὶ έκπορίζεται; 'Επὶ τούτω, ύφη. 'Αρ' ουν καί έκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν έστι τι έμυμφέρον ἄλλο ἢ ὁ τι μάλιστα τελέαν Ε είναι; Πῶς τούτο έρωτᾶς; "Ωσπερ, ύφην έγώ,
"Why, do you suppose," I said, "that I am so mad as to try to beard a lion and try the pettifogger on Thrasymachus?" "You did try it just now," he said, "paltry fellow though you be." "Something too much of this sort of thing," said I. "But tell me, your physician in the precise sense of whom you were just now speaking, is he a moneymaker, an earner of fees, or a healer of the sick? And remember to speak of the physician who is really such." "A healer of the sick," he replied. "And what of the pilot—the pilot rightly so called—is he a ruler of sailors or a sailor?" "A ruler of sailors." "We don't, I fancy, have to take into account the fact that he actually sails in the ship, nor is he to be denominated a sailor. For it is not in respect of his sailing that he is called a pilot but in respect of his art and his ruling of the sailors." "True," he said. "Then for each of them is there not a something that is for his advantage?" "Quite so." "And is it not also true," said I, "that the art naturally exists for this, to discover and provide for each his advantage?" "Yes, for this." "Is there, then, for each of the arts any other advantage than to be as perfect as possible?" "What do you mean by does not understand what is meant by saying that the art (= the artist qua artist) has no interest save the perfection of its (his) own function. Socrates explains that the body by its very nature needs art to remedy its defects (Herod. i. 32, Lysis 217 b). But the nature of art is fulfilled in its service, and it has no other ends to be accomplished by another art and so on ad infinitum. It is idle to cavil and emend the text, because of the shift from the statement (341 d) that art has no interest save its perfection, to the statement that it needs nothing except to be itself (342 a-b). The art and the artist qua artist are ideals whose being by hypothesis is their perfection.
PLATO

εἰ μὲ ἑρωῖο, εἰ ἔξαρκεῖ σῶματι εἶναι σῶματι ἤ προσδείται τινος, εἴπομι’ ἄν ὦτι παντάπασι μὲν ὄνν προσδείται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἑστὶν ἢ ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὐρημένη, ὅτι σῶμα ἑστὶ ποιηρὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτῳ εἶναι. τούτω ὄνν ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ τὰ ἐξιμφέροντα, ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρεσκευάσθη ἡ τέχνη. ἢ ὥρθως σοι δοκῶ, ἔφην, 

342 ἂν εἴπεῖν οὕτω λέγων, ἢ οὐ; Ὅρθως, ἔφη. Τῷ δὲ δή; αὐτῇ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἑστὶ ποιηρά, ἢ ἄλλη τις τέχνη ἑστ’ ο’ τι προσδείται τινος ἀρετῆς, ὅπερ ὅφθαλμοι ὅφεως καὶ ἅτα ἀκοῆς καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς δεὶ τινὸς τέχνης τῆς τὸ ἐξιμφέρον εἰς ταῦτα1 σκεφομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριούντης2; ἄρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνι τις ποιηρία, καὶ δεὶ ἐκάστῃ τέχνῃ ἄλλης τέχνης, ἢτις αὐτῇ τὸ ἐξιμφέρον σκέφεται, καὶ τῇ σκοπουμένῃ ἔτερας αὐτὴν τοιαύτης, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἑστὶν ἀπέραντόν; ἢ αὐτῇ αὐτῇ τὸ ἐξιμ-

Β φέρον σκέφεται; ἢ οὔτε αὐτῆς οὔτε ἄλλης προσ-

31 δεῖ ποιηρίαν τὸ ἐξιμφέρον σκοτεῖν; οὔτε γὰρ ποιηρία οὔτε ἄμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμιὰ τέχνη πάρεστιν, οὔδε προσήκει τέχνῃ ἄλλῳ τὸ ἐξιμφέρον ἐκεῖν ἡ ἐκείνῳ οὖ τέχνῃ ἑστὶν, αὐτῇ δὲ ἀβλαβῆς καὶ ἀκέραιος ἑστὶν ὥρθη ὅφει, ἐως περ ἂν ἡ ἐκάστῃ ἀκριβῆς ὅλη ἂπερ ἑστί; καὶ σκοτεῖ ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ οὗτος ἡ ἄλλως ἔχει; Οὔτως, ἔφη, φαίνεται. οὐκ ἄρα, ἢν δ’

C ἐγὼ, ἰατρικὴ ἰατρικὴ τὸ ἐξιμφέρον σκοτεῖ ἄλλα σῶματι. Ναὶ, ἔφη. Οὔδε ἵππικὴ ἵππικὴ ἄλλ’ ἵπποισ; οὔδε ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ οὐδεμία ἑαυτῇ, οὔδε

1 A. M. Burnet improbably reads αὐτὰ ταῦτα with FD. 
2 The future (q) is better than the present (Α11Ξ).
that question?" "Just as if," I said, "you should ask me whether it is enough for the body to be the body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, 'By all means it stands in need. That is the reason why the art of medicine has now been invented, because the body is defective and such defect is unsatisfactory. To provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is the end for which the art was devised.' Do you think that would be a correct answer, or not?" "Correct," he said. "But how about this? Is the medical art itself defective or faulty, or has any other art any need of some virtue, quality, or excellence—as the eyes of vision, the ears of hearing, and for this reason is there need of some art over them that will consider and provide what is advantageous for these very ends—does there exist in the art itself some defect and does each art require another art to consider its advantage and is there need of still another for the considering art and so on *ad infinitum*, or will the art look out for its own advantage? Or is it a fact that it needs neither itself nor another art to consider its advantage and provide against its deficiency? For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art. Nor does it befit an art to seek the advantage of anything else than that of its object. But the art itself is free from all harm and admixture of evil, and is right so long as each art is precisely and entirely that which it is. And consider the matter in that 'precise' way of speaking. Is it so or not?" "It appears to be so," he said. "Then medicine," said I, "does not consider the advantage of medicine but of the body?" "Yes." "Nor horsemanship of horsemanship but of horses, nor does any other art look out
The next step is the identification of (true) politics with the disinterested arts which also rule and are the stronger. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 11. \(\gamma\varepsilon\) emphasizes the argumentative implication of \(\alphaρχουσι\) to which Thrasymachus assents reluctantly; and Socrates develops and repeats the thought.
for itself—for it has no need—but for that of which it is the art." "So it seems," he replied. "But surely, a Thrasyrmachus, the arts do hold rule and are stronger than that of which they are the arts." He conceded this but it went very hard. "Then no art considers or enjoins b the advantage of the stronger but every art that of the weaker which is ruled by it." This too he was finally brought to admit though he tried to contest it. But when he had agreed—"Can we deny, then," said I, "that neither does any physician in so far as he is a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, 'precisely' speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a money-maker. Did we agree on that?" He assented. "And so the 'precise' pilot is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor?" That was admitted. "Then that sort of a pilot and ruler will not consider and enjoin the advantage of the pilot but that of the sailor whose ruler he is." He assented reluctantly. "Then," said I, "Thrasymachus, neither does anyone in any office of rule in so far as he is a ruler consider and enjoin his own advantage but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and he keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is advantageous and suitable to that in all that he says and does."

XVI. When we had come to this point in the dis-
Thrasymachus first vents his irritation by calling Socrates a snivelling innocent, and then, like Protagoras (Protag. 334), when pressed by Socrates’ dialectic makes a speech. He abandons the abstract (ideal) ruler, whom he assumed to be infallible and Socrates proved to be disinterested, for the actual ruler or shepherd of the people, who tends the flock only that he may shear it. All political experience and the career of successful tyrants, whom all men count happy, he thinks confirms this view, which is that of Callicles in the Gorgias. Justice is another’s good which only the naive and “innocent” pursue. It is better to inflict than to suffer wrong. The main problem of the Republic is clearly indicated, but we are not yet ready to debate it seriously.

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b κορυζώντα L. & S., also s.v. κόρυζα. Lucian, Lexiphanes 18, treats the expression as an affectation, but elsewhere employs it. The philosophers used this and similar terms 64
cussion and it was apparent to everybody that his formula of justice had suffered a reversal of form, Thrasymachus, instead of replying, said, "Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?" "What do you mean?" said I. "Why didn't you answer me instead of asking such a question?" "Because," he said, "she lets her little 'snotty' run about drizzling and doesn't wipe your face clean, though you need it badly, if she can't get you to know the difference between the shepherd and the sheep." "And what, pray, makes you think that?" said I. "Because you think that the shepherds and the neat-herds are considering the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view than the good of their masters and themselves; and by the same token you seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real rulers, differ at all in their thoughts of the governed from a man's attitude towards his sheep or that they think of anything else night and day than the sources of their own profit. And you

(1) of stupidity, (2) as a type of the minor ills of the flesh. Horace, Sat. i. 4. 8, ii. 2. 76, Epictet. i. 6. 30 ἀλλ' αἱ μηδὲν μου ἰδεύον.

' Literally, "if you don't know for her." For the ethical dative cf. Shakes. Taming of the Shrew, i. ii. 8 "Knock me here soundly." Not to know the shepherd from the sheep seems to be proverbial. "Shepherd of the people," like "survival of the fittest," may be used to prove anything in ethics and politics. Cf. Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 431, Xen. Mem. iii. 2. 1, Sueton. Vit. Tib. 32, and my note in Class. Phil. vol. i. p. 298.

' Thrasymachus's real rulers are the bosses and tyrants. Socrates' true rulers are the true kings of the Stoics and Ruskin, the true shepherds of Ruskin and Milton.

Cf. Aristoph. Clouds 1203 πρὸβατ' ἀλλως, Herrick, "Kings ought to shear, not skin their sheep."

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This (quite possible) sense rather than the ironical, “so far advanced,” better accords with ἄγνοεις and with the direct brutality of Thrasymachus.

ὁ δὲ ὄντι like ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀτεχνῶς, etc., marks the application (often ironical or emphatic) of an image or familiar proverbial or technical expression or etymology. Cf. 443 δ, 442 α, 419 α, 432 α, Laches 187 β, Phileb. 64 ε. Similarly ἐτήνυμον of a proverb, Archil. fr. 35 (87). The origin of the usage appears in Aristoph. Birds 507 τοῦτ’ ἄρ’ ἐκεῖν ἐν τούτῳ ἀληθῶς, etc. Cf. Anth. Pal. v. 6. 3. With ἐυθικῶς, however, ὡς ἀληθῶς does not verify the etymology but ironically emphasizes the contradiction between the etymology and the conventional meaning, “simple,” which Thrasymachus thinks truly fits those to whom Socrates would apply the full etymological meaning “of good character.” Cf. 348 c, 66
are so far out a concerning the just and justice and the unjust and injustice that you don't know that justice and the just are literally b the other fellow's good c—the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves; while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense of the word and just, and they being thus ruled do what is for his advantage who is the stronger and make him happy by serving him, but themselves by no manner of means. And you must look at the matter, my simple-minded Socrates, in this way: that the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with the unjust. To begin with, in their business dealings in any joint undertaking of the two you will never find that the just man has the advantage over the unjust at the dissolution of the partnership but that he always has the worst of it. Then again, in their relations with the state, if there are direct taxes or contributions to be paid, the just man contributes more from an equal estate and the other less, and when there is a distribution the one gains much and the other nothing. And so when each holds office, apart from any other loss the just

400 ε, Laws 679 c, Thucyd. iii. 83. Cf. in English the connexion of "silly" with selig, and in Italian, Leopardi's bitter comment on dabbenaggine (Pensieri xxvi.).

a Justice not being primarily a self-regarding virtue, like prudence, is of course another's good. Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1130 a 3; 1134 b 5. Thrasymachus ironically accepts the formula, adding the cynical or pessimistic comment, "but one's own harm," for which see 392 b, Eurip. Heracleid. 1-5, and Isocrates' protest (viii. 32). Bion (Diog. Laert. iv. 7. 48) wittily defined beauty as "the other fellow's good"; which recalls Woodrow Wilson's favourite limerick, and the definition of business as "l'argent des autres."
δικαίω υπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἄλλη ζημία, τὰ γε οἰκεία δι' ἀμέλειαν μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ὕφελεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἀπέχθεσθαι τοῖς τε οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθέλη αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον: τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τούτων τάναντία υπάρχει. Λέγω γὰρ ὦντερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, 344 τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν. τούτον οὖν σκόπει, εἴπερ βούλει κρίνειν, ὅσω μᾶλλον ἔμφερεν ιδία αὐτῷ ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ ῥάστα μαθήσει, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὴν τελεώτατην ἀδικίαν ἔλθης, ἢ τὸν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἀδικηθέντας καὶ ἀδικήσαι οὐκ ἂν ἑθέλοντας ἀθλωτάτους. ἔστι δὲ τούτο τυραννίς, ἢ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τάλλοτρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βίᾳ ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ὁσια καὶ ἰδια καὶ δημόσια, Β ἀλλὰ ξυληθήδην· ὅν ἐφ' ἐκάστω μέρει ὅταν τεῖς ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθη, ζημιοῦταί τε καὶ ὀνείδη ἔχει τὰ μέγιστα· καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδίσται καὶ τοιχωρύχοι καὶ ἀποστερηταί καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἄδικοντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται· ἐπειδὰν δὲ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήματι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενον δουλώσηται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἵσχρων ὀνομάτων

a For the idea that the just ruler neglects his own business and gains no compensating “graft” cf. the story of Deioces in Herod. i. 97, Democ. fr. 253 Diels, Laches 180 b, Isoc. xii. 145, Aristot. Pol. v. 8. 15-20. For office as a means of helping friends and harming enemies cf. Meno 71 e, Lysias ix. 14, and the anecdote of Themistocles (Plutarch, Praecept. 68
man must count on his own affairs^falling into disorder through neglect, while because of his justice he makes no profit from the state, and thereto he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man all the opposite advantages accrue. I mean, of course, the one I was just speaking of, the man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale. Consider this type of man, then, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to him personally to be unjust than to be just. And the easiest way of all to understand this matter will be to turn to the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. And this is tyranny, which both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at one swoop. For each several part of such wrongdoing the malefactor who fails to escape detection is fined and incurs the extreme of contumely; for temple-robbers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves are the appellations of those who commit these several forms of injustice. But when in addition to the property of the citizens men kidnap and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of these opprobrious

reipub. ger. 13) cited by Godwin (Political Justice) in the form: “God forbid that I should sit upon a bench of justice where my friends found no more favour than my enemies.” Democr. (fr. 266 Diels) adds that the just ruler on laying down his office is exposed to the revenge of wrongdoers with whom he has dealt severely.

^ The order of words dramatically expresses Thrasy-machus’s excitement and the sweeping success of the tyrant.
PLATO

eudai'mones kai makarion kéklyntai, ou monon upo
C twon politon alla kai upo twon allon, oiso an
pibwontai auton tyn olhn adikian ydikykota. ou
gar to poieiin tata adika alla to pasxein phosoumew-
non oneidizeusai oin oneidizeoutes tyn adikian. ou'tos,
O Stwvrateis, kai iushuroteron kai elenevriwte-
eron kai despotikwteron adikia dikaiosynis estin
ikanos gynomei, kai oter eis arxia ekaleon, to men
 tou krepitonos xumferon to dikaiou tyvkhanei ou,
to 'i adikon eautw lysitelouin te kai xumferon.

D XVII. Tauta eipow o Thrasymachos en vov eixe
apienai, owsper baleunous hmon katanplhsas kata
twn wton arboin kai polv ton logon. ou mh
eiasan ye auton oi parontes, all' ymangeisain
upomeinai te kai paraschein twn eirhmenon logon-
ka di' eggon kai autous panu edeomhn te kai eipw
'Omega daimwne Thrasymache, oton embhalwv logon en
vow exhes apienai, prin didazai ikanwv h mavein
eite ou'tos eite allwv exei; h smikron oiei epi-

E cheirein pragma diorizesthai, all' ou bion diagnosthn,
' oiv diagomwous ekastos hmon lysitelestatn
zwny zwn; 'Eng yap oimai, efh o Thrasymachos,
touti allwv echein; Eoiw, hiv d' eng, hto
hmon en voudex kheosta, oudei ti frountizein eite

a The European estimate of Louis Napoleon before 1870
is a good illustration. Cf. Theopompus on Philip, Polybius
viii. 11. Euripides' Bellerophon (fr. 288) uses the happiness
of the tyrant as an argument against the moral government
of the world.

b Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1130 b 15 uses the expression in a
different sense.

c The main issue of the Republic. Cf. 360 d, 358 e and
Gorg. 469 b.

d Cf. Theophrastus, Char. xv. 19 (Jebb), Tucker, Life in
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names they are pronounced happy and blessed⁴ not only by their fellow-citizens but by all who hear the story of the man who has committed complete and entire injustice.⁵ For it is not the fear of doing ⁶ but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits a man's self and is for his advantage.”

XVII. After this Thrasydamus was minded to depart when like a bathman⁷ he had poured his speech in a sudden flood over our ears. But the company would not suffer him and were insistent that he should remain and render an account of what he had said. And I was particularly urgent and said, “I am surprised at you, Thrasydamus; after hurling⁸ such a doctrine at us, can it be that you propose to depart without staying to teach us properly or learn yourself whether this thing is so or not? Do you think it is a small matter⁹ that you are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worth while?” “Well, do I deny it?⁴” said Thrasydamus. “You seem to,” said I, “or else ⁵ to care nothing for us and so feel no


⁵ Socrates reminds us that a serious moral issue is involved in all this word-play. So 352 d, Gorg. 492 c, 500 c, Laches 185 a. Cf. infra 377 b, 578 c, 608 b.
⁶ Plainly a protesting question, “Why, do I think otherwise?” Cf. supra 339 d.
⁷ For the impossibility of J. and C.’s “or rather” see my note in A.J.P. vol. xiii. p. 234.
χείρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα ἀγνοοῦντες δ' σὺ 
φῆς εἰδέναι. ἀλλ', ὥ 'γαθε', προδυμοῦ καὶ ἡμῖν 345 ἐνδείξασθαι: οὐτοὶ κακῶς σοι κείσεται, ὥ τι ἂν 
ήμας τοσοῦτο ὄντας εὐφρενῆσθης. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ 
σοι λέγω τό γ' ἐμὸν, ὅτι οὐ πείθομαι οὐδ' οἶμαι ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον εἶναι, οὐδ' ἢ ἢν 
εἰ τις αὐτῇ καὶ μὴ διακωλύῃ πράττειν ἄ ὀμέλεται: ἀλλ', ὥ 'γαθε', ἔστω μὲν ἂδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ 
ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λανθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι, οἷμος 
ἐμὲ γε οὐ πείθει ὡς ἐστι τῆς δικαιοσύνης κερδα-

Β λεώτερον. ταῦτ' οὖν καὶ ἐτερος ὅσοι τις ἢμῶν 
pέποιθεν, οὐ μόνος ἐγώ. πείσον οὐν, ὃ μακάριε, 
ἰκανῶς ἢμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ὅρθως βουλευόμεθα δικαιο-
σύνης ἀδικίας περὶ πλεῖονος ποιοῦμενοι. Καὶ πῶς, 
ἐφη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον μὴ πέ-
πεισά, τί σοι ἢτι ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων 
ἐνθώ τὸν λόγον; Μα Δι', ἢν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ σὺ γε. 
ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν, ἃ ἂν εὔπης, ἐμμενε τούτως. ἢ 
ἐὰν μετατιθῇ, φανερῶς μετατίθεσο καὶ ἦμᾶς μὴ 
C ἐξαπάτα. νῦν δὲ ὅρᾶς, ὧ Θρασύμαχε, ἢτι γὰρ 
tὰ ἐμπροσθεν ἐπισκεφώμεθα, ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς 
ιατρόν τὸ πρῶτον ὅριζόμενος τὸν ώς ἀληθῶς ποι-

\[\text{Cf.} \quad \text{infra} \quad 438 \alpha, \quad 577 \text{d, and Gorg.} \quad 467 \text{b.}\]

\[\text{Cf.} \quad 365 \text{d.}\]

\[\text{Thrasymachus has stated his doctrine. Like Dr. Johnson}\]

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concern whether we are going to live worse or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know. Nay, my good fellow, do your best to make the matter clear to us also: it will be no bad investment\(^a\) for you—any benefit that you bestow on such a company as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do I think that injustice is more profitable\(^b\) than justice, not even if one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will.\(^c\) But, suppose, sir, a man to be unjust and to be able to act unjustly either because he is not detected or can maintain it by violence,\(^d\) all the same he does not convince me that it is more profitable than justice. Now it may be that there is someone else among us who feels in this way and that I am not the only one. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised in preferring justice to injustice.” “And how am I to persuade you?” he said. “If you are not convinced by what I just now was saying, what more can I do for you? Shall I take the argument and ram\(^f\) it into your head?” “Heaven forbid!” I said, “don’t do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it,\(^g\) or if you shift your ground change openly and don’t try to deceive us. But, as it is, you see, Thrasy-machus—let us return to the previous examples—you see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not he cannot supply brains to understand it. \textit{Cf. Gorg. 489 c, 499 b, Meno 75 d.}\(^h\)

\(^a\) The language is idiomatic, and the metaphor of a nurse feeding a baby, Aristoph. \textit{Ecll. 716}, is rude. \textit{Cf. Shakespeare, “He crams these words into my ears against the stomach of my sense.”} \(^b\) \textit{Cf. Socrates’ complaint of Callicles’ shifts, Gorg. 499 b-c, but cf. supra 334 e, 340 b-c.}
μένα οὐκέτι ὑδον δεῖν ὑστερον ἄκριβῶς φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ ποιμαίνειν ὡς ἀυτὸν τὰ πρόβατα, καθ’ ὅσον ποιμὴν ἔστω, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα, ἀλλ’ ὅσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινα καὶ μέλλοντα ἐστιάσεσθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἤ αὐ πρὸς D τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὅσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ’ οὐ ποιμένα. τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δήπον ἀλλο τοῦ μέλει ὑ, ἐφ’ ὑ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκπορεῖ· ἐπεὶ τὰ γε αὐτῆς, ὡστ’ ἐναι βελτίστη, ἵκανὸς δήπον ἐκπεπόρωσται, ἐως γ’ ἄν μηδὲν ἐνδέχετο τῷ ποιμενικῷ εἶναι· οὕτως δὲ ὧμην ἔγωγε νῦν δὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν, πάσαν ἁρχήν, καθ’ ὅσον ἁρχή, μηδενὶ ἀλλῷ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἁρχομένῳ τε καὶ θερα-

Ε πευμομένως, ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἁρχῇ. σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἁρχοντας ἐν τοῖς πόλεσι, τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἁρχοντας, ἐκόντας οὐεὶ ἁρχειν; Μᾶ Δ’ οὐκ, ἐφη, ἀλλ’ εὐ οἶδα.

XVIII. Τῇ δὲ; ἤν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τᾶς ἀλλας ἁρχὰς οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἁρχειν ἐκών, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αὐτοῦς, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖς ωφέλειαν ἐςομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἁρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἁρχο-

346 μένοις; ἐπεὶ τοσόνδε εἰπὲ· οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φαμέν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτω ἐτέραν εἶναι,

1 ποιμαίνειν (π γρ in marg. Α²) πιάνειν (Α) might seem to fit δαιτυμόνα better but does not accord so well with καθ’ ὅσον, etc. For the thought cf. Dio Chrys. Or. i. 48 R., who virtually quotes, adding ὡς ἐφη τις.

* The art = the ideal abstract artist. See on 342 Α-Ο. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1098 a 8 ff. says that the function of a harper and that of a good harper are generically the same. Cf. Crito 48 Δ.

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think fit afterwards to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd, not with regard to what is best for the sheep, but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer or again with a view to the sale of them, as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherd surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which it is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are surely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd’s art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of rule in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, alike in political and private rule. Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulers—willingly hold office and rule?” “I don’t think,” he said, “I know right well they do.”

XVIII. “But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule? For tell me this: we ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is different from others

b Aristotle’s despotic rule over slaves would seem to be an exception (Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 245). But that too should be for the good of the slave; infra 590 d.

c See on 343 b, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1102 a 8. The new point that good rulers are reluctant to take office is discussed to 347 e, and recalled later, 520 d. See Newman, I.e. pp. 244-245, Dio Cass. xxxvi. 27. 1.
τῷ ἐτέραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν; καὶ, ὃ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαι ἀποκρίνου, ἂν τι καὶ περαινωμεν. Ἄλλα τούτω, ἔφη, ἐτέρα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁφελειαν ἐκάστη ἓδαι τινὰ ἢμῶν παρέχεται, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινῆν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ μὲν ὑγείαν, κυβερνητικὴ δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλεῖν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθὸν; αὕτη γάρ αὐτῆς Β ἡ δύναμις. ἦ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σοῦ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἦ εἶπτερ βούλη ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὥσπερ ὑπέθου, οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον, ἐὰν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιῆς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ ἐξιμφέρειν αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἔνεκα τοῦτον καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικὴν; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Οὐδὲ γ', οἴμαι, τὴν μισθωτικὴν, ἐὰν υγιαίνῃ τις μισθαργόν. Οὐ

C δῆτα. Τί δέ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μισθαργυρίαν, ἐὰν ἑώμενός τις μισθαργόν; Οὐκ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τὴν γε ὁφελειαν ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἓδαι ὁμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; Ἐστω, ἔφη. Ἡντινα ἄρα ὁφελειαν κοινὴ ὁφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοὶ, δῆλον ὅτι κοινὴ τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρῶμενοι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὁφελοῦνται. Ἐοικεν, ἔφη. Φαμέν δέ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένον ὁφελεῖσθαι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρῆσθαι τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς. Ἐννέφη μόνης. Οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς

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*a Cf. Gorg. 495 a. But elsewhere Socrates admits that the "argument" may be discussed regardless of the belief of the respondent (349 a). Cf. Thompson on Meno 83 d, Campbell on Soph. 246 d.

*b As each art has a specific function, so it renders a specific service and aims at a specific good. This idea and the examples of the physician and the pilot are commonplaces in Plato and Aristotle.

-c Hence, as argued below, from this abstract point of view wage-earning, which is common to many arts, cannot
because its power or function is different? And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don’t answer counter to your real belief.” “Well, yes,” he said, “that is what renders it different.” “And does not each art also yield us benefit that is peculiar to itself and not general, as for example medicine health, the pilot’s art safety at sea, and the other arts similarly?” “Assuredly.” “And does not the wage-earner’s art yield wage? For that is its function. Would you identify medicine and the pilot’s art? Or if you please to discriminate ‘precisely’ as you proposed, none the more if a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you?” “Of course not,” he said. “Neither, I take it, do you call wage-earning medicine if a man earning wages is in health.” “Surely not.” “But what of this? Do you call medicine wage-earning, if a man when giving treatment earns wages?” “No,” he said. “And did we not agree that the benefit derived from each art is peculiar to it?” “So be it,” he said. “Any common or general benefit that all craftsmen receive, then, they obviously derive from their common use of some further identical thing.” “It seems so,” he said. “And we say that the benefit of earning wages accrues to the craftsmen from their further exercise of the wage-earning art.” He assented reluctantly be the specific service of any of them, but must pertain to the special art μισθωτική. This refinement is justified by Thrasymachus’s original abstraction of the infallible craftsman as such. It has also this much moral truth, that the good workman, as Ruskin says, rarely thinks first of his pay, and that the knack of getting well paid does not always go with the ability to do the work well. See Aristotle on χρηματιστική, Pol. i. 3 (1253 b 14).
D αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἐκάστῳ αὐτῇ ἡ ὕφελεια ἢστιν, ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις, ἀλλ' ἐι δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἡ μὲν ἱατρικὴ ύγιειναν ποιεῖ, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ μισθόν, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ αὐτῇ ἐπομένῃ μισθόν, καὶ αἱ ἀλλαὶ πάσαι οὖτω τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται καὶ ὑφελεῖ ἐκεῖνο, ἐφ' ὃ τέτακται. ἕαν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς αὐτῇ προσγίγνηται, ἔσθ' ὁ τι ὑφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; Οὐ φαίνεται, ἐφη. 'Αρ' Εὐσὺν οὖν ὑφελεῖ τότε, ὅταν προίκα ἐργάζηται; Ὁμια ἐγώγη. Ὄνοκον, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, τούτο ἤδη δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ ἀρχή τὸ αὐτῆς ὑφέλιμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ', ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῶ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκεῖνον ξυμφέρον ἤπτωνος ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἐγώγη, ὃ φίλε Θρασύμαχε, καὶ ἀρτί ἐλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἐκόντα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅμως κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἄνορθοῦντα, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν 347 αἰτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ πράξεων οὐδὲν ἀυτῷ τὸ βελτιστὸν πράττει οὖν ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ὅν δὴ ἐνεκα, ὡς ἐοικε, μισθοῦ δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοὺς μέλλουσαν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἡ ἀργύριον ἡ τιμὴ, ἡ ξημίαν, εἰάν μὴ ἀρχή.

XIX. Πώς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες; ἐφη ὁ Γλαύκων. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δῦο μισθούς γιγνώσκως τὴν δὲ ξημίαν ἦντινα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἰρηκας, οὐ ξυνὴκα. Τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἀρα

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*a κακά = troubles, misères, 517 d. For the thought cf. 343 e, 345 e, Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 8, Herod. i. 97.

"Then the benefit, the receiving of wages does not accrue to each from his own art. But if we are to consider it 'precisely' medicine produces health but the fee-earning art the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others, each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set, but unless pay is added to it is there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft?" "Apparently not," he said. "Does he then bestow no benefit either when he works for nothing?" "I'll say he does." "Then, Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office provides what is beneficial for itself—but as we said long ago it provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the advantage of that, the weaker, and not the advantage of the stronger? That was why, friend Thrasymachus, I was just now saying that no one of his own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people's troubles in hand to straighten them out, but everybody expects pay for that, because he who is to exercise the art rightly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject. That is the reason, it seems, why pay must be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in the form of money or honour or a penalty if they refuse."

XIX. "What do you mean by that, Socrates?" said Glaucon. "The two wages I recognize, but the penalty you speak of and described as a form of wage I don't understand." "Then," said I, "you don't
In a good democracy the better classes will be content, for they will not be ruled by worse men. 

Cf. Cicero, Ad Att. ii. 9 "male vehi malo alio gubernetante quam tam ingratissimi vectoribus bene gubernare"; Democ. fr. 49 D.: "It is hard to be ruled by a worse man;" Spencer, Data of Ethics, § 77.

The good and the necessary is a favourite Platonic antithesis, but the necessary is often the condicio sine qua non of the good. Cf. 358 c, 493 c, 540 b, Laws 628 c-d, 858 a. Aristotle took over the idea, Met. 1072 b 12.

This suggests an ideal state, but not more strongly than Meno 100 a, 89 b.
understand the wages of the best men for the sake of which the finest spirits hold office and rule when they consent to do so. Don't you know that to be covetous of honour and covetous of money is said to be and is a reproach?" "I do," he said. "Well, then," said I, "that is why the good are not willing to rule either for the sake of money or of honour. They do not wish to collect pay openly for their service of rule and be styled hirelings nor to take it by stealth from their office and be called thieves, nor yet for the sake of honour, for they are not covetous of honour. So there must be imposed some compulsion and penalty to constrain them to rule if they are to consent to hold office. That is perhaps why to seek office oneself and not await compulsion is thought disgraceful. But the chief penalty is to be governed by someone worse if a man will not himself hold office and rule. It is from fear of this, as it appears to me, that the better sort hold office when they do, and then they go to it not in the expectation of enjoyment nor as to a good thing, but as to a necessary evil and because they are unable to turn it over to better men than themselves or to their like. For we may venture to say that, if there should be a city of good men only, immunity from office-holding would be as eagerly contended for as office is now, and there it

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The paradox suggests Spencer's altruistic competition and Archibald Marshall's Upsilon. Cf. infra 521 a, 586 c, Isoc. vii. 24, xii. 145; Mill, On Representative Government, p. 56: "The good despot . . . can hardly be imagined as consenting to undertake it unless as a refuge from intolerable evils;" ibid. p. 200: "Until mankind in general are of opinion with Plato that the proper person to be entrusted with power is the person most unwilling to accept it."
ἀν καταφανεὶς γενέσθαι, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἀρχὼν οὗ πέφυκε τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ὡστε πάς ἂν ὁ γιγνώσκων τὸ ωφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἐλοιτο ὑπ᾽ ἀλλοῦ ἦ ἀλλον ωφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν. τούτῳ μὲν οὐν ἔγγυε
Ε ὤν ὄνταμῇ συγχωρῷ Θρασυμάχῳ, ὡς τὸ δίκαιον ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαύθις σκεφόμεθα· πολὺ δὲ μοι δοκεὶ μείζον εἶναι, ὃ νῦν λέγει Θρασύμαχος, τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου βίον φάσκων εἶναι κρείττων ἢ τόν τοῦ δικαίου. σὺ οὖν πότερον, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, αἱρεῖ καὶ ποτέρως ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; Τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἐγώγη, ἐφη, λυσιτελέστερον βίον 348 εἶναι. Ἡκουσα, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὡς ἂρτι Θρασύ-

μαχος ἀγαθὰ διήλθε τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου; Ἡκουσα, ἐφη, ἀλλ᾽ οὗ πεῖθομαι. Βούλει οὖν αὐτῶν πεἰ-
θωμεν, ἄν δυνάμεθα πὴ ἐξευρέω, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῇ λέγει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἢ δ᾽ ὡς. Ἄν μὲν 
τοῦν, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀντικατατείναντες λέγωμεν αὐτῷ λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὡς αὐ ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ 
δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὖθις οὕτως, καὶ ἀλλον ἡμεῖς, ἀριθμεῖν δεῖσε τἀγαθὰ καὶ μετρεῖν, ὡς ἑκάτεροι 

Β ἐν ἐκατέρω λέγομεν, καὶ ἦδη δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν 

diakrinoúntων δεσσόμεθα· ἂν δὲ ὦσπερ ἂρτι ἄνομο-

λογοῦμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἀμα αὐτοὶ

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* eἰσαύθις lays the matter on the table. Cf. 430 c. The suggestiveness of Thrasymachus's definition is exhausted, and Socrates turns to the larger question and main theme of the Republic raised by the contention that the unjust life is happier and more profitable than the just.

* This is done in 358 d ff. It is the favourite Greek
would be made plain that in very truth the true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled; so that every man of understanding would rather choose to be benefited by another than to be bothered with benefiting him. This point then I by no means concede to Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the superior. But that we will reserve for another occasion. A far weightier matter seems to me Thrasymachus’s present statement, his assertion that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. Which now do you choose, Glaucon? said I, “and which seems to you to be the truer statement?” “That the life of the just man is more profitable, I say,” he replied. “Did you hear,” said I, “all the goods that Thrasymachus just now enumerated for the life of the unjust man?” “I heard,” he said, “but I am not convinced.” “Do you wish us then to try to persuade him, supposing we can find a way, that what he says is not true?” “Of course I wish it,” he said. “If then we oppose him in a set speech enumerating in turn the advantages of being just and he replies and we rejoin, we shall have to count up and measure the goods listed in the respective speeches and we shall forthwith be in need of judges to decide between us. But if, as in the preceding discussion, we come to terms with one another as to what we admit in the inquiry, we shall be ourselves both judges and method of balancing pros and cons in set speeches and antithetic enumerations. Cf. Herod. viii. 83, the διάλεγμα (Diels, Vorsokratiker ii. pp. 334-345), the choice of Heracles (Xen. Mem. ii. 1), and the set speeches in Euripides. With this method the short question and answer of the Socratic dialectic is often contrasted. Cf. Protag. 329 A, 334-335, Gorg. 461-462, also Gorg. 471 E, Cratyl. 437 D, Theaetet. 171 A.
Plato

τε δικασταί καὶ ρήτορες ἐσώμεθα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἕφη. Ποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει; Οὔτως, ἕφη.

XX. Ἡθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς Ὀρασύμαχε, ἀπόκρων ἦμιν ἐξ ἀρχής· τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν τελέας οὐσίας δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φῆς εἶναι;

C Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ φημί, ἕφη, καὶ δι' ἃ, εἰρήκα. Φέρε δὴ τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; τὸ μὲν ποὺ ἀρετήν αὐτῶν καλεῖς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ὅποιον τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετήν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν; Ἐικός γ', ἕφη, ὡς ἠδιστε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' οὖ. Ἁλλὰ τί μὴν; Τοῦναντίον, ἦ δ' ὅσ. Ἡ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν; Οὐκ, ἄλλα πάνω γενναίαν εὐθυειαν. Τὴν ἀδικίαν ἀρα κακοθείαν D καλεῖς; Οὐκ, ἄλλ' εὐβουλίαν, ἕφη. Ἡ καὶ φρονιμοὶ σοι, ὡς Ὀρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι; Οἱ γε τελέως, ἕφη, οἵοι τέ ἀδικεῖν, πόλεις τε καὶ ἐθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὡς' ἐαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι· σὺ δὲ οἶει με ἵσως τοὺς τὰ βαλάντια ἀποτείμοντας λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅσ, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάνπερ λανθάνῃ· ἐστι δὲ οὐκ ἄξια E λόγου, ἄλλ' ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον. Τοῦτο μεντοῦ, ἕφην, οὐκ ἀγνοῶ ὧ τι βουλεῖ λέγειν· ἄλλα τὸδε ἑθαύμασα,
pleaders." "Quite so," he said. "Which method do you like best?" said I. "This one," he said.

XX. "Come then, Thrasymachus," I said, "go back to the beginning and answer us. You affirm that perfect and complete injustice is more profitable than justice that is complete." "I affirm it," he said, "and have told you my reasons." "Tell me then how you would express yourself on this point about them. You call one of them, I presume, a virtue and the other a vice?" "Of course." "Justice the virtue and injustice the vice?" "It is likely, a you innocent, when I say that injustice pays and justice doesn't pay." "But what then, pray?" "The opposite," he replied. "What! justice vice?" "No, but a most noble simplicity b or goodness of heart." "Then do you call injustice badness of heart?" "No, but goodness of judgement." "Do you also, Thrasymachus, regard the unjust as intelligent and good?" "Yes, if they are capable of complete injustice," he said, "and are able to subject to themselves cities and tribes of men. But you probably suppose that I mean those who take purses. There is profit to be sure even in that sort of thing," he said, "if it goes undetected. But such things are not worth taking into the account, but only what I just described." "I am not unaware of your meaning in that," I said; "but this is what surprised me,c

Socrates understands the theory, and the distinction between wholesale injustice and the petty profits that are not worth mentioning, but is startled by the paradox that injustice will then fall in the category of virtue and wisdom. Thrasymachus affirms the paradox and is brought to self-contradiction by a subtle argument (349-350 c) which may pass as a dramatic illustration of the game of question and answer. Cf. Introd. p. x.
eἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας τίθης μέρει τὴν ἁδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις. Ἀλλὰ πάνω οὕτω τίθημι. Τούτω, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἢδη στερεώτερον, ὦ ἐταίρε, καὶ οὐκέτι βάδιον ἔχειν ὁ τί τις εἴπη. εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεύτων μὲν τὴν ἁδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίας μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὠμολόγεις εἶναι, ὡσπερ ἄλλοι τινὲς, εἶχομεν ἀν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζό-
μενα λέγοντες· νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἰ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀοιχυρὸν εἶναι καὶ τάλλα αὐτῶ πάντα
349 προσβησεις, ἢ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν, ἐπει-
δή γε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ αὐτῷ καὶ σοφία ἐτόλμησας
θείναι. Ἀληθεστάτα, ἐφη, μαντεύει. Ἀλλ' οὐ
μέντοι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀποκνητέον γε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξ-
eltheion skopoumenon, évos an se úpolambánw légein
ἀπερ διανοεί. ἔμοι γὰρ δοκεῖς σὺ, ὃ Ὄρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς νῦν οὐ σκώπτειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ
τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν. Τί δὲ σοι, ἐφη, τούτῳ
diaferei, eite moi dokei eite mh, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον
Β'έλεγχεις; Οὔδεν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι
πειρῷ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι· ὁ δικαίος
tou dikaion dokei ti soi an εὕβελεν πλέον ἔχειν;

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a ἢδη marks the advance from the affirmation that injustice is profitable to the point of asserting that it is a virtue. This is a “stiffer proposition,” i.e. harder to refute, or possibly more stubborn.

b e.g. Polus in Gorg. 474 ff., 482 d-e. Cf. Isoc. De Pace 31. Thrasymachus is too wary to separate the kaków and the aïschorón and expose himself to a refutation based on conventional usage. Cf. Laws 627 d, Polit. 306 λ, Laws 662 λ.

c Cf. supra on 346 λ.

d peri tῆς ἀληθείας suggests the dogmatic titles of sophistic and pre-Socratic books. Cf. Antiphon, p. 553 Diels, Campbell on Theaetet. 161 c, and Aristot. Met. passim.
that you should range injustice under the head of virtue and wisdom, and justice in the opposite class.” “Well, I do so class them,” he said. “That,” said I, “is a stiffer proposition, a my friend, and if you are going as far as that it is hard to know what to answer. For if your position were that injustice is profitable yet you conceded it to be vicious and disgraceful as some other b disputants do, there would be a chance for an argument on conventional principles. But, as it is, you obviously are going to affirm that it is honourable and strong and you will attach to it all the other qualities that we were assigning to the just, since you don’t shrink from putting it in the category of virtue and wisdom.” “You are a most veritable prophet,” he replied. “Well,” said I, “I mustn’t flinch from following out the logic of the inquiry, so long as I conceive you to be saying what you think. c For now, Thrasymachus, I absolutely believe that you are not ‘mocking’ us but telling us your real opinions about the truth. d ” “What difference does it make to you,” he said, “whether I believe it or not? Why don’t you test the argument?” “No difference,” said I, “but here is something I want you to tell me in addition to what you have said. Do you think the just man would want to overreach e or exceed another just

* In pursuance of the analogy between the virtues and the arts the moral idea πλεονεξία (overreaching, getting more than your share; see on 359 c) is generalized to include doing more than or differently from. English can hardly reproduce this. Jowett’s Shakespearian quotation (King John iv. ii. 28),

When workmen strive to do better than well,
They do confound their skill in covetousness,
though apt, only illustrates the thought in part.
Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἤν ἀστείος, ὥσπερ νῦν, καὶ εὐθῆς. Τί δέ; τῆς δικαιᾶς πράξεως; Οὐδέ τῆς δικαιᾶς, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ ἅδικον πότερον ἁξιοὶ ἂν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἡγοίτο δίκαιον εἶναι, ἦ οὐκ ἂν ἡγοίτο δίκαιον; 'Ἡγοῖτ' ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅσ, καὶ ἁξιοὶ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δύνατο. 'Αλλ' οὔ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπὲρτώ, ἀλλ' εἶ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἁξιοὶ πλέον ἔχειν μηδὲ βουλεταῖ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἅδικοι; 'Αλλ' οὔτως, ἔφη, ἔχει. Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἅδικος; ἢ ἀρα ἁξιοὶ τοῦ δικαίου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαιᾶς πράξεως; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη, ὅσ γε πάντων πλέον ἔχειν ἁξιοί. Οὐκοὖν καὶ ἅδικον ἀνθρώπον τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἅδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλεῖστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ; Ἔστι ταῦτα.

XXI. Ὡδὲ δὴ λέγωμεν, ἔφην· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὀμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου, ὁ δὲ ἅδικος D τοῦ τε ὀμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου. Ἄριστα, ἔφη, εἰρήκας. Ἐστὶ δὲ γε, ἔφην, φρονίμος τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἅδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερα. Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, εὖ. Οὐκοὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ ἅδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ἐοικεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ἔφη, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὡν καὶ ἐοικέναι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐοικέναι; Καλῶς. τοιοῦτος ἢ ἄρα ἑστιν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν ὅσπερ ἐοικεν. 'Αλλὰ τί μέλλει; ἔφη. Ἐἰεν, ὁ Θρασύ-

* The assumption that a thing is what it is like is put as an inference from Thrasymachus’s ready admission that the unjust man is wise and good and is like the wise and good. Jevons says in “Substitution of Similars”: “Whatever is true of a thing is true of its like.” But practical logic requires the qualification “in respect of their likeness.” Socrates, 88
man?" "By no means," he said; "otherwise he would not be the delightful simpleton that he is."

"And would he exceed or overreach or go beyond the just action?" "Not that either," he replied. "But how would he treat the unjust man—would he deem it proper and just to outdo, overreach, or go beyond him or would he not?" "He would," he said, "but he wouldn't be able to."

"That is not my question," I said, "but whether it is not the fact that the just man does not claim or wish to outdo the just man but only the unjust?"

"That is the case," he replied. "How about the unjust then? Does he claim to overreach and outdo the just man and the just action?" "Of course," he said, "since he claims to overreach and get the better of everything." "Then the unjust man will overreach and outdo also both the unjust man and the unjust action, and all his endeavour will be to get the most in everything for himself." "That is so."

XXI. "Let us put it in this way," I said; "the just man does not seek to take advantage of his like but of his unlike, but the unjust man of both." "Admirably put," he said. "But the unjust man is intelligent and good and the just man neither." "That, too, is right," he said. "Is it not also true," I said, "that the unjust man is like the intelligent and good and the just man is not?" "Of course," he said, "being such he will be like to such and the other not." "Excellent. Then each is such as that to which he is like." "What else do you suppose?"

however, argues that since the just man is like the good craftsman in not overreaching, and the good craftsman is good, therefore the just man is good. The conclusion is sound, and the analogy may have a basis of psychological truth; but the argument is a verbal fallacy.
μαχε. μουσικὸν δὲ τινα λέγεις, ἐτερὸν δὲ ἄμουσον. Ἔγωγε. Πότερον φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἄφρονα; Τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν δήποτε φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἄμουσον ἄφρονα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθὸν, ἀ δὲ ἄφроνα, κακὸν; Ναι. Τι δὲ ιατρικὸν; οὐχ οὔτως; Οὔτως. Δοκεῖ ἄν οὖν τίς σοι, ἢ ἄριστε, μουσικὸς ἀνήρ ἄμοιττομενος λύραν ἐθέλειν μουσικὸν ἄνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ ἀξίου πλέον ἐχειν; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. Τι δέ; ἄμουσον; Ἄναγκη, ἔφη. Τι δὲ ιατρικὸς; ἐν τῇ ἐδωκῇ ἡ πόσει ἐθέλειν ἀν τι ιατρικὸν πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ ἄνδρος ἡ πράγματος; Οὐ δήτα. Μὴ ιατρικὸν δέ; Ναι. Περὶ πάσης δὲ ὅρα ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, εἰ τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμων ὀστισοῦν πλεώ ἀν ἐθέλειν αἰρεισθαὶ ἢ ὁσα ἄλλοις ἐπιστήμων ἡ πράττειν ἡ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρᾶξιν. Ἁλλ' ἴσως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη τοῦτό γε οὔτως ἐχειν. Τι δέ ο ἀνεπιστήμων; οὐχὶ ὁμοῖος μὲν Β ἐπιστήμωνος πλεονεκτήσειν ἄν, ὁμοῖος δὲ ἀνεπιστήμωνος; Ἰσώς. Ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφὸς; Φημί. Ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός; Φημί. Ὁ ἄρα ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐκ ἐθελήσει πλεον-

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a Cf. 608 e, Gorg. 463 e, Protag. 332 a, 358 d, Phaedo 103 c, Soph. 226 b, Phileb. 34 e, Meno 75 d, 88 a, Alc. I. 128 b, Cratyl. 385 b. The formula, which is merely used to obtain formal recognition of a term or idea required in the argument, readily lends itself to modern parody. Socrates seems to have gone far afield. Thrasymachus answers quite confidently, ἔγωγε, but in δήτου there is a hint of bewilderment as to the object of it all.

b Familiar Socratic doctrine. Cf. Laches 194 d, Lysis 210 d, Gorg. 504 d.

c πλεονεκτεῖν is here a virtual synonym of πλέον ἐχειν. The
he said. "Very well, Thrasymachus, but do you recognize that one man is a musician and another unmusical?" "I do." "Which is the intelligent and which the unintelligent?" "The musician, I presume, is the intelligent and the unmusical the unintelligent." "And is he not good in the things in which he is intelligent and bad in the things in which he is unintelligent?" "Yes." "And the same of the physician?" "The same." "Do you think then, my friend, that any musician in the tuning of a lyre would want to overreach another musician in the tightening and relaxing of the strings or would claim and think fit to exceed or outdo him?" "I do not." "But would he the unmusical man?" "Of necessity," he said. "And how about the medical man? In prescribing food and drink would he want to outdo the medical man or the medical procedure?" "Surely not." "But he would the unmedical man?" "Yes." "Consider then with regard to all forms of knowledge and ignorance whether you think that anyone who knows would choose to do or say other or more than what another who knows would do or say, and not rather exactly what his like would do in the same action." "Why, perhaps it must be so," he said, "in such cases." "But what of the ignorant man—of him who does not know? Would he not overreach or outdo equally the knower and the ignorant?" "It may be." "But the one who knows is wise?" "I'll say so." "And the wise is good?" "I'll say so." "Then he who is good and wise will not wish to overreach two terms help the double meaning. Cf. Laws 691 a πλεον- εκτείν τῶν νόμων.

* Generalizing from the inductive instances.
ekteîn, toû dê ánomoîou te kai énantiou. "Eoukev, ἔφη. 'O dê kakôs te kai ámabhês toû te ómioîou kai toû énantiou. Φαίνεται. Όυκοῦν, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὃ ἄδικος ἡμῶν τοῦ ἀνομοὶου τε καὶ ὁμοῖον πλεονεκτεῖ; ἦ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες; "Εγώγε, C ἔφη. 'O dê ge díkaios toû mên ὁμοίου οὖ πλεονεκτήσει, toû dê ἀνομοίου; Ναί. "Εοικεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἔγω, ὃ μὲν δικαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὃ dê ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεῖ. Κινδυνεύει. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὃ γε ὁμοίους ἐκάτεροι εἶπ, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐκάτερον εἶναι. Ὀμολογοῦμεν γὰρ. 'Ὁ μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται ὃν ἀγαθὸς τε καὶ σοφὸς, ὃ dê ἄδικος ἀμαθῆς τε καὶ κακὸς.

XXII. 'Ὁ dê Θρασύμαχος ὁμολόγησε μὲν πάντα D ταῦτα, οὐχ ώς ἔγω νῦν ῥαδίως λέγω, ἀλλ' ἐλκόμενος καὶ μόγις, μετὰ ἱδρῶτος θαυμαστοῦ ὀσύν, ἀτε καὶ θέρους ὑπότε· τότε καὶ εἶδον ἔγω, πρότερον δὲ οὕτω, Θρασύμαχον ἑρυθρώντα. ἔπειθῇ δὲ οὖν διωμολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἄρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄδικίαιν κακίαιν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαιν, Εἰεν, ἦν δ' ἔγω, τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτω κεῖσθω, ἐφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἱσχυρόν εἶναι τὴν ἄδικίαιν· ἦ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὃ Θρασύμαχε; Μέμνημαι, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε οὐδὲ ὃ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει, Ε καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγεων. εἰ οὖν λέγομι, εὕ oίδ' ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἂν μὲ φαίης· ἦ οὖν ἐὰ μὲ

a Cf. 334 A.
b Cf. Protag. 333 b.
c Cf. the blush of the sophist in Euthydem. 297 a.
d The main paradox of Thrasymachus is refuted. It will be easy to transfer the other laudatory epithets ἱσχυρὸν, etc., from injustice back to justice. Thrasymachus at first refuses
his like but his unlike and opposite." "It seems so," he said. "But the bad man and the ignoramus will overreach both like and unlike?" "So it appears." "And does not our unjust man, Thrasymachus, overreach both unlike and like? Did you not say that?" "I did," he replied. "But the just man will not overreach his like but only his unlike?" "Yes." "Then the just man is like the wise and good, and the unjust is like the bad and the ignoramus." "It seems likely." "But furthermore we agreed that each is such as that to which he is like." "Yes, we did." "Then the just man has turned out on our hands to be good and wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant."

XXII. Thrasymachus made all these admissions not as I now lightly narrate them, but with much baulking and reluctance and prodigious sweating, it being summer, and it was then I beheld what I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing. But when we did reach our conclusion that justice is virtue and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance, "Good," said I, "let this be taken as established." But we were also affirming that injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don't you remember, Thrasymachus?" "I remember," he said; "but I don't agree with what you are now saying either and I have an answer to it, but if I were to attempt to state it, I know very well that you would say that I was delivering a harangue." Either then allow me to speak at such to share in the discussion but finally nods an ironical assent to everything that Socrates says. So Callicles in Gorg. 510 A. This is really a reminiscence of such passages as Theaetet. 162 D, Protag. 336 B, Gorg. 482 C, 494 D, 513 A ff., 519 D. The only justification for it in the preceding conversation is 348 A-B.
eispein ósa boúlomai, ἦ, e i boúlei érwta, érwta: égω dě soi, ὧσπερ ταῖς γραυσι ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσας, εἰεν ἐρω καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. Μηδαμως, ἦν δ' ἐγω, παρά γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν. Ῥοστε σοι, ἔφη, ἀρέσκειν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ εἶας λέγειν. καίτοι τί ἄλλο βούλει; Οὐδεν μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγω, ἀλλ' εἰπέρ τοῦτο ποιήσεις, ποίει· ἐγώ δὲ ἐρωτήσω. Ἑρώτα δή. Τοῦτο τοῖς ερωτῶ, ὀπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξῆς διασκεψώ.

351 μεθά τὸν λόγον, ὅποιον τι τυγχάνει ὁν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ἐλέχθη γάρ που, ὦτι καὶ δυνατῷτερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἰὴ ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης· νῦν δὲ γ', ἔφη, εἰπέρ σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετή ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ῥαδίως, οἶμαι, φανησται καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἢ ἀδικία. οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐτὶ τούτῳ ἀγγονήσειεν, ἀλλ' οὗτι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὡς Ἀρασύμαχε, ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῆμω, ἀλλὰ τῇ τῇ σκέψασθαι· πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἀδικον εἶναι καὶ ᾿Β ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι, πολλάς δὲ καὶ ὑφ' ἓαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσάμενην; Πῶς γάρ οὐκ; ἔφη· καὶ τοῦτο γε ἡ ἀριστή μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα ὁὐσα ἀδικος. Μανθάνω, ἔφην, ὦτι σὸς οὕτως ἦν ὁ λόγος· ἄλλα τόδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ· πότερον ἢ κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἀνέυ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔξει, ἡ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ ἀδικασύνης; Εἰ μὲν, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἐλεγες.

a So Polus in Gorg. 461 d.

b Cf. Gorg. 527 λ.

c Cf. 331 c, 386 ν. Instead of the simple or absolute argument that justice, since it is wisdom and virtue, must be stronger, etc., than injustice, Socrates wishes to bring out the deeper thought that the unjust city or man is strong not
length as I desire, or, if you prefer to ask questions, go on questioning and I, as we do for old wives telling their tales, will say 'Very good' and will nod assent and dissent.' "No, no," said I, "not counter to your own belief." "Yes, to please you," he said, "since you don't allow me freedom of speech. And yet what more do you want?" "Nothing, indeed," said I; "but if this is what you propose to do, do it, and I will ask the questions." "Ask on, then." "This, then, is the question I ask, the same as before, so that our inquiry may proceed in sequence. What is the nature of injustice as compared with justice? For the statement made, I believe, was that injustice is a more potent and stronger thing than justice. But now," I said, "if justice is wisdom and virtue, it will easily, I take it, be shown to be also a stronger thing than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now fail to recognize that—but what I want is not quite so simple as that. I wish, Thrasymachus, to consider it in some such fashion as this. A city, you would say, may be unjust and try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection." "Certainly," he said; "and this is what the best state will chiefly do, the state whose injustice is most complete." "I understand," I said, "that this was your view. But the point that I am considering is this: whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice." "If," he replied, "what you were just now because but in spite of his injustice and by virtue of some saving residue of justice.

Thrasymachus can foresee the implications of either theory.
For the thought cf. Spencer, Data of Ethics, § 144: "Joint aggressions upon men outside the society cannot prosper if there are many aggressions of man on man within the society;" Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, Chap. VIII, § 31: "It (the loyalty of a thief to his gang) is rather a kind of spurious or class morality," etc.; Carlyle: "Neither James Boswell’s good book, nor any other good thing . . . is or can be performed by any man in virtue of his badness, but always solely in spite thereof." Proclus, In Rempub. 96
saying holds good, that justice is wisdom, with justice; if it is as I said, with injustice." "Admirable, Thrasymachus," I said; "you not only nod assent and dissent, but give excellent answers." "I am trying to please you," he replied.

XXIII. "Very kind of you. But please me in one thing more and tell me this: do you think that a city, an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group that attempted any action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another?" "Certainly not," said he. "But if they didn't, wouldn't they be more likely to?" "Assuredly." "For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so?" "So be it," he replied, "not to differ from you." "That is good of you, my friend; but tell me this: if it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable of effective action in common?" "By all means." "Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just?" "They will," he said. "And then will you tell me that if

Kroll i. 20 expands this idea. Dante (Convivio i. xii.) attributes to the Philosopher in the fifth of the ethics the saying that even robbers and plunderers love justice. Locke (Human Understanding i. 3) denies that this proves the principles of justice innate: "They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities," etc. Cf. further Isoc. xii. 226 on the Spartans, and Plato, Protag. 322 b, on the inconveniences of injustice in the state of nature, ἡδικοὺν ἀλλήλους.
The specific function must operate universally in bond or free, in many, two or one. The application to the individual reminds us of the main argument of the Republic. Cf. 369 a, 434 d, 441 c. For the argument many, few or two, one, cf. Laws 626 c.

Plato paradoxically treats the state as one organism and the individual as many warring members (cf. Introd. p. xxxv). Hence, justice in one, and being a friend to oneself are more than metaphors for him. Cf. 621 c, 416 c, 428 d, Laws 626 e, 693 b, Epist. vii. 332 d, Antiphon 556. 45 Diels ομονοιην προς ἑαυτὸν. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. v. 11, inquires whether a man can wrong himself, and Chrysippus (Plutarch, Stoic. Repug. xvi.) pronounces the expression absurd.

This is the conventional climax of the plea for any
injustice arises in one it will lose its force and function or will it none the less keep it?" "Have it that it keeps it," he said. "And is it not apparent that its force is such that wherever it is found in city, family, camp, or in anything else, it first renders the thing incapable of co-operation with itself owing to faction and difference, and secondly an enemy to itself and to its opposite in every case, the just? Isn't that so?" "By all means." "Then in the individual too, I presume, its presence will operate all these effects which it is its nature to produce. It will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner faction and lack of self-agreement, and then an enemy to himself and to the just. Is it not so?" "Yes." "But, my friend, the gods too are just." "Have it that they are," he said. "So to the gods also, it seems, the unjust man will be hateful, but the just man dear." "Revel in your discourse," he said, "without fear, for I shall not oppose you, so as not to offend your partisans here." "Fill up the measure of my feast, then, and complete it for me," I said, "by continuing to answer as you have been doing. Now that moral ideal. So Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1179 a 24, proves that the ὀφάλων being likest God is θεοφιλεστάτος. Cf. Democ. fr. 217 D. μονον θεοφιλές δοσις ἔχθρων τῷ ἁδικεῖν; infra 382 ε, 612 ε, Phileb. 39 e, Laws 716 d. The "enlightened" Thrasymachus is disgusted at this dragging in of the gods. Cf. Theaetet. 162 δ θεοὺς τε εἰς τὸ μέσου ἄγνοιας. He is reported as saying (Diels p. 544. 40) that the gods regard not human affairs, else they would not have overlooked the greatest of goods, justice, which men plainly do not use.

ἔστιν δὲ ἐκτικέων keeps up the image of the feast of reason. Cf. 334 a-b, Lysis 211 c, Gorg. 522 a, Phaedr. 227 b, and Tim. 17 a, from which perhaps it became a commonplace in Dante and the Middle Ages.
σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν
οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδέν πράττειν
C μετ’ ἀλλήλων οὐδέ τε, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὐσ φαμεν
ἐρωμένως πώποτε τι μετ’ ἀλλήλων κοινῇ πραξαί
ἄδικους οὖνται, τούτῳ οὐ παντάπασιν ἄλθεις
λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδὴ
οντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνὶ τις αὐτοὶς δι-
καιοσύνη, ἦ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει μήτω καὶ ἀλλήλους γε
καὶ ἐφ’ οὖς ἦσαν ἁμα ἄδικεῖν, δι’ ἂν ἔπραξαν
ἀ ἐπράξαν, ὠρμησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικια
ἡμιμόχθηροι οὖντες, ἐπεὶ οἱ γε παμπόνηροι καὶ
D τελέως ἄδικοι τελέως εἰσὶ καὶ πράττειν ἄδύνατοι·
tαύτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, μανθάνω, ἀλλ’ οὐχ
ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον
ξώσων οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἄδικων καὶ εὐδαιμόνεστεροὶ
eἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὑστερον προὐθέμεθα σκέψασθαι,
σκεπτέον. φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὡς γε μοι
dοκεῖ, εἰς ὃν εἰρήκαμεν· οἷος δ’ ἐτί βέλτιον
σκεπτέον. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἑπτυχόντος ὁ λόγος,
ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντως τρόπον χρή ἔσην. Σκόπει δὴ,
ἔφη. Σκοτῶ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ· καὶ μοι λέγε· δοκεῖ τί
Ε σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἐργον; Ἐμοιγε. Ἀρ’ οὖν τοῦτο

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a For the idea cf. the argument in Protag. 327 c-d, that Socrates would yearn for the wickedness of Athens if he found himself among wild men who knew no justice at all.
b The main ethical question of the Republic, suggested in 347 e, now recurs.
c Similarly 578 c. What has been said implies that injustice is the corruption and disease of the soul (see on 445 λ-β). But Socrates wishes to make further use of the argument from ἐργον or specific function.
d Cf. on 344 D, supra, pp. 71 f.
e See on 335 ν, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 7. 14. The virtue or excellence of a thing is the right performance of
the just appear to be wiser and better and more capable of action and the unjust incapable of any common action, and that if we ever say that any men who are unjust have vigorously combined to put something over, our statement is not altogether true, for they would not have kept their hands from one another if they had been thoroughly unjust, but it is obvious that there was in them some justice which prevented them from wronging at the same time one another too as well as those whom they attacked; and by dint of this they accomplished whatever they did and set out to do injustice only half corrupted \(^a\) by injustice, since utter rascals completely unjust are completely incapable of effective action—all this I understand to be the truth, and not what you originally laid down. But whether it is also true \(^b\) that the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier, which is the question we afterwards proposed for examination, is what we now have to consider. It appears even now that they are, I think, from what has already been said. But all the same we must examine it more carefully.\(^c\) For it is no ordinary \(^d\) matter that we are discussing, but the right conduct of life. " "Proceed with your inquiry," he said. "I proceed," said I. "Tell me then—would you say that a horse has a specific work \(^e\) or function?" "I would." "Would you be willing its specific function. See Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, i. p. 301, Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 48. The following argument is in a sense a fallacy, since it relies on the double meaning of life, physical and moral (cf. 445 B and Cratyl. 399 D) and on the ambiguity of e\(\nu\) παρττευ, "fare well" and "do well." The Aristotelian commentator, Alexander, animadvert on the fallacy. For ἐπρευ cf. further Epictet. Dis. i. 4. 11, Max. Tyr. Dis. ii. 4, Musonius, apud Stob. 117. 8, Thompson on Meno 90 e, Plato, Laws 896 D, Phaedr. 246 B.
αν θείς καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὀτονοῦν ἔργον, ὡς ᾧ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιή τις ἢ ἁριστά; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. 'Ἀλλ' ὥδε· ἔσθ' ὡτ' ᾧ ἄλλῳ ὡδις ἢ ὀφθαλμοὶς; Οὐ δήτα. Τί δέ; ἀκούσας ἄλλῳ ἢ ὡςίν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὔκοιν δικαίως ᾧ ταύτα τούτων φαίμεν ἔργα εἶναι; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; 353 μαχαίρα ᾧ ἀμπέλου κλήμα ἀποτέμονοι καὶ σμίλη καὶ ἄλλως πολλοὶς; Πῶς γαρ οὗ; 'Ἀλλ' οὗδεν' γ' ᾧ, οἴμαι, οὕτω καλῶς, ὡς δρεπάνω τῷ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐργασθέντι. 'Ἀληθῆ. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐ τούτῳ τούτου ἔργον θήσομεν; Θήσομεν μὲν οὖν.

XXIV. Νῦν δή, οἴμαι, ἀμεινὸν ᾧ μάθοις ὁ ἄρτι ἦρωτων πυνθανόμενος, εἰ οὗ τούτῳ ἐκάστου εἴη ἔργον, ὡς ᾧ μόνον τι ἢ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζηται. 'Ἀλλ', ἔφη, μανθάνω τε καὶ μοι Β δοκεῖ τούτῳ ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔργον εἶναι. Ἐλεν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ· οὔκοιν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστῳ, ὅπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; ἵωμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν. ὀφθαλμῶν, φαμέν, ἐστιν ἔργον; 'Εστιν. 'Αρ' οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐστιν; Καὶ ἀρετή. Τί δέ; οὕτων ἢν τι ἔργον; Ναι. Οὔκοιν καὶ ἀρετή; Καὶ ἀρετή. Τί δὲ πάντων πέρι τῶν ἄλλων; οὗ οὕτω; Οὔτω. ἴν ὅτι δή· ἀρ' ᾧ ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον Σ καλῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι μὴ ἐχοῦτα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκεῖαν ἀρετὴν, ἄλλ' ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς κακίαν; Καὶ πῶς ἦν; ἔφη· τυφλότητα γὰρ ἵσως λέγεις ἀντὶ τῆς ὀψεως. Ἡτις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν ἢ ἀρετή· οὗ γάρ πω
to define the work of a horse or of anything else to be that which one can do only with it or best with it?" "I don't understand," he replied. "Well, take it this way: is there anything else with which you can see except the eyes?" "Certainly not." "Again, could you hear with anything but ears?" "By no means." "Would you not rightly say that these are the functions of these (organs)?" "By all means." "Once more, you could use a dirk to trim vine branches and a knife and many other instruments." "Certainly." "But nothing so well, I take it, as a pruning-knife fashioned for this purpose." "That is true." "Must we not then assume this to be the work or function of that?" "We must."

XXIV. "You will now, then, I fancy, better apprehend the meaning of my question when I asked whether that is not the work of a thing which it only or it better than anything else can perform." "Well," he said, "I do understand, and agree that the work of anything is that." "Very good," said I. "Do you not also think that there is a specific virtue or excellence of everything for which a specific work or function is appointed? Let us return to the same examples. The eyes we say have a function?" "They have." "Is there also a virtue of the eyes?" "There is." "And was there not a function of the ears?" "Yes." "And so also a virtue?" "Also a virtue." "And what of all other things? Is the case not the same?" "The same." "Take note now. Could the eyes possibly fulfil their function well if they lacked their own proper excellence and had in its stead the defect?" "How could they?" he said; "for I presume you meant blindness instead of vision." "Whatever," said I, "the excellence may be. For
PLATO

touto ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον εὐ ἔργασται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακίᾳ δὲ κακῶς. 'Αληθές, ἐφη, τούτο γε λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὡτα στερόμενα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀπεργάσται; Πάνυ γε. Τίθεμεν

D οὖν καὶ τάλλα πάντα εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον; 'Εμοιγε δοκεῖ. 'Ιθι δὴ, μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ νερὸν τὸ εἶναι τῇ οἰκείᾳ, ἀλλ' τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄν ἐνὶ πράξεις, ὦν τὸ τοιόνδε τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ 

μεταφεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα, ἐσθ' ὀτί ἀλλα ἡ ἐργα ἐκιαώς ἂν αὐτὴν ἀποδοκίμην καὶ φαίμεν ὅπια ἐκείνης εἶναι; Οὐδὲνι ἄλλως. Τί δ' αὐτὸ τῷ 

ξῆνι; ἐργά θεάομεν ἔργον εἰναι; Μάλιστα γ', ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετήν φαμέν τινα ἐργὴς

Ε εἶναι; Φαμέν. 'Αρ' οὖν ποτέ, ὡ Ὁρασόμαχε, 

ψυχῇ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα εὐ ἀπεργάσται στερομενή 

τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς, ἡ ἀδύνατον; 'Αδύνατον. 

'Ανάγκη ἄρα κακῆς ψυχῆς κακῶς ἀρχεῖν καὶ 

ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῇ νὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὐ 

πράττειν. 'Ανάγκη. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετήν γε ἐνεχωρή-

σαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ ἄδικαν; 

Συνεχωρήσαμεν γάρ. 'Η μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχὴ 

καὶ δικαίος ἄνηρ εὐ βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ δὲ 

ἀδικός. Φαίνεται, ἐφη, κατά τὸν σὸν λόγον.

354 Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε εὐ τοῖς μακάριωσ τε καὶ εὐνάμων, 

ὁ δὲ μὴ τάναντια. Πῶς γάρ ὦ; Ὁ μὲν δίκαιος 

ἀρα εὐνάμων, ὃ δ' ἄδικος ἀθλιός. Ἑστωσαν,

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a Platonic dialectic asks and affirms only so much as is needed for the present purpose.

I have not yet come to that question, but am only asking whether whatever operates will not do its own work well by its own virtue and badly by its own defect.” “That much,” he said, “you may safely affirm to be true.” “Then the ears, too, if deprived of their own virtue will do their work ill?” “Assuredly.” “And do we then apply the same principle to all things?” “I think so.” “Then next consider this. The soul, has it a work which you couldn’t accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example, management, rule, deliberation, and the like, is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar work?” “Nothing else.” “And again life? Shall we say that too is the function of the soul?” “Most certainly,” he said. “And do we not also say that there is an excellence or virtue of the soul?” “We do.” “Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if deprived of its own virtue, or is this impossible?” “It is impossible.” “Of necessity, then, a bad soul will govern and manage things badly while the good soul will in all these things do well.” “Of necessity.” “And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is justice and its defect injustice?” “Yes, we did.” “The just soul and the just man then will live well and the unjust ill?” “So it appears,” he said, “by your reasoning.” “But furthermore, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not the contrary.” “Of course.” “Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable.” “So be (English ed.), ii. p. 70. It does not seriously affect the validity of the argument, for it is used only as a rhetorical confirmation of the implication that κακὸς ἀρχεῖν, etc. = misery and the reverse of happiness.
ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄθλιων γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, ευδαιμονα δέ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐδέποτ᾽ ἄρα, ὃ μακάριε Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδείοις. Ἡπό σοῦ γε, ἴν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδὴ μοι πρᾶσσε ἐγένον καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω, οὐ μὲντοι καλῶς γε Β εἰστίμαμι, δι' ἐμαυτὸν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σὲ· ἀλλ' ὡσπερ οὐ κήρυκτι τοῦ αἰεὶ παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἄρπάξαντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαῦσαι, καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω, πρὶν δ' τὸ πρῶτον ἔσκοπονεν εὔρειν, τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀφέμενος ἐκείνου ὁρμήσαι ἑπὶ τὸ σκέφτομαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμαθία εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἁρετή, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος αὐτῷ προτέρου λόγου, ὅτι λυσιτελέστερον ἡ ἀδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσφόδην τὸ μή οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὡστ' οὐν

C τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἶδέναι· ὅποτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μή οἴδα ὃ ἐστὶ, σχολὴ εἴσομαι εἴτε ἁρετή τῆς οὕσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἐχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαιμον ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμον.

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*a* For similar irony cf. Gorg. 489 d, Euthydem. 304 c.

*b* Similarly Holmes (Poet at the Breakfast Table, p. 108) of the poet: “He takes a bite out of the sunny side of this and the other, and ever stimulated and never satisfied,” etc. Cf. Lucian, Demosth. Encom. 18, Julian, Orat. ii. p. 69 c, Polyb. iii. 57. 7.
it,” he said. “But it surely does not pay to be miserable, but to be happy.” “Of course not.” “Never, then, most worshipful Thrasymachus, can injustice be more profitable than justice.” “Let this complete your entertainment, Socrates, at the festival of Bendis.” “A feast furnished by you, Thrasymachus,” I said, “now that you have become gentle with me and are no longer angry.” I have not dined well, however—by my own fault, not yours. But just as gluttons b snatch at every dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first object of our inquiry—what justice is—let go of that and set out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other topic. So that for me the present outcome of the discussion c is that I know nothing. d For if I don’t know what the just is, e I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy.”

Hirzel, Der Dialog, i. p. 4, n. 1, argues that διαλέγου here means “inquiry” (Erörterung), not the dialogue with Thrasymachus.


* Knowledge of the essence, or definition, must precede discussion of qualities and relations. Cf. Meno 71 B, 86 D-E, Laches 190 B, Gorg. 448 E.
I. 'Εγώ μὲν οὖν ταύτα εἰπὼν ὡμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δὴ ἦν ἄρα, ὡς έοικε, προοίμιον. ὦ γὰρ Γλαύκων ἀεὶ τε ἀνδρειότατος ὄν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἀπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τήν ἀπόρρησιν ὄυκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἀλλ' ἐφη. Ὡ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι Β ἦ ὡς ἀληθῶς πείσαι, ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμενὸν ἐστὶ δίκαιον εἰναι ἢ ἄδικον; 'Ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἴπον, ἐγὼν' ἢν ἐλοίμην, εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἰη. Οὐ τοῖνυν, ἐφη, ποιεῖσ ὁ βούλει. λέγε γάρ μοι· ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ τοιόνδε τι εἰναι ἀγαθὸν, ὁ δεξαίμεθ' ἢν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι; οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἴ ἂνοι οὐσία ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἑπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἀλλο ἡ χαίρειν ἔχοντα.

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*a* So in *Philebus* 11 c, *Philebus* cries off or throws up the sponge in the argument.

*b* Aristotle borrows this classification from Plato (*Topics* 118 b 20-22), but liking to differ from his teacher, says in one place that the good which is desired solely for itself is the highest. The Stoics apply the classification to "preferables" (*Diog. Laert. vii. 107*). *Cf.* Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* i. 11. Elsewhere Plato distinguishes goods of the soul, of the body,
BOOK II

I. When I had said this I supposed that I was done with the subject, but it all turned out to be only a prelude. For Glaucon, who is always an intrepid, enterprising spirit in everything, would not on this occasion acquiesce in Thrasymachus's abandonment of his case, but said, "Socrates, is it your desire to seem to have persuaded us or really to persuade us that it is without exception better to be just than unjust?" "Really," I said, "if the choice rested with me." "Well, then, you are not doing what you wish. For tell me: do you agree that there is a kind of good which we would choose to possess, not from desire for its after effects, but welcoming it for its own sake? As, for example, joy and such pleasures as are harmless and nothing results from them afterwards save to have and to hold the enjoyment." "I

and of possessions (Laws 697 b, 727-729) or as the first Alcibiades puts it (131) the self, the things of the self, and other things.

* Plato here speaks of harmless pleasures, from the point of view of common sense and prudential morality. Cf. Tim. 59 δ ἀμεταμέλητον ἠδονήν, Milton's Mirth that after no repenting draws.

But the Republic (583 δ) like the Gorgias (493 E-494 c) knows the more technical distinction of the Philebus (42 c ff., 53 c ff.) between pure pleasures and impure, which are conditioned by desire and pain.
C "Εμοιγε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Τί δὲ; ὁ αὐτός τε αὐτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνομένων; οἶον αὖ το φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὄραν καὶ τὸ γνωιέν. τα γὰρ τοιαῦτα ποὺ δ' ἀμφότερα ἀσπαζόμεθα. Ναι, εἶπον. Τρίτον δὲ ὄρας τι, ἐφη, εἰδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ὧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἰατρεύσις τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός; ταύτα γὰρ ἐπίτονο φαίμεν ἂν, ὡφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν εαυτῶν

D ἐνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἑχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ήσα γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν. "Εστι γὰρ οὖν, ἐφη, καὶ τοῦτο τρίτον. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ; Ἐν ποίῳ, ἐφη, τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην 358 τίθης; Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖμαι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὁ καὶ δ' αὐτό καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι. Οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ἐφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιτόνου εἶδους, ὁ μισθῶν θ' ἐνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δοξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ δὲ δ' αὐτὸ φευκτέον ὡς ὧν χαλεποῦν.

II. Οἶδα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὔτω, καὶ πάλαι ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὃν ψέγεται, ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται. ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔουκε, δυσμαθής. "Ἰθι

Β δὴ, ἐφη, ἀκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, εάν σοι ταύτα δοκῇ. Θρασυμάχος γάρ μοι φαίνεται πρωιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡσπερ ὃφις κηληθήναι, ἔμοι δὲ

1 ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται A omits.

a Isoc. i. 47 has this distinction, as well as Aristotle.

b Some philosophers, as Aristippus (Diog. Laert. x. 1. 138), said that intelligence is a good only for its consequences, but the opening sentences of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* treat all forms of knowledge as goods in themselves.

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recognize that kind,” said I. “And again a kind that we love both for its own sake and for its consequences, such as understanding, sight, and health? For these I presume we welcome for both reasons.” “Yes,” I said. “And can you discern a third form of good under which falls exercise and being healed when sick and the art of healing and the making of money generally? For of them we would say that they are laborious and painful yet beneficial, and for their own sake we would not accept them, but only for the rewards and other benefits that accrue from them.” “Why yes,” I said, “I must admit this third class also. But what of it?” “In which of these classes do you place justice?” he said. “In my opinion, I said, “it belongs in the fairest class, that which a man who is to be happy must love both for its own sake and for the results.” “Yet the multitude,” he said, “do not think so, but that it belongs to the toilsome class of things that must be practised for the sake of rewards and repute due to opinion but that in itself is to be shunned as an affliction.”

II. “I am aware,” said I, “that that is the general opinion and Thrasymachus has for some time been disparaging it as such and praising injustice. But I, it seems, am somewhat slow to learn.” “Come now,” he said, “hear what I too have to say and see if you agree with me. For Thrasymachus seems to me to have given up to you too soon, as if he were a serpent that you had charmed, but I am not yet satis-

\[c \text{ Plutarch (1040 c) says that Chrysippus censured Plato for recognizing health as a good, but elsewhere Plato explicitly says that even health is to be disregarded when the true interests of the soul require it.} \]

\[d \text{ For Plato’s fondness for the idea of } κηλείω \text{ cf. } The \text{ Unity of Plato’s Thought, note 500.} \]
οὔπω κατὰ νοῦν ἡ ἀπόδειξις γέγονεν περὶ ἐκατέρου· ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκούσαι, τί τ’ ἔστιν ἐκατέρων καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἔνον ἐν τῷ ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἐὰςαι χαί-ρειν. οὔτωσι οὐν ποιήσω, ἐὰν καὶ σοὶ δοκῇς ἐπι-
C ανανεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρω δικαιοσύνην οἰνον εἶναι φασί καὶ θεν γεγο-
νέαν· δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀκοντες ἐπιτηδεύονσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν τρίτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείων ἁρα δ’ τοῦ ἄδικου ἢ δ’ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἔπει ἐμοιγε, ὅ Σώκρατες, οὔτι δοκεῖ οὕτως· ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὅτα, ἀκούνων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν
D δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον, ὡς ἀμείων ἄδικιας, οὐδενὸς πιθ ἀκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι· βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐγκυμωμαζόμενων ἀκούσαι. μάλιστα δ’ οἶμαι ἂν· σοὶ πυθέσχαι· διὸ κατατείναι ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδείξομαι σοι, ὅν τρόπον αὐ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἄδικιαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἀλλ’ ὅρα, εἰ σοὶ βουλομένω δ’ λέγω. Πάντων μάλιστα, ἣν
E δ’ ἐγὼ· περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἐχὼν χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων; Κάλλιστα, ἐφη, λέγεις· καὶ δ’ πρῶτον ἐφην ἑρεῖν, περὶ τούτου

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a Cf. infra 366 E.
b Cf. supra 347 c-d.
c Cf. Phileb. 66 E. Plato affirms that the immoralism of Thrasymachus and Callicles was widespread in Greece. Cf. 112
fied with the proof that has been offered about justice and injustice. For what I desire is to hear what each of them is and what potency and effect it has in and of itself dwelling in the soul, but to dismiss their rewards and consequences. This, then, is what I propose to do, with your concurrence. I will renew the argument of Thrasymachus and will first state what men say is the nature and origin of justice; secondly, that all who practise it do so reluctantly, regarding it as something necessary and not as a good; and thirdly, that they have plausible grounds for thus acting, since forsooth the life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just man—as they say; though I, Socrates, don't believe it. Yet I am disconcerted when my ears are dinned by the arguments of Thrasymachus and innumerable others. But the case for justice, to prove that it is better than injustice, I have never yet heard stated by any as I desire to hear it. What I desire is to hear an encomium on justice in and by itself. And I think I am most likely to get that from you. For which reason I will lay myself out in praise of the life of injustice, and in so speaking will give you an example of the manner in which I desire to hear from you in turn the dispraise of injustice and the praise of justice. Consider whether my proposal pleases you. "Nothing could please me more," said I; "for on what subject would a man of sense rather delight to hold and hear discourse again and again?" "That is excellent," he said; "and now listen to what I said would be the first topic

Glaucon employs the antithesis between nature and law and the theory of an original social contract to expound the doctrine of Thrasymachus and Callicles in the Gorgias. His statement is more systematic than theirs, but the principle is the same; for, though Callicles does not explicitly speak of a
—the nature and origin of justice. By nature, they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good in doing wrong. So that when men do wrong and are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack the power to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for their profit to make a compact with one another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice; and that this is the beginning of legislation and of covenants between men, and that they name the commandment of the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and essential nature of justice—a compromise between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent to get one's revenge. Justice, they tell us, being mid-way between the two, is accepted and approved, not as a real good, but as a thing honoured in the lack of vigour to do injustice, since anyone who had the power to do it and was in reality 'a man' would never make a compact with anybody neither to wrong nor to be wronged; for he would be mad. The nature, then, of justice is this and such as this, Socrates, and such are the conditions in which it originates, according to the theory.

III. "But as for the second point, that those who practise it do so unwillingly and from want of power to commit injustice—we shall be most likely to apprehend that if we entertain some such supposition as social contract, he implies that conventional justice is an agreement of the weak devised to hold the strong in awe (Gorg. 492 c), and Glaucon here affirms that no really strong man would enter into any such agreement. The social contract without the immoral application is also suggested in Protag. 322 b. Cf. also Crito 50 c, f.
C dōntes ἐξουσίαν ἐκατέρω ποιεῖν ὧ τι ἂν βούληται, 
tῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἄδικῳ, εἰτ᾿ ἐπακολουθήσα-
μεν θεώμενοι, ποί ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐκατέρων ἄζει. ἐπ’
ἀυτοφόρῳ οὖν λάβομεν ἃν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἄδικῳ
εἰς ταύτων ἴδοντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πᾶσα φύσις
διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βία παρ-
ἀγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἰσον τιμῆν. εἰ ὃ ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία
ἡν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἶαν

D ποτὲ φασὶ δύναμιν τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνω
γενέσθαι. εἰναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα θητεύοντα
παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὄμβρου δὲ πολλοῦ
γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ ῥαγήναι τῇ γῆς καὶ
gενέσθαι χάριμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἢ ἐνεμεν· ἴδοντα
dὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβήναι, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε
τῇ μυθολογοῦσι θαυμαστά καὶ ἵππων χαλκοῦν
κοίλον, θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθ’ ἀς ἐγκύψαντα ἰδεῖν
ἐνόντα νεκρόν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι, μείζω ἡ κατ’

Ε ἄνθρωπον, τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, 1 περὶ δὲ τῇ
χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον, ὃν περιελόμενον ἐκβηναι.
συλλόγον δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος,
ἵν’ ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μῆνα 1 τῷ βασιλεὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ

1 ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν Α; the translation tries to preserve
the idiomatic ambiguity of the text: ἔχειν οὐδέν of II would
explicitly affirm the nakedness of the corpse.

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* The antithesis of φύσις and νόμος, nature and law, custom
or convention, is a commonplace of both Greek rhetoric and
Greek ethics. Cf. the Chicago Dissertation of John Walter
Beardslee, *The Use of φύσις in Fifth Century Greek Liter-
ature*, ch. x. p. 68. Cf. Herod. iii. 38, Pindar, quoted by
Plato, Gorg. 484 b, Laws 690 b. 715 A; Euripides or Critias,
337 d, Gorg. 483 ε, Laws 889 c and 890 d. It was misused
by ancient as it is by modern radicals. Cf. my interpretation
of the Timaeus, *A.J.P.* vol. ix. p. 405. The ingenuity of

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this in thought: if we grant to each, the just and the unjust, licence and power to do whatever he pleases, and then accompany them in imagination and see whither his desire will conduct each. We should then catch the just man in the very act of resorting to the same conduct as the unjust man because of the self-advantage which every creature by its nature pursues as a good, while by the convention of law it is forcibly diverted to paying honour to ‘equality.’

The licence that I mean would be most nearly such as would result from supposing them to have the power which men say once came to the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian. They relate that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler at that time of Lydia, and that after a great deluge of rain and an earthquake the ground opened and a chasm appeared in the place where he was pasturing; and they say that he saw and wondered and went down into the chasm; and the story goes that he beheld other marvels there and a hollow bronze horse with little doors, and that he peeped in and saw a corpse within, as it seemed, of more than mortal stature, and that there was nothing else but a gold ring on its hand, which he took off and went forth. And when the shepherds held their customary assembly to make their monthly report to the king about the

modern philologians has tried to classify the Greek sophists as distinctly partisans of νόμος or φύσις. It cannot be done. Cf. my unsigned review of Alfred Benn in the New York Nation, July 20, 1899, p. 57.

Cf. Gorg. 508 a.

So manuscripts and Proclus. There are many emendations which the curious will find in Adam’s first appendix to this book. Herod. i. 8-13 tells a similar but not identical story of Gyges himself, in which the magic ring and many other points of Plato’s tale are lacking. On the whole legend cf. the study of Kirby Flower Smith, A.J.P. vol. xxiii. pp. 261-282, 361-387, and Frazer’s Paus. iii. p. 417.
ποίμνια, ἀφικέσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτυλιόν. καθήμενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεὶν τῆν σφενδόνην τοῦ δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἐαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἰσω τῆς χειρός· τούτου δὲ γενομένου 360 ἀφανῇ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου. καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιμηλαφώντα τὸν δακτυλίον στρέφαι ἐξω τῆν σφενδόνην, καὶ στρέφαντα βανερὸν γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτο ἐννοήσαντα ἀποπειρᾶσθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου, εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τῇ δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῷ οὖτω ἐξυμβάινειν, στρέφοντι μὲν εἰσω τῇ σφενδόνῃ ἅδηλω γίγνεσθαι, ἐξω δὲ δήλω. αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθὺς διαπράξασθαι τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα: ἐλθόντα δὲ καὶ τῇ γυναικῇ αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσαντα, μετ’ ἐκείνης ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ κατασχεῖν. εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίῳ γενοίσθην, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειαν, οὖτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἀπτεσθαί, ἐξὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀδεῷς ὁ τι βούλοιτο λαμ- 

C βάνειν, καὶ εἰσίοντι εἰς τὰς ὀἰκίας συγγίγνεσθαι ὁτῳ βούλοιτο, καὶ ἀποκτινύναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λύειν οὔστινας βούλοιτο, καὶ τὰλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἵσολεον ὁντα. οὖτω δὲ δρᾶν οὔδεν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιοῖ, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ ταύτῶν ἱσον ἀμφότεροι. καίτοι μέγα τούτῳ τεκμηρίων ἂν

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*Mr. H. G. Wells’ The Invisible Man rests on a similar fancy. Cf. also the lawless fancies of Aristoph. Birds 785 ff.*

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flocks, he also attended wearing the ring. So as he sat there it chanced that he turned the collet of the ring towards himself, towards the inner part of his hand, and when this took place they say that he became invisible to those who sat by him and they spoke of him as absent; and that he was amazed, and again fumbling with the ring turned the collet outwards and so became visible. On noting this he experimented with the ring to see if it possessed this virtue, and he found the result to be that when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, and when outwards visible; and becoming aware of this, he immediately managed things so that he became one of the messengers who went up to the king, and on coming there he seduced the king's wife and with her aid set upon the king and slew him and possessed his kingdom. If now there should be two such rings, and the just man should put on one and the unjust the other, no one could be found, it would seem, of such adamantine temper as to persevere in justice and endure to refrain his hands from the possessions of others and not touch them, though he might with impunity take what he wished even from the marketplace, and enter into houses and lie with whom he pleased, and slay and loose from bonds whomsoever he would, and in all other things conduct himself among mankind as the equal of a god. And in so acting he would do no differently from the other man, but both would pursue the same course. And yet

*b The word is used of the firmness of moral faith in Gorg. 509 A and Rep. 618 E.

*c ἱσάθεος. The word is a leit-motif anticipating Plato's rebuke of the tragedians for their praises of the tyrant. Cf. infra 568 A-B. It does not, as Adam suggests, foreshadow Plato's attack on the popular theology.
PLATO

φαίη τις, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐκών δίκαιος ἄλλ’ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδία ὄντος, ἐπεὶ ὅποις γ’ ἄν οὕτως ἐκαστὸς οἶδος τε ἐσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν.

Δ λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ οἶεται πάς ἀνήρ πολὺ μάλλον ἰδία τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ οὐκέμενος, ὡς φησεὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτον λόγου λέγων· ἐπεὶ εἶ τις τουαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος μηδὲν ποτε ἐθέλοι ἀδικήσαι μηδὲ ἁμαίτω τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀθλιώτατος μὲν ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητότατος, ἔπαινοιεν δὲ ἂν αὐτὸν ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατῶντες ἄλληλους διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικείσθαι φόβον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτως.

Ε ΙV. Τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου πέρι ἄν λέγομεν, εἰδὶ διαστησώμεθα τὸν τε δικαιῶτατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικῶτατον, οἷοι τ’ ἐσόμεθα κρίναι ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ μὴν, οὐ. τίς οὖν δὴ ἢ διάστασις; ἢδὲ μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδικοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄδικιας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἐκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιτίθενμα τιθῶμεν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὁ ἀδικος ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιεῖτω· οἴον κυβερνήτης ἄκρος ἢ ἱατρὸς τὰ τε ἀδύνατα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ διαυσάνεται. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ δὲ εἰ, ἐτι δὲ ἐὰν ἄρα τῇ σφαλῇ, ἵκανος ἑπαναρθοῦσας· οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀδικος ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀδικήμασι λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἀδικος εἶναι· τὸν

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a Cf. supra 344 a, Gorg. 492 b.
b αἰσθανομένοις suggests men of discernment who are not taken in by phrases, "the knowing ones." Cf. Protag. 317 a, and Aristoph. Clouds 1241 τοῖς εἴδοσιν.
c Cf. Gorg. 483 b, 492 a, Protag. 327 b, Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23.
d Cf. infra 580 b-c, Phileb. 27 c.
this is a great proof, one might argue, that no one is just of his own will but only from constraint, in the belief that justice is not his personal good, inasmuch as every man, when he supposes himself to have the power to do wrong, does wrong. For that there is far more profit for him personally in injustice than in justice is what every man believes, and believes truly, as the proponent of this theory will maintain. For if anyone who had got such a licence within his grasp should refuse to do any wrong or lay his hands on others' possessions, he would be regarded as most pitiable a and a great fool by all who took note of it, though they would praise him c before one another's faces, deceiving one another because of their fear of suffering injustice. So much for this point.

IV. "But to come now to the decision d between our two kinds of life, if we separate the most completely just and the most completely unjust man, we shall be able to decide rightly, but if not, not. How, then, is this separation to be made? Thus: we must subtract nothing of his injustice from the unjust man or of his justice from the just, but assume the perfection of each in his own mode of conduct. In the first place, the unjust man must act as clever craftsmen do: a first-rate pilot or physician, for example, feels the difference between impossibilities e and possibilities in his art and attempts the one and lets the others go; and then, too, if he does happen to trip, he is equal to correcting his error. Similarly, the unjust man who attempts injustice rightly must be supposed to escape detection if he is to be altogether unjust, and we must regard the man who is

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a Cf. Quint. iv. 5. 17 "recte enim Graeci praecepient non tentanda quae effici omnino non possint."
a Cf. Emerson, Eloquence: "Yet any swindlers we have known are novices and bunglers. . . . A greater power of face would accomplish anything and with the rest of the takings take away the bad name."

caught as a bungler.\textsuperscript{a} For the height of injustice\textsuperscript{b} is to seem just without being so. To the perfectly unjust man, then, we must assign perfect injustice and withhold nothing of it, but we must allow him, while committing the greatest wrongs, to have secured for himself the greatest reputation for justice; and if he does happen to trip,\textsuperscript{c} we must concede to him the power to correct his mistakes by his ability to speak persuasively, if any of his misdeeds come to light, and when force is needed, to employ force by reason of his manly spirit and vigour and his provision of friends and money; and when we have set up an unjust man of this character, our theory must set the just man at his side—a simple and noble man, who, in the phrase of Aeschylus, does not wish to seem but be good. Then we must deprive him of the seeming.\textsuperscript{d} For if he is going to be thought just he will have honours and gifts because of that esteem. We cannot be sure in that case whether he is just for justice’ sake or for the sake of the gifts and the honours. So we must strip him bare of everything but justice and make his state the opposite of his imagined counterpart.\textsuperscript{e} Though doing no wrong he must have the repute of the greatest injustice, so that he may be put to the test as regards justice through not softening because of ill repute and the consequences thereof. But let him hold on his course unchangeable even unto death, seeming all his life to be unjust though being just, that so, both men attaining to the limit, the one of injustice,

\textsuperscript{a} Cf. Thucyd. viii. 24 on the miscalculation of the shrewd Chians.

\textsuperscript{b} As Aristotle sententiously says, ὃς δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν δ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἔλοιπο (Rhet. 1365 b 1, Topics iii. 3. 14).

\textsuperscript{c} For the thought cf. Eurip. Hel. 270–271.
δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας, κρίνωνται ὅπότερος αὐτῶν εὐθαμονέστερος.

V. Βαβαί, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὥς φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένως ἐκάτερον ὁσπέρ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖς ἀνδροῖς. 'Ὡς μάλιστ', ἔφη, δύναμαι. ὅρων δὲ τοιούτων, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγὼ-μαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, οἷος ἐκάτερον Ἑβίος ἐπιμένει. λεκτέον οὖν καὶ δὴ κἂν ἀγροι-κοτέρως λέγηται, μὴ ἐμὲ οἶον λέγειν, ὥς Σώ-κρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν. ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὔτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, 362 ἐκκαθαίρησεται τῷ φθαλμῷ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθῶν ἀνασχινδυνεθήσεται, καὶ γνώσεται, ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν· τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰαχύλου πολὺ ἢν ἅρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου. τῷ ὅτι γὰρ φήσοι τὸν ἀδίκον, ἢτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πράγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῴην, οὐ δοκεῖν ἀδίκον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλεων,

βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενον,

B εξ ἂν τὰ κεῖνα βλαστάνει βουλεύματα,

πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίων εἶναι, ἐπείτα γαμεῖν ὅποθεν ἂν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὐς ἂν βούληται, ἤμβαλλειν, κοινοῦν εἰς ἂν ἐθέλη, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὤφελεσθαι κερδαίνοντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· εἰς

a Cf. infra 540 c.
b Cf. infra 613 e, Gorg. 486 c, 509 a, Apol. 32 d. The Greeks were sensitive to rude or boastful speech.
c Or strictly "‘impaled." Cf. Cic. De Rép. iii. 27. Writers on Plato and Christianity have often compared the fate of Plato’s just man with the Crucifixion.

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the other of justice, we may pass judgement which of the two is the happier."

V. "Bless me, my dear Glaucon," said I, "how strenuously you polish off each of your two men for the competition for the prize as if it were a statue!" "To the best of my ability," he replied, "and if such is the nature of the two, it becomes an easy matter, I fancy, to unfold the tale of the sort of life that awaits each. We must tell it, then; and even if my language is somewhat rude and brutal, you must not suppose, Socrates, that it is I who speak thus, but those who commend injustice above justice. What they will say is this: that such being his disposition the just man will have to endure the lash, the rack, chains, the branding-iron in his eyes, and finally, after every extremity of suffering, he will be crucified, and so will learn his lesson that not to be but to seem just is what we ought to desire. And the saying of Aeschylus was, it seems, far more correctly applicable to the unjust man. For it is literally true, they will say, that the unjust man, as pursuing what clings closely to reality, to truth, and not regulating his life by opinion, desires not to seem but to be unjust,

Exploiting the deep furrows of his wit
From which there grows the fruit of counsels shrewd,
first office and rule in the state because of his reputation for justice, then a wife from any family he chooses, and the giving of his children in marriage to whomsoever he pleases, dealings and partnerships with whom he will, and in all these transactions advantage and profit for himself because he has no squeamishness about committing injustice; and so

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4 Septem 592-594.
άγώνας τοίνυν ἵντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλούτειν καὶ τοὺς τε φίλους εὗ
C ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, καὶ θεοὶς θυσίας καὶ ἀναθήματα ἰκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολύ ἄμεινοι τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπων οὐς ἄν βούληται, ὡστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἦ τὸν δίκαιον. οὕτω φασίν, ὡ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἄνθρωπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τῶν βίων ἄμεινον ἦ τῷ δικαίῳ.

VI. Ταύτ' εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος, ἐγὼ μὲν
D ἐν νῷ εἰχόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ταύτα, ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, Οὐ τί που οἴει, ἐφή, ὡ Σώκρατες, ἰκανῶς εἰρήσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου; Ἀλλὰ τί μή; εἶπον. Αὐτὸ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὔκ εἰρήσθη ὁ μάλιστα ἐδει ῥηθήναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἄνδρι παρείη· ὡστε καὶ σύ, εἴ τι οἶδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμμυνε. καίτοι ἐμέ γε ικανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ῥηθέντα καταπαλαῖσαι καὶ
Ε ἀδύνατον τοιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη. καὶ ὅς, Οὐδὲν, ἐφή, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἐτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε· δεὶ γὰρ διελθέων ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους ὅν οἴδε εἴπεν, οἱ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπιμνηθοῦν, ἀδικίαν δὲ ψέγουσι, ἣν ἡ σαφεστέρον ὁ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι Γλαύκων. λέγουσι δὲ που καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέρες τε νιέσι καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι,

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*a Cf. supra on 343 d, 349 b.  
*b Cf. supra 333 d.  
*c μεγαλοπρεπῶς. Usually a word of ironical connotation in Plato.  
*d Cf. Euthyphro 12 eff. and supra 331 b, θεῷ θυσίας, where
they say that if he enters into lawsuits, public or private, he wins and gets the better of his opponents, and, getting the better, is rich and benefits his friends and harms his enemies; and he performs sacrifices and dedicates votive offerings to the gods adequately and magnificently, and he serves and pays court to men whom he favors and to the gods far better than the just man, so that he may reasonably expect the favour of heaven also to fall rather to him than to the just. So much better they say, Socrates, is the life that is prepared for the unjust man from gods and men than that which awaits the just.”

VI. When Glaucon had thus spoken, I had a mind to make some reply thereto, but his brother Adeimantus said, “You surely don’t suppose, Socrates, that the statement of the case is complete?” “Why, what else?” I said. “The very most essential point,” said he, “has not been mentioned.” “Then,” said I, “as the proverb has it, ‘Let a brother help a man’ — and so, if Glaucon omits any word or deed, do you come to his aid. Though for my part what he has already said is quite enough to overthrow me and incapacitate me for coming to the rescue of justice.” “Nonsense,” he said, “but listen to this further point. We must set forth the reasoning and the language of the opposite party, of those who commend justice and dispraise injustice, if what I conceive to be Glaucon’s meaning is to be made more clear. Fathers, when they address exhortations to their sons, and all the respectable morality of the good Cephalus is virtually identical with this commercial view of religion.

*Cf. supra 352 b and 613 a-b.*

*ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρεῖη. The rhythm perhaps indicates a proverb of which the scholiast found the source in Odyssey xvi. 97.*
363 ὃς χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπι- 
ανοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ἵνα 
δοκοῦντι δικαίω εἶναι γίγνηται ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης 
ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμου καὶ ὅσαπερ Γλαύκων διήλθεν 
ἀρτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ ἄδικῳ. ἐπὶ 
πλέον δὲ οὕτω τὰ τῶν δοξῶν λέγουσι τὰς γὰρ 
παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις ἐμβάλλοντες ἄφθονα 
ἔχονσι λέγειν ἁγαθά, τοῖς οὖσιν ἃ φασι θεοὺς 
διδόναι, ὦσπερ ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδος τε καὶ Ὁμή 
Βρόσ φασιν, δὲ μὲν τὰς δρῶς τοῖς δικαίοις τοὺς θεοὺς 
ποιεῖν 

άκρας μὲν τε φέρειν βαλάνους, μέσος δὲ μελίσσας 
eἰροπόκοι δ’ ὀιεῖ, φησίν, μαλλοῦς καταβεβρίθασι, 
καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἁγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα· παρα- 
πλήσια δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐτερος· ὦστε τεν γάρ φησιν 

ἡ βασιλῆς ἀμύμωνος, ὅστε θεουδής 
eὐδικίας ἀνέχῃς, φέρησθι δὲ γαία μέλανα 

C 
πυρῶς καὶ κριθᾶς, βρίθησθι δὲ δένδρα καρπῶ, 
tίκτη δ’ ἐμπεδᾶ μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχῃ ἱχθὺς. 
Μουσαῖος δὲ τούτων νεανικώτερα τάγαθα καὶ ὁ 

1 ἄδικῳ recent mss.; cf. 362 B: the δίκαλψ of Α and Ρ can 
be defended.

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a Who, in Quaker language, have a concern for, who 
have charge of souls. Cf. the admonitions of the father 
of Horace, Sat. i. 4. 105 ff., Protag. 325 ν, Xen. Cyr. i. 
5. 9, Isoc. iii. 2, Terence, Adelphi 414 f., Schmidt, Ethik 
der Griechen, i. p. 187, and the letters of Lord Chesterfield 
passim, as well as Plato himself, Laws 662 ε.

b Hesiod, Works and Days 232 f., Homer, Od. xix. 109 ff.

c Cf. Kern, Orphicorum Fragmenta, iv. p. 83. The son is 
possibly Eumolpus.

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those who have others in their charge, urge the necessity of being just, not by praising justice itself, but the good repute with mankind that accrues from it, the object that they hold before us being that by seeming to be just the man may get from the reputation office and alliances and all the good things that Glaucón just now enumerated as coming to the unjust man from his good name. But those people draw out still further this topic of reputation. For, throwing in good standing with the gods, they have no lack of blessings to describe, which they affirm the gods give to pious men, even as the worthy Hesiod and Homer declare, the one that the gods make the oaks bear for the just:

Acorns on topmost branches and swarms of bees on their mid-trunks,
and he tells how the
Flocks of the fleece-bearing sheep are laden and weighted with soft wool,
and of many other blessings akin to these; and similarly the other poet:

Even as when a good king, who rules in the fear of the high gods,
Upholds justice and right, and the black earth yields him her foison,
Barley and wheat, and his trees are laden and weighted with fair fruits,
Increase comes to his flocks and the ocean is teeming with fishes.

And Musaeus and his son have a more excellent

d For the thought of the following cf. Emerson, Compensation: "He (the preacher) assumed that judgement is not executed in this world; that the wicked are successful; that the good are miserable; and then urged from reason and scripture a compensation to be made to both parties in the next life. No offence appeared to be taken by the congregation at this doctrine."
νίδος αὐτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν διδόσαι τοῖς δικαίοις: εἰς Ἄιδου γὰρ ἀγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατακλίναντες καὶ συμπόσιον τῶν ὀσίων κατασκευάσαντες ἐστε-

D φανωμένους ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄπαντα χρόνον ἢ διάγειν μεθύοντας, ἡγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετὴς μισθὸν μέθην αἰώνιον· οἱ δ' ἔτι τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσι μισθοὺς παρὰ θεῶν· παίδας γὰρ παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ εὐφρόκιον. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐγκωμιάζουσι δικαιοσύνην· τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους αὖ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν τίνα κατορύπτουσι ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὅπως ἀναγκάζοντι φέρειν, ἐτι Ἐ τε ζώντας εἰς κακὰς δόξας ἄγοντες, ἀπερ Γλαύκων περὶ τῶν δικαίων δοξαζομένων δὲ ἀδίκων διηλθε τιμωρήματα, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων λέγουσιν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἔπαινος καὶ ὁ ψόγος οὔτος ἐκατέρων.

VII. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκέψαι, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἄλλο αὖ εἰδὸς λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας 364 ἰδία τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἐνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν, ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφρο-
σύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξῃ δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἱ-
σχρόν. λυσιτελέστερα δὲ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἀδικα

1 ἀποτείνουσιν ΑΠΕ: ἀποτίνουσιν q.

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a νεανικώτερα is in Plato often humorous and depreciative. Cf. infra 563 e νεανική.

b συμπόσιον τῶν ὀσίων. Jowett’s notion that this is a jingle is due to the English pronunciation of Greek.

c Kern, ibid., quotes Servius ad Virgil, Aen. iii. 98 “et nati

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song<sup>a</sup> than these of the blessings that the gods bestow on the righteous. For they conduct them to the house of Hades in their tale and arrange a symposium of the saints,<sup>b</sup> where, reclined on couches and crowned with wreaths, they entertain the time henceforth with wine, as if the fairest meed of virtue were an everlasting drunk. And others extend still further the rewards of virtue from the gods. For they say that the children's children<sup>c</sup> of the pious and oath-keeping man and his race thereafter never fail. Such and such-like are their praises of justice. But the impious and the unjust they bury in mud<sup>d</sup> in the house of Hades and compel them to fetch water in a sieve,<sup>e</sup> and, while they still live, they bring them into evil repute, and all the sufferings that Glaucon enumerated as befalling just men who are thought to be unjust, these they recite about the unjust, but they have nothing else to say.† Such is the praise and the censure of the just and of the unjust.

VII. "Consider further, Socrates, another kind of language about justice and injustice employed by both laymen and poets. All with one accord reiterate that soberness and righteousness are fair and honourable, to be sure, but unpleasant and laborious, while licentiousness and injustice are pleasant and easy to win and are only in opinion and by convention disgraceful. They say that injustice pays better than justice, natorum" and opines that Homer took II. xx. 308 from Orpheus.

<sup>a</sup>Cf. Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. i. pp. 56-57, infra 533 D, Phaedo 69 c, commentators on Aristoph. Frogs 146.
<sup>b</sup>Cf. my note on Horace, Odes iii. 11. 22, and, with an allegorical application, Gorg. 493 B.
<sup>c</sup>Plato elsewhere teaches that the real punishment of sin is to be cut off from communion with the good. Theaetet. 176 D-E, Laws 725 B, infra 367 A.
The gnomic poets complain that bad men prosper for a time, but they have faith in the late punishment of the wicked and the final triumph of justice.

There is a striking analogy between Plato's language here and the description by Protestant historians of the sale of indulgences by Tetzel in Germany. Rich men's doors is proverbial. Cf. 489 b.

Cf. Mill, "Utility of Religion," Three Essays on Religion, p. 90: "All positive religions aid this self-delusion. Bad religions teach that divine vengeance may be bought off by 
for the most part, and they do not scruple to felicitate bad men who are rich or have other kinds of power and to do them honour in public and private, and to dishonour and disregard those who are in any way weak or poor, even while admitting that they are better men than the others. But the strangest of all these speeches are the things they say about the gods and virtue, how so it is that the gods themselves assign to many good men misfortunes and an evil life, but to their opposites a contrary lot; and begging priests and soothsayers go to rich men's doors and make them believe that they by means of sacrifices and incantations have accumulated a treasure of power from the gods that can expiate and cure with pleasurable festivals any misdeed of a man or his ancestors, and that if a man wishes to harm an enemy, at slight cost he will be enabled to injure just and unjust alike, since they are masters of spells and enchantments that constrain the gods to serve their end. And for all these sayings they cite the poets as witnesses, with regard to the ease and plentifulness of vice, quoting:

Evil-doing in plenty a man shall find for the seeking;
Smooth is the way and it lies near at hand and is easy to enter;
But on the pathway of virtue the gods put sweat from the first step,
and a certain long and uphill road. And others cite offerings or personal abasement." Plato, Laws 885 d, anticipates Mill. With the whole passage compare the scenes at the founding of Cloudcuckootown, Aristoph. Birds 960-990, and more seriously the mediaeval doctrine of the "treasure of the church" and the Hindu tapas.

In Laws 933 d both are used of the victim with ἐπινόης, which primarily applies to the god. Cf. Lucan, Phars. vi. 492 and 527.

* Hesiod, Works and Days 287-289.
θεῶν ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὀμηρον μαρτύροντα, ὅτι καὶ ἐκεῖνος εἶπε

λιστοὶ δὲ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοὶ,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαις καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἄγαναίσων

Ε λοβῆ τε κυνῆ τε παρατρωπῶσ’ ἀνθρωποι
λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβῆ καὶ ἀμάρτη.

βιβλίων δὲ ὁμαδὸν παρέχονται Μουσαίοι καὶ Ὀρφεῖς, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων, ὡς φασί, καθ’ ὅς θυγγυλοῦσι, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ἰδίωτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσίων καὶ παιδιὰς ἥδων ἐποίη 365 μὲν ἐτὶ ξόσων, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ὡς δὴ τελετάς καλοῦσιν, αἱ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἠμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δενὰ περιμένει.

VIII. Ταῦτα πάντα, ἐφή, ὥς φίλε Σώκρατες,
τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἄρετής πέρι καὶ
κακίας, ὡς ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα ἀκοουόμεθα νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὃτι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἴκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συνλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν,

Β ποιὸς τις ἂν ὡν καὶ πῇ πορευθεῖς τὸν βίον ὡς ἀριστα διέλθει; λέγοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων πρὸς αὐτὸν κατὰ Πύνδαρον ἐκεῖνο τὸ

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*a Iliad, ix. 497 ff. adapted.
*b ὁμαδὸν, lit. noise, hubbub, babel, here contemptuous.
*c Cf. Laws 819 b.
*d Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 25: “His (Plato’s) imagination was beset by the picture of some brilliant young
Homer as a witness to the beguiling of gods by men, since he too said:

The gods themselves are moved by prayers,
And men by sacrifice and soothing vows,
And incense and libation turn their wills
Praying, whene'er they have sinned and made transgression.

And they produce a bushel of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and of the Muses, as they affirm, and these books they use in their ritual, and make not only ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice, by means of sacrifice and pleasant sport for the living, and that there are also special rites for the defunct, which they call functions, that deliver us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice.

VIII. "What, Socrates, do we suppose is the effect of all such sayings about the esteem in which men and gods hold virtue and vice upon the souls that hear them, the souls of young men who are quick-witted and capable of flitting, as it were, from one expression of opinion to another and inferring from them all the character and the path whereby a man would lead the best life? Such a youth would most likely put to himself the question Pindar asks, 'Is it by Alcibiades standing at the crossways of life and debating in his mind whether his best chance of happiness lay in accepting the conventional moral law that serves to police the vulgar or in giving rein to the instincts and appetites of his own stronger nature. To confute the one, to convince the other, became to him the main problem of moral philosophy.' Cf. Introd. x-xi; also "The Idea of Good in Plato's Republic," p. 214.
πότερον δίκα τείχος ύψιν
ἡ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις

ἀναβᾶς καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ: τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δικαίω μὲν ὄντι μου, ἕάν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ, ὁφελος οὐδὲν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζημίας φανερὰς· ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρασκευασμένης θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται. οὐκοῦν,

C ἐπειδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοὶ, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιάται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον ὅλως· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἄρετῆς περιγραπτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἐλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ βάδιον ἂεὶ λανθάνων κακὸν ὄντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπέτεις,

D φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων· ἀλλ' ὁμος, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτην ἵτεον, ὡς τὰ ἰχνὶ τῶν λόγων φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνεων ἠνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἐταπειείας συνάξομεν, εἰς τε πείθοις διδάσκαλοι σοφίαν δημηγορικὴν τε καὶ δικαίκην διδόντες, ἔξ οὖν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτούντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὐτε λανθάνεων οὐτε βιάσασθαι δυνατὸν. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσών ἡ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀν-

1 ἕαν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ] cf. Introd. xlix. ἕαν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ would, unless we assume careless displacement of the καί, mean "if I also seem not to be (just)."

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a φανερὰ ζημία is familiar and slightly humorous. Cf. Starkie on Aristoph. Acharn. 737.

b Simonides, Fr. 76 Bergk, and Eurip. Orest. 236.

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justice or by crooked deceit that I the higher tower shall scale and so live my life out in fenced and guarded security? ’ The consequences of my being just are, unless I likewise seem so, not assets, they say, but liabilities, labour and total loss; but if I am unjust and have procured myself a reputation for justice a godlike life is promised. Then since it is ‘the seeming,’ as the wise men show me, that ‘masters the reality’ and is lord of happiness, to this I must devote myself without reserve. For a front and a show I must draw about myself a shadow-outline of virtue, but trail behind me the fox of the most sage Archilochus, shifty and bent on gain. Nay, ’tis objected, it is not easy for a wrong-doer always to lie hid. Neither is any other big thing facile, we shall reply. But all the same if we expect to be happy, we must pursue the path to which the footprints of our arguments point. For with a view to lying hid we will organize societies and political clubs, and there are teachers of cajolery who impart the arts of the popular assembly and the court-room. So that, partly by persuasion, partly by force, we shall contrive to overreach with impunity. But against the gods, it may be said, neither secrecy nor force can avail. Well, if there are no gods, or they

...
PLATO

Ε ἑρωτημένοι μέλει, οὔτ' ἡμᾶς μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν·
ei δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, οὐκ ἀλλοθέν τοι
αὐτοὺς ἵσμεν ἡ ἀκηκόαμεν ἡ ἔκ τε τῶν λόγων
καὶ τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν· οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ
οὕτω λέγουσιν, ὡς εἰσὶν οἴοι θυσίαις τε καὶ
εὐχωλαίς ἀγανήσι καὶ ἀναθήμασι παράγεσθαι
ἀναπειθόμενοι· οἷς ἡ ἀμφότερα ἡ οὐδέτερα πει-
στέον· εἰ δ' οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον

366 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων. δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες
ἀξίμιοι ὑπὸ θεῶν ἔσομεθα, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀδικίας
κέρδῃ ἀπωσόμεθα· ἀδικοὶ δὲ κερδανοῦμεν τε καὶ
λισόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες πει-
θοντες αὐτοὺς ἀξίμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ
ἐν Ἀιδοὺ δίκην δώσομεν ὃν ἃν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν,
ἡ αὐτοὶ ἡ παίδες παίδων. ἀλλ' ὁ φίλε, φήσει
λογιζόμενος, αἱ τελεταὶ αὐ ὑγα δύναται καὶ οἱ

Βλύσιοι θεοὶ, ὡς αἱ μέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ
θεῶν παίδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφήται τῶν θεῶν
gενόμενοι, οἱ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν μηνύουσιν.

IX. Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἂν
πρὸ μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἱροίμεθ' ἂν; ἢν ἐὰν μετ'
εὐσχημοσύνης κιβδήλου κτησόμεθα, καὶ παρὰ
θεοὺς καὶ παρ' ἄνθρωποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν
ζωντες τε καὶ τελευτησάντες, ὡς ο τῶν πολλῶν

1 οὔτ' q: καὶ Λ. This is the simplest and most plausible
text. For a possible defence of καὶ cf. Introd. p. xlix.
2 αὐ ὑγα δύναται: Λ omits.

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a For the thought compare Tennyson, “Lucretius”:
But he that holds
The Gods are careless, wherefore need he care
Greatly for them?

Cf. also Eurip. I.A. 1034-1035, Anth. Pal. x. 34.

b Cf. Verres’ distribution of his three years’ spoliation of
do not concern themselves with the doings of men, neither need we concern ourselves with eluding their observation. If they do exist and pay heed, we know and hear of them only from such discourses and from the poets who have described their pedigrees. But these same authorities tell us that the gods are capable of being persuaded and swerved from their course by 'sacrifice and soothing vows' and dedications. We must believe them in both or neither. And if we are to believe them, the thing to do is to commit injustice and offer sacrifice from the fruits of our wrong-doing. For if we are just, we shall, it is true, be unscathed by the gods, but we shall be putting away from us the profits of injustice; but if we are unjust, we shall win those profits, and, by the importunity of our prayers, when we transgress and sin we shall persuade them and escape scot-free. Yes, it will be objected, but we shall be brought to judgement in the world below for our unjust deeds here, we or our children's children. 'Nay, my dear sir,' our calculating friend will say, 'here again the rites for the dead have much efficacy, and the absolving divinities, as the greatest cities declare, and the sons of gods, who became the poets and prophets of the gods, and who reveal that this is the truth.'

IX. "On what further ground, then, could we prefer justice to supreme injustice? If we combine this with a counterfeit decorum, we shall prosper to our heart's desire, with gods and men, in life and death, as the words of the multitude and of men of the highest Sicily, Cic. In C. Verrem actio prima 14 (40), and Plato, Laws 906 c-d, Lysias xxvii. 6.

His morality is the hedonistic calculus of the Protagoras or the commercial religion of "other-worldliness."

For these τελεταλ cf. 365 Α. Or rather "mouthpieces."
χρημάτων ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελάν ἐπαινομένης ἀκούοντα; ὡς δὴ τοι εἴ τις ἔχει ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφήμαι ὧ εἰρήκαμεν, ἰκανῶς δὲ ἔγνωκεν ὦτι ἀριστον δικαιοσύνη, πολλὴν ποι ὑπὸ συγγνώμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὄργιζεται τοῖς ἀδίκοις, ἀλλ' οἴδεν, ὅτι πλὴν εἴ τις θείᾳ φύσει δυσχεραίνω τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβών ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ,

D τῶν γε ἀλλων οὐδὲς ἐκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας ἡ γῆρως ἡ τινος ἀλλής ἀσθενείας ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ὡς δὲ, δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν πρῶτος ἀδικεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἶδος τῇ ἢ. καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτῶν ἢ ἐκεῖνο, θθενπέρ ἄπασι δ' τὸν λόγον οὕτως ὤρμησε καὶ τώδε καὶ ἐμι πρὸς σέ, ὦ Σώκρατε, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι, ὦ θαυμάσει, Επάντων ἡμῶν, οὓς ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ἀπὸ τῶν εἴς ἄρχης ἡρώων ἀρξάμενοι, ὡς ὁ λόγοι λειεμμένοι, μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔστηξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπήμεσέ δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰς ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμᾶς καὶ δωρεάς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένας· αὐτὸ δ' ἐκάτερον τῇ αὐτοῦ δύναμεν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνὸν καὶ λανθάνον θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐδεὶς πώποτε ὤτ' ἐν ποιήσει ὤτ' ἐν ὅδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξήλθεν ἰκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς τὸ μὲν μέγιστον κακῶν ὁσα ἵσχε ψυχῇ ἐν αὐτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ 367 μέγιστον ἀγαθόν. εἴ γὰρ οὔτως ἐλέγετο εἴς ἄρχης

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a Aristoph. Clouds 1241.  b Cf. Gorg. 492 A.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

authority declare. In consequence, then, of all that has been said, what possibility is there, Socrates, that any man who has the power of any resources of mind, money, body, or family should consent to honour justice and not rather laugh when he hears her praised? In sooth, if anyone is able to show the falsity of these arguments, and has come to know with sufficient assurance that justice is best, he feels much indulgence for the unjust, and is not angry with them, but is aware that except a man by inborn divinity of his nature disdains injustice, or, having won to knowledge, refrains from it, no one else is willingly just, but that it is from lack of manly spirit or from old age or some other weakness that men dispraise injustice, lacking the power to practise it. The fact is patent. For no sooner does such an one come into the power than he works injustice to the extent of his ability. And the sole cause of all this is the fact that was the starting-point of this entire plea of my friend here and of myself to you, Socrates, pointing out how strange it is that of all you self-styled advocates of justice, from the heroes of old whose discourses survive to the men of the present day, not one has ever censured injustice or commended justice otherwise than in respect of the repute, the honours, and the gifts that accrue from each. But what each one of them is in itself, by its own inherent force, when it is within the soul of the possessor and escapes the eyes of both gods and men, no one has ever adequately set forth in poetry or prose—the proof that the one is the greatest of all evils that the soul contains within itself, while justice is the greatest good. For if you had all spoken in this way from the beginning and from our youth up
υπὸ πάντων ύμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπείθετε, οὐκ ἄν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἢν ἐκαστὸς ἄριστος φύλαξ, δεδώσ μὴ ἄδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῶν ξύνοικος ἢ. ταῦτα, ὦ Σῶ-κρατές, ἰσως δὲ καὶ ἐτι τούτων πλείω Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ ἄλλος ποὺ τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄδικιας λέγοιεν ἃν, μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν, φορτικῶς, ὣς γέ μοι δοκεῖ· ἀλλ’ ἐγώ, B οὐδὲν γάρ σε δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκοῦσαι τάναντία, ὅσ δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. μὴ οὖν ἦμιν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἄδικιας κρείττον, ἄλλα τί ποιοῦσα ἐκατέρωθεν τῷ ἔχοντα αὐτῇ δι’ αὐτήν ἢ μὲν κακῶν, ἢ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ· τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαίρει, ὥσπερ Γλαύκων διεκελεύσατο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἐκατέρωθεν ταῖς ἀληθείσι, τὰς δὲ ἑυνείς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε, ἄλλα τὸ δοκεῖν, C οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικον εἰναι ψέγειν, ἄλλα τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι ἄδικον ὅντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασύμαχον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄλλοτριον ἀγαθόν, ἐξυμβέρον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὐτῷ μὲν ἐξυμβέρον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἤττοι ἀξύμφορον. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὠμολογήσας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἰναι δικαιοσύνην, αἱ τῶν τε ἄποβανώντων ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἑνεκα ἀξία κεκτήσαται, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, οἰον ὅραν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ D ύμαίνεις δή, καὶ ὅσ’ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γόνυμα τῇ αὐ-τῶν φύσει ἄλλ’ οὐ δόξη ἐστὶ, τούτ’ οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαινεσθαι δικαιοσύνης, ὅ αὐτῇ δι’ αὐτήν τὸν

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a Cf. supra 363 e.  
b Cf. supra 343 c.  
Adam’s note on γόνυμα: i.q. γνήσια is, I think, wrong.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK II

had sought to convince us, we should not now be guarding against one another's injustice, but each would be his own best guardian, for fear lest by working injustice he should dwell in communion with the greatest of evils. This, Socrates, and perhaps even more than this, Thrasyvymachus and haply another might say in pleas for and against justice and injustice, inverting their true potencies, as I believe, grossly. But I—for I have no reason to hide anything from you—am laying myself out to the utmost on the theory, because I wish to hear its refutation from you. Do not merely show us by argument that justice is superior to injustice, but make clear to us what each in and of itself does to its possessor, whereby the one is evil and the other good. But do away with the repute of both, as Glaucon urged. For, unless you take away from either the true repute and attach to each the false, we shall say that it is not justice that you are praising but the semblance, nor injustice that you censure, but the seeming, and that you really are exhorting us to be unjust but conceal it, and that you are at one with Thrasyvymachus in the opinion that justice is the other man's good, the advantage of the stronger, and that injustice is advantageous and profitable to oneself but disadvantageous to the inferior. Since, then, you have admitted that justice belongs to the class of those highest goods which are desirable both for their consequences and still more for their own sake, as sight, hearing, intelligence, yes and health too, and all other goods that are productive by their very nature and not by opinion, this is what I would have you praise about justice—the benefit which it and the harm which
ἐξοντα ὀνύνησι καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει· μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν. ὥς ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀνασχοίμην ἄν οὔτως ἐπαινοῦντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἰσεγόντων ἀδικίαιν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιπορούντων, οὐδὲ οὐκ ἂν, εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύοις, διότι ἔπαντα τὸν βίον οὐδεὶς ἀλλὸ σκοπῶν διελήλυθας ἡ τοῦτο. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῶν λόγων, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἐξοντα αὐτῇ δι' αὐτῆν, εάν τε λανθάνῃ εάν τε μὴ θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἥ μὲν ἀγαθὸν, ἥ δὲ κακὸν ἕστων.

Χ. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας αἰ ἡ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδεμάντου ἡγάμην, ἀτὰρ 368 οὖν καὶ τότε πάνω γε ἡσθην καὶ εἶπον. Οὐ κακῶς εἰς ύμᾶς, ὦ παίδες ἐκεῖνος τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἁρχὴν τῶν ἐλεγείων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμήσαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην, εἰπὼν·

παίδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θείον γένος ἀνδρός.

τοῦτο μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὖ δοκεῖ ἐξειν· πάνω γὰρ θείον πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαιν δικαιοσύνης ἀμείνοι εἰναι, οὔτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. Β δοκεῖτε δὴ μοι ὡς ἀλήθως οὐ πεπείσθαι. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ύμετέρου τρόπου,

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* Cf. infra 506 c.
* Cf. my note in Class. Phil. 1917, vol. xii. p. 436. It does not refer to Thrasymachus facetiously as Adam fancies, but is an honorific expression borrowed from the Pythagoreans.
* Possibly Critias,
* Probably the battle of 409 B.C., reported in Diodor. Sic. xiii. 65. Cf. Introd. p. viii.
* The implied pun on the name is made explicit in 580 c-d.

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injustice inherently works upon its possessor. But the rewards and the honours that depend on opinion, leave to others to praise. For while I would listen to others who thus commended justice and disparaged injustice, bestowing their praise and their blame on the reputation and the rewards of either, I could not accept that sort of thing from you unless you say I must, because you have passed your entire life in the consideration of this very matter. Do not, then, I repeat, merely prove to us in argument the superiority of justice to injustice, but show us what it is that each inherently does to its possessor—whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and men—whereby the one is good and the other evil."

X. While I had always admired the natural parts of Glaucon and Adeimantus, I was especially pleased by their words on this occasion, and said: "It was excellently spoken of you, sons of the man we know, in the beginning of the elegy which the admirer of Glaucon wrote when you distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara—

Sons of Ariston, whose race from a glorious sire is god-like.

This, my friends, I think, was well said. For there must indeed be a touch of the god-like in your disposition if you are not convinced that injustice is preferable to justice though you can plead its case in such fashion. And I believe that you are really not convinced. I infer this from your general char-

Some have held that Glaucon and Adeimantus were uncles of Plato, but Zeller decides for the usual view that they were his brothers. Cf. Ph. d. Gr. ii. 1, 4th ed. 1889, p. 392, and Abhandl. d. Berl. Akad., 1873, Hist.-Phil. Kl. pp. 86 ff.
ἐπεὶ κατά γε αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἦπιστοιν ἃν ὡμῖν· ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ὃ τι χρήσωμαι· οὕτε γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω· δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι· σημεῖον δὲ μοι, ὅτι ἀ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων ὁμην ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἂμενον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθέ μου· ο.addButton() ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω· δέδοικα γάρ, μὴ}

C οὖν ὃσιν ἡ παραγενομένου δικαιοσύνη κακηγοροῦμένη ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἐπὶ ἐμπνεύστα καὶ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν οὕτως ὁπως δύναμαι ἐπικούρευιν αὐτῆ. ὃ τε οὖν Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέστο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀνείναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ διερευνήσασθαι τὸ τέ ἐστιν ἐκάτερον καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑφελειάς αὐτῶν τάληθες ποτέρως ἔχει. εἶπον οὖν ὁπερ ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν, ὃτι Τὸ ζήτημα ὧ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ ψαύλον ἀλλ'

D ὃξι βλέποντος, ὃς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκεῖ μοι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἰκαντερ ἂν εἰ προσεταξὲ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνώρισι μὴ πάνυ ὃξι βλέποντος, ἐστείτα τις ἐνενογείν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἀλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζων, ἐρμαίοι ἂν ἐφάνη, ὅμαι, ἐκεῖνα πρὸς βοηθῶ ἀναγνώρισαν οὕτως ἐπισκόπεω τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὀντα τυγχάνει. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη δ' ἠ' Αδείμαντος. ἀλλὰ τὶ τουοῦτον, ὡ Σωκρατεῖς, ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον ζήτησε καθορᾶς; Ἕγω σοι, ἐφην, ἐρώ. δικαιοσύνη, φαμέν, ἐστί μὲν ἄνδρός ἐνός, ἔστι δὲ ποὺ καὶ ὀλής πόλεως; Πάνω γε, ἢ δ' ὦς. Οὐκοῦν μείζων πόλις ἐνός ἄνδρός; Μείζων,

a So Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 2. 8 (1094 b 10).
acter, since from your words alone I should have distrusted you. But the more I trust you the more I am at a loss what to make of the matter. I do not know how I can come to the rescue. For I doubt my ability for the reason that you have not accepted the arguments whereby I thought I proved against Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice. Nor yet again do I know how I can refuse to come to the rescue. For I doubt my ability for the reason that you have not accepted the arguments whereby I thought I proved against Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice. Nor yet again do I know how I can refuse to come to the rescue. For I fear lest it be actually impious to stand idly by when justice is reviled and be faint-hearted and not defend her so long as one has breath and can utter his voice. The best thing, then, is to aid her as best I can." Glaucon, then, and the rest besought me by all means to come to the rescue and not to drop the argument but to pursue to the end the investigation as to the nature of each and the truth about their respective advantages. I said then as I thought: "The inquiry we are undertaking is no easy one but calls for keen vision, as it seems to me. So, since we are not clever persons, I think we should employ the method of search that we should use if we, with not very keen vision, were—bidden to read small letters from a distance, and then someone had observed that these same letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface. We should have accounted it a godsend, I fancy, to be allowed to read those letters first, and then examine the smaller, if they are the same." "Quite so," said Adeimantus; "but what analogy to this do you detect in the inquiry about justice?" "I will tell you," I said: "there is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also of an entire city?" "Assuredly," said he. "Is not the city larger than the man?" "It is larger," he said. "Then, per-
εφη. Ἡσως τοῖνυν πλεῖων ἄν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μείζονι ἐνείη καὶ βάσων καταμαθεῖν. εἴ ὦν 369 βούλησθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεις ζητήσωμεν πολλοῖς τί ἐστιν· ἐπείτα οὕτως ἐπισκεφτόμεθα καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἐκάστῳ, τῇ τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοίωτητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττωνος ἰδέα ἐπισκοποῦντες. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς, ἐφη, καλῶς λέγειν. Ἀρ' οὖν, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, εἴ γιγνομένη πόλιν θεασάμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἄν γιγνομένη καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν; Τάχ' ἂν, ἂν δ' ὡς. Οὐκοῦν γενομένον αὐτοῦ ἑλπὶς εὐπετέστερον ἰδεῖν ὁ ζητοῦμεν;

Β Πολὺ γε. Δοκεῖ οὖν χρήναι ἐπιχειρήσαι περαινεῖν; οἴμαι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὁλίγον ἔργον αὐτὸ εἶναι· σκοπεύετε οὖν. Ἐσκεπταί, ἐφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλος ποίει.

XI. Γίγνεται τοῖνυν, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἐκαστός ὁμίλος αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής· ἢ τίν' οἷοι ἁρχὴν ἀλλήν πόλιν οἰκίζειν; Οὐδεμίαν, ἂν δ' ὡς. Οὔτω C ἡ ἄρα παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλου, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου χρείας, πολλῶν δεόμενοι, πολλοὺς εἰς μίαν οἴκησιν ἀγείραντος κοινωνοῦσ᾽ ὑμῖν, βοηθοῦσ, ταύτῃ τῇ εὐνοικίᾳ ἑθεμέθα πόλιν ὅνομα. ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Μεταδίδοσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλω, εἰ τι μεταδίδοσιν, ἡ μεταλαμβάνει, οἴμοις αὐτῷ ἁμείναι εἶναι. Πάνυ γε. "Ἰδί δὴ, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ λόγῳ εἴς ἁρχῆς ποιώμεν πόλιν. ποιήσει

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b "C'est tout réfléchi."

c Often imitated, as e.g. Hooker, Eccles. Pol. i. 10: "Forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish
haps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend. If it please you, then, let us first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less." "I think that is a good suggestion," he said. "If, then," said I, "our argument should observe the origin of a state, we should see also the origin of justice and injustice in it?" "It may be," said he. "And if this is done, we may expect to find more easily what we are seeking?" "Much more." "Shall we try it, then, and go through with it? I fancy it is no slight task. Reflect, then." "We have reflected," said Adeimantus; "proceed and don't refuse."

XI. "The origin of the city, then," said I, "in my opinion, is to be found in the fact that we do not severally suffice for our own needs, but each of us lacks many things. Do you think any other principle establishes the state?" "No other," said he. "As a result of this, then, one man calling in another for one service and another for another, we, being in need of many things, gather many into one place of abode as associates and helpers, and to this dwelling together we give the name city or state, do we not?" "By all means." "And between one man and another there is an interchange of giving, if it so happens, and taking, because each supposes this to be better for himself." "Certainly." "Come, then, let us create a city from the beginning, in our ourselves with a competent store of things needful for such a life as our nature doth desire . . . therefore to supply these defects . . . we are naturally inclined to seek communion and fellowship with others; this was the cause of men uniting themselves at first in civil societies."
Aristotle says that the city comes into being for the sake of life, but exists for the sake of the good life, which, of course, is also Plato’s view of the true raison d’être of the State. Cf. Laws 828 d and Crito 48 b.

It is characteristic of Plato’s drama of ideas to give this
theory. Its real creator, as it appears, will be our needs."" Obviously."" "Now the first and chief of our needs is the provision of food for existence and life."" Assuredly."" "The second is housing and the third is raiment and that sort of thing."" "That is so."" "Tell me, then," said I, "how our city will suffice for the provision of all these things. Will there not be a farmer for one, and a builder, and then again a weaver? And shall we add thereto a cobbler and some other purveyor for the needs of the body?"" "Certainly."" "The indispensable minimum of a city, then, would consist of four or five men."" "Apparently."" "What of this, then? Shall each of these contribute his work for the common use of all? I mean shall the farmer, who is one, provide food for four and spend fourfold time and toil on the production of food and share it with the others, or shall he take no thought for them and provide a fourth portion of the food for himself alone in a quarter of the time and employ the other three-quarters, the one in the provision of a house, the other of a garment, the other of shoes, and not have the bother of associating with other people, but, himself for himself, mind his own affairs?"" And Adeimantus said, "But, perhaps, Socrates, the former way is easier."" "It would not, by Zeus, be at all strange," said I; "for now that you have mentioned it, it occurs to me myself that, to begin with, our several natures are not all alike but different. One man is naturally fitted for one task, and another for kind of rhetorical advantage to the expression of the view that he intends to reject. In what follows Plato anticipates the advantages of the division of labour as set forth in Adam Smith, with the characteristic exception of its stimulus to new inventions. Cf. Introd. xv.
"Εμοιγε. Τι δέ; πότερον κάλλιον πράττοι ἃν τις εἰς ὄν πολλὰς τέχνας ἐργαζόμενος, ἦ ὅταν μίαν εἰς; "Ὅταν, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, εἰς μίαν. Ἄλλα μήν, οἶμαι, καὶ τόδε δῆλον, ὡς, ἐὰν τὶς τινος παρῇ ἐργον καίρων, διόλυται. Δῆλον γάρ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐθέλει τὸ πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος σχολὴν περιμενεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη τὸν πράττοντα

C τῷ πραττομένῳ ἑπακολουθεῖν μὴ ἐν παρέργῳ μέρει. Ὅναγκη. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἐκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ βάσον, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καίρῳ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Πλεῖόνων δὴ, ὃ Ἀδείμαντε, δεῖ πολιτῶν ἡ τεττάρων ἐπὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς ὃν ἐλέγομεν. ὁ γάρ γεωργὸς, ὡς ἐσικευ, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιῆσεται ἐαυτῷ τὸ ἄροτρον, εἰ μέλλῃ

ὅ καλὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ σμινύῃν οὐδὲ τάλλα ὄργανα ὁσα περὶ γεωργίαν. οὐδ’ αὐ ὁ οἰκοδόμος πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τούτω δεῖ: ὅσαύτως δ’ ὁ υφάντης τε καὶ ο σκυτοτόμος. Ἀλήθη. Τέκτονες δὴ καὶ χαλκῆς καὶ τοιοῦτοι τυνὲς πολλοὶ δημιουργοί, κοινῶνοι ἧμιν τῷ πολυχνίου γιγνόμενοι, συχνὸν αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἂν πω πάνυ γε μέγα τι εἰς, οὐδ’ εἰ αὐτῶς βουκόλους τε καὶ ποιμένας τοὺς τε ἄλλους νομεάς προσθεῖμεν.

Εἶνα οἱ τε γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄροδν ἔχουσι βοῦς, οἱ τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρήσθαι ὑποζυγίους, ὑφάνται δὲ καὶ σκυτοτόμοι δέρμασι τε καὶ ἐρίος. οὐδὲ γε, ἤ δ’ ὅσ, σμικρὰ πόλις ἂν εἰς ἑξοῦσα πάντα ταῦτα. Ἄλλα μήν, ἤν δ’ ἐγὼ, κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιούτον τόπον, οὐ ἐπεισαγωγῆμω μὴ δεησεται,
another. Don't you think so?" "I do." "Again, would one man do better working at many tasks or one at one?" "One at one," he said. "And, furthermore, this, I fancy, is obvious—that if one lets slip the right season, the favourable moment in any task, the work is spoiled." "Obvious." "That, I take it, is because the business will not wait upon the leisure of the workman, but the workman must attend to it as his main affair, and not as a by-work." "He must indeed." "The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and more easily when one man performs one task according to his nature, at the right moment, and at leisure from other occupations." "By all means." "Then, Adeimantus, we need more than four citizens for the provision of the things we have mentioned. For the farmer, it appears, will not make his own plough if it is to be a good one, nor his hoe, nor his other agricultural implements, nor will the builder, who also needs many; and similarly the weaver and cobbler." "True." "Carpenters, then, and smiths and many similar craftsmen, associating themselves with our hamlet, will enlarge it considerably." "Certainly." "Yet it still wouldn't be very large even if we should add to them neat-herds and shepherds and other herders, so that the farmers might have cattle for ploughing, and the builders oxen to use with the farmers for transportation, and the weavers and cobblers hides and fleeces for their use." "It wouldn't be a small city, either, if it had all these." "But further," said I, "it is practically impossible to establish the city in a region where it will not

*Butcher's meat and pork appear first in the luxurious city, 373 c. We cannot infer that Plato was a vegetarian.*
σχεδόν τι ἀδύνατον. Ἄδυνατον γάρ. Προσδεήσει ἁρα ἐτὶ καὶ ἄλλων, οἱ ἐξ ἀλλῆς πόλεως αὐτῇ κομίσουσιν ὅν δεῖται. Δεήσει. Καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ἢ ἡ διάκονος, μηδὲν ἄγων ὅν ἐκείνου δέονται, 371 παρ’ ὅν ἂν κομίζωνται ὅν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία, κενὸς ἄπεισιν. ἢ γάρ; Δοκεῖ μοι. Δει ὁ δὲ τὰ οἴκοι μὴ μόνον ἐαυτοῖς ποιεῖν ἱκανά, ἄλλα καὶ οἶκα καὶ ὅσα ἐκείνοι ὅν ἂν δέονται. Δει γάρ. Πλειόνων δὴ γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν δεῖ ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει. Πλειόνων γάρ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων ποὺ τῶν τε εἰσαξόντων καὶ ἐξαξόντων ἐκαστὰ: οὖτοι δὲ εἰσὶν ἐμποροὶ. ἢ γάρ; Ναὶ. Καὶ ἐμπόρων δὴ δεησόμεθα. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε κατὰ θάλασσαν ἡ ἐμπορία γίγνηται, Β συχνῶν καὶ ἄλλων προσδεήσεται τῶν ἐπιστημόνων τῆς περὶ τῆν θάλασσαν ἐργασίας. Συχνῶν μέντοι.

ΧΙΙ. Τί δὲ δὴ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει; πῶς ἄλληλοι μεταδόσουσιν ὅν ἂν ἐκαστοὶ ἐργάζονται; ὅν δὴ ἐνεκα καὶ κοινωνίαν πουησάμενοι πόλιν ὄκισαμεν. Δὴλον δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὤς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὀψοῦμενοι. Ἀγορὰ δὴ ἢμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ἕμμι- βολον τῆς ἄλλαγῆς ἐνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου.

C Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄν οὖν κομίσασα ὁ γεωργὸς εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν τι ὧν ποιεῖ, ἢ τις ἄλλος τῶν δημιουργῶν, μὴ εἰς τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρόνου ἡκῇ τοῖς δεομένοις τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἄλλαξασθαι, ἀργήσει τῆς αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας καθημένος ἐν ἀγορᾷ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ’ ὤς, ἄλλ’ εἰσὶν οἱ τοῦτο ὀρνώντες ἐαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διακονίαν τάττουσι ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθῶς οἰκουμέναις πόλεσι σχεδόν τι οἱ ἄσθενε·

* Aristotle adds that the medium of exchange must of itself have value (Pol. 1257 a 36).
need imports." "It is." "There will be a further need, then, of those who will bring in from some other city what it requires." "There will." "And again, if our servitor goes forth empty-handed, not taking with him any of the things needed by those from whom they procure what they themselves require, he will come back with empty hands, will he not?"
"I think so." "Then their home production must not merely suffice for themselves but in quality and quantity meet the needs of those of whom they have need." "It must." So our city will require more farmers and other craftsmen." "Yes, more." "And also of other ministrants who are to export and import the merchandise. These are traders, are they not?"
"Yes." "We shall also need traders, then." "Assuredly." "And if the trading is carried on by sea, we shall need quite a number of others who are expert in maritime business." "Quite a number."

XII. "But again, within the city itself how will they share with one another the products of their labour? This was the very purpose of our association and establishment of a state." "Obviously," he said, "by buying and selling." "A market-place, then, and money as a token for the purpose of exchange will be the result of this." "By all means." "If, then, the farmer or any other craftsman taking his products to the market-place does not arrive at the same time with those who desire to exchange with him, is he to sit idle in the market-place and lose time from his own work?" "By no means," he said, "but there are men who see this need and appoint themselves for this service—in well-conducted cities they are generally those who are weakest in body

Similarly Laws 918-920.
PLATO

στατοι τὰ σώματα καὶ ἄρχειοι τι ἄλλο ἔργον πράττειν. αὐτοῦ γὰρ δεῖ μένοντας αὐτούς περὶ

D τὴν ἁγορὰν τὰ μὲν ἀντὶ ἀργυρίου ἀλλάξασθαι τοῖς
ti δεομένους ἀποδόσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὖ ἀργυρίου
dιαλλάττειν, ὅσοι τι δέονται πράσθαι. Αὐτὴ
ἀρα, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, ἡ χρεία κατῆλων ἡμῶν γένεσιν
ἐμποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἦ νυ κατῆλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς
πρὸς ὀνὴν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας ἰδρυμένους
ἐν ἁγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις
ἐμπόρους; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἐτι δὴ τινες, ὡς
ἐγὼμαι, εἰσὶ καὶ ἂλλοι διάκονοι, οἱ ἂν τὰ μὲν τῇς
Ε διανοίας μὴ πάνω ἁξιοκοινωνήτου ὅσι, τὴν δὲ
tοῦ σώματος ἱσχύν ἰκανήν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους ἐξωσων
οἱ δὴ πωλοῦντες τὴν τῆς ἱσχύος χρείαν, τὴν
tιμὴν ταύτην μισθὸν καλοῦντες, κέκληται, ὡς
ἐγὼμαι, μισθωτοί. γὰρ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Πλή-
ρωμα δὴ πόλεώς εἰσιν, ὡς έουσε καὶ μισθωτοί.
Δοκεῖ μοι. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὡ 'Αδείμαντε, ὡς ήμῶν
ηύξηται ἡ πόλις, ὥστε εἶναι τελέα; Ἰσως. Ποῦ
οὖν ἂν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐη ἡ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἡ
άδικα; καὶ τίνι ἁμα ἐγγενομένη ὄν ἐσκέμμεθα;

372 Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἐφη, οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Ἐφικράτες, εἰ μὴ
ποὺ ἐν αὐτῶν τοῦτων χρεία τω τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.
'Αλλ' Ἰσωσ, ὡς δ' ἐγὼ, καλῶς λέγεις: καὶ σκεπτέον
γε καὶ οὐκ ἀποκηντεόν. πρῶτον οὖν σκεφώμεθα,
tίνα τρόπον διαιτήσονται οἱ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένοι.
ἄλλο τι ἡ σύτων τε πωλοῦντες καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἰμάτα
καὶ υπόδηματα, καὶ οἰκοδομησάμενοι οἰκίας,
θέρους μὲν τὰ πολλὰ γυμνοὶ τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι
ἐργάσονται, τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος ἡμφιεσμένοι τε καὶ

a Aristotle (Pol. 1254 b 18) says that those, the use of whose bodies is the best thing they have to offer, are by nature

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and those who are useless for any other task. They must wait there in the agora and exchange money for goods with those who wish to sell, and goods for money with as many as desire to buy." "This need, then," said I, "creates the class of shopkeepers in our city. Or is not shopkeepers the name we give to those who, planted in the agora, serve us in buying and selling, while we call those who roam from city to city merchants?" "Certainly." "And there are, furthermore, I believe, other servitors who in the things of the mind are not altogether worthy of our fellowship, but whose strength of body is sufficient for toil; so they, selling the use of this strength and calling the price wages, are designated, I believe, wage-earners, are they not?" "Certainly." "Wage-earners, then, it seems, are the complement that helps to fill up the state."

"I think so." "Has our city, then, Adeimantus, reached its full growth and is it complete?" "Perhaps." "Where, then, can justice and injustice be found in it? And along with which of the constituents that we have considered does it come into the state?" "I cannot conceive, Socrates," he said, "unless it be in some need that those very constituents have of one another." "Perhaps that is a good suggestion," said I; "we must examine it and not hold back. First of all, then, let us consider what will be the manner of life of men thus provided. Will they not make bread and wine and garments and shoes? And they will build themselves houses and carry on their work in summer for the most part unclad and unshod and in winter clothed slaves. Cf. Jesus of Sirach xxxviii. 36 ἀνεὶ αὑτῶν οὐκ οἰκινωθήτεται πόλις. So Carlyle, and Shakespeare on Caliban: "We cannot miss him" (Tempest, i. ii.)
B ὑποδεδεμένοι ἰκανῶς; θρέψονται δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῶν κρυθῶν ἄλφιτα σκευαζόμενοι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἀλευρᾶ, τὰ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μάξαντες, μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμον τῶν παραβαλλόμενοι ἡ φύλλα καθαρά, κατακλυνέντες ἐπὶ στῆθάδων ἐστρωμένων μιλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις, εὐωχήσονται αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδία, ἐπιπύνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, ἑστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεοὺς, ἢδεως ἐνυόντες ἄλληλοις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν C σούσιαν ποιούμενοι τοὺς παίδας, εὐλαβοῦμενοι πενιάν ἡ πόλεμον;

XIII. Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ὑπολαβών, Ἀνευ ὁφον, ἐφη, ως ἔσκασς, ποιεῖς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἑστιωμένους. Ἄληθή, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ἐπελαθόμην οτι καὶ ὁφον ἐξουσιν, ἄλας τε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἕλας καὶ τυρών καὶ βολβοὺς καὶ λάχανα, οία δὴ ἐν ἀγροῖς ἐψήματα, ἐψήσονται καὶ τραγήματα ποιο παραθύσομεν αὐτοῖς τῶν τε σύκων καὶ ἑρέβινθων καὶ

D κυάμων, καὶ μύρτα καὶ φηγοὺς σποδιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, μετρίως ὑποπύνοντες καὶ οὕτω διάγοντες τὸν βίον ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ υγείας, ως εἰκός, γηραιοὶ τελευτῶντες ἄλλον τοιοῦτον βίον τοῖς ἐκγόνοις παραδώσωσιν. καὶ ὁς, Εἰ δὲ νῦν πόλιν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, κατεσκεύαζες, τί ἂν αὐτάς ἄλλο ἢ ταύτα ἐχόρταζες; Ἀλλὰ πῶς χρή, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Γλαύκων; Ἀπερ νομίζεται, ἐφη ἐπὶ τε κλωνων κατακείσαι, οίμαι, τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπω-Ε ρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν δειπνεῖν καὶ ὁμὰ ἀπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἐχουσι καὶ τραγήματα. Εἰεν, ἢν δ'

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a ὁφον is anything eaten with bread, usually meat or fish, as Glaucon means; but Socrates gives it a different sense.

b Cf. Introd. p. xiv. By the mouth of the fine gentleman,
and shod sufficiently? And for their nourishment they will provide meal from their barley and flour from their wheat, and kneading and cooking these they will serve noble cakes and loaves on some arrangement of reeds, or clean leaves, and, reclined on rustic beds strewn with bryony and myrtle, they will feast with their children, drinking of their wine thereto, garlanded and singing hymns to the gods in pleasant fellowship, not begetting offspring beyond their means lest they fall into poverty or war?"

XIII. Here Glaucon broke in: "No relishes "apparently," he said, "for the men you describe as feasting."
"True," said I; "I forgot that they will also have relishes—salt, of course, and olives and cheese; and onions and greens, the sort of things they boil in the country, they will boil up together. But for dessert we will serve them figs and chickpeas and beans, and they will toast myrtle-berries and acorns before the fire, washing them down with moderate potations; and so, living in peace and health, they will probably die in old age and hand on a like life to their offspring." And he said, "If you were founding a city of pigs,” Socrates, what other fodder than this would you provide?" "Why, what would you have, Glaucon?" said I. "What is customary," he replied; "they must recline on couches, I presume, if they are not to be uncomfortable, and dine from tables and have made dishes and sweetmeats such as are now

Glaucion, Plato expresses with humorous exaggeration his own recognition of the inadequacy for ethical and social philosophy of his idyllic ideal. Cf. Mandeville, Preface to Fable of the Bees:

A golden age must be as free
For acorns as for honesty.

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On flute-girls as the accompaniment of a banquet cf. Symp. 176 ε, Aristoph. Ach. 1090-1092, Catullus 13. 4. But apart from this, the sudden mention of an incongruous item in a list is a device of Aristophanic humour which even the philosophic Emerson did not disdain: “The love of little maids and berries.”
in use.” "Good," said I, "I understand. It is not merely the origin of a city, it seems, that we are considering but the origin of a luxurious city. Perhaps that isn’t such a bad suggestion, either. For by observation of such a city it may be we could discern the origin of justice and injustice in states. The true state I believe to be the one we have described—the healthy state, as it were. But if it is your pleasure that we contemplate also a fevered state, there is nothing to hinder. For there are some, it appears, who will not be contented with this sort of fare or with this way of life; but couches will have to be added thereto and tables and other furniture, yes, and relishes and myrrh and incense and girls a and cakes—all sorts of all of them. And the requirements we first mentioned, houses and garments and shoes, will no longer be confined to necessities, b but we must set painting to work and embroidery, and procure gold and ivory and similar adornments, must we not?" "Yes," he said. "Then shall we not have to enlarge the city again? For that healthy state is no longer sufficient, but we must proceed to swell out its bulk and fill it up with a multitude of things that exceed the requirements of necessity in states, as, for example, the entire class of huntsmen, and the imitators, c many of them occupied with figures and colours and many with music—the necessity." Cf. 369 d "the indispensable minimum of a city." The historical order is: (1) arts of necessity, (2) arts of pleasure and luxury, (3) disinterested science. Cf. Critias 110 a, Aristot. Met. 981 b 20.

c θηλευταί and μυνηταί are generalized Platonic categories, including much not ordinarily signified by the words. For a list of such Platonic generalizations cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, note 500.
μουσικήν, ποιηταὶ τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ραψωδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι, σκευῶν τε C παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοῖ, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν γυναικείον κόσμον. καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλειόνων δεσσόμεθα. ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ δεήσειν παιδαγωγῶν, τιτθῶν, τροφῶν, κομμωτρίων, κουρέων, καὶ αὖ ὄφοποιῶν τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἢτι δὲ καὶ συμβωτῶν προσδεσσόμεθα. πούτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνήν. ἑδει γὰρ οὐδέν. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ τούτου προσδεήσει, δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βοσκημάτων παμπόλλων, εἰ τις αὐτὰ ἔδεται. D ἡ γὰρ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ὅνικοῦν καὶ ίατρῶν ἐν χρείαις ἐσόμεθα πολὺ μᾶλλον οὕτω διαιτώμενοι ἡ ὦς τὸ πρότερον; Πολὺ γε.

XIV. Καὶ ἡ χώρα που ἡ τότε ἰκανὴ τρέφειν τοὺς τότε σμικρὰ δὴ ἐξ ἰκανῆς ἐσταιν. ἡ πῶς λέγομεν; Οὕτως, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτιμητέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἰκανὴν ἐξεῖν νέμειν τε καὶ ἄρον, καὶ ἐκεῖνοι αὖ τῆς ἁμετέρας, ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀφώσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν

Ε ἀπειρον, ὑπερβάντες τῶν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄρων; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες. Πολεμῆσομεν

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\(^a\) Contractors generally, and especially theatrical managers.

\(^b\) The mothers of the idyllic state nursed their own children, but in the ideal state the wives of the guardians are relieved of this burden by special provision. *Cf. infra 460 d.*

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poets and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, chorus-dancers, contractors—and the manufacturers of all kinds of articles, especially those that have to do with women's adornment. And so we shall also want more servitors. Don't you think that we shall need tutors, nurses wet and dry, beauty-shop ladies, barbers and yet again cooks and chefs? And we shall have need, further, of swineherds; there were none of these creatures in our former city, for we had no need of them, but in this city there will be this further need; and we shall also require other cattle in great numbers if they are to be eaten, shall we not?" "Yes." "Doctors, too, are something whose services we shall be much more likely to require if we live thus than as before?" "Much."

XIV. "And the territory, I presume, that was then sufficient to feed the then population, from being adequate will become too small. Is that so or not?" "It is." "Then we shall have to cut out a cantle of our neighbour's land if we are to have enough for pasture and ploughing, and they in turn of ours if they too abandon themselves to the unlimited acquisition of wealth, disregarding the limit set by our necessary wants." "Inevitably, Socrates." "We

The rhetoricians of the empire liked to repeat that no barber was known at Rome in the first 200 or 300 years of the city.

Illogical idiom referring to the swine. Cf. infra 598 c.

Χρειάζομαι: Greek idiom could use either singular or plural. Cf. 410 A; Phaedo 87 C; Laws 630 E. The plural here avoids hiatus.

Cf. Isocrates iii. 34.

Cf. 591 D. Natural desires are limited. Luxury and unnatural forms of wealth are limitless, as the Greek moralists repeat from Solon down. Cf. Aristot. Politics 1257 b 23.

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The unnecessary desires are the ultimate cause of wars. Phaedo 66 c. The simple life once abandoned, war is inevitable. "My lord," said St. Francis to the Bishop of Assisi, "if we possessed property we should have need of arms for its defence" (Sabatier, p. 81). Similarly that very dissimilar thinker, Mandeville. Cf. supra on 372 c. Plato recognizes the struggle for existence (Spencer, Data of Ethics, § 6), and the "bellum omnium contra omnes," Laws 625 e. Cf. Sidgwick, Method of Ethics, i. 2: "The Republic of Plato seems in many respects sufficiently divergent from the reality. And yet he contemplates war as a permanent, unalterable fact to be provided for in the ideal state." Spencer on the contrary contemplates a completely
shall go to war as the next step, Glaucon—or what will happen?" "What you say," he said. "And we are not yet to speak," said I, "of any evil or good effect of war, but only to affirm that we have further discovered the origin of war, namely, from those things from which the greatest disasters, public and private, come to states when they come." "Certainly." "Then, my friend, we must still further enlarge our city by no small increment, but by a whole army, that will march forth and fight it out with assailants in defence of all our wealth and the luxuries we have just described." "How so?" he said; "are the citizens themselves not sufficient for that?" "Not if you," said I, "and we all were right in the admission we made when we were moulding our city. We surely agreed, if you remember, that it is impossible for one man to do the work of many arts well." "True," he said. "Well, then," said I, "don’t you think that the business of fighting is an art and a profession?" "It is indeed," he said. "Should our concern be greater, then, for the cobbler’s art than for the art of war?" "By no means." "Can we suppose, then, that while we were evolved society in which the ethics of militarism will disappear.

i.e. as well as the genesis of society. 369 b.

ε ἕ ὕν: i.e. ἐκ τοῦτον ἕ ὕν, namely the appetites and the love of money.

Cf. 567 ε τί δέ; αὐτόθεν. In the fourth century “it was found that amateur soldiers could not compete with professionals, and war became a trade” (Butcher, Demosth. p. 17). Plato arrives at the same result by his principle “one man one task” (370 a-b). He is not here “making citizens synonymous with soldiers” nor “laconizing” as Adam says.

For the thought of this a fortiori or ex contrario argument cf. 421 a.
γεωργον ἐπιχειρεῖν εἶναι ἡμεῖς ὑφάντην μήτε οἰκοδόμοιν ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμων, ὡσαύτως ἐν ἀπεδιδομεν, πρὸς δὲ ἐπεφύκει ἐκατός καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἐμελλε τῶν ἄλλων

c ςχολῆν άγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παρεῖς τοὺς καιροὺς καλῶς ἀπεργάζεσθαι τά δὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν πόλεμον πότερον οὐ περὶ πλείστου ἐστίν ἐδ ἀπεργαζόντα; ἡ ούτω ράδιον, ὡστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἡμα πολεμικὸς ἐσται καὶ σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἔντυνθεν ἐργαζό-μενος, πεπτευτικὸς δὲ ἡ κυβευτικὸς ἰκανῶς οὐδ᾿ ἄν εἰς γένοιτο μή αὐτῷ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτη-

d λαβὼν ἡ τι ἀλλὸ τῶν πολεμικῶν ὀπλῶν τε καὶ ὀργάνων αὐθημερόν ὀπλιτικῆς ἡ τυνος ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἰκανὸς ἐσται ἀγωνιστής, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν οὐδένα δημιουργον οὐδὲ ἀθλητὴν ληφθέν ποιήσει, οὐδ᾽ ἐσται χρήσιμον τῷ μήτε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου λαβόντι μήτε τὴν μελέτην ἰκανὴν παρασχομένω; Πολλοῦ γὰρ ἄν, ἡ δ’ ὡς, τὰ ὀργανὰ ἡ τ其间.

XV. Οὔκοδον, ἡν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁςω μέγιστον τὸ τῶν

e φυλάκων ἐργον, τοσοῦτῳ σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων

πλείστῃς ἄν εἰη καὶ αὐ τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας

μεγίστης δεόμενω. Οἴμαι ἐγώγη, ἡ δ’ ὡς. Ἄρ

1 ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμων II: not indispensable, and A omits.

a ἴνα δὴ ironical.
b Cf. 370 B-c.
c The ironical argument ex contrario is continued with fresh illustrations to the end of the chapter.
d Cf. on 467 A.
at pains to prevent the cobbler from attempting to be at the same time a farmer, a weaver, or a builder instead of just a cobbler, to the end that we might have the cobbler's business well done, and similarly assigned to each and every one man one occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted and at which he was to work all his days, at leisure from other pursuits and not letting slip the right moments for doing the work well, and that yet we are in doubt whether the right accomplishment of the business of war is not of supreme moment? Is it so easy that a man who is cultivating the soil will be at the same time a soldier and one who is practising cobbling or any other trade, though no man in the world could make himself a competent expert at draughts or the dice who did not practise that and nothing else from childhood but treated it as an occasional business? And are we to believe that a man who takes in hand a shield or any other instrument of war springs up on that very day a competent combatant in heavy armour or in any other form of warfare—though no other tool will make a man be an artist or an athlete by his taking it in hand, nor will it be of any service to those who have neither acquired the science of it nor sufficiently practised themselves in its use?" "Great indeed," he said, "would be the value of tools in that case!"

XV. "Then," said I, "in the same degree that the task of our guardians is the greatest of all, it would require more leisure than any other business and the greatest science and training." "I think so," said he.

* For the three requisites, science, practice, and natural ability cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, note 596, and my paper on Φύσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη, Tr. A. Ph. A. vol. xl., 1910.

† Cf. Thucyd. ii. 40.

‡ First mention. Cf. 428 d note, 414 b.
οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἐπιτηδείας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτή-
δεμα; Πῶς δ’ οὖ; 'Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον ἂν ἔχῃ, ὃς ἔσκεν, εἰπτερ οἷοί τ’ ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι, τίνες 
τε καὶ ποιαί φύσεις ἐπιτηδειαί εἰς πόλεως φυλακῆν. 
'Ἡμέτερον μέντοι. Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὐκ ἄρα 
φαύλον πράγμα ἡράμεθα· ὃμως δὲ οὐκ ἀποδει-
375 λιατέου, ὅσον γ’ ἃν δύναμις παρεῖκη. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, 
ἔφη. Οἷς οὖν τι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν 
γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐ-
γενοῦς; Τὸ ποιὸν λέγεις; Οἶον δὲν τέ ποι δεὶ 
αὐτοῦν ἐκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς αἰσθήσην καὶ ἔλαφρον 
πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκάθεν, καὶ ἰσχυρὸν αὐ, 
ἐὰν δέῃ ἐλόντα διαμάχεσθαι. Δεὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, 
pάντων τούτων. Καὶ μὴν ἄνδρεῖον γε, εἰπτερ εὐ 
μαχεῖται. Πῶς δ’ οὖ; 'Ἀνδρεῖος δὲ εἶναι ἄρα 
ἐθελήσει δ’ μὴ θυμοειδῆς εἴτε ἰππος εἴτε κύων ἦ 
Β ἀλλο ὅτι οὖν ξῷν; ἦ οὐκ ἐννενόκασ, ὡς ἀμαχὸν 
τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὐ παρόντος ψυχή πάσα 
πρὸς πάντα ἀφοβός τε ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος; Ἑν-
νενόκα. Τὰ μὲν τοῖνυν τοῦ σώματος οὖν δεὶ τὸν 
φύλακα εἶναι, δῆλα. Ναὶ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς 
ψυχῆς, ὅτι γε θυμοειδῆ. Καὶ τοῦτο. Πῶς οὖν, 
ὦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὃ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἀγριοί ἀλλήλοις τε 
έσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὁντες τοιοῦτοι 
tὰς φύσεις; Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ’ ὃς, οὐ ῥαδίως. 'Ἀλλὰ 
C μέντοι δεὶ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πράους αὐτοὺς

*aισθανόμενον: present. There is no pause between per-
ception and pursuit.*

*b In common parlance. Philosophically speaking, no 
brute is brave. Laches 196 d, infra 430 b.*

*c Anger (or the heart's desire?) buys its will at the price 
of life, as Heracleitus says (Fr. 105 Bywater). Cf. Aristot. 
Eth. Nic. 1105 a 9, 1116 b 23.*

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"Does it not also require a nature adapted to that very pursuit?" "Of course." "It becomes our task, then, it seems, if we are able, to select which and what kind of natures are suited for the guardianship of a state." "Yes, ours." "Upon my word," said I, "it is no light task that we have taken upon ourselves. But we must not faint so far as our strength allows." "No, we mustn't." "Do you think," said I, it is no light task that we have taken upon ourselves. But we must not faint so far as our strength allows." "No, we mustn't." "What point have you in mind?" "I mean that each of them must be keen of perception, quick in pursuit of what it has apprehended, and strong too if it has to fight it out with its captive." "Why, yes," said he, "there is need of all these qualities." "And it must, further, be brave if it is to fight well." "Of course." "And will a creature be ready to be brave that is not high-spirited, whether horse or dog or anything else? Have you never observed what an irresistible and invincible thing is spirit, the presence of which makes every soul in the face of everything fearless and unconquerable?" "I have." "The physical qualities of the guardian, then, are obvious." "Yes." "And also those of his soul, namely that he must be of high spirit." "Yes, this too." "How then, Glaucum," said I, "will they escape being savage to one another and to the other citizens if this is to be their nature?" "Not easily, by Zeus," said he. "And yet we must have them gentle to their friends

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εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους χαλεποὺς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ περιμνεοῦσιν ἄλλους σφάς διολέσαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖ φθησονται αὐτῷ δράσαντες. 'Αληθῆ, ἐφη. Τί οὖν, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ποιήσομεν; πόθεν ἄμα πράον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον ἢδος εὑρήσομεν; ἕναντία γάρ ποι 
θυμοειδεὶ πραείᾳ φύσις. Φαίνεται. 'Αλλὰ μέντοι τούτων ὅποτέρου ἄν στέρηται, φύλαξ ἀγαθὸς οὐ 
μὴ γένηται· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικε, καὶ οὐτω 
D δὴ εὐμβαίνει ἀγαθὸν φύλακα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. 
Κινδυνεύει, ἐφη. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀπορήσας τε καὶ ἐπι-
σκεφάμενος τὰ ἐμπροσθέν, Δικαίως γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, 
ὡς φίλε, ἀποροῦμεν· ἂς γὰρ προθύμεθα εἰκόνος 
ἀπελεύθημεν. Πῶς λέγεις; Οὐκ ἐνοῆσαμεν, ὅτι 
eἰσιν ἅρα φύσεις, οἷς ἡμεῖς οὐκ ὑμὴσμεν, ἔχουσαι 
tάναντία ταῦτα. Ποῦ δὴ; 'Ἰδοι μὲν ἂν τις καὶ ἐν 
ἄλλοις ζῷοις, οὐ μέντ' ἂν ἡκιστα ἐν ὧν ἡμεῖς 
Επαρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι. οἰσθα γὰρ ποτὶ τῶν 
γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἢδος, 
πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἶν 
te πραστάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας 
τοῦτοι ταῦτα. Οἴδα μέντοι. Τοῦτο μὲν ἅρα, ἢν δ' 
ἐγώ, δυνατῶν, καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ξητοῦμεν τοιοῦ-
tον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

XVI. Ἡρ' οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐτὶ τοῦτο προσδεῖσθαι ὁ 
φυλακικὸς ἑσόμενος, πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ ἐτὶ προσ-
γενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τῇ φύσιν; Πῶς δὴ; ἐφη· οὐ

1 δὴ q: others δὲ or γε.

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1 The contrast of the strenuous and gentle temperaments is a chief point in Platonic ethics and education. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 59, 70, 481.
and harsh to their enemies; otherwise they will not await their destruction at the hands of others, but will be first themselves in bringing it about." "True," he said. "What, then, are we to do?" said I. "Where shall we discover a disposition that is at once gentle and great-spirited? For there appears to be an opposition between the spirited type and the gentle nature." "There does." "But yet if one lacks either of these qualities, a good guardian he never can be. But these requirements resemble impossibilities, and so the result is that a good guardian is impossible." "It seems likely," he said. And I was at a standstill, and after reconsidering what we had been saying, I said, "We deserve to be at a loss, my friend, for we have lost sight of the comparison that we set before ourselves." "What do you mean?" "We failed to note that there are after all such natures as we thought impossible, endowed with these opposite qualities." "Where?" "It may be observed in other animals, but especially in that which we likened to the guardian. You surely have observed in well-bred hounds that their natural disposition is to be most gentle to their familiairs and those whom they recognize, but the contrary to those whom they do not know." "I am aware of that." "The thing is possible, then," said I, "and it is not an unnatural requirement that we are looking for in our guardian." "It seems not." XVI. "And does it seem to you that our guardian-to-be will also need, in addition to the being high-spirited, the further quality of having the love of wisdom in his nature?" "How so?" he said; "I don't

b Plato never really deduces his argument from the imagery which he uses to illustrate it.
Your dog now is your only philosopher," says Plato, not more seriously than Rabelais (Prologue): "Mais vistes vous oncques chien rencontrant quelque os medullaire: c'est comme dit Platon, lib. ii. de Rep., la beste du monde plus philosophe." Cf. Huxley, Hume, p. 104: "The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will let a well-dressed man pass him without opposition. Has he not a 'general idea' of rags and dirt associated with the idea of aversion?" Dümmler 172
apprehend your meaning.” “This too,” said I, “is something that you will discover in dogs and which is worth our wonder in the creature.” “What?” “That the sight of an unknown person angers him before he has suffered any injury, but an acquaintance he will fawn upon though he has never received any kindness from him. Have you never marvelled at that?” “I never paid any attention to the matter before now, but that he acts in some such way is obvious.” “But surely that is an exquisite trait of his nature and one that shows a true love of wisdom.” “In what respect, pray?” “In respect,” said I, “that he distinguishes a friendly from a hostile aspect by nothing save his apprehension of the one and his failure to recognize the other. How, I ask you, can the love of learning be denied to a creature whose criterion of the friendly and the alien is intelligence and ignorance?” “It certainly cannot,” he said. “But you will admit,” said I, “that the love of learning and the love of wisdom are the same?” “The same,” he said. “Then may we not confidently lay it down in the case of man too, that if he is to be in some sort gentle to friends and familiairs he must be by nature a lover of wisdom and of learning?” “Let us so assume,” he replied. “The love of wisdom, then, and high spirit and quickness and strength will be combined for us in the nature of him who is to be a good and true guardian of the state.” “By all means,” he said. “Such, then,” I said, “would be the basis of his character. But the rearing of and others assume that Plato is satirizing the Cynics, but who were the Cynics in 380-370 B.C.? 

kaiτοι πῶς: humorous oratorial appeal. Cf. 360 καιτοί. 

Cf. 343 ο. ὑπάρχοι marks the basis of nature as opposed to teaching.
PLATO

θησονται τίνα τρόπον; καὶ ἃρα τι προὐργοῦν ἡμῖν

D ἐστὶν αὐτὸ σκοποῦσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν, οὔπερ ἕνεκα

πάντα σκοποῦμεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα

τρόπον ἐν πόλει γίγνεται; ἵνα μὴ ἐ玓ς ἰκανὸν

λόγον ἢ συχνὸν διεξήκομεν. καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος

ἀδελφὸς Πάννυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ἔγωγε προσδοκὼ

προὐργοῦ εἶναι εἰς τοῦτο ταύτῃ τὴν σικέψιν. Μᾶ

Δία, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ φίλε 'Αδείμαντε, οὐκ ἁρα

ἀφετέον, οὔδ' εἰ μακροτέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα. Οὐ

γὰρ οὖν. Ἡθο οὖν, ὁσπερ ἐν μὴθὸ μυθολογοῦντες

Ε τε καὶ σχολὴν ἀγοντες λόγω παιδεύωμεν τοὺς

ἀνδρας. Ἡλλὰ χρή.

XVII. Τις οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἡ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν

βελτίω τῆς. ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὐρημένης;

ἐστι δὲ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστικῆ, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική. Ἡστι γάρ. Ἡρ' οὖν οὐ μουσι-

κῆ πρότερον ἀρξόμεθα παιδεύοντες ἡ γυμναστικῆ;

Πῶς δ' οὖ; Μουσικῆς δ' εἰπὼν τίθης λόγους, ἡ

οὖ; Ἡγωγε. Λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν

ἀληθῆς, ψεῦδος δ' ἑτερον; Ναι. Παιδεῦτεον δ' 377

ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν; Οὐ

μανθάνω, ἐφη, πῶς λέγεις. Οὐ μανθάνεις, ἢν δ'

ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μῦθους λέγομεν,

τοῦτο δὲ που ὑς τὸ ὀλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἐνι δὲ καὶ

1 εἰπὼν ΑΠ: εἰπον ν.

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b Plato likes to contrast the leisure of philosophy with the hurry of business and law. Cf. Theaetet. 172 c-d.

c For the abrupt question cf. 360 e. Plato here prescribes for all the guardians, or military class, the normal Greek education in music and gymnastics, purged of what he considers its errors. A higher philosophic education will prepare a selected few for the office of guardians par excellence 174.
these men and their education, how shall we manage that? And will the consideration of this topic advance us in any way towards discerning what is the object of our entire inquiry—the origin of justice and injustice in a state—our aim must be to omit nothing of a sufficient discussion, and yet not to draw it out to tiresome length?" And Glaucon's brother replied, "Certainly, I expect that this inquiry will bring us nearer to that end." "Certainly, then, my dear Adeimantus," said I, "we must not abandon it even if it prove to be rather long." "No, we must not." "Come, then, just as if we were telling stories or fables and had ample leisure, let us educate these men in our discourse." "So we must."

XVII. "What, then, is our education?  Or is it hard to find a better than that which long time has discovered? Which is, I suppose, gymnastics for the body and for the soul music." "It is." "And shall we not begin education in music earlier than in gymnastics?" "Of course." "And under music you include tales, do you not?" "I do." "And tales are of two species, the one true and the other false?" "Yes." "And education must make use of both, but first of the false?" "I don't understand your meaning." "Don't you understand," I said, "that we begin by telling children fables, and the fable is, taken as a or rulers. Quite unwarranted is the supposition that the higher education was not in Plato's mind when he described the lower. Cf. 412 A, 429 D-430 c, 497 c-d, Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 650.

* For this conservative argument cf. Politicus 300 b, Laws 844 A.

* Qualified in 410 c. μουσική is playing the lyre, music, poetry, letters, culture, philosophy, according to the context.

* A slight paradox to surprise attention.
αληθής; πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἢ γυμνασίους χρώμεθα. Ἐστὶ ταῦτα. Τούτῳ δὴ ἔλεγον, ὅτι μουσικῇς πρότερον ἀπτέον ἢ γυμναστικῆς. Ὁρθώς, ἐφη. Οὐκοίνιν οἶοθ' ὅτι ἀρχῇ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νέω καί
Β ἀπαλῷ ὅτων; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καί ἐνδυέται τύπος, ὅν ἄν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἐκάστῳ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν βαδίως οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἄκοινεν τοὺς παῖδας καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις, ἀς, ἐπειδὰν τελεωθέσσαν, ἐχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτοὺς; Οὔδ' ὀπωσδήποτε παρήσομεν. Πρώτον δὴ ἢμῖν, ὡς ἐοικέν, ἐπι-
C στατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ δὲν μὲν ἄν καλὸν ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκρίτεον, ὅν δ' ἂν μή, ἀποκρίτεον τοὺς δ' ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφοῦς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοὺς μύθους πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν, ὅν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον. Ποίους δὴ; ἐφη. Ἐν τοίς μείζοσιν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, μύθους ὁφόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. δεὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι καὶ ταῦτον δύνασθαι τούς τε
D μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἢ οὐκ οἴει; 'Εγωγ',

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*b Cf. Laws 664 β, and Shelley's

“Specious names

Learned in soft childhood's unsuspecting hour,”

perhaps derived from the educational philosophy of Rousseau.

*c The image became a commonplace. Cf. Theaetet. 191 α, Horace, Ep. ii. 2. 8, the Stoic τῇ τπως ἐν ψυχῇ, and Byron's

“Wax to receive and marble to retain.”

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whole, false, but there is truth in it also? And we make use of fable with children before gymnastics.” “That is so.” “That, then, is what I meant by saying that we must take up music before gymnastics.” “You were right,” he said. “Do you not know, then, that the beginning in every task is the chief thing, especially for any creature that is young and tender? For it is then that it is best moulded and takes the impression that one wishes to stamp upon it.” “ Quite so.” “Shall we, then, thus lightly suffer our children to listen to any chance stories fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds opinions for the most part contrary to those that we shall think it desirable for them to hold when they are grown up? “By no manner of means will we allow it.” “We must begin, then, it seems, by a censorship over our story-makers, and what they do well we must pass and what not, reject. And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so shape their souls by these stories far rather than their bodies by their hands. But most of the stories they now tell we must reject.” “What sort of stories?” he said. “The example of the greater stories,” I said, “will show us the lesser also. For surely the pattern must be the same and the greater and the less must have a like tendency. Don’t you think so?” “I do,” he said; “but I

\[a\] Cf. the censorship proposed in Laws 656 c. Plato’s criticism of the mythology is anticipated in part by Euripides, Xenophanes, Heracleitus, and Pythagoras. \[Cf. Décharme, Euripides and the Spirit of his Dramas,\] translated by James Loeb, chap. ii. Many of the Christian Fathers repeated his criticism almost verbatim.
Theogony 151-181.

a Conservative feeling or caution prevents Plato from proscribing absolutely what may be a necessary part of traditional or mystical religion.

b The ordinary sacrifice at the Eleusinian mysteries. Cf.
don't apprehend which you mean by the greater, either." "Those," I said, "that Hesiod and Homer and the other poets related to us. These, methinks, composed false stories which they told and still tell to mankind." "Of what sort?" he said; "and with what in them do you find fault?" "With that," I said, "which one ought first and chiefly to blame, especially if the lie is not a pretty one." "What is that?" "When anyone images badly in his speech the true nature of gods and heroes, like a painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to his models." "It is certainly right to condemn things like that," he said; "but just what do we mean and what particular things?" "There is, first of all," I said, "the greatest lie about the things of greatest concernment, which was no pretty invention of him who told how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did to Cronos, and how Cronos in turn took his revenge; and then there are the doings and sufferings of Cronos at the hands of his son. Even if they were true I should not think that they ought to be thus lightly told to thoughtless young persons. But the best way would be to bury them in silence, and if there were some necessity for relating them, that only a very small audience should be admitted under pledge of secrecy and after sacrificing, not a pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim, to the end that as few as possible should have heard these tales." "Why, yes," said he, "such stories are hard sayings." "Yes, and they are not to be told, Adeimantus, in our city, nor is it to be said in the hearing of a young man, that in doing Aristoph. Acharn. 747, Peace 374-375; Walter Pater, Demeter and the Pig.
"Plato does not sympathize with the Samuel Butlers of his day. Cf. Euthyphro 4 b, Crito 51 b.

The argument, whether used in jest or earnest, was a commonplace. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, i. 137, Laws 941 b, Aeschyl. Eumen. 640-641, Terence, Eunuchus 590 "At quem deum! . . . ego homuncio hoc non facerem." The Neoplatonists met the criticism of Plato and the Christian Fathers by allegorizing or refining away the immoral parts of the mythology, but St. Augustine cleverly retorts (De Civ. Dei, ii. 7): "Omnes enim . . . cultores talium deorum . . . magis intuentur quid Iupiter fecerit quam quid docuerit Plato."

Cf. the protest in the Euthyphro 6 b, beautifully translated by Ruskin, Aratra Pentelici § 107: "And think you that there is verily war with each other among the gods?"
the utmost wrong he would do nothing to surprise anybody, nor again in punishing his father’s wrong-doings to the limit, but would only be following the example of the first and greatest of the gods."

"No, by heaven," said he, "I do not myself think that they are fit to be told." "Neither must we admit at all," said I, "that gods war with gods and plot against one another and contend—for it is not true either—if we wish our future guardians to deem nothing more shameful than lightly to fall out with one another; still less must we make battles of gods and giants the subject for them of stories and embroideries, and other enmities many and manifold of gods and heroes toward their kith and kin. But if there is any likelihood of our persuading them that no citizen ever quarrelled with his fellow-citizen and that the very idea of it is an impiety, that is the sort of thing that ought rather to be said by their elders, men and women, to children from the beginning and as they grow older, and we must compel the poets to keep close to this in their compositions. But Hera’s fetterings by her son and the hurling out of heaven of Hephaestus by his father when he was trying to save his mother from a beating, and the battles of the gods in Homer’s verse are things

And dreadful enmities and battles, such as the poets have told, and such as our painters set forth in graven sculpture to adorn all our sacred rites and holy places. Yes, and in the great Panathenaia themselves the Peplus, full of such wild picturing, is carried up into the Acropolis—shall we say that these things are true, oh Euthyphron, right-minded friend?"

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*d* On the Panathenaic πεταλος of Athena.


*f* *Il.* xx. 1-74; xxi. 385-513.
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παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἀνευ ὑπονοιῶν. ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἶδ' τε κρίνειν ὁ τι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὁ μή, ἀλλ' ἂν τηλικοῦτος ὃν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνυττά

Ε' τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι. ὥν δὴ ἰσως ἕνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον, ἀ πρώτα ἄκοινοιν, ὁ τι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετήν ἄκοινεν.

ΧVIII. Ἐχει γάρ, ἐφη, λόγον. ἀλλ' εἰ τις αὖ καὶ ταῦτα ἑρωτώθη ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα ἀττα ἐστὶ καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι, τίνας ἂν φαίμεν; καὶ ἐγὼ εἰπον Ὡ. Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμέν ποιηταὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ 379 παρόντι, ἀλλ' οἰκίσταί πόλεως. οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι, ἐν οἷς δεὶ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ' οὓς ἐὰν ποιώσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μῦθος. Ὅρθῶς, ἐφη. ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἰεν; Τοιοίδε ποὺ τινες, ἢν δ' ἐγώ' οἶδος τυγχάνει δ θεός ὃν, ἀεὶ δὴπο ἀποδοτέον, εἀν τὲ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἐπεσι ποιή ἐὰν τε ἐν μέλεσι' ἐὰν τε ἐν τραγῳδία. Δεῖ γάρ. Οὐκοὖν ἄγαθὸς ὦ γε θεὸς τῷ Β ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὔτως; Τί μὴν; Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γε τῶν ἄγαθῶν βλαβερόν. ἢ γάρ; Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὦ μὴ βλαβερόν, βλάπτει; Οὐδὰ-

1 εἀν τε ἐν μέλεσιν II: om. A.


b The poet, like the rhetorician (Politicus 304 δ), is a ministerial agent of the royal or political art. So virtually Aristotle, Politics 1336 b.

c The γε implies that God is good ex vi termini.

d It is characteristic of Plato to distinguish the fact and
that we must not admit into our city either wrought in allegory\(^a\) or without allegory. For the young are not able to distinguish what is and what is not allegory, but whatever opinions are taken into the mind at that age are wont to prove indelible and unalterable. For which reason, maybe, we should do our utmost that the first stories that they hear should be so composed as to bring the fairest lessons of virtue to their ears."

XVIII. "Yes, that is reasonable," he said; "but if again someone should ask us to be specific and say what these compositions may be and what are the tales, what could we name?" And I replied, "Adeimantus, we are not poets,\(^b\) you and I at present, but founders of a state. And to founders it pertains to know the patterns on which poets must compose their fables and from which their poems must not be allowed to deviate; but the founders are not required themselves to compose fables." "Right," he said; "but this very thing—the patterns or norms of right speech about the gods, what would they be?" "Something like this," I said, "The true quality of God we must always surely attribute to him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse." "We must." "And is not God of course\(^c\) good in reality and always to be spoken of\(^d\) as such?" "Certainly." "But further, no good thing is harmful, is it?" "I think not." "Can what is not harmful the desirability of proclaiming it. The argument proceeds by the minute links which tempt to parody.

Below τὸ ἀγαθὸν, followed by οὐδὲ ἀρα... ὁ θεὸς, is in itself a refutation of the ontological identification in Plato of God and the Idea of Good. But the essential goodness of God is a commonplace of liberal and philosophical theology, from the Stoics to Whittier's hymn, "The Eternal Goodness."
μῶς. Ὡδὲ μὴ βλάπτει, κακῶν τι ποιεῖ; Οὐδὲ τούτο. Ὡδὲ γε μηδὲν κακῶν ποιεῖ, οὐδ’ ἂν τινος ἐὴ κακοῦ αἰτίων; Πῶς γάρ; Τί δὲ; ᾧφελίμον τὸ ἀγαθὸν; Ναί. Αἰτίων ἄρα εὐπραγίας; Ναί. Ὡθ ἄρα πάντων γε αἰτίων τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὗ ἐχόντων αἰτίων, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιων. Παν-
C τελῶς γ’, ἔφη. Οὐδ’ ἄρα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ θεὸς, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν ἐη αἰτίων, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέ-
γουσιν, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτίων, πολ-
λῶν δὲ ἀναίτιων· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν ἠμῶν· καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἀλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀλλ’ ἀττα δεὶ ἢητεὶν τὰ αἰτία, ἀλλ’ οὗ τὸν θεὸν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, δοκεῖς
μοι λέγειν. Ὡθ ἄρα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀποδεκτέον οὔτε
D Ὁμήρου οὔτ’ ἀλλού ποιητοῦ ταύτην τὴν ἀμαρτίαν
περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνοῆτως ἀμαρτάνοντος καὶ λέγοντος
ὡς δοιοὶ πίθοι
κατακείσαταί εν Δίος οὔδει
κηρῶν ἐμπλειοὶ, ὁ μὲν ἔσθλων, αὐτάρ ὁ δειλῶν·
καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν μίξας ὁ Ζεὺς δῶ ἀμφοτέρων,
ἀλλοτε μὲν τε κακῷ ὃ γε κύρεται, ἀλλοτε δ’ ἔσθλῳ,
ὡ δ’ ἂν μὴ, ἀλλ’ ἄκρατα τὰ ἑτερα,

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\(^a\) Anticipates the proclamation of the prophet in the final
myth, 617 ε: \(\text{αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος.} \) The idea, elabor-
atated in Cleanthes’ hymn to Zeus, may be traced back to the
speech of the Homeric Zeus in \(\text{Od. i. 33} \) \(\varepsilon \varepsilon \ θημέων γάρ φασι
κάκ’ ἐμμεναι. \) St. Thomas distinguishes: \(\text{‘Deus est auctor}
malii quod est poena, non autem malii quod est culpa.’}\

\(^b\) A pessimistic commonplace more emphasized in the
harm?" "By no means." "Can that which does not harm do any evil?" "Not that either." "But that which does no evil would not be cause of any evil either?" "How could it?" "Once more, is the good beneficent?" "Yes." "It is the cause, then, of welfare?" "Yes." "Then the good is not the cause of all things, but of things that are well it is the cause—of things that are ill it is blameless."

"Entirely so," he said. "Neither, then, could God," said I, "since he is good, be, as the multitude say, the cause of all things, but for mankind he is the cause of few things, but of many things not the cause." For good things are far fewer with us than evil, and for the good we must assume no other cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for in other things and not in God." "What you say seems to me most true," he replied. "Then," said I, "we must not accept from Homer or any other poet the folly of such error as this about the gods when he says—

Two urns stand on the floor of the palace of Zeus and are filled with Dooms he allots, one of blessings, the other of gifts that are evil,

and to whomsoever Zeus gives of both commingled—

Now upon evil he chances and now again good is his portion,

but the man for whom he does not blend the lots, but to whom he gives unmixed evil—

_Laws_ than in the _Republic_. Cf. _Laws_ 896 e, where the Manichean hypothesis of an evil world-soul is suggested.

*Il. xxiv. 527-532.* Plato, perhaps quoting from memory, abbreviates and adapts the Homeric quotation. This does not justify inferences about the Homeric text.
The line is not found in Homer, nor does Plato explicitly say that it is. Zeus is dispenser of war in II. iv. 84.

II. iv. 69 ff.

"Ερυν τε καὶ κρίσιν" is used in Menex. 237 c of the contest of the gods for Attica. Here it is generally taken of the theomachy, II. xx. 1-74, which begins with the summons of the gods to a council by Themis at the command of Zeus. It has also been understood, rather improbably, of the judgement of Paris.

For the idea, "quem deus vult perdere dementat prius,"
Hunger devouring drives him, a wanderer over the wide world,
nor will we tolerate the saying that
Zeus is dispenser alike of good and of evil to mortals.\(^a\)

XIX. "But as to the violation of the oaths\(^b\) and the truce by Pandarus, if anyone affirms it to have been brought about by the action of Athena and Zeus, we will not approve, nor that the strife and contention\(^c\) of the gods was the doing of Themis and Zeus; nor again must we permit our youth to hear what Aeschylus says—

A god implants the guilty cause in men
When he would utterly destroy a house,\(^d\)

but if any poets compose a 'Sorrows of Niobe,' the poem that contains these iambics, or a tale of the Pelopidae or of Troy, or anything else of the kind, we must either forbid them to say that these woes are the work of God, or they must devise some such interpretation as we now require, and must declare that what God did was righteous and good, and they were benefited\(^e\) by their chastisement. But that they were miserable who paid the penalty, and that the doer of this was God, is a thing that the poet must not be suffered to say; if on the other hand he should say that for needing chastisement the wicked were miserable and that in paying the penalty they were benefited by God, that we must allow. But as to saying that God, who is good,

\(^a\) Plato's doctrine that punishment is remedial must apply to punishments inflicted by the gods. Cf. Protag. 324\(\text{b}\), Gorg. 478\(\text{E}\), 480\(\text{A}\), 505\(\text{B}\), 525\(\text{B}\), infra 590\(\text{A-B}\). Yet there are some incurables. Cf. infra 615\(\text{E}\).
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φάναι θεόν τινι γύγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὅντα, δια-
μαχετέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν
τῇ αὐτῷ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει εὐνομήσεσθαι, μήτε τινὰ
C ἀκούειν, μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτ' ἐν
μέτρῳ μήτε ἄνευ μέτρου μυθολογοῦντα, ὡς οὕτε
όσια ἂν λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο, οὕτε ἡμιμορφα ἧμῖν
οὕτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. Σύμψηφός σοι εἰμι,
ἐφη, τούτου τοῦ νόμου, καὶ μοι ἀρέσκει. Οὕτος
μὲν τοῖνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἂν εἰ ἡ τῶν περὶ θεοὺς
νόμων τε καὶ τύπων, ἐν φ' δέησε τοὺς λέγοντας
λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων αὐτιον
τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Καὶ μάλ', ἐφη, ἀπὸ-
D χρῆ. Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δεύτερος ὁδε; ἀρα γόητα τὸν
θεὸν οἰεί εἶναι καὶ οἶον εἰς ἐπιβουλής φαντάζεσθαι
ἀλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ἱδέαις, τοτε μὲν αὐτὸν γιγνό-
μενον καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἴδος εἰς πολλὰς
μορφὰς, τοτε δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ
αὐτοῦ τουαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἥ ἠπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων
ἡκιστὰ τῆς ἐαυτοῦ ἱδέας ἐκβάινειν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ἐφη,
νῦν γε οὕτως εἰσεῖν. Τί δὲ τόδε; οὐκ ἀνάγκη,
εἴπερ τι ἐξίσταιο τῆς αὐτοῦ ἱδέας, ἥ αὐτὸ ἕφ
Ε ἐαυτοῦ μεθύστασθαι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλον; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκ-
οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλον τὰ ἀριστὰ ἐχοῦντα ἥκιστα
ἀλλοιοῦται τε καὶ κινεῖται; οἶον σῶμα ὑπὸ συτῖων

a Minucius Felix says of Plato's theology, Octav. chap. xix: "Platoni apertior de deo et rebus ipsis et nominibus oratio est et quae tota esset caelestis nisi persuasionis civilis non-nunquam admixtione sordesceret."

b The two methods, (1) self-transformation, and (2) production of illusions in our minds, answer broadly to the two methods of deception distinguished in the Sophist 236 c.

c Cf. Tim. 50 b, Cratyl. 439 e. Aristotle, H. A. i. 1. 32, 188
becomes the cause of evil to anyone, we must contend in every way that neither should anyone assert this in his own city if it is to be well governed, nor anyone hear it, neither younger nor older, neither telling a story in metre or without metre; for neither would the saying of such things, if they are said, be holy, nor would they be profitable to us or concordant with themselves.” “I cast my vote with yours for this law,” he said, “and am well pleased with it.” “This, then,” said I, “will be one of the laws and patterns concerning the gods a to which speakers and poets will be required to conform, that God is not the cause of all things, but only of the good.” “And an entirely satisfactory one,” he said. “And what of this, the second. Do you think that God is a wizard and capable of manifesting himself by design, now in one aspect, now in another, at one time b himself changing and altering his shape in many transformations and at another deceiving us and causing us to believe such things about him; or that he is simple and less likely than anything else to depart from his own form?” “I cannot say offhand,” he replied. “But what of this: If anything went out from c its own form, would it not be displaced and changed, either by itself or by something else?” “Necessarily.” “Is it not true that to be altered and moved d by something else happens least to things that are in the best condition, as, for example, a body by food applies it to biology: τὸ γενναῖον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχιστάμενον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως. Plato’s proof from the idea of perfection that God is changeless has little in common with the Eleatic argument that pure being cannot change.

a The Theaetetus explicitly distinguishes two kinds of motion, qualitative change and motion proper (181 c-d), but the distinction is in Plato’s mind here and in Cratyl. 439 e.
te καὶ ποτῶν καὶ πόνων, καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἰλήφεσῶν τε καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, οὐ τὸ υγιέστατον καὶ ἱσχυρότατον ἢκιστα

381 ἀλλοιοῦται; Πῶς δ’ οὖ; Ψυχὴν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀν-

δρειότατην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἢκιστ’ ἂν τι ἔξωθεν

πάθος ταράξειε τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσειεν; Ναῖ. Καὶ

μὴν ποιν καὶ τά γε ξύνθετα πάντα σκέψῃ τε καὶ

οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀμφιέσματα’ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν

λόγον, τά εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου

t καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων ἢκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται.

"Εστὶ δὴ ταῦτα. Πάν δὴ τὸ καλὸς ἔχων ἢ φύσει ἢ

Β τέχνη ἡ ἀμφοτέρους ἐλαχιστὴν μεταβολὴν ὑπ’ ἄλλου

ἐνδέχεται. "Εοικεν. ’Αλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεὸς γε καὶ τά

τοῦ θεοῦ πάντη ἄριστα ἔχει. Πῶς δ’ οὖ; Ταύτη

μὲν δὴ ἢκιστα ἂν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἴσχοι ὁ θεὸς.

’Ἡκιστα δὴ ταῦτα.

XX. ’Αλλ’ ἀρὰ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεταβάλλει ἂν καὶ

ἄλλοιοι; Δήλον, ἐφη, ὅτι, εἰπὲρ ἀλλοιοῦται. Πό-

τερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει

ἐαυτὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον καὶ τὸ αὐσχον ἐαυτοῦ;

C Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον, εἰπὲρ ἀλλοιοῦται· οὐ

γάρ ποι ἐνδεῖ γε φῆσομεν τὸν θεοῦ κάλλιος ἢ

ἀρετῆς εἶναι. ’Ορθότατα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, λέγεις· καὶ

οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἂν τὸς σοι, ὥ ’Αδείμαντε,

ἐκὼν αὐτὸν χείρω ποιεῖν ὀπηθοῦν ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώ-

πων; ’Αδύνατον, ἐφη. ’Αδύνατον ἀρα, ἐφην, καὶ

θεῶ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄλλοιον, ἄλλ’, ὡς ἔοικε, κάλ-

λιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὑν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκαστος

1 καὶ ἀμφιέσματα II: om. A.

a Cf. Laws 765 e.

b ταράξειε suggests the ἀταραξία of the sage in the later schools.

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and drink and toil, and plants \(^a\) by the heat of the sun and winds and similar influences—is it not true that the healthiest and strongest is least altered?" 

"Certainly." "And is it not the soul that is bravest and most intelligent, that would be least disturbed \(^b\) and altered by any external affection?" "Yes."  

"And, again, it is surely true of all composite implements, edifices, and habiliments, by parity of reasoning, that those which are well made and in good condition are least liable to be changed by time and other influences." "That is so." "It is universally \(^c\) true, then, that that which is in the best state by nature or art or both admits least alteration by something else." "So it seems." "But God, surely, and everything that belongs to God is in every way in the best possible state." "Of course." "From this point of view, then, it would be least of all likely that there would be many forms in God." "Least indeed."  

XX. "But would he transform and alter himself?" "Obviously," he said, "if he is altered." "Then does he change himself for the better and to something fairer, or for the worse \(^d\) and to something uglier than himself?" "It must necessarily," said he, "be for the worse if he is changed. For we surely will not say that God is deficient in either beauty or excellence." "Most rightly spoken," said I. "And if that were his condition, do you think, Adeimantus, that any one god or man would of his own will worsen himself in any way?" "Impossible," he replied. "It is impossible then," said I, "even for a god to wish to alter himself, but, as it appears, each of them being  

\(^{a \, \pi\alpha\nu \, \delta\eta\} \) generalizes from the preceding exhaustive enumeration of cases. \textit{Cf.} 382 \textit{r}, \textit{Parmen.} 139 \alpha. 

\(^{d \, \text{So Aristot.} \, \textit{Met.} \, 1074 \text{b} \, 26.\)
αὐτῶν μένει ἂν ἀπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ μορφῇ. Ἀπασά, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Μηδεῖς ἄρα, 

D ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὃ ἀριστε, λεγέτω ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν, ώς 

θεοὶ ξείνουσι ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖς 

παντοῖοι τελέθοντες ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόλης.

μηδὲ Πρωτέως καὶ Θρέτους καταψυχείς ὑπὸ μηδὲ 

ἐν τραγῳδίαις μηδὲ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοίς ποιήμασιν 

eισαγέτω Ἡραν ἡλιοωμένην ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν

'Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παιῦν βιοδώροις.

Ε καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα πολλὰ μη ἡμῖν ψευδόθωσαν· μηδὲ 

ἀδ ὑπὸ τοῦτον ἀναπειθόμεναι αἰ μητέρες τὰ παιδία 

ἐκδεματοῦντων, λέγουσι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς, ὡς 

ἄρα θεοὶ τινὲς περιέρχονται νῦκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις 

καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἱδαλλόμενοι, ἵνα μη ἁμα μὲν εἰς 

θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἁμα δὲ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπεργάζονται 

δειλότερους. Μὴ γάρ, ἐφη. 'Αλλ' ἄρα, ᾧ: 

δ' ἔγω, αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ οἱ μη μεταβάλλειν 

ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσι δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποῦς φαύνεσθαι 

ἐξαπατώντες καὶ γοητεύοντες; 'Ἰσως, ἐφη. Τὶ 

382 δὲ; ἢν δ' ἔγω· ψευδέσθαι θεος ἐθέλοι ἃν ἡ λόγῳ 

ἡ ἔργω φάντασμα προτεῖνων; Οὐκ οἶδα, ἢ δ' ὡς. 

Οὐκ οἶσθα, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὅτι τὸ γε ὑπὸ ἄληθῶς ψεῦδος, 

eι οἰὸν τε τοῦτο εἰπέιν, πάντες θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσιν; Πῶσ, ἐφη, λέγεις; Οὔτως, ἢν 

δ' ἔγω, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ ποὺ εὐτῶν ψευδέσθαι

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* Cf. Tim. 42 έ εμενεν, which suggested the Neoplatonic and Miltonic paradox that the divine abides even when it goes forth.

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the fairest and best possible abides for ever simply in his own form." "An absolutely necessary conclusion to my thinking." "No poet then," I said, "my good friend, must be allowed to tell us that

The gods, in the likeness of strangers, Many disguises assume as they visit the cities of mortals.®

Nor must anyone tell falsehoods about Proteus and Thetis, nor in any tragedy or in other poems bring in Hera disguised as a priestess collecting alms 'for the life-giving sons of Inachus, the Argive stream.'® And many similar falsehoods they must not tell. Nor again must mothers under the influence of such poets terrify their children® with harmful tales, how that there are certain gods whose apparitions haunt the night in the likeness of many strangers from all manner of lands, lest while they speak evil of the gods they at the same time make cowards of the children." "They must not," he said. "But," said I, "may we suppose that while the gods themselves are incapable of change they cause us to fancy that they appear in many shapes deceiving and practising magic upon us?" "Perhaps," said he. "Consider," said I; "would a god wish to deceive, or lie, by presenting in either word or action what is only appearance?" "I don't know," said he. "Don't you know," said I, "that the veritable lie, if the expression is permissible, is a thing that all gods and men abhor?" "What do you mean?" he said. "This," said I, "that falsehood in the most

® Od. xvii. 485-486, quoted again in Sophist 216 b-c. Cf. Tim. 41 A.
® From the Ξαιρπλαι of Aeschylus.
® Rousseau also deprecates this.
καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα οὐδεὶς ἐκών ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεί αὐτὸ κεκτήσθαι. Οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἢ δ’ ὦς, μανθάνω. Οἶει γάρ τί με,
Β ἐφη, σεμινὸν λέγειν. ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω, ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεῦδεσθαι τε καὶ ἐψευδομαί καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἑχεῖν τε καὶ κεκτήσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἥκιστα ἰδίως δὲκαὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ ποιούτω. Πολὺ γε, ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁρθότατα γ’ ἀν, δ’ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον, τοῦτο ὃς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖς, ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοιαι ἡ τοῦ ἐψευδομένου. ἐπεῖ τὸ γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημα τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶ παθήματος καὶ
C ύστερον γεγονὸς εἰδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἀκρατον ψεῦδος. ἡ οὐχ οὕτως; Πάνυ μὲν οὐν.
XXI. Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται. Δοκεῖ μοι. Τὶ δὲ δὴ; τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὡστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἀρ’ οὐ πρὸς τε τούς πολεμίους, καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἡ τίνα ἁνοιαν κακοῦ τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἐνεκα ὡς
D φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται; καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογιαῖς διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, ὥστε τάληθες ἑχει περὶ τῶν πολαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθείδε τὸ ψεῦδος ὅ τι μάλιστα οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν; Καὶ μάλα, ἡ δ’ ὦς, οὕτως ἑχει. Κατὰ τὶ δὴ οὖν τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεῦδος χρήσιμον;

\[\text{a Cf. Aristot. De Interp. i. 12 ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα. Cf. also Cratyl. 428 d, infra 535 e, Laws 730 c, Bacon, Of Truth: “But it is not the lie that passes through the mind but the lie that sinketh in and settleth in it that doth the hurt.”}

\[\text{b Cf. Phaedr. 245} \Delta \text{ μυρία τῶν πολαιῶν ἐργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς}\]
vital part of themselves, and about their most vital concerns, is something that no one willingly accepts, but it is there above all that everyone fears it." "I don't understand yet either." "That is because you suspect me of some grand meaning," I said; "but what I mean is, that deception in the soul about realities, to have been deceived and to be blindly ignorant and to have and hold the falsehood there, is what all men would least of all accept, and it is in that case that they loathe it most of all." "Quite so," he said. "But surely it would be most wholly right, as I was just now saying, to describe this as in very truth falsehood—ignorance namely in the soul of the man deceived. For the falsehood in words is a copy of the affection in the soul, an after-rising image of it and not an altogether unmixed falsehood. Is not that so?" "By all means."

XXI. "Essential falsehood, then, is hated not only by gods but by men." "I agree." "But what of the falsehood in words, when and for whom is it serviceable so as not to merit abhorrence? Will it not be against enemies? And when any of those whom we call friends owing to madness or folly attempts to do some wrong, does it not then become useful to avert the evil—as a medicine? And also in the fables of which we were just now speaking owing to our ignorance of the truth about antiquity, we liken the false to the true as far as we may and so make it edifying." "We most certainly do," he said. "Tell me, then, on which of these grounds falsehood would be serviceable to God. ἐπιγγυσμένος παίδευε, Isoc. xii. 149 and Livy's Preface. For χρύσιμον cf. Politicus 274ε. We must not infer that Plato is trying to sophisticate away the moral virtue of truth-telling.
πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἂν ψεῦδοιτο; Γελοῖον μὲν᾽ ἂν εἶη, ἐφη. Ποιητὴς μὲν ἄρα ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι. Ὡ δέ οἱ δοκεῖ. 

Ε Ἀλλὰ δεδώς τοὺς ἔχθρους ψεῦδοιτο; Πολλοῦ γε δει. Ἀλλὰ δ᾽ οὐκείον ἀνοιαν ἡ μανίαν; ἈΛΛ' οὔδείς, ἐφη, τῶν ἀνοητῶν καὶ μανιμένων θεοφιλῆς. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὐ ἐνεκα ἂν θεὸς ψεῦδοιτο. οὐκ ἔστιν. Πάντη ἄρα ἄφευδες τὸ δαμμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ θείον. Παυτάπαι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Κομιδὴ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθές ἐν τε ἔργῳ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθύσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾶ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ 383 σημείων πομπᾶς, οὐθ᾽ ὑπάρ οὐτ᾽ ὁναρ. οὔτωσ, ἐφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῶ φαινεται σοῦ λέγοντος. Συνχωρείς ἄρα, ἐφην, τοῦτον δεύτερον τύπον εἶναι· ἐν ὧ δει περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς μήτε αὐτοῦς γοήτας ὄντας τῷ μεταβαλλείν ἑαυτοὺς μήτε ἡμᾶς ψεῦδει παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ; Συνχωρῶ. Πολλὰ ἄρα 'Ομήρου ἑπανοῦντες ἄλλα τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπ- ανεσόμεθα, τήν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπῆν ὑπὸ Δίος τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι· οὐδὲ Δισχύλου, ὅταν φῆ ἢ Θέτις Β τὸν Ὁπόλλω ἐν τοῖς αὐτῆς γάμοις ἄδοντα ἐνδατείσθαι τὰς ἐὰς εὐπαιδίας, νόσων τ' ἀπείρους καὶ μακραίωνες βίους. εὔμπαντα τ' εἰπὼν θεοφιλεῖς ἐμᾶς τόχας παίαν' ἐπευφήμησεν, εὐθυμῶν ἐμέ. καγὼ τὸ Φοῖβοι θείον ἄφευδες στόμα ἥλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῆ βρύον τέχνη.

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*a* Generalizing after the exhaustive classification that precedes.

*b* II. ii. 1-34. This apparent attribution of falsehood to Zeus was an "Homeric problem" which some solved by a 196
Would he because of his ignorance of antiquity make false likenesses of it?" "An absurd supposition, that," he said. "Then there is no lying poet in God." "I think not." "Well then, would it be through fear of his enemies that he would lie?" "Far from it." "Would it be because of the folly or madness of his friends?" "Nay, no fool or madman is a friend of God." "Then there is no motive for God to deceive." "None." "So from every point of view the divine and the divinity are free from falsehood." "By all means." "Then God is altogether simple and true in deed and word, and neither changes himself nor deceives others by visions or words or the sending of signs in waking or in dreams." "I myself think so," he said, "when I hear you say it." "You concur then," I said, "in this as our second norm or canon for speech and poetry about the gods,—that they are neither wizards in shape-shifting nor do they mislead us by falsehoods in words or deed?" "I concur." "Then, though there are many other things that we praise in Homer, this we will not applaud, the sending of the dream by Zeus to Agamemnon, nor shall we approve of Aeschylus when his Thetis avers that Apollo, singing at her wedding, 'foretold the happy fortunes of her issue'—

Their days prolonged, from pain and sickness free,
And rounding out the tale of heaven's blessings,
Raised the proud paean, making glad my heart.
And I believed that Phoebus' mouth divine,
Filled with the breath of prophecy, could not lie.
ο δ', αὐτὸς ὑμνῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θούῃ παρὼν,
αὐτὸς τάδ' εἰπὼν, αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ κτανὼν
τὸν παίδα τὸν ἐμὸν.

ο ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε
καὶ χορῶν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους
ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδείας χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλ-
λουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θείοι
gίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπω εἰπὶ πλεῖστον οἴον
τε. Παντάπασιν, ἐφη, ἐγώγε τοὺς τῦπους τού-
tους συγχωρῶ καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρώμην.
But he himself, the singer, himself who sat
At meat with us, himself who promised all,
Is now himself the slayer of my son.

When anyone says that sort of thing about the gods, we shall be wroth with him, we will refuse him a chorus, neither will we allow teachers to use him for the education of the young if our guardians are to be god-fearing men and god-like in so far as that is possible for humanity.” “By all means,” he said, “I accept these norms and would use them as canons and laws.”
Γ

386 1. Τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς, ἥν δ’ ἐγώ, τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα, ὡς ἐοικέν, ἀκοντσέιον τε καὶ ὁυκ ἀκοντσέιον εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων τοῖς θεοὺς τε τιμήσουσι καὶ γονέας τὴν τε ἄλληλων φιλίαν μὴ περὶ σμικροῦ ποιησμένως. Καὶ οἶμαι γ’, ἔφη, ὁρθῶς ἢμῖν φαίνεσθαι. Τί δὲ δή; εἰ μέλλουσιν εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, ἄρ’ οὐ ταῦτα τε λεκτέον καὶ οἷα αὔτοις ποιῆσαι Β ἡκιστα τὸν θάνατον δεδιέναι; ἥ ἡγεῖ τινὰ ποτ’ ἂν γενέσθαι ἀνδρεῖον, ἔχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτο τὸ δείμα; Μὰ Δία, ἥ δ’ ὦς, οὐκ ἐγὼγε. Τί δὲ; τὰν Ἄιδου ἡγούμενοι εἶναι τε καὶ δεινὰ εἶναι οἶει τινὰ θανάτου ἀδεὴ ἐσεσθαι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις αἰρήσεσθαι πρὸ ἕττης τε καὶ δουλείας θάνατον; Οὐδαμῶς. Δεὶ δὴ, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἡμᾶς ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦτων τῶν μύθων τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν, καὶ δεῖσθαι μὴ λοιδορεῖν ἀπλῶς οὕτως τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου, ἄλλα μᾶλλον C ἐπαινεῖν, ὡς οὕτ’ ἀληθῆ λέγοντας οὕτ’ ὦφέλιμα τοῖς μέλλουσι μαχύμοις ἔσεσθαι. Δεὶ μέντοι, ἔφη.

a We may, if we choose, see here a reference to the virtue of piety, which some critics fancifully suppose was eliminated by the Euthyphro. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, note 58.

b For the idea that death is no evil cf. Apology, in fine.
III

I. "Concerning the gods then," said I, "this is the sort of thing that we must allow or not allow them to hear from childhood up, if they are to honour the gods and their fathers and mothers, and not to hold their friendship with one another in light esteem." "That was our view and I believe it right." "What then of this? If they are to be brave, must we not extend our prescription to include also the sayings that will make them least likely to fear death? Or do you suppose that anyone could ever become brave who had that dread in his heart?" "No indeed, I do not," he replied. "And again if he believes in the reality of the underworld and its terrors, do you think that any man will be fearless of death and in battle will prefer death to defeat and slavery?" "By no means." "Then it seems we must exercise supervision also, in the matter of such tales as these, over those who undertake to supply them and request them not to dispraise in this undiscriminating fashion the life in Hades but rather praise it, since what they now tell us is neither true nor edifying to men who are destined to be warriors." "Yes, we must," he said. "Then,"

*Laws* 727 d, 828 d, and 881 a, where, however, the fear of hell is approved as a deterrent.

* Cf. 377 b.
PLATO

'Εξαλείψομεν ἄρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπὸ τούτῳ τοῦ ἐπον ἄρξάμενοι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα,

βουλοίμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητενέμεν ἄλλω ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ . . .

ἡ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένους ἀνάσσειν·
καὶ τὸ . . .

D  οἰκία δὲ θυητοὶ καὶ ἀθανάτουις φανεῖν

σμερδαλέ’, εὑρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοὶ περ.
καὶ

ὁ πόποι, ἢ βά τις ἔστι καὶ εἰν Ἁίδαο δόμοις

ψυχῇ καὶ εἰδώλοι, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἐνι πάμπαν·
καὶ τὸ

σὺν πεπνύσθαι, ταὶ δὲ σκιαὶ αἰώσουσι.

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a Spoken by Achilles when Odysseus sought to console him for his death, Od. xi. 489-491. Lucian, Dialog. Mort. 18, develops the idea. Proclus comments on it for a page. Cf. Matthew Arnold’s imitation in “Balder Dead”:

Hermod the nimble, gild me not my death!
Better to live a serf, a captured man,
Who scatters rushes in a master’s hall
Than be a crown’d king here, and rule the dead;

Lowell, “After the Burial”:

But not all the preaching since Adam
Has made death other than death;

Heine, Das Buch Le Grand, chap. iii.; Education of Henry Adams: “After sixty or seventy years of growing astonishment the mind wakes to find itself looking blankly into the void of death . . . that it should actually be satisfied would prove . . . idiocy.” Per contra, cf. Landor:

Death stands beside me whispering low
I know not what into my ear.
Of his strange language all I know
Is, there is not a word of fear;
said I, "beginning with this verse we will expunge everything of the same kind:

Liefer were I in the fields up above to be serf to another Tiller of some poor plot which yields him a scanty subsistence, Than to be ruler and king over all the dead who have perished,

and this:

Lest unto men and immortals the homes of the dead be uncovered Horrible, noisome, dank, that the gods too hold in abhorrence,

and:

Ah me! so it is true that e'en in the dwellings of Hades Spirit there is and wraith, but within there is no understanding,

and this:

Sole to have wisdom and wit, but the others are shadowy phantoms,

and the passage of the Cratylus 403 d, exquisitely rendered by Ruskin, Time and Tide xxiv.: "And none of those who dwell there desire to depart thence—no, not even the sirens; but even they the seducers are there themselves beguiled, and they who lulled all men, themselves laid to rest—they and all others—such sweet songs doth death know how to sing to them."

b Il. xx. 64. δείσας μη precedes.

c Il. xxiii. 103. The exclamation and inference (φά) of Achilles when the shade of Patroclus eludes his embrace in the dream. The text is endlessly quoted by writers on religious origins and dream and ghost theories of the origin of the belief in the soul.

d Od. x. 495. Said of the prophet Teiresias. The preceding line is,

Unto him even in death was it granted by Persephoneia.

The line is quoted also in Meno 100 a.
καὶ

ψυχή δὲ ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη "Αὐδόοδε βεβήκει, δὲν πότιμον γοώσα, λιποῦσ' ἀνδροτήτα καὶ ἦβην."

387 καὶ τὸ

ψυχή δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς, ἦπτε καπνός, ὥρχετο τετριγυῖα:

καὶ

ὡς δ' ὅτε νυκτερίδες μυχῶ ἀντρου θεσπεσίοιο τρίζουσαι ποτέονται, ἐπεὶ κέ τις ἀποπέσησιν ὅρμαθυ ἐκ πέτρης, ἀνά τ' ἀλλήλησιν ἤχονται, ὡς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἀμ' Ἥσαν.

Β ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα παρατησόμεθα "Ομηρὸν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς μὴ χαλεπαίνειμὲν ἀν διαγράφωμεν, αὐχ ὡς οὐ ποιητικὰ καὶ ἤδεα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄκουέιν, ἀλλ' ὅσω ποιητικώτερα, τοσοῦτω ἦττον ἀκουστέον παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν, οὐς δεὶ ἔλευθέρους εἶναι, δουλείαν θανάτου μᾶλλον πεφοβημένους. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Π. Οὐκοῦν ἐτί καὶ τὰ περὶ ταύτα ὀνόματα πάντα τὰ δεινὰ τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποβλητεῖα, κωκυς, τοὺς τε καὶ στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας, καὶ

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a Said of the death of Patroclus, Il. xvi. 856, and Hector, xxii. 382; imitated in the last line of the Aeneid "Vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras," which is in turn expanded by Masefield in "August 1914." Cf. Matthew Arnold in "Sohrab and Rustum":

Till now all strength was ebb'd and from his limbs
Unwillingly the spirit fled away,
Regretting the warm mansion which it left,
And youth, and bloom, and this delightful world;
and:

Forth from his limbs unwilling his spirit flitted to Hades,
Wailing its doom and its lustihood lost and the May of its
manhood, *

and:

Under the earth like a vapour vanished the gibbering soul, 

and:

Even as bats in the hollow of some mysterious grotto
Fly with a flittermouse shriek when one of them falls from
the cluster
Whereby they hold to the rock and are clinging the one to
the other,
Flitted their gibbering ghosts. 

We will beg Homer and the other poets not to be
angry if we cancel those and all similar passages,
not that they are not poetic and pleasing to most
hearers, but because the more poetic they are the
less are they suited to the ears of boys and men who
are destined to be free and to be more afraid of
slavery than of death.” “By all means.”

II. “Then we must further taboo in these matters
the entire vocabulary of terror and fear, Cocytus named
of laments loud, abhorred Styx, the flood of
deadly hate, the people of the infernal pit and of

Bacchyl. v. 153-4:

\[ \pi\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon \, \delta\varepsilon \, \pi\nu\acute{e}\omega\nu \, \delta\acute{a}k\rho\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha \, \tau\lambda\acute{a}\mu\omega\nu \, \acute{a}g\lambda\alpha\acute{a}n \, \acute{h}\beta\acute{a}n \, \pi\rho\omega\lambda\epsilon\iota\pi\omicron\nu. \]

\( ^b \) Cf. II. xxiii. 100.

\( ^c \) Od. xxiv. 6-10. Said of the souls of the suitors slain by
Odysseus. Cf. Tennyson, “Oenone”:

Thin as the bat-like shrillings of the dead.

\( ^d \) Cf. Theaetet. 177 c \( \omicron \upsilon \kappa \) \( \acute{a}g\delta\acute{e}\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha \, \acute{a}k\omega\omicron\epsilon\omicron\nu. \)

\( ^e \) Milton’s words, which I have borrowed, are the best
expression of Plato’s thought.

205
PLATO

άλλα ὅσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου οὐνομαζόμενα φρίττευν δὴ ποιεῖ ὅσα ἐτη¹ πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ὅσως εὖ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλο τι· ἤμείς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλάκων φοβούμεθα, μὴ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης φρίκης θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακότεροι τοῦ δέοντος γένωνται ἡμῖν. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, φοβούμεθα. 'Αφ- 

αιρετέα ἄρα; Ναι. Τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον τύπου τούτους λεκτέον τε καὶ ποιητέον; Δήλα δή. Καὶ τοὺς

D ὁδυρμοὺς ἄρα ἐξαιρήσομεν καὶ τοὺς οἴκτους τοὺς τῶν ἐλλογίμων ἄνδρῶν; 'Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρότερα. Σκόπει δή, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ὀρθῶς ἐξαιρήσομεν ἡ οὐ. φαμέν δὲ δή, ὅτι ο ἐπιεικὴς ἀνήρ τῷ ἐπιεικεί, οὕπερ καὶ ἐπαίρος ἔστι, τὸ τεθνάναι οὐ δεινὸν ἡγήσεται. Φαμέν γάρ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπὲρ γ' ἐκείνου ὡς δεινὸν τι πεπονθότος ὀδύροιτ' ἄν. Οὐ δήτα. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε λέγομεν, ὡς ο τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτῷ αὐτ- 

Ε ἄρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζήν, καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἠκιστά ἐτέρου προσδείται. 'Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. 'Ἡκιστ' ἄρ' αὐτῷ δεινὸν στερηθήναι νίεος ἡ ἀδελφοῦ ἡ

¹ ὅσα ἐτη is a plausible emendation of Hermann, referring to annual recitations of rhapsodists and performances of tragedy. The best mss. read ὃς οἴεται, some others ὃς οἴν τε. Perhaps the words are best omitted.

α φρίττευν and φρίκη are often used of the thrill or terror of tragedy. Cf. Soph. El. 1402, O.T. 1306, Aeschyl. Prom. 540.

b Some say, to frighten the wicked, but more probably for their aesthetic effect. Cf. 390 Α εἰ δὲ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονὴν παρέχεται, Laws 886 c εἰ μὲν εἰς ἄλλο τι καλῶς ἡ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει.

c θερμότεροι contains a playful suggestion of the fever of 206
the charnel-house, and all other terms of this type, whose very names send a shudder to through all the hearers every year. And they may be excellent for other purposes, but we are in fear for our guardians lest the habit of such thrills make them more sensitive and soft than we would have them.” “And we are right in so fearing.” “We must remove those things then?” “Yes.” “And the opposite type to them is what we must require in speech and in verse?” “Obviously.” “And shall we also do away with the wailings and lamentations of men of repute?” “That necessarily follows,” he said, “from the other.” “Consider,” said I, “whether we shall be right in thus getting rid of them or not. What we affirm is that a good man will not think that for a good man, whose friend he also is, death is a terrible thing.” “Yes, we say that.” “Then it would not be for his friend’s sake as if he had suffered something dreadful that he would make lament.” “Certainly not.” “But we also say this, that such a one is most of all men sufficient unto himself for a good life and is distinguished from other men in having least need of anybody else.” “True,” he replied. “Least of all then to him is following the chill; cf. Phaedr. 251 a. With μαλακότεροι the image passes into that of softened metal; cf. 411 b, Laws 666 b-c, 671 b.

That only the good can be truly friends was a favourite doctrine of the ancient moralists. Cf. Lysis 214 c, Xen. Mem. ii. 6, 9, 20.

Cf. Phaedo 117 c “I wept for myself, for surely not for him.”

αὐτάρκης is the equivalent of ἰκάνος αὐτῷ in Lysis 215 a. For the idea cf. Menex. 247 e. Self-sufficiency is the mark of the good man, of God, of the universe (Tim. 33 d), of happiness in Aristotle, and of the Stoic sage.
χρημάτων ἡ ἄλλοι τῶν τῶν τοιούτων. "Ἡκιστα
μέντοι. "Ἡκιστ' ἀρα καὶ ὀδύρεται, φέρει" δὲ ὡς
πραότατα, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν τοιαύτη ἐξιμφορὰ κατα-
λάβῃ. Πολὺ γε. 'Ορθῶς ἄρ' ἂν ἔξαυροίμεν τοὺς
θρήνους τῶν ὄνοματῶν ἀνδρῶν, γυναιξὶ δὲ ἀπο-
388 ὁδοίμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτας σπουδαίας, καὶ ὁσι
κακοὶ τῶν ἄνδρῶν, ἵνα ἡμῖν δυσχεραίνωσιν ὂμοια
τούτων ποιεῖν οὐδ' ἄφημεν ἐπὶ φυλακῇ τῆς χώρας
τρέφειν. 'Ορθῶς, ἐφη. Πάλιν ὁ δὴ Ὦμήρου τε
dεησόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν μὴ ποιεῖν
'Αχιλλέα θεᾶς παῖδα

ἄλλοτ' ἐπὶ πλευρᾶς κατακείμενον, ἄλλοτε δ' αὐτὲ
ὑπτιον, ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνη,
τοτὲ δ' ὀρθὸν ἀναστάντα

πλωίζοντ' ἀλύντ' ἐπὶ θῖν' ἀλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο,

Β μηδὲ ἀμφοτέρημι χερσὶν ἐλόντα κόνιν αἰθαλό-
εσσαν χενάμενον καὶ κεφαλῆς, μηδὲ ἄλλα κλαί-
οντά τε καὶ ὁδυρόμενον, ὃσα καὶ οἰα ἐκεῖνος
ἐποίησε: μηδὲ Πρίαμον ἐγγὺς θεῶν γεγονότα
λιτανεύοντα τε καὶ κυλινδόμενον κατὰ κόπρον,

εξονομακλήδην ὄνομαξοντ' ἀνδρα ἐκαστον.

1 ὀδύρεται, φέρει] this conjecture of Stallbaum reads more
smoothly: the mss. have ὀδύρεσθαι φέρειν.

a Cf. the anecdotes of Pericles and Xenophon and the
comment of Pater on Marcus Aurelius in Marius the
Epicurean. Plato qualifies the Stoic extreme in 603 e. The
Platonic ideal is μετριοπάθεια, the Stoic ἀπάθεια,
b Cf. 398 e.

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it a terrible thing to lose son or brother or his wealth or anything of the sort." "Least of all." "Then he makes the least lament and bears it most moderately when any such misfortune overtakes him." "Certainly." "Then we should be right in doing away with the lamentations of men of note and in attributing them to women, and not to the most worthy of them either, and to inferior men, in order that those whom we say we are breeding for the guardianship of the land may disdain to act like these." "We should be right," said he. "Again then we shall request Homer and the other poets not to portray Achilles, the son of a goddess, as,

Lying now on his side, and then again on his back,
And again on his face,

and then rising up and

Drifting distraught on the shore of the waste unharvested ocean,

nor as clutching with both hands the sooty dust and strewing it over his head, nor as weeping and lamenting in the measure and manner attributed to him by the poet; nor yet Priam, near kinsman of the gods, making supplication and rolling in the dung,

Calling aloud unto each, by name to each man appealing.

\[\text{The description of Achilles mourning for Patroclus, II. xxiv. 10-12. Cf. Juvenal iii. 279-280:}
\]
\[
\text{Noctem patitur lugentis amicum Pelidae, cubat in faciem mox deinde supinus.}
\]

\[\text{II. xxiv. 12. Our text of Homer reads } δινεύεσθαι ἄλων παρὰ θεῖν ἄλως, οὖδὲ μὲν ἢ ὡς. Plato's text may be intentional burlesque or it may be corrupt.}
\]

\[\text{II. xviii. 23-24. When he heard of Patroclus's death.}
\]

\[\text{II. xxii. 414-415.}
\]
plů δ’ ἐτὶ τοὺτων μᾶλλον δεσιόμεθα μήτοι θεοὺς γε ποιεῖν ὀδυρομένους καὶ λέγοντας

C ὃ μοι ἐγὼ δειλή, ὃ μοι δυσαριστοτόκεια:
eἰ δ’ οὖν θεοὺς, μήτοι τὸν γε μέγιστον τῶν θεῶν
tομήσαι οὕτως ἄνομοίς μιμήσασθαι, ὥστε ὃ πόποι, φάναι,

ἡ φίλον ἄνδρα διωκόμενον περὶ ἀστι
οφθαλμοῖσιν ὅρωμαί, ἐμὸν δ’ ὀλοφύρεται ἥτορ·
καὶ

αἷ αἰ ἐγὼν, ὅτε μοι Σαρπιδόνα φίλτατον ἄνδρῶν

D μοῖρ’ ὑπὸ Πατρόκλου Μενοιτιάδαο δαμῆναι.

III. Εἰ γάρ, ὃ φίλε 'Αδείμαντε, τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡμῖν
οἱ νέοι σπουδῆ ἀκούοιεν καὶ μὴ καταγελώειν ὡς
ἀναξίως λεγομένων, σχολῆ ἂν ἐαυτὸν γε τις ἀνθρωπὸν ὄντα ἀνάξιον ἡγήσατο τοὺτον καὶ ἐπι-
πλήξει εἰ καὶ ἐπίοι αὐτῷ τουοῦτον ἡ λέγειν ἦ
ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν αἰσχυνόμενος οὐδὲ καρτερῶν πολ-
λοὺς ἐπὶ συμκροίαν παθῆμασι θρήνους ἢν ἄδοι καὶ

E ὀδυρμοὺς. 'Αληθέστατα, ἐφη, λέγεις. Δεῖ δὲ γε
οὐχ, ὡς ἄρτι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἐσθημαίνειν. ὃ πευτέον,
ἔως ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἄλλω καλλίουν πείσῃ. Ὅν γὰρ
οὖν δεῖ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ φιλογέλωτας γε δεῖ

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\( a \) Thetis in II. xviii. 54.
\( b \) Cf. 377 e.
\( c \) II. xxii. 168. Zeus of Hector.
\( d \) II. xvi. 433-434. Cf. Virgil's imitation, Aen. x. 465 ff.,
Cicero, De Div. ii. ch. 10, and the imitation of the whole
passage in Matthew Arnold's "Balder Dead."
\( e \) I have imitated the suggestion of rhythm in the original
which with its Ionic dative is perhaps a latent quotation
from tragedy. Cf. Chairemon, οὐδεὶς ἐπὶ συμκροιά ἀυτῆπαι
σοφὸς, N. fr. 37.

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And yet more than this shall we beg of them at least not to describe the gods as lamenting and crying,

Ah, woe is me, woeful mother who bore to my sorrow the bravest,

and if they will so picture the gods at least not to have the effrontery to present so unlikely a likeness of the supreme god as to make him say:

Out on it, dear to my heart is the man whose pursuit around Troy-town
I must behold with my eyes while my spirit is grieving within me,

and:

Ah, woe is me! of all men to me is Sarpedon the dearest,
Fated to fall by the hands of Patroclus, Menoitus' offspring.

III. "For if, dear Adeimantus, our young men should seriously incline to listen to such tales and not laugh at them as unworthy utterances, still less likely would any man be to think such conduct unworthy of himself and to rebuke himself if it occurred to him to do or say anything of that kind, but without shame or restraint full many a dirge for trifles would he chant and many a lament."

"You say most truly," he replied. "But that must not be, as our reasoning but now showed us, in which we must put our trust until someone convinces us with a better reason." "No, it must not be."

"Again, they must not be prone to laughter." For

The ancients generally thought violent laughter undignified. Cf. Isoc. Demon. 15, Plato, Laws 732 c, 935 b, Epictet. Encheirid. xxxiii. 4, Dio Chrys. Or. 33. 703 R. Diog. Laert. iii. 26, reports that Plato never laughed excessively in his youth. Aristotle's great-souled man would presumably have eschewed laughter (Eth. iv. 8, Rhet. 1389 b 10), as Lord Chesterfield advises his son to do.
PLATO

εἶναι. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὅταν τις ἐφὴ ἱσχυρῶ γέλωτι, ἱσχυρὰν καὶ μεταβολὴν ζητεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφη. Οὕτε ἄρα ἀνθρώπους ἥξιοις λόγου 389 κρατομέμενοι ὑπὸ γέλωτος ἀν τις ποιή, ἀποδεκτέον, πολὺ δὲ ἦττον, ἑάν θεοῦ. Πολὺ μὲντοι, ἢ δ’ ὅς. Οὔκουν Ὁμήρου οὔδε τὰ τοιαῦτα [ἀποδεξόμεθα περὶ θεῶν],

ἀοβεστὸς δ’ ἄρ’ ἐνώρτο γέλως μακάρεσσον θεοῦσιν, ὡς ἢδον Ὁφαιστὸν διὰ δύματα ποινύοντα,

οὐκ ἀποδεκτέον κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. Ἐι σὺ, ἐφη, Β θεοὺς ἐμὸν τιθέναι οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ ἀποδεκτέον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητεύον. εἰ γὰρ ὅρθως ἠλέγομεν ἁρτι καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεοῦσι μὲν ἄχρηστον πειδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρήσιμον ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει, δῆλον, ὅτι τὸ γε τοιοῦτον ἰατροῖς δοτέον, ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἀπτέον. Δῆλον, ἐφη. Τοῖς ἀρχομοι δὴ τῆς πόλεως εἴπερ τοιοῦ ἄλλοις προσήκει πειδος ἡ πολεμίων ἡ πολιτῶν ἐνεκα ἐπ’ ωφελεῖα τῆς πόλεως· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πᾶσιν οὐχ Σ ἀπτέον τοῦ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γε δὴ τοὺς τοιοῦτος ἀρχομόσιν ἰδιώτης πειδοσσαθαι ταύτον καὶ μείζων ἀμάρτημα φήσομεν ἡ κάμνοντι πρὸς ἰατρὸν ἢ ἀσκοῦντι πρὸς παιδοτρίβην περὶ τῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ

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*a* In 563 e Plato generalizes this psychological principle.

*b* This laughter of the Homeric gods has been endlessly commented upon. Hegel allegorizes it. Mrs. Browning ("Aurora Leigh") says:

And all true poets laugh unquenchably  
Like Shakespeare and the gods.

Proclus, *In Rempub.* i. 127 Kroll, says that it is an expression of the abundance of the divine energy. It is a commonplace repeated by George Eliot that the primitive sense of humour
ordinarily when one abandons himself to violent laughter his condition provokes a violent reaction." "I think so," he said. "Then if anyone represents men of worth as overpowered by laughter we must not accept it, much less if gods." "Much indeed," he replied. "Then we must not accept from Homer such sayings as these either about the gods:

Quenchless then was the laughter that rose from the blessed immortals

When they beheld Hephaestus officiously puffing and panting.

—we must not accept it on your view." "If it pleases you to call it mine," he said; "at any rate we must not accept it." "But further we must surely prize truth most highly. For if we were right in what we were just saying and falsehood is in very deed useless to gods, but to men useful as a remedy or form of medicine, it is obvious that such a thing must be assigned to physicians, and laymen should have nothing to do with it." "Obviously," he replied. "The rulers then of the city may, if anybody, fitly lie on account of enemies or citizens for the benefit of the state; no others may have anything to do with it, but for a layman to lie to rulers of that kind we shall affirm to be as great a sin, nay a greater, than it is for a patient not to tell his physician or an athlete his trainer the truth of the Homeric gods laughs at the personal deformity of Hephaestus, but they really laugh at his officiousness and the contrast he presents to Hebe. Cf. my note in Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223.

Cf. on 334 D.


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σώματος παθημάτων μὴ τάληθη λέγειν, ἡ πρὸς κυβερνήτην περὶ τῆς νεώς τε καὶ τῶν ναυτῶν μὴ τὰ ὅντα λέγοντι, ὅπως ἡ αὐτὸς ἡ τις τῶν ἕυν- ναυτῶν πράξεως ἔχει. 'Αληθέστατα, ἐφη. "Ἀν
D ἂρ' ἄλλον τινὰ λαμβάνῃ ψευδόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει
tῶν οὗ δημιουργοί ἔσοι,

μάντιν ἡ ἴητηρα κακῶν ἡ τέκτωνα δούρων,

κολάσει ὡς ἐπιτίθενμα εἰσάγοντα πόλεως ὁσπερ νεώς ἀνατρεπτικόν τε καὶ ὀλέθριον. 'Εὰν γε, η
d' ὃς, ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελήται. Τί δὲ; σωφρο-
σύνης ἁρα οὐ δεῖσει ἡμῖν τοὺς νεανίας; Πῶς δ' οὖ;
Σωφροσύνης δὲ ὡς πλήθει οὐ τὰ τοιάδε
μέγιστα, ἄρχοντων μὲν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ
Ε ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἄφροδίσια καὶ περὶ
ἐδωδᾶς ἡδονῶν; "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ. Τὰ δὴ τοιάδε
φήσομεν, οἴμαι, καλῶς λέγεσθαι, οία καὶ Ὁμήρῳ
Διομήδης λέγει,

τέττα, σιωπὴ ἡσο, ἐμῶ δ' ἐπιπείθεο μῦθω,
καὶ τὰ τοῦτων ἐχόμενα, τὰ

[Ἰσαν μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί]

σιγῆ δειδιότες σημάντορας,

390 καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Καλῶς. Τί δὲ; τὰ τοιάδε

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b The word is chosen to fit both ship and state. Cf.
424 e, 442 b; and Alcaeus apud Aristoph. Wasps 1235, Eurip.
Phoen. 888, Aeschines iii. 158, Epictet. iii. 7. 20.
c That is, probably, if our Utopia is realized. Cf. 452 α
ἐπὶ πράξεως ἑ λέγεται. Cf. the imitation in Epistles 357 α
ἐπὶ ἔργα ἐπὶ νῦ ἐγθησομενο.
d For the mass of men, as distinguished from the higher
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about his bodily condition, or for a man to deceive the pilot about the ship and the sailors as to the real condition of himself or a fellow-sailor, and how they fare." "Most true," he replied. "If then the ruler catches anybody else in the city lying, any of the craftsmen

Whether a prophet or healer of sickness or joiner of timbers, a he will chastise him for introducing a practice as subversive b and destructive of a state as it is of a ship." "He will," he said, "if deed follows upon word. c " "Again, will our lads not need the virtue of self-control?" "Of course." "And for the multitude d are not the main points of self-control these—to be obedient to their rulers and themselves to be rulers e over the bodily appetites and pleasures of food, drink, and the rest?" "I think so." "Then, I take it, we will think well said such sayings as that of Homer's Diomed:

Friend, sit down and be silent and hark to the word of my bidding, f

and what follows:  
Breathing high spirit the Greeks marched silently fearing their captains, g

and all similar passages." "Yes, well said." "But what of this sort of thing?


a In Gorg. 491 d-E, Callicles does not understand what Socrates means by a similar expression.

b II. iv. 412. Diomede to Sthenelos.

c In our Homer this is II. iii. 8, and σεγγύ κτλ. iv. 431. See Howes in Harvard Studies, vi. pp. 153-237.
οίνοβαρές, κυνός ὀμματ’ ἔχων, κραδίνην δ’ ἐλάφοιο καὶ τὰ τούτων ἔξης ἄρα καλῶς, καὶ ὀσο ἀλλα τις ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ποιήσει εἰρήκει νεανιεύματα ἰδιωτῶν εἰς ἄρχοντας; Οὐ καλῶς. Οὐ γάρ, οἴμαι, εἰς γε σωφροσύνην νέους ἐπιτήδεια ἄκουειν· εἰ δὲ τινα ἀλλήν ἥδονὴν παρέχεται, θαυμαστόν οὐδέν’ ἢ πῶς σοι φαίνεται; Οὔτως, ἐφη.

IV. Τι δέ; ποιεῖν ἄνδρα τὸν σοφώτατον λέγοντα, ὡς δοκεῖ αὐτῷ κάλλιστον εἶναι πάντων, ὅταν παραπλεῖαι ὦσι τράπεζαι

B σῖτου καὶ κρείων, μέθυ δ’ ἐκ κρητήρως ἀφύσων οίνοχόος φορέσῃ καὶ ἐγχείη δεπάεσσι,

δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν ἕαυτοῦ ἄκουειν νέω; ἢ τὸ

λιμῷ δ’ οἰκτιστὸν θανέειν καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν;

ἡ Δία, καθευδόντων τῶν ἀλλών θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ μόνος ἐγγηγορός ἡ ἐβουλεύσατο,

C τούτων πάντων ῥάδιως ἐπιλαυθανόμενον διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὔτως ἐκπλαγέντα ἴδόντα τὴν Ἡραν, ὅστε μηδ’ εἰς τὸ δυσμάτιον ἐθέλειν ἐλθέων, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ βουλόμενον χαμαὶ ξυγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ λέγοντα ὡς οὔτως ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχεται, ὡς οὔδ’ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐφοίτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους

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a II. i. 225. Achilles to the commander-In-chief. Agamemnon. Several lines of insult follow.

b Cf. Philebus 42 c.

c Cf. Gorgias 482 c.

Odysseus in Od. ix. 8-10. For παραπλεῖαι the Homeric text has παρὰ δὲ πλῆθῳ. Plato’s treatment of the quotation 216
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

Heavy with wine with the eyes of a dog and the heart of a fleet deer,
and the lines that follow, are these well—and other impertinences in prose or verse of private citizens to their rulers?" "They are not well." "They certainly are not suitable for youth to hear for the inculcation of self-control. But if from another point of view they yield some pleasure we must not be surprised; or what is your view of it?" "This," he said.

IV. "Again, to represent the wisest man as saying that this seems to him the fairest thing in the world,

When the bounteous tables are standing
Laden with bread and with meat and the cupbearer ladles the sweet wine
Out of the mixer and bears it and empties it into the beakers.
—do you think the hearing of that sort of thing will conduce to a young man's temperance or self-control? or this:

Hunger is the most piteous death that a mortal may suffer. Or to hear how Zeus lightly forgot all the designs which he devised, awake while the other gods and men slept, because of the excitement of his passions, and was so overcome by the sight of Hera that he is not even willing to go to their chamber, but wants to lie with her there on the ground and says that he is possessed by a fiercer desire than when they first consorted with one another,

is hardly fair to Homer. Aristotle, Pol. 1338 a 28, cites it more fairly to illustrate the use of music for entertainment (διανοιγή). The passage, however, was liable to abuse. See the use made of it by Lucian, Parasite 10.

* Od. xii. 342.  
† Il. xiv. 294-341.
φίλους λήθοντες τοκῆς;

οὔδε Ἄρεως τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης ὑπὸ Ῥήματος δεσμὸν δὲ ἐτερα τοιαῦτα. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ἢ δ᾿ ὅς,

D οὐ μοι φαίνεται ἐπτυθεῖον. 'Αλλ᾽ εἴ πού τινες,

δὲ ἐγώ, καρτερία πρὸς ἀπαντά καὶ λέγονται

καὶ πράττονται ὑπὸ ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν, θεατέον τε

καὶ ἀκουστέον, οἶνον καὶ τὸ

στῆθος δὲ πλῆξας κραδίνην ἠνίπατε μύθω.

τέπλαθι δὴ, κραδίνη· καὶ κῦντερον ἄλλο ποτ᾽ ἔτης.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Οὐ μὲν δὴ δωροδόκους

γε ἐπαίνει εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρας οὔδε φιλοχρημάτους.

Ε Ὄνδαμώς. Οὔδ᾽ ἀστέον αὐτοῖς ὁτι

dῶρα θεοὺς πείθει, δῶρ᾽ αἰδοίους βασιλῆς.

οὔδὲ τὸν τὸν Ἀχιλλέως παιδαγωγὸν Φοίνικα

ἐπανετέον, ὡς μετρίως ἐλεγε συμβουλεύων αὐτῷ

dῶρα μὲν λαβόντι ἐπαμύνειν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ

dόρων μη ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τῆς μένιος. οὔδ᾽ αὐτὸν

τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἀξιώσομεν οὔδ᾽ ὀμολογήσομεν οὗτω

φιλοχρήματον εἶναι, ὡστε παρὰ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονος

dῶρα λαβεῖν, καὶ τιμήν αὐ λαβόντα νεκρὸν ἀπο-

391 λύειν, ἀλλὰς δὲ μὴ θέλειν. Ὀ̎κουν δικαίον γε,

ἐφη, ἐπανεῖν τὰ τουαῦτα. Ἄκυνω δὲ γε, ἢν δ᾽

de ἐγώ, δι Ὄμηρον λέγειν, ὅτι οὔδ᾽ ὅσιον ταῦτα γε

κατὰ Ἀχιλλέως φάναι καὶ ἀλλων λεγόντων πεί-

θεσθαι, καὶ αὐ ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ἀπόλλω εἴπεν

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a Od. viii. 266 ff.
b May include on Platonic principles the temptations of pleasure. Cf. Laws 633 d, Laches 191 d-e.
c Od. xx. 17-18. Quoted also in Phaedo 94 d-e.
d Suidas s.v. δῶρα says that some attributed the line to
Deceiving their dear parents.

Nor will it profit them to hear of Hephaestus's fettering of Ares and Aphrodite for a like motive. "No, by Zeus," he said, "I don't think it will."

But any words or deeds of endurance in the face of all odds attributed to famous men are suitable for our youth to see represented and to hear, such as:

He smote his breast and chided thus his heart,
'Endure, my heart, for worse hast thou endured.'

"By all means," he said. "It is certain that we cannot allow our men to be acceptors of bribes or greedy for gain." "By no means." "Then they must not chant:

Gifts move the gods and gifts persuade dread kings.

Nor should we approve Achilles' attendant Phoenix as speaking fairly when he counselled him if he received gifts for it to defend the Achaeans, but without gifts not to lay aside his wrath; nor shall we think it proper nor admit that Achilles himself was so greedy as to accept gifts from Agamemnon and again to give up a dead body after receiving payment but otherwise to refuse." "It is not right," he said, "to commend such conduct." "But, for Homer's sake," said I, "I hesitate to say that it is positively impious to affirm such things of Achilles and to believe them when told by others; or again to believe that he said to Apollo


See his speech, II. ix. 515 ff.

' Cf. II. xix. 278 ff. But Achilles in Homer is indifferent to the gifts.

II. xxiv. 502, 555, 594. But in 560 he does not explicitly mention the ransom.

Cf. 368 b.
"βλαψάς μ’ ἐκάργαγς, θεὸν ὀλούτατε πάντων· ἢ σ’ ἀν τισαίμην, εἴ μοι δύναμις γε παρεύῃ.

Β καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὸν ποταμὸν, θεὸν ὄντα, ἀπειθῶς εἶχε καὶ μάχεσθαι ἕτοιμος ἢν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου ποταμοῦ Σπερχείου ἱερὰς τρίχας.

Πατρόκλῳ ἦρω, ἐφη, κόμην ὀπάσαιμοι φέρεσθαι, νεκρῷ ὄντι, καὶ ὡς ἐδρασε τοῦτο, οὐ πειστέον. τὰς τε αὖ Ἐκτόρος ἔλεισι περὶ τὸ σήμα τὸ Πατρόκλου καὶ τὰς τῶν ζωγρηθέντων σφαγάς εἰς τὴν πυράν, ἐξυπναντα τὰῦτα οὐ φήσομεν ἀληθῆ εἰρή

C ἄθα, οὖν ἐάσομεν πείθεσθαι τοὺς ἥμετέρους ὡς Ἀχιλλεὺς, θεᾶς ὃν παῖς καὶ Πηλέως, σωφρονεστάτου τε καὶ τρίτου ἄπο Διὸς, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σοφωτάτων Χείρων τεθραμμένος, τοσαύτης ἢν ταραχῆς πλέον, ὡστ' ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῶ νοσήματε δυὸ ἐναντίων άλληλουν, ἀνελευθερίαν μετὰ φιλοχρηματίας καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπερηφανίαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων Ὁρθῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις.

V. Μὴ τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μηδὲ τάδε πειθώμεθα μηδ' ἐώμεν λέγειν, ὡς Θησεύς Ποσειδώνος νῦς

D Πειρίδους τε Διὸς ὠμησθεν οὖτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγάς, μηδὲ τῶν ἄλλον θεοῦ παιδά τε καὶ ἢρῳ

a II. xxii. 15. Professor Wilamowitz uses ὀλούτατε to prove that Apollo was a god of destruction. But Menelaus says the same of Zeus in II. iii. 365. Cf. Class. Phil. vol. iv. (1909) p. 329.

b Scamander. II. xxi. 130-132.

c II. xxiii. 151. Cf. Proclus, p. 146 Kroll. Plato exaggerates to make his case. The locks were vowed to Sperchecius on the condition of Achilles’ return. In their context the words are innocent enough.

d II. xxiv. 14 ff.

e II. xxiii. 175-176.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III

Me thou hast baulked, Far-darter, the most pernicious of all gods,
Mightily would I requite thee if only my hands had the power.¹

And how he was disobedient to the river,² who was a god, and was ready to fight with him, and again that he said of the locks of his hair, consecrated to the other river Spercheius:

This let me give to take with him my hair to the hero, Patroclus,³ who was a dead body, and that he did so we must not believe. And again the trailings⁴ of Hector's body round the grave of Patroclus and the slaughter⁵ of the living captives upon his pyre, all these we will affirm to be lies, nor will we suffer our youth to believe that Achilles, the son of a goddess and of Peleus the most chaste⁶ of men, grandson⁷ of Zeus, and himself bred under the care of the most sage Cheiron, was of so perturbed a spirit as to be affected with two contradictory maladies, the greed that becomes no free man and at the same time overweening arrogance towards gods and men.” "You are right,” he said.

V. “Neither, then,” said I, "must we believe this or suffer it to be said, that Theseus, the son of Poseidon, and Peirithoüs, the son of Zeus, attempted such dreadful rapes,⁸ nor that any other child of a

³ Theseus was assisted by Peirithoüs in the rape of Helen and joined Peirithoüs in the attempt to abduct Persephone. Theseus was the theme of epics and of lost plays by Sophocles and Euripides.
Plato was probably thinking of this passage when he wrote the last paragraph of the Critias.

From Aeschylus's Niobe.

Cf. my note in Class. Phil. vol. xii. (1910) p. 308.
god and hero would have brought himself to accomplish the terrible and impious deeds that they now falsely relate of him. But we must constrain the poets either to deny that these are their deeds or that they are the children of gods, but not to make both statements or attempt to persuade our youth that the gods are the begetters of evil, and that heroes are no better than men. For, as we were saying, such utterances are both impious and false. For we proved, I take it, that for evil to arise from gods is an impossibility.” “Certainly.” “And they are furthermore harmful to those that hear them. For every man will be very lenient with his own misdeeds if he is convinced that such are and were the actions of

The near-sown seed of gods,  
Close kin to Zeus, for whom on Ida’s top  
Ancestral altars flame to highest heaven,  
Nor in their life-blood fails the fire divine.

For which cause we must put down such fables, lest they breed in our youth great laxity in turpitude.” “Most assuredly.” “What type of discourse remains for our definition of our prescriptions and proscriptions? We have declared the right way of speaking about gods and daemons and heroes and that other world?” “We have.” “Speech, then, about men would be the remainder.” “Obviously.” “It is impossible for us, my friend, to place this here.” “Why?” “Because I presume we are going to say that so it is that both poets and writers of prose speak wrongly about men in matters of greatest moment, saying

Or possibly “determine this at present.” The prohibition which it would beg the question to place here is made explicit in Laws 660 e. Cf. Laws 899 d, and supra 364 b.
μέγιστα, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄδικοι μὲν, εὐδαίμονες δὲ πολλοὶ, δίκαιοι δὲ ἄθλιοι, καὶ ὃς λυστελεῖ τὸ ἄδικεῖν, ἐὰν λανθάνῃ, ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλότριον μὲν ἀγαθόν, οὐκεία δὲ ἥμιστα καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀπερέαν λέγειν, τὰ δὲ ἐνναῦ τούτων προστάξειν ἀδειν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν. ἢ οὐκ οἷοι; Ἐὰν μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, οἶδα. Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν ὀμολογήσῃς ὀρθῶς με λέγειν, φήσω σε ὄμολογηκέναι ἃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν;

C Ὀρθῶς, ἐφη, ὑπέλαβες. Οὐκοῦν περὶ άνθρώπων ὅτι τοιούτους δεῖ λόγους λέγεσθαι, τότε δι-ομολογησόμεθα, ὅταν εὑρωμεν, οἶνον ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ὃς φύσει λυστελοῦν τῶν ἔχοντι, εάν τε δοκῇ εάν τε μὴ τοιοῦτος εἶναι; Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη.

VI. Τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων πέρι ἐχέτω τέλος, τὸ δὲ λέξεως, ὃς ἐγὼ, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτεόν, καὶ ἦμιν ἀ τε λεκτέον καὶ ὃς λεκτέον παντελῶς ἐσκέφτεται. καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Τοῦτο, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ὃς μανθάνω δὲ τι λέγεις. Ἀλλὰ μὲντοι, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, δεῖ γε. ὅσως οὖν τίθε μᾶλλον εἴσει. ἄρ᾽ οὖ πάντα, οὐκ οὑ μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν λέγεται, διήγησος οὖσα τυγχάνει ἡ γεγονότων ἡ ὑπόν ἡ μελλόντων; Τί γάρ, ἐφη, ἄλλο; Ἀρ᾽ οὖν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀπλὴ διηγήσει ἡ διὰ μιμήσεως γιγνομένη ἡ δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων περαι-νουσιν; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἡ δ᾽ ὅς, ἕτι δέομαι σαφέστερον μαθεῖν. Γελοῖος, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, ἔσικα διδάσκαλος

a λόγων here practically means the matter, and λέξεως, which became a technical term for diction, the manner, as Socrates explains when Adeimantus fails to understand.

b Cf. Aristot. Poet. 1449 b 27.

c All art is essentially imitation for Plato and Aristotle. But imitation means for them not only the portrayal or description of visible and tangible things, but more especially the communication of a mood or feeling, hence the (to a modern) paradox that music is the most imitative of the arts.
that there are many examples of men who, though unjust, are happy, and of just men who are wretched, and that there is profit in injustice if it be concealed, and that justice is the other man's good and your own loss; and I presume that we shall forbid them to say this sort of thing and command them to sing and fable the opposite. Don't you think so?" "Nay, I well know it," he said. "Then, if you admit that I am right, I will say that you have conceded the original point of our inquiry?" "Rightly apprehended," he said. "Then, as regards men that speech must be of this kind, that is a point that we will agree upon when we have discovered the nature of justice and the proof that it is profitable to its possessor whether he does or does not appear to be just." "Most true," he replied.

VI. "So this concludes the topic of tales." That of diction, I take it, is to be considered next. So we shall have completely examined both the matter and the manner of speech." And Adeimantus said, "I don't understand what you mean by this." "Well," said I, "we must have you understand. Perhaps you will be more likely to apprehend it thus. Is not everything that is said by fabulists or poets a narration of past, present, or future things?" "What else could it be?" he said. "Do not they proceed either by pure narration or by a narrative that is effected through imitation, or by both?" "This too," he said, "I still need to have made plainer." "I seem to be a ridiculous and obscure

But Plato here complicates the matter further by sometimes using imitation in the narrower sense of dramatic dialogue as opposed to narration. An attentive reader will easily observe these distinctions. Aristotle's Poetics makes much use of the ideas and the terminology of the following pages.
εἶναι καὶ ἀσαφῆς. ὦσπερ οὖν οἳ ἄδυνατοι λέγειν, Ε olmuş ἐν τούτῳ δηλώσαι ὁ βουλόμαι. καὶ μοι εἰπε· ἐπιστασαί τῇ Ἡλίαδος τὰ πρῶτα, ἐν οἷς ὁ ποιητής φησι τὸν μὲν Χρύσην δείσθαι τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἀπολύσαι τὴν θυγατέρα, τὸν δὲ χαλεπαῖνεν, τὸν 393 δὲ, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐτύγχανε, κατεύχεσθαι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πρὸς τὸν θεόν; Ἔγωγε. Ὅσθ’ οὖν ὦτι μέχρι μὲν τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν
καὶ ἔλεγοντο πάντας Ἀχαιῶν,
.xpath('div[1]/p[1]')

σocratic urbanity professes that the speaker, not the hearer, is at fault. Cf. Protag. 340 e, Phileb. 23 ν.

 Plato and Aristotle often contrast the universal and the particular as whole and part. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 52. Though a good style is concrete, it is a mark of linguistic helplessness not to be able to state an idea in 226
teacher," I said; "so like men who are unable to express themselves I won't try to speak in wholes and universals but will separate off a particular part and by the example of that try to show you my meaning. Tell me. Do you know the first lines of the *Iliad* in which the poet says that Chryses implored Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that the king was angry and that Chryses, failing of his request, imprecated curses on the Achaeans in his prayers to the god?" "I do." "You know then that as far as these verses,

And prayed unto all the Achaeans,
Chiefly to Atreus' sons, twin leaders who marshalled the people;

the poet himself is the speaker and does not even attempt to suggest to us that anyone but himself is speaking. But what follows he delivers as if he were himself Chryses and tries as far as may be to make us feel that not Homer is the speaker, but the priest, an old man. And in this manner he has carried on nearly all the rest of his narration about affairs in Ilion, all that happened in Ithaca, and the entire *Odyssey.*" "Quite so," he said. "Now, it is narration, is it not, both when he presents the several speeches and the matter between the speeches?" "Of course." "But when he delivers a speech as if he were someone else, shall we not say that he then assimilates thereby his own diction as far as possible to that of the person whom he general terms. Cf. Locke, *Human Understanding*, iii. 10. 27: "This man is hindered in his discourse for want of words to communicate his complex ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them."

Il. i. 15 f.
δὲν ἄν προειπη ὡς ἔροιντα; Φήσομεν· τί γάρ; Ὑμᾶς ὅτε γε ὁμοιοῦν ἕαυτον ἄλλω ἢ κατὰ φανήν ἢ κατὰ σχήμα μιμεῖσθαί ἐστιν ἐκεῖνον ὃ ἂν τις ὁμοίς; Τί μὴν; 'Εν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ἂς ἔοικεν, οὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ διὰ μιμήσεως τῆς διήγησιν ποιοῦνται. Πάντως μὲν οὖν. Εἰ δὲ γε μηδαμοῦ ἕαυτον ἀποκρύπτοιτο ὁ ποιητής, πᾶσα ἂν αὐτῷ ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἡ ποιήσις τε καὶ διήγησις

D γεγονότα εἰς. Ἰνα δὲ μὴ εὑρησι, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτοθανείς, ὅπως ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἐγὼ φράσωσ. εἰ γάρ ὁ Ὄμηρος εἰπὼν, ὅτι ἤλθεν ὁ Χρύσης τῆς τε θυγατρός λύτρα φέρων καί ἱκέτης τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, Μάλιστα δὲ τῶν βασιλέων, μετὰ τούτο μὴ ὡς Χρύσης γενόμενος ἐλεγεν, ἄλλ' ἐτὶ ὡς ὁ Ὄμηρος, οἴοθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν μίμησις ἂν ἄλλ', ἀπλὴ διήγησις. εἰχε δ' ἃν ὡδὲ πως' φράσωσ δὲ ἄνευ μέτρου· οὐ γάρ εἰμι

Ε ποιητικός· ἐλθὼν δ' ἰερεὺς ἦδεκεν ἔκεινος μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς δούνα ἐλόντας τῆν Τροίαν αὑτοὺς σωθῆναι, τήν δὲ θυγατέρα οἱ λύσαι δεξαμένους ἠποινα καὶ τὸν θεὸν αἰδευθέντας. ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐσέβοντο καὶ συνήνουν, ὁ δὲ Ἀγαμέμνων ἥγραμεν ενετελλόμενον νῦν τε ἀπιέναι καὶ αὐθὶς μὴ ἐλθεῖν, μὴ αὐτῷ τὸ τε σκῆπτρον καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ στέμματα οὐκ ἑπαρκέσοι· πρὶν δὲ λυθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν θυγατέρα, ἐν Ἀργεὶ ἐφ' ἀγράσει μετὰ οὐ· ἀπιέναι δ' ἐκέλευε καὶ μὴ ἐρεθίζειν, ἵνα σῶς ὅκικα

394 ἐλθοί. ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτης ἄκουσα ἐδεισε τε καί

a In the narrower sense.

b Cf. Hazlitt, Antony and Cleopatra: “Shakespeare does not stand reasoning on what his characters would do or say, but at once becomes them and speaks and acts for them.”

c From here to 394 b, Plato gives a prose paraphrase of 228
announces as about to speak?” “We shall obviously.” “And is not likening one’s self to another in speech or bodily bearing an imitation of him to whom one likens one’s self?” “Surely.” “In such case then, it appears, he and the other poets effect their narration through imitation.” “Certainly.” “But if the poet should conceal himself nowhere, then his entire poetizing and narration would have been accomplished without imitation.a And lest you may say again that you don’t understand, I will explain to you how this would be done. If Homer, after telling us that Chryses came with the ransom of his daughter and as a suppliant of the Achaians but chiefly of the kings, had gone on speaking not as if made or being Chryses b but still as Homer, you are aware that it would not be imitation but narration, pure and simple. It would have been somewhat in this wise. I will state it without metre for I am not a poet: c the priest came and prayed that to them the gods should grant to take Troy and come safely home, but that they should accept the ransom and release his daughter, out of reverence for the god; and when he had thus spoken the others were of reverent mind and approved, but Agamemnon was angry and bade him depart and not come again lest the sceptre and the fillets of the god should not avail him. And ere his daughter should be released, he said, she would grow old in Argos with himself, and he ordered him to be off and not vex him if he wished to get home safe. And the old man on hearing this was frightened and departed in silence, and having

Il. i. 12-42. Roger Ascham in his Schoolmaster quotes it as a perfect example of the best form of exercise for learning a language.
The dithyramb was technically a poem in honour of Bacchus. For its more or less conjectural history cf. Pickard-Cambridge, Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy. 230
gone apart from the camp he prayed at length to Apollo, invoking the appellations of the god, and reminding him of and asking requital for any of his gifts that had found favour whether in the building of temples or the sacrifice of victims. In return for these things he prayed that the Achaeans should suffer for his tears by the god's shafts. It is in this way, my dear fellow," I said, "that without imitation simple narration results." "I understand," he said.

VII. "Understand then," said I, "that the opposite of this arises when one removes the words of the poet between and leaves the alternation of speeches." "This too I understand," he said, "—it is what happens in tragedy." "You have conceived me most rightly," I said, "and now I think I can make plain to you what I was unable to before, that there is one kind of poetry and tale-telling which works wholly through imitation, as you remarked, tragedy and comedy; and another which employs the recital of the poet himself, best exemplified, I presume, in the dithyrambs; and there is again that which employs both, in epic poetry and in many other places, if you apprehend me." "I understand now," he said, "what you then meant." "Recall then also the preceding statement that we were done with the 'what' of speech and still had to consider the 'how.'" "I remember." "What I meant then was just this, that we must reach a decision whether we are to suffer our poets to narrate as imitators or in part as imitators and in part not, and what sort of things in

Here, however, it is used broadly to designate the type of elaborate Greek lyric which like the odes of Pindar and Bacchylides narrates a myth or legend with little if any dialogue.
οὐδὲ μιμεῖσθαι. Μαντεύομαι, ἕφη, σκοπεῖσθαι σε, ἐἴτε παραδεξόμεθα τραγῳδίαν τε καὶ κωμῳδίαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἐἴτε καὶ οὐ. "Ἰσως, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· ἑσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἐτι τούτων· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐγωγεί πω οἶδα, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἂν ὁ λόγος ὦσπερ πνεύμα φέρῃ, ταύτῃ Εἰτέον. Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἕφη, λέγεις. Τόδε τούνων, ὦ 'Αδείμαντε, ἄθρει, πότερον μιμητικοὺς ἡμῖν δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας ἡ οὔ; ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐπεται, ὅτι εἰς ἐκαστὸς ἐν μὲν ἄν ἐπιτήδευμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι, πολλὰ δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' εἰ τούτο ἐπιχειροῖ, πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος πάντων ἀποτυγχάνοι ἂν, ὡστ' εἶναι ποὺ ἔλλογμοσ; Τί δ' οὔ μέλλει; Ὁδικοῦν καὶ περὶ μιμήσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι πολλὰ ὁ αὐτὸς μιμεῖσθαι εὑ ὦσπερ ἐν οὔ δυνατός; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Σχολὴ ἀρὰ ἐπιτηδεύεισι

395 γε τι ἁμα των ἁξίων λόγου ἐπιτηδεύματων καὶ πολλά μιμήσεται καὶ ἐσται μιμητικός, ἐπεὶ πον οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἄλληλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα¹ δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἁμα εὑ μιμεῖσθαι, όπον κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν πειοῦντες. ἡ οὐ μιμήματα ἄρτι τούτω ἐκάλεις; Ὑγωγε καὶ ἂληθή γε λέγεις, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται οἱ αὐτοί. Οὐδὲ μὴν ῥαβῳδοί γε καὶ ὑποκριταί ἁμα. ἂληθή. ἂλλ'

¹ μιμήματα is more euphonious: some mss. and editors read μιμήματε.

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a Again in the special limited sense.
b This seems to imply that Plato already had in mind the extension of the discussion in the tenth book to the whole question of the moral effect of poetry and art.
c Cf. Theaetet. 172 d. But it is very naive to suppose that the sequence of Plato's argument is not carefully planned in his own mind. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 5.
each case, or not allow them to imitate\textsuperscript{a} at all."

"I divine," he said, "that you are considering whether we shall admit tragedy and comedy into our city or not." "Perhaps," said I, "and perhaps even more than that.\textsuperscript{b} For I certainly do not yet know myself, but whithersoever the wind, as it were, of the argument blows,\textsuperscript{c} there lies our course."

"Well said," he replied. "This then, Adeimantus, is the point we must keep in view, do we wish our guardians to be good mimics or not? Or is this also a consequence of what we said before, that each one could practise well only one pursuit and not many, but if he attempted the latter, dabbling in many things, he would fail of distinction in all?"

"Of course it is." "And does not the same rule hold for imitation, that the same man is not able to imitate many things well as he can one?" "No, he is not." "Still less, then, will he be able to combine the practice of any worthy pursuit with the imitation of many things and the quality of a mimic; since, unless I mistake, the same men cannot practise well at once even the two forms of imitation that appear most nearly akin, as the writing of tragedy and comedy\textsuperscript{d}? Did you not just now call these two imitations?" "I did, and you are right in saying that the same men are not able to succeed in both, nor yet to be at once good rhapsodists\textsuperscript{e} and actors." "True. But neither can the same men

\textsuperscript{a} At the close of the \textit{Symposium} Socrates constrains Agathon and Aristophanes to admit that one who has the science (\textit{rêêvû}) of writing tragedy will also be able to write comedy. There is for Plato no contradiction, since poetry is for him not a science or art, but an inspiration.

\textsuperscript{b} The rhapsode Ion is a Homeric specialist who cannot interpret other poets. \textit{Cf. Ion} 533 c.
Β ούδε τοι ύποκριταί κωμωδοῖς τε καὶ τραγῳδοῖς οί αυτοὶ· πάντα δὲ ταύτα μμήματα. ἢ οὐ; Μμή-
ματα. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, ὃ Αδείμαντε, φαίνεται
μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερματίσθαι ἡ τοῦ ἀν-
θρώπου φύσις, ἀστ’ ἀδύνατος εἶναι πολλὰ καλῶς
μμείσθαι, ἡ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν, δὲν δὴ καὶ τὰ
μμήματα ἐστὶν ἀφομοιώματα. ’Αληθέστατα, ἡ
δὲ ὅσ.

VIII. Εἰ ἄρα τὸν πρωτόν λόγον διασώσομεν,
τοὺς φύλακας ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν δημιουρ-
γων ἀφειμένους δεῖν εἶναι δημιουργοὺς ἑλευθε-
ρίας τῆς πόλεως πάνω ἀκριβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο
ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὃ τι μὴ εἰς τοῦτο φέρει, οὐδὲν δὴ δέοι
ἀν αὐτούς ἄλλο πράττειν οὐδὲ μμείσθαι· ἕαν δὲ
μμῶνται, μμείσθαι τὰ τοὺτοι προσήκοντα εὐθὺς
ἐκ παῖδων, ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὀσίους, ἑλευθε-
ρους, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, τὰ δὲ ἀνελευθέρα
μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε δεινοῦς εἶναι μμήσασθαι, μηδὲ
ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μμήσεως

D τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν. ἡ οὐκ ἠφθησαι, ὅτι αἱ
μμήσεις, ἕαν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσσωσιν, εἰς
ἐθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ
φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν; Καὶ μάλα, ἡ δ’ ὅσ.
Οὐ δὴ ἐπιτρέψομεν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὃν φαμέν κήδεσθαι

*b Cf. Laws 846e, Montaigne, “Nostre suffisance est detaillee
    à menues pièces,” Pope, Essay on Criticism, 60:
    One science only will one genius fit,
    So vast is art, so narrow human wit.

Cf. the fine passage in Laws 817 β ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγῳδὸς
aυτὸλ ποιηταῖ, [Pindar] apud Plut. 807 c δημιουργὸς εὔνωμας
καὶ δίκης.

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be actors for tragedies and comedies—a—and all these are imitations, are they not?" "Yes, imitations."
"And to still smaller coinage than this, in my opinion, Adeimantus, proceeds the fractioning of human faculty, so as to be incapable of imitating many things or of doing the things themselves of which the imitations are likenesses." "Most true," he replied.

VIII. "If, then, we are to maintain our original principle, that our guardians, released from all other crafts, are to be expert craftsmen of civic liberty, and pursue nothing else that does not conduce to this, it would not be fitting for these to do nor yet to imitate anything else. But if they imitate they should from childhood up imitate what is appropriate to them—men, that is, who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things of that kind; but things unbecoming the free man they should neither do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from the imitation they imbibe the reality. Or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle down into habits and (second) nature in the body, the speech, and the thought?" "Yes, indeed," said he. "We will not then allow our charges, whom we expect to

\[d\] Cf. 386 A.
\[\dagger\] i.e., δημιουργοὶς ἑλευθερίας.
\[\ddagger\] Cf. infra 606 B, Laws 656 B, 669 B-c, and Burke, Sublime and Beautiful iv. 4, anticipating James, Psychology ii. pp. 449, 451, and anticipated by Shakespeare's (Cor. iii. ii. 123)

By my body's action teach my mind
A most inherent baseness.

καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, γυναῖκα
μμοείσθαι ἄνδρας οὔτας, ἥ νέαν ἡ πρεσβυτέραν, ἡ
ἀνδρὶ λαυδορουμένη ἡ πρὸς θεοῦς ἐριζοῦσαν τε καὶ
μεγαλαυχουμένην, οἴομεν οὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἡ ἐν
Ε ἐξυμφοραῖς τε καὶ πένθει καὶ θρήνοις εἰχομένη·
κάμνουσαν δὲ ἡ ἐρώσαν ἡ ὁδύνουσαν πολλοῦ καὶ
deήσομεν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἡ δ' ὁς. Οὐδὲ γε
δούλας τε καὶ δούλους πράττοντας ὁσα δούλων.
Oυδὲ τοῦτο. Οὐδὲ γε ἄνδρας κακοὺς, ὡς ἔοικε,
δειλοὺς τε καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πράττοντας δὲν νῦν δὴ
eἴπομεν, κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦντας
ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας, μεθύοντας ἡ καὶ
396 νήφοντας, ἡ καὶ ἄλλα ὁσα οἱ ταῖοῦτοι καὶ ἐν
λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἐργοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσιν εἰς αὐτοὺς τε
καὶ εἰς ἄλλους· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ μανωμένους ἔθιστέον
ἄφομοιον αὐτοὺς ἐν λόγοις οὐδ' ἐν ἐργοῖς. γυνω-
στέον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μανωμένους καὶ πονηροὺς
ἀνδρας τε καὶ γυναίκας, ποιητέον δὲ οὐδὲν τοῦτον
οὐδὲ μυητέον. 'Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. Τί δ'; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ·
χαλκεύοντας ἡ τι ἄλλο δημοουργοῦντας, ἡ
elαιύνοντας τρίηρεις ἡ κελεύοντας τοῦτοι, ἡ τι
B ἄλλο τῶν περὶ ταῦτα μυητέον; Καὶ πώς, ἔφη,
ois γε οὐδὲ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτων οὐδενὶ
ἐξέσται; Τί δε; ἵππους χρημετίζοντας καὶ ταῦ-
ρους μυκωμένους καὶ ποταμοὺς ψοφοῦντας καὶ
θάλατταν κτυποῦσαν καὶ βροντάς καὶ πάντα αὐ τὰ
tοιαῦτα ἡ μυήσονται; 'Αλλ' ἀπείρηται αὐτοῖς,
prove good men, being men, to play the parts of women and imitate a woman young or old wrangling with her husband, defying heaven, loudly boasting, fortunate in her own conceit, or involved in misfortune and possessed by grief and lamentation—still less a woman that is sick, in love, or in labour.”

“Most certainly not,” he replied. “Nor may they imitate slaves, female and male, doing the offices of slaves.” “No, not that either.” “Nor yet, as it seems, bad men who are cowards and who do the opposite of the things we just now spoke of, reviling and lampooning one another, speaking foul words in their cups or when sober and in other ways sinning against themselves and others in word and deed after the fashion of such men. And I take it they must not form the habit of likening themselves to madmen either in words nor yet in deeds. For while knowledge they must have of both of mad and bad men and women, they must do and imitate nothing of this kind.” “Most true,” he said. “What of this?” I said, “—are they to imitate smiths and other craftsmen or the rowers of triremes and those who call the time to them or other things connected therewith?” “How could they,” he said, “since it will be forbidden them even to pay any attention to such things?” “Well, then, neighing horses and lowing bulls, and the noise of rivers and the roar of the sea and the thunder and everything of that kind—will they imitate these?” “Nay, looms, the hissing of locomotives; often the wild, restless tumult of streets, the humming and rumbling of dense masses of the people” (Stefan Zweig). So another modern critic celebrates “the cry of the baby in a Strauss symphony, the sneers and snarls of the critics in his Helden Leben, the contortions of the Dragon in Wagner’s Siegfried.”
Plato

éph, μήτε μαίνεσθαι μήτε μαίνομένοις ἀφομοιοῦ-
σθαι. Εἰ ἀρ', ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μανθάνω ἃ σὺ λέγεις,
ἐστι τι εἴδος λέξεως τε καὶ διηγήσεως, ἐν ὧν ὁ
C διηγοῖτο ὁ τῷ ὄντι καλὸς κἀγαθός, ὅποτε τι δεόι
αὐτὸν λέγειν· καὶ ἔτερον αὐτὸν ἀνόμοιον τούτῳ εἴδος,
οὐ ἂν ἔχοιτο αἰεὶ καὶ ἐν ὧν διηγοῖτο ὁ ἑναντίως
ἐκεῖνως φύς τε καὶ τραφεῖς. Ποια δὴ, ἔφη, ταῦτα;
᾿Ο μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μέτριος ἀνήρ, ἐπειδὰν
ἀφίκηται ἐν τῇ διηγήσει ἐπὶ λέξιν τινὰ ἣ πρᾶξιν
ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ἐθελήσεις ὡς αὐτὸς ὃν ἑκεῖνος
ἀπαγγέλλει καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαῦτῃ
μυθίστε, μάλιστα μὲν μμούμενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν
D ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα, ἐλάττω δὲ
καὶ ἤττον ἢ ὑπὸ νόσων ἢ ὑπὸ ἐρωτῶν ἑσφαλμένον
ἡ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἐξιμφορᾶς· ὅταν δὲ
γίγνηται κατὰ τινα ἐαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον, οὐκ ἐθελήσειν
ἐπικάζειν ἐαυτὸν τῷ χείρον, εἰ μὴ ἄρα
κατὰ βραχύ, ὅταν τῇ χρηστῷ ποιή, ἅλλ' αἰσχυ-
νεῖσθαι, ἀμα μὲν ἀγύμναστος ὃν τοῦ μμείζοναι
τοὺς τοιούτους, ἀμα δὲ καὶ δυσχεραίνων αὐτὸν
ἐκμάττειν τε καὶ ἐνιστάναι εἰς τοὺς τῶν κακιῶν
Ε τύπους, ἀτιμάζων τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὃ τι μὴ παιδίας
χάρων. Εἰκός, ἔφη.

IX. Οὐκοῦν διηγήσει χρῆσται οὐδ' ἧμείς ὁλίγων
πρότερον διήλθομεν περὶ τὰ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἔπη, καὶ
ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἡ λέξις μετέχουσα μὲν ἀμφοτέρων,

a Chaucer drew from a misapplication of Tim. 29 b or
Boethius the opposite moral:

Who so shall telle a tale after a man,
He most rehearse, as neighe as ever he can,
Everich word, if it be in his charge,
All speke he never so rudely and so large;

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they have been forbidden,” he said, “to be mad or liken themselves to madmen.” “If, then, I understand your meaning,” said I, “there is a form of diction and narrative in which the really good and true man would narrate anything that he had to say, and another form unlike this to which the man of the opposite birth and breeding would cleave and in which he would tell his story.” “What are these forms?” he said. “A man of the right sort, I think, when he comes in the course of his narrative to some word or act of a good man will be willing to impersonate the other in reporting it, and will feel no shame at that kind of mimicry, by preference imitating the good man when he acts steadfastly and sensibly, and less and more reluctantly when he is upset by sickness or love or drunkenness or any other mishap. But when he comes to someone unworthy of himself, he will not wish to liken himself in earnest to one who is inferior, except in the few cases where he is doing something good, but will be embarrassed both because he is unpractised in the mimicry of such characters, and also because he shrinks in distaste from moulding and fitting himself to the types of baser things. His mind disdains them, unless it be for jest.” “Naturally,” he said.

IX. “Then the narrative that he will employ will be of the kind that we just now illustrated by the verses of Homer, and his diction will be one that partakes

Eke Plato sayeth, who so can him rede,
The wordes most ben cosin to the dede.

Plato, like Howells and some other modern novelists, would have thought somewhat gross comedy less harmful than the tragedy or romance that insidiously instils false ideals.
μμήσεως τε καὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς δυγηγήσεως, ομικρὸν δὲ τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς μμήσεως: ἥ οὐδὲν λέγω; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὖν γε ἀνάγκη τὸν τύπον εἶναι τοῦ τοιοῦτον ρήτορος. Οὐκοῦν, ὃν δ᾽ ἔγω, 397 ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος αὐ, ὅσω ἄν φαυλότερος ἦ, πάντα τε μάλλον μμήσεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἐαυτοῦ ἀνάξιων οὐκεταί εἶναι, ὡστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμεΐσθαι σπουδῇ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, καὶ ἀ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγουμεν, βροντάς τε καὶ ψόφους ἀνέμων τε καὶ χαλαζῶν καὶ ἀξόνων καὶ προχιλίων καὶ σαλπίγγων καὶ αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων φωνᾶς, καὶ ἐτὶ κυνῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὄρνεων φθόγγους: καὶ ἔσται δὴ ἡ τούτου λέξις ἀπασά διὰ

Β μμήσεως φωναῖς τε καὶ σχήμασιν, ἥ ομικρὸν τι δυγηγήσεως ἔχουσα; Ἐνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ τούτο. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἥν δ᾽ ἔγω, ἐλέγον τὰ δύο εἶδη τῆς λέξεως. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σμικρὰς τὰς μεταβολὰς ἔχει, καὶ ἐὰν τις ἀποδιδῶ πρέπουσαν ἀρμονίαν καὶ ρυθμὸν τῇ λέξει, ὡσιχοῦ πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν γίγνεται λέγειν τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ἀρμονίᾳ—σμικρὰ γὰρ αἱ μετα-

C βολαὶ—καὶ δὴ ἐν ρυθμῷ ὑσαύτως παραπλησίως τινὶ; Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει. Τι δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου εἶδος; οὐ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖται, πασῶν μὲν ἀρμονίων, πάντων δὲ ῥυθμῶν, εἰ μέλλει αὖ οἰκεῖως λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ παντοδαπὰς μορφὰς τῶν μεταβολῶν ἔχειν; Καὶ σφόδρα γε οὕτως

1 ἀπλῆς Adam plausibly: the mss. ἀληθὸς idiomatically, “as well.”

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They respondent plays on the double meaning of οὐδὲν λέγεις and replies, “Yes indeed, you do say something, namely the type and pattern,” etc.
of both, of imitation and simple narration, but there will be a small portion of imitation in a long discourse—or is there nothing in what I say?" "Yes, indeed," he said, "that is the type and pattern of such a speaker." "Then," said I, "the other kind of speaker, the more debased he is the less will he shrink from imitating anything and everything. He will think nothing unworthy of himself, so that he will attempt, seriously and in the presence of many, to imitate all things, including those we just now mentioned—claps of thunder, and the noise of wind and hail and axles and pulleys, and the notes of trumpets and flutes and pan-pipes, and the sounds of all instruments, and the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds; and so his style will depend wholly on imitation in voice and gesture, or will contain but a little of pure narration." "That too follows of necessity," he said. "These, then," said I, "were the two types of diction of which I was speaking." "There are those two," he replied. "Now does not one of the two involve slight variations, and if we assign a suitable pitch and rhythm to the diction, is not the result that the right speaker speaks almost on the same note and in one cadence—for the changes are slight—and similarly in a rhythm of nearly the same kind?" "Quite so." "But what of the other type? Does it not require the opposite, every kind of pitch and all rhythms, if it too is to have appropriate expression, since it involves manifold forms of variation?" "Empha-
έχει. Ἄρ' οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ τι λέγοντες ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνονσι τύπῳ τῆς λέξεως ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ εἰς ἀμφοτέρων τινὶ ἐγγεκεραυ-νόντες; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Τί οὖν ποιήσομεν; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· πότερον εἰς τὴν πόλιν πάντας τούτους παρα-δεξόμεθα ἢ τῶν ἀκράτων τὸν ἑτέρον ἢ τὸν κεκραμένον; Ἐαν ἢ ἐμὴ, ἔφη, νικᾶ, τὸν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς μμητὴν ἄκρατον. Ἀλλὰ μή, ὥ 'Αδεί-"μαντε, ἦδὺς γε καὶ δ' κεκραμένος, πολὺ δὲ ἦδιστος παῖσι τε καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς ὁ ἐναντίος οὐ σὺ αἰρεῖ καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὀχλῳ. Ἡδιστος γὰρ. Ἀλλ' ἰσως, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν ἁρμότευν φαῖσις Ἐ τῷ ἡμετέρᾳ πολιτείᾳ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστι διπλοὺς ἀνὴρ παρ' ἦμων οὐδὲ πολλαπλοὺς, ἐπειδὴ ἐκαστὸς ἐν πράττει. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἁρμότευε. Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει τὸν τε σκυτοτόμον σκυτοτόμον εὑρήσομεν καὶ οὐ κυβερνήτην πρὸς τῇ σκυτοτομίᾳ, καὶ τὸν γεωργόν γεωργόν καὶ οὐ δικαστὴν πρὸς τῇ γεωργίᾳ, καὶ τὸν πολεμικὸν πολεμικὸν καὶ οὐ χρηματιστὴν πρὸς τῇ πολεμικῇ, καὶ πάντας οὕτως; Ἀληθῇ, ἔφη. Ἄνδρα δὴ, ὥσ
398 ἔουε, δυνάμενον ὑπὸ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μμείσθαι πάντα χρήματα, εἰ ἦμων ἄφικοι εἰς τὴν πόλιν αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδείξασθαι, προσκυνοῦμεν ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς ἱερὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἦδυν, εἴπομεν δ' ὃν ὃτι οὐκ ἐστι τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ ἐν τῇ πόλει παρ' ἦμων οὐδὲ θέμις ἐγγενέσθαι, ἀποτεμπομενέν τε εἰς ἄλλην

The reverse of the Periclean ideal. Cf. Thucyd. ii. 41.

The famous banishment of Homer, regarded as the prototype of the tragedian. Cf. 568 a-c, 595 b, 605 c, 607 d, Laws 656 c, 817 b.

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And do all poets and speakers hit upon one type or the other of diction or some blend which they combine of both?" "They must," he said. "What, then," said I, "are we to do? Shall we admit all of these into the city, or one of the unmixed types, or the mixed type?" "If my vote prevails," he said, "the unmixed imitator of the good." "Nay, but the mixed type also is pleasing, Adeimantus, and far most pleasing to boys and their tutors and the great mob is the opposite of your choice." "Most pleasing it is." "But perhaps," said I, "you would affirm it to be ill-suited to our polity, because there is no twofold or manifold man among us, since every man does one thing." "It is not suited." "And is this not the reason why such a city is the only one in which we shall find the cobbler a cobbler and not a pilot in addition to his cobbling, and the farmer a farmer and not a judge added to his farming, and the soldier a soldier and not a money-maker in addition to his soldiery, and so of all the rest?" "True," he said. "If a man, then, it seems, who was capable by his cunning of assuming every kind of shape and imitating all things should arrive in our city, bringing with himself the poems which he wished to exhibit, we should fall down and worship him as a holy and wondrous and delightful creature, but should say to him that there is no man of that kind among us in our city, nor is it lawful for such a man to arise among us, and we should send him away to another

\[\text{Cf. for a less striking example 427 D, Phaedr. 250 b-c.}\]

\[\text{Greek idiom achieves an effect impossible to English here, by the shift from the co-ordination of } \pi\nu\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha \text{ with } a\iota\tau\omicron\sigma \text{ to the treatment of it as the object of } \epsilon\pi\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\xi\alpha\sigma\thta\text{ and the possible double use of the latter as middle with } a\iota\tau\omicron\sigma \text{ and transitive with } \pi\nu\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha.}\]
πόλιν μύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχέαντες καὶ ἔρωτ στέφαντες, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ
Β ἀδεστέρῳ ποιητῇ χρώμεθα καὶ μυθολόγῳ ωφελείας ἐνεκα, ὃς ἦμῖν τὴν τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς λέξιν μμοῦτο καὶ
tα λεγόμενα λέγοι ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τύποισ, οἷς
cat’ ἀρχὰς ἐνομοθετῆσαμεθα, ὡτὸ τοὺς στρατῶ-
tas ἐπεχειροῦμεν παθεῦειν. Καὶ μᾶλ’, ἔφη, οὕτως ἂν ποιοῦμεν, εἰ ἔφ ήμῖν εἴη. Νῦν δὴ, εἰπόν ἐγὼ, ὥ
φίλε, κινδυνεύει ἠμῖν τῆς μουσικῆς τὸ περὶ
λόγους τε καὶ μύθους παντελῶς διαπεπεράνθαι. ἂ
τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον, εὑρηταί. Καὶ
αὐτῶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

C Χ. Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τούτο, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, τὸ περὶ ὀδη
τρόπου καὶ μελῶν λουτῶν; Δήλα δὴ. Ἀρ’ οὖν
οὐ πάς ἶδη ἂν εὑροι, ὃ ἦμῖν λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν,
oia deí εἰναι, εἶπερ μέλλομεν τοῖς προειρημένοισ
συμφωνήσειν; καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων ἐπιγελάσας, Ἐγὼ
τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύω ἐκτὸς τῶν
πάντων εἰναι οὐκοῦν ἰκανῶς γε ἐξω ἐν τῷ παρόντι
ἐμβαλέοθαι, ποῦ ἁττα deí ἢμᾶς λέγειν, ὑποπτεύω
μέντοι. Πάντως δὴπου, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, πρῶτον μὲν
D τὸ δε ἰκανῶς ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν
ἐστὶ συγκείμενον, λόγον τε καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ
ῥυθμοῦ. Ναὶ, ἔφη, τούτο γε. Οὐκοῦν ὅσον γε
αὐτοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, οὐδὲν δὴπο διαφέρει τοῦ
μὴ ἄδομένου λόγου πρὸς τὸ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δεῖν

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a Cf. from a different point of view Arnold’s The Austerity of Poetry.
b Cf. 379 A ff.
c He laughs at his own mild joke, which Professor Wilamowitz (Platon ii. p. 192) does not understand. Cf. Laws 244
city, after pouring myrrh down over his head and crowning him with fillets of wool, but we ourselves, for our souls' good, should continue to employ the more austere\(^a\) and less delightful poet and tale-teller, who would imitate the diction of the good man and would tell his tale in the patterns which we prescribed in the beginning,\(^b\) when we set out to educate our soldiers." "We certainly should do that if it rested with us." "And now, my friend," said I, "we may say that we have completely finished the part of music that concerns speeches and tales. For we have set forth what is to be said and how it is to be said." "I think so too," he replied.

X. "After this, then," said I, "comes the manner of song and tunes?" "Obviously." "And having gone thus far, could not everybody discover what we must say of their character in order to conform to what has already been said?" "I am afraid that 'everybody' does not include me," laughed Glaucon\(^c\); "I cannot sufficiently divine off-hand what we ought to say, though I have a suspicion." "You certainly, I presume," said I, "have a sufficient understanding of this—that the song\(^d\) is composed of three things, the words, the tune, and the rhythm?" "Yes," said he, "that much." "And so far as it is words, it surely in no manner differs from words not sung in the requirement of

\(^{559}\) \textit{Hipp. Major} 293 \(\hat{\eta}\) \(\hat{\omicron}\) \(\nu\) \(\chi\) \(\epsilon\)\(\iota\) \(\tau\)\(\omicron\) \(\acute{\alpha}\)\(\alpha\)\(\tau\)\(\acute{\alpha}\)\(\tau\)\(\omicron\) \(\nu\) \(\kappa\)\(\acute{\iota}\)\(\acute{\omicron}\)\(\lambda\)\(\acute{\omicron}\)\(\acute{\omicron}\); and in a recent novel, "'I am afraid everybody does not include me,' she smiled."

\(^{d}\) The complete song includes words, rhythm, and "harmony," that is, a pitch system of high and low notes. Harmony is also used technically of the peculiar Greek system of scales or modes. \textit{Cf.} Monro, \textit{Modes of Ancient Greek Music.}
The poets at first composed their own music to fit the words. When, with the further development of music, there arose the practice of distorting the words, as in a mere libretto, it provoked a storm of protest from conservatives in aesthetics and morals.

The modes of Greek music are known to the English reader only from Milton’s allusions, his “Lap me in soft Lydian airs” and, P.L. i. 549 f., his

Anon they move

In perfect phalanx to the Dorian mood
Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised
To highth of noblest temper heroes old.

The adaptation of particular modes, harmonies or scales to the expression of particular feelings is something that we are obliged to accept on faith. Plato’s statements here were challenged by some later critics, but the majority believed that there was a real connexion between modes of music.
conformity to the patterns and manner that we have prescribed?" "True," he said. "And again, the music and the rhythm must follow the speech." "Of course." "But we said we did not require dirges and lamentations in words." "We do not." "What, then, are the dirge-like modes of music? Tell me, for you are a musician." "The mixed Lydian," he said, "and the tense or higher Lydian, and similar modes." "These, then," said I, "we must do away with. For they are useless even to women who are to make the best of themselves, let alone to men." "Assuredly." "But again, drunkenness is a thing most unfitting guardians, and so is softness and sloth." "Yes." "What, then, are the soft and convivial modes?" "There are certain Ionian and also Lydian modes that are called lax." "Will you make any use of them for warriors?" "None at all," he said; "but it would seem that you have left the Dorian and the Phrygian." "I don't know the musical modes," I said, "but leave us that mode that would fittingly imitate the utterances and the and modes of feeling, as Ruskin and many others have in our day. The hard-headed Epicureans and sceptics denied it, as well as the moral significance of music generally.

Cf. 387 E.

a Plato, like a lawyer or popular essayist, affects ignorance of the technical details; or perhaps rather he wishes to disengage his main principle from the specialists' controversy about particular modes of music and their names.

b ἐκείνη may mean, but does not say, Dorian, which the Laches (188 D) pronounces the only true Greek harmony.

This long anacoluthic sentence sums up the whole matter with impressive repetition and explicit enumeration of all types of conduct in peace and war, and implied reference to Plato's doctrine of the two fundamental temperaments, the swift and the slow, the energetic and the mild.

Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, nn. 59, 70, 481.
plato

πολεμική πράξει οντός ἄνδρείου καὶ ἐν πᾶσῃ βιαίῳ ἐργασίᾳ πρεπόντως ἂν μιμήσατο φθόγγους τε καὶ προσωπίας, καὶ ἀποτυχόντως, ἡ ἐἰς τραύματα ἡ ἐἰς θανάτους οὐντός ἡ ἐἰς τινα ἀλλήν ξυμφοράν

Β πεσόντος, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως ἀμυνομένου τὴν τύχην καὶ ἀλλήν αὐ ἐν ἐφημερικῇ τε καὶ μὴ βιαίως ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκουσίω πράξει οντός, ἡ τινὰ τι πείθοντος τε καὶ δεομένου, ἡ εὐχή θεοῦ ἡ διδαχὴ καὶ νοοθετήσει ἀνθρωπων, ἡ τούναντιν ἀλλῶν δεομένων ἡ διδάσκοντι ἡ μεταπείθοντι έαυτὸν ἐπέχοντα,¹ καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ μὴ ύπερηφάνως ἐχοντα, ἀλλὰ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πράττοντά τε καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπώντα. ταῦτας δύο ἀρμονίας, βίαιον, ἐκούσιον, δυστυχούντων, εὐτυχούντων, σωφρόνων, ἄνδρεῖων ἀρμονίας αὐτινες φθόγγους μιμήσονται κάλλιστα, ταῦτας λείπε. 'Αλλ', ἡ δ' ὅσ, οὐκ ἄλλας αἰτεῖς λείπεν, ἡ ἄς νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐλεγον. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, πολυχρόνια γε οὐδὲ παναρμονίον ἡμῖν δείησε ἐν ταῖς ὁδαίς τε καὶ μέλεσιν. Οὐ μοι, ἐφη, φαίνεται. Τριγώνων ἄρα καὶ πηκτίδων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων, D ὅσα πολυχρόδα καὶ πολυμορφία, δημιουργοὺς οὐ θρέψομεν. Οὐ φανόμεθα. Τὶ δὲ; αὐλοτοιχοὺς ἢ αὐλητὰς παραδέξει εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἡ οὐ τούτο πολυχροδότατον, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμονία αὐλοῦ τυχάνει ὄντα μύμημα; Δῆλα δῆ, ἡ δ' ὅσ. Λύρα δὴ σοι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ κιβάρα λείπεται καὶ κατὰ

¹ ἐπέχοντα has most ms. authority, but ὑπέχοντα or παρέχοντα is more normal Greek for the idea.

¹ Cf. Laws 814 e.
² Metaphorically. The "many-toned instrumentation of 248
accents of a brave man who is engaged in warfare or in any enforced business, and who, when he has failed, either meeting wounds or death or having fallen into some other mishap, in all these conditions confronts fortune with steadfast endurance and repels her strokes. And another for such a man engaged in works of peace, not enforced but voluntary, either trying to persuade somebody of something and imploiring him—whether it be a god, through prayer, or a man, by teaching and admonition—or contrariwise yielding himself to another who is petitioning or teaching him or trying to change his opinions, and in consequence faring according to his wish, and not bearing himself arrogantly, but in all this acting modestly and moderately and acquiescing in the outcome. Leave us these two modes—the enforced and the voluntary—that will best imitate the utterances of men failing or succeeding, the temperate, the brave—leave us these.” “Well,” said he, “you are asking me to leave none other than those I just spoke of.” “Then,” said I, “we shall not need in our songs and airs instruments of many strings or whose compass includes all the harmonies.” “Not in my opinion,” said he. “Then we shall not maintain makers of triangles and harps and all other many-stringed and poly-harmonic instruments.” “Apparently not.” “Well, will you admit to the city flute-makers and flute-players? Or is not the flute the most ‘many-stringed’ of instruments and do not the pan-harmonics themselves imitate it?” “Clearly,” he said. “You have left,” said I, “the lyre and the the flutes,” as Pindar calls it, Ol. vii. 12, can vie with the most complex and many-stringed lyre of musical innovation.

*Cf. 404 D, the only other occurrence of the word in Plato.*
pólin chrísima· kai αὐ κατ' ἀγροὺς τοῖς νομεύοι· σύριγξ· ἦν τις εἴη. 'Ως γοῦν, ἔφη, ὁ λόγος ἦμιν·
Ε σημαίνει. Οὐδέν γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καίνον ποιοῦμεν, ὃ φίλε, κρίνοντες τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλω
νος ὄργανα πρὸ Μαραντοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου ὄργανων. Μᾶ Δι', ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐ μοι φαινόμεθα. Καὶ
νὴ τὸν κύνα, εἰπον, λελήθημεν γε δια-καθαίροντες πάλιν ἦν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἐφαμεν πόλιν. Σωφρονοῦντες γε ἢμεῖς, ἢ δ' ὅς.

XI. Ἡθί δή, ἔφην, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθαίρωμεν. ἐπόμενον γὰρ δὴ ταῖς ἄρμονίαις ἦν ἦμιν εἴη τὸ
περὶ ῥυθμοῦς, μὴ ποικίλους αὐτοὺς διώκεν μηδὲ παντοδαπὰς βάσεις, ἀλλὰ βίου ῥυθμοὺς ἰδεῖν
κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου τίνες εἴδων· οὐς ἰδόντα
400 τὸν πόδα τῷ τοιοῦτον λόγῳ ἀναγκάζειν ἐπεσθαί
καὶ τὸ μέλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγον ποῦ περὶ τε καὶ μέλει.
οίτων δ' ἄν εἶν οὕτου ὅ ῥυθμοῖ, σοῦ ἔργον, ὡσπερ
τὰς ἄρμονίας, φράσαι. Ἀλλὰ μᾶ Δι', ἔφη, οὐκ
ἐξω λέγειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τρὶ ἄττα ἐστὶν ἑιδη, ἐξ
ἂν αἱ βάσεις πλέκονται, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις
tέτταρα, ὅθεν αἱ πάσαι ἄρμονίαι, τεθεαμένοι ἄν

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a Cf. my note on Tim. 47 c, in A.J.P. vol. x. p. 61.
b Ancient critics noted this sentence as an example of adaptation of sound to sense. Cf. Demetr. Περὶ ἑρµ. 185.
The sigmas and iotas may be fancied to suggest the whistling notes of the syrinx. So Lucretius v. 1385 "tibia quas
fundit digitis pulsata canentum." Cf. on Catull. 61. 13
"voce carmina tinnitus."

c The so-called Rhadamanthine oath to avoid taking the
names of the gods in vain. Cf. 592 λ, Apol. 21 ε, Blaydes
on Aristoph. Wasps 83.

that this is an express retraction of the ἀληθινὴ πόλις. This
is to misapprehend Plato's method. He starts with the
indispensable minimum of a simple society, develops it by
either. These are useful in the city, and in the fields the shepherds would have a little piccolo to pipe on."

"So our argument indicates," he said. "We are not innovating, my friend, in preferring Apollo and the instruments of Apollo to Marsyas and his instruments."

"No, by heaven!" he said, "I think not." "And by the dog," said I, "we have all unawares purged the city which a little while ago we said was luxurious."

"In that we show our good sense," he said.

XI. "Come then, let us complete the purification. For upon harmonies would follow the consideration of rhythms: we must not pursue complexity nor great variety in the basic movements, but must observe what are the rhythms of a life that is orderly and brave, and after observing them require the foot and the air to conform to that kind of man's speech and not the speech to the foot and the tune. What those rhythms would be, it is for you to tell us as you did the musical modes." "Nay, in faith," he said, "I cannot tell. For that there are some three forms from which the feet are combined, just as there are four in the notes of the voice whence come all harmonies, is a thing that I have observed and could

Herbert Spencer's multiplication of effects into an ordinary Greek city, then reforms it by a reform of education and finally transforms it into his ideal state by the rule of the philosopher kings. Cf. Introd. p. xiv.

1 Practically the feet.

1 According to the ancient musicians these are the equal as e.g. in dactyls (~), spondees (--) and anapaests (~ --), where the foot divides into two equal quantities; the ~ ratio, as in the so-called cretic (~); the ~ as in the iamb (~) and trochee (~). Cf. Aristid. Quint. i. pp. 34-35.

Possibly the four notes of the tetrachord, but there is no agreement among experts. Cf. Monro, Modes of Ancient Greek Music.
εἶπομὲν ποιά δὲ ποίου βίου μμήματα, λέγειν οὐκ ἐξώ. Ἄλλα ταῦτα μὲν, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος βουλευσόμεθα, τίνες τε ἀνελευθερίας καὶ ὀβρεως ἡ μανίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας πρέπουσαι βάσεις, καὶ τίνας τοῖς ἑναντίοις λειτουργοὺς νῦθοις. οἶμαι δὲ μὲ ἀκηκοέναι οὐ σαφῶς ἐνόπλιον τε τινὰ ὄνομαζοντος αὐτοῦ ἔνυθεν ταῖς δάκτυλοι καὶ ἡφών γε, οὐκ οἴδα ὡσπῶς διακοσμούντος καὶ ἵναν ἄνω καὶ κάτω τιθέντος, εἰς βραχύ τε καὶ μακρὸν γιγνόμενον, καὶ, ώς ἐγώμαι, ἵμμβον καὶ τως ἄλλον τροχαιὸν ὄνομαζε, μήκη δὲ καὶ βραχύτητας προσηπτετε. καὶ τούτων τισιν οἴμαι τὰς ἀγωγὰς τοῦ ποδὸς αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἤττον ἰγείνει τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἡ τοὺς ρυθμοὺς αὐτοὺς, ἥτοι ἐνναμφότερον τις οὐ γὰρ ἐξώ λέγειν. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, ὡσπερ εἶπον, εἰς Δάμωνα ἀναβεβλήσθων. διελέσθαι γὰρ οὐ σμικροῦ λόγου. ἂν σὺ οἶει; Ἔλλα 'Δι', οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἄλλα τόδε γε, ὅτι τό τῆς εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης τῷ εὐρύθμῳ τε καὶ ἄρρυθμῳ ἀκολουθεῖ, δύνασαι διελέσθαι; Πῶς δ' οὖ; Ἄλλα μὴν τὸ

a Modern psychologists are still debating the question.

b The Platonic Socrates frequently refers to Damon as his musical expert. Cf. Laches 200 b, infra 424 c, Alc. I. 118 c.

c There is a hint of satire in this disclaimer of expert knowledge. Cf. 399 a. There is no agreement among modern experts with regard to the precise form of the so-called enoplios. Cf. my review of Herkenrath's "Der Enoplios," Class. Phil. vol. iii. p. 360, Goodell, Chapters on Greek Metric, pp. 185 and 189, Blaydes on Aristoph. Nubes 651.

d Possibly foot, possibly rhythm. δάκτυλον seems to mean the foot, while ἡφῶς is the measure based on dactyls but admitting spondees.

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tell. But which are imitations of which sort of life, I am unable to say. "Well," said I, "on this point we will take counsel with Damon, too, as to which are the feet appropriate to illiberality, and insolence or madness or other evils, and what rhythms we must leave for their opposites; and I believe I have heard him obscurely speaking of a foot that he called the enoplus, a composite foot, and a dactyl and an heroic foot, which he arranged, I know not how, to be equal up and down in the interchange of long and short, and unless I am mistaken he used the term iambic, and there was another foot that he called the trochaic, and he added the quantities long and short. And in some of these, I believe, he censured and commended the tempo of the foot no less than the rhythm itself, or else some combination of the two; I can't say. But, as I said, let this matter be postponed for Damon's consideration. For to determine the truth of these would require no little discourse. Do you think otherwise?" "No, by heaven, I do not." "But this you are able to determine—that seemliness and unseemliness are attendant upon the good rhythm and the bad." "Of course." "And, further, that good rhythm and

* ἄνω καὶ κάτω is an untranslatable gibe meaning literally and technically the upper and lower half of the foot, the arsis and thesis, but idiomatically meaning topsy-turvy. There is a similar play on the idiom in Phileb. 43 a and 43 b.

f Literally "becoming" or "issuing in long and short," long, that is, when a spondee is used, short when a dactyl.

g Plato, as often, employs the forms of an argument proceeding by minute links to accumulate synonyms in illustration of a moral or aesthetic analogy. He is working up to the Wordsworthian thought that order, harmony, and beauty in nature and art are akin to these qualities in the soul.
D εὐρυθμόν γε καὶ τὸ ἀρρυθμον τὸ μὲν τῇ καλῇ λέξει ἐπεται ὁμοιοῦμενον, τὸ δὲ τῇ ἑναντίᾳ, καὶ τὸ εὐάρμοστον καὶ ἀνάρμοστον ὄσαυτως, εἴπερ ῥυθμός γε καὶ ἀρμονία λόγω, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος τούτως. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἢ δ’ ὡς, ταῦτα γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον. Τί δ’ ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ λόγος; οὐ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢθει ἐπεται; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τῇ δὲ λέξει τάλλα; Ναί. Εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθμία εὐθείᾳ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἢν ἀνοιαν οὐδαν ὑποκριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐθείαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὃς ἄληθῶς εῦ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἴθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ πανταχοῦ ταῦτα διωκτέα τοῖς νέοις, εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ αὐτῶν πράττειν; Διωκτέα μὲν οὖν. Ἑστι δὲ γε που πλήρης μὲν 401 γραφική αὐτῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τουαύτη δημιουργία, πλήρης δὲ ὑφαντική καὶ ποικιλία καὶ οἰκοδομία καὶ πᾶσα αὐτῇ τῶν ἄλλων σκευῶν ἑργασία, ἐτὶ δὲ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φυτῶν· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ἐνεστὼ εὐσχημοσύνη ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη. καὶ ἢ μὲν ἀσχημοσύνη καὶ ἀρρυθμία καὶ ἀναρμοστία κακολογίας καὶ κακοθείας ἀδελφά, τὰ δ’ ἑναντία τοῦ ἑναντίου, σωφρονος τε καὶ

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a Plato recurs to the etymological meaning of εὐθείᾳ. Cf. on 343 c.

b The Ruskinian and Wordsworthian generalization is extended from music to all the fine arts, including, by the way, 254
bad rhythm accompany, the one fair diction, assimilating itself thereto, and the other the opposite, and so of the apt and the unapt, if, as we were just now saying, the rhythm and harmony follow the words and not the words these.” “They certainly must follow the speech,” he said. “And what of the manner of the diction, and the speech?” said I. “Do they not follow and conform to the disposition of the soul?” “Of course.” “And all the rest to the diction?” “Yes.” “Good speech, then, good accord, and good grace, and good rhythm wait upon a good disposition, not that weakness of head which we euphemistically style goodness of heart, but the truly good and fair disposition of the character and the mind.⁶” “By all means,” he said. “And must not our youth pursue these everywhere if they are to do what it is truly theirs to do?⁷” “They must indeed.” “And there is surely much of these qualities in painting and in all similar craftsmanship⁸—weaving is full of them and embroidery and architecture and likewise the manufacture of household furnishings and thereto the natural bodies of animals and plants as well. For in all these there is grace or gracelessness. And gracelessness and evil rhythm and disharmony are akin to evil speaking and the evil temper, but the opposites are the symbols and the architecture (οἰκοδομία), which Butcher (Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry, p. 138) says is ignored by Plato and Aristotle.

⁵ Their special task is to cultivate the true εὐθυεία in their souls. For τὸ αὐτῶν πράττειν here cf. 443 c-d.
⁶ The following page is Plato’s most eloquent statement of Wordsworth’s, Ruskin’s, and Tennyson’s gospel of beauty for the education of the young. He repeats it in Laws 668 b. Cf. my paper on “Some Ideals of Education in Plato’s Republic,” Educational Bi-monthly, vol. ii. (1907-1908) pp. 215 ff.
άγαθος, ἄδελφα τε καὶ μιμήματα. Παν-
teλῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

B XII. Ὅρ’ οὖν τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἥμῖν μόνον ἐπι-
στατητέον καὶ προσαναγκαστέον τὴν τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ
eἰκόνα ἥθους ἐμποίειν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἥ μὴ παρ’
ἡμῖν ποιεῖν, ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς ἐπι-
στατητέον καὶ διακωλυτέον τὸ κακόθες τοῦτο καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ ἁσχημον μῆτε ἐν
eἰκόσι ξάων μῆτε ἐν οἰκοδομήμασι μῆτε ἐν ἄλλῳ
μηδείς δημιουργοῦμεν ἐμποίειν, ἢ δ’ μὴ οἶδος τε
ἀν οὐκ ἔστεος παρ’ ἥμῖν δημιουργεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐν
κακίας εἰκόσι τρεφόμενοι ἥμῖν οἱ φύλακες ὅσπερ

C ἐν κακῇ βοτάνῃ, πολλὰ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας κατὰ
σμικρὸν ἀπὸ πολλῶν δρεπόμενοι τε καὶ νεμόμενοι,
ἐν τῷ ξυνιστάντες λανθάνωσι κακὸν μέγα ἐν τῇ
αὐτῶν ψυχῇ. ἄλλ’ ἐκείνους ξητητέον τοὺς δημι-
ουργοὺς τοὺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους ἵχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ
καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, ὅ’ ὅσπερ ἐν
ὑγιεινῷ τόπῳ οἰκούντες οἱ νέοι ἀπὸ παντὸς
ωθελῶνται, ὅποθεν ἢν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν
ἐργῶν ἢ πρὸς ὅμιν ἢ πρὸς ἄκοην τι προσβάλη,
ἄσπερ αὖρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρυστῶν τόπων ὑγίειαν,

D καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνῃ εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε
καὶ φιλίαν καὶ ἑυμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα;
Πολὺ γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, κάλλιστα οὐτῷ τραφεῖν. Ὅρ’
οὖν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὅ Γλαύκων, τοῦτων ἐνεκα κυριω-
tάτη ἐν μονικῇ τροφῇ, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται

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kin of the opposites, the sober and good disposition.”

"Entirely so," he said.

XII. "Is it, then, only the poets that we must supervise and compel to embody in their poems the semblance of the good character or else not write poetry among us, or must we keep watch over the other craftsmen, and forbid them to represent the evil disposition, the licentious, the illiberal, the graceless, either in the likeness of living creatures or in buildings or in any other product of their art, on penalty, if unable to obey, of being forbidden to practise their art among us, that our guardians may not be bred among symbols of evil, as it were in a pasturage of poisonous herbs, lest grazing freely and cropping from many such day by day they little by little and all unawares accumulate and build up a huge mass of evil in their own souls. But we must look for those craftsmen who by the happy gift of nature are capable of following the trail of true beauty and grace, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a salubrious region, may receive benefit from all things about them, whence the influence that emanates from works of beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze that brings from wholesome places health, and so from earliest childhood insensibly guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason." "Yes," he said, "that would be far the best education for them." "And is it not for this reason, Glaucon," said I, "that education in music is most sovereign," because more than anything else

Schopenhauer, following Plato, adds the further metaphysical reason that while the other arts imitate the external manifestations of the universal Will, music represents the Will itself.
eis to ěntos tῆς ψυχῆς ὁ te ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἀρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενεύστατα ἀπτεται αὐτῆς, φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἕως τὶς ὀρθῶς Ἐτραφῆ, εἶ δὲ μὴ, τούναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἡ μή καλῶς φύντων ὑζύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεὶ τραφεῖς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαίνοι καὶ χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος εῖς τὴν ψυχῆν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο 402 καλὸς τε κάγαθος, τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ὕζγου τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοὶ ἐτι νέοι ὅν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἑλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτῳ τραφεῖς; Ἔμοι γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἐφ' ὃ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐνεκα ἐν μουσικῇ εἶναι ἡ τροφῆ. "Ὡσπερ ἁρὰ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἰκανῶς εἰχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὀλίγα ὄντα ἐν ἄπασιν οἷς ἔστω περιφερόμενα, καὶ οὔτ' ἐν σμικρῷ οὔτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἐτιμάζομεν αὐτά, ὡς οὐ δέοι αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ προοθιμοῦμεθα διαγγυνωσκειν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσόμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν οὕτως ἐχομεν. Ἄληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας

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a Cf. supra 362 b, 366 c, 388 a, 391 e, and Ruskin's paradox that taste is the only morality.
b Cf. Laws 653 b-c, where Plato defines education by this principle. Aristotle virtually accepts it (Ethics ii. 3. 2). The Stoics somewhat pedantically laid it down that reason entered into the youth at the age of fourteen.
c Plato often employs letters or elements (στοιχεῖα) to
rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the contrary? And further, because omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or grown would be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in music, and so, feeling distaste a rightly, he would praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its growth and become himself beautiful and good. The ugly he would rightly disapprove of and hate while still young and yet unable to apprehend the reason, but when reason came b the man thus nurtured would be the first to give her welcome, for by this affinity he would know her.” “I certainly think,” he said, “that such is the cause of education in music.” “It is, then,” said I, “as it was when we learned our letters c and felt that we knew them sufficiently only when the separate letters did not elude us, appearing as few elements in all the combinations that convey them, and when we did not disregard them in small things or great d and think it unnecessary to recognize them, but were eager to distinguish them everywhere, in the belief that we should never be literate and letter-perfect till we could do this.” “True.” “And is illustrate the acquisition of knowledge (Theaetet. 206 a), the relation of elements to compounds, the principles of classification (Phileb. 18 c, Cratyl. 393 d), and the theory of ideas (Polit. 278 a. Cf. Isoc. xiii. 13, Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 7, Blass, Attische Beredsamkeit, ii. pp. 23 f., 348 f., Cic. De or. ii. 130).

d It is fundamental Platonic doctrine that truth is not concerned with size or seeming importance. (Cf. Parmen. 130 d-E, Polit. 266 d, Laws 793 c, 901-902, Sophist 227 b, Hipp. Major 288 d.)
It is of course possible to contrast images with the things themselves, and to speak of forms or species without explicit allusion to the metaphysical doctrine of ideas. But on the other hand there is not the slightest reason to assume that the doctrine and its terminology were not familiar to Plato at the time when this part of the Republic was written. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 31 ff., 35. Statistics of the uses of eidos and ideia (Peiper’s Ontologica Platonica, Taylor, Varia Socratica, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 249-253), whatever their philological interest, contribute nothing to the interpretation of Plato’s thought. Cf. my De Platonis Idearum Doctrina, pp. 1, 30, and Class. Phil. vol. vi. pp. 363-364.

There is for common sense no contradiction or problem in the fact that Plato here says that we cannot be true “musicians” till we recognize both the forms and all copies of, or approximations to, them in art or nature, while in Book X. (601) he argues that the poet and artist copy not the idea but its copy in the material world.
it not also true that if there are any likenesses of letters reflected in water or mirrors, we shall never know them until we know the originals, but such knowledge belongs to the same art and discipline?

"By all means." "Then, by heaven, am I not right in saying that by the same token we shall never be true musicians, either—neither we nor the guardians that we have undertaken to educate—until we are able to recognize the forms of soberness, courage, liberality, and high-mindedness and all their kindred and their opposites, too, in all the combinations that contain and convey them, and to apprehend them and their images wherever found, disregarding them neither in trifles nor in great things, but believing the knowledge of them to belong to the same art and discipline?"

"The conclusion is inevitable," he said. "Then," said I, "when there is a coincidence of a beautiful disposition in the soul and corresponding and harmonious beauties of the same type in the bodily form—is not this the fairest spectacle for one who is capable of its contemplation?"

Plato, like all intellectuals, habitually assumes that knowledge of principles helps practice. Cf. Phaedr. 259 f, 262 b, and infra 484 d, 520 c, 540 a.

Liberality and high-mindedness, or rather, perhaps, magnificence, are among the virtues defined in Aristotle's list (Eth. Nic. 1107 b 17), but are not among the four cardinal virtues which the Republic will use in Book IV. in the comparison of the individual with the state.


Music and beauty lead to the philosophy of love, more fully set forth in the Phaedrus and Symposium, and here dismissed in a page. Plato's practical conclusion here may be summed up in the Virgilian line (Aen. v. 344):

Gratior et pulchro veniens in corpore virtus.

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τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι; Πολὺ γε. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε κάλλιστον ἐρασμίωτατον. Πῶς δ' οὖ; Τῶν δὴ ὦ τι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ὦ γε μουσικὸς ἐρώτη ἂν: εἰ δὲ αξιόμαθος εἰή, οὐκ ἂν ἐρώτη. Οὔκ ἂν, εἰ γε τι, ἔφη, κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλλείποι: εἰ μέντοι τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὑπομείνειεν ἂν ὅστ' ἐθέλειν Ἐ ἀσπάζεσθαι. Μανθάνω, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔστι σοι ἡ γέγονε παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ συγχωρῶ. ἀλλὰ τὸ δὲ μοι εἰπέ· σωφροσύνη καὶ ἠδονή ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ἐστὶ τις κοινωνία; Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, ἢ γε ἐκφρονα ποιεῖ 403 οὐχ ἦττον ἡ λύπη; Ἄλλα τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ; Ὀὐδαμῶς. Τί δὲ; ὑβρεῖ τε καὶ ἀκολασία; Πάντων μάλιστα. Μεῖσσος δε τινα καὶ ὀξυτέραν ἔχεις εἰ- πεῖν ἠδονὴν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια; Οὔκ ἔχω, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδὲ γε μανικωτέραν. Ὁ δὲ ὀρθὸς ἔρως πέφυκε κοσμίου τε καὶ καλοῦ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μουσικῶς ἔραν; Καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐδὲν ἄρα προσοιστέοι μανικὸν οὐδὲ ἐγγενεῖς ἀκολασίας τῷ ὀρθῷ ἔρωτι; Οὐ προσοιστέοι. Οὐ προσοιστέον Β ἄρα αὕτη ἡ ἠδονή, οὐδὲ κοινωνιτέον αὕτης ἐραστή τε καὶ παιδικοῖς ὀρθῶς ἐρῶσι τε καὶ ἐρωμένοις; Οὐ μέντοι, μὰ Δ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, προσοιστέον. Οὔτω δὴ, ὡς ἐοικε, νομοθετήσεις ἐν τῇ οἰκίζομενῃ πόλει φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ ἐξείναι καὶ ἀπτεθαί ὑπερ νόεσι παιδικῶν ἐραστῆν, τῶν καλῶν χάρων, ἐὰν πείθη· τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὕτως ὀμιλεῖν πρὸς ὦν τις σπουδάζοι, ὄπως μηδέποτε δόξει μακρότερα τού-

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*a Extravagant pleasure is akin to madness. Cf. Phileb. 47 α-ε, Phaedo 83 c-d.
*b Cf. 468 β-ε.
"Far the fairest." "And surely the fairest is the most lovable." "Of course." "The true musician, then, would love by preference persons of this sort; but if there were disharmony he would not love this." "No," he said, "not if there was a defect in the soul; but if it were in the body he would bear with it and still be willing to bestow his love." "I understand," I said, "that you have or have had favourites of this sort and I grant your distinction. But tell me this—can there be any communion between soberness and extravagant pleasure?" "How could there be," he said, "since such pleasure puts a man beside himself no less than pain?" "Or between it and virtue generally?" "By no means." "But is there between pleasure and insolence and licence?" "Most assuredly." "Do you know of greater or keener pleasure than that associated with Aphrodite?" "I don't," he said, "nor yet of any more insane." "But is not the right love a sober and harmonious love of the orderly and the beautiful?" "It is indeed," said he. "Then nothing of madness, nothing akin to licence, must be allowed to come nigh the right love?" "No." "Then this kind of pleasure may not come nigh, nor may lover and beloved who rightly love and are loved have anything to do with it?" "No, by heaven, Socrates," he said, "it must not come nigh them." "Thus, then, as it seems, you will lay down the law in the city that we are founding, that the lover may kiss and pass the time with and touch the beloved as a father would a son, for honourable ends, if he persuade him. But otherwise he must so associate with the objects of his care that there should never be any suspicion of anything further,
The dependence of body on soul, whether in a mystical, a moral, or a medical sense, is a favourite doctrine of Plato and Platonists. Cf. Charm. 156-157, Spenser, “An Hymn in Honour of Beauty”:

For of the soul the body form doth take,
For soul is form, and doth the body make,

and Shelley, “The Sensitive Plant”:

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on penalty of being stigmatized for want of taste and true musical culture.” “Even so,” he said. “Do you not agree, then, that our discourse on music has come to an end? It has certainly made a fitting end, for surely the end and consummation of culture is the love of the beautiful.” “I concur,” he said.

XIII. “After music our youth are to be educated by gymnastics?” “Certainly.” “In this too they must be carefully trained from boyhood through life, and the way of it is this, I believe; but consider it yourself too. For I, for my part, do not believe that a sound body by its excellence makes the soul good, but on the contrary that a good soul by its virtue renders the body the best that is possible. What is your opinion?” “I think so too.” “Then if we should sufficiently train the mind and turn over to it the minutiae of the care of the body, and content ourselves with merely indicating the norms or patterns, not to make a long story of it, we should be acting rightly?” “By all means.” “From intoxication we said that they must abstain. For a guardian is surely the last person in the world to whom it is allowable to get drunk and not know where on earth he is.” “Yes,” he said, “it would be absurd that a guardian should need a guard.” “What next about their food? These men are

A lady, the wonder of her kind,
Whose form was upborne by a lovely mind,
Which dilating had moulded her mien and motion
Like a sea-flower unfolded beneath the ocean.

Cf. also Democ. fr. B. 187 Diels.

Cf. 398 E. There is no contradiction between this and the half-serious proposal of the Laws to use supervised drinking-bouts as a safe test of character (Laws 641).

g emphases what follows from the very meaning of the word. Cf. 379 B, 389 B, 435 A.
οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγώνος· ἦ οὔχι; Ναί. Ἔρστε ἡ τῶν ἄσκησιῶν ἐξίς προσήκουσ’ ἐν εἰπ’ τούτοις; Ἡσίως. ᾿Αλλά, ἦ δ’ ἐγώ, ὑπνώνησι αὕτη γέ τις καὶ σφαλερά πρὸς ὑγίειαν· ἦ οὔχ ὅρας ὅτι καθεύδουσι τε τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐὰν σμικρά ἐκβώσι τῆς τεταγμένης διαίτης, μεγάλα καὶ σφόδρα νοσοῦσιν οὗτοι οἱ ἄσκηται; Ὕφρω. Κομψοτέρας δὴ τίνος, ἦ δ’ ἐγώ, ἀσκήσεως δεῖ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἅθληταις, οὔς γε ὥσπερ κῦνας ἀγρύπνους τε ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ὅξυ ὅραν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς ἐν ταῖς στρατεύσισι

Β μεταβάλλοντας ὦδάτων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σίτων καὶ εἰδήσεως καὶ χειμῶνων μὴ ἀκροσφαλεῖς εἶναι πρὸς ὑγίειαν. Φαινεται μοι. Ἔρστε ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστικὴ ἀδελφὴ τις ἐν εἰπ’ τῆς μουσικῆς, ἦν ὀλίγων πρότερον διῇμεν; Πῶς λέγεις; ᾿Απλῆ που καὶ ἐπιεικῆς γυμναστικῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ἢ τῶν περὶ τῶν πόλεμον. Πὴ δὴ; Καὶ παρ’ Ὅμηρου, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τά γε τουαῦτα μάθοι ἀν τις. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐπὶ στρατεύσις ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἡρώων ἐστιάσεσιν οὔτε

Ϲ ἠθύουσιν αὐτοὺς ἑστιᾶ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ ἐν ᾿Ελλησπόντω οὖντα, οὔτε ἐφθοῖς κρέασιν ἄλλα

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*a* Cf. 543 b, 621 d, Laches 182 a, Laws 830 a, Demosth. xxv. 97 ἀθληταί τῶν καλῶν ἐργῶν.

*b* Cf. ᾿Εράστει 132 c καθεύδων πάντα τῶν βιῶν. Xenophanes, Euripides, Aristotle, and the medical writers, like Plato, protest against the exaggerated honour paid to athletes and the heavy sluggishness induced by overfeeding and overtraining.

*c* Laws 797 d. Cf. supra 380 e. Aristotle’s comment on μεταβολή, Eth. Nic. 1154 b 28 ff., is curiously reminiscent of Plato, including the phrase ᾿απλῆ ὁδῷ ἐπιεικῆς.

*d* Perhaps in the context “cold.”

*e* Literally “equitable,” if we translate ἐπιεικῆς by its later meaning, that is, not over-precise or rigid in conformity to 266
athletes in the greatest of contests,\(^a\) are they not?" "Yes." "Is, then, the bodily habit of the athletes we see about us suitable for such?" "Perhaps." "Nay," said I, "that is a drowsy habit and precarious for health. Don't you observe that they sleep away their lives,\(^b\) and that if they depart ever so little from their prescribed regimen these athletes are liable to great and violent diseases?" "I do." "Then," said I, "we need some more ingenious form of training for our athletes of war, since these must be as it were sleepless hounds, and have the keenest possible perceptions of sight and hearing, and in their campaigns undergo many changes\(^c\) in their drinking water, their food, and in exposure to the heat of the sun and to storms,\(^d\) without disturbance of their health." "I think so." "Would not, then, the best gymnastics be akin to the music that we were just now describing?" "What do you mean?" "It would be a simple and flexible\(^e\) gymnastic, and especially so in the training for war." "In what way?" "One could learn that," said I, "even from Homer.\(^f\) For you are aware that in the banqueting of the heroes on campaign he does not feast them on fish,\(^g\) though they are at the sea-side on the Hellespont,\(^h\) nor on boiled meat, but only on roast, which is rule. Adam is mistaken in saying that \(\epsilonπιεικής\) is practically synonymous with \(\alphaγάθη\). It sometimes is, but not here. Cf. Plutarch, \(De\ san. 13 \, \alphaκριβῆς \ldots καὶ \deltaι' \bdνυχος.\)

\(^f\) So \(Laws\ 706\ \nu\). The \(καλ\) is perhaps merely idiomatic in quotation.

\(^g\) Homer's ignoring of fish diet, except in stress of starvation, has been much and idly discussed both in antiquity and by modern scholars. Modern pseudo-science has even inferred from this passage that Plato placed a "taboo" on fish.

\(^h\) Which Homer calls "fish-teeming," \(Il.\ ix. 360.\)
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μόνον ὅπτοις, ἀ δὴ μάλιστ' ἂν εἴῃ σтратιώταις εὐποραί, πανταχοῦ γάρ, ὃς ἔπος εἰπείν, αὐτῷ τῷ πυρὶ χρῆσθαι εὐποροῦτερον ἢ ἀγγεία εὐμπεριφέρειν. Καὶ μάλα. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἰδυυμάτων, ὡς ἔγγυμαι, "Ὄμαρος πώποτε ἐμνήσθη; ή τοῦτο μὲν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσκιταὶ ἱσασιν, ὡς τῷ μέλλοντι σῶματι εὐ ἐξειν ἀφεκτέον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπάντων; Καὶ ὅρθως γε, ἔφη, ἱσασι τε καὶ ἀπέχονται. Συρακοσίαν δὲ, ὃ φίλε, τρόπεζαν καὶ Σικελικῆς ποικιλίαν ὄψου, ὡς ἕοικας, οὐκ αἰνεῖς ἐπερ σοι παῦτα δοκεῖ ὅρθως ἐξειν. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ. Ψέγεις ἁρα καὶ Κορυνθίαν κόρην φίλην εἶναι ἀνδράσι μέλλουσιν εὐ σώματος ἐξειν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Ἀττικῶν πεμμάτων τὰς δοκούσας εἶναι εὐπαθείας; Ἀνάγκη. "Ολὴν γὰρ, οἶμαι, τὴν τοιαύτην σίτησιν καὶ διάιτα τῇ μελοποίᾳ τε καὶ ὑδή τῇ ἐν τῷ παναρ.

Ε μονίω καὶ ἐν πάσι βροθμοῖς πεπουμενή ἀπεικάζοντες ὅρθως ἂν ἀπεικάζουμεν. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖ μὲν ἀκολασίαν ἢ ποικιλία ἐνέτικτεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ νόσου, ἢ δὲ ἀπλότης κατὰ μὲν μουσικῆν ἐν ψυχαῖσ σωφροσύνην, κατὰ δὲ γυμναστικῆν ἐν σῶμασιν υγίειαν; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Ἀκολα-405 σίας δὲ καὶ νόσων πληθυνοῦσών ἐν πόλει ἄρ' οὐ δικαστήρια τε καὶ ἰατρεία πολλὰ ἀναγέται, καὶ δικανικῆ τε καὶ ἰατρικὴ σεμύνονται, ὡταν δὴ καὶ ἑλεύθεροι πολλοὶ καὶ σφόδρα περὶ αὐτὰ σπουδά-ζωσιν; Τί γὰρ οὐ μέλλεις;

a Cf. Green, History of English People, Book II. chap. ii., an old description of the Scotch army: "They have therefore no occasion for pots or pans, for they dress the flesh of the cattle in their skins after they have flayed them," etc. But cf. Athenaeus, i. 8-9 (vol. i. p. 36 L.C.L.), Diog. Laert. viii. 13 ὡτε εὐποριστοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι τᾶς τροφᾶς.

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what soldiers could most easily procure. For everywhere, one may say, it is of easier provision to use the bare fire than to convey pots and pans along." "Indeed it is." "Neither, as I believe, does Homer ever make mention of sweetmeats. Is not that something which all men in training understand—that if one is to keep his body in good condition he must abstain from such things altogether?" "They are right," he said, "in that they know it and do abstain." "Then, my friend, if you think this is the right way, you apparently do not approve of a Syracusan table and Sicilian variety of made dishes." "I think not." "You would frown, then, on a little Corinthian maid as the chère amie of men who were to keep themselves fit?" "Most certainly." "And also on the seeming delights of Attic pastry?" "Inevitably." "In general, I take it, if we likened that kind of food and regimen to music and song expressed in the pan-harmonic mode and in every variety of rhythm it would be a fair comparison." "Quite so." "And there variety engendered licentiousness, did it not, but here disease? While simplicity in music begets sobriety in the souls, and in gymnastic training it begets health in bodies." "Most true," he said. "And when licentiousness and disease multiply in a city, are not many courts of law and dispensaries opened, and the arts of chicane and medicine give themselves airs when even free men in great numbers take them very seriously?" "How can they help it?" he said.


dικανική: more contemptuous than δικαστική.
XIV. Τῆς δὲ κακῆς τε καὶ αἰσχρᾶς παιδείας ἐν πόλει ἀρα μὴ τι μείζον ἐξεις λαβεῖν τεκμήριον, ἥ το δεῖσθαι ιατρῶν καὶ δικαστῶν ἄκρων, μὴ μόνον τοὺς φαύλους τε καὶ χειροτέχνας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἐλευθέρῳ σχήματι προσποιομένους τεθράφθαι; ἢ
Β οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ καὶ ἀπαίδευσις μέγα τεκμήριον τὸ ἐπακτῷ παρ’ ἄλλων, ὡς δεσποτῶν τε καὶ κριτῶν, τῷ δικαίῳ ἀναγκάζονται χρήσθαι, καὶ ἀπορία οἰκείων; Πάντων μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, αἰσχιστὸν.
"Η δοκεῖ σοι, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, τούτου αἰσχυνό εἶναι τούτο, ὅταν τις μὴ μόνον τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βίου ἐν δικαστηρίῳς φεύγων τε καὶ διώκων κατατρίβηται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ ἀπειροκαλίας ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δὴ τοῦτω πεισθῇ καλλωπίζοντας, ὡς δεινὸς ὁν περὶ τὸ
C ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐκανὸς πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι, πάσας δὲ διεξόδους διεξελθῶν ἀποστραφῆναι λυγιζόμενος, ὡστε μὴ παρασχεῖν δίκην, καὶ ταύτα σμικρῶν τε καὶ οὕδενος ἀξίων ἐνεκα, ἄγνοιαν ὅσῳ κάλλιον καὶ ἁμεινὸν τὸ παρασκευάζειν τὸν βίον αὐτῶ μηδὲν δεῖσθαι νυστάξωντος δικαστοῦ; Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’, ἔφη, ἐκείνον ἐτί αἰσχυνο. Τὸ δὲ ιατρικῆς, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, δεῖσθαι, ὅ τι μὴ τραυμάτων ἐνεκα ἢ τινων ἐπετείων νοσημάτων ἐπιπεσόντων,
D ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀργίαν τε καὶ δίαιταν οίαν διήλθομεν ῥεμάτων τε καὶ πνευμάτων ὑσπερ λίμνας ἐμ-

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a I have given the sense. The construction is debated accordingly as we read ἀπορία or ἀπορία. Cf. Phaedr. 239 ν, of the use of cosmetics, χάτει οἶκελων. The καὶ with ἀπορία is awkward or expresses the carelessness of conversation.
b Plato likes to emphasize by pointing to a lower depth or a higher height beyond the superlative.
c There is no exact English equivalent for ἀπειροκαλία, the
XIV. "Will you be able to find a surer proof of an evil and shameful state of education in a city than the necessity of first-rate physicians and judges, not only for the base and mechanical, but for those who claim to have been bred in the fashion of free men? Do you not think it disgraceful and a notable mark of bad breeding to have to make use of a justice imported from others, who thus become your masters and judges, from lack of such qualities in yourself?"

"The most shameful thing in the world." "Is it?" said I, "or is this still more shameful—" when a man not only wears out the better part of his days in the courts of law as defendant or accuser, but from the lack of all true sense of values is led to plume himself on this very thing, as being a smart fellow to 'put over' an unjust act and cunningly to try every dodge and practice, every evasion, and wriggle out of every hold in defeating justice, and that too for trifles and worthless things, because he does not know how much nobler and better it is to arrange his life so as to have no need of a nodding juryman?" "That is," said he, "still more shameful than the other." "And to require medicine," said I, "not merely for wounds or the incidence of some seasonal maladies, but, because of sloth and such a regimen as we described, to fill one's body up with winds and humours like an insensitiveness to the καλὸν of the banausic, the nouveau riche and the Philistine.

The phrasing of this passage recalls passages of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, and the description of the pettifogging lawyer and politician in the *Theaetetus* 172. *Cf. infra* 519, also *Euthydem*. 302, and Porphyry, *De abstinentia*, i. 34. The metaphors are partly from wrestling.


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Plato ridicules the unsavoury metaphors required to describe the effects of auto-intoxication. There is a similar bit of somewhat heavier satire in Spencer’s Social Statics, 1868, p. 32: “Carbuncled noses, cadaverous faces, foetid breaths, and plethoric bodies meet us at every turn; and our condolences are perpetually asked for headaches, flatulences, nightmare, heartburn, and endless other dyspeptic symptoms.”

Plato is probably quoting from memory. In our text, Il. xi. 624, Hecamede gives the draught to Machaon and Nestor as the Ion (538 b) correctly states.
marsh and compel the ingenious sons of Aesculapius to invent for diseases such names as fluxes and flatulences—don’t you think that disgraceful? " "Those surely are," he said, "new-fangled and monstrous strange names of diseases." "There was nothing of the kind, I fancy," said I, "in the days of Aesculapius. I infer this from the fact that at Troy his sons did not find fault with the damsel who gave to the wounded Eurypylus to drink a posset of Pramnian wine plentifully sprinkled with barley and gratings of cheese, inflammatory ingredients of a surety, nor did they censure Patroclus, who was in charge of the case." "It was indeed," said he, "a strange potion for a man in that condition." "Not so strange," said I, "if you reflect that the former Asclepiads made no use of our modern coddling medication of diseases before the time of Herodicus. But Herodicus was a trainer and became a vale-tudinarian, and blended gymnastics and medicine, for the torment first and chiefly of himself and then of many successors." "How so?" he said. "By lingering out his death," said I; "for living in perpetual observance of his malady, which was incurable, he was not able to effect a cure, but lived through his days unfit for the business of life, suffering the tortures of the damned if he departed a whit

\[\text{\textsuperscript{c}}\] This coddling treatment of disease, which Plato affectsto reprobate here, he recommends from the point of view of science in the Timaeus (89 c): διὸ παιδαγωγεῖν δὲὶ διαλταῖς, etc. Cf. Eurip. Orestes 883; and even in the Republic 459 c.

εκβαίη, δυσθανατῶν δὲ ὑπὸ σοφίας εἰς γῆρας ἀφίκετο. Καλὸν ἄρα τὸ γέρας, ἐφη, τῆς τέχνης

C ἦνέγκατο. Οἷοι εἰκός, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸν μὴ εἰδότα, ὅτι Ἀσκληπίδος οὐκ ἄγνοια οὐδὲ ἀπερίῳ τοῦτο
τοῦ εἴδους τῆς ἰατρικῆς τοῖς ἐκγόνοις οὐ κατ- 
ἐδείξεν αὐτό, ἀλλ' εἰδῶς ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς εὐνομο-
μένοις ἔργον τι ἐκάστῳ ἐν τῇ πόλει προστέτακται,
δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἔργαζεσθαι, καὶ οὐδεὶς σχολὴ διὰ
βίου κάμνειν ἰατρευμένων. ὃ ἤμεῖς γελοῖς ἐπὶ
μὲν τῶν δημιουργῶν αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν
πλουσίων τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνων δοκοῦντων εἶναι οὐκ
αἰσθανόμεθα. Πῶς; ἐφη.

D XV. Τέκτων μὲν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, κάμνων ἀξιοὶ
παρὰ τοῦ ἰατροῦ φάρμακον πιὸν ἐξεμέσαι τὸ
νόσημα ἡ κάτω καθαρθεὶς ἡ καῦσε η τομὴ χρησά-
μενος ἀπηλλάχθαι· ἐὰν δὲ τοῖς αὐτῶι μακρὰν δίαιταν
προστάτη, πιλίδια τε περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περιτιθεῖς
καὶ τὰ τοῦτοι ἐπόμενα, ταὐτ εἰπεν ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ
κάμνειν οὐδὲ λυσιτελεῖ οὕτως ἕνων, νοσήματι τὸν

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*a* Cf. Macaulay on Mitford's *History of Greece*: "It (oligarchical government) has a sort of valetudinarian long-
evity; it lives in the balance of Sanctorius; it takes no
exercise; it exposes itself to no accident; it is seized with a
hypochondriac alarm at every new sensation; it trembles at
every breath; it lets blood for every inflammation; and
thus, without ever enjoying a day of health or pleasure, drags
out its existence to a doting and debilitated old age." That
Macaulay here is consciously paraphrasing Plato is apparent
from his unfair use of the Platonic passage in his essay on
Bacon. *Cf.* further Eurip. *Supp.* 1109-1113; Seneca on
early medicine, *Epistles* xv. 3 (95) 14 ff., overdoses both
"Je ne sais point apprendre à vivre à qui ne songe qu'à
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from his fixed regimen, and struggling against death by reason of his science he won the prize of a doting old age." "A noble prize indeed for his science," he said. "The appropriate one," said I, "for a man who did not know that it was not from ignorance or inacquaintance with this type of medicine that Aesculapius did not discover it to his descendants, but because he knew that for all well-governed peoples there is a work assigned to each man in the city which he must perform, and no one has leisure to be sick and doctor himself all his days. And this we absurdly enough perceive in the case of a craftsman, but don't see in the case of the rich and so-called fortunate." "How so?" he said.

XV. "A carpenter," said I, "when he is sick expects his physician to give him a drug which will operate as an emetic on the disease, or to get rid of it by purging or the use of cautery or the knife. But if anyone prescribes for him a long course of treatment with swathing about the head and their accompaniments, he hastily says that he has no leisure to be sick, and that such a life of preoccupation with his work is ennuyeuse maladie que de conserver sa santé par un trop grand régime."


c Cf. Plutarch, De sanitate tuenda 23, Sophocles, fr. 88. 11 (?), Lucian, Nigrinus 22, differently; Hotspur's, "Zounds! how has he the leisure to be sick?"

d For ἡ κάτω cf. Chaucer, "Ne upward purgative ne downward laxative."

νοῦν προσέχοντα, τῆς δὲ προκειμένης ἐργασίας ἀμελοῦντα: καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα χαίρειν εἰσὶν τῷ
τοιοῦτῳ ιατρῶ, εἰς τὴν εἰωθούναν διάιταν ἐμβάς, ὑγιῆς γενόμενος ζή τὰ ἐαυτοῦ πράττων: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ
ικανὸν ἢ τὸ σῶμα ὑπενεγκεῖν, τελευτήσας πραγμάτων ἀπηλλάγῃ. Καὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ μέν γ', ἔφη, δοκεῖ πρέπειν οὕτως ιατρικὴ χρήσθαι. Ἀρ', ἢν
407 δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἢν τι αὐτῷ ἐργον, δ' εἰ μὴ πράττοι, οὐκ ἐλυσιτέλει ζήν; Δήλον, ἔφη. ὃ δὲ δὴ πλούσιος,
ὡς φαμεν, οὖδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον ἐργον προκειμένον, οὐ ἀναγκαζομένων ἀπέχεσθαι ἄβιώτων. Οὐκοιν δὴ
λέγεται γε. Φωκυλίδου γάρ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀκούεις, πῶς φησί δεῖν, ὅταν τῷ ἠδη βίος ἢ,
ἀρετὴν ἀσκείν. Οἶμαι δὲ γε, ἔφη, καὶ πρότερον. Μηδὲν, εἰπον, περὶ τούτου αὐτῷ μαχώμεθα, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διδάξωμεν, πότερον μελετητέον τούτῳ
Β τῷ πλούσιῳ καὶ ἄβιώτων τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι, ἡ νοσοτροφία τεκτονικὴ μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῇ προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ, τὸ δὲ Φωκυλίδου
παρακέλευμα οὖδὲν ἐμποδίζει. Ναι μὰ τὸν Δία, ἢ δ' ὅσ, σχεδόν γε τι πάντων μάλιστα ἢ γε
περαιτέρω γυμναστικῆς ἢ περιττή αὐτὴ ἐπι-
μέλεια τοῦ σώματος καὶ γάρ πρὸς οἰκονομίας καὶ
πρὸς στρατείας καὶ πρὸς ἔδραίους ἐν πόλει ἄρχας
dύσκολος. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς

a This alone marks the humour of the whole passage, which Macaulay's Essay on Bacon seems to miss. Cf. Aristoph. Acharnians 757; Apology 41 d.

b The line of Phocylides is toyed with merely to vary the expression of the thought. Bergk restores it διγησθαί βιοτήν, ἀρετήν δ' ὅταν ἢ βίος ἢ, which is Horace's (Ep. i. 1. 53 f.):

Quaerenda pecunia primum est;
Virtus post nummos!

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illness and neglect of the work that lies before him isn’t worth living. And thereupon he bids farewell to that kind of physician, enters upon his customary way of life, regains his health, and lives attending to his affairs—or, if his body is not equal to the strain, he dies and is freed from all his troubles."

"For such a man," he said, "that appears to be the right use of medicine." "And is not the reason," I said, "that he had a task and that life wasn’t worth acceptance on condition of not doing his work?" "Obviously," he said. "But the rich man, we say, has no such appointed task, the necessity of abstaining from which renders life intolerable." "I haven’t heard of any." "Why, haven’t you heard that saying of Phocylides,\textsuperscript{b} that after a man has ‘made his pile’ he ought to practise virtue?" "Before, too, I fancy," he said. "Let us not quarrel with him on that point," I said, "but inform ourselves whether this virtue is something for the rich man to practise, and life is intolerable if he does not, or whether we are to suppose that while valetudinarianism is a hindrance to single-minded attention to carpentry and the other arts, it is no obstacle to the fulfilment of Phocylides’ exhortation." "Yes, indeed," he said, "this excessive care for the body that goes beyond simple gymnastics\textsuperscript{c} is about the greatest of all obstacles. For it is troublesome in household affairs and military service and sedentary offices in the city." "And, chief of all, it puts difficulties in the way of any kind of

\textsuperscript{a} In the Gorgias (464 b) \textit{ιαπρική} is recognized as co-ordinate in the care of the body with \textit{γυμναστική}. Here, whatever goes beyond the training and care that will preserve the health of a normal body is austere rejected. \textit{Cf.} 410 b.
maθήσεις ἀστινασοῦν καὶ ἐννοήσεις τε καὶ μελέτας
C πρὸς ἑαυτὸν χαλεπῆ, κεφαλῆς τινὰς αἰεὶ δια-
tάσεις\(^1\) καὶ ἰλιγγοὺς ὕποπτεύουσα καὶ αὐτιωμένη
ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὡστε, ὅπῃ ταύτῃ
ἀρετῇ ἀσκεῖται καὶ δοκιμάζεται, πάντῃ ἐμπόδιος·
kάμνειν γὰρ οἶεσθαι ποιεῖ ἄι καὶ ὦδίνοντα μήποτε
λήγειν περὶ τοῦ σώματος. Εἰκός γ’, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν
ταύτα γιγνώσκοντα φώμεν καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸν τοὺς
μὲν φύει τε καὶ διαίτῃ ὑγιεινῶς ἔχοντας ἕκατον τὰ
D σώματα, νόσημα δὲ τὶ ἁποκεκριμένον ὑψούντας ἐν
αὐτοῖς, τοῦτοις μὲν καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ἔξει καταδείξαι
ιατρικῆν, φαρμάκοις τε καὶ τομαῖς τὰ νοσήματα
ἐκβάλλοντα αὐτῶν τὴν εἰωθόνα προστάτευει
dιαίτας, ἵνα μὴ τὰ πολιτικὰ βλάπτει, τὰ δ’ εἰσο
διὰ παντὸς νεοσηκότα σώματα οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν
διαίτας κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀπαντλοῦντα καὶ ἐπιχέοντα
μακρὸν καὶ κακῶν βίον ἀνθρώπων ποιεῖν, καὶ
ἐκγυνα αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔτερα τοιαῦτα φυτεύειν,
Ε ἀλλὰ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυῖα περιόδῳ
ζῆν μὴ οἴεσθαι δεῖν θεραπεύειν, ὡς οὐτε αὐτῷ ὡστε
πόλει λυσιτελῆ; Πολιτικὸν, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκλη-
πιόν. Δῆλον, ἥν δ’ ἐγὼ:\(^2\) καὶ οἱ παιδεῖς αὐτοῦ,

\(^1\) διατάσεις Galen: διαστάσεις mss., plainly wrong.
\(^2\) δῆλον, ἥν δ’ ἐγὼ κτλ.] this, the ms. reading, will not construe
smoothly, and many emendations have been proposed, none
of which seriously affects the sense. I have translated
Schneider’s transposition of ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἥν after ἐγὼ and
before καὶ.

\(a\) As Macaulay, Essay on “Bacon,” puts it: “That a vale-
tudinarian . . . who enjoyed a hearty laugh over the Queen of
Navarre’s tales should be treated as a caput lupinum because
he could not read the Timaeus without a headache, was a
notion which the humane spirit of the English schools of
wisdom altogether rejected.” For the thought cf. Xen. Mem.
iii. 12. 6-7.

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instruction, thinking, or private meditation, forever imagining headaches\(^a\) and dizziness and attributing their origin to philosophy. So that wherever this kind of virtue is practised\(^b\) and tested it is in every way a hindrance.\(^c\) For it makes the man always fancy himself sick and never cease from anguishing about his body.” “Naturally,” he said. “Then shall we not say that it was because Asclepius knew this—that for those who were by nature and course of life sound of body but had some localized disease, that for such, I say, and for this habit he revealed the art of medicine, and, driving out their disease by drugs and surgery, prescribed for them their customary regimen in order not to interfere with their civic duties, but that, when bodies were diseased inwardly and throughout, he did not attempt by diet and by gradual evacuations and infusions to prolong a wretched existence for the man and have him beget in all likelihood similar wretched offspring? But if a man was incapable of living in the established round\(^d\) and order of life, he did not think it worth while to treat him, since such a fellow is of no use either to himself or to the state.” “A most politic Asclepius you’re telling us of,” he said. “Obviously,” said I,

\(^a\) Literally “virtue is practised in this way.” Cf. 503 \(d\) for a similar contrast between mental and other labours. And for the meaning of virtue cf. the Elizabethan: “Virtue is ever sowing of her seeds.”

\(^b\) There is a suggestion of Stoic terminology in Plato’s use of \(\varepsilon\mu\rho\delta\.\iota\sigma\) and similar words. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 4. On the whole passage cf. again Macaulay’s Essay on “Bacon,” Maximus of Tyre (Duebn.) 10, and the diatribe on modern medicine and valetudinarianism in Edward Carpenter’s Civilization, Its Cause and Cure. \(^d\) Cf. Thucyd. i. 130.

\(^c\) There is a touch of comedy in the Greek. Cf. Eupolis, fr. 94 Kock \(\tau\alpha\chi\nu\nu \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\iota\igamma\upsilon \mu\acute{e}n.\)
ōτι τοιούτος ἦν, οὖν ὃρας ὡς καὶ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἀγαθοὶ
408 πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐφάνησαν, καὶ τῇ ἱατρικῇ, ὡς ἔγω λέγω, ἔχρωντο; ἣ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὦτι καὶ τῷ Μενέλεω ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος οὗ ὁ Πάνταρος ἐβαλεν
ἀιμ' ἐκμυξύσαντ' ἐπὶ τ ὑπια χάρμακ' ἐπασσον,
ὁ τι δ' ἔχρην μετὰ τοῦτο ἦ πιεῖν ἦ φαγεῖν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἦ τῷ Ἐὐρυπόλῳ προσέτατον, ὡς ἴκανῶν ὄντων τῶν χάρμακων ἱάσασθαι ἄνδρας πρὸ τῶν τραυμάτων ὑγειούς τε καὶ κοσμίους ἐν διαίτῃ, Β καὶ εἰ τύχοιεν ἐν τῷ παραχρήμα κυκέδνα πίόντες, νοσώδῃ δὲ φύσει τε καὶ ἀκόλουθον ὦτε αὐτοὶς οὐτε τοὺς ἄλλους ὄντων λυστελεῖν ἐξ' ὁ, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν τέχνην δεῖν εἶναί, οὐδὲ θεραπευτέον αὐτοὺς, οὐδ' εἰ Μίδου πλουσιῶτεροι εἶν. Πάνω κομψοῦς, ἐφή, λέγεις 'Ἀσκληπιοῦ παύδας.

XVI. Πρέπει, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· καίτοι ἀπειθοῦντες γε ἠμῖν οἱ τραγῳδιοποιοὶ τε καὶ Πίνδαρος Ἀπόλλωνος μὲν φασὶν Ἀσκληπιοῦ εἶναι, ὑπὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ Λ πεισθήναι πλοῦσιν ἄνδρα θανάσιμον ἡ' ὅντα ἱάσασθαι, οἰδεν δὴ καὶ κεραυνωθήναι αὐτόν. ἢ'meis δὲ κατὰ τὰ προερημένα οὐ πειθόμεθα αὐτοῖς ἀμφότερα, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θεοῦ ἦν, οὐκ ἦν, φήσομεν, αἰσχροκερδῆς, εἰ δ' αἰσχροκερδῆς, οὐκ ἦν θεοῦ. Ὀρθότατα, ᾧ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα γε. ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτῳ τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἄρ', οὐκ ἄγαθος δεῖ εὖ τῇ πόλει κεκτῆσθαι ἱατροὺς; εἶν δ' ᾧν ποῦ

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a Cf. the Homeric ἦ οὐ μέμνη:

b Plato is quoting loosely or adapting Il. iv. 218. αἰμ' ἐκμυξύσας ἐπ' ἀρ' ἡπια χάρμακα εἴδος πάσσω εἰς said of Machaon, not of Menelaus.

c Proverbial and suggests Tyrtaeus. Cf. Laws 660 e.
that was his character. And his sons too, don't you see that at Troy they approved themselves good fighting-men and practised medicine as I described it? Don't you remember that in the case of Menelaus too from the wound that Pandarus inflicted

They sucked the blood, and soothing simples sprinkled?

But what he was to eat or drink thereafter they no more prescribed than for Eurypylus, taking it for granted that the remedies sufficed to heal men who before their wounds were healthy and temperate in diet even if they did happen for the nonce to drink a posset; but they thought that the life of a man constitutionally sickly and intemperate was of no use to himself or others, and that the art of medicine should not be for such nor should they be given treatment even if they were richer than Midas. "Very ingenious fellows," he said, "you make out these sons of Asclepius to be."

XVI. "'Tis fitting," said I; "and yet in disregard of our principles the tragedians and Pindar affirm that Asclepius, though he was the son of Apollo, was bribed by gold to heal a man already at the point of death, and that for this cause he was struck by the lightning. But we in accordance with the aforesaid principles refuse to believe both statements, but if he was the son of a god he was not avaricious, we will insist, and if he was greedy of gain he was not the son of a god." "That much," said he, "is most certainly true. But what have you to say to this, Socrates, must we not have good physicians in our city? And they would be the most likely to be good

\[ \text{Cf. Aeschyl. Ag. 1022 ff., Eurip. Alcest. 3-4, Pindar, Pyth. iii. 53.} \]
\[ \text{Cf. 379 ff., also 365 e.} \]
μάλιστα τοιούτων, ὃσοι πλείστους μὲν ὑγεινοὺς,
D πλείστους δὲ νοσόδεις μετεχειρίζαντο, καὶ δικα-
στὰὶ αὐ ὀσαύτως οἱ παντοδαπαῖς φύσεως ὄμω-
ληκότες. Καὶ μάλα, εἶπον, ἀγαθοὺς λέγω· ἀλλ’
οἴσθα ὦν ἤγομαι τοιούτους; “Ἀν εἴης, ἐφη.
’Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ· σὺ μέντοι οὐχ
ὀμοίων πράγμα τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ἦρου. Πῶς; ἐφη.
’Ιατροὶ μὲν, εἶπον, δεινότατοι ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ ἐκ
παίδων ἀρξάμενοι πρὸς τῷ μανθάνειν τὴν τέχνην
ὡς πλείστους τε καὶ πονηροτάτους σώμασιν ὁμλή-
Ε σειαν καὶ αὐτοὶ πᾶσας νόσους κάμιοιν καὶ εἶνεν μὴ
πάντα ὑγεινοὶ φύσει. οὐ γὰρ, οἶμαι, σώματι σῶμα
θεραπεύουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὰ ἐνεχώρει κακὰ εἶναι
ποτε καὶ γενέσθαι· ἀλλὰ ψυχῆ σῶμα, ἢ οὐκ
ἐγχωρεῖ καθή γενομένην τε καὶ οὔσαι εἰ τι
θεραπεύειν. Ὕρθως, ἐφη. Δικαστὴς δὲ γε, ὥ
409 φίλε, ψυχῆ ψυχῆς ἄρχει, ἢ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ ἐκ νέας
ἐν πονηραῖς ψυχαῖς τεθράφθαι τε καὶ ὁμολήκναι
καὶ πάντα ἀδικήματα αὐτὴν ἡδικηκυῖαι διεξέλ-
λυθέναι, ὡστε δέξιως ἂφ’ αὐτῆς τεκμαίρεσθαι τὰ
τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικήματα, οἶον κατὰ σῶμα νόσους·
ἀλλ’ ἄπειρον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκέραιον δεῖ κακῶν ἡθῶν
νέαν οὔσαι γεγονέναι, εἰ μέλλει καλὴ κἀγαθὴ οὔσα
κρίνειν ὑγίως τὰ δίκαια. διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐθεῖαι νέοι
ὅντες οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς φαίνονται καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοι ὕπο
Β τῶν ἀδίκων, ὅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς παραδείγ-
ματα ὁμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηροῖς. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἐφη,
σφόνδρα γε αὐτὸ πάσχουσιν. Τοιγάρτοι, ἢν δ’

\* Cf. Gorg. 465 c-d.
who had treated the greatest number of healthy and diseased men, and so good judges would be those who had associated with all sorts and conditions of men."

"Most assuredly I want them good," I said; "but do you know whom I regard as such?" "I'll know if you tell," he said. "Well, I will try," said I.

"You, however, have put unlike cases in one question." "How so?" said he. "Physicians, it is true," I said, "would prove most skilled if, from childhood up, in addition to learning the principles of the art they had familiarized themselves with the greatest possible number of the most sickly bodies, and if they themselves had suffered all diseases and were not of very healthy constitution. For you see they do not treat the body by the body. If they did, it would not be allowable for their bodies to be or to have been in evil condition. But they treat the body with the mind—and it is not competent for a mind that is or has been evil to treat anything well."

"Right," he said. "But a judge, mark you, my friend, rules soul with soul and it is not allowable for a soul to have been bred from youth up among evil souls and to have grown familiar with them, and itself to have run the gauntlet of every kind of wrong-doing and injustice so as quickly to infer from itself the misdeeds of others as it might diseases in the body, but it must have been inexperienced in evil natures and uncontaminated by them while young, if it is to be truly fair and good and judge soundly of justice. For which cause the better sort seem to be simple-minded in youth and are easily deceived by the wicked, since they do not have within themselves patterns answering to the affections of the bad."

"That is indeed their experience," he said. "There-
éγώ, οὐ νέον ἄλλα γέροντα δεῖ τὸν ἁγαθὸν δικαστὴν εἶναι, ὁμμαθὴ γεγονότα τῆς ἀδικίας οἰνὸν ἔστιν: οὐκ οἰκεῖαν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἔνοισαν ἥσθημένον, ἀλλὰ ἀλλοτρίαν ἐν ἀλλοτρίαις μεμελετήτοτα ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διαισθάνοντα, οἶνον πέφυκε

C κακὸν, ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἐμπειρία οἰκεῖα κεχρημένον. Γενναίοτατος γοῦν, ἐφη, ἐσικεν εἶναι ὁ τοιοῦτος δικαστὴς. Καὶ ἁγαθὸς γε, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ σὺ ἡρώτας; ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ψυχὴν ἁγαθὴν ἁγαθός. ὁ δὲ δεινὸς ἐκεῖνος καὶ καχύποτος, ὁ πολλὰ αὐτὸς ἡδικηκὼς καὶ πανούργος τε καὶ σοφὸς οἴμενος εἶναι, ὅταν μὲν ὁμοίως ὁμιλῇ, δεινὸς φαίνεται ἐξευλαβοῦμενος, πρὸς τά ἐν αὐτῷ παραδείγματα ἀποσκοπῶν. ὅταν δὲ ἁγαθοὶ καὶ πρεσβυτέροι ὕδη πλησιάσῃ,

D ἀβέλτερος αὐτοὶ φαίνεται, ἀπιστῶν παρὰ καιρὸν καὶ ἄγνωστον ὑγείας ἠδος, ἀτε οὐκ ἔχων παράδειγμα τοῦ τοιοῦτον πλεονάκις δὲ πονηροὶς ἡ χρηστοὶς ἐντυγχάνων σοφώτερος ἡ ἀμαθέστερος δοκεῖ εἴναι αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλοις. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ἀληθῆ.

XVII. Οὖ τοῖνυν, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, τοιούτον χρή τον δικαστήν ἐγείρῃ τὸν ἁγαθὸν τε καὶ σοφὸν, ἄλλα τὸν πρότερον. πονηρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετήν τε καὶ αὐτὴν οὐποτ' ἀν γνοίη, ἀρετή δὲ φύσεως παιδευ-Ε μένης χρόνῳ ἀμα αὐτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστή-

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*a όμμαθη: here in a favourable sense, but usually an untranslatable Greek word for a type portrayed in a character of Theophrastus.

b For this type of character cf. Thucyd. iii. 83, and my comments in T.A.P.A. vol. xxiv. p. 79. Cf. Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol: "They who raise suspicions on the good on account of the behaviour of ill men, are of the party of the latter;" Stobaeus ii. p. 46 Bias ἐφη, οἱ ἁγαθοὶ εὐπάτητοι, Menander, fr. 845 Kock χρηστοῦ παρ' ἀνδρὸς μηδὲν ὑπονεῖ κακὸν.

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fore it is," said I, "that the good judge must not be a youth but an old man, a late learner of the nature of injustice, one who has not become aware of it as a property in his own soul, but one who has through the long years trained himself to understand it as an alien thing in alien souls, and to discern how great an evil it is by the instrument of mere knowledge and not by experience of his own." "That at any rate," he said, "appears to be the noblest kind of judge." "And what is more, a good one," I said, "which was the gist of your question. For he who has a good soul is good. But that cunning fellow quick to suspect evil, and who has himself done many unjust acts and who thinks himself a smart trickster, when he associates with his like does appear to be clever, being on his guard and fixing his eyes on the patterns within himself. But when the time comes for him to mingle with the good and his elders, then on the contrary he appears stupid. He is unseasonably distrustful and he cannot recognize a sound character because he has no such pattern in himself. But since he more often meets with the bad than the good, he seems to himself and to others to be rather wise than foolish." "That is quite true," he said.

XVII. "Well then," said I, "such a one must not be our ideal of the good and wise judge but the former. For while badness could never come to know both virtue and itself, native virtue through education will at last acquire the science of both itself and badness."

*Cf. George Eliot, Adam Bede, chap. xiv.: "It is our habit to say that while the lower nature can never understand the higher, the higher nature commands a complete view of the lower. But I think the higher nature has to learn this comprehension by a good deal of hard experience."*
μὴν λήψεται. σοφὸς οὐν οὐτός, ὡς μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὃ κακὸς γίγνεται. Καὶ ἔμοι, ἔφη, ξυνδοκεῖ. Ὥνκοιν καὶ ἰατρικὴν, οἶναν εἰπομεν, μετὰ τῆς τουιάτης δικαστικῆς κατὰ πόλιν νομοθετήσεις, αἱ τῶν πολιτῶν σοὶ τοὺς μὲν εὐφυεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς θεραπεύσουσι, τοὺς δὲ μή, οὗτοι μὲν κατὰ σώμα τουιντοῦ, ἀποθνῄσκειν ἔσουσι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεῖς καὶ ἀνίατος αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν; Τὸ γοῦν ἀριστον, ἔφη, αὐτοῖς τε τοὺς πάσχουσι καὶ τῇ πόλει οὕτω πέφανται. Οἱ δὲ δὴ νέοι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, δῆλον οἳ εὐλαβήσονται σοι δικαστικῆς εἰς χρείαν ἔχοντες, τῇ ἀπλῇ ἐκείνῃ μονοθηκῇ χρῶμενοι, ἢν δὴ ἐφαμεν σωφροσύνην ἐντικτεύν. Τί μὴν; ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ τοῦτα

Β' ἵνα ταῦτα ὃ μουσικὸς γυμναστικὴν διώκων, ἐὰν ἔθελῃ, αἰρήσει, ὡστε μηδὲν ἰατρικὴν δεῖδαι ὁ τι μὴν ἀνάγκη; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Αὐτὰ μὴν τὰ γυμνάσσα καὶ τοὺς πόνους πρὸς τὸ θυμοειδὲς τῆς φύσεως βλέπων κάκεινο ἐνείρων πονῆσει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἱσχύν, ὦν ὡσπερ σὲ ἄλλου ἀθληταὶ ῥώμης ἑνεκα συτία καὶ πόνους μεταχειρίζονται. ὂρθοτατα, ἢ δ' ὃς. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὡς Πλαύκων,
This one, then, as I think, is the man who proves to be wise and not the bad man." "And I concur," he said. "Then will you not establish by law in your city such an art of medicine as we have described in conjunction with this kind of justice? And these arts will care for the bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly well born, but of those who are not, such as are defective in body they will suffer to die and those who are evil-natured and incurable in soul they will themselves put to death."

"This certainly," he said, "has been shown to be the best thing for the sufferers themselves and for the state." "And so your youths," said I, "employing that simple music which we said engendered sobriety will, it is clear, guard themselves against falling into the need of the justice of the court-room."

"Yes," he said. "And will not our musician, pursuing the same trail in his use of gymnastics, if he please, get to have no need of medicine save when indispensable?" "I think so." "And even the exercises and toils of gymnastics he will undertake with a view to the spirited part of his nature to arouse that rather than for mere strength, unlike ordinary athletes, who treat diet and exercise only as a means to muscle." "Nothing could be truer," he said. "Then may we not say, Glaucon," said I,
καὶ οἱ καθιστάντες μουσικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν
C παιδεύειν οὐχ οὐ̃ ἐνεκὰ τινες οἴονται καθιστασίν, ἵνα τῇ μὲν τὸ σῶμα θεραπεύοντο, τῇ δὲ τὴν
ψυχὴν; 'Αλλὰ τί μὴν; ἐφη. Κινδυνεύονσιν, ἣν
d' ἐγώ, ἀμφότερα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεκα τὸ μέγιστον
καθιστάναι. Πῶς δὴ; Ὡς ἐννοεῖς, εἴπον, ὡς
dιατίθενται αὐτὴν τὴν διάνοιαν, οἴ ἂν γυμναστικῆν
μὲν διὰ βίον ὀμιλήσωσι, μουσικῆς δὲ μὴ ἄψωσιν;
ἵ οὔσοι ἂν τοῦνατιον διατεθῶσιν; Τίνος δὲ, ἂ δ'
D ὡς, πέρι λέγεις; 'Αγριότητός τε καὶ σκληρότητος,
καὶ αὐ̃ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἥμερότητος, ὥν δ' ἐγὼ.
'Εγωγε, ἐφη, ὡς οἱ μὲν γυμναστικῆς ἀκράτῳ
χρησάμενοι ἀγριώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος ἀποβαίνουσιν,
οἱ δὲ μουσικῆς μαλακότεροι αὐ̃ γίγνονται ἢ ὡς
cάλλιον αὐτοῖς. Καὶ μὴν, ὥν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ γε ἀγρινὸ
tὸ θυμοειδὲς ἂν τῆς φύσεως παρέχοιτο, καὶ ὀρθῶς
μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδρείων ἂν εἶη, μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιταθὲν
tοῦ δέοντος σκληροῦ τε καὶ χαλεποῦ γίγνοιτ' ἂν,
ὡς τὸ εἰκός. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφῆ. Τί δὲ; τὸ ἥμερον
E οὐ̃ ἢ φιλόσοφος ἂν ἔχοι φύσις; καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν
ἀνεθέντος αὐτοῦ μαλακότερον εἶη τοῦ δέοντος,
cαλῶς δὲ τραφέντος ἥμερον τε καὶ κόσμιον; "Ἑστι
tαῦτα. Δεῖν δὲ γε φαμεν τοὺς φύλακας ἀμφότερα
ἔχειν τοῦτῳ τῶν φύσει. Δεῖ γάρ. Οὐ̃κοῦν ἡμιο-
σθαι δὲ αὐτῶσ πρὸς ἀλλήλας; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Καὶ
tοῦ μὲν ἡμιοσμένου σώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία ἡ

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a Plato half seriously attributes his own purposes to the founders. Cf. 405-406 on medicine and Phileb. 16 c on dialectics.

b For the thought cf. Eurip. Suppl. 882 f. and Polybius's account of the effect of the neglect of music on the Arcadians (iv. 20).

c Cf. supra 375 c. With Plato's doctrine of the two
"that those who established an education in music and gymnastics had not the purpose in view that some attribute to them in so instituting, namely to treat the body by one and the soul by the other?"

"But what?" he said. "It seems likely," I said, "that they ordained both chiefly for the soul's sake."

"How so?" "Have you not observed," said I, "the effect on the disposition of the mind itself of lifelong devotion to gymnastics with total neglect of music? Or the disposition of those of the opposite habit?" "In what respect do you mean?" he said.

"In respect of savagery and hardness or, on the other hand, of softness and gentleness?" "I have observed," he said, "that the devotees of unmitigated gymnastics turn out more brutal than they should be and those of music softer than is good for them."

"And surely," said I, "this savagery is a quality derived from the high-spirited element in our nature, which, if rightly trained, becomes brave, but if overstrained, would naturally become hard and harsh."

"I think so," he said. "And again, is not the gentleness a quality which the philosophic nature would yield? This if relaxed too far would be softer than is desirable but if rightly trained gentle and orderly?"

"That is so." "But our requirement, we say, is that the guardians should possess both natures."

"It is." "And must they not be harmoniously adjusted to one another?" "Of course." "And the soul of the man thus attuned is sober and brave?"

temperaments cf. the distinction of quick-wits and hard-wits in Ascham's Schoolmaster. Ascham is thinking of Plato, for he says: "Galen saith much music marreth men's manners; and Plato hath a notable place of the same thing in his book De rep., well marked also and excellently translated by Tully himself."
411 ψυχή; Πάνω γε. Τού δὲ ἀναρμόστου δειλή καὶ ἄγροικος; Καὶ μάλα.

ΧVIII. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὲν τις μουσικὴ παρέχῃ καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὦτων ὦσπερ διὰ χώνης ἃς νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν τὰς γλυκείας τε καὶ μαλακός καὶ θρηνῶδεις ἁρμονίας, καὶ μινυρίζων τε καὶ γεγανωμένος ὑπὸ τῆς ὑδῆς διατελῇ τῶν βίων ὀλον, οὕτως τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, εἰ δὲ 

Β τι θυμοειδὲς εἶχεν, ὦσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξε καὶ χρήσιμον εἰς ἀκρήστου καὶ σκληροῦ ἐποίησεν· ὅταν δὲ ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνίκ ἄλλα κηλῆ, τὸ μετὰ τούτο ἡδη τήκει καὶ λείβει, ἢς ἢς ἐκτήξῃ τοῦ θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτέμῃ ὦσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ποιήσῃ μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφι. Καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσει ἀθυμὸν λάβῃ, ταχὺ τούτο διεπράξατο· ἐὰν δὲ θυμοειδῆ, ἀσθενῆ ποιήσας τὸν θυμὸν ὄξυρροπον ἀπειργάσατο,

C ἀπὸ σμικρῶν ταχὺ ἐρεθιζόμενον τε καὶ κατασβεν- νύμενον. ἀκράχολοι οὖν καὶ ὅργαλοι άντὶ θυμο- ειδοὺς γεγένηται, δυσκολίας ἐμπλεοῦ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ· ἢν αὐ γυμναστικῆ πολλὰ πονῆ καὶ εὐωξήται εὗ μάλα, μουσικῆς δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας μὴ ἀπτηται, οὐ πρῶτον μὲν εὗ ἐσχὼν τὸ σῶμα φρονήματός τε καὶ θυμὸν ἐμπίπλαται καὶ ἀνδρείο-

a Cf. 561 c.

b Demetrius, Περι τ’Ερμ. 51, quotes this and the following sentence as an example of the more vivid expression following the less vivid. For the image cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Thesm. 18, Aeschyl. Choeph. 451, Shakespeare, Cymbeline iii. ii. 59 "Love’s counsellor should fill the bores of hearing."

c Cf. 398 D-E, where the θηνωδεὶς ἁρμονίαι are rejected altogether, while here they are used to illustrate the softening effect of music on a hard temperament. It is misspent ingenuity to harp on such “contradictions.”

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"Certainly." "And that of the ill adjusted is cowardly and rude?" "It surely is."

XVIII. "Now when a man abandons himself to music to play upon him and pour into his soul as it were through the funnel of his ears those sweet, soft, and dirge-like airs of which we were just now speaking, and gives his entire time to the warblings and blandishments of song, the first result is that the principle of high spirit, if he had it, is softened like iron and is made useful instead of useless and brittle. But when he continues the practice without remission and is spellbound, the effect begins to be that he melts and liquefies till he completely dissolves away his spirit, cuts out as it were the very sinews of his soul and makes of himself a 'feeble warrior.'"

"Assuredly," he said. "And if," said I, "he has to begin with a spiritless nature he reaches this result quickly, but if a high-spirited, by weakening the spirit he makes it unstable, quickly irritated by slight stimuli, and as quickly quelled. The outcome is that such men are choleric and irascible instead of high-spirited, and are peevish and discontented."

"Precisely so." "On the other hand, if a man toils hard at gymnastics and eats right lustily and holds no truck with music and philosophy, does he not at first get very fit and full of pride and high spirit and

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\[d\] For images drawn from the tempering of metals cf. Aeschyl. Ag. 612 and Jebb on Soph. Ajax 650.

\[e\] Cf. Theaetet. 165 e ēπεχων καλ ουκ ἄνιεις, and Blaydes on Aristoph. Peace 1121.

\[f\] Cf. Tennyson's "Molten down in mere uxoriousness" ("Geraint and Enid").

\[g\] A familiar Homeric reminiscence (Il. xvii. 588) quoted also in Symp. 174 c. Cf. Froissart's "un mol chevalier."

\[h\] Etymologically ἄθυμος = "deficient in θυμός."
A hater of rational discussion, as explained in Laches 188 c., and the beautiful passage in the Phaedo 89 d ff. Cf. Minucius Felix, Octavius 14. 6 “Igitur nobis providendum est ne odio identidem sermonum laboremus.” John Morley describes obscurantists as “sombre hierophants of misology.”

For virtue as “music” cf. Phaedo 61 a, Laches 188 d, and Iago’s “There is a daily music in his life.” The
become more brave and bold than he was?' " "He does indeed." "But what if he does nothing but this and has no contact with the Muse in any way, is not the result that even if there was some principle of the love of knowledge in his soul, since it tastes of no instruction nor of any inquiry and does not participate in any discussion or any other form of culture, it becomes feeble, deaf, and blind, because it is not aroused or fed nor are its perceptions purified and quickened?" "That is so," he said. "And so such a man, I take it, becomes a misologist and a stranger to the Muses. He no longer makes any use of persuasion by speech but achieves all his ends like a beast by violence and savagery, and in his brute ignorance and ineptitude lives a life of disharmony and gracelessness." "That is entirely true," he said. "For these two, then, it seems there are two arts which I would say some god gave to mankind, music and gymnastics for the service of the high-spirited principle and the love of knowledge in them—not for the soul and the body except incidentally, but for the harmonious adjustment of these two principles by the proper degree of tension and relaxation of each." "Yes, so it appears," he said. "Then he who best blends gymnastics with music and applies them most suitably to the soul is the man whom we should most rightly pronounce to be the most perfect and harmonious musician, far rather than the one who brings the strings into unison with one another." "That seems likely, "perfect musician" is the professor of the royal art of Politicus 306-308 ff. which harmonizes the two temperaments, not merely by education, but by eliminating extremes through judicious marriages.
krates. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡμῖν, ὥς Γλαύκων, δεήσει τοῦ τοιοῦτον τινὸς ἀεὶ ἐπιστάτου, εἰ μέλλει Ἡ πολιτεία σωζέσθαι; Δεήσει μέντοι ὡς οἶον τὲ γε μάλιστα.

ΧΙΘ. Οἱ μὲν δὴ τύποι τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς οὕτως ἄν εἰεν. χορείας γὰρ τί ἀν τις διεξόμει τῶν τοιοῦτων καὶ θήρας τε καὶ κυνηγείας καὶ γυμνικοὺς ἁγώνας καὶ ἐπιπυκοὺς; σχεδὸν γὰρ τι δῆλα δὴ ὅτι τούτους ἐπόμενα δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκέτι χαλεπὰ εὔρεῖν. 'Ἰσως, ἢ δ' ὡς, οὐ χαλεπὰ. Εἰεν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ· τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο τί ἄν ἡμῖν διαρεῖτο εὑρή; ἂρ' οὐκ αὐτῶν τούτων οὕτως C ἀρξοῦσι τε καὶ ἀρξοῦνται; Τί μήν; Ὄτι μὲν πρεσβυτέρους τοὺς ἀρχοντας δεὶ εἶναι, νεωτέρους δὲ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, δῆλον; Δῆλον. Καὶ ὅτι γε τοὺς ἀρίστους αὐτῶν; Καὶ τοῦτο. Οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν ἀριστοὶ ἂρ' οὐ γεωργικῶτατοι γίγνονται; Ναί. Νῦν δ', ἐπειδὴ φυλάκων αὐτοὺς ἀρίστους δεὶ εἶναι, ἂρ' οὐ φυλακικωτάτους πόλεως; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν φρονίμους τε εἰς τοῦτο δεὶ ὑπάρχειν καὶ δυνατοὺς D καὶ ἐτὶ κηδεμόνας τῆς πόλεως; 'Εστι ταῦτα. Κήδεοτο δὲ γ' ἄν τις μάλιστα τοῦτον δ' τυγχάνοι φιλῶν. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ μήν τοῦτο γ' ἄν μάλιστα φιλοὶ, ὥς ἐμφέρεν ἡγοῦτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ εαυτῷ καὶ

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a This “epistates” is not the director of education of Laws 765 d ff., though of course he or it will control education. It is rather an anticipation of the philosophic rulers, as appears from 497 c-d, and corresponds to the nocturnal council of Laws 950 b ff. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 86, note 650.

b γὰρ explains τούτω, or outlines. Both in the Republic and the Laws Plato frequently states that many details must be left to subsequent legislation. Cf. Rep. 379 a, 400 b-c, 294.
Socrates," he said. "And shall we not also need in our city, Glaucon, a permanent overseer\(^a\) of this kind if its constitution is to be preserved?" "We most certainly shall."

XIX. "Such would be the outlines of their education and breeding. For why\(^b\) should one recite the list of the dances of such citizens, their hunts and chases with hounds, their athletic contests and races? It is pretty plain that they must conform to these principles and there is no longer any difficulty in discovering them." "There is, it may be, no difficulty," he said. "Very well," said I; "what, then, have we next to determine? Is it not which ones among them\(^c\) shall be the rulers and the ruled?" "Certainly." "That the rulers must be the elder and the ruled the younger is obvious." "It is." "And that the rulers must be their best?" "This too." "And do not the best of the farmers prove the best farmers?" "Yes." "And in this case, since we want them to be the best of the guardians, must they not be the best guardians, the most regardful of the state?" "Yes." "They must then to begin with be intelligent in such matters and capable, and furthermore careful\(^d\) of the interests of the state?" "That is so." "But one would be most likely to be careful of that which he loved." "Necessarily." "And again, one would be most likely to love that whose interests he supposed to

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\(^{a}\)\(\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\) marks a class within a class. \textit{Cf. Class. Phil.} vol. vii. (1912) p. 485. \(535\ \alpha\) refers back to this passage.

\(^{b}\) The argument proceeds by minute links. \textit{Cf. supra} on 338 \(\delta\).
[ὅταν μάλιστα] \(^1\) ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐν πράττοντος οἷοι ἔφημαίνει καὶ ἑαυτῷ εὖ πράττειν, μὴ δὲ, τούναντίον. Οὔτως, ἐφη. Ἐκλεκτέον ἄρ’ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων φυλάκων τουτούτως ἀνδρας, οἳ ἄν σκοποῦσιν ἢμῖν μάλιστα φαίνωνται παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον, δὲ μὲν ἔν τῇ πόλει ἡγήσωνται ἐμφέρειν, πάση προθυμία ποιεῖν, δ’ ἄν μὴ, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ πρᾶξαι ἄν ἔθελεν. Ἐπιτήθειον γάρ, ἐφη. Δοκεῖ δὴ μοι τηρητέον αὐτούς εἶναι ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἡλικίαις, εἰ φυλακικοὶ εἰσὶ τούτων τοῦ δόγματος καὶ μήτε γονητευόμενοι μήτε βιαζόμενοι ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐπιλαμβανόμενοι δόξαν τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν δεῖν, ἄ τῇ πόλει βέλτιστα. Τίνα, ἐφη, λέγεις, τὴν ἐκβολήν; Ἔγω σοι, ἐφη, ἐρω. φαίνεται μοι δόξα ἐξείναι εἷς διανοίας ἡ

413 ἐκοινώσως ἡ ἄκουσίως, ἐκοινώσως μὲν ἡ ψευδής τοῦ μεταμανθάνοντός, ἄκουσίως δὲ πάσα ἡ ἀληθῆς. Τὸ μὲν τῆς ἐκοινώσου, ἐφη, μανθάνω, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἄκουσίου δέομαι μαθεῖν. Τί δαί; οὐ καί σο ἡγεῖ, ἐφην ἐγὼ, τῶν μὲν ἄγαθῶν ἄκουσίως στέρεσθαι τοὺς ἄνθρώπους, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἐκοινώσως; ἦ ού τὸ μὲν ἐμεῦδον τῆς ἀληθείας κακὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀληθεύειν ἀγαθῶν; ἦ οὐ τὸ τὰ ὀντα δοξάζειν ἀληθεύειν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι; Ἀλλ’, ἦ δ’ ὅσ, ὀρθῶς λέγεις, καὶ μοι δοκοῦσι ἄκοντες ἀληθοῦς δόξας στερίσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν κλαπέντες ἡ γοητευόμενες ἡ βιασθέντες τοῦτο πάσχονσιν; Οὐδὲ νῦν, ἐφη, μανθάνω. Τραγικῶς, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, κινδυνεύον λέγειν.

\(^1\) Bracketed by Hermann.

\(^a\) Cf. Crito 46 b, Xen. Mem. iii. 12. 7.

\(^b\) Cf. on 382 a and Sophist. 228 c, Marcus Aurelius vii. 63.

\(^c\) The preceding metaphors are in the high-flown, obscure style of tragedy. Cf. Thompson on Meno 76 e, Cratyl. 418 d, Aristoph. Frogs, passim, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 146. 296
coincide with his own, and thought that when it prospered he too would prosper and if not, the contrary." "So it is," he said. "Then we must pick out from the other guardians such men as to our observation appear most inclined through the entire course of their lives to be zealous to do what they think for the interest of the state, and who would be least likely to consent to do the opposite." "That would be a suitable choice," he said. "I think, then, we shall have to observe them at every period of life, to see if they are conservators and guardians of this conviction in their minds and never by sorcery nor by force can be brought to expel a from their souls unawares this conviction that they must do what is best for the state." "What do you mean by the 'expelling'?" he said. "I will tell you, said I; "it seems to me that the exit of a belief from the mind is either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary is the departure of the false belief from one who learns better, involuntary that of every true belief." "The voluntary," he said, "I understand, but I need instruction about the involuntary." "How now," said I, "don't you agree with me in thinking that men are unwillingly deprived of good things but willingly of evil? Or is it not an evil to be deceived in respect of the truth and a good to possess truth? And don't you think that to opine the things that are is to possess the truth?" "Why, yes," said he, "you are right, and I agree that men are unwillingly deprived of true opinions." "And doesn't this happen to them by theft, by the spells of sorcery or by force?" "I don't understand now either," he said. "I must be talking in high tragic style," I said; "by
Β κλαπέντας μὲν γὰρ τοὺς μεταπεισθέντας λέγω καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλαμβανομένους, ὅτι τῶν μὲν χρόνοις, τῶν δὲ λόγοις ἔξαρκούμενοι λανθάνει. νῦν γὰρ ποι μανθάνεις; Ναι. Τοὺς τοῖνυν βιασθέντας λέγω οὖς ἄν ὀδύνη τις ἡ ἀλγηδὼν μεταδοξάσαι ποιήσῃ. Καὶ τοῦτ, ἐφή, ἐμαθον, καὶ ὅρθως λέγεις. Τοὺς C μὴν γοητευθέντας, ὡς ἐγώμαι, κἂν σοὶ φαίης εἶναι οἶ ἄν μεταδοξάσωσιν ἡ ὑφ' ἤδωνης κηληθέντες ἢ υπὸ φόβου τι δείσαντες. "Εοικε γὰρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, γοητεύειν πάντα ὁσα ἀπατᾷ.

XX. "Ο τοῖνυν ἄρτι ἐλεγον, ξητητέον, τίνες ἀριστοι φύλακες τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς δόγματος, τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέον, ὃ ἄν τῇ πόλει αἰεὶ δοκῶσι βέλτιστον εἶναι αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν. τηρητέον δ' εὐθὺς ἐκ παῖδων, προθεμένοις ἔργα, ἐν οἷς ἄν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον μάλιστα ἐπιλαμβάνοιτο καὶ ἐξαπατώτο, καὶ τὸν μὲν μνήμονα καὶ δυσεξαπάτητον ἐγκριτέον, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀποκριτέον. ἢ γάρ; Ναι. Καὶ πόνους γε αὖ καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ἀγώνας αὐτοῖς θετέον, ἐν οἷς ταύτα ταύτα τηρητέον. Ὄρθως, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ τρίτου εἴδους τούτους γοητείας ἀμιλλαν ποιητέον, καὶ θετέον, ὥσπερ τοὺς πώλους ἐπὶ τοὺς ψόφους τε καὶ θορύβους ἄγοντες σκοπούσων εἰ φοβεροί, οὕτω νέοις ὁντας εἰς δείματ' ἀττα.

Ε κομιστέον καὶ εἰς ἕδονας αὖ μεταβλητέον, βασανίζοντας πολὺ μάλλον ἡ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρί, εἰ δυσγοητεύτως καὶ εὐσχήμων ἐν πάσι φαίνεται,

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a Cf. Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος, who went over from the Stoics to the Cyrenaics because of pain in his eyes, Diog. Laert. vii. 166.
b Cf. 584 A γοητεία.
those who have their opinions stolen from them I
mean those who are over-persuaded and those who
forget, because in the one case time, in the other
argument strips them unawares of their beliefs. Now
I presume you understand, do you not?" "Yes."
"Well then, by those who are constrained or forced
I mean those whom some pain or suffering compels a
to change their minds." "That too I understand
and you are right." "And the victims of sorcery b I
am sure you too would say are they who alter their
opinions under the spell of pleasure or terrified by
some fear." "Yes," he said: "everything that
deceives appears to cast a spell upon the mind."

XX. "Well then, as I was just saying, we must
look for those who are the best guardians of the indwell-
ing conviction that what they have to do is what they
at any time believe to be best for the state. Then we
must observe them from childhood up and propose
for them tasks in which one would be most likely to
forget this principle or be deceived, and he whose
memory is sure and who cannot be beguiled we must
accept and the other kind we must cross off from our
list. Is not that so?" "Yes." "And again we
must subject them to toils and pains and com-
petitions in which we have to watch for the same
traits." "Right," he said. "Then," said I, "must
we not institute a third kind of competitive test with
regard to sorcery and observe them in that? Just
as men conduct colts to noises and uproar to see if
they are liable to take fright, so we must bring these
lads while young into fears and again pass them into
pleasures, testing them much more carefully than
men do gold in the fire, to see if the man remains
immune to such witchcraft and preserves his com-
φύλαξ αὐτοῦ ᾧν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μουσικὴς ἦς ἐμάνθανεν, εὐρυθμὸν τε καὶ εὐάρμοστον ἑαυτὸν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρέχων, οἷος δὴ ἄν ὃν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ πόλει χρησιμῶτατος εἰη. καὶ τὸν ἄει ἐν τε παισί καὶ νεανίσκους καὶ ἐν ἀνδράσι βασα-

υζόμενον καὶ ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἄρχοντα τῆς πόλεως καὶ φύλακα, καὶ τιμᾶς δοτέον καὶ ξώντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, τάφων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μνημείων μέγιστα γέρα λαγχάνοντα· τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποκριτέον. τουαύτῃ τις, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεὶ μοι, ὡ Γλαύκων, ἡ ἐκλογὴ εἶναι καὶ κατα-

στασις τῶν ἄρχοντων τε καὶ φυλάκων, ὡς ἐν τῦπῳ, μὴ δ' ἀκριβείας, εἰρήθαι. Καὶ ἐμοί, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὕτω πη φαίνεται. Ἀρ' οὖν ὃς ἄληθῶς

Β ὀρθότατον καλεῖν τούτους μὲν φύλακας παντελεῖς τῶν τε ἐξωθεὶν πολεμίων τῶν τε ἐντὸς φιλίων, ὡσ οἱ μὲν μὴ βουλήσονται, οἱ δὲ μὴ δινήσονται κακουργεῖν, τοὺς δὲ νέους, οὓς νῦν δὴ φύλακας ἐκαλοῦμεν, ἐπικούρους τε καὶ βοηθοὺς τοῖς τῶν ἄρχοντων δόγμασιν; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

XXI. Τίς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, μηχανὴ γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δέοντι γιγνομένων, ὡν

C δὴ νῦν ἐλέγομεν, γενναίον τι ἐν ψευδομένους πεῖσαι μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὕτους τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν; Ποιον τι; ἔφη. Μηδὲν καίων,

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a The concept μηχανὴ or ingenious device employed by a superior intelligence to circumvent necessity or play provi-
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posure throughout, a good guardian of himself and the culture which he has received, maintaining the true rhythm and harmony of his being in all those conditions, and the character that would make him most useful to himself and to the state. And he who as boy, lad, and man endures the test and issues from it unspoiled we must establish as ruler over our city and its guardian, and bestow rewards upon him in life, and in death the allotment of the supreme honours of burial-rites and other memorials. But the man of the other type we must reject. Such,” said I, “appears to me, Glaucon, the general notion of our selection and appointment of rulers and guardians as sketched in outline, but not drawn out in detail.” “I too,” he said, “think much the same.” “Then would it not truly be most proper to designate these as guardians in the full sense of the word, watchers against foemen without and friends within, so that the latter shall not wish and the former shall not be able to work harm, but to name those youths whom we were calling guardians just now, helpers and aids for the decrees of the rulers?” “I think so,” he replied.

XXI. “How, then,” said I, “might we contrive a one of those opportune falsehoods b of which we were just now c speaking, so as by one noble lie to persuade if possible the rulers themselves, but failing that the rest of the city?” “What kind of a fiction do you mean?” said he. “Nothing unprecedented,” said
dence with the vulgar holds a prominent place in Plato’s physics, and is for Rousseau-minded readers one of the dangerous features of his political and educational philosophy. Cf. infra 415 c, Laws 664 a, 752 c, 769 e, 798 b, 640 b. b Cf. 389 b. c 389 b f.
As was the Cadmus legend of the men who sprang from the dragon’s teeth, which the Greeks believed υτως ἀπίθανον δι’ Λαος 663 ε. Pater, who translates the passage (Plato and Platonism, p. 223), fancifully suggests that it is a “miners’ story.” Others read into it an allusion to Egyptian castes. The proverb ψεύσμα Φωνικικόν (Strabo 259 β) probably goes back to the Phoenician tales of the Odyssey.

Plato never attempts a Voltairian polemic against the general faith in the supernatural, which he is willing to utilize for ethical ends, but he never himself affirms “le surnaturel particulier.”

καὶ μάλ’ here as often adds a touch of humorous colloquial emphasis, which our conception of the dignity of Plato does not allow a translator to reproduce.

Perhaps “that so it is that” would be better. ὡς ἄρα as
I, "but a sort of Phoenician tale, something that has happened ere now in many parts of the world, as the poets aver and have induced men to believe, but that has not happened and perhaps would not be likely to happen in our day and demanding no little persuasion to make it believable." "You act like one who shrinks from telling his thought," he said. "You will think that I have right good reason for shrinking when I have told," I said. "Say on," said he, "and don't be afraid." "Very well, I will. And yet I hardly know how to find the audacity or the words to speak and undertake to persuade first the rulers themselves and the soldiers and then the rest of the city, that in good sooth all our training and educating of them were things that they imagined and that happened to them as it were in a dream; but that in reality at that time they were down within the earth being moulded and fostered themselves while their weapons and the rest of their equipment were being fashioned. And when they were quite finished the earth as being their mother delivered them, and now as if their land were their mother and their nurse often disclaims responsibility for the tale. Plato's fancy of men reared beneath the earth is the basis of Bulwer-Lytton's Utopia, The Coming Race, as his use of the ring of Gyges (359 d-360 b) is of H. G. Wells' Invisible Man.


All races but one are as aliens engrafted or sown,
Strange children and changelings, but we, O our mother, thine own.

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peri μητρός καὶ τροφοῦ τῆς χώρας ἐν ἃ εἰσὶ βου-
λεύσθαι τε καὶ ἀμύνειν αὑτούς, ἐάν τις ἐπ' αὐτήν
ηῇ, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ὡς ἀδελφῶν
ὄντων καὶ γηγενῶν διανοεῖσθαι. Ούκ ἐτόσο, ἕφη,
pάλαι ἧσχύνοι τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν. Πάνω, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰκότως· ἀλλ' ὦμως ἄκουε καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ
μύθουν. ἔστε μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει
ἀδελφοί, ὡς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολογοῦντες,
ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, ὃσιοι μὲν ὦμοι ἰκανοὶ ἄρχεν,
χρυσὸν ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἔξυμεμψεν αὐτοῖς, διὸ τιμώται-
tοί εἰσιν· ὃσιοι δ' ἐπίκουροι, ἄργυροι· σίδηρων δὲ
καὶ χαλκῶν τοῖς τε γεωργοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
δημογραφοῖς. ἀτε οὖν ἔπυγγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες τὸ
μὲν πολὺ ὦμοιος ἂν ὦμῳν αὐτοῖς γεννώτε, ἐστί
Β δ' ὅτε ἐκ χρυσοῦ γεννηθεῖ ἄν ἄργυρον καὶ ἐξ
ἄργυροῦ χρυσοῦ ἐκγονοῦ καὶ τάλλα πάντα οὖτως
ἐξ ἄλληλων. τοῖς οὖν ἄρχουσι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μά-
λιστα παραγγέλλει ὁ θεός, ὅπως μὴδεν οὖτω
φύλακες ἁγαθοὶ ἔσονται μηδ' οὖτω σφόδρα
φυλάξουσι μηδὲν ὡς τοὺς ἐκγόνους, ὃ τι αὐτοῖς

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*a* οὐκ ἐτόσο is comic. *Cf.* 568 Α, and Blaydes on Aristoph. Acharn. 411.

*b* *Cf.* 468 ε, 547 Α, and “already” Cratyl. 394 δ, 398 Α. Hesiod’s four metals, *Works and Days* 109-201, symbolize four successive ages. Plato’s myth cannot of course be interpreted literally or made to express the whole of his apparently undemocratic theory, of which the biologist Huxley in his essay on Administrative Nihilism says: “The lapse of more than 2000 years has not weakened the force of these wise words.”

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they ought to take thought for her and defend her against any attack and regard the other citizens as their brothers and children of the self-same earth."

"It is not for nothing," he said, "that you were so bashful about coming out with your lie." "It was quite natural that I should be," I said; "but all the same hear the rest of the story. While all of you in the city are brothers, we will say in our tale, yet God in fashioning those of you who are fitted to hold rule mingled gold in their generation, for which reason they are the most precious—but in the helpers silver, and iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen. And as you are all akin, though for the most part you will breed after your kinds, it may sometimes happen that a golden father would beget a silver son and that a golden offspring would come from a silver sire and that the rest would in like manner be born of one another. So that the first and chief injunction that the god lays upon the rulers is that of nothing else are they to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the intermixture of these

c The four classes are not castes, but are species which will generally breed true. Cf. Cratyl. 393 b, 394 a.
d The phrasing of this injunction recalls Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, in fine:

I'll fear no other thing
So sore as keeping safe Nerissa's ring.

The securing of disinterested capacity in the rulers is the pons asinorum of political theory. Plato constructs his whole state for this end. Cf. Introd. p. xv. Aristotle, Pol. 1262 b 27, raises the obvious objection that the transference from class to class will not be an easy matter. But Plato here and in 423 d-e is merely stating emphatically the postulates of an ideal state. He admits that even if established it will some time break down, and that the causes of its failure will lie beyond human ken, and can only be expressed in symbol. See on 546-547.
toúton eis taípsi yuχaiís paraμémiKtai, kai eán te σφέτερos ékgonos úpóχalKos ò òpοσίδηρος γένηtai, C μηδενι τρόπω kateleíshousin, ἀλλα την τη φύσει προσήκουσαν τιμήν ἀποδόντες ὠσονουν εἰς δημιουργοὺς η εἰς γεωργοὺς, καὶ ἂν αὐτὸ τοὺτων τις ὑπόχρυσος ἢ ὑπάργυρος φυῆ, τιμήσαντες ἀνάξουν τούς μὲν εἰς φυλακήν, τοὺς δὲ εἰς ἐπικούριαν, ὡς χρησμοῦ ὄντος τότε τῆν πόλιν διαφαρῆραι, ὅταν αὐτὴν ὁ σίδηρος ἢ ὁ χαλκός φυλάξῃ. τούτων οὖν τὸν μύθων ὅπως ἂν πεισθέεν, ἔχεις τινὰ μηχανήν;

D Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὅπως γ' ἂν αὐτὸι οὔτοι ὅπως μεντ' ἂν οἱ τούτων υἱεῖς καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ύστεροι. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτω, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, εὖ ἂν ἔχωι πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ ἄλληλων κῆδεσθαι. σχεδὸν γάρ τι μανθάνω δ' λέγεις. XXII. καὶ τούτῳ μὲν δὴ ἔξει ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸ ἡ φήμη ἀγάγῃ.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτους τοὺς γηγενεῖς ὀπλίσαντες προάγωμεν ἡγουμένων τῶν ἄρχοντων. ἀλθόντες δὲ θεασάσθων τῆς πόλεως ὅπως οὖν κάλλιστον ἔστρατοπεδεύσασθαι, θεὶν τοὺς τε ἔνδου μάλιστ' ἂν κατέχουν, εἰ τις μὴ ἐθέλοι τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι, τοὺς τε ἐξωθην ἀπαμύνοιεν, εἰ πολέμους ύστερ πάκος ἐπὶ ποιμῆν τις ίοί, ἐστρατοπεδεύν-

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a The summary in Tim. 19 a varies somewhat from this. Plato does not stress the details. Cf. Introd. p. viii.

b Plato's oracle aptly copies the ambiguity of the bronze men's answer to Psammetik (Herod. ii. 152), and admits of both a moral and a literal physical interpretation, like the "lame reign" against which Sparta was warned. Cf. Xen. Hellenica iii. 3. 3.

c Plato repeats the thought that since the mass of men 306
metals in the souls of their offspring, and if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out among the artizans or the farmers. And again, if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his composition they shall honour such and bid them go up higher, some to the office of guardian, some to the assistanceship, alleging that there is an oracle that the state shall then be overthrown when the man of iron or brass is its guardian. Do you see any way of getting them to believe this tale?" "No, not these themselves," he said, "but I do, their sons and successors and the rest of mankind who come after." "Well," said I, "even that would have a good effect in making them more inclined to care for the state and one another. For I think I apprehend your meaning. XXII. And this shall fall out as tradition guides."

"But let us arm these sons of earth and conduct them under the leadership of their rulers. And when they have arrived they must look out for the fairest site in the city for their encampment, a position from which they could best hold down rebellion against the laws from within and repel aggression from without as of a wolf against the fold. And after they can be brought to believe anything by repetition, myths framed for edification are a useful instrument of education and government. Cf. Laws 663 e-664 a.

a φήμη, not any particular oracular utterance, but popular belief from mouth to mouth.

b The Platonic guardians, like the ruling class at Sparta, will live the life of a camp. Cf. Laws 666 e, Isoc. Archedamus.
sάμενοι δέ, θύσαντες οίς χρή, εύνάς ποιησάθων: ἢ πῶς; Οὔτως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τουαύτας, οίας χειμώνος τε στέγειν καὶ θέρους ίκανὰς εἶναι; Πῶς γάρ οὐχί; οἰκήσεις γάρ, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. Ναι, ἢν δ' ἔγω, στρατιωτικάς γε, ἀλλ' 416 οὐ χρηματιστικάς. Πῶς, ἔφη, αὐτοῦ λέγεις διαφέρειν ἐκείνου; Ἐγώ σοι, ἢν δ' ἔγω, πειράσομαι εἰπεῖν. δεινότατον γάρ ποιν πάντων καὶ αἰσχυστὸν ποιμέσι τοιούτους γε καὶ οὕτω τρέφειν κύνας ἐπικούρους ποιμνίων, ὡστε ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἡ λυμοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλου κακοῦ ἔθους αὐτοὺς τοὺς κύνας ἐπιχειρήσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακούργειν καὶ ἀντὶ κυνῶν λύκων ὅμοιωθήναι. Δεινόν, ἢ δ' ὃς. Β πῶς δ' οὔ; Οὐκοῦν φυλακτέον παντὶ τρόπῳ, μὴ τοιούτοιν ἡμῖν οἱ ἐπίκουροι ποιήσωσι πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, ἐπειδή αὐτῶν κρείττους εἰσίν, ἀντὶ εὐμμάχων εὐμενῶν δεσπότας ἄγριος ἀφομοιωθῶσιν; Φυλακτέον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας παρεσκευασμένοι ἂν εἶν, εἰ τῷ οὖντι καλῶς πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν; Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσὶ γ', ἔφη, καὶ ἐγών1 εἰπον, Τοῦτο μὲν οὗκ ἀξιών δυσχυρίζεσθαι, ὡ φίλε Γλαύκων. δ' μέντοι ἀρτι C ἑλέγομεν, ἀξιών, ὃτι δὲι αὐτοῖς τῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν παιδείας, ἦτις ποτὲ ἑστιν, εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ μέγιστον ἑχειν πρὸς τὸ ἡμερὶ εἶναι αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς I

1 Burnet and Adam read ἔγω.

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* Partly from caution, partly from genuine religious feeling, Plato leaves all details of the cult to Delphi. Cf. 427 b.
* For the limiting γε cf. 430 c.
* Aristotle's objection (Pol. 1264 a 24) that the Platonic state will break up into two hostile camps, is plagiarized in expression from Plato's similar censure of existing Greek cities (422 ε) and assumes that the enforced disinterestedness, 308
have encamped and sacrificed to the proper gods they must make their lairs, must they not?" "Yes," he said. "And these must be of a character to keep out the cold in winter and be sufficient in summer?" "Of course. For I presume you are speaking of their houses." "Yes," said I, "the houses of soldiers not of money-makers." "What distinction do you intend by that?" he said. "I will try to tell you," I said. "It is surely the most monstrous and shameful thing in the world for shepherds to breed the dogs who are to help them with their flocks in such wise and of such a nature that from indiscipline or hunger or some other evil condition the dogs themselves shall attack the sheep and injure them and be likened to wolves instead of dogs." "A terrible thing, indeed," he said. "Must we not then guard by every means in our power against our helpers treating the citizens in any such way and, because they are the stronger, converting themselves from benign assistants into savage masters?" "We must," he said. "And would they not have been provided with the chief safeguard if their education has really been a good one?" "But it surely has," he said. "That," said I, "dear Glaucon, we may not properly affirm, but what we were just now saying we may, that they must have the right education, whatever it is, if they are to have what will do most to make them gentle

the higher education, and other precautions of the Platonic Republic will not suffice to conjure away the danger to which Plato first calls attention.

\(^d\) This is not so much a reservation in reference to the higher education as a characteristic refusal of Plato to dogmatize. Cf. *Meno* 86 b and my paper "Recent Platonism in England," *A.J.P.* vol. ix. pp. 7-8.
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φυλαττομένοις ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. Καὶ ὅρθως γε, ἢ δ’ ὃς. Πρὸς τούν τῇ παιδείᾳ ταύτη φαίη ἂν τις νόν ἐχων δεῖν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην οὐσίαν ταιαύτην αὐτοῖς παρασκευάσασθαι, ἣτις μήτε τοὺς φύλακας ὡς ἀρίστους εἶναι παύσοι αὐτοὺς, κακονργεῖν τε μὴ ἔπαροι περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους

D polítas. Καὶ ἀληθῶς γε φήσει. "Ὅρα δὴ, εἴπον ἐγὼ, εἰ τοιώδε τινὰ τρόπον δεῖ αὐτοὺς ζῆν τε καὶ οἰκεῖν, εἰ μέλλουσι τοιούτοι ἐσεθαί: πρῶτον μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένου μηδεμίαν μηδένα ἰδίαν, ἀν μὴ πάσα ἀνάγκη ἐπειτα οἰκήσιν καὶ ταμιεῖον μηδενὶ εἶναι μηδὲν τοιούτον, εἰς ὃ οὐ πᾶς ὁ βουλόμενος εἴσειν· τὰ δ’ ἐπιτήδεια, ὅσων δέονται ἄνδρες ἄθληται πολέμου σώφρονες τε καὶ ἄνδρεῖοι,

Ε ταξαμένους παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δέχεσθαι μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς τοσοῦτον, ὅσον μήτε περεῖναι αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν μήτε ἐνδείκνυται φοιτῶντας δὲ εἰς ξυσσίτια ὡσπερ ἐστρατοπεδευμένους κουβή ζῆν· χρυσόν δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον εἴπειν αὐτοῖς ὅτι θείον παρὰ θεῶν ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχουσι καὶ οὐδὲν προσδέονται τοῦ ἄνθρωπεῖον, οὐδὲ ὅσια τὴν ἐκείνου κτῆσιν τῇ τοῦ θωτοῦ χρυσοῦ κτῆσιν ξυμμεγνυντάς μιαίνειν, διότι πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόσια περὶ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν νόμισμα γέγονεν, τὸ παρ’ ἐκείνοις δὲ ἀκήρατον· ἀλλὰ μόνοις αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει

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a Plato’s communism is primarily a device to secure disinterestedness in the ruling class, though he sometimes treats it as a counsel of perfection for all men and states. Cf. Introd. p. xv note a.

b Cf. supra 403 e.

c Cf. 551 b, Meno 91 b, Thucyd. i. 108, G. M. T. 837.

d They are worthy of their hire. Cf. on 347 a. It is a strange misapprehension to speak of Plato as careless of 310
to one another and to their charges." "That is right," he said. "In addition, moreover, to such an education a thoughtful man would affirm that their houses and the possessions provided for them ought to be such as not to interfere with the best performance of their own work as guardians and not to incite them to wrong the other citizens." "He will rightly affirm that." "Consider then," said I, "whether, if that is to be their character, their habitations and ways of life must not be something after this fashion. In the first place, none must possess any private property a save the indispensable. Secondly, none must have any habitation or treasure-house which is not open for all to enter at will. Their food, in such quantities as are needful for athletes of war b sober and brave, they must receive as an agreed c stipend d from the other citizens as the wages of their guardianship, so measured that there shall be neither superfluity at the end of the year nor any lack. e And resorting to a common mess f like soldiers on campaign they will live together. Gold and silver, we will tell them, they have of the divine quality from the gods always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold, since many impious deeds have been done about the coin of the multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied. But for these only of all the dwellers in the welfare of the masses. His aristocracy is one of social service, not of selfish enjoyment of wealth and power.

a This is precisely Aristophanes' distinction between beggary and honourable poverty, Plutus 552-553.

μεταχειρίζεσθαι καὶ ἀπτεσθαι χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύ-ρου οὐ θέμις, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄροφον ἴναι οὐδὲ περιάψασθαι οὐδὲ πίνειν ἐκ ἀργύρου ἡ χρυσοῦ. καὶ οὔτω μὲν σώζουντό τ' ἄν καὶ σώζοιεν τὴν πόλιν· ὃποτε δ' αὐτοὶ γῆν τε ἱδίαν καὶ οἰκίας καὶ νομίσματα κτήσονται, οἰκονόμοι μὲν καὶ γεωργοὶ ἀντὶ φυλάκων ἔσονται, ἰδεῖται δ'.

Β ἐχθροὶ ἀντὶ ξυμμάχων τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γενή-σονται, μισοῦντες δὲ δὴ καὶ μισούμενοι καὶ ἐπι-βουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπιβουλευόμενοι διάξοσι πάντα τὸν βίον, πολὺ πλεῖω καὶ μᾶλλον δεδιότες τοὺς ἐνδον ἡ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πολεμίους, θέντες ἢ δὴ τότε ἐγγύτατα ὁλέθροι αὐτοὶ τε καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πόλις. τούτων οὖν πάντων ἐνεκα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, φῶμεν οὔτω δεῖν κατεσκευάσθαι τοὺς φύλακας οἰκήσεως τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ταῦτα νομοθετήσωμεν, ἡ μὴ; Πάνυ γε, ἡ δ' ὅσ ὁ Γλαύκων.

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*a* As if the accursed and tainted metal were a polluted murderer or temple-robber. *Cf.* my note on Horace, *Odes* iii. 2. 27 "sub isdem trabis," Antiphon v. 11.

*b* *Cf.* 621 b-c, and *Laws* 692 a.

*c* δεσπόται. *Cf.* *Menex.* 238 e.

*d* *Cf.* *Laws* 697 d in a passage of similar import, μισοῦντες μισοῦνται.
the city it is not lawful to handle gold and silver and to touch them nor yet to come under the same roof with them, nor to hang them as ornaments on their limbs nor to drink from silver and gold. So living they would save themselves and save their city. But whenever they shall acquire for themselves land of their own and houses and coin, they will be householders and farmers instead of guardians, and will be transformed from the helpers of their fellow-citizens to their enemies and masters, and so in hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against they will pass their days fearing far more and rather the townsmen within than the foemen without—and then even then laying the course of near shipwreck for themselves and the state. For all these reasons," said I, "let us declare that such must be the provision for our guardians in lodging and other respects and so legislate. Shall we not?" "By all means," said Glaucon.

* more and rather: so 396 D, 551 B.

The image is that of a ship nearing the fatal reef. Cf. Aeschy. Eumen. 562. The sentiment and the heightened rhetorical tone of the whole passage recall the last page of the Critias, with Ruskin's translation and comment in A Crown of Wild Olive.
Adeimantus's criticism is made from the point of view of a Thrasymachus (343 a, 345 b) or a Callicles (Gorgias 492 b-c) or of Solon's critics (cf. my note on Solon's Trochaics to Phokos, Class. Phil. vol. vi. pp. 216 ff.). The captious objection is repeated by Aristotle, Pol. 1264 b 15 ff., though he later (1325 a 9-10) himself uses Plato's answer to it, and by moderns, as Herbert Spencer, Grote, Newman to some extent (Introduction to Aristotle's Politics, p. 69), and Zeller (Aristotle, ii. p. 224) who has the audacity to say that "Plato demanded the abolition of all private possession and the suppression of all individual interests because it is only
BOOK IV

I. AND Adeimantus broke in and said, "What will be your defence, Socrates, if anyone objects that you are not making these men very happy, and that through their own fault? For the city really belongs to them and yet they get no enjoyment out of it as ordinary men do by owning lands and building fine big houses and providing them with suitable furniture and winning the favour of the gods by private sacrifices and entertaining guests and enjoying too those possessions which you just now spoke of, gold and silver and all that is customary for those who are expecting to be happy? But they seem, one might say, to be established in idleness in the city, exactly like hired mercenaries, with nothing to do but keep guard." "Yes," said I, "and what is in the Idea or Universal that he acknowledges any title to true reality." Leslie Stephen does not diverge so far from Plato when he says (Science of Ethics, p. 397): "The virtuous men may be the very salt of the earth, and yet the discharge of a function socially necessary may involve their own misery." By the happiness of the whole Plato obviously means not an abstraction but the concrete whole of which Leslie Stephen is thinking. But from a higher point of view Plato eloquently argues (465 b-c) that duty fulfilled will yield truer happiness to the guardians than seeking their own advantage in the lower sense of the word.

\[b\] Cf. 362 c, and Laws 909 d ff. where they are forbidden.
Other men, ordinary men. Cf. 543 β ὃν ὑν ὁι ἄλλοι, which disposes of other interpretations and misunderstandings.

This is, for a different reason, one of the deprivations of the tyrant (579 β). The Laws strictly limits travel (949 ε). Here Plato is speaking from the point of view of the ordinary citizen.

The Platonic Socrates always states the adverse case strongly (Introd. p. xi), and observes the rule: Would you adopt a strong logical attitude, Always allow your opponent full latitude.
more, they serve for board-wages and do not even receive pay in addition to their food as others do,\(^a\) so that they will not even be able to take a journey \(^b\) on their own account, if they wish to, or make presents to their mistresses, or spend money in other directions according to their desires like the men who are thought to be happy. These and many similar counts of the indictment you are omitting."  

"Well, said he, "assume these counts too."  

"What then will be our apology you ask?"  

"Yes."  

"By following the same path I think we shall find what to reply. For we shall say that while it would not surprise us if these men thus living prove to be the most happy, yet the object on which we fixed our eyes in the establishment of our state was not the exceptional happiness of any one class but the greatest possible happiness of the city as a whole. For we thought\(^a\) that in a state so constituted we should be most likely to discover justice as we should injustice in the worst governed state, and that when we had made these out we could pass judgement on the issue of our long inquiry. Our first task then, we take it, is to mould the model of a happy state—we are not isolating\(^e\) a small class in it and postulating their happiness, but that of the city as a whole. But the opposite type of state we will consider presently.\(^f\) It is as if we were colouring a statue and someone approached and censured us, saying that we did not

\(^a\) Cf. 369 A.  
\(^b\) \(\alphaπολαβόντες\), "separating off," "abstracting," may be used absolutely as in Gorgias 495 E, or with an object as supra 392 E.  
\(^c\) That is 449 A and books VIII. and IX. The degenerate types of state are four, but the extreme opposite of the good state, the tyranny, is one.  

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κάλλιστα φάρμακα προστίθεμεν. οί γὰρ ὀφθαλμοὶ κάλλιστον ὄν όυκ ὀστρεῖω ἐναληλυμένοι εἶνεν ἄλλα

D μελαιν. μετρίως ἄν ἐδοκούμεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπο-

λογεῖσθαι λέγοντες, ὦ θαυμᾶσι, μὴ οίου δεῖν ἡμᾶς

οὕτω καλοῦσ ὀφθαλμοὺς γράφειν, ὡστε μηδὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς φαίνεσθαι, μηδ' αὐ τάλλα μέρη, ἂλλ' ἀθρεὶ εἰ τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις ἀποδιδόντες τὸ

ὄλον καλὸν ποιοῦμεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν μὴ ἀνάγκαζε

ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς φύλαξι προσ-

ἀπτειν, ἥ ἐκεῖνος πάν μᾶλλον ἀπεργάσεται ἣ

Ε φύλακας. ἐπιστάμεθα γὰρ καὶ τοὺς γεωργοὺς

ξυστίδας ἀμφίεσαντες καὶ χρυσὸν περιβάτες πρὸς

ἡδονῆν ἐργάζεσθαι κελεύειν τὴν γῆν, καὶ τοὺς

κεραμέας κατακλύναντες ἐπιδέξια πρὸς τὸ πῦρ δια-

πύνοντάς τε καὶ εὐχομένους, τὸν τροχὸν παρα-

θεμένους, ὅσον ἂν ἐπιθυμῶν κεραμεύειν, καὶ τοὺς

アルバム πάντας τοιούτω τρόπῳ μακάριον ποιεῖν,

ἵνα δὴ ὅλῃ ἡ πόλις εὐδαιμονήν ἂν, ἡμᾶς μὴ οὕτω

421 νουθέτει. ὥσ, ἃν σοι πειθώμεθα, οὔτε ὁ γεωργὸς

γεωργὸς ἄρταν οὔτε ὁ κεραμεύς κεραμεύς οὔτε

アルバム οὔδεις οὔδεν ἔχων σχῆμα, ἐξ ὧν πόλις

γίγνεται. ἄλλα τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἑλάττων λόγος

νευρορράφοι γὰρ φαύλοι γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες

a So Hippias Major 290 b.

b For this principle of aesthetics cf. Phaedrus 264 c,

Aristot. Poetics 1450 b 1-2.

c "We know how to." For the satire of the Socialistic

millennium which follows cf. Introd. p. xxix, and Ruskin,

Fors Clavigera. Plato may have been thinking of the scene

on the shield of Achilles, Il. xviii. 541-560.

d i.e. so that the guest on the right hand occupied a lower

place and the wine circulated in the same direction. Many

write ἐπὶ δεξιά, but Α ἐπιδέξια. "Forever, 'tis a single word.

Our rude forefathers thought it two."

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apply the most beautiful pigments to the most beautiful parts of the image, since the eyes,\(^a\) which are the most beautiful part, have not been painted with purple but with black—we should think it a reasonable justification to reply, ‘Don’t expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so fine that they will not be like eyes at all, nor the other parts, but observe whether by assigning what is proper to each we render the whole beautiful.\(^b\)’ And so in the present case you must not require us to attach to the guardians a happiness that will make them anything but guardians. For in like manner we could\(^c\) clothe the farmers in robes of state and deck them with gold and bid them cultivate the soil at their pleasure, and we could make the potters recline on couches from left to right\(^d\) before the fire drinking toasts and feasting with their wheel alongside to potter with when they are so disposed, and we can make all the others happy in the same fashion, so that thus the entire city may be happy. But urge us not to this, since, if we yield, the farmer will not be a farmer nor the potter a potter, nor will any other of the types that constitute a state keep its form. However, for the others it matters less. For cobblers\(^e\) who deteriorate and are

\(^a\) Note the “ab urbe condita” construction. For the thought cf. 374 b. Zeller and many who follow him are not justified in inferring that Plato would not educate the masses. (Cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle’s Politics, i. p. 160.) It might as well be argued that the high schools of the United States are not intended for the masses because some people sometimes emphasize their function of “fitting for college.” In the Republic Plato describes secondary education as a preparation for the higher training. The secondary education of the entire citizenry in the Laws marks no change of opinion (Laws 818 ff.). Cf. Introd. p. xxxiii.
καὶ προσποιησάμενοι εἶναι μὴ ὄντες πόλει οὐδὲν
dεινόν: φύλακες δὲ νόμων τε καὶ πόλεως μὴ ὄντες
ἀλλὰ δοκοῦντες ὅρας δὴ ὅτι πᾶσαν ἀρδην πόλιν
ἀπολλύσιν, καὶ αὕ τοῦ εὐ οὐκεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν
μόνοι τον κατον ἐχούσισιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν

B φύλακας ὃς ἀληθῶς ποιοῦμεν, ἦκιστα κακούρ-
γους τῆς πόλεως, ὁ δ' ἐκείνο λέγων γεωργοὺς
tινας καὶ ὡσπερ ἐν πανηγύρει ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν πόλει
ἐστιάτορας εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλο ἂν τι ἡ πόλιν λέγω.
σκεπτέον οὖν, πότερον πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντας τοὺς
φύλακας καθιστῶμεν, ὅπως ὁ τι πλείστη αὐ-
τοῖς εὐδαιμονία ἐγγενῆσται, ἡ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς τὴν
πόλιν ὅλην βλέποντας θεατέοιν εἰ ἐκείνη ἐγγίγνε-
ται, τοὺς δ' ἐπικούρους τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς φύλακας

C ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκαστέον ποιεῖν καὶ πειστέον, ὅπως ὁ
τι ἄριστοι δημιουργοὶ τοῦ ἐαυτῶν ἔργων ἐσονται,
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπαντᾶς ὁσαύτως, καὶ οὕτω
ἐμπάσης τῆς πόλεως αὐξανομένης καὶ καλῶς
οἰκιζομένης ἐστέοι ὅπως ἐκάστοις τοῖς ἐθνοῖς ἡ
φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.

II. 'Αλλ', ἢ δ' ὅς, καλῶς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.
'Αρ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ το τοῦτο ἀδελφὸν δόξω
σοι μετρίως λέγειν; Τί μάλιστα; Τοὺς ἄλλους

D αὕ δημιουργοὺς σκόπει εἰ τάδε διαφθέιρει, ὡστε
καὶ κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι. Τά ποία δὴ ταῦτα; Πλού-
tος, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ πενία. Πῶς δή; Ἡ Ὄμε. πλού-

a The expression is loose, but the meaning is plain. The
principle "one man, one task" makes the guardians real
guardians. The assumption that their happiness is the end
is incompatible with the very idea of a state. Cf. Introd.
pp. xxix f. ἐστιάτορας recalls μέλλοντα ἐστιάσεθαι 345 c, but
we are expected to think also of the farmers of 420 e.

b The guardians are δημιουργοὶ ἑλευθερίας (395 c).
spoiled and pretend to be the workmen that they are not are no great danger to a state. But guardians of laws and of the city who are not what they pretend to be, but only seem, destroy utterly, I would have you note, the entire state, and on the other hand, they alone are decisive of its good government and happiness. If then we are forming true guardians and keepers of our liberties, men least likely to harm the commonwealth, but the proponent of the other ideal is thinking of farmers and 'happy' feasters as it were in a festival and not in a civic community, he would have something else in mind than a state. Consider, then, whether our aim in establishing the guardians is the greatest possible happiness among them or whether that is something we must look to see develop in the city as a whole, but these helpers and guardians are to be constrained and persuaded to do what will make them the best craftsmen in their own work, and similarly all the rest. And so, as the entire city develops and is ordered well, each class is to be left to the share of happiness that its nature comports."

II. "Well," he said, "I think you are right." "And will you then," I said, "also think me reasonable in another point akin to this?" "What pray?" "Consider whether these are the causes that corrupt other craftsmen too so as positively to spoil them." "What causes?" "Wealth and poverty," said I.

\\(\text{Cf. Lysis 217 B.}
\)

tʰσας χυτρεύς δοκεῖ σοι ἐτι θελήσεων ἐπιμελείσθαι τῆς τέχνης; Ὅυδαμως, ἔφη. 'Αργὸς δὲ καὶ ἀμελής γενήσεται μᾶλλον αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ; Πολὺ γε. Ὅυκοῦν κακών χυτρεύς γίγνεται; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, πολὺ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὄργανα γε μὴ ἔχων παρέχεσθαι ὑπὸ πενίας ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν εἰς τὴν Ε τέχνην, τὰ τε ἔργα πονηρότερα ἐργάσεται καὶ τοὺς υἱῶν ἢ ἄλλους οὐς ἂν διδάσκη χείρους δημιουργόν διδάξεται. Πῶς δ' οὖ; 'Ὑ' ἀμφοτέρων δῆ, πενίας τε καὶ πλούτου, χείρω μὲν τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔργα, χείρους δὲ αὐτοῦ. Φαίνεται. Ἐτερα δῆ, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῖς φύλαξι εὐρήκαμεν, δ' παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλακτεῖν ὅπως μῆποτε αὐτοὺς λήσει εἰς τὴν πόλιν παραδύντα. Ποία ταῦτα;

422 Πλούτος τε, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ πενία, ὡς τοῦ μὲν τροφῆν καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ νεωτερισμὸν ποιοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀνελυθερίαν καὶ κακοεργίαν πρὸς τῷ νεωτερισμῷ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τὸδε μέντοι, ὡς Σωκράτης, σκόπει, πῶς ἢμῖν ἢ πόλις οἰα τ' ἐσται πολεμεῖν, ἐπειδὰν χρῆματα μὴ κεκτημένη ἢ, ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸς μεγάλην τε καὶ πλουσίαν ἀναγκασθῇ πολεμεῖν. Δῆλον, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὅτι πρὸς μὲν μίαν Β χαλεπώτερον, πρὸς δὲ δύο τοιαύτας ῥᾶν. Πῶς εἶπες; ἢ δ' ὦς. Πρῶτον μὲν ποὺ, εἶπον, ἐὰν δέῃ μάχεσθαι, ἄρα οὗ πλουσίος ἀνδράς μαχοῦνται αὐτοὶ ὄντες πολέμου ἀθληταί; Ναι τούτο γε, ἔφη.

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*a Apparent paradox to stimulate attention. Cf. 377 a, 334 a, 382 a, 414 b-c, 544 c, Laws 646 b. To fight against two was quasi-proverbial. Cf. Laws 919 b. For images from boxing cf. Aristot. Met. 985 a 14, and Demosthenes' statement (Philip. i. 40-41) that the Athenians fight Philip as the barbarians box. The Greeks felt that "lesser breeds
"How so?" "Thus! do you think a potter who grew rich would any longer be willing to give his mind to his craft?" "By no means," said he. "But will he become more idle and negligent than he was?" "Far more." "Then he becomes a worse potter?" "Far worse too." "And yet again, if from poverty he is unable to provide himself with tools and other requirements of his art, the work that he turns out will be worse, and he will also make inferior workmen of his sons or any others whom he teaches." "Of course." "From both causes, then, poverty and wealth, the products of the arts deteriorate, and so do the artisans?" "So it appears." "Here, then, is a second group of things, it seems, that our guardians must guard against and do all in their power to keep from slipping into the city without their knowledge." "What are they?" "Wealth and poverty," said I, "since the one brings luxury, idleness and innovation, and the other illiberality and the evil of bad workmanship in addition to innovation." "Assuredly," he said; "yet here is a point for your consideration, Socrates, how our city, possessing no wealth, will be able to wage war, especially if compelled to fight a large and wealthy state." "Obviously," said I, "it would be rather difficult to fight one such, but easier to fight two." "What did you mean by that?" he said. "Tell me first," I said, "whether, if they have to fight, they will not be fighting as athletes of war against men of wealth?" "Yes, that is true," he said.

without the law" were inferior in this manly art of self-defence. Cf. the amusing description of the boxing of Orestes and Pylades by the ἀγαλματικός in Eurip. I.T. 1366 ff.

Cf. 416 E, 403 E.
Τι οὖν, ἓν δ' ἐγώ, ὡ 'Αδείμαντε; εἰς πῦκτης ὡς οἶὸν τε κάλλιστα ἐπὶ τούτο παρεσκευασμένος δυνὼν μὴ πῦκταιν, πλουσίων δὲ καὶ πιόνων, οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι ῥαδίως μάχεσθαι; Οὐκ ἂν ἰσως, ἐφη, ἀμα γε. Οὖν' εἰ ἔξει, ἓν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπο-

C φεύγωντι τὸν πρότερον ἄει προσφέρομεν ἀνα-

στρέφοντα κρούειν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιοὶ πολλάκις ἐν ἡλίῳ
tε καὶ πνίγει; ἀρά γε οὐ καὶ πλείους χειρώσατι
ἀν τοιοῦτος ὁ τοιοῦτος; Ἀμέλει, ἐφη, οὐδὲν
ἀν γένοιτο θαυμαστὸν. Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶει πυκτικῆς
πλέον μετέχειν τοὺς πλουσίους ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ
ἐμπειρία ἡ πολεμικῆς; 'Εγὼγ', ἐφη. ῥαδίως
ἀρά ἡμῖν οἱ ἀθληταί ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων διπλασίως
tε καὶ τριπλασίος αὐτῶν μαχοῦνται. Συγκροήσο-

D μαί σοι, ἐφη· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι ὅρθως λέγειν. Τι
d', ἂν προσβείαιν πέμψαντε εἰς τὴν ἐτέραν πόλιν
tάληθ' εἶπωσιν, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν οὐδὲν χρυσών οὐδ'
ἀργυρίων χρώμεθα, οὐδ' ἡμῖν θέμις, ὡμοὶ
ἐξυπολεμήσαντες οὖν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἔχετε τὰ τῶν
ἐτέρων· οἰεὶ τινὰς ἀκούσαντας ταῦτα αἰρήσεσθαι
kυσὶ πολεμεῖν στερεοῖς τε καὶ ἱσχυοῖς μᾶλλον ἡ
μετὰ κυνῶν προβάτως πίσσι τε καὶ ἀπαλοῖς; Οὐ
μοι δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' εὰν εἰς μίαν, ἐφη, πόλιν ἐκ

Ε αἴροισθι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων χρήματα, ὥρα μὴ κίνδυνον
φέρῃ τῇ μὴ πλουτοῦσῃ. Ἐνδαίμονει εἰ, ἓν δ' ἐγώ,
ὅτι οἰεὶ ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλην τινὰ προσειπεῖν πόλιν ἡ
τὴν τοιαύτην οἰαν ἡμεῖς κατεσκευάζομεν. Ἀλλὰ
tί μήν; ἐφη. Μειζόνως, ἓν δ' ἐγώ, χρὴ προσ-

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a Cf. Herod. iv. 111.
b Two elements of the triad φύσις, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη. Cf. supra 374 d.

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"Answer me then, Adeimantus. Do you not think that one boxer perfectly trained in the art could easily fight two fat rich men who knew nothing of it?" "Not at the same time perhaps," said he. "Not even," said I, "if he were allowed to retreat and then turn and strike the one who came up first, and if he repeated the procedure many times under a burning and stifling sun? Would not such a fighter down even a number of such opponents?" "Doubtless," he said; "it wouldn't be surprising if he did." "Well, don't you think that the rich have more of the skill and practice of boxing than of the art of war?" "I do," he said. "It will be easy, then, for our athletes in all probability to fight with double and triple their number." "I shall have to concede the point," he said, "for I believe you are right." "Well then, if they send an embassy to the other city and say what is in fact true: 'We make no use of gold and silver nor is it lawful for us but it is for you: do you then join us in the war and keep the spoils of the enemy,'—do you suppose any who heard such a proposal would choose to fight against hard and wiry hounds rather than with the aid of the hounds against fat and tender sheep?" "I think not. Yet consider whether the accumulation of all the wealth of other cities in one does not involve danger for the state that has no wealth." "What happy innocence," said I, "to suppose that you can properly use the name city of any other than the one we are constructing." "Why, what should we say?" he said. "A greater predication," said I,

* Cf. Herod. vii. 233 τὸν ἀληθείας τῶν λύγων, Catull. x. 9 id quod erat.*

+ The style is of intentional Spartan curtness.
agoreuein tás állas. ékásth gár autῶν πόλεις eìdoi pàmopollias, áll' ou pòlis, tô tôn paizōntwn. dûo mên, kàn ótioùn ἦ, polemia állhlais, ἦ mên
423 penvýtwv, ἦ de plousiōwn. tôutôv ð' ev ékatéra pánw polllai, aîs èavn mên ws miá prosoférh, pantós ãn âmártous, èavn ðè ws pollassis, didous tà tôv étérwv tôis étérwv chrêmatá te kai dýnámeis ἦ kai aùtvûs, ëvmamáchos mên ìai pollossis chrhseis, po-
lemíous ð' ðlýgous. kai ëwvs ãn ἦ pólis sói òikî ñowfrónws ñws ártpi ètákthè, megísth èstai, ou tôv évdokimein légw, ἦl' ñws álhtwos megísth, kai éavn múvon ἦ ñklywvn tôv prospolemuûtwv. oûtw gár
B megalhain pólin mían ou ðadíwos ouûte ëv Ïllhseiv oûte ëv barbárwois eýrâseis, dôkousas ðè pollassis kai polllaplaçias tôs ñlukáutês. ἦ állwos òiei; Oû mà tôv ðl', ëfhi.

III. ëvkoûn, ἦν ð' égô, òvtoùs ãn eîh kai kál-
lwtoos òros tôis ëmetérous árkhousin, òsthv ðeî tô tô 
megéthos tô ñv pólív poieîsthai kai ñlîkhv òôph òsthv õwrav àfórisaménoûs tôv állhîn xhîren èavn. Tîs, 
ëfhi, òros; Òîmai mên, ἦν ð' égô, tôndè: méchrî ou

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a "As they say in the game" or "in the jest." The general meaning is plain. We do not know enough about the game called πόλεις (cf. scholiast, Suidas, Hesychius, and Photius) to be more specific. Cf. for conjectures and details Adam's note, and for the phrase Thompson on Meno 77 a.

b Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1316 b 7 and 1264 a 25.

c Aristotle, Pol. 1261 b 38, takes this as the actual number of the military class. Sparta, according to Xenophon, Rep. Lac. 1. 1, was τῶν ὀλιγανθρωποτάτων πόλεων, yet one of the strongest. Cf. also Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 14 f. In the Laws 326
"must be applied to the others. For they are each one of them many cities, not a city, as it goes in the game. There are two at the least at enmity with one another, the city of the rich and the city of the poor, and in each of these there are many. If you deal with them as one you will altogether miss the mark, but if you treat them as a multiplicity by offering to the one faction the property, the power, the very persons of the other, you will continue always to have few enemies and many allies. And so long as your city is governed soberly in the order just laid down, it will be the greatest of cities. I do not mean greatest in repute, but in reality, even though it have only a thousand defenders. For a city of this size that is really one you will not easily discover either among Greeks or barbarians—but of those that seem so you will find many and many times the size of this. Or do you think otherwise?" "No, indeed I don't," said he.

III. "Would not this, then, be the best rule and measure for our governors of the proper size of the city and of the territory that they should mark off for a city of that size and seek no more?" "What is the measure?" "I think," said I, "that Plato proposes the number 5040 which Aristotle thinks too large, Pol. 1265 a 15.

Commentators, I think, miss the subtlety of this sentence; μιαν means truly one as below in δ, and its antithesis is not so much πολλάς as δοκείωσα which means primarily the appearance of unity, and only secondarily refers to μεγάλην. καί then is rather "and" than "even." "So large a city that is really one you will not easily find, but the semblance (of one big city) you will find in cities many and many times the size of this." Cf. also 462 a-b, and my paper "Plato's Laws and the Unity of Plato's Thought," Class. Phil. 1914, p. 358. For Aristotle's comment cf. Pol. 1261 a 15.
The Greek idea of government required that the citizens should know one another. They would not have called Babylon, London or Chicago cities. Cf. Introd. p. xxviii, Fowler, Greek City State, passim, Newman, Aristot. Pol. vol. i. Introd. pp. 314-315, and Isocrates’ complaint that Athens was too large, Antid. 171-172.

Ironical, of course.

Cf. on 415 n.

The special precept with regard to the guardians was significant of the universal principal, “one man, one task.”
they should let it grow so long as in its growth it consents to remain a unity, but no further.”

“Excellent,” he said. “Then is not this still another injunction that we should lay upon our guardians, to keep guard in every way that the city shall not be too small, nor great only in seeming, but that it shall be a sufficient city and one?” “That behest will perhaps be an easy one for them,” he said.

“And still easier, haply,” I said, “is this that we mentioned before when we said that if a degenerate offspring was born to the guardians he must be sent away to the other classes, and likewise if a superior to the others he must be enrolled among the guardians; and the purport of all this was that the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity.” “Why yes,” he said, “this is even more trifling than that.”

“These are not, my good Adeimantus, as one might suppose, numerous and difficult injunctions that we are imposing upon them, but they are all easy, provided they guard, as the saying is, the one great thing—or instead of great let us call it sufficient.”

“What is that?” he said. “Their education and

Cf. 443 c, 370 b-c (note), 394 e, 374 a-d, Laws 846 b-847 b.

* It is a natural growth, not an artificial contrivance. For Aristotle’s criticism cf. Pol. 1261 a.

† The proverbial one great thing (one thing needful). The proverb perhaps is: πολλ’ αδικέλλσις αλλ’ ἐκδοκεί έν μέγα (Suidas). Cf. Archil. fr. 61 έν δ’ ἐπίσταμαι μέγα, Polit. 297 ά μέχρι τερ άν έν μέγα φυλάττωσι.

§ μέγα has the unfavourable associations of ἐπος μέγα, and ἰκανόν, “adequate,” is characteristically preferred by Plato.
deiav, ἄν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τροφὴν. εἰν γὰρ εὖ παι-
δευόμενοι μέτριοι ἄνδρες γίγνονται, πάντα ταῦτα ῥα-
δίως διόφορνται καὶ ἄλλα γε, ὥσα νῦν ἡμεῖς
παραλείπομεν, τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτῆσιν καὶ
424 γάμων καὶ παιδοποιίας, οτι δεὶ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν
παρομίαν πάντα ὁ τι μάλιστα κοινὰ τὰ φίλων
ποιεῖσθαι. Ὅρθοτατα γὰρ, ἔφη, γίγνοντ' ἄν. Καὶ
μὴν, εἶπον, πολιτεία, ἐάνπερ ἁπαξ ὀρμήσῃ εὖ,
ἐρχεται ὄσπερ κύκλος αὐξανομένη. τροφὴ γὰρ
καὶ παιδευόμενας χρηστῇ σωζόμενη φύσεις ἁγαθᾶς
ἐμποιεῖ, καὶ ἂν φύσεις χρησταὶ τοιαύτης παιδείας
ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι ἐτι βελτίους τῶν προτέρων
Β φύνονται εἰς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν, ὄσπερ καὶ
ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴωις. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη. Ὅς τοῖνυν
diὰ βραχέων εἰπείν, τούτου ἄνθεκτεον τοῖς ἐπι-
μεληταῖς τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως ἂν αὐτῶς μὴ λάθη
diαφθαρέν, ἄλλα παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ φυλάττωσι, τὸ
μὴ νεστερίζων περὶ γυναικικῆς τε καὶ μονικῆς
παρὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἄλλ' ως οἰόν τε μάλιστα φυλάτ-
tευν φοβομένους, ὅταν τις λέγη, ὃς τὴν ἀοιδὴν
μᾶλλον ἐπιφρονέουσιν ἄνθρωποι,

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a Cf. on 416 b. Plato of course has in mind both the
education already described and the higher education of
books VI. and VII.

b The indirect introduction of the proverb is characteristic
of Plato's style. Cf. on 449 c, where the paradox thus lightly
introduced is taken up for serious discussion. Quite
fantastic is the hypothesis on which much ink has been
wasted, that the Ecclesiazusae of Aristophanes was suggested
by this sentence and is answered by the fifth book. Cf.
Introd. pp. xxv and xxxiv. It ought not to be necessary to
repeat that Plato's communism applies only to the guardians,
and that its main purpose is to enforce their disinterested-
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nurture," I replied. "For if a right education makes of them reasonable men they will easily discover everything of this kind—and other principles that we now pass over, as that the possession of wives and marriage, and the procreation of children and all that sort of thing should be made as far as possible the proverbial goods of friends that are common." "Yes, that would be the best way," he said. "And, moreover," said I, "the state, if it once starts well, proceeds as it were in a cycle of growth. I mean that a sound nurture and education if kept up creates good natures in the state, and sound natures in turn receiving an education of this sort develop into better men than their predecessors both for other purposes and for the production of offspring as among animals also." "It is probable," he said. "To put it briefly, then," said I, "it is to this that the overseers of our state must cleave and be watchful against its insensible corruption. They must throughout be watchful against innovations in music and gymnastics counter to the established order, and to the best of their power guard against them, fearing when anyone says that that song is most regarded among men.


c Cf. Polit. 305 δ τὴν ἀρχὴν τε καὶ ὀρμήν.

d No concrete metaphor of wheel, hook or circle seems to be intended, but only the cycle of cumulative effect of education on nature and nature on education, described in what follows. See the evidence collected in my note, Class. Phil. vol. v. pp. 505-507.

e Cf. 459 a.
ήτις άειδόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἁμφιπέληται,

C μὴ πολλάκις τὸν ποιητὴν τις οὕτωι λέγειν οὐκ ἁσματα νέα, ἀλλὰ τρόπον ὄδης νέον, καὶ τούτο ἐπαινή. δεῖ δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐπαινεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐτε ὑπολαμβάνειν. εἴδος γὰρ καινὸν μουσικῆς μεταβάλλει εὐλαβητέον ὡς ἐν ὁλῳ κινδυνεύοντα· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ κινοῦνται μουσικῆς τρόποι άνευ πολιτικῶν νόμων τῶν μεγίστων, ὡς φησὶ τε Δάμων καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι. Καὶ ἐμε τοίνυν, ἐφη ὁ ῬΔείμαντος, θές τῶν πεπεισμένων.

D IV. Τὸ δὴ φυλακτήριον, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνταῦθα ποιοικοδομησεον τοὺς φίλαξιν, ἐν μουσικῇ. Ἡ γοῦν παρανομία, ἐφη, ῥαδίως αὕτη λανθάνει παραδυναμένη. Ναι, ἐφην, ὡς ἐν παιδίας γε μέρει καὶ ὡς κακὸν οὐδὲν ἐργαζομένη. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, ἐφη, ἀλλο γε ἕ κατὰ σμικρὸν εἰσοικεσαμένη ἡρέμα ὑπορρεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἡθη τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτη- δεύματα· ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους

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*a* Od. i. 351. Our text has ἐπικλείσων and ἀκουόντεσσι. For the variant cf. Howes in Harvard Studies, vi. p. 205. For the commonplace that new songs are best cf. Pindar, Ol. ix. 52.


*c* The meaning of the similar phrase in Pindar, Ol. iii. 4 is different.

*d* μουσικῆς τρόποι need not be so technical as it is in later Greek writers on music, who, however, were greatly influenced by Plato. For the ethical and social power of music cf. Introd. p. xiv note c, and supra 401 d-404 a, also Laws 700 d-e, 701 a.

*e* Cf. Protag. 316 a, Julian 150 b.

*f* The etymological force of the word makes the metaphor less harsh than the English translation “guard-house.” Cf. Laws 962 c, where Bury renders “safeguard.” Cf. Pindar’s 332
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which hovers newest on the singer's lips, a
lest haply b it be supposed that the poet means not
new songs but a new way of song c and is commending
this. But we must not praise that sort of thing nor
conceive it to be the poet's meaning. For a change
to a new type of music is something to beware of
as a hazard of all our fortunes. For the modes of
music d are never disturbed without unsettling of
the most fundamental political and social conventions, as
Damon affirms and as I am convinced e " "Set me
too down in the number of the convinced," said
Adeimantus.

IV. "It is here, then," I said, "in music, as it seems,
that our guardians must build their guard-house f and
post of watch." "It is certain," he said, "that
this is the kind of lawlessness g that easily insinuates h
itself unobserved." "Yes," said I, "because it is
supposed to be only a form of play i and to work no
harm." "Nor does it work any," he said, "except
that by gradual infiltration it softly overflows j upon
the characters and pursuits of men and from these
issues forth grown greater to attack their business

ákōnas λυγυρᾶς, the sharpening thing, that is, the whetstone,
Ol. vi. 82.

9 παραρωμία besides its moral meaning (537 ε) suggests
lawless innovation in music, from association with the musical
sense of νῆμος. Cf. Chicago Studies in Class. Phil. i. p. 22
n. 4.

h So Aristot. Pol. 1307 b 33.

i Cf. the warning against innovation in children's games,
Laws 797 a-b. But music is παιδέα as well as παιδία. Cf.
Aristotle's three uses of music, for play, education, and the
entertainment of leisure (Pol. 1339 a 16).

j Cf. Demosth. xix. 228. The image is that of a stream
overflowing and spreading. Cf. Eurip. fr. 499 N. and
Cicero's use of "serpit," Cat. iv. 3, and passim.
ευμβόλαια μείζων ἐκβαίνει, ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἐμ
Ε βολαίων ἐρχεται ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ πολιτείας σὺν
πολλῆ, ὥς Ἐν τελευτῶσα πάντα ἱδία καὶ δημοσία ἀνατρέψῃ. Εἶεν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· οὕτω τούτ' ἔχει; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν
ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, τοὺς ἡμετέρους παισῖν ἐν
νομωτέρου εὐθὺς παιδίας μεθεκτέον, ὡς παρανόμου
γιγνομένης αὐτῆς καὶ παῖδων τουιοτῶν ἐννόμους τε
καὶ σπουδαίους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀνδρᾶς αὐξάνεσθαι
ἀδύνατον ὦν; Πῶς δ' οὐχί; ἐφη. "Ὅταν δὴ ἄρα
καλῶς ἀρξάμενοι παιδεῖ παιζεῖν εὐνομίαν διὰ τῆς
μουσικῆς εἰσδέξωνται, πάλιν τούναντιόν ἦ ἱείνους
εἰς πάντα ἐξυνέπεται τε καὶ αὐξεῖ, ἐπανορθοῦσα εἴ
τι καὶ πρότερον τῆς πόλεως ἔκειτο. Ἀληθῆ μέντοι,
ἐφη. Καὶ τὰ σμικρὰ ἄρα, εἴτεν, δοκοῦντα εἶναι
νόμιμα ἐξευρίσκουσιν οὕτω, ἃ οἱ πρότερον ἀπ
ώλυσαν πάντα. Ποια; Τὰ τοιαῦτα σιγάς τε

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B τῶν νεωτέρων παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις, ἃς πρέπει, καὶ
κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις καὶ γονέων θερα-
πείας, καὶ κουρᾶς γε καὶ ἀμπεχόνας καὶ ὑποδέεις
καὶ ὅλων τοῦ σώματος σχηματισμὸν καὶ τάλλα
ὁσα τοιαύτα. ἦ οὐκ οἶει; "Ἐγὼγε. Νομοθετείν
ὁ ἄντ' ὁμοίως εὐηθεῖς· οὕτε γὰρ που γίγνεται οὕτ
ἀν μείνειεν, λόγῳ τε καὶ γράμμασι νομοθετήθεντα.

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a Cf. on 389 d.
b The reference is to the general tenour of what precedes.
c ἐπρότερον is an unconscious lapse from the construction of an ideal state to the reformation of degenerate Athens. Cf. Isoc. Areopagiticus 41 ff., and Laws 876 b-c, 948 c-d.
d For these traits of old-fashioned decorum and modesty cf. Aristoph. Clouds 961-1023, Blaydes on 991, Herod. ii. 80, Isoc. Areopagit. 48-49.
e Cf. Starkie on Aristoph. Wasps 1069.

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dealings, and from these relations it proceeds against the laws and the constitution with wanton licence, Socrates, till finally it overthrows all things public and private." "Well," said I, "are these things so?" "I think so," he said. "Then, as we were saying in the beginning, our youth must join in a more law-abiding play, since, if play grows lawless and the children likewise, it is impossible that they should grow up to be men of serious temper and lawful spirit." "Of course," he said. "And so we may reason that when children in their earliest play are imbued with the spirit of law and order through their music, the opposite of the former supposition happens—this spirit waits upon them in all things and fosters their growth, and restores and sets up again whatever was overthrown in the other type of state." "True, indeed," he said. "Then such men rediscover for themselves those seemingly trifling conventions which their predecessors abolished altogether." "Of what sort?" "Such things as the becoming silence of the young in the presence of their elders; the giving place to them and rising up before them, and dutiful service of parents, and the cut of the hair and the garments and the fashion of the footgear, and in general the deportment of the body and everything of the kind. Don't you think so?" "I do." "Yet to enact them into laws would, I think, be silly. For such laws are not obeyed nor would they last, being enacted only in words and on

1 Cf. on 412 b, Isoc. Areopagit. 41, and Laws 788 b, where the further, still pertinent consideration is added that the multiplication of minor enactments tends to bring fundamental laws into contempt. Cf. "Plato's Laws and the Unity of Plato's Thought," p. 353, n. 2.
Πῶς γάρ; Κινδυνεύει γούν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ 'Αδείμαντε, ἐκ τῆς παιδείας, ὅποι ἂν τις ὀρμήσῃ,
C τοιαύτα καὶ τὰ ἐπομένα εἶναι. ἡ οὕκ ἂεῖ τὸ ὀμοιον ἄν ὀμοιον παρακαλεῖ; Τί μήν; Καὶ τελευτῶν δὴ, οἷμαι, φαίμεν ἃν εἰς ἐν τὸ τέλεον καὶ νεανικὸν ἀποβαίνειν αὐτὸ ἡ ἁγαθὸν ἢ καὶ τούναντίον. Τί γάρ οὐκ; ἡ δ' ὁς. 'Εγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, διὰ ταύτα οὐκ ἂν ἐτί τὰ τοιαύτα ἐπι-χειρήσαμι νομοθετεῖν. Εἰκότως γ', ἐφη. Τί δὲ, ὃ πρὸς θεῶν, ἐφη, τὰ ἀγοραία ξυμβολαίων τε πέρι κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐκαστοι ἀ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμ-
D βάλλουσιν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ χειροτεχνικῶν περὶ ξυμβολαίων καὶ λοιδοριῶν καὶ αἰκίς καὶ δικῶν λήξεις1 καὶ δικαστῶν καταστάσεις, καὶ εἰ ποιοι τελῶν τινές ἢ πράξεις ἢ θέσεις ἁναγκαῖοί εἰσιν ἡ κατ' ἀγορᾶς ἢ λιμένας, ἡ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀγορα-νομικά ἀττα ἡ ἀστυνομικὰ ἡ ἐλλημενικὰ ἡ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαύτα, τούτων τολμήσομέν τι νομοθετεῖν; Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἄξιον, ἐφη, ἀνδράσι καλοῖς καγαθοῖς ἐπιτάττειν: τα πολλά γὰρ αὐτῶν, ὅσα δεῖ νομοθετή-
E σασθαι, ῥαδίως ποιν ἑυρήσομαι. Ναί, ὃ φίλε, εἶπον, εάν γε θεὸς αὐτοῖς διδὼ σωτηρίαν τῶν

1 λήξεως ὅ: λήξεις others.

a Cf. 401 c, Demosth. Olynth. iii. 33 τελεῖον τι καὶ μέγα.
b τὰ τοιαύτα is slightly contemptuous. Specific commercial, industrial and criminal legislation was not compatible with the plan of the Republic, and so Plato omits it here. Much of it is given in the Laws, but even there details are left to the citizens and their rulers. Cf. supra on 412 b.
d In Laws 920 d Plato allows a δίκη ἀτελοῦς ὁμολογίας against
"How could they?" "At any rate, Adeimantus," I said, "the direction of the education from whence one starts is likely to determine the quality of what follows. Does not like ever summon like?" "Surely." "And the final outcome, I presume, we would say is one complete and vigorous product of good or the reverse." "Of course," said he. "For my part, then," I said, "for these reasons I would not go on to try to legislate on such matters." "With good reason," said he. "But what, in heaven's name," said I, "about business matters, the deals that men make with one another in the agora—and, if you please, contracts with workmen and actions for foul language and assault, the filing of declarations, the impanelling of juries, the payment and exaction of any dues that may be needful in markets or harbours and in general market, police or harbour regulations and the like, can we bring ourselves to legislate about these?" "Nay, 'twould not be fitting," he said, "to dictate to good and honourable men." For most of the enactments that are needed about these things they will easily, I presume, discover." "Yes, my friend, provided God grants them the preservation of the principles of law that we have workmen or contractors who break or fail to complete contracts.

*Cf. Laws 935 c. There was no λοιδορίας δίκη under that name at Athens, but certain words were actionable, ἀπόρρητα, and there was a δίκη κακηγορίας.

† Plato shows his contempt for the subject by this confused enumeration, passing without warning from contracts and torts to procedure and then to taxes, market, harbour and police regulations.

§ τολμήσομεν is both "venture" and "deign."

*Cf. Isoc. Panegyr. 78 ὃι τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν δεχεσθε πολλῶν γραμμάτων.
νόμων ὰν ἐμπροσθεν διήλθομεν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, ἃ δ' ὃς, πολλὰ τοιαῦτα τιθέμενοι ἀεὶ καὶ ἐπανορθοῦμεν τὸν βίον διατελέσονσιν, οὐμένου ἐπιλήψεσθαι τοῦ βελτίστου. Λέγεις, ἐφη ἐγώ, βιώσεσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους ὡσπερ τοὺς καμνοντάς τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἐκβιβὴναι πονηρὰς διαίτης.

426 Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Καὶ μὴν οὕτοι γε χαριέντως διατελοῦσιν. ἰατρευόμενοι γὰρ οὐδὲν περαίνουσι, πλὴν γε ποικιλότερα καὶ μείζω ποιοῦσι τὰ νο- σήματα, καὶ ἂεὶ ἐλπίζοντες, εάν τις φάρμακον ἐμβουλεύσῃ, ὑπὸ τούτον ἐσεσθαι ὑγιεῖς. Πάνω γὰρ, ἐφη, τῶν οὔτω καμνόντων τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη. Τί δὲ; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ; τόδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαρίεν, τὸ πάντων ἐχθροῦν ἤγεισαί τὸν τάληθ' λέγοντα, ὅτι πρῖν ἄν μεθύων καὶ ἐμπιπλάμενος καὶ ἀφροδι- Βιαξοῦν καὶ ἀργῶν παύσηται, οὔτε φάρμακα οὔτε καύσεις οὔτε τομαὶ οὔδ' αὕτ' ἐπῳδαῖ ἀυτῶν οὐδὲ περίπτα οὖδε ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ὄνθησει; Οὐ πάνω χαρίεν, ἐφη· τὸ γάρ τῷ εὖ λέγοντι χαλεπαίνειν οὐκ ἔχει χάριν. Οὐκ ἐπαινέτης εἰ, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὥς ἔοικας, τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.

α Cf. Emerson, "Experience": "They wish to be saved from the mischiefs of their vices but not from their vices. Charity would be wasted on this poor waiting on the symptoms. A wise and hardy physician will say, 'Come out of that' as the first condition of advice."

b Ironical. Quite fanciful is Dümmler's supposition (Kleine Schriften, i. p. 99) that this passage was meant as destructive criticism of Isocrates' Panegyricus and that Antid. 62 is a reply. Plato is obviously thinking of practical politicians rather than of Isocrates.

c ἰπὶ γὲ etc., is loosely elliptical, but emendations are superfluous.
already discussed." "Failing that," said he, "they will pass their lives multiplying such petty laws and amending them in the expectation of attaining what is best." "You mean," said I, "that the life of such citizens will resemble that of men who are sick, yet from intemperance are unwilling to abandon their unwholesome regimen." "By all means." "And truly," said I, "these latter go on in a most charming fashion. For with all their doctoring they accomplish nothing except to complicate and augment their maladies. And they are always hoping that some one will recommend a panacea that will restore their health." "A perfect description," he said, "of the state of such invalids." "And isn't this a charming trait in them, that they hate most in all the world him who tells them the truth that until a man stops drinking and gorging and wenching and idling, neither drugs nor cautery nor the knife, no, nor spells nor periapts nor anything of that kind will be of any avail?" "Not altogether charming," he said, "for there is no grace or charm in being angry with him who speaks well." "You do not seem to be an admirer of such people," said I. "No, by heaven, I am not."

For the list cf. Pindar, *Pyth.* iii. 50-54. *οὐδὲν ἄδικα* emphasizes the transition to superstitious remedies in which Plato doesn't really believe. Cf. his rationalizing interpretation of *ἐπιφοίνι*, *Charm.* 157 A, *Theaet.* 149 C. *Laws* 933 a-b is to be interpreted in the spirit of the observation in Selden's *Table Talk*: "The law against witches does not prove that there bee any but it punishes the malice," etc. [Demosthenes] xxv. 80 is sceptical.

Cf. any lexicon, Shakes. *1 Henry VI.* v. iii. 2 "Now help, ye charming spells and periapts," and Plutarch's story of the women who hung them on Pericles' neck on his death-bed.

Cf. *480 A, 354 A.*

The noun is more forcible than the verb would be. Cf. *Protag.* 309 A *ἐπισκέψεως.*
V. Οὖν ἂν ἡ πόλις ἀρα, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἑλέγομεν, ὀλη τοιοῦτον ποιή, οὐκ ἑπαυνέσει. ἦ οὖ φαινον- 
ταί σου ταῦταν ἐργάζεσθαι τούτοις τῶν πόλεων

C ὁσαί κακῶς πολιτευόμεναι προαγορεύουσι τοῖς 
πολέταις τῆς μὲν κατάστασιν τῆς πόλεως ὀλην μὴ 
kinein, ὡς ἀποθανομένους, ὃς ἂν τούτο δρᾷ: ὃς 
δ' ἡν σφᾶς οὕτω πολιτευομένους ἧδιστα θεραπεύῃ 
καὶ χαρίζηται ὑποτέχνων καὶ προγνώσκων τὰς 
σφετέρας βουλήσεις καὶ ταῦτας δεινός ἦ ἀπο- 
πληροῦν, οὕτω τρὰ ἀγαθός τε ἐσται ἀνήρ καὶ σοφὸς 
τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τιμήσεται ὑπὸ σφῶν; Ταῦταν μὲν 
οὖν, ἐφι, ἐμοιγε δοκοῦσι δράν, καὶ οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν

D ἑπαυνῶ. Τί δ' αὖ τοὺς θέλοντας θεραπεύειν τὰς 
τοιαύτας πόλεις καὶ προθυμομένους οὐκ ἁγασά 
τῆς ἀνδρείας τε καὶ εὐχερείας; Ἄγωγ', ἐφη, 
πλὴν γ' ὃσοι ἐξηπάτηται ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἰόντα 
τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πολιτικοὶ εἶναι, ὅτι ἑπαυνοῦται ὑπὸ 
tῶν πολλῶν. Πῶς λέγεις; οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις,

a We return from the illustration to its application to the state.

b Cf. 497 b, Aristot. Pol. 1301 b 11. Cf. the obvious imitation in the (probably spurious) Epistle vii. 330 e. For the thought, from the point of view of an enemy of democracy, cf. the statement in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 3. 9, that the faults of Athens cannot be corrected while she remains a democracy. The Athenians naturally guarded their constitution and viewed with equal suspicion the idealistic reformer and the oligarchical reactionary.


d Almost technical. Cf. 538 b.

e Here “serve,” not “flatter.”

f This word εὐχερεία is often misunderstood by lexicons and commentators. It is of course not “dexterity” (L. & S.) nor 340
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V. "Neither then, if an entire city, as we were just now saying, acts in this way, will it have your approval, or don’t you think that the way of such invalids is precisely that of those cities which being badly governed forewarn their citizens not to meddle with the general constitution of the state, denouncing death to whosoever attempts that—while whoever most agreeably serves them governed as they are and who curries favour with them by fawning upon them and anticipating their desires and by his cleverness in gratifying them, him they will account the good man, the man wise in worthwhile things, the man they will delight to honour?" "Yes," he said, "I think their conduct is identical, and I don’t approve it in the very least." "And what again of those who are willing and eager to serve such states? Don’t you admire their valiancy and light-hearted irresponsibility?" "I do," he said, "except those who are actually deluded and suppose themselves to be in truth statesmen because they are praised by the many."

"What do you mean? Can’t you make allowances yet probably “complaisance,” nor yet “humanitas” or “Gutmütigkeit,” as Adam and Schneider think. It expresses rather the lightheartedness with which such politicians rush in where wiser men fear to tread, which is akin to the lightness with which men plunge into crime. Cf. Laws 690 d τῶν ἐπὶ νόμων θέων ἄντων ραδίως and 969 a ἀνδρείοτατος. Plato’s political physician makes “come out of that” a precondition of his treatment. Cf. Laws 736-737, Polit. 299 A-B, infra 501 A, 540 E, Epistle vii. 330 c-d, and the story in Aelian, V.H. ii. 42, of Plato’s refusal to legislate for the Arcadians because they would not accept an equalization of property.

* Cf. Euthyphro 2 c-d, Gorg. 513 B, Polit. 275 c and 292 D.

Plato often condescendingly and half ironically pardons psychologically inevitable errors. Cf. 366 c, Phaedr. 269 b, Euthydem. 306 c.
Ἐταῦτα μὴ ἥγεισθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ; Οὐκ ἂν, ἐφη, τοῦτό γε. Μὴ τοιών χαλέπαινε· καὶ γάρ ποῦ εἰσὶ πάντων χαριέστατοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι, νομοθετοῦντες τε οἷα ἄρτι διήλθομεν καὶ ἐπαναρθοῦντες αἰέ οἰόμενοι τι πέρας εὐρήσειν περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἔμβολαις κακουργηματα καὶ περὶ ἄ νῦν δὴ ἔγω ἔλεγον, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ὄσπερ Ὑδραν 427 τέμνονσιν. Καὶ μὴν, ἐφη, οὐκ ἀλλο τι γε ποιοῦσιν. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοιῶν, ἂν δ' ἔγω, τὸ τοιοῦτον εἴδος νόμων περὶ καὶ πολιτείας ο郤τ' ἐν κακῷς οὔτ' ἐν εὖ πολιτευμένη πόλει ὄμην ἀν δεῖν τὸν ἀληθινὸν νομοθέτην πραγματεύεσθαι, ἐν τῇ μὲν ὅτι ἀνωφελῆ καὶ πλέον οὐδέν, ἐν δὲ τῇ, ὅτι τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κἀν ὀστισοῦν εὗροι, τὰ δὲ ὅτι αὐτόματα ἐπείσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπροσθέν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

Β Τὶ οὖν, ἐφη, ἔτι ἄν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῆς νομοθεσίας εὔη; καὶ ἔγω εἴπον ὅτι Ἡμῖν μὲν οὔδέν, τῷ μέντοι Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς τά τε μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ πρώτα τῶν νομοθετημάτων. Τὰ ποία; ἂ δ' ὀsic.

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a For οὐκ ἂν cf. 393 d, 442 A, Theaetet. 161 A, Class. Phil. vol. xxiii. pp. 285-287. ἐγωγε above concurs with ἄγασιν, ignoring the irony. τλῆν γε etc. marks dissent on one point. This dissent is challenged, and is withdrawn by οὐκ ἂν . . . τοῦτό γε (ὁμαί).

b τῷ ὄντι points the application of the proverbial ὕδραν τέμνειν, which appears in its now trite metaphorical use for the first time here and in Euthydem. 297 c. Cf. my note on Horace iv. 4. 61. For the thought cf. Isoc. vii. 40, Macrobr. Sat. ii. 13 "leges bonae ex malis moribus procreantur," Arcesilaus apud Stob. Flor. xliii. 91 οὗτο δὴ καὶ ὅπου νόμωι 342
for the men? Do you think it possible for a man who does not know how to measure when a multitude of others equally ignorant assure him that he is four cubits tall not to suppose this to be the fact about himself?" "Why no," he said, "I don't think that." "Then don't be harsh with them. For surely such fellows are the most charming spectacle in the world when they enact and amend such laws as we just now described and are perpetually expecting to find a way of putting an end to frauds in business and in the other matters of which I was speaking because they can't see that they are in very truth trying to cut off a Hydra's head." "Indeed," he said, "that is exactly what they are doing." "I, then," said I, "should not have supposed that the true lawgiver ought to work out matters of that kind in the laws and the constitution of either an ill-governed or a well-governed state—in the one because they are useless and accomplish nothing, in the other because some of them anybody could discover and others will result spontaneously from the pursuits already described.'" "What part of legislation, then," he said, "is still left for us?" And I replied, "For us nothing, but for the Apollo of Delphi, the chief, the fairest and the first of enactments." "What are they?" he said.

πλεῖστα ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀδικίαν εἶναι μεγίστην, Theophrastus apud Stob. Flor. xxxvii. 21 ὅληγον οἷς ἀγαθοὶ νόμων δέονται.

Ironically, "I should not have supposed, but for the practice of our politicians."

eidos νόμων πέρι is here a mere periphrasis, though the true classification of laws was a topic of the day. Cf. Laws 630 e, Aristot. Pol. 1267 b 37. Plato is not always careful to mark the distinction between the legislation which he rejects altogether and that which he leaves to the discretion of the citizens.

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'Ιερών τε ἰδρύσεις καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἄλλαι θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἥρων θεραπεῖαν, τελευτησάντων τε αὖ θήκαι καὶ οὐσα τοὺς εἴκει δεῖ ὑπηρετοῦντας ἕλεως αὐτοῦς ἔχειν. ὁ γὰρ ἦ τοιαῦτα

C οὔτ' ἐπιστάμεθα ἥμεις οἰκίζοντες τε πόλιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ πεισόμεθα, εἰν νῦν ἔχωμεν, οὖδὲ χρησόμεθα ἐξηγητῇ ἄλλῃ ἡ τῷ πατρίῳ. οὗτος γὰρ ἐκεῖνον ὁ θεὸς περί τὰ τοιαύτα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πάτριος ἐξηγητῆς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος ἐξηγεῖται. Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἐφη, λέγεις· καὶ ποιητέον οὖν.

D VI. Ὄμικοσμήνη μὲν τοῖνυν, ἥν δ' ἔγω, ἦδη ἄν σοι εἰή, ὦ παῖ Ἀρίστωνος, ἡ πόλις· τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τούτο σκόπει ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς ποθὲν πορισάμενος ἰκανὸν αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει καὶ Πολέμαρχον καὶ τοὺς ἀλλούς, εὰν πως ἱδὼμεν, ποῦ ποτ' ἂν εἰῆ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ποῦ ἡ ἄδικια, καὶ τί

a ἐκεὶ = in the other world. So often.
b For the exegete as a special religious functionary at Athens cf. L. & S. s.v. and Laws 759 c-d. Apollo in a higher sense is the interpreter of religion for all mankind. He is technically πατρίως at Athens (Euthydem. 302 d) but he is πάτριος for all Greeks and all men. Plato does not, as Thümser says (p. 301), confuse the Dorian and the Ionian Apollo, but rises above the distinction.
c Plato prudently or piously leaves the details of ceremonial and institutional religion to Delphi. Cf. 540 b-c, Laws 759 c, 738 b-c, 828 a, 856 e, 865 b, 914 a, 947 d.
d This "navel" stone, supposed to mark the centre of the earth, has now been found. Cf. Poulsen's Delphi, pp. 19, 29, 157, and Frazer on Pausanias x. 16.
e Not the ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις of 369 e, nor the φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις of 372 e, but the purified city of 399 e has now been established and described. The search for justice that follows formulates for the first time the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues and defines each provisionally and sufficiently for the

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"The founding of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons, and heroes; and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond to keep them gracious. For of such matters we neither know anything nor in the founding of our city if we are wise shall we entrust them to any other or make use of any other interpreter than the God of our fathers. For this God surely is in such matters for all mankind the interpreter of the religion of their fathers who from his seat in the middle and at the very navel of the earth delivers his interpretation."

"Excellently said," he replied; "and that is what we must do."

VI. "At last, then, son of Ariston," said I, "your city may be considered as established. The next thing is to procure a sufficient light somewhere and to look yourself, and call in the aid of your brother and of Polemarchus and the rest, if we may in any wise discover where justice and injustice should be in it, wherein present purpose, and solves the problems dramatically presented in the minor dialogues, Charmides, Laches, etc. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 15-18, nn. 81-102, and the introduction to the second volume of this translation.

See on 369 a. Matter-of-fact critics may object that there is no injustice in the perfectly good state. But we know the bad best by the canon of the good. Cf. on 409 a-b. The knowledge of opposites is the same.

Injustice can be defined only in relation to its opposite (444 a-b), and in the final argument the most unjust man and state are set up as the extreme antitypes of the ideal (571-580). By the perfect state Plato does not mean a state in which no individual retains any human imperfections. It is idle then to speak of "difficulties" or "contradictions" or changes of plan in the composition of the Republic."
∀λλήλων διαφέρεται, καὶ πότερον δεί κεκτήσθαι
tὸν μέλλοντα ευδαιμονα εἶναι, ἕαν τε λανθάνη ἕαν
tε μὴ πάντας θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους. Οὐδὲν
λέγεις, ἐφη ὁ Πλαύκων· σὺ γὰρ ὑπέσχον ζητήσεις,
Εἰ ὡς οὐχ ὅσιόν σου ὅν μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη
eis δύναμιν παντὶ τρόπῳ. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφην ἐγὼ, ὑπο-
mιμήσις, καὶ ποιητέον μὲν γε οὕτω, χρή δὲ καὶ
μᾶς ξυλλαμβάνειν. Ἀλλ', ἐφη, ποιήσομεν οὕτω.
'Ελπίζω τοῖνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εὐρήσεων αὐτὸ ὦδε.
οἶμαι ἣμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἶπερ ὅρθως γε ὧκισται,
tελέως ἀγαθήν εἶναι. Ἀνάγκης, ἐφη. Δῆλον δῆ
ὁτι σοφή τ' ἔστι καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρον καὶ
dικαία. Δῆλον. Οὐκοῦν ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὐρωμεν
ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὖχ εὐρημένον;
428 Τί μὴν; "Ωσπερ τοῖνυν ἄλλων τινῶν τεττάρων,
ei én τι ἐξητοῦμεν αὐτῶν ἐν ὦτῳ̣μοιν, ὅποτε
πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο ἐγνώμεν, ἰκανὸς ἂν εἶχεν ἤμιν, ei
dὲ τὰ τρία πρῶτον ἐγνωρίσαμεν, αὐτῷ ἂν τούτῳ
ἐγνώριστο τὸ ἐξητούμενον. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο

a For ἕαν τε . . . ἕαν τε cf. 367 e.
b Cf. supra 331 e. Emphatic as in 449 d-450 a, Phaedo
95 Α, and Aleib. I. 135 d.
c Cf. 368 ἀ-ε.
d Cf. 434 e, 449 a. This in a sense begs the original
question in controversy with Thrasy machus, by the assump-
tion that justice and the other moral virtues are goods. Cf.
For the cardinal virtues cf. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, i.
p. 304, Pearson, Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, pp. 173 f.,
and commentators on Pindar, Nem. iii. 74, which seems to
refer to four periods of human life, and Xen. Mem. iii. 9.
1-5, and iv. 6. 1-12.
Plato recognizes other virtues even in the Republic (supra
402 c ἐλευθερίας and μεγαλοπρέπεια. Cf. 536 a), and would
have been as ready to admit that the number four was a
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they differ from one another and which of the two he must have who is to be happy, alike whether his condition is known or not known to all gods and men."

"Nonsense," said Glaucon, "you promised that you would carry on the search yourself, admitting that it would be impious for you not to come to the aid of justice by every means in your power." "A true reminder," I said, "and I must do so, but you also must lend a hand." "Well," he said, "we will."

"I expect then," said I, "that we shall find it in this way. I think our city, if it has been rightly founded, is good in the full sense of the word." "Necessarily," he said. "Clearly, then, it will be wise, brave, sober, and just." "Clearly." "Then if we find any of these qualities in it, the remainder will be that which we have not found?" "Surely." "Take the case of any four other things. If we were looking for any one of them in anything and recognized the object of our search first, that would have been enough for us, but if we had recognized the other three first, that in itself would have made known to us the thing we were seeking. For plainly there was nothing part of his literary machinery as Ruskin was to confess the arbitrariness of his Seven Lamps of Architecture.

It is pedantry to identify this with Mill's method of residues and then comment on the primitive naïveté of such an application of Logic to ethics. One might as well speak of Andocides' employment of the method (De myst. 109) or of its use by Gorgias in the disjunctive dilemma of the Palamedes 11 and passim, or say that the dog of the anecdote employs it when he sniffs at one trail and immediately runs up the other. Plato obviously employs it merely as a literary device for the presentation of his material under the figure of a search. He, "in the infancy of philosophy," is quite as well aware as his censors can be in the senility of criticism that he is not proving anything by this method, but merely setting forth what he has assumed for other reasons.
et ἡν ἡ το ύπολειφθέν. Ὀρθώς, ἔφη, λέγεις. ὅνκοιν καὶ περὶ τοῦτων, ἐπειδὴ τέτταρα ὄντα τυγχάνει, ὡσαύτως ζητητέον; Δῆλα δὴ. Καὶ μὲν 
Β δὴ πρῶτον γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ καταδήλον εἶναι ἡ σοφία: καὶ τι ἄτοπον περὶ αὐτῆς φαίνεται. Τι; ἡ δ’ ὅς. Σοφὴ μὲν τῷ ὄντι δοκεῖ μοι ἡ πόλις εἶναι ἦν διήλθομεν εὐβουλοῦσα γάρ. οὐκ; Ναι. Καὶ μὴν 
toῦτο γε αὐτὸ, ἡ εὐβουλία, δῆλον ὅτι ἑπιστήμη τῆς ἐστιν. οὐ γάρ που ἀμαθίᾳ γε ἄλλ’ ἑπιστήμην εὖ 
βουλεύονται. Δῆλον. Πολλαὶ δὲ γε καὶ παντο-
δαπαὶ ἑπιστήμαι ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσίν. Πώς γάρ οὐ;
‘Αρ’ οὖν διὰ τήν τῶν τεκτόνων ἑπιστήμην σοφὴ 
C καὶ εὐβουλοῦσα ἡ πόλις προσφητείᾳ; Οὔδαμώς, ἔφη,
διὰ γε ταύτην, ἄλλα τεκτονική. Οὐκ ἄρα διὰ τήν 
ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐξιλίνων σκευῶν ἑπιστήμην, βουλευομένη, 
ὡς ἂν ἔχοι βέλτιστα, σοφῆ κλητέα πόλις. Οὐ 
μέντοι. Τι δὲ; τῆν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἡ 
tίνα ἄλλην τῶν τοιούτων; Οὔδ’ ἤντινον, ἔφη. 
Οὐδὲ τήν ὑπὲρ τοῦ καρποῦ τῆς γενέσεως ἐκ τῆς 

1 βουλευομένη codd.: βουλευομένη Heindorf.

a σοφία is wisdom par excellence. Aristotle, Met. i., traces 
the history of the idea from Homer to its identification in 
Aristotle’s mind with first philosophy or metaphysics. For 
Plato, the moralist, it is virtue and the fear of the Lord; for 
his political theory it is the “political or royal art” which 
the dramatic dialogues fail to distinguish from the special 
sciences and arts. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 17, 
n. 97, Protag. 319 A, Euthyd. 282 e, 291 c, Gorg. 501 a-b, etc. 
In the unreformed Greek state its counterfeit counterpart 
is the art of the politician.
In the Republic its reality will be found in the selected 
guardians who are to receive the higher education, and who 
alone will apprehend the idea of good, which is not mentioned 
here simply because Plato, not Krohn, is writing the 
Republic.

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left for it to be but the remainder." "Right," he said. "And so, since these are four, we must conduct the search in the same way." "Clearly." "And, moreover, the first thing that I think I clearly see therein is the wisdom, and there is something odd about that, it appears." "What?" said he. "Wise in very deed I think the city that we have described is, for it is well counselled, is it not?" "Yes." "And surely this very thing, good counsel, is a form of wisdom. For it is not by ignorance but by knowledge that men counsel well." "Obviously." "And, moreover, the first thing that I think I clearly see therein is the dom,' and there is something odd about that, it appears." "What?" said he. "Wise in very deed I think the city that we have described is, for it is well counselled, is it not?" "Yes." "And surely this very thing, good counsel, is a form of wisdom. For it is not by ignorance but by knowledge that men counsel well." "Obviously." "And, moreover, the first thing that I think I clearly see therein is the dom,' and there is something odd about that, it appears." "What?" said he. "Wise in very deed I think the city that we have described is, for it is well counselled, is it not?" "Yes." "And surely this very thing, good counsel, is a form of wisdom. For it is not by ignorance but by knowledge that men counsel well." "Obviously." "But there are many and manifold knowledges or sciences in the city." "Of course." "Is it then owing to the science of her carpenters that a city is to be called wise and well advised?" "By no means for that, but rather mistress of the arts of building." "Then a city is not to be styled wise because of the deliberations of the science of wooden utensils for their best production?" "No, I grant you." "Is it, then, because of that of brass implements or any other of that kind?" "None whatsoever," he said. "Nor yet because of the science of the production of crops from the soil, but the name it takes from that

b Protagoras, like Isocrates, professed to teach εὐβουλία (Protag. 318 ε), which Socrates at once identifies with the political art. Plato would accept Protagoras's discrimination of this from the special arts (ibid. 318 ε ff.), but he does not believe that such as Protagoras can teach it. His political art is a very different thing from Protagoras's εὐβουλία and is apprehended by a very different education from that offered by Protagoras. Cf. "Plato's Laws and the Unity of Plato's Thought," p. 348, n. 5, Euthydem. 291 β-ε, Charm. 170 β, Protag. 319 α, Gorg. 501 α-β, 503 δ, Polit. 289 c, 293 d, 309 c.

c θεωρευμένη: Heindorf's θεωρευμένη is perhaps supported by ἣ ... θεωρεύσει τινθ below, but in view of Plato's colloquial anacoluthic style is unnecessary.
γῆς, ἄλλα γεωργικῆ. Δοκεῖ μοι. Τί δέ; ἄν δ' ἐγὼ: ἐστι τις ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῇ ἁρτί ψφ' ἡμῶν οἰκισθείη παρὰ τισ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἢ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν

D ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλεύεται, ἄλλ' ὑπὲρ ἐαυτῆς ὅλης, ὅτιν' ἂν τρόπον αὐτῇ τε πρὸς αὐτήν καὶ πρὸς τᾶς ἄλλας πόλεως ἄριστα ὁμιλοῖ; Ἡ Ἐστι μέντοι. Τίς, ἐφην ἐγὼ, καὶ ἐν τίσιν; Ἀὐτή, ἢ δ' ὅσ, ἢ φυλακική καὶ ἐν τούτωι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, οὐς νῦν δὴ τελεός φύλακας ὑνομάζομεν. Διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τί τὴν πόλιν προσαγορεύεις; Ἔιβουλον, ἐφη, καὶ τῷ ὅντι σοφήν. Πότερον οὖν, ἄν δ' ἐγὼ,

E ἐν τῇ πόλει οὐεί ήμῶν χαλκέας πλείους ἐνέσεσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φύλακας τούτους; Πολύ, ἐφη, χαλκέας. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὸς ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντες ὑνομάζοντα τινὲς εἶναι, πάντων τούτων οὕτω ἂν εἶν ὅλιγοστοι; Πολύ γε. Τῷ σμικροτάτῳ ἄρα ἔθνει καὶ μέρει ἐαυτῆς καὶ τῇ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπιστήμῃ, τῷ προεστῶτι καὶ ἄρχοντι, ὅλῃ σοφῇ ἂν εἴη κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθείσα πόλις. καὶ 429 τοῦτο, ὅς ἐοικε, φύσει ὅλιγοστον γίγνεται γένος, ὃς προσήκει ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης μεταλαμβάνειν, ἢν μόνην δεί τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστήμων σοφιάν καλείσθαι. Ἀληθεστατα, ἐφη, λέγεις. Τούτο μὲν δὴ ἐν τῶν τεταρτῶν οὐκ οἶδα ὅτινα τρόπον εὐρήκαμεν αὐτό τε καὶ ὅπου τῆς πόλεως ἱδρυται. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ἀποχρώντως εὐρήσθαι.

VII. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνδρεία γε αὐτῇ τε καὶ ἐν ὧν

1 ὅτιν' ἂν Ast's conjecture: ὅτινα codd.

a Cf. on 416 c.
b Cf. Protag. 311 ε τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λέγημεν περί Πρωτ-350
is agricultural." "I think so." "Then," said I, "is there any science in the city just founded by us residing in any of its citizens which does not take counsel about some particular thing in the city but about the city as a whole and the betterment of its relations with itself and other states?" "Why, yes, there is." "What is it," said I, "and in whom is it found?" "It is the science of guardianship or government and it is to be found in those rulers to whom we just now gave the name of guardians in the full sense of the word." "And what term then do you apply to the city because of this knowledge?" "Well advised," he said, "and truly wise." "Which class, then," said I; "do you suppose will be the more numerous in our city, the smiths or these true guardians?" "The smiths, by far," he said. "And would not these rulers be the smallest of all the groups of those who possess special knowledge and receive distinctive appellations?" "By far." "Then it is by virtue of its smallest class and minutest part of itself, and the wisdom that resides therein, in the part which takes the lead and rules, that a city established on principles of nature would be wise as a whole. And as it appears these are by nature the fewest, the class to which it pertains to partake of the knowledge which alone of all forms of knowledge deserves the name of wisdom." "Most true," he said. "This one of our four, then, we have, I know not how, discovered, the thing itself and its place in the state." "I certainly think," said he, "that it has been discovered sufficiently."

VII. "But again there is no difficulty in seeing ἀγαρον ἄκοιμονες; ὡσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιοῦν καὶ περὶ Ἄμηρου ποιητήν.
κείται τῆς πόλεως, δι' ὁ τουαύτη κλητέα ἢ πόλις, οὐ πάνω χαλεπόν ἵδειν. Πώς δὴ; Τίς ἂν, ἢν ὁ Β ἐγώ, εἰς ἄλλο τι ἀποβλέψῃ ἢ δειλὴν ἢ ἄνδρείαν πόλιν εἶποι, ἀλλ' ἢ εἰς τούτο τὸ μέρος, ὁ προπολεμεῖ τε καὶ στρατεύεται υπὲρ αὐτῆς; Οὐδ' ἂν εἰς, ἐφη, εἰς ἄλλο τι. Ὁ γὰρ οἶμαι, εἶπον, οἳ γε ἄλλοι ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ δειλῷ ἢ ἄνδρειοι ὄντες κύριοι ὁν ἐκεῖν ἢ τοῖαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἢ τοίαν. Ὁ γὰρ. Καὶ ἄνδρεια ἄρα πόλις μέρει τινι ἐαυτῆς ἢςτι, διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἔχειν δύναμιν τουαύτην, ἢ διὰ παντὸς σώσει τὴν

C περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν, ταῦτα τε αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ τουαύτα, ἀ τε καὶ οἷα ὁ νομοθέτης παρήγγειλεν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ. ἡ οὐ τούτο ἄνδρείαν καλεῖς; Οὐ πάνω, ἐφη, ἐμαθὼν δ' εἶπες, ἀλλ' αὕθις εἶπε. Σωτηρίαν ἔγνυ', εἶπον, λέγω τυνᾶ εἶναι τὴν ἄνδρειαν. Ποιαν δὴ σωτηρίαν; Τὴν τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑπὸ νόμου διὰ τῆς παιδείας γεγονοῦσα περὶ τῶν δεινῶν, ἢ τε ἐστὶ καὶ οἷα. διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἐλεγον αὐτὴν' σωτηρίαν τὸ ἐν τε λύπας ὅντα διασώζεσθαι

D αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἢδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις καὶ μὴ ἐκβάλλειν. ὁ δὲ μοι δοκεῖ ὁμοιον

1 αὐτὴν codd.: Adam unnecessarily αὐτῆς.

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*a touautil=such, that is, brave. The courage of a state, qua such, also resides in a small class, the warriors.

*b anapreioi ointes: the ab urbe condita construction. Cf. supra 421 Α.

*c toilav...η toilav: cf. 437 ε, Phaedr. 271 ν, Laws 721 u.
bravery itself and the part of the city in which it resides for which the city is called brave." "How so?" "Who," said I, "in calling a city cowardly or brave would fix his eyes on any other part of it than that which defends it and wages war in its behalf?" "No one at all," he said. "For the reason, I take it," said I, "that the cowardice or the bravery of the other inhabitants does not determine for it the one quality or the other." "It does not," he said. "Bravery too, then, belongs to a city by virtue of a part of itself owing to its possession in that part of a quality that under all conditions will preserve the conviction that things to be feared are precisely those which and such as the lawgiver inculcated in their education. Is not that what you call bravery?" "I don't altogether understand what you said," he replied; "but say it again." "A kind of conservation," I said, "is what I mean by bravery." "What sort of a conservation?" "The conservation of the conviction which the law has created by education about fearful things—what and what sort of things are to be feared. And by the phrase 'under all conditions' I mean that the brave man preserves it both in pain and pleasures and in desires and fears and does not expel it from his soul. And I may illustrate it by a

\[\text{Cf. supra 442 c, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1129 b 19 προστάττει δ’ ό νόμος καὶ τά τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἐργα ποιεῖν.}\]

\[\text{Cf. supra on 347 A.}\]

\[\text{σωτηρία is the genus; Phileb. 34 A, Def. Plat. 412 A-B. Hence ποιαν as often in the minor dialogues sometimes with a play on its idiomatic, contemptuous meaning. Cf. Laches 194 D.}\]

\[\text{In the Laches 191 D-E, and the Laws 633 D also, Plato generalizes courage to include resistance to the lure of pleasure.}\]

\[\text{Cf. supra 412 E.}\]
The moral training of the guardians is likened to the dyeing of selected white wools with fast colours. Cf. Aristot. *Ethics Nic.* 1105 a 2, Marc. Aurel. iii. 4. 3 διακοσμήνη θεομεμένη εἰς βάθος, Sir Thomas Browne, *Christian Morals*, i. 9 “Be what thou virtuously art, and let not the ocean wash away thy tincture.” The idea that the underlying substance must be of neutral quality may have been suggested to Plato by Anaxagoras. It occurs in the *Timaeus* 50 d-e, whence it passed to Aristotle’s psychology and Lucretius. Cf. my paper on “Plato, Epicurus and Lucretius,” *Harvard Studies*, vol. xii. p. 204.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IV

similitude if you please." "I do." "You are aware that dyers when they wish to dye wool so as to hold the purple hue begin by selecting from the many colours there be the one nature of the white and then give it a careful preparatory treatment so that it will take the hue in the best way, and after the treatment, then and then only, dip it in the dye. And things that are dyed by this process become fast-coloured and washing either with or without lyes cannot take away the sheen of their hues. But otherwise you know what happens to them, whether anyone dips other colours or even these without the preparatory treatment." "I know," he said, "that they present a ridiculous and washed-out appearance. "By this analogy, then," said I, "you must conceive what we too to the best of our ability were doing when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music and exercises of the body. The sole aim of our contrivance was that they should be convinced and receive our laws like a dye as it were, so that their belief and faith might be fast-coloured both about the things that are to be feared and all other things because of the fitness of their nature and nurture, and that so their dyes might not be washed out by those lyes.

b For the technique cf. Blümner, Technologie, vol. i. pp. 227 ff. The θέραπευσις seems to be virtually identical with the προπαρασκευή, so that the aorist seems inappropriate, unless with Adam's earlier edition we transpose it immediately before οὕτω δή.

c For δευσοποίος cf. L. & S., and Nauck, Ἀδεσποτα 441 τοῖς δευσοποίοις φαρμάκοις ξανθίζεται.

d The two points of precaution are (1) to select white wool, not ἄλλα χρώματα, (2) to prepare by treatment even this.

* Cf. 522 A, Phileb. 17 b.

γένοιτο is process; εἰκπλάνα (aorist) is a single event (μή).
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βαφθήν τὰ ρύμματα ταῦτα, δεινὰ ὅντα ἐκκλύζειν, ἤ τε ἡδονῆ, παντὸς χαλεστραῖον δευνοτέρα οὖσα
Β τοῦτο δράν καὶ κονίας, λύπῃ τε καὶ φόβοι καὶ ἐπιθυμία, παντὸς ἄλλου ρύμματος. τὴν δὴ τουαύτην τὴν δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὅρθησι τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν πέρι καὶ μη ἀνδρείαν ἔγγυε καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις. 'Αλλ' οὖδὲν, ἦ δ' ὅσ, λέγω. δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῦτων ἀνευ παιδείας γεγονούσαν, τὴν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραπόδωδη, οὔτε πάνω νόμμουν ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἦ ἀνδρείαν
C καλεῖν. 'Αληθέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. 'Αποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι. Καὶ γάρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέξει. αὖθις δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἐὰν βούλῃ, ἐτι κάλλιον δίμεν. νῦν γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο ἐξητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην πρὸς οὖν τὴν ἐκείνου ἔχτησιν, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἰκανῶς ἔχει. 'Αλλὰ καλῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις.
D VIII. Δύο μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι λοιπά, ἄ δει κατιδεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἦ τε σωφροσύνη καὶ οὗ δὴ

1 νόμμουν κοδ.: μόνιμον Stob. Flor. xliii. 97.

a δεινὰ: it is not fanciful to feel the unity of Plato's imagination as well as of his thought in the recurrence of this word in the δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ... παθήματα of the mortal soul in Tim. 69 c.


c Phaedo 69 b.

d νόμμου of the mss. yields quite as good a meaning as
that have such dread power to scour our faiths away, pleasure more potent than any detergent or abstergent to accomplish this, and pain and fear and desire more sure than any lye. This power in the soul, then, this unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief about things to be and not to be feared is what I call and would assume to be courage, unless you have something different to say." "No, nothing," said he; "for I presume that you consider mere right opinion about the same matters not produced by education, that which may manifest itself in a beast or a slave, to have little or nothing to do with law and that you would call it by another name than courage." "That is most true," said I. "Well then," he said, "I accept this as bravery." "Do so," said I, "and you will be right with the reservation that it is the courage of a citizen. Some other time, if it please you, we will discuss it more fully. At present we were not seeking this but justice; and for the purpose of that inquiry I believe we have done enough." "You are quite right," he said. 

VIII. "Two things still remain," said I, "to make out in our city, soberness and the object of the whole Stobaeus's μόναν. The virtuous habit that is inculcated by law is more abiding than accidental virtue.

* γε marks a reservation as 415 τραπεζικάς γε, Polit. 309 e, Laws 710 A την δημώδη γε. Plotinus, unlike some modern commentators, perceived this. Cf. Enn. i. 2. 3. In Phaedo 82 a πολιτικήν is used disparagingly of ordinary bourgeois virtue. In Xen. Rep. Lac. 10. 7 and Aristot. Eth. Nic. iii. 8. 1 (1116 a 17) there is no disparagement. The word is often used of citizen soldiery as opposed to professional mercenaries. 

' This dismissal of the subject is sometimes fancifully taken as a promise of the Laches. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, nn. 77 and 603.

* Matthew Arnold's word. But cf. on 389 d and 430 e—"sobriety," "temperance," "Besonnenheit."
ένεκα πάντα ζητοῦμεν δικαιοσύνη. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Πώς οὖν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὑρομεν, ἵνα μηκέτι πραγματευώμεθα περὶ σωφροσύνης; Ἐγὼ μὲν τοῖνυ, ἔφη, οὐτε οἶδα οὐτ' ἂν βουλοίμην αὐτὸ πρότερον φανήναι, εὔπερ μηκέτι ἐπισκεφθόμεθα σωφροσύνην: ἀλλ' εἰ ἔμοι γε βούλει χαρίζεσθαι, σκόπει πρότερον τοῦτο ἑκείνῳ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν ἔγω, βούλομαι γε, εἰ μὴ ἄδικω. Σκόπει δὴ, ἐφη. Σκεπτέον, εἶπον· καὶ ὦς γε ἐντεύθεν ἰδεῖν, ἐξουσίας τινὶ καὶ ἀρμονία προσέοικε μᾶλλον ἡ τὰ πρότερον. Πώς; Κόσμος ποὺ τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστι καὶ ἱδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὃς φασι, κρείττω δὴ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες οὐκ οἶδ' οὖν τρὸπον, καὶ ἀλλ' ἄτα τουαῦτα ὥσπερ ἰχνη αὐτῆς φαίνεται· ἡ γὰρ; Πάντων μάλιστα, ἐφη. Οὐκοὖν τὸ μὲν κρείττω αὐτοῦ γελοῖον; ὁ γὰρ ἐαυτοῦ κρείττων καὶ ἦττων δῆπον ἂν αὐτοῦ εἶδη καὶ ὦ ζήτην κρείττων· ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐν ἀπασί τοῦτοις προσαγορεύεται. Τί δ' οὖ; Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, φαίνεται μοι βούλεσθαι λέγειν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὃς τι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ἐνι, τὸ δ' χεῖρον, καὶ οὖν μὲν τὸ βέλτιον φύσει τοῦ χείρονος ἐγκρατεῖς ἦ, τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ κρείττω αὐτοῦ· ἐπανεῖ γοῦν· οὖν ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ

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*a* ei μη ἄδικω is idiomatic, “I ought to.” Cf. 608 d, 612, Menex. 236 b.

*b* Cf. Gorg. 506 e ff. σωφροσύνη and σωφρονεῖν sometimes mean etymologically of sound mind or level head, with or without ethical suggestion, according to the standpoint of the speaker. Cf. Protag. 333 b-c. Its two chief meanings in Greek usage are given in 389 d-e: subordination to due authority, and control of appetite, both raised to higher 358.
inquiry, justice.” “Quite so.” “If there were only some way to discover justice so that we need not further concern ourselves about soberness.” “Well, I, for my part,” he said, “neither know of any such way nor would I wish justice to be discovered first if that means that we are not to go on to the consideration of soberness. But if you desire to please me, consider this before that.” “It would certainly be very wrong of me not to desire it,” said I. “Go on with the inquiry then,” he said. “I must go on,” I replied, “and viewed from here it bears more likeness to a kind of concord and harmony than the other virtues did.” “How so?” “Soberness is a kind of beautiful order and a continence of certain pleasures and appetites, as they say, using the phrase ‘master of himself’ I know not how; and there are other similar expressions that as it were point us to the same trail. Is that not so?” “Most certainly.” “Now the phrase ‘master of himself’ is an absurdity, is it not? For he who is master of himself would also be subject to himself, and he who is subject to himself would be master. For the same person is spoken of in all these expressions.” “Of course.” “But,” said I, “the intended meaning of this way of speaking appears to me to be that the soul of a man within him has a better part and a worse part, and the expression self-mastery means the control of the worse by the naturally better part. It is, at any rate, a term of praise. But significance in Plato’s definition. As in the case of bravery, Plato distinguishes the temperamental, the bourgeois, the disciplined and the philosophical virtue. But he affects to feel something paradoxical in the very idea of self-control, as perhaps there is. Cf. Laws 626 e ff., 863 d, A.J.P. vol. xiii. pp. 361 f., Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 77 and 78.
τροφῆς κακῆς ἡ τινος ὀμιλίας κρατήρθη ὑπὸ πλήθος τοῦ χείρονος σμικρότερον τὸ βέλτιον ὦν, τοῦτο
Β δὲ ὡς ἐν ὑπείδει ψέγειν τε καὶ καλεῖν ἦττω ἐαυτοῦ καὶ ἀκόλαστον τὸν ὀὐτῶ διακείμενον. Καὶ γάρ ἐσοκεῖν, ἐφη. Ἀποβλέπτει τοῖς, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, πρὸς τὴν νέαν ἡμῖν πόλιν, καὶ εὑρήσεις ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ἐτερον τούτων ἐνόν κρείττω γὰρ αὐτῆς αὐτῆς
dικαίως φήσεις προσαγορευόθαι εἴπερ οὐ τὸ ἄμεινον τοῦ χείρονος ἀρχεῖ σώφρον κλητέον καὶ κρείττων αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλ’ ἀποβλέπω, ἐφη, καὶ ἀληθὴ
λέγεις. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε πολλὰς καὶ παντο-
C δαπάς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας ἐν παισὶ
μάλιστα ἂν τις εὗροι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ
τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ
φαύλοις. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τὰς δὲ γε ἀπλᾶς τε καὶ
μετρίας, αἱ δὴ μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογι-
σμῷ ἀγονταί, ἐν ὅλῳς τε ἐπιτεύξει καὶ τοῖς
βέλτιστα μὲν φύσι, βέλτιστα δὲ παιδευθεῖσιν.
'Αληθῆ, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ὅρας ἔνοντα σοι ἐν
τῇ πόλει, καὶ κρατουμένας αὐτοθι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
D τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις ὑπὸ τε τῶν
ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσὶ
tε καὶ ἐπεικεστέροις; Ἐγνω', ἐφη.
IX. Εἰ ἀρὰ δεῖ τινὰ πόλιν προσαγορεύειν κρείττω
ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτῆς, καὶ ταὐ-

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a Cf. Phaedr. 250 a.
b Cf. 442 a, Laws 689 a-b. The expression is intended to
remind us of the parallelism between man and state. See
Introd. p. xxxv.
c Cf. Symp. 189 e.
d Cf. 441 d, 443 b, 573 d.
e παντοδαπὸς is disparaging in Plato. Cf. 557 c.
f ταιο: so Wolf, for ms. ταὐτ, a frequent error. Cf. 494 b.
360
when, because of bad breeding or some association, the better part, which is the smaller, is dominated by the multitude of the worse, I think that our speech censures this as a reproach, and calls the man in this plight unselfcontrolled and licentious. “That seems likely,” he said. “Turn your eyes now upon our new city,” said I, “and you will find one of these conditions existent in it. For you will say that it is justly spoken of as master of itself if that in which the superior rules the inferior is to be called sober and self-mastered.” “I do turn my eyes upon it,” he said, “and it is as you say.” “And again, the mob of motley appetites and pleasures and pains one would find chiefly in children and women and slaves and in the base rabble of those who are freemen in name.” “By all means.” “But the simple and moderate appetites which with the aid of reason and right opinion are guided by consideration you will find in few and those the best born and best educated.” “True,” he said. “And do you not find this too in your city and a domination there of the desires in the multitude and the rabble by the desires and the wisdom that dwell in the minority of the better sort?” “I do,” he said.

IX. “If, then, there is any city that deserves to be described as master of its pleasures and desires and self-mastered, this one merits that designation.”

Plato, like Shakespeare’s Rosalind, brackets boys and women as creatures who have for every passion something and for no passion truly anything.

*Cf. on 336 a. The ordinary man who is passion’s slave is not truly free. The Stoics and Cynics preached many sermons on this text. See Persius, Sat. v. 73 and 124, Epictet. Diss. iv. 1, Xen. Mem. iv. 5. 4, Xen. Oecon. 1. 22-23.
τὴν προσρητέον. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἕφη. " Ἀρ’
oùn οὐ καὶ σῴφρονα κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα; Καὶ μάλα,
ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν εὔπερ αὐ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ἥ αὐτῇ δόξα
Ε ἑνεστὶ τοὺς τε ἄρχουσι καὶ ἄρχομένοις περὶ τοῦ
ουσίων δεῖ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἄν εἴῃ τούτῳ
ἔνων· ἥ οὐ δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα. 'Εν
ποτέροις οὖν φήσεις τών πολιτῶν τὸ σωφρονεῖν
ἐνείναι, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχωσιν, ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἥ ἐν
toῖς ἄρχομένοις; 'Εν ἀμφοτέροις ποιεῖν, ἔφη. Ὁρὰς
οὖν, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπεικῶς ἐμαντευόμεθα ἀρτί,
ὡς ἄρμονία τυλί ἡ σωφροσύνη ὑμοίωται; Τί δή;
"Οτι οὖν ὡσπερ ἡ ἄνδρεία καὶ ἡ σοφία ἐν μέρει
432 τυλί ἐκατέρα ἐνούσα ἡ μὲν σοφήν, ἡ δ' ἄνδρεῖαν τὴν
πόλιν παρείχετο, οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖ αὐτῇ, ἄλλα δ' ὡς
ὁλης ἀτεχνῶς τέτατα, διὰ πασῶν παρεχομένη
ξυνάδοντας τούς τε ἄσθενεστάτους ταῦτάν καὶ
toὺς ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους, εἰ μὲν βούλει,
φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἵσχυι, εἰ δὲ, καὶ πλῆθει ἡ
χρήμασιν ἡ ἄλλω ὀτώσιω τῶν τοιούτων· ὡστε

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α. Plato is again proceeding by seemingly minute verbal
links. *Cf. supra* 354 A, 379 B, 412 D. καὶ μὴν introduces
a further verification of the definition.

β. ποιεῖ marks the slight hesitation at the deviation from the
symmetry of the scheme which would lead us to expect, as
Aristotle and others have taken it, that σωφροσύνη is the
distinctive virtue of the lowest class. It is so practically for
the lower sense of σωφροσύνη, but in the higher sense of the
willingness of each to fulfil his function in due subordination
to the whole, it is common to all classes.

ε. *Cf.* 430 E. Aristotle gives this as an example of
(faulty) definition by metaphor (*Topics* iv. 3. 5).
"Most assuredly," he said. "And is it not also to be called sober\(^d\) in all these respects?" "Indeed it is," he said. "And yet again, if there is any city in which the rulers and the ruled are of one mind as to who ought to rule, that condition will be found in this. Don’t you think so?" "I most emphatically do," he said. "And yet again, if there is any city in which the rulers and the ruled are of one mind as to who ought to rule, that condition will be found in this. Don’t you think so?" "I most emphatically do," he said. "In which class of the citizens, then, will you say that the virtue of soberness has its seat when this is their condition? In the rulers or in the ruled?" "In both, I suppose,\(^b\)" he said. "Do you see then," said I, "that our intuition was not a bad one just now that discerned a likeness between soberness and a kind of harmony\(^c?\)" "Why so?" "Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, which residing in separate parts respectively made the city, the one wise and the other brave. That is not the way of soberness, but it extends literally through the entire gamut\(^d\) throughout, bringing about\(^e\) the unison in the same chant of the strongest, the weakest and the intermediate, whether in wisdom or, if you please,\(^f\) in strength, or for that matter in numbers, wealth, or any similar criterion. So that we should be quite right

\(^d\) δι’ ὀλης: 8c. τῆς πόλεως, but as Ἀτεχνῶς shows (cf. supra on 419 ε) it already suggests the musical metaphor of the entire octave διὰ πασῶν.

\(^e\) The word order of the following is noteworthy. The translation gives the meaning. ταὐτῶν, the object of συν-ἀδουτας, is, by a trait of style that grows more frequent in the Laws and was imitated by Cicero, so placed as to break the monotony of the accusative terminations.

\(^f\) For the comparison the kind of superiority is indifferent. See Thompson on Meno 71 ε and compare the enumeration of claims to power in the Laws, ἀξιώματα . . . τοῦ ἀρχεῖν, Laws 690 Α ff. and infra 434 b.
The final statement of the definition, which, however, has little significance for Plato's thought, when isolated from its explanatory context. Cf. Def. Plat. 413 e, Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 15 f., n. 82. Quite idle is the discussion whether σωφροσύνη is otiose, and whether it can be absolutely distinguished from δικαιοσύνη. They are sufficiently distinguished for Plato's purpose in the imagery and analogies of the Republic.

Cf. on 351 e.

Cf. Dem. xx. 18 and 430 e ὡς γε ἐνεργοῦν ἰδεῖν. Plato's definitions and analyses are never presented as final. They are always sufficient for the purpose in hand. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 13, nn. 63-67 and 519.

This is an example of the terminology of the theory of ideas “already” in the first four books. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 35, n. 238, p. 38.
in affirming this unanimity \(^a\) to be sobriety, the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual.\(^b\)"

"I entirely concur," he said. "Very well," said I; "we have made out these three forms in our city to the best of our present judgement.\(^c\) What can be the remaining form that \(^d\) would give the city still another virtue? For it is obvious that the remainder is justice." "Obvious." "Now then,\(^e\) Glaucon, is the time for us like huntsmen \(^f\) to surround the covert and keep close watch that justice may not slip through and get away from us and vanish from our sight. It plainly must be somewhere hereabouts. Keep your eyes open then and do your best to desery it. You may see it before I do and point it out to me." "Would that I could," he said; "but I think rather that if you find in me one who can follow you and discern what you point out to him you will be making a very fair \(^g\) use of me." "Pray \(^h\) for success then," said I, "and follow along with me." "That I will do, only lead on," he said. "And truly," said I, "it appears to be an inaccessible

\(^a\) νῦν δή: i.e. νῦν ἡδή.

\(^b\) Cf. Soph. 235 \(b\), Euthydem. 290 \(b-c\), Phaedo 66 \(c\), Laws 654 \(e\), Parmen. 128 \(c\), Lysis 218 \(c\), Thompson on Meno 96 \(e\), Huxley, Hume, p. 139 "There cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy." Cf. also Hardy’s "He never could beat the covert of conversation without starting the game." The elaboration of the image here is partly to mark the importance of δικαίωσων and partly to relieve the monotony of continuous argument.

\(^c\) It is not necessary, though plausible, to emend μετρίας to μετρησε. The latter is slightly more idiomatical. Cf. Terence's "benigno me utetur patre."

\(^d\) Prayer is the proper preface of any act. Cf. Tim. 27 \(c\), Laws 712 \(b\).
PLATO

φαίνεται καὶ ἐπίσκιος· ἔστι γοῦν σκοτεινὸς καὶ

D ὁδοιπορικὸς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁμως ἅτεν. Ἰτέον γὰρ,

ἔφη, καὶ ἐγὼ κατιδὼν 'Ιου ἰου, εἶπον, ὥ Ἡλακων·

κινδυνεύομεν τι ἔχειν ζένος, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ οὐ πάνυ

τι ἐκφευγεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς. Εὖ ἀγγέλλεις, ἦ δὲ ὅσ.

Ἡ μὴν, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, βλακικόν γε ἡμῶν τὸ πάθος.

Τὸ ποίον; Πάλαι, ὥ μακάριε, φαίνεται πρὸ

ποδῶν ἡμῖν εἰς ἀρχής κυλινδεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἐωρώ-

μεν ἃρ’ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ ἡμεν καταγελαστότατοι. ἔστ

Επερ οἵ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν ἐχοντες ζητοῦσιν ἐνίστε ὅ

ἐχουσι, καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀπεβλέπομεν,

πόρρω δέ ποι ἀπεσκοποῦμεν, ἢ δὴ καὶ ἐλάνθανεν

ἰῶσι ἡμᾶς. Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Οὔτως, εἶπον, ὡς

dοκοῦμεν μοι καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸ καὶ ἄκουοντες

πάλαι οὐ μανθάνειν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ὧτι ἐλέγομεν

τρόπον τυνα αὐτό. Μακρόν, ἔφη, τὸ προοίμιον τῷ

ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἄκοψαι.

433 Χ. Ἀλλ’, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἀκουε, εἰ τι ἅρα λέγω.

ὅ γὰρ εἰς ἀρχής ἐβεμεθα δεῖν ποιεῖν διὰ παντός,

ὅτε τῇ πόλιν κατώκιζομεν, τοῦτο ἔστιν, ὥς ἐμοὶ

dοκεῖ, ἦτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη. ἐβεμεθα

δὲ ὡς ὅτι καὶ πολλάκις ἐλέγομεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, ὧτι

ἐναι ἐκαστὸν ἐν δεοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν

πόλιν, εἰς δ’ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη πεφυκνία

a τὸ πάθος: for the periphrasis cf. 376 A.

b Cf. Theaetet. 201 A.

c A homely figure such as Dante and Tennyson sometimes

use.

d This sounds like Hegel but is not Hegelian thought.

e Cf. on 344 ε. Justice is a species falling under the

vague genus τὸ ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν, which Critias in the Charmides proposed as a definition of σωφροσύνη (Charm. 161 b),

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place, lying in deep shadows." "It certainly is a
dark covert, not easy to beat up." "But all the
same on we must go." "Yes, on." And I caught
view and gave a hulloo and said, "Glaucou, I think
we have found its trail and I don't believe it will get
away from us." "I am glad to hear that," said he.
"Truly," said I, "we were slackers" indeed." "How
so?" "Why, all the time, bless your heart, the
thing apparently was tumbling about our feet from
the start and yet we couldn't see it, but were most
ludicrous, like people who sometimes hunt for what
they hold in their hands." So we did not turn our
eyes upon it, but looked off into the distance, which
was perhaps the reason it escaped us." "What do
you mean?" he said. "This," I replied, "that it
seems to me that though we were speaking of it
and hearing about it all the time we did not under-
stand ourselves or realize that we were speaking of
it in a sense." "That is a tedious prologue," he
said, "for an eager listener."

X. "Listen then," said I, "and learn if there is any-
thing in what I say. For what we laid down in the
beginning as a universal requirement when we were
founding our city, this I think, or some form of this,
is justice. And what we did lay down, and often said,
if you recall, was that each one man must perform
one social service in the state for which his nature
was best adapted." "Yes, we said that." "And
but failed to sustain owing to his inability to distinguish the
various possible meanings of the phrase. In the Republic
too we have hitherto failed to "learn from ourselves" its
ture meaning, till now when Socrates begins to perceive that
if taken in the higher sense of spiritual division of labour in
the soul and in the state, it is the long-sought justice. Cf.
infra 433 b-c-d, 443 c-d.
eιη. Ἐλέγομεν γάρ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν, 
B καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ 
pολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν. Εἰρήκαμεν γάρ. Τοῦτο τοι-
νυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὥ φίλε, κινδυνεύει τρόπον τινὰ 
γιγνόμενον ἡ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράτ-
tειν. οἶδα ὅθεν τεκμαίρομαι; Ὁυκ, ἀλλὰ λέγ', 
ἐφη. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ 
pολεῖ δὲν ἐσκέμμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας 
cαι φρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι, δ' πάσῳ ἐκείνους τὴν 
dύναμιν παρέσχεν, ὡστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομέ-
νοις γε σωτηρίαν παρέχειν, ἐσωπερ ἄν ἐνή. καῖτοι 
C ἔφαμεν δικαιοσύνην ἔσεσθαι τὸ ὑπολειβθὲν ἐκεῖνων, 
eἰ τὰ τρία εὑρομεν. Καὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, ἐφη. 
Ἀλλὰ μὲντοι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δέοι γε κρίναι, τί τὴν 
pολὺν ἡμῖν τούτων μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν ἀπεργάσεται 
ἐγγενόμενον, δύσκριτον ἂν εἴη, πότερον ἡ ὁμοδοξία 
tῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ ἀρχομένων, ἡ ἡ περὶ δεινῶν 
tε καὶ μῆ, ἀττα ἐστὶ, δόξης ἐννόμου σωτηρία ἐν 
tοῖς στρατιώταις ἐγγενομένη, ἡ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχουσι 
D φρόνησις τε καὶ φυλακὴ ἐνοῦσα, ἡ τοῦτο μάλιστα 
ἀγαθὴν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ ἄνω καὶ ἐν παιδὶ καὶ ἐν 
γυναικὶ καὶ δούλῳ καὶ ἑλευθέρῳ καὶ δημιουργῷ 
cαὶ ἀρχοντὶ καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, ὅτι τὸ αὐτοῦ ἐκαστὸς εἰς 
ὡν ἔπραττε καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει. Δύσκριτον, 
ἐφη: πῶς δ' οὗ; Ἐνάμιλλον ἀρα, ὡς ἐοικε, πρὸς

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\[a\] This need not refer to any specific passage in the dialogues. *Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 236. A Greek could at any time say that minding one's own business and not being a busybody is σῶφρον or δίκαιον or both.

\[b\] τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμενον: as in the translation, not "justice
again that to do one’s own business and not to be a busybody is justice, is a saying that we have heard from many and have very often repeated ourselves. “We have.” “This, then,” I said, “my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice, this principle of doing one’s own business. Do you know whence I infer this?” “No, but tell me,” he said. “I think that this is the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of soberness, courage, and intelligence, a quality which made it possible for them all to grow up in the body politic and which when they have sprung up preserves them as long as it is present. And I hardly need to remind you that we said that justice would be the residue after we had found the other three.” “That is an unavoidable conclusion,” he said. “But moreover,” said I, “if we were required to decide what it is whose indwelling presence will contribute most to making our city good, it would be a difficult decision whether it was the unanimity of rulers and ruled or the conservation in the minds of the soldiers of the convictions produced by law as to what things are or are not to be feared, or the watchful intelligence that resides in the guardians, or whether this is the chief cause of its goodness, the principle embodied in child, woman, slave, free, artisan, ruler, and ruled, that each performed his one task as one man and was not a versatile busybody.” “Hard to decide indeed,” he said. “A thing, then, that in its contribution to


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ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τῇ σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφρο-

σύνη καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ τοῦ ἐκαστοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ

αὐτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις. Καὶ μάλ', ἐφη. Ὄνκ-

οῦν δικαιοσύνην τὸ γε τούτους ἐνάμιλλον ἄν εἰς

Ε ἀρετὴν πόλεως θεῖς; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Σκό-

πει δὴ καὶ τῇ δὲ, εἰ οὔτω δοξεῖ. ἄρα τοῖς ἀρ-

χουσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰς δίκας προστάξεις δικάειν;

Τί μὴν; Ἡ ἀλλ' οὔτινοσοίν μᾶλλον ἐφείμενοι

dικάσουσιν ἢ τούτου, ὅπως ἄν ἐκαστοι μὴ' ἔχουσιν

tάλλοτρια μήτε τῶν αὐτῶν στέρωνται; ὎πικ, ἀλλὰ

tούτου. Ὁς δικαίου ὄντος; Ναὶ. Καὶ ταῦτῃ

ἀρα πη ἢ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἕαυτοῦ ἐξις τε καὶ

434 πρᾶξει δικαιοσύνη ἀν ὀμολογοῦτο. "Εστι ταῦτα.

Ἰδέ δὴ, ἐάν σοι ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ξυνδοκῆ. τέκτων

σκυτοτόμου ἐπιχειρῶν ἐργα ἐργάζεσθαι ἡ σκυτο-

tόμος τέκτων, ἡ τὰ ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνοντες

tάλλήλων ἢ τιμᾶς, ἢ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπιχειρῶν ἀμφό-

tερα πράττειν, πάντα τάλλα μεταλλαττόμενα ἀρὰ

σοι ἄν τι δοκεῖ μέγα βλάψαι πόλιν; Οὐ πάνω, ἐφη. "Ἀλλ' ὅταν γε, σῶμαι, δημιουργὸς ὃν ἢ τις ἄλλος

Β χρηματιστῆς φύσει, ἐπειτα ἐπαρόμενος ἢ πλοῦτω

ἢ πλῆθει ἢ ἱσχύῃ ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ εἰς τὸ τοῦ

πολεμικοῦ εἴδος ἐπιχειρή ἑναί, ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν

tis eis to tov bouleutikou kai fulakos anaxios

a γε argues from the very meaning of ἐνάμιλλον. Cf. supra

379 b.

b So Phaedo 79 ε ὅρα δῇ καὶ τῇ. It introduces a further

confirmation. The mere judicial and conventional concep-

tion of justice can be brought under the formula in a fashion

(πη infra), for legal justice "est constans et perpetua volun-

tas ius suum cuique tribuens." Cf. supra 331 ε and Aristot.

Rhet. 1366 b 9 ἐστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετῇ δὲ ἦν τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκαστα

ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος.

c τάλλοτρια: the article is normal; Stallb. on Phaedr. 230 A.

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the excellence of a state vies with and rivals its wisdom, its soberness, its bravery, is this principle of everyone in it doing his own task." "It is indeed," he said. "And is not justice the name you would have to give to the principle that rivals these as conducing to the virtue of state?" "By all means," "Consider it in this wise too if so you will be convinced. Will you not assign the conduct of lawsuits in your state to the rulers?" "Of course." "Will not this be the chief aim of their decisions, that no one shall have what belongs to others or be deprived of his own?" "Nothing else but this." "On the assumption that this is just?" "Yes." "From this point of view too, then, the having and doing of one's own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice." "That is so." "Consider now whether you agree with me. A carpenter undertaking to do the work of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter or their interchange of one another's tools or honours or even the attempt of the same man to do both—the confounding of all other functions would not, think you, greatly injure a state, would it?" "Not much," he said. "But when I fancy one who is by nature an artisan or some kind of money-maker tempted and incited by wealth or command of votes or bodily strength or some similar advantage tries to enter into the class of the soldiers or one of the soldiers into the class of counsellors and guardians, for which he is not fitted, and these inter-

For the ambiguity of τάλλοτρια cf. 443 D. So oikeiōn is one's own in either the literal or in the ideal sense of the Stoics and Emerson, and ἐαυτοῦ is similarly ambiguous. Cf. on 443 D. 

A further confirmation. For what follows cf. 421 A.
The definition is repeated in terms of the three citizen classes to prepare the way for testing it in relation to the individual soul, which, if the analogy is to hold, must possess three corresponding faculties or parts. The order of words in this and many Platonic sentences is justified by the psychological "investigation," which showed that when the question "which do you like best, apples, pears, or cherries?" was presented in the form "apples, pears, cherries, which do you like best?" the reaction time was appreciably shortened.
change their tools and their honours or when the same man undertakes all these functions at once, then, I take it, you too believe that this kind of substitution and meddlesomeness is the ruin of a state.”

“By all means.” “The interference with one another’s business, then, of three existent classes and the substitution of the one for the other is the greatest injury to a state and would most rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly works it harm.” “Precisely so.” “And the thing that works the greatest harm to one’s own state, will you not pronounce to be injustice?” “Of course.” “This, then, is injustice.

XI. “Again, let us put it in this way. The proper functioning of the money-making class, the helpers and the guardians, each doing its own work in the state, being the reverse of that just described, would be justice and would render the city just.” “I think the case is thus and no otherwise,” said he. “Let us not yet affirm it quite fixedly,” I said, “but if this form when applied to the individual man, is

\[ \text{\textit{oik}eio} \text{\textit{op}r} \text{\textit{a}i} : \text{this coinage is explained by the genitive absolute. Proclus (Kroll i. p. 207) substitutes \textit{au}\textit{to} \textit{op}r \textit{a}i. So Def. Plat. 411 e.} \]
\[ \text{\textit{eke}inou : cf. \textit{eke}inou, 425 A.} \]
\[ \text{\textit{tau}i} \text{\textit{os} : cf. 479 c, Aristot. \textit{Met.} 1062 b 15.} \]
\[ \text{The doctrine of the transcendental ideas was undoubtedly familiar to Plato at this time. Cf. supra on 402 b, and \textit{Unity of Plato’s Thought}, p. 31, n. 194, p. 35. But we need not invoke the theory of \textit{par} \textit{ov} \textit{ia} here to account for this slight personification of the form, idea, or definition of justice. Cf. 538 n, and the use of \textit{e} \textit{lo} \textit{a} \textit{v} in Eurip. \textit{Suppl.} 562 and of \textit{i} \textit{v} in \textit{Phileb.} 52 e. Plato, in short, is merely saying vivaciously what Aristotle technically says in the words \textit{dei} \textit{de} \textit{tv} \textit{to} \textit{vito} \textit{m} \textit{v} \textit{m} \textit{v} \textit{n} \textit{av} \textit{kav} \textit{v} \textit{to} \textit{v} \textit{al} \textit{av}, \textit{alav} \textit{kai} \textit{tov} \textit{av} \textit{kav} \textit{e} \textit{kav} \textit{e} \textit{v} \textit{f} \textit{v} \textit{a} \textit{m} \textit{v} \textit{te}, \textit{Eth. Nic.} 1107 a 28.} \]
λογήται καὶ ἐκεῖ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, ἐνυγχωρησόμεθα ἡδη· τί γὰρ καὶ ἔρούμεν; εἰ δὲ μὴ, τότε ἀλλο τι σκεφόμεθα· νῦν δὲ ἐκτελέσωμεν τὴν σκέψιν, ἢν ψήθημεν, εἰ ἐν μείζονι τινὶ τῶν ἐχόντων δικαιοσύνην πρότερον ἐκεῖ ἐπιχειρήσαμεν θεάσασθαι, ρᾶν ἀν ἐν ἐνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ κατιδεῖν οἴνον ἔστι, καὶ Ε ἔδοξε δὴ ἢμῖν τούτῳ εἶναι πόλις, καὶ οὕτως ψκί-ζομεν ὡς ἐδυνάμεθα ἀρίστην, εὗ εἰδότες ὅτι ἐν γε τῇ ἁγαθῇ ἂν εἰη. δ οὖν ἢμῖν ἐκεῖ ἐφάνη, ἐπανα-φέρωμεν εἰς τὸν ἑνα, καὶ μὲν ὀμολογήται, καλῶς ἔξει· ἐὰν δὲ τι ἀλλο ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ἐμφαίνηται, πάλιν 435 ἐπανιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν βασανιοῦμεν, καὶ τάχ’ ἂν παρ’ ἄλληλα σκοποῦντες καὶ τρίβοντες ὅσπερ ἐκ πυρείων ἐκλάμψαι ποιῆσαιμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καὶ φανερὰν γενομένην βεβαιωσάμεθ’ ἂν αὐτὴν παρ’ ἢμῖν αὐτοῖς. Ἄλλ’, ἐφη, καθ’ ὁδὸν τε λέγεις καὶ ποιεῖν χρὴ οὕτως. Ἄρ’ οὖν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὅ γε

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a In 368 ε. For the loose internal accusative ἢν cf. 443 β, Laws 666 β, Phaedr. 249 ν, Sophist 264 β, my paper on Illogical Idiom, T.A.P.A., 1916, vol. xlvii. p. 213, and the school-girl’s “This is the play that the reward is offered for the best name suggested for it.”

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accepted there also as a definition of justice, we will
then concede the point—for what else will there be
to say? But if not, then we will look for something
else. But now let us work out the inquiry in which a
we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that
contained justice and viewed it there, b we should
more easily discover its nature in the individual man.
And we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and
so we constructed the best city in our power, well
knowing that in the good c city it would of course be
found. What, then, we thought we saw there we
must refer back to the individual and, if it is con-
firmed, all will be well. But if something different
manifests itself in the individual, we will return again
to the state and test it there and it may be that, by
examining them side by side d and rubbing them
against one another, as it were from the fire-sticks e
we may cause the spark of justice to flash forth, f
and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds.""Well," he said, "that seems a sound method g and
that is what we must do." "Then," said I, "if you

b ēkei though redundant need not offend in this inten-
tionally anacoluthic and resumptive sentence. Some inferior
mss. read ēkeino. Burnet's <η> is impossible.

c ἐν γε τῇ ἁγαθῇ: cf. on 427 E, and for the force of γε cf.
379 B, 403 E.

79, Nic. 17.

e Cf. L. & S. and Morgan, "De Ignis Eliciendi Modis,"
Harvard Studies, vol. i. pp. 15, 21 ff. and 30; and Damascius
(Ruelle, p. 54, line 18) καὶ τοῦτο ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐξαίφνης ἀνάπτεται
φῶς ἀνθελασ ὅπερ ἐκ πυρεῖων προστριβομένων.

f Cf. Gorg. 484 B, Epistle vii. 344 B.

g Plato often observes that a certain procedure is
methodical and we must follow it, or that it is at least
methodical or consistent, whatever the results may be.
ταύτων ἂν τις προσείποι μεῖζόν τε καὶ ἐλάττων, ἀνόμοιον τυγχάνει ὅν ταύτη ἢ ταύτων προσ-
αγορευεται, ἢ ὁμοίον; ὁμοίον, ἐφη. Καὶ δίκαιος
Β ἢρα ἀνήρ δικαίας πόλεως κατ’ αὐτό τὸ τής
dικαιοσύνης εἶδος οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίος ἔσται.
"Ομοίος, ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πόλεις γε ἐξοδεῖν εἶναι
dικαία, οτὲ ἐν αὐτῇ τριττά γένη φύσεων ἐνότα τὸ
αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν ἑπραττεῖ· σώφρων δὲ αὐ καὶ
ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφίᾳ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν
ἀλλ’ ἀστὰ πάθη τε καὶ ἐξεις. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη. Καὶ
τὸν ἔνα ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, οὕτως ἀξιώσομεν, τὰ αὐτὰ
C ταύτα εἶδη ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἔχοντα, διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ
πάθη ἐκεῖνοι τῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάτων ὁρθῶς ἀξιώ-
σθαι τῇ πόλει. Πάσα ἀνάγκη, ἐφη. Εἰς φαύλον
γε αὐ, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, ὦ θαυμάσιε, σκέμμα ἐμπεπτώ-
καμεν περὶ ψυχῆς, εἴτε ἔχει τὰ τρία εἶδη ταύτα
ἐν αὐτῇ εἴτε μῆ. Ὁ γὰρ πᾶν μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἐφη, εἰς
φαύλον. ἰσως γὰρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ λεγόμενον

ᵃ ὁ γε ταύτων: there are several reasons for the seeming
over-elaboration of the logic in the next few pages. The
analogy between the three classes in the state and the
tripartite soul is an important point in Plato’s ethical theory
and an essential feature in the structure of the Republic.
Very nice distinctions are involved in the attempt to prove
the validity of the analogy for the present argument without
too flagrant contradiction of the faith elsewhere expressed
in the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Unity of Plato’s
Thought, p. 42. These distinctions in the infancy of logic
Plato is obliged to set forth and explain as he proceeds.
Moreover, he is interested in logical method for its own sake
(cf. Introd. p. xiv), and is here stating for the first time
important principles of logic afterwards codified in the
treatises of Aristotle.
call a thing by the same name whether it is big or little, is it unlike in the way in which it is called the same or like?" "Like," he said. "Then a just man too will not differ at all from a just city in respect of the very form of justice, but will be like it." "Yes, like." "But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other affections and habits of these three kinds." "True," he said. "Then, my friend, we shall thus expect the individual also to have these same forms in his soul, and by reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations." "Inevitable," he said. "Goodness gracious," said I, "here is another trifling inquiry into which we have plunged, the question whether the soul really contains these three forms in itself or not." "It does not seem to me at all trifling," he said, "for perhaps, Socrates, the saying is true that 'fine things are

\[\gamma^c\] marks the inference from the very meaning of \(\tau\alpha\upsilon\rho\nu\). Cf. on 379 b, 389 b, and Polit. 278 e; cf. also Parmen. 139 e.

The language suggests the theory of ideas. But Plato is not now thinking primarily of that. He is merely repeating in precise logical form the point already made (434 d-e), that the definition of justice in the individual must correspond point for point with that worked out for the state.

\[a\] Cf. 369 a and Meno 72 b. In Phileb. 12 e-13 c, Plato points out that the generic or specific identity does not exclude specific or sub-specific differences.

\[c\] \(\epsilon\xi\epsilon\) is here almost the Aristotelian \(\epsilon\xi\). Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1105 b 20, regards \(\pi\alpha\theta\eta, \epsilon\xi\epsilon\) and \(\delta\nu\nu\alpha\mu\epsilon\iota\) as an exhaustive enumeration of mental states. For \(\delta\nu\nu\alpha\mu\epsilon\iota\) cf. 477 c. Simplic. De An. Hayduck, p. 289 allà \(\tau\a\bar{a}\ \omega\nu\ \pi\delta\sigma\ \pi\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\kappa\iota\nu\ \epsilon\delta\epsilon\iota\tau\o\acute{\iota} \varsigma\omega\iota\nu, \tau\a\bar{a}\ \tau\r\iota\a\ \mu\o\a\ \pi\ar\epsilon\i\iota\lambda\gamma\i\iota\i\iota\nu\).

\[d\] Cf. 423 c.
The inferior reading ἀλλὰ of several good mss. would not appreciably affect the meaning.

1 The inferior reading ἀλλὰ of several good mss. would not appreciably affect the meaning.

A proverb often cited by Plato with variations. Cf. 497 D-E.

τοῦτο by strict grammatical implication means the problem of the tripartite soul, but the reference to this passage in 504 b shows that it includes the whole question of the definition of the virtues, and so ultimately the whole of ethical and political philosophy. We are there told again that the definitions of the fourth book are sufficient for the purpose, but that complete insight can be attained only by relating them to the idea of good. That required a longer and more circuitous way of discipline and training. Plato then does not propose the "longer way" as a method of reasoning which he himself employs to correct the approximations of the present discussion. He merely describes it as the higher education which will enable his philosophical rulers to do that. We may then disregard all idle guesses about a “new logic” hinted at in the longer way, and all fantastic hypotheses about the evolution of Plato’s thought and the composition of the Republic based on supposed contradictions between this passage and the later books.

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difficult." Apparently," said I; "and let me tell you, Glaucon, that in my opinion we shall never apprehend this matter accurately from such methods as we are now employing in discussion. For there is another longer and harder way that conducts to this. Yet we may perhaps discuss it on the level of our previous statements and inquiries." "May we not acquiesce in that?" he said; "I for my part should be quite satisfied with that for the present." "And I surely should be more than satisfied," I replied. "Don't you weary then," he said, "but go on with the inquiry." "Is it not, then," said I, "impossible for us to avoid admitting this much, that the same forms and qualities are to be found in each one of us that are in the state? They could

Cf. Introd. p. xvi, "Idea of Good," p. 190, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 16, n. 90; followed by Professor Wilamowitz, ii. p. 218, who, however, does not understand the connexion of it all with the idea of good.

Plato the logician never commits himself to more than is required by the problem under discussion (cf. on 353 c), and Plato the moralist never admits that the ideal has been adequately expressed, but always points to heights beyond. Cf. infra 506 ε, 533 A, Phaedo 85 c, Tim. 29 b-c, Soph. 254 c.

* Plato takes for granted as obvious the general correspondence which some modern philosophers think it necessary to reaffirm. Cf. Mill, Logic, vi. 7. 1 "Human beings in society have no properties, but those which are derived from and may be resolved into the laws and the nature of individual man"; Spencer, Autobiog. ii. p. 543 "Society is created by its units. . . . The nature of its organization is determined by the nature of its units."

Plato illustrates the commonplace in a slight digression on national characteristics, with a hint of the thought partly anticipated by Hippocrates and now identified with Buckle's name, that they are determined by climate and environment. Cf. Newman, Introd. to Aristot. Pol. pp. 318–320.
Obviously better than the τούτω of the better mss. accepted by Burnet.

\(^{1}\) Obviously better than the τούτω of the better mss. accepted by Burnet.

\(^{a}\) \(\alpha\)ιτιδάσατο: this merely varies the idiom \(\alpha\)ιτίλαν \(\epsilon\)ξε\(υ\)ν above, “predicate of,” “say of.” Cf. 599 E. It was a common boast of the Athenians that the fine air of Athens produced a corresponding subtlety of wit. Cf. Eurip. Medea 829–830, Isoc. vii. 74, Roberts, The Ancient Boeotians, pp. 59, 76.

\(^{b}\) \(\phiιλοχρη\(μ\)ατο\(ν\) is a virtual synonym of \(\epsilon\)πι\(θυμη\(ν\)ικο\(ν\). Cf. 580 E and Phaedo 68 c, 82 c.

\(^{c}\) In Laws 747 c, Plato tells us that for this or some other cause the mathematical education of the Phoenicians and Egyptians, which he commends, developed in them \(\pi\)αν\(ο\)υρ\(γ\)ια rather than \(\sigma\)φ\(ι\)α.

\(^{d}\) The question debated by psychologists from Aristotle 380.
not get there from any other source. It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high spirit was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have this quality, as the populations of the Thracian and Scythian lands and generally of northern regions; or the quality of love of knowledge, which would chiefly be attributed to the region where we dwell, or the love of money which we might say is not least likely to be found in Phoenicians and the population of Egypt. One certainly might," he replied. "This is the fact then," said I, "and there is no difficulty in recognizing it." "Certainly not." 

XII. "But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with one and one with another—learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul that we function in each case when we once begin. That is what is really hard to determine properly." "I think so too," he said. "Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide whether they are identical with one another in this way." "How?" "It is obvious that the same (Eth. Nic. 1102 a 31) to the present day is still a matter of rhetoric, poetry and point of view rather than of strict science. For some purposes we must treat the "faculties" of the mind as distinct entities, for others we must revert to the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Arnold's "Lines on Butler's Sermons" and my remarks in The Assault on Humanism.

Plato himself is well aware of this, and in different dialogues emphasizes the aspect that suits his purpose. There is no contradiction between this passage and Phaedo 68 c, 82 c, and Rep. x. 611-12. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 42-43.
The first formulation of the law of contradiction. Cf. Phaedo 102 ε, Theaetet. 188 λ, Soph. 220 β, infra 602 ε.

Sophistical objections are anticipated here and below (436 ε) by attaching to it nearly all the qualifying distinctions of the categories which Aristotle wearily observes are necessary πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις (De interp. 17 a 36-37). Cf. Met. 1005 b 22 πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας, and Rhet. ii. 24.

Plato invokes the principle against Heraclitism and other philosophies of relativity and the sophistries that grew out of them or played with their formulas. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 50 ff., 53, 58, 68. Aristotle follows Plato in this, pronouncing it πασῶν βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή (Met. 1005 b 18).

κατὰ ταῦτα = in the same part of or aspect of itself; πρὸς ταῦτα = in relation to the same (other) thing. Cf. Sophist 230 β ἀμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐναντίας.

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thing will never do or suffer opposites \(^a\) in the same respect \(^b\) in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we find \(^c\) these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was \(^d\) not the same thing functioning but a plurality." 

"Very well." "Consider, then, what I am saying." "Say on," he replied. "Is it possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect to be at rest \(^e\) and in motion?" "By no means." "Let us have our understanding still more precise, lest as we proceed we become involved in dispute. If anyone should say of a man standing still but moving his hands and head that the same man is at the same time at rest and in motion we should not, I take it, regard that as the right way of expressing it, but rather that a part \(^f\) of him is at rest and a part in motion. Is not that so?" "It is." "Then if the disputant should carry the jest still further with the subtlety that tops at any rate \(^g\) stand still as a whole at the same time that they are in motion when with the peg fixed in one point they revolve, and that the same is true of any other case of circular motion about the same spot

\(^a\) For this method of reasoning cf. 478 D, 609 B, Laws 896 C, Charm. 168 B-C, Gorg. 496 C, Phileb. 11 D-E.

\(^b\) \(\dot{\varepsilon}\) was all along and is.

\(^c\) The maxim is applied to the antithesis of rest and motion, so prominent in the dialectics of the day. Cf. Sophist 249 C-D, Parmen. 156 D and passim.

\(^d\) Cf. Theaetet. 181 E.

\(^e\) The argumentative \(\gamma\) is controversial. For the illustration of the top cf. Spencer, First Principles, § 170, who analyzes "certain oscillations described by the expressive though inelegant word 'wobbling'" and their final dissipation when the top appears stationary in the \(equilibrium\) mobile.

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The meaning is plain, the alleged rest and motion do not relate to the same parts of the objects. But the syntax of τὰ τοιαῦτα is difficult. Obvious remedies are to expunge the words or to read τῶν τοιοῦτων, the cacophony of which in the context Plato perhaps rejected at the cost of leaving his syntax to our conjectures.

Cf. Aristot. Met. 1022 a 23 ἐτι δὲ τὸ καθὸ τὸ κατὰ θέσιν λέγεται, καθὸ ἑστηκεν, etc.

eἰη, the reading of most mss., should stand. It covers the case of contradictory predicates, especially of relation, that do not readily fall under the dichotomy ποιεῖν πᾶσχειν. So Phaedo 97 c ἦ ἐνὶ ἄλλο ὑποῖον πᾶσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν.

αἱμφιαβητήσεις is slightly contemptuous. Cf. Aristot. supra, ἐνοχλήσεις, and Theaetet. 158 c τὸ γε ἀμφιαβητήσαι οὐ χαλεπῶν.

It is almost a Platonic method thus to emphasize the
—we should reject the statement on the ground that
the repose and the movement in such cases a were not
in relation to the same parts of the objects, but we
would say that there was a straight line and a cir-
cumference in them and that in respect of the straight
line they are standing still b since they do not incline
to either side, but in respect of the circumference
they move in a circle; but that when as they revolve
they incline the perpendicular to right or left or
forward or back, then they are in no wise at rest."
"And that would be right," he said. "No such
remarks then will disconcert us or any whit the more
make us believe that it is ever possible for the same
thing at the same time in the same respect and the
same relation to suffer, be, c or do opposites." "They
will not me, I am sure," said he. "All the same,"
said I, "that we may not be forced to examine at
tedious length the entire list of such contentions d and
convince ourselves that they are false, let us proceed
on the hypothesis e that this is so, with the understand-
ing that, if it ever appear otherwise, everything that
results from the assumption shall be invalidated."
"That is what we must do," he said.

dependence of one conclusion on another already accepted.
Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 471, Polit. 234 d, 
Phaedo 77 a, 92 d, Tim. 51 d, Parmen. 149 a. It may be
used to cut short discussion (Unity of Plato’s Thought, 
n. 471) or divert it into another channel. Here, however,
he is aware, as Aristotle is, that the maxim of contradic-
tion can be proved only controversially against an adversary
who says something (cf. my De Platonis Idearum Doctrina, 
pp. 7-9, Aristot. Met. 1012 b 1-10); and so, having suffi-
ciently guarded his meaning, he dismisses the subject with
the ironical observation that, if the maxim is ever proved
false, he will give up all that he bases on the hypothesis
of its truth. Cf. Sophist 247 e.

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B XIII. "Αρ' οὖν, ἃν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἐπινεῦεν τῷ ἀνανεύεων καὶ τὸ ἐφίσεσθαι τινος λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπ- ἀρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθείσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἂν ἂλλήλως θείς εἶτε ποιημάτων εἶτε παθημάτων; οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτη διοίσει. 'Αλλ', ἂν δ' ὅς, τῶν ἐναντίων. Τί οὖν; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὅλως τὰς ἐπι- θυμίας, καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὐ πάντα ταῦτα εἰς ἑκεῖνα ποι ἂν θείς τὰ εἴδη τὰ

C νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα; οἷον ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἑπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἐφίσεσθαι φήσεις ἑκεῖνου οὐ ἂν ἐπιθυμῆ; ἡ προσάγεσθαι τούτο δ' ἂν βούληται οἱ γενέσθαι, ἡ αὖ, καθ' ὅσον ἐθέλει τί οἱ πορισθῆναι, ἐπινεῦει τούτῳ πρὸς αὕτην ὥσπερ τινὸς ἑρωτώντως, ἐπορευομένην αὕτου τῆς γενέσεως; 'Ἐγγυε. Τί δαί; τὸ ἀβουλεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν μηδ' ἑπιθυμεῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀπωθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἂπ' αὕτης καὶ
D εἰς ἀπαντα τάναντία ἑκείνοις θήσομεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἑχόντων ἑπιθυμῶν τι

1 Baiter's ἂν is of course necessary.

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* Cf. Gorg. 496 e, and supra on 435 d.
* ἐθέλειν in Plato normally means to be willing, and βούλεσθαι to wish or desire. But unlike Prodicus, Plato emphasizes distinctions of synonyms only when relevant to his purpose. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 47 and n. 339, Phileb. 60 d. προσάγεσθαι below relates to ἑπιθυμία and ἐπινεῦεν to ἐθέλειν . . . βούλεσθαι.
* Cf. Aristot. De anima 434 a 9. The Platonic doctrine that opinion, δόξα, is discussion of the soul with herself, or the judgement in which such discussion terminates (cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 47) is here applied to the specific case of the practical reason issuing in an affirmation of the will.
XIII. "Will you not then," said I, "set down as opposed to one another assent and dissent, and the endeavour after a thing to the rejection of it, and embracing to repelling—do not these and all things like these belong to the class of opposite actions or passions; it will make no difference which?" "None," said he, "but they are opposites." "What then," said I, "of thirst and hunger and the appetites generally, and again consenting and willing, would you not put them all somewhere in the classes just described? Will you not say, for example, that the soul of one who desires either strives for that which he desires or draws towards its embrace what it wishes to accure to it; or again, in so far as it wills that anything be presented to it, nods assent to itself thereon as if someone put the question, striving towards its attainment?" "I would say so," he said. "But what of not-willing and not consenting nor yet desiring, shall we not put these under the soul's rejection and repulsion from itself and generally into the opposite class from all the former?" "Of course." "This being so, shall we say that the desires constitute a

\[\text{Διπλωσίσεις} \text{ recalls the French coinage "nolonté," and the Southern mule's "won't-power."} \] Cf. Epist. vii. 347 a, Demosth. Epist. ii. 17.

\[\text{雅λθέλκευ} \text{, De an. 433 b 8. "All willing is either pushing or pulling," Jastrow, Fact and Fable in Psychology, p. 336.} \] Cf. the argument in Spencer's First Principles § 80, that the phrase "impelled by desires" is not a metaphor but a physical fact. Plato's generalization of the concepts "attraction" and "repulsion" brings about a curious coincidence with the language of a materialistic, physiological psychology (cf. Lange, History of Materialism, passim), just as his rejection in the Timaeus of attraction and actio in distans allies his physics with that of the most consistent materialists.

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Φήσομεν εἶναι εἴδος, καὶ ἐναργεστάτας αὐτῶν τούτων ἦν τε δύσαν καλοῦμεν καὶ ἦν πείναν; 
Φήσομεν, ἢ δ' ὁς. Οὔκοιν τὴν μὲν ποτοῦ, τὴν δὲ ἐδώδης; Ναι. Ἄρ' οὖν, καθ' ὁσον δύση ἐστὶ, 
πλέονος ἀν τινος ἢ οὖ' λέγομεν ἐπιθυμία ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἶνη; οἴον δύση ἐστὶ δύση ἄρα γέ θερμοῦ 
ποτοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ, ἢ πολλοῦ ἢ ὀλίγου, ἢ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ ποτοῦ τινὸς πῶματος; ἢ ἐὰν μὲν τις 
Ε ἁθερμότης τῷ δύσῃ προσῃ, τὴν τοῦ ψυχροῦ ἐπι-
θυμίαν προσπαρέχου' ἀν, ἕαν δὲ ψυχρότης, τὴν 
tοῦ θερμοῦ; εἶν ἄδια πλῆθους παρουσίαν πολλῆ 
ἠ δύση ἦ, τὴν τοῦ πολλοῦ παρέξεται, ἕαν δὲ ὀλίγη, 
tὴν τοῦ ὀλίγου; αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δυσῆν οὐ μῆ ποτε 
ἀλλου γένηται ἐπιθυμία ἢ οὔπερ πέφυκεν, αὐτοῦ 
pῶματος, καὶ αὐ τὸ πενήν βρῶματος; Οὔτως, 
ἔφη, αὐτῇ γέ ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἐκάστη αὐτοῦ μόνον 
ἐκάστοιν οὐ πέφυκε, τοῦ δὲ τοίον ἢ τοίον τὰ 
438 προσγεγράμενα. Μήτου τις, ἢ δ' ἐγώ, ἀσκέτους 
ἡμᾶς οὖνας θορυβῆσῃ, ὡς οὔδεις ποτοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ.

1 Several good mss. have the obviously wrong που, others ἢ οὖ.

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a Cf. on 349 ε.


c The argument might proceed with 439 α τοῦ διψῶντος ἄρα ἢ ψυχῆ. All that intervenes is a digression on logic, a 
caveat against possible misunderstandings of the proposition 
that thirst qua thirst is a desire for drink only and un-
qualifiedly. We are especially warned (438 α) against the 
 misconception that since all men desire the good, thirst must 
be a desire not for mere drink but for good drink. Cf. 
the dramatic correction of a misconception, Phaedo 79 b, 
intra 529 α-β.

d In the terminology of the doctrine of ideas the “pre-
sence” of cold is the cause of cool, and that of heat, of hot. 
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class and that the most conspicuous members of that class are what we call thirst and hunger?"
"We shall," said he. "Is not the one desire of drink, the other of food?" "Yes." "Then in so far as it is thirst, would it be of anything more than that of which we say it is a desire in the soul? I mean is thirst thirst for hot drink or cold or much or little or in a word for a draught of any particular quality, or is it the fact that if heat is attached to the thirst it would further render the desire—a desire of cold, and if cold of hot? But if owing to the presence of muchness the thirst is much it would render it a thirst for much and if little for little. But mere thirst will never be desire of anything else than that of which it is its nature to be, mere drink, and so hunger of food." "That is so," he said; "each desire in itself is of that thing only of which it is its nature to be. The epithets belong to the quality—such or such." "Let no one then," said I, "disconcert us when off our guard with the objection that everybody


If we assume that Plato is here speaking from the point of view of common sense (cf. Lysis 215 ε τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν), there is no need of Hermann’s transposition of ψυχρὸν and θερμὸν, even though we do thereby get a more exact symmetry with πληθοῦς παρουσίαν ... τοῦ πολλοῦ below.

* προσή denotes that the “presence” is an addition. Cf. προσέπη in Parmen. 149 ε.

† Phileb. 35 Α adds a refinement not needed here, that thirst is, strictly speaking, a desire for repletion by drink.

" Cf. 429 b. But (the desires) of such or such a (specific) drink are (due to) that added qualification (of the thirst).

μήτοι τις = look you to it that no one, etc.
PLATO

άλλα χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ, καὶ οὐ σίτου ἄλλα χρηστοῦ σίτου. πάντες γὰρ ἀρὰ τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· εἰ οὖν ἡ δύσα ἐπιθυμία ἐστὶ, χρηστοῦ ἄν εἰη εἰτε πόματος εἰτε ἄλλου ὁτου ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω. Ἡσυς γὰρ ἃν, ἑῇ, δοκοῖ τὴ λέγειν ὁ ταῦτα λέγων. Ἀλλὰ μὲντοι, ἥν δὲ ἔγω, ὁ σα γ’.

Β ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα ὅλα εἶναι του, τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἀττα ποιοῦ τινός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰ δ’ αὐτὰ ἐκαστὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου μόνον. Οὐκ ἐμαθὼν, ἑῇ. Οὐκ ἐμαθεῖ, ἑῇ, ὅτι τὸ μείζον τοιοῦτον ἐστιν οἶδον τινὸς εἶναι μείζον; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν τοῦ ἐλάττονος; Ναὶ. Τὸ δὲ γε πολὺ μείζον πολὺ ἐλάττονος. ἡ γὰρ; Ναὶ. Ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ τὸ ποτὲ μείζον ποτὲ ἐλάττονος, καὶ τὸ ἐσόμενον μείζον ἐσομένου ἐλάττονος; Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; ἡ δ’ ὅσ.

C Καὶ τὰ πλείω δὴ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ τὰ διπλασία πρὸς τὰ ἡμίσεα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ αὖ βαρύτερα πρὸς κονφότερα καὶ βάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα, καὶ ἔτι γε τὰ θερμὰ πρὸς τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ

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*a ἀρὰ marks the rejection of this reasoning. Cf. supra 358 c, 364 e, 381 e, 499 c. Plato of course is not repudiating his doctrine that all men really will the good, but the logic of this passage requires us to treat the desire of good as a distinct qualification of the mere drink.  
*b ὅσα γ’ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα etc.: a palmary example of the concrete simplicity of Greek idiom in the expression of abstract ideas. ὅσα etc. (that is, relative terms) divide by partitive apposition into two classes, τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ. The meaning is that if one term of the relation is qualified, the other must be, but if one term is without qualification, the other also is taken absolutely. Plato, as usual (cf. supra on 347 b), represents the interlocutor as not understanding the first general abstract statement, which he therefore interprets and repeats. I have varied the translation in the repetition
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desires not drink but good drink and not food but good food, because (the argument will run) all men desire good, and so, if thirst is desire, it would be of good drink or of good whatsoever it is; and so similarly of other desires." "Why," he said, "there perhaps would seem to be something in that objection." "But I need hardly remind you," said I, "that of relative terms those that are somehow qualified are related to a qualified correlate, those that are severally just themselves to a correlate that is just itself. "I don't understand," he said. "Don't you understand," said I, "that the greater is such as to be greater than something?" "Certainly." "Is it not than the less?" "Yes." "But the much greater than the much less. Is that not so?" "Yes." "And may we add the one time greater than the one time less and that which will be greater than that which will be less?" "Surely." "And similarly of the more towards the fewer, and the double towards the half and of all like cases, and again of the heavier towards the lighter, the swifter towards the slower, and yet again of the hot towards the cold and all cases of that kind, in order to bring out the full meaning, and some of the differences between Greek and English idiom.

The notion of relative terms is familiar. Cf. Charm. 167 Ε, Theaetet. 160 Α, Symp. 199 ΔΕ, Parmen. 133 c ff., Sophist 255 D, Aristot. Topics vi. 4, and Cat. v. It is expounded here only to insure the apprehension of the further point that the qualifications of either term of the relation are relative to each other. In the Politicus 283 f. Plato adds that the great and small are measured not only in relation to each other, but by absolute standards. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 61, 62, and infra 531 Α.

καί . . . καί αὖ . . . καὶ ἕτε γε etc. mark different classes of relations, magnitudes, precise quantities, the mechanical properties of matter and the physical properties.
Plato

πάντα τὰ τούτων ὁμοιὰ ἢ ὅπαρον ὁὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τι δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; οὐχ οὗτος τρόπος; ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτου δὴ δεῖ θείναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμη δὲ τις καὶ ποιά τις ποιοῦ

D τινὸς καὶ τινὸς. λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε οὐκ, ἐπειδὴ οὐκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμη ἐγένετο, δὴ ἦν ὁμοίως τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ὥστε οἰκοδομικὴ κληθῆναι;

Τι μὴν; Ἄρ' οὖ τῷ ποιά τις εἶναι, οἷα ἐτέρα συνείμα τῶν ἄλλων; Ναὶ. Ὁμοίως ἐπειδὴ ποιοῦ τινὸς, καὶ αὐτὴ ποιά τις ἐγένετο; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω τέχναι τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαι; Ἐστὶν οὕτω.

XIV. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φαθι με τότε βούλεσθαι λέγειν, εἰ ἄρα νῦν ἔμαθες, ὅτι ὅσα ἐστὶν οἷα εἶναι του, αὐτὰ μὲν μόνα αὐτῶν μόνων ἐστὶν,

Ε τῶν δὲ ποιῶν τινῶν ποιά ἄστα. καὶ οὔ τι λέγω, ὃς, οἷον ἄν ἂν, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐστὶν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσώδων ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινή καὶ νοσώδης καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακῆ καὶ ἀγαθῆ. ἄλλ' ἐπειδή οὐκ αὐτοῦ ὀδηρ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἐγένετο ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλα ποιῶν τινὸς, τοῦτο

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a Plato does not wish to complicate his logic with metaphysics. The objective correlate of ἐπιστήμη is a difficult problem. In the highest sense it is the ideas. Cf. Parmen. 134 a.

But the relativity of ἐπιστήμη (Aristot. Top. iv. 1. 5) leads to psychological difficulties in Charm. 168 and to theological in Parmen. 134 c-e, which are waived by this phrase. Science in the abstract is of knowledge in the abstract, architectural science is of the specific knowledge called architecture. Cf. Sophist 257 c.

b Cf. Phileb. 37 c.

c Cf. Cratyl. 393 b, Phaedo 81 d, and for the thought Aristot. Met. 1030 b 2 ff. The “added determinants” need not be the same. The study of useful things is not necessarily 392
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does not the same hold?" "By all means." "But what of the sciences? Is not the way of it the same? Science which is just that, is of knowledge which is just that, or is of whatsoever we must assume the correlate of science to be. But a particular science of a particular kind is of some particular thing of a particular kind. I mean something like this: As there was a science of making a house it differed from other sciences so as to be named architecture." "Certainly." "Was not this by reason of its being of a certain kind such as no other of all the rest?" "Yes." "And was it not because it was of something of a certain kind that it itself became a certain kind of science? And similarly of the other arts and sciences?" "That is so."

XIV. "This then," said I, "if haply you now understand, is what you must say I then meant, by the statement that of all things that are such as to be of something, those that are just themselves only are of things just themselves only, but things of a certain kind are of things of a kind. And I don't at all mean that they are of the same kind as the things of which they are, so that we are to suppose that the science of health and disease is a healthy and diseased science and that of evil and good, evil and good. I only mean that as science became the science not of just the thing of which science is but of some particular kind of thing, a useful study, as opponents of the Classics argue. In Gorg. 476 b this principle is violated by the wilful fallacy that if to do justice is fine, so must it be to suffer justice, but the motive for this is explained in Laws 859-860.

d autou outer episthemh estin is here a mere periphrasis for mathematos, autou expressing the idea abstract, mere, absolute, or per se, but outer or eter estin is often a synonym of autos; or auth in the sense of abstract, absolute, or ideal. Cf. Thompson on Meno 71 b, Sophist 255 d touto outer estin elnav.
δ’ ἦν ὑγιεῖν καὶ νοσῶδες, ποιὰ δὴ τις ἔγνέσθαι καὶ αὐτὴ γενέσθαι, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτὴν ἐποίησε μηκέτι ἑπιστήμην ἀπλῶς καλείσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινὸς προσγενομένου ἱατρικῆν. Ἐμαθον, ἐφη, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὑώτως ἔχειν. Τὸ δὲ δὴ δύσος, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὖ 439 τούτων θήσεως τῶν τινὸς εἶναι τούτῳ ὀπερ ἐστὶν; ἔστι δὲ δῆπον δύσος; Ἐγνηγε, ἢ δ’ ὅστις πόματός γε. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦ μὲν τινὸς πόματος ποιόν τι καὶ δύσος, δύσος δ’ ὅν αὐτὸ ὀντε πολλοῦ ὀντε ὀλγοῦ, ὀντε ἀγαθοῦ ὀντε κακοῦ, οὐδ’ ἐνί λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινὸς, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ πόματος μόνον αὐτὸ δύσος πέφυκεν; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Τοῦ δυσώντος ἄρα ἡ ψυχή, καθ’ ὅσον δυνη, οὐκ ἄλλο τι βούλεται ἡ πιεῖν, καὶ Β τούτου ὄρεγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὁμᾶ. Δήλον δὴ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ποτὲ τι αὐτήν ἀνθέλκει δυσώσαν, ἔτερον ἄν τι ἐν αὐτῇ εἰ ἀυτοῦ τοῦ δυσώντος καὶ ἄγοντος ὀσπερ θηρίον ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ, φαμέν,

a δὴ marks the application of this digression on relativity, for δύσος is itself a relative term and is what it is in relation to something else, namely drink.

b τῶν τινὸς εἶναι: If the text is sound, εἶναι seems to be taken twice, (1) with τοúτo etc., (2) τῶν τινὸς as predicates. This is perhaps no harsher than τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι in Aesch. Ag. 788. Cf. Tennyson’s

How sweet are looks that ladies bend
On whom their favours fall,

and Pope’s

And virgins smiled at what they blushed before.

Possibly θήσεως τῶν τινὸς is incomplete in itself (cf. 437 b) and εἶναι τούτo etc. is a loose epexegesis. The only emendation worth notice is Adam’s insertion of καὶ τινὸς between τινὸς and εἶναι, which yields a smooth, but painfully explicit, construction.

c Cf. further Sophist 255 d, Aristot. Met. 1021 a 27, Aristot. Cat. v., Top. vi. 4. So Plotinus vi. 1. 7 says that 394
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namely, of health and disease, the result was that it itself became some kind of science and this caused it to be no longer called simply science but with the addition of the particular kind, medical science.” “I understand,” he said, “and agree that it is so.” “To return to thirst, then,” said I, “will you not class it with the things that are of something and say that it is what it is in relation to something—and it is, I presume, thirst?” “I will,” said he, “—namely of drink.” “Then if the drink is of a certain kind, so is the thirst, but thirst that is just thirst is neither of much nor little nor good nor bad, nor in a word of any kind, but just thirst is naturally of just drink only.” “By all means.” “The soul of the thirsty then, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and yearns for this and its impulse is towards this.” “Obviously.” “Then if anything draws it back when thirsty it must be something different in it from that which thirsts and drives it like a beast to drink. For it cannot be, we say, that relative terms are those whose very being is the relation Kal to einai ouk allou to ti to allhlos einai.

a Cf. on 437 c, Aristot, De an. 483 b 8, Laws 644 e, infra 604 b, Phaedr. 238 c. The practical moral truth of this is independent of our metaphysical psychology. Plato means that the something which made King David refuse the draught purchased by the blood of his soldiers and Sir Philip Sidney pass the cup to a wounded comrade is somehow different from the animal appetite which it overpowers. Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1102 b 24, Laws 863 e.

b Cf. infra 589, Epist. 335 b. Cf. Descartes, Les Passions de l’âme, article xlvii: “En quoi consistent les combats qu’on a coutume d’imaginer entre la partie inférieure et la supérieure de l’âme.” He says in effect that the soul is a unit and the “lower soul” is the body. Cf. ibid. lxviii, where he rejects the “concupiscible” and the “irascible.”

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PLATO

tό γε αὐτό τῷ αὐτῷ ἐαντοῦ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμα
tάναντια πράττει. 1 Όυ γάρ οὖν. Ὡσπερ γε, οἷμαι,
tοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἀμα
αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνται τε καὶ προσέλκονται,
ἄλλ' ὡς ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χείρ, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ
C προσαγομένη. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Πότερον
dὴ φαμέν τινας ἐστὶν ὅτε δυσώντας οὐκ ἔθελεν
πιεῖν; Καὶ μάλα γ', ἐφη, πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις.
Τί οὖν, ἐφην ἔγω, φαίνει τις ἃν τούτων πέρι; οὐκ
ἐνείναι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ κελεύον, ἐνείναι
dὲ τὸ κωλὺν πιεῖν, ἄλλο οὖν καὶ κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύ-
οντος; Ἐμοιγε, ἐφη, δοκεῖ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν
κωλὺν τὰ τοιαύτα ἐγγίγνεται, ὅταν ἐγγίγνηταί,2 ἐκ
D λογισμοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄγοντα καὶ ἐλκοντα διὰ παθημάτων
tε καὶ νοσημάτων παραγίγνεται; Φαίνεται. Οὐ
dὴ ἄλγος, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτὰ δυττά τε
καὶ ἑτέρα ἄλληλων εἰναι, τὸ μὲν ὃ λογίζεται
λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ὃ

1 So Ast for ms. πράττοι—necessarily, unless we read with
Campbell ἄμ' ἄν.
2 So Schneider; cf. 373 E: ἐγγίγνηται codd.

*Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 68: “Plato ... delights to prick ... the bubbles of imagery, rhetoric and
antithesis blown by his predecessors. Heraclitus means well
when he says that the one is united by disunion (Symp. 187 Α)
or that the hands at once draw and repel the bow. But the
epigram vanishes under logical analysis.”

For the conceit cf. Samuel Butler’s lines:

He that will win his dame must do
As love does when he bends his bow,
With one hand thrust his lady from
And with the other pull her home.

* ἐνείναι μὲν ... ἐνείναι δὲ: the slight artificiality of the
anaphora matches well with the Gorgian jingle κελεύον ...
the same thing with the same part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing.”

“We must admit that it does not.” “So I fancy it is not well said of the archer that his hands at the same time thrust away the bow and draw it nigh, but we should rather say that there is one hand that puts it away and another that draws it to.” “By all means,” he said. “Are we to say then, that some men sometimes though thirsty refuse to drink?” “We are indeed,” he said, “many and often.” “What then,” said I, “should one affirm about them? Is it not that there is a something in the soul that bids them drink and a something that forbids, a different something that masters that which bids?” “I think so.” “And is it not the fact that that which inhibits such actions arises when it arises from the calculations of reason, but the impulses which draw and drag come through affections and diseases?” “Apparently.” “Not unreasonably,” said I, “shall we claim that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby it reckons and reasons the rational and that with which it loves,


c The “pulls” are distinguished verbally from the passions that are their instruments. νοσημάτων suggests the Stoic doctrine that passions are diseases. Cf. Cic. Tusc. iii. 4 perturbationes, and passim, and Phileb. 45 c.

d λογιστικῶν is one of Plato’s many synonyms for the intellectual principle. Cf. 441 c, 571 c, 587 d, 605 b. It emphasizes the moral calculation of consequences, as opposed to blind passion. Cf. Crito 46 b (one of the passages which the Christian apologists used to prove that Socrates knew the λόγος), Theaetet. 186 c ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὖσιν καὶ ωφέλειαν, and Laws 644 d. Aristot. Eth. 1139 a 12 somewhat differently.
ερα τε καὶ πενή καὶ δυσή καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεων τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἔταιρον. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ Ε εἶκότως, ἐφη, ἠγοίμεθ᾽ ἀν οὖτως. Ταῦτα μὲν τοινυν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, δύο ἡμῖν ὑρίσθω εἴδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἑνόντα· τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ὁ θυμούμεθα πότερον τρίτον ἢ τούτων ποτέρῳ ἂν εἴη ὁμοφυές; Ἰσως, ἐφη, τῷ ἑτέρῳ, τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ. Ἀλλ’, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ, ὡς ἀρα Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγαλαϊώνος ἀνίων ἐκ Πειραιέως ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειου τεῖχος ἐκτός, αἰσθόμενος νεκρούς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κεμένους, ἃμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἃμα δ’ αὖ δυσχεραῖνοι καὶ ἀποτρέπου ἔαυτόν, καὶ

\[ \text{a} \] ἐπτόηται: almost technical, as in Sappho’s ode, for the flutter of desire. ἀλόγιστον, though applied here to the ἐπιθυμητικόν only, suggests the bipartite division of Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1102 a 28.

\[ \text{b} \] So the bad steed which symbolizes the ἐπιθυμητικόν in Phaedr. 235 e is ἀλαξινείας ἔταιρος.

\[ \text{c} \] We now approach the distinctively Platonic sense of θυμός as the power of noble wrath, which, unless perverted by a bad education, is naturally the ally of the reason, though as mere angry passion it might seem to belong to the irrational part of the soul, and so, as Glaucon suggests, be akin to appetite, with which it is associated in the mortal soul of the Timaeus 69 ν.

In Laws 731 B-C Plato tells us again that the soul cannot combat injustice without the capacity for righteous indignation. The Stoics affected to deprecate anger always, and the difference remained a theme of controversy between them and the Platonists. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. pp. 321 ff., Seneca, De ira, i. 9, and passim. Moralists are still divided on the point. Cf. Bagehot, Lord Brougham: “Another faculty of Brougham . . . is the faculty of easy anger. 398.
hunger, thirsts, and feels the flutter\(^a\) and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive—companion\(^b\) of various repletions and pleasures."

"It would not be unreasonable but quite natural," he said, "for us to think this."

"These two forms, then, let us assume to have been marked off as actually existing in the soul. But now the Thumos\(^c\) or principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger, is it a third, or would it be identical in nature with one of these?"

"Perhaps," he said, "with one of these, the appetitive."

"But," I said, "I once heard a story\(^d\) which I believe, that Leontius the son of Aglaion, on his way up from the Peiraeus under the outer side of the northern wall,\(^e\) becoming aware of dead bodies\(^f\) that lay at the place of public execution at the same time felt a desire to see them and a repugnance and aversion, and that for a time he

The supine placidity of civilization is not favourable to animosity [Bacon’s word for θυμός]." Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 60 ff. and p. 62, seems to contradict Plato: "The supposed conflict between reason and passion is, as I hold, meaningless if it is taken to imply that the reason is a faculty separate from the emotions," etc. But this is only his metaphysics. On the practical ethical issue he is with Plato.

\(^a\) Socrates has heard and trusts a, to us, obscure anecdote which shows how emotion may act as a distinct principle rebuking the lower appetites or curiosities. Leontius is unknown, except for Bergk’s guess identifying him with the Leotrophides of a corrupt fragment of Theopompus Comicus, fr. 1 Kock, p. 789.

\(^b\) He was following the outer side of the north wall up to the city. Cf. Lysis 203 ά, Frazer, Paus. ii. 40, Wachsmuth, Stadt Athen, i. p. 190.

\(^c\) The corpses were by, near, or with the executioner (ο έπε του γραμματευς) whether he had thrown them into the pit (βάραθρον) or not.
440 τέως μάχοιτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπτοιτο, κρατού-
μενος δ’ οὖν υπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, διελκύσας τοὺς
ὀφθαλμοὺς, προσδραμῶν πρὸς τοὺς νεκροὺς, ἱδοὺ
ὔμιν, ἔφη, ὧ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ
θεάματος. Ἡκουσα, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός. Οὕτως μέν-
τοι, ἔφην, ὃ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν
ἐνίστε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ώς ἄλλο ὅτι ἄλλῳ. Σημαίνει
γάρ, ἔφη.

ΧV. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἔφην, πολλαχοὶ αἰ-
σθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιάζωνται τινα παρὰ τὸν λόγισμὸν
Β ἐπιθυμίας, λοιδοροῦντα τε αὐτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον
τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὃσπερ δυνῶν στασια-
ζόντων ἠμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν
tοῦ τοιούτου; ταῖς δ’ ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν κοινω-
νήσαντα, αἰροῦντος λόγου μὴ δεῖν, ἀντιπράττειν,
οἶμαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν φάναι γενομένου ποτὲ ἐν σαυτῷ
tοῦ τοιούτου αἰσθάνεσθαι, οἶμαι δ’ οὐδ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ.

C Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἣν δ’ ἐγὼ· ὅταν
τις οἶνται ἀδικεῖν, οὐχ ὅσω ἂν γενναίοτερος ἐν,
tοσοῦτῳ ἤππον δόγαται ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ πεινῶν καὶ
ῥυγῶν καὶ ἄλλο ὃτιον τῶν τοιούτων πάσχων ὑπ’

—a Cf. Antiph. fr. 18 Kock πληγεῖλς, τέως μὲν ἐπεκράτει τῆς
συμφοράς, etc., and

Maids who shrieked to see the heads
Yet shrieking pressed more nigh.

b He apostrophizes his eyes, in a different style from
Romeo’s, “Eyes, look your last.”

c αὐτὸν: we shift from the θυμὸς to the man and back again.

d ἀντιπράττειν: that is, oppose the reason. It may be
construed with δεῖν or as the verb of αὐτὸν. There are no
real difficulties in the passage, though many have been
found. The order of words and the anacoluthon are inten-
tional and effective. Cf. supra on 434 c. οὐκ ἂν ... ποτὲ
is to literal understanding an exaggeration. But Plato is
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resisted and veiled his head, but overpowered in
despite of all by his desire, with wide staring eyes
he rushed up to the corpses and cried, 'There, ye
wretches, take your fill of the fine spectacle!'
"I too," he said, "have heard the story." "Yet,
surely, this anecdote," I said, "signifies that the
principle of anger sometimes fights against desires as
an alien thing against an alien." "Yes, it does," he
said.

XV. "And do we not," said I, "on many other occa-
sions observe when his desires constrain a man con-
trary to his reason that he reviles himself and is angry
with that within which masters him; and that as it
were in a faction of two parties the high spirit of such
a man becomes the ally of his reason? But its making
common cause with the desires against the
reason when reason whispers low — that, I think, is a kind of thing you would not affirm
ever to have perceived in yourself, nor, I fancy, in any-
body else either." "No, by heaven," he said. "Again,
when a man thinks himself to be in the wrong, is it
not true that the nobler he is the less is he capable of
anger though suffering hunger and cold and what-
speaking of the normal action of uncorrupted θυμός. Plato
would not accept the psychology of Euripides' Medea
(1079-1080):

καὶ μαυθάνω μὲν οἷα δράν μέλλω κακά,
θυμός δὲ κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων.

Cf. Dr. Loeb's translation of Décharme, p. 340.

αἰροῦντος: cf. 604 c, and L. & S. s.v. A. ii. 5.

1 So Aristot. Rhet. 1380 b 17 οὗ γίγνεται γάρ ἡ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸ
dίκαιον, and Eth. Nic. 1135 b 23 ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ ἄδικα
ἡ ὀργὴ ἔστιν. This is true only with Plato's reservation
γενναϊότερος. The baser type is angry when in the wrong.

Cf. Demosth. xv. 10 for the same general idea.
έκείνου, δὲν ἀν οὐχταὶ δικαίως ταῦτα δράν, καὶ, δὲ
λέγω, οὐκ ἔθελε πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἔγειρεσθαι ὁ
θυμός; Ὅληθή, ἐφη. Τί δὲ; ὅταν ἀδικεῖοθαί τις
νηγήτατι, οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ ζεῖ τε καὶ καλεπαίνει καὶ
ξυμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίως καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινήν
καὶ διὰ τὸ βίγον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν
ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾶ καὶ οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων,
πρὸν ἀν ἣ διαπράζεται ἡ τελευτησίῃ ἡ ὁποτερ κύων
ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ᾽ αὐτῶ ἀνα-
κληθείς πραῖνθη; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ἐοικε τούτῳ
ὡ λέγεις, καίτοι γ' ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει τοὺς
ἐπικούρους ὁποτέρ κύων ἐθέμεθα ὑπηκόους τῶν
ἀρχόντων ὁποτέρ ποιμένων πόλεως. Καλῶς γάρ,
ἣν δ' ἐγώ, νοεῖς ὁ βούλομαι λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς
τοῦτῳ καὶ τόδε ἔβουμεῖ; Τὸ ποῖον; Ὅτι τούναν-
τίον ἡ ἁρτίως ἡμῖν φαίνεται περὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς.
τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμητικόν τι αὐτὸ φόμεθα εἶναι,
νῦν δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖν φαμέν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ
ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχει 
πρὸς τὸ
λογιστικόν. Παντάπασιν, ἐφη. Ἀρ' οὖν ἔτερον
ὁν καὶ τοῦτον, ἡ λογιστικὸν τι εἰδὸς, ὥστε μὴ
τρία ἀλλὰ δύο εἰδὴ εἶναι ἐν ψυχῇ, λογιστικὸν καὶ

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a δ λέγω: idiomatic, "as I was saying."

b ἐν τούτῳ: possibly "in such an one," preferably "in such a case." θυμός is plainly the subject of ἐστὶ. (Cf. the physiological definition in Aristot. De an. 403 a 31 ἐστὶν τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν αἴματος), and so, strictly speaking, of all the other verbs down to λήγει. καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινήν . . . πάσχειν is best taken as a parenthesis giving an additional reason for the anger, besides the sense of injustice.

c τῶν γενναίων: i.e. the θυμός of the noble, repeating δος ἀν γενναίστερος ἢ above. The interpretation "does not desist from his noble (acts)" destroys this symmetry and has no

soever else at the hands of him whom he believes to be acting justly therein, and as I say his spirit refuses to be aroused against such a one?" "True," he said. "But what when a man believes himself to be wronged, does not his spirit in that case see the and grow fierce (and also because of his suffering hunger, cold and the like) and make itself the ally of what he judges just, and in noble souls it endures and wins the victory and will not let go until either it achieves its purpose, or death ends all, or, as a dog is called back by a shepherd, it is called back by the reason within and calmed." "Your similitude is perfect," he said, "and it confirms our former statements that the helpers are as it were dogs subject to the rulers who are as it were the shepherds of the city." "You apprehend my meaning excellently," said I. "But do you also take note of this?" "Of what?" "That what we now think about the spirited element is just the opposite of our recent surmise. For then we supposed it to be a part of the appetitive, but now, far from that, we say that, in the factions of the soul, it much rather marshals itself on the side of the reason." "By all means," he said. "Is it then distinct from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but two kinds in the soul, warrant in Plato’s use of γενναίος. Cf. 375 ε, 459 Α. The only argument against the view here taken is that "θυμὸς is not the subject of λήγει," which it plainly is. The shift from θυμὸς to the man in what follows is no difficulty and is required only by τελευτήσῃ, which may well be a gloss. Cf. A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.

a κάιτοι γε calls attention to the confirmation supplied by the image. Cf. supra on 376 Β, and my article in Class. Journ. vol. iii. p. 29.

b Cf. 440 Β and Phaedr. 237 Ε.
It still remains to distinguish the \textit{logistików} from \textit{θυμός}, which is done first by pointing out that young children and animals possess \textit{θυμός} (cf. \textit{Laws} 963 \textit{ε}, Aristot. \textit{Pol.} 1334 \textit{b} 22 ff.), and by quoting a line of Homer already cited in 390 \textit{ν}, and used in \textit{Phaedo} 94 \textit{ε}, to prove that the soul, regarded there as a unit, is distinct from the...
the rational and the appetitive, or just as in the city there were three existing kinds that composed its structure, the money-makers, the helpers, the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture?" "We have to assume it as a third," he said. "Yes," said I, "provided it shall have been shown to be something different from the rational, as it has been shown to be other than the appetitive." "That is not hard to be shown," he said; "for that much one can see in children, that they are from their very birth chock-full of rage and high spirit, but as for reason, some of them, to my thinking, never participate in it, and the majority quite late." "Yes, by heaven, excellently said," I replied; "and further, one could see in animals that what you say is true. And to these instances we may add the testimony of Homer quoted above:

He smote his breast and chided thus his heart.

For there Homer has clearly represented that in us which has reflected about the better and the worse as rebuking that which feels unreasoning anger as if it were a distinct and different thing." "You are entirely right," he said.

XVI. "Through these waters, then," said I, "we have with difficulty made our way and we are fairly agreed that the same kinds equal in number are to be found in the state and in the soul of each one of us."

passions, there treated as belonging to the body, like the mortal soul of the Timaeus. See Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 42-43.

^ Cf. Parmen. 137 a, Pindar, Ol. xiii. 114 ἐκνεῦσαί. 405
ταῦτα. Ὄνκοιν ἐκεῖνό γε ἦδη ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς πόλις ἢν σοφὴ καὶ ὦ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἴδιωτὴν καὶ τοῦτω σοφὸν εἶναι; 'Τι μὴν; Καὶ ὦ δὴ ἀνδρεῖος

D ἴδιωτῆς καὶ ὦ, τοῦτῳ καὶ πόλιν ἀνδρείαν καὶ οὕτως, καὶ τάλα πάντα πρὸς ἄρετὴν ύσταύτως ἀμφότερα ἔχειν. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ δίκαιον δὴ, ὦ Γλαύκων, οἶμαι, φήσομεν ἀνδρα εἶναι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ πόλις ἢν δικαία. Καὶ τούτῳ πάσα ἀνάγκη. Ἀλλ' οὐ πὴ μὴν τοῦτο ἐπιλελήσμεθα, ὅτι ἐκεῖνη γε τῷ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐκαστόν ἐν αὐτῇ πράττειν τρώον ὄντων γενόν τις δικαία ἦν. Οὐ μοι δοκούμεν, ἔφη, ἐπιλελῆσθαι. Μνημονευτέον ἄρα ἢμῖν, ὅτι καὶ ἡμῖν ἐκαστος, ὅτου ἂν τὰ αὐτοῦ

Ε ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πράττη, οὕτως δίκαιος τε ἐσταὶ καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν πράττων. Καὶ μάλα, ἡ δ' ὅς, μνημονευτέον. Ὄνκοιν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπέρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόων εἶναι καὶ ἔμμαχῳ τούτῳ; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν, μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κράτιος ἔμμουνα αὐτὰ ποιήσει, τὸ μὲν ἐπιτείνουσα 442 καὶ τρέφουσα λόγους τε καλοῖς καὶ μαθήμασι, τὸ δὲ ἀνεισόσα παραμυθουμένη, ἡμεροῦσα ἀρμονία τε καὶ ὑμηθῶ; Κομιδὴ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Καὶ τούτω δὴ οὕτω τραφέντε καὶ ὦς ἀληθῶς τὰ αὑτῶν μαθόντε καὶ παίδευθεντε προστατήσεστον τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, δ' δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐστι καὶ

Bekker's προστατήσεστον is better than the ms. προστή-

σεστον.

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¹ Bekker's προστατήσεστον is better than the ms. προστή-

σεστον.

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a Cf. 435 b.

b Cf. Meno 73 c, Hipp. Major 295 d. A virtual synonym for τῷ αὑτῷ εἶδει, Meno 72 e.

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"That is so." "Then does not the necessity of our former postulate immediately follow, that as and whereby a the state was wise so and thereby is the individual wise?" "Surely." "And so whereby and as the individual is brave, thereby and so is the state brave, and that both should have all the other constituents of virtue in the same way b?" "Necessarily." "Just too, then, Glaucon, I presume we shall say a man is in the same way in which a city was just." "That too is quite inevitable." "But we surely cannot have forgotten this, that the state was just by reason of each of the three classes found in it fulfilling its own function." "I don't think we have forgotten," he said. "We must remember, then, that each of us also in whom c the several parts within him perform each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair." "We must indeed remember," he said. "Does it not belong to the rational part to rule, being wise and exercising forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and to the principle of high spirit to be subject to this and its ally?" "Assuredly." "Then is it not, as we said, d the blending of music and gymnastics that will render them concordant, intensifying and fostering the one with fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and rhythm?" "Quite so," said he. "And these two thus reared and having learned and been educated to do their own work in the true sense of the phrase, e will preside over the appetitive part which is the mass f of the soul in each of us and the

a Oe. 431 B òv, and 573 D òv.
b Cf. 411 E, 412 A.
c Cf. supra on 433 B-E, infra 443 D, and Charm. 161 B.
d Cf. on 431 A-B, Laws 689 A-B.
χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον· δι᾽ τηρήσετον, μὴ τῷ πίππλασθαί τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλουμένων Ἧδονῶν πολὺ καὶ ἱσχυρὸν γενόμενον οὐκ αὐτὰ αὖ τὰ αὐτοῖ τοῦ πράττῃ, ἀλλὰ καταδουλώσασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ δόν οὐ προσήκον αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ ξύμπαντα τῶν βίων πάντων ἀνατρέψῃ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἕφη. Ἀρ' οὖν, ἧν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τοὺς ἐξωθεῖν πολεμίους τούτω ἀν κάλλιστα φυλαττοῦν ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον, τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν, ἐπόμενον δὲ τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιτελοῦν τὰ βουλευθέντα; Ἐστι ταῦτα. Καὶ ἄνδρεῖον δὴ, οἴμαι, τούτῳ τῷ

C μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἐκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοεἰδὲς διασώζῃ διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἰδιών τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παραγγελθέν δεινόν τε καὶ μῆ. Ὄρθως γ', ἐφη. Σοφὸν δὲ γε ἐκείνω τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει, τῷ δ᾽ ἡρχέ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρῆγγελλεν, ἔχον αὐτῷ κἀκεῖνο ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ ξυμ-φέροντος ἐκάστῳ τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὅντων. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ; σώφρονα

D οὐ τῇ φυλᾷ καὶ ἡμίφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὅταν τὸ τε ἄρχον καὶ τῷ ἄρχομένῳ τὸ λογιστικόν ὁμοδοξώσαι δειν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασάζωσιν αὐτῷ; Σωφροσύνη γοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅσ, οὐκ ἀλλὰ τί ἐστὶν ἦ

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a Strictly speaking, pleasure is in the mind, not in the body. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 330. καλουμένων implies the doctrine of the Gorgias 493 E, 494 C, Phileb. 42 C, Phaedr. 258 E, and infra 583 B-584 A, that the pleasures of appetite are not pure or real. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 152. Cf. on λεγομένων 431 C.

b Cf. on 426 E, 606 B.

c προσήκον: sc. ἐστὶν ἄρχειν. γένει, by affinity, birth or nature. Cf. 444 B. q reads γενών.
most insatiate by nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the body and so waxing big and strong, it may not keep to its own work but may undertake to enslave and rule over the classes which it is not fitting that it should, and so overturn the entire life of all." "By all means," he said. "Would not these two, then, best keep guard against enemies from without also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel, the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler's designs?" "That is so." "Brave, too, then, I take it, we call each individual by virtue of this part in him, when, namely, his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared." "Right," he said. "But wise by that small part that ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its possession in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three." "By all means." "And again, was he not sober by reason of the friendship and concord of these same parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against it?" "The virtue of soberness certainly," said he, "is nothing else than this, whether in a city or an

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Cf. supra 389 d.
Cf. supra 415 e.
Cf. Isoc. xii. 138 αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ βουλευομένη περὶ ἀπάντων.
Cf. Goodwin's Greek Grammar, § 1027.
έχον: anacoluthic epexegeesis, corresponding to διασώζω. αὖ probably merely marks the correspondence.
PLATO

touto, polewos te kai idiwton. 'Alla m'en de
dikaioz ge, o pollakis legomev, toutw kai ouwos
estai. Pollar anakhe. Ti ouv; eitev ego: mi
pi h mi anapamblyvetai allo ti dikaiosunh dok ein
evai h opor en ty polei efanh; Out 6mouge, efh,
E dokiei. 'Ode gar, h' de, egw, pantapason an
bebasosaimetha, ei ti h miw eti en ty psychi amphi-
sbethei, ta foptik a autw prosofreontes. Poia dhi;
Oion ei deoi h'mas anumologenevai peri te ekeinhs
tis polewos kai tout ekein h omiois pefukotos te
kai tebarameoun andros, ei dokiei an parakata-
thev h' xhrisioi h argyrioi dezameno o toiootto
apostereisai, tin an oiei oithwvouto avtov

443 drasai mallo h osou mi toioouto; Oudewn an,
efh. Outou kai ierousolin kai klpopw kai
prodosow, h idia etaipw h dhemosa polewv,
ekto' an ouwos eih; 'Ekotos. Kai mi h' ouv'
oposteron apistos h kata drkous h kata tas
allas omologias. Pws gar an; Moixeai mi h
kai gonnei amelei kai thei an theipesvai panti
allw mallo h tw toiooutw prosxhkonwv. Panti
B menou, efh. Outou toutwv panton aitwv, oti

a 'v pollakis: that is, by the principle of to eautou
prattew.
b 'apamblyvetai: is the edge or outline of the definition
blunted or dimmed when we transfer it to the individual?
c The transcendental or philosophical definition is con-
irmed by vulgar tests. The man who is just in Plato's
sense will not steal or betray or fail in ordinary duties.
Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1178 b 16 h foptikos o epainos ...
to say that the gods are sofrones. Similarly Plato feels
that there is a certain vulgarity in applying the cheap
tests of prudential morality (cf. Phaedo 68 c-d) to intrinsic
virtue. "Be this," is the highest expression of the moral

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individual." "But surely, now, a man is just by that which and in the way we have so often a described." "That is altogether necessary." "Well then," said I, "has our idea of justice in any way lost the edge b of its contour so as to look like anything else than precisely what it showed itself to be in the state?" "I think not," he said. "We might," I said, "completely confirm your reply and our own conviction thus, if anything in our minds still disputes our definition—by applying commonplace and vulgar c tests to it." "What are these?" "For example, if an answer were demanded to the question concerning that city and the man whose birth and breeding was in harmony with it, whether we believe that such a man, entrusted with a deposit d of gold or silver, would withhold it and embezzle it, who do you suppose would think that he would be more likely so to act than men of a different kind?" "No one would," he said. "And would not he be far removed from sacrilege and theft and betrayal of comrades in private life or of the state in public?" "He would." "And, moreover, he would not be in any way faithless either in the keeping of his oaths or in other agreements." "How could he?" "Adultery, surely, and neglect of parents and of the due service of the gods would pertain to anyone rather than to such a man." "To anyone indeed," he said. "And is not the cause law. "Do this," inevitably follows. Cf. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 376 and 385, and Emerson, Self-Reliance: "But I may also neglect the reflex standard, and absolve me to myself ... If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day." The Xenophontic Socrates (Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 10-11 and iv. 4. 17) relies on these vulgar tests. a Cf. supra on 332 a and Aristot. Rhet. 1353 b 21.
αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκαστὸν τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει ἀρχής τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀρχεσθαί; Τούτο μὲν οὖν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο. Ἡ δὲ ἐπορεύον ζητεῖς δικαιοσύνην εἶναι ἡ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν, ἡ τούς τοιούτους ἄνδρας τε παρέχεται καὶ πόλεις; Μᾶ Δία, ἡ δ' ὅσι, οὐκ ἔγνωγε.

XVII. Τέλεον ἅμιν τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἀποτελεσταί, ὃ ἐφαμεν ὑποπτεύσαι, ὡς εὐθὺς ἄρχομενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν κατὰ θεόν τινα εἰς ἀρχήν τε C καὶ τύπων τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κινδυνεύομεν ἐμβεβηκέναι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Τὸ δὲ γε ἢν ἅμιν ἅμιν, ὁ Γλαύκων, δι' ὃ καὶ ὅφελεῖ, εἶδωλον τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης, τὸ τὸν μὲν σκυτοτομικὸν φύσει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν σκυτοτομεῖν καὶ ἄλλο μὴν πράττειν, τὸν δὲ τεκτονικὸν τεκταίνεσθαι, καὶ τὰλλα δὴ οὕτως. Φαίνεται. Τὸ δὲ γε ἀληθὲς τοιοῦτο μὲν τί ἢν, ὡς D ἐσκευεὶ, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' οὖ περὶ τὴν ἐξω πράξειν τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἐαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ, μὴ ἡσαντα ταλλότρια

a §. cf. supra on 434 d.

b The contemplation of the εἴδωλον, image or symbol, leads us to the reality. The reality is always the Platonic Idea. The εἴδωλον, in the case of ordinary “things,” is the material copy which men mistake for the reality (516 a). In the case of spiritual things and moral ideas, there is no visible image or symbol (Polit. 286 a), but imperfect analogies, popular definitions, suggestive phrases, as τὰ ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν, well-meant laws and institutions serve as the εἴδωλα in which the philosophic dialectician may find a reflection of the true idea. Cf. on 520 c, Sophist 234 c, Theaetet. 150 b.

c Cf. Tim. 86 d, Laws 731 e, Apol. 23 a. The reality of justice as distinguished from the εἴδωλον, which in this case is merely the economic division of labour. Adam errs in 412
of this to be found in the fact that each of the principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled?" "Yes, that and nothing else." "Do you still, then, look for justice to be anything else than this potency which provides men and cities of this sort?" "No, by heaven," he said, "I do not."

XVII. "Finished, then, is our dream and perfected—the surmise we spoke of, that, by some Providence, at the very beginning of our foundation of the state, we chanced to hit upon the original principle and a sort of type of justice." "Most assuredly." "It really was, it seems, Glaucon, which is why it helps, a sort of adumbration of justice, this principle that it is right for the cobbler by nature to cobble and occupy himself with nothing else, and the carpenter to practise carpentry, and similarly all others. But the truth of the matter was, as it seems, that justice is indeed something of this kind, yet not in regard to the doing of one’s own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one’s self, and the things of one’s self—it means that thinking that the real justice is justice in the soul, and the εἰσωλθὸν is justice in the state. In the state too the division of labour may be taken in the lower or in the higher sense. Cf. supra on 370 a, Introd. p. xv.

A series of participles in implied indirect discourse expand the meaning of τὴν ἐντὸς (πράξειν), and enumerate the conditions precedent (resumed in ὁτ' οὖν 443 ε; cf. Prolag. 325 a) of all action which is to be called just if it tends to preserve this inner harmony of soul, and the reverse if it tends to dissolve it. The subject of πράττειν is anybody or Everyman. For the general type of sentence and the Stoic principle that nothing imports but virtue cf. 591 ε and 618 c.
Plato  

πράττειν ἐκαστον ἐν αὐτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὶ ὑπὸ τὰ οἰκεῖα εὑ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμῆσαντα καὶ φιλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἔναρμόσαντα τρία ὅτα ὅστε ὅρους τρεῖς ἀρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ Ἐμέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὅντα, πάντα ταῦτα ἔνδησαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρωνα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, ὡστω δὴ πράττειν ἤδη, εάν τι πράττῃ ἡ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν ἡ περὶ σώματος θεραπείαν ἡ καὶ πολιτικόν τι ἡ περὶ τὰ ἱδια ἱμβόλαια, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἡγούμενον καὶ ὀνομάζοντα δικαίων μὲν καὶ καλήν πράξειν, ἡ ἄν ταύτην τὴν ἐξίν σώζῃ τε καὶ ἔναπεργάζηται, σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ἑλατή τὴν πράξει ἐπιστήμην, ἄδικον δὲ πράξειν, ἡ ἄν ἄει ταύτην λύῃ, ἀμαθίαν δὲ τὴν ταύτην αὖ

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a Cf. supra on 433 e.
b Cf. Gorg. 491 d where Callicles does not understand.
c Cf. Gorg. 504.
d Cf. infra 621 c and supra on 352 a.
e The harmony of the three parts of the soul is compared to that of the three fundamental notes or strings in the octave, including any intervening tones, and so by implication any faculties of the soul overlooked in the preceding classification. Cf. Plutarch, Plat. Quest. 9, Proclus, p. 230 Kroll. ὅστε introduces the images, the exact application of which is pointed by ἀτεχνῶς. Cf. on 343 c. The scholiast tries to make two octaves (διὸ διὰ πασῶν) of it. The technical musical details have at the most an antiquarian interest, and in no way affect the thought, which is that of Shakespeare's

For government, though high and low and lower,  
Put into parts, doth keep in one concert,

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a man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose well of what in the true sense of the word is properly his own, and having first attained to self-mastery and beautiful order within himself, and having harmonized these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean, and all others there may be between them, and having linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit, one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to practice if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendance of the body or it may be in political action or private business, in all such doings believing and naming the just and honourable action to be that which preserves and helps to produce this condition of soul, and wisdom the science that presides over such conduct; and believing and naming the unjust action to be that which ever tends to overthrow this spiritual constitution, and brutish Congreeing in a full and natural close

Like music. (Henry V. i. ii. 179.)

Cf. Cicero, De Rep. ii. 42, and Milton (Reason of Church Government), "Discipline . . . which with her musical chords preserves and holds all the parts thereof together."

Cf. Epin. 992 b. The idea was claimed for the Pythagoreans; cf. Zeller i. i. p. 463, Guyau, Esquisse d'uns Morale, p. 109 "La moralité n'est autre chose que l'unité de l'être." "The key to effective life is unity of life," says another modern rationalist.

οὐναύτοντα betrays a consciousness that the ordinary meaning of words is somewhat forced for edification. Cf. Laws 864 a-b and Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 9, n. 21. Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 1138 b 6) would regard all this as mere metaphor.
επιστατούσαν δόξαν. Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ’ ὁς, δ’ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἐδειν, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ· τὸν μὲν δίκαιον καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, δ’ τυχχανέει ἐν αὐτοῖς ὦν, εἰ φαίμεν εὐρηκέναι, οὐκ ἀν πάντι, οἶμαι, δόξαμεν ψευδεσθαί. Μᾶ Δία οὐ μέντοι, ἐφη. Φώμεν ἄρα; Φώμεν.

ΧVIII. Ἡστω δή, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ· μετὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτο σκέπτεόν, οἶμαι, ἄδικίαν. Δῆλον ὅτι. Οὐκοῦν Βοστάσιν τινα αὖ τριῶν ἄντων τούτων δεῖ αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐπανάστασιν μέρους τινὸς τῷ ὅλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἤν ἄρχη ἐν αὐτῇ οὖ προσήκον, ἀλλὰ τοι-ούτοι ὄντος φύσει, οἶνον πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι; τοιαύτ’ ἄττα, οἶμαι, φήσομεν καὶ τὴν τούτων ταραχήν καὶ πλάνην εἶναι τὴν τῇ ἄδικίᾳ καὶ ἀκολογίᾳ καὶ δειλίᾳ καὶ ἀμαθίᾳ καὶ ἔυλληβδήν πᾶσαν κακίαι. Ταῦτα μὲν C οὖν ταῦτα, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, καί τὸ ἄδικα πράττειν καὶ τὸ ἄδικείν καὶ αὖ τὸ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ταῦτα πάντα τυχχάνει ὄντα κατάδηλα ὅθ’ σαφῶς, εἴπερ καὶ ἥ ἄδικία τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη; Πώς δή; Ὅστι, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, τυχχάνει οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῶν ὑγιείων τε καὶ νοσώδων, ὃς ἔκεινα ἐν σώματι,

1 πρέπειν . . . δυτὶ is plainly the better reading. Burnet amends the additional τοῦ δ’ αὖ δουλεύειν of several mss. to τῷ δ’ οὐ δουλεύειν, which might be justified by 358 a.

* ἐπιστήμην . . . δόξαν: a hint of a fundamental distinction, not explicitly mentioned before in the Republic. Cf. Meno 97 b ff. and Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 47-49. It is used here rhetorically to exalt justice and disparage injustice. ἀμαθία is a very strong word, possibly used here already in the special Platonic sense: the ignorance that mistakes itself for knowledge. Cf. Sophist 229 c.

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ignorance, to be the opinion that in turn presides over this." "What you say is entirely true, Socrates." "Well," said I, "if we should affirm that we had found the just man and state and what justice really is in them, I think we should not be much mistaken." "No indeed, we should not," he said. "Shall we affirm it, then?" "Let us so affirm."

XVIII. "So be it, then," said I; "next after this, I take it, we must consider injustice." "Obviously." "Must not this be a kind of civil war of these three principles, their meddlesomeness and interference with one another's functions, and the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul that it may hold therein a rule which does not belong to it, since its nature is such that it befits it to serve as a slave to the ruling principle? Something of this sort, I fancy, is what we shall say, and that the confusion of these principles and their straying from their proper course is injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and brutish ignorance and, in general, all turpitude." "Precisely this," he replied. "Then," said I, "to act unjustly and be unjust and in turn to act justly—the meaning of all these terms becomes at once plain and clear, since injustice and justice are so." "How so?" "Because," said I, "these are in the soul what the healthful and the diseaseful are in the body;
ταύτα ἐν ψυχῇ. Πή; ἐφη. Τὰ μὲν πον ὑγιεινα
ὑγίειαν ἐμποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ νοσῶδη νόσουν. Ναι.
Οὔκοιν καὶ το μὲν δίκαια πράττειν δικαιοσύνην
D ἐμποιεῖ, τὸ δ’ ἄδικα ἄδικιαν; Ἀνάγκη. Ἐστὶ δὲ
τὸ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ
φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ’
ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσουν παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ
ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ’ ἄλλου. Ἐστι γὰρ. Οὔκοιν
αὖ, ἐφην, τὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ πρατεῖσθαι
ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ ἄδικιαν παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν
tε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ’ ἄλλου; Κομιδῆ, ἐφη.
'Αρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς έοικεν, ὑγίειά τε τις ἂν εὑρ
Ε καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε
cαὶ αἰσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια. Ἐστίν οὖτω. Ἀρ’ οὖν
οὐ καὶ τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα εἰς ἄρετῆς κτή-
σων φέρει, τὰ δ’ αἰσχρὰ εἰς κακίας; Ἀνάγκη.

XIX. Τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν ἦδη, ὡς έοικεν, Ἦμιν ἐστὶ
σκέψασθαι, ποτέρον αὖ λυσιτελεῖ δίκαια τε πράτ-
445 τεν καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἐὰν τε
λανθάνῃ ἐὰν τε μὴ τοιοῦτος ὡν, ἡ ἄδικειν τε καὶ
ἄδικον εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μὴ διδῶ δίκην μηδὲ βελτίων
γίγνηται κολαξόμενος. Ἀλλ’, ἐφη, οὐ Σώκρατες,

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In Gorg. 460 b, Socrates argues the paradox that he who knows justice does it. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 11, n. 42.

b Cf. the generalization of ἐρως to include medicine and music in Symp. 186-187, and Tim. 82 a, Laws 906 c, Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 500.

c The identification of virtue with spiritual health really, as Plato says (445 a), answers the main question of the 418
there is no difference." "In what respect?" he said. "Healthful things surely engender health and diseaseful disease." "Yes." "Then does not doing just acts engender justice and unjust injustice?" "Of necessity." "But to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of dominating and being dominated by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature." "Yes, that is so." "And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature?" "Exactly so," he said. "Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice would be disease, ugliness, and weakness." "It is so." "Then is it not also true that beautiful and honourable pursuits tend to the winning of virtue and the ugly to vice?" "Of necessity."

XIX. "And now at last, it seems, it remains for us to consider whether it is profitable to do justice and practise honourable pursuits and be just, whether one is known to be such or not, or whether injustice profits, and to be unjust, if only a man escape punishment and is not bettered by chastisement." "Nay,

Republic. It is not explicitly used as one of the three final arguments in the ninth book, but is implied in 591 b. It is found "already" in Crito 47 d-e. Cf. Gorg. 479 b.

*dakia . . . aioskos: Sophist 228 e distinguishes two forms of dakia: vosos or moral evil, and ignorance or aioskos. Cf. Gorg. 477 b.

* év τε . . . év τε: cf. supra 337 c, 367 e, 427 d, 429 e.

† Cf. Gorg. 512 a-b, and supra on 380 b.
On the following argumentum ex contrario cf. supra on 336 E.


Cf. 577 d, Gorg. 466 E. If all men desire the good, he who does evil does not do what he really wishes.

The strict theory of ideas any distinction may mark a class, and so constitute an idea. (Cf. De Platonis Idearum Doctrina, pp. 22-25.) But Plato's logical practice recognizes that
Socrates,” he said, “I think that from this point on our inquiry becomes an absurdity—if, while life is admittedly intolerable with a ruined constitution of body even though accompanied by all the food and drink and wealth and power in the world, we are yet to be asked to suppose that, when the very nature and constitution of that whereby we live is disordered and corrupted, life is going to be worth living, if a man can only do as he pleases, and pleases to do anything save that which will rid him of evil and injustice and make him possessed of justice and virtue—now that the two have been shown to be as we have described them.” “Yes, it is absurd,” said I; “but nevertheless, now that we have won to this height, we must not grow weary in endeavouring to discover with the utmost possible clearness that these things are so.” “That is the last thing in the world we must do,” he said. “Come up here then,” said I, “that you may see how many are the kinds of evil, I mean those that it is worth while to observe and distinguish.” “I am with you,” he said; “only do you say on.” “And truly,” said I, “now that we have come to this height of argument I seem to see only typical or relevant “Ideas” are worth naming or considering. The Republic does not raise the metaphysical question how a true idea is to be distinguished from a part or from a partial or casual concept. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 52-53, n. 381, Polit. 263 a-b.

9 Cf. 588 B, Emerson, Nominalist and Realist, ii. p. 256: “We like to come to a height of land and see the landscape, just as we value a general remark in conversation.” Cf. Lowell, Democracy, Prose Works, vi. 8: “He who has mounted the tower of Plato to look abroad from it will never hope to climb another with so lofty a vantage of speculation.” From this and 517 a-b, the ἀνάβασις became a technical or cant term in Neoplatonism.
PLATO

ἀρετῆς, ἀπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας, τέσσαρα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄττα δὲ καὶ ἄξιων ἐπιμνησθήναι. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφη. "Οσοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτείων τρόποι εἰσὶν εἴδη ἐχοντες, τοσούτοι κινδυνεύουσι καὶ

D ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι. Πόσοι δή; Πέντε μὲν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτείων, πέντε δὲ ψυχῆς. Λέγε, ἐφη, τίνες. Λέγω, εἶπον, ὅτι εἰς μὲν οὕτος ὅν ήμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν πολιτείας εἰη ἂν τρόπος, ἐπονομασθεὶ ἀν καὶ διχῇ ἐγγενομένως μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἐνίατος ἂν τοῖς ἀρχομεν διαφέροντος βασιλεία ἂν κληθεὶν, πλείονων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη. Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖνοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν εἴδος λέγω.

Εὐτυχεῖ γὰρ ἂν πλείους οὐτε εἰς ἐγγενόμενον κινήσειν ἂν τῶν ἄξιων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως, τροφῆ τε καὶ παϊδεία χρησάμενοι, ἢ διηλθόμεν. Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ἐφη.

* ἐν μὲν, etc.: perhaps a faint reminiscence of the line ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί, quoted by Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1106 b 35. It suggests Plato’s principle of the unity of virtue, as ἀπειρα below suggests the logical doctrine of the Phileb. 16 and Parmen. 145 λ, 158 b-c that the other of the definite idea is the indefinite and infinite.

b The true state is that in which knowledge governs. It may be named indifferently monarchy, or aristocracy, according as such knowledge happens to be found in one or more than one. It can never be the possession of many. Cf. infra 494 A. The inconsistencies which some critics have
as from a point of outlook that there is one form of excellence, and that the forms of evil are infinite, yet that there are some four among them that it is worth while to take note of." "What do you mean?" he said. "As many as are the varieties of political constitutions that constitute specific types, so many, it seems likely, are the characters of soul." "How many, pray?" "There are five kinds of constitutions," said I, "and five kinds of soul." "Tell me what they are," he said. "I tell you," said I, "that one way of government would be the constitution that we have just expounded, but the names that might be applied to it are two. If one man of surpassing merit rose among the rulers, it would be denominated royalty; if more than one, aristocracy." "True," he said. "Well, then," I said, "this is one of the forms I have in mind. For neither would a number of such men, nor one if he arose among them, alter to any extent worth mentioning the laws of our city—if he preserved the breeding and the education that we have described." "It is not likely," he said.

found between this statement and other parts of the Republic, are imaginary. Hitherto the Republic has contemplated a plurality of rulers, and such is its scheme to the end. But we are explicitly warned in 540 d and 587 d that this is a matter of indifference. It is idle then to argue with Immisch, Krohn, and others that the passage marks a sudden, violent alteration of the original design.
Ε

Ι. Ἀγαθήν μὲν τοίνυν τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ ὅρθην καλῶ, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον κακὰς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ ἡμαρτημένας, εἶπερ αὕτη ὅρθη, περὶ τε πόλεων διουκήσεις καὶ περὶ ἱδωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν, ἐν τέταρται πονηρίας εἰδεσθαι οὖσας. Ποῖας δὴ ταύτας; ἐφη. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἦν τὰς ἐφεξῆς ἔρων, ὡς μοι ἐφαίνοντο ἔκασται

B ἐξ ἀλλήλων μεταβαίνειν. ο δὲ Πολέμαρχος—σμικρὸν γὰρ ἀπωτέρω τοῦ Ἀδείμαντος καθήστο—ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ λαβόμενος τοῦ ἰματίου ἀνωθεν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τὸν ὃμον ἐκεῖνὸν τε προσηγάγετο καὶ προτείνας ἑαυτὸν ἔλεγεν ἀπα προσκεκυφῶς, ὃν ἀλλο μὲν οὐδὲν κατηκούσαμεν, τὸδε δὲ· Ἀφήσομεν οὖν, ἐφη, ἢ τι δράσομεν; Ἡκιστὰ γε, ἐφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος μέγα ἡδὴ λέγων, καὶ ἐγὼ, Τί μάλιστα, ἐφην, ὑμεῖς οὖκ ἄφιετε; Σέ,

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b κατασκευήν: a highly general word not to be pressed in this periphrasis. Cf. Gorg. 455 ε, 477 β.
c Cf. 562 c, Theaetet. 180 c, Stein on Herod. i. 5. For the transition here to the digression of books V., VI., and VII. cf. Introd. p. xvii, Phaedo 84 c. “Digression” need not imply that these books were not a part of the original design.
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BOOK V

I. "To such a city, then, or constitution I apply the terms good and right—and to the corresponding kind of man; but the others I describe as bad and mistaken, if this one is right, in respect both to the administration of states and to the formation of the character of the individual soul, they falling under four forms of badness." "What are these," he said. And I was going on to enumerate them in what seemed to me the order of their evolution from one another, when Polemarchus—he sat at some little distance from Adeimantus—stretched forth his hand, and, taking hold of his garment from above by the shoulder, drew the other toward him and, leaning forward himself, spoke a few words in his ear, of which we overheard nothing else save only this, "Shall we let him off; then," he said, "or what shall we do?" "By no means," said Adeimantus, now raising his voice. "What, pray," said I, "is it that you are not letting off?" "You," said he. "And

1 μεταβάνεω: the word is half technical. Cf. 547 c, 550 d, Laws 676 a, 736 d-e, 894 a.
1 Cf. 327 b. 2 Cf. 359 e. 3 Cf. on 327 c.
4 Cf. 337 d, 343 b, 421 c, 612 c, Laches 188 e, Meno 80 b. There is a play on the double meaning, "What, pray?" and "Why, pray?"
C ἦ δ' ὡς. Ὅτι, ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα; Ἀπορραθυμεῖν ἡμῖν δοκεῖσ, ἔφη, καὶ εἶδος ὅλον οὐ τὸ ἑλάχιστον ἐκκλέπτειν τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα μὴ διέλθησ, καὶ λήσεις οὐθῆναι εἰπὼν αὐτὸ φαύλως, ὡς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται. Οὐκοῦν ὃρθῶς, ἔφην, ὡς Ἀδείμαντε; Ναὶ, ἦ δ' ὡς· ἀλλὰ τὸ ὃρθως τούτο, ὅσπερ τάλλα, λόγου δεῖται, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἂν γένοντο. μὴ οὖν παρῆσ

D ὄντινα σὺ λέγεις. ὡς ἡμεῖς πάλαι περιμένομεν οἵμονείς σὲ ποι μνησθῆσεσθαι παιδοποιεῖσθαι τὸ πέρι, πῶς παιδοποιησοῦνται, καὶ γενομένους πῶς θρέψουσι, καὶ ὅλην ταύτην ἧν λέγεις κοινωνίας γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν· μέγα γὰρ τι οἵμοθεθα φέρειν καὶ ὅλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὃρθως ἡ μὴ ὃρθως γυνώμενον. νῦν οὖν ἐπειδὴ ἀλλὰς ἐπιλαμβάνει πολιτείας πρὶν ταῦτα ἴκανῶς διελέσθαι, δεδοκται 450 ἡμῖν τούτῳ, ὅ σὺ ἡκουσας, τὸ σὲ μὴ μεθιέναι, πρὶν ἂν ταῦτα πάντα ὅσπερ τάλλα διέλθησ. Καὶ ἐμὲ τοῖνυν, ὁ Γαλαύκων ἔφη, κοινωνὸν τῆς ψήφου ταύτης τίθετε. Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Ὀρασύμαχος, πᾶσι ταῦτα δεδομένα ἡμῖν νόμιζε, ὡς Σώκρατες.

II. Οἶον, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰργάσασθε ἐπιλαβόμενοι

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\[a\) Cf. Soph. Trach. 437. \]  \[b\) So Isoc. xv. 74 ὁλος εἶδεν. \]  \[c\) Cf. 424 a, Laws 739 c. Aristotele says that the possessions of friends should be separate in ownership but common in use, as at Sparta. Cf. Newman, Introd. to Aristot. Pol. p. 201, Epicurus in Diog. Laert. x. 11, Aristot. Pol. 1263 a 30 ff., Eurip. Androm. 270. \]  \[d\) Cf. 459 d, Laws 668 d, Aristot. Pol. 1269 b 13, Shakes. Tro. and Cres. i. i. 23 “But here’s yet in the word hereafter the kneading, the making of the cake,” etc. \]  \[e\) Cf. Laws 665 b 7. \]  \[f\) Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1264 a 12. \]
for what special reason, pray?" said I. "We think you are a slacker," he said, "and are trying to cheat us out of a whole division, and that not the least, of the argument to avoid the trouble of expounding it, and expect to 'get away with it' by observing thus lightly that, of course, in respect to women and children it is obvious to everybody that the possessions of friends will be in common." "Well, isn't that right, Adeimantus?" I said. "Yes," said he, "but this word 'right,' like other things, requires defining as to the way and manner of such a community. There might be many ways. Don't, then, pass over the one that you have in mind. For we have long been lying in wait for you, expecting that you would say something both of the procreation of children and their bringing up, and would explain the whole matter of the community of women and children of which you speak. We think that the right or wrong management of this makes a great difference, all the difference in the world, in the constitution of a state; so now, since you are beginning on another constitution before sufficiently defining this, we are firmly resolved, as you overheard, not to let you go till you have expounded all this as fully as you did the rest." "Set me down, too," said Glaucon, "as voting this ticket." "Surely," said Thrasymachus, "you may consider it a joint resolution of us all, Socrates."

II. "What a thing you have done," said I, "in thus

9 Emphatic. Cf. 427 e.
A γενομένου: a noun is supplied from the preceding verb. Cf. on 598 c, and supra on 341 d.
4 µέγα... καὶ διὸν: cf. 469 c, 527 c, Phaedo 79 c, Laws 779 B, 944 c, Symp. 188 d, Demosth. ii. 22, Aeschyl. Prom. 961.
4 Cf. Protag. 330 c.

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μον. ὃςον λόγον πάλιν ἄσπερ εἴς ἀρχής κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας! ἢν ὦς ἢδη διελθηλθὼς ἐγωγε ἐξαυρον ἀγαπῶν, εἰ τις εὔασοι ταῦτα ἀποδεξάμενος
Β ὃς τότε ἔρρηθη· ᾧ νῦν ὑμεῖς παρακαλοῦντες οὐκ ἢστε ὃςον ἐσμον λόγων ἐπεγείρετε· ὃν ὄρων ἐγὼ παρῆκα τότε, μὴ παράσχοι πολὺν ὀχλον. Τί δὲ; ἢ δ' ὃς ὁ Θρασύμαχος· χρυσοχοήσοντας οἷς τούσδε νῦν ἐνθάδε ἀφίχθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγων ἀκοουσμένοις; Ναὶ, εἶπον, μετρίων γε. Μετρον δὲ γ', ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὁ Πλαύκων, τουότων λόγων ἀκούειν ὁλος ὃ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον ἐα. οὐ δὲ περὶ ὧν ἐρωτώμεν μηδαμῶς
C ἀποκάμης ἦ σοι δοκεῖ διεξών, τίς ἢ κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξιν ἡμῖν παίδων τε πέρι καὶ γυναικῶν ἔσται καὶ τροφῆς νέων ἐτὶ ὄντων, τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ γυνομενής γενέσεως τε καὶ παιδείας, ἢ δὴ ἐπιποντάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι. πειρῶ ὦν εἴπειν τίνα τρόπον δεὶ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὴν. Οὐ ράδιον, ὃ εὐδαιμον, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, διελθεῖν· πολλὰς γὰρ ἀπιστίας ἔχει ἐτὶ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἦν διήλθομεν. καὶ γὰρ ὃς δυνατὰ λέγεται, ἀπιστοῖτ' ἄν, καὶ εἰ δ' τι μάλιστα γένοιτο, ὃς ἄριστ' ἄν εἰπ' ταῦτα, καὶ
D ταὐτὴ ἀπιστήσεται. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁκνοὶς τις αὐτῶν

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a Cf. Theaetet. 184 c, Gorg. 469 c.


c Cf. Phileb. 36 d, Theaetet. 184 a, Cratyl. 411 a.

d Thrasymachus speaks here for the last time. He is mentioned in 357 a, 358 b-c, 498 c, 545 b, 590 d.

e Lit. “to smelt ore.” The expression was proverbial and was explained by an obscure anecdote. Cf. Leutsch, Paroemioiographi, ii. pp. 91, 727, and i. p. 464, and commentators on Herod. iii. 102.

f Plato often anticipates and repels the charge of tedious
challenging me! What a huge debate you have started afresh, as it were, about this polity, in the supposed completion of which I was rejoicing, being only too glad to have it accepted as I then set it forth! You don’t realize what a swarm of arguments you are stirring up by this demand, which I foresaw and evaded to save us no end of trouble.” “Well,” said Thrasymachus, “do you suppose this company has come here to prospect for gold and not to listen to discussions?” “Yes,” I said, “in measure.” “Nay, Socrates,” said Glaucon, “the measure of listening to such discussions is the whole of life for reasonable men. So don’t consider us, and do not you yourself grow weary in explaining to us what we ask for, your views as to how this communion of wives and children among our guardians will be managed, and also about the rearing of the children while still young in the interval between birth and formal schooling which is thought to be the most difficult part of education. Try, then, to tell us what must be the manner of it.” “It is not an easy thing to expound, my dear fellow,” said I, “for even more than the provisions that precede it, it raises many doubts. For one might doubt whether what is proposed is possible and, even conceding the possibility, one might still be sceptical whether it is best. For which reason one, as it were, shrinks from touching length (see Polit. 286 c, Phileb. 28 d, 36 d). Here the thought takes a different turn (as 504 c). The ὅτε γε implies a slight rebuke (cf. Class. Phil. xiv. pp. 165-174).

* 498 a. Cf. on Aristoph. Acharn. 434, and Laws 792 A.

* 456 c, Thucyd. vi. 98, Introd. xvii.

* εἴδε τι μάλιστα: a common formula for what a disputant can afford to concede. Cf. Lysias xiii. 52, xxii. 1, xxii. 10. It occurs six times in the Charmides.
απτεσθαι, μη ευχη δοκη ειναι τ λόγος, ω φίλε έταιρε. Μηδεν, ἃ δ' ὦς, ὀκνει· οὔτε γάρ ἁγνώμονες οὔτε ἀπιστοι οὔτε δύσοι οἱ ἄκουσόμενοι. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον Ὡ στοι, ἃ ποι βουλόμενος μὲ παραθαρρύνειν λέγεις; Ἡ' Εγγω', ἐφη. Πάν τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τοῦνατίον ποιεῖς. πιστεύοντος μὲν γάρ ἐμοι εἰμοί εἰδέναι ἃ λέγω, καλῶς εἰχεν ἡ παρα-

Εμνυθα· ἐν γάρ φρονίμους τε καὶ φίλους περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ φιλών τάληθη εἰδότα λέγειν ἀσφαλές καὶ θαρραλέον· ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ξη-τοῦντα ἃμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, δ' ἡ ἐγὼ δρῶ, 451 φοβερόν τε καὶ σφαλερόν, οὔ τι γέλωτα ὁφλείν· παιδικόν γάρ τοιτό γε· ἀλλὰ μη σφαλείς τῆς ἀληθείας οὔ μόνον αὑτός ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἑυνεπισπασάμενος κείσομαι περὶ ἃ ήκιστα δεὶ σφάλλεσθαι. προσκυνῶ δὲ Ἀδράστειαν, ὃ Γλαύ-
κων, χάριν οὔ μέλλω λέγειν· ἐλπίζω γάρ οὔν ἐλατ-
tον ἀμάρτημα ἄκουσίως τινὸς φουνέα γενέσθαι ἃ ἀπατεώνα καλῶν τε καὶ ἄγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νομίμων πέρι. τούτο οὖν τὸ κινδύνευμα κινδυ-

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a Cf. Introd. xxxi-xxxii, infra 456 c, 499 c, 540 d, Laws 736 d, Aristot. Pol. 1260 b 29, 1265 a 17 δεὶ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ εὐχήν, μηδὲν μὲντοι ἀδύνατον.
b ἁγνώμονες = inconsiderate, unreasonable, as Andoc. ii. 6 shows.
c Cf. on 452 c-d, Euthydem. 3 c "To be laughed at is no matter," Laws 830 b τῶν τῶν ἀνοητῶν γέλωτα, Eurip. fr. 495.
d Ἀδράστειαν: practically equivalent to Nemesis. Cf. our "knock on wood." Cf. Posnansky in Breslauer Phil. 430
on the matter lest the theory be regarded as nothing but a 'wish-thought,' my dear friend." "Do not shrink," he said, "for your hearers will not be inconsiderate nor distrustful nor hostile." And I said, "My good fellow, is that remark intended to encourage me?" "It is," he said. "Well then," said I, "it has just the contrary effect. For, if I were confident that I was speaking with knowledge, it would be an excellent encouragement. For there is both safety and boldness in speaking the truth with knowledge about our greatest and dearest concerns to those who are both wise and dear. But to speak when one doubts himself and is seeking while he talks, as I am doing, is a fearful and slippery venture. The fear is not of being laughed at, for that is childish, but, lest, missing the truth, I fall down and drag my friends with me in matters where it most imports not to stumble. So I salute Nemesis, Glaucon, in what I am about to say. For, indeed, I believe that involuntary homicide is a lesser fault than to mislead opinion about the honourable, the good, and the just. This is a risk that it is better to run with enemies than


γὰρ οὖρ, "for in fact," but often with the suggestion that the fact has to be faced, as e.g. in Tim. 47 e, where the point is often missed.

B νεύειν ἐν ἐχθροῖς κρείττον ἡ φίλοις, ὦστε οὐ με
παραμυθεί. καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων γελάσας Ἀλλ', ὁ
Σώκρατες, ἐφη, ἐάν τι πάθωμεν πλημμελές ὅπο
tοῦ λογοῦ, ἀφιέμεν σε ὦστερ φόνου καὶ καθαρὸν
εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀπατεώνα ἡμῶν. ἀλλὰ θαρρήσας λέγε.
Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, καθαρός γε καὶ ἐκεῖ ὁ ἀφεθείς,
ὡς ὁ νόμος λέγει· εἰκὸς δὲ γε, εἴπερ ἐκεῖ, κανθάδε.
Δέγε τοῖνυν, ἐφη, τούτον γ' ἐνεκα. Δέγειν δὴ,
ἐφην ἐγώ, χρῆ ἀνάπαλιν αὕ νῦν, ἡ τότε ἵσως ἔδει
C ἐφεξῆς λέγειν· τάχα δὲ οὕτως ἀν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι, μετὰ
ἀνδρείον δράμα παντελῶς διαπεραθεῖ τὸ γνωι-
κείον αὕ περαίνειν, ἀλλος τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ σον οὕτω
προκαλεί.

III. Ἀνθρώποις γὰρ φῶς καὶ παιδευθείσων ὡς
ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἔστ' ἀλλὴ
ὄρθῃ παῖδων τε καὶ γυναικῶν κτῆσις τε καὶ χρεία
ἡ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν ὄρμην ἱούσιν, ἣνπερ τὸ πρῶτον
ὡρμῆσαμεν· ἐπεχειρήσαμεν δὲ ποι ὅς ἀγέλης
φύλακας τοὺς ἀνδρας καθιστάναι τῷ λόγῳ. Ναι.

D Ἀκολουθώμεν τοῖνυν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν
παραπλησίαν ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ ἡμῖν
πρέπει ἡ οὕ. Πῶς; ἐφη. Ὁδε. τὰς θηλείας
τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν πότερα ἠξυμφυλάττειν οἰόμεθα
dein, ἀπερ ἂν οἱ ἄρρενες φιλάττωσι, καὶ ξυν-
θηρεύειν καὶ τάλλα κοινὴ πράττειν, ἡ τὰς μὲν

1 οὗ Hermann: mss. οὐκ eδ and eν, which would be ironical.
Adam is mistaken in supposing that Glaucon laughs at
the irony.

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a ὦστερ marks the legal metaphor to which ἐκεῖ below
refers. Cf. Laws 869 e, and Eurip. Hippol. 1433 and 1448-
1450, with Hirzel, Δίκη etc. p. 191, n. 1, Demosth. xxxvii. 58-59.
Plato transfers the idea to the other world in Phaedo 114 A-B,
where the pardon of their victims is required for the release
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with friends, so that your encouragement is none." And Glaucon, with a laugh, said, "Nay, Socrates, if any false note in the argument does us any harm, we release you as in a homicide case, and warrant you pure of hand and no deceiver of us. So speak on with confidence." "Well," said I, "he who is released in that case is counted pure as the law bids, and, presumably, if there, here too." "Speak on, then," he said, "for all this objection." "We must return then," said I, "and say now what perhaps ought to have been said in due sequence there. But maybe this way is right, that after the completion of the male drama we should in turn go through with the female, especially since you are so urgent."

III. "For men, then, born and bred as we described, there is in my opinion no other right possession and use of children and women than that which accords with the start we gave them. Our endeavour, I believe, was to establish these men in our discourse as the guardians of a flock?" "Yes." "Let us preserve the analogy, then, and assign them a generation and breeding answering to it, and see if it suits us or not." "In what way?" he said. "In this. Do we expect the females of watch-dogs to join in guarding what the males guard and to hunt with them and share all their pursuits or do we expect the of sinners. The passage is used by the older critics in the comparison of Plato with Christianity.

b Sophron's Mimes are said to have been so classified. For δράμα cf. also Theaetet. 150 a.

c For the use of analogies drawn from animals cf. 375-376, 422 d, 466 d, 467 b, 491 d-e, 537 a, 546 a-b, 564 a. Plato is only pretending to deduce his conclusions from his imagery. Aristotle's literal-minded criticism objects that animals have no "economy," Pol. 1264 b 4-6.
Reformers always denounce this source of wit while conservative satirists maintain that ridicule is a test of truth. Cf. e.g. Renan, Avenir de la Science, p. 439 “Le premier pas dans la carrière philosophique est de se cuirasser contre le ridicule,” and Lucian, Piscator 14 “No harm can be done by a joke; that on the contrary, whatever is beautiful shines brighter . . . like gold cleansed,” Harmon in Loeb translation, iii. 22. There was a literature for and against
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V

females to stay indoors as being incapacitated by the bearing and the breeding of the whelps while the males toil and have all the care of the flock?" "They have all things in common," he replied, "except that we treat the females as weaker and the males as stronger." "Is it possible, then," said I, "to employ any creature for the same ends as another if you do not assign it the same nurture and education?" "It is not possible." "If, then, we are to use the women for the same things as the men, we must also teach them the same things." "Yes." "Now music together with gymnastic was the training we gave the men." "Yes." "Then we must assign these two arts to the women also and the offices of war and employ them in the same way." "It would seem likely from what you say," he replied. "Perhaps, then," said I, "the contrast with present custom a would make much in our proposals look ridiculous if our words b are to be realized in fact." "Yes, indeed," he said. "What then," said I, "is the funniest thing you note in them? Is it not obviously the women exercising unclad in the palestra together with the men, not only the young, but even the older, like old men in gymnasiums, c when, though wrinkled and unpleasant to look at, they still persist in exercising?" "Yes, on my word," he replied, "it would seem ridiculous under present

custom (sometimes called σωμήθεια) of which there are echoes in Cicero’s use of consuetudo, Acad. ii. 75, De off. i. 148, De nat. deor. i. 83.

b ἡ λέγεται: cf. on 389 D.

ἐν τῷ παρεστώτι, φανείη. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ἐπείτερ ὑμήσαμεν λέγειν, οὐ φοβητέον τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκῶμματα, ὡσα καὶ οὐα ἄν εἴποιεν εἰς τὴν τουαὔτην μεταβολήν γενομένην καὶ περὶ τὰ C γυμνάσια καὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα περὶ τὴν τῶν ὁπλών σχέσιν καὶ ἵππων ὁχήσεις. Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἄλλ' ἐπείτερ λέγειν ἡρξά-μεθα, πορευόμεν ὑπὸ τὸ τραχὺ τοῦ νόμου, δεηθεὶς τε τούτον μὴ τα αὐτῶν πράττεν άλλα σπουδάζειν, καὶ ὑπομνήσασιν, ὅτι οὗ πολὺς χρόνος ἐξ οὗ τοῖς Ἐλλησιόν ἐδόκει αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα, ἀπερ νῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων, γυμνοὶς ἄν-δρας ὀρᾶσθαι, καὶ ὅτε ἰρχοντο τῶν γυμνασίων πρῶ-D τοι μὲν Κρῆτες, ἐπείτα Λακεδαίμονιοι, ἔξην τοῖς τότε ἀστείοις πάντα ταῦτα κωμιῳδεῖν· ἦ οὖν οἶει; Ἔγωγε. Ἅλλ' ἐπειδῆ, οἶμαι, χρωμένοις ἀμενον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τα τουαύτα ἑφάνη, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξέρρυς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μενυθέντος ἄριστον, καὶ τούτο ἐνεδείξατο, ὅτι μάταιος ὃς γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἤγεται ἢ τὸ κακόν, καὶ τὸ γελώσποτειείν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ όψιν ἀποβλέπτων ὡς γελοῖον ἦ Ἐ τὴν τοῦ ἄφρονος τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὐτοῦ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοποῦν στηθάμενου ἢ τοῦ τοῦ ἄγαθον. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

IV. Ἀρ' οὖν οὗ πρῶτον μὲν τούτο περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνομολογητέον, εἰ δυνατὰ ἦ οὖ, καὶ δοτέον ἀμφι-σβήτησιν, εἶτε τις φιλοσοφῶν εἶτε σπουδαστικὸς

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\[a\] Cf. Propert. iv. 13 Müller.
\[b\] For a variation of this image cf. 568 d.
\[c\] Plato plays on his own favourite phrase. The proper business of the wit is to raise a laugh. Cf. Symp. 189 b.
\[d\] Cf. Thucyd. i. 6, Herod. i. 10. Sikes in Anthropology 436
conditions." "Then," said I, "since we have set out to speak our minds, we must not fear all the jibes with which the wits would greet so great a revolution, and the sort of things they would say about gymnastics and culture, and most of all about the bearing of arms and the bestriding of horses." "You're right," he said. "But since we have begun we must go forward to the rough part of our law, after begging these fellows not to mind their own business but to be serious, and reminding them that it is not long since the Greeks thought it disgraceful and ridiculous, as most of the barbarians do now, for men to be seen naked. And when the practice of athletics began, first with the Cretans and then with the Lacedaemonians, it was open to the wits of that time to make fun of these practices, don't you think so?" "I do." "But when, I take it, experience showed that it is better to strip than to veil all things of this sort, then the laughter of the eyes faded away before that which reason revealed to be best, and this made it plain that he talks idly who deems anything else ridiculous but evil, and who tries to raise a laugh by looking to any other pattern of absurdity than that of folly and wrong or sets up any other standard of the beautiful as a mark for his seriousness than the good." "Most assuredly," said he.

IV. "Then is not the first thing that we have to agree upon with regard to these proposals whether they are possible or not? And we must throw open the debate to anyone who wishes either in jest or earnest to and the Classics says this was borrowed from Thucydides, whom Wilamowitz says Plato never read. Cf. Dio Chrys. xiii. 226 M. For ἐξ ὀβ cf. Demosth. iv. 3, Isoc. v. 47.

a Lit. "what (seemed) laughable to (in) the eyes."

Cf. 607 δ ὁδίμεν . . . λόγον.
PLATO

453 ἑθέλει ἀμφισβητήσαι, πότερον δυνατή φύσις ἢ ἀνθρωπίνη ἢ θήλεια τῇ τοῦ ἄρρενος γένους κοινωνήσαι εἰς ἀπαντα τὰ ἔργα, ἢ οὖδ' εἰς ἐν, ἢ εἰς τὰ μὲν οἰα τε, εἰς δὲ τὰ οὐ, καὶ τούτο δὴ τὸ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ποτέρων ἔστιν; ἃρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν κάλλιστά τις ἀρχόμενος ὡς τὸ εἰκός καὶ κάλλιστα τελευτήσειν; Πολύ γε, ἐφη. Βούλει οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἡμεῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλλών ἀμφισβητήσωμεν, ἵνα μὴ ἔρημα τὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου β λόγου πολυρκήται; Οὐδέν, ἐφη, κωλύει. Δέγω-μεν δὴ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὅτι, "ὡ Σῶκρατές τε καὶ Γλαύκων, οὐδέν δεί ὑμῖν ἄλλους ἀμφισβητεῖν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς κατοικίσεως, ἦν ἀκίζετε πόλιν, ὑμιλογεῖτε δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔκαστον ἕν ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ πράττειν." Ὡμολογήσαμεν, οἴμαι: πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἐστιν οὖν ὅπως οὐ πάμπολυ διαφέρει γνῆ ἄνδρὸς τῆ φύσιν; Πῶς δ' οὗ διαφέρει; Οὔκοιν ἀλλο καὶ ἔρχον ἐκατέρω προσήκει προσ- C τάττειν τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν; Τί μὴν; Πῶς οὖν οὖν ἀμαρτάνετε νῦν καὶ τάναντία ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγετε, φάσκοντες αὖ τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τὰς γυναικας δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράττειν, πλεῖστον κεχωρισμένην φύσιν ἔχοντος; ἔξεις τι, ὃ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς ταῦτ'?

a Plato as elsewhere asks whether it is true of all, some, or none. So of the commingling of ideas in Sophist 251 d. Aristotle (Pol. 1260 b 38) employs the same would-be exhaustive method.

b ἀρχόμενος . . . τελευτήσειν: an overlooked reference to a proverb also overlooked by commentators on Pindar, Pyth. i. 35. Cf. Pindar, fr. 108 a Loeb, Laws 775 e, Sophocles, fr. 831 (Pearson), Antiphon the Sophist, fr. 60 (Diels).

c This pleading the opponent’s case for him is common
raise the question whether female human nature is capable of sharing with the male all tasks or none at all, or some but not others, and under which of these heads this business of war falls. Would not this be that best beginning which would naturally and proverbially lead to the best end? “Far the best,” he said. “Shall we then conduct the debate with ourselves in behalf of those others so that the case of the other side may not be taken defenceless and go by default?” “Nothing hinders,” he said. “Shall we say then in their behalf: ‘There is no need, Socrates and Glaucon, of others disputing against you, for you yourselves at the beginning of the foundation of your city agreed that each one ought to mind as his own business the one thing for which he was fitted by nature?’ ‘We did so agree, I think; certainly!’ ‘Can it be denied then that there is by nature a great difference between men and women?’ ‘Surely there is.’ ‘Is it not fitting, then, that a different function should be appointed for each corresponding to this difference of nature?’ ‘Certainly.’ ‘How, then, can you deny that you are mistaken and in contradiction with yourselves when you turn around and affirm that the men and the women ought to do the same thing, though their natures are so far apart?’ Can you surprise me with an answer to that ques-

in Plato. Cf. especially the plea for Protagoras in Theaetet. 166-167.

Apparently a mixture of military and legal phraseology. Cf. ἐκπέρσῃ in Protag. 340 a, II. v. 140 τὰ δ' ἐρήμα φοβεῖται, and the legal phrase ἐρήμην καταδίασαν ὁ ὀφειάς, and the legal phrase ἐρήμην καταδίασαν ὁ ὀφειάς.

ἀπολογεῖσθαι; Ἡς μὲν ἔξαίφνης, ἐφη, οὐ πάντι βῆδιον. ἀλλὰ σοῦ δεήσομαι τε καὶ δέομαι καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λόγον, ὅστις ποτ’ ἐστίν, ἐρμηνεύσαι. Ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ ἄλλα

D πολλά τοιαῦτα, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι προορῶν ἐφοβοῦμην τε καὶ ἠκούν ἄπτεσθαι τοῦ νόμου τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν κτήσιν καὶ τροφήν. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἐφη, οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλω ἐσκεν. Οὐ γὰρ, εἶπον· ἄλλα δὴ ὡδ’ ἐξει: ἂν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβηθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἄν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὡμος γε νεὶ οὐδὲν ἤττον. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ήμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειρατέων σώζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ἦτοι δελφίνα των ἐλπίζοντας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἄν ἡ τινὰ ἀλλὴν ἀπορον

Ε σωτηρίαν. Ἐσκεν, ἐφη. Φέρε δή, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, εάν τη εὑρωμεν τὴν ἐξοδον. ὦμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δὴ ἄλλην φύσιν ἄλλο δεῖν ἐπιτηδεύσειν, γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρος ἄλλην εἶναι· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φύσεις τὰ αὐτὰ φαμεν νῦν δεῖν ἐπιτηδεύσαι. ταῦτα ἡμῶν κατηγορεῖτε; Κομιδῆ γε. Ἡ γενναία, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ,

454 ὥ Γλαύκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης. Τί δή; "Οτι, εἴπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτευν καὶ οἶσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζεων, ἄλλα διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ’ εἴδη διαιροῦμεν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἄλλα κατ’

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a Cf. the πέλαγος τῶν λόγων Protag. 338 a. Similarly Sidney Smith: “cut his cable, and spread his enormous canvas, and launch into the wide sea of reasoning eloquence.”

b An allusion to the story of Arion and the dolphin in Herod. i. 24, as ὑπολαβεῖν perhaps proves. For ἀπορον cf. 378 A.

c γενναία: often as here ironical in Plato. Cf. Sophist 231 b, where interpreters misunderstand it. But the new L. & S. is correct.

d ἀντιλογικῆς: one of several designations for the eristic

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tion?" "Not easily on this sudden challenge," he replied: "but I will and do beg you to lend your voice to the plea in our behalf, whatever it may be." "These and many similar difficulties, Glaucon," said I, "I foresaw and feared, and so shrank from touching on the law concerning the getting and breeding of women and children." "It does not seem an easy thing, by heaven," he said, "no, by heaven." "No, it is not," said I; "but the fact is that whether one tumbles into a little diving-pool or plump into the great sea he swims all the same." "By all means." "Then we, too, must swim and try to escape out of the sea of argument in the hope that either some dolphin will take us on its back or some other desperate rescue." "So it seems," he said. "Come then, consider," said I, "if we can find a way out. We did agree that different natures should have differing pursuits and that the nature of men and women differ. And yet now we affirm that these differing natures should have the same pursuits. That is the indictment?" "It is." "What a grand thing, Glaucon," said I, "is the power of the art of contradiction!" "Why so?" "Because," said I, "many appear to me to fall into it even against their wills, and to suppose that they are not wrangling but arguing, owing to their inability to apply the proper divisions and distinctions to the subject under con-
αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἐριδμένος διὰ λέξεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. Ἐστι γὰρ δὴ, ἔφη, περὶ πολλῶν τούτο τὸ πάθος· ἀλλὰ μόνον καὶ πρὸς ἦμας τούτο τείνει ἐν τῷ

B παρόντι; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἦν δὲ ἐγὼ κινδυνεύομεν γοῦν ἄκοντες ἀντιλογίας ἀπτεσθαι. Πῶς; Τὸ τὴν ἄλλην φύσιν ὅτι οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τυγχάνειν πάνω ἀνδρείως τε καὶ ἑριστικῶς κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκομεν, ἐπεισεκεφάμεθα δὲ οὐδ’ ὁποίουν, τί εἴδος τὸ τῆς ἐτέρας τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τί τείνου όριζόμεθα τότε, ὅτε τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἄλλῃ φύσει ἀλλα, τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπεδίδομεν. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

C ἐπεσκεφάμεθα. Τουγάρτου, εἴπον, ἐξεστών ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἄνερωταν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, εἰ ἡ αὐτῇ φύσις φαλακρῶν καὶ κομητῶν καὶ οὔχ ἡ ἐναντία, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ὁμολογῶμεν ἐναντίαι εἶναι, ἐὰν φαλακρὸι σκυτοτομῶσι, μὴ ἔξω κομῆται, εάν δ’ αὐτ’ ἐντού κομῆται, μὴ τοὺς ἐτέρους. Γελοίον μέντ’ ἄν εἰπῇ, ἔφη. Ἄρα κατ’ ἄλλο τι, εἴπον ἑγὼ, γελοιοῦν, ἢ ὅτι τότε οὐ πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἐτέραν φύσιν ἐπιθέμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῳ τὸ εἴδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως τὲ

D καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφιλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τείνου τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα; οἶον ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ

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a ἄκοντες is almost "unconscious." Cf. Phileb. 14 c.

b Greek style often couples thus two adverbs, the second defining more specifically the first, and, as here and often in Plato and Aristophanes, with humorous or paradoxical effect. Cf. Aristoph. Knights 800 εἰ καὶ μιαρός. So Shakes. "well and chirurgeonly."

c Cf. Sophist 256 A-B for the relativity of "same" and "other." Polit. 292 c describes in different language the correct method.

d For this humorously trivial illustration cf. Mill, Rep. Gov. 442
consideration. They pursue purely verbal oppositions, practising eristic, not dialectic on one another.”

“Yes, this does happen to many,” he said; “but does this observation apply to us too at present?”

“Absolutely,” said I; “at any rate I am afraid that we are unawares\(^a\) slipping into contentiousness.”

“In what way?” “The principle that natures not the same ought not to share in the same pursuits we are following up most manfully and eristically\(^b\) in the literal and verbal sense; but we did not delay to consider at all what particular kind of diversity and identity\(^c\) of nature we had in mind and with reference to what we were trying to define it when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same.” “No, we didn’t consider that,” he said.

“Wherefore, by the same token,” I said, “we might ask ourselves whether the natures of bald\(^d\) and long-haired men are the same and not, rather, the contrary. And, after agreeing that they were opposed, we might, if the bald cobbled, forbid the long-haired to do so, or vice versa.” “That would be ridiculous,” he said. “Would it be so,” said I, “for any other reason than that we did not then posit likeness and difference of nature in any and every sense, but were paying heed solely to the kind of diversity and homogeneity that was pertinent\(^e\) to the pursuits themselves? We meant, for example, that a man and

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\(a\) Cf. Laches 190 D eis ὁ τείνειν δοκεῖ, Protag. 345 B.
Adam makes difficulties, but cf. Laws 963 A νοῦν ... κυβερνητικῶν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικῶν καὶ στρατηγικῶν. The translation follows Hermann despite the objection that this reading forestalls the next sentence. Cf. Campbell ad loc. and Apelt, Woch. für klass. Phil., 1903, p. 344.

b Plato anticipates the objection that the Socratic dialectic...
"A woman who have a physician's mind have the same nature. Don't you think so?" "I do." "But that a man physician and a man carpenter have different natures?" "Certainly, I suppose."

V. "Similarly, then," said I, "if it appears that the male and the female sex have distinct qualifications for any arts or pursuits, we shall affirm that they ought to be assigned respectively to each. But if it appears that they differ only in just this respect that the female bears and the male begets, we shall say that no proof has yet been produced that the woman differs from the man for our purposes, but we shall continue to think that our guardians and their wives ought to follow the same pursuits." "And rightly," said he.

"Then, is it not the next thing to bid our opponent tell us precisely for what art or pursuit concerned with the conduct of a state the woman's nature differs from the man's?" "That would be at any rate fair." "Perhaps, then, someone else, too, might say what you were saying a while ago, that it is not easy to find a satisfactory answer on a sudden, but that with time for reflection there is no difficulty." "He might say that." "Shall we, then, beg the raiser of such objections to follow us, if we may perhaps prove able to make it plain to him that there is no pursuit connected with the administration of a state that is peculiar to woman?" "By all means." "Come then, we shall say to him, answer our question. Was this the basis of your distinction between the man naturally gifted for anything and the one not so gifted—that the one learned easily, surprises assent. Cf. more fully 487 b, and for a comic version Hippias Major 295 a "if I could go off for a little by myself in solitude I would tell you the answer more precisely than precision itself."
μανθάνοι, ὁ δὲ χαλεπῶς, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ βραχέιας
μαθήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ εὐρετικὸς εἶη ὦ ἐμαθεν, ὁ δὲ
πολλῆς μαθήσεως τυχῶν καὶ μελέτης μηδ' ἂ
ἐμαθε σῶζοιτο, καὶ τῷ μὲν τα τοῦ σώματος ἵκανῶς.

C ὑπηρετοὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, τῷ δὲ ἐναντιοτο; ἀρ' ἀλλ' ἦν
τοῦτοι ἢ ταῦτα, οἷον τὸν εὐφυὴν πρὸς ἐκαστα
καὶ τῶν μῆ ὦρίζου; Οὐδεῖς, ἦ δ' ὦς, ἀλλὰ φήσει.
Οίσθα τι οὖν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων μελετῶμεν, ἐν ὦ
οὗ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος διαφερόντως
ἐχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν; ἦ μακρολογούμεν τὴν
τε ὑφαντικὴν λέγοντες καὶ τὴν τῶν ποπᾶν τε

D καὶ ἐφημάτων θεραπείαν, ἐν οἷς δὴ τι δοκεῖ τὸ
γυναικεῖον γένος εἶναι, οὐ καὶ καταγελαστῶτατον
ἐστὶ πάντων ἠπτόμενον; Ἀλῆθη, ἐφή, λέγεις, στὶ
πολὺ κρατεῖται ἐν ἀπαισιν ὦς ἐποιεῖν τὸ γένος
τοῦ γένους. γυναικεῖς μὲν τοι πολλὰ πολλῶν
ἀνδρῶν βελτίως εἰς πολλά· τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐχεῖ ὦς
οὐ λέγεις. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἦν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπιτήδευμα
τῶν πόλιν διοικοῦντων γυναικὸς διότι γυνη, οὐδ'
ἀνδρὸς διότι ἀνήρ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως διεσπαρμέναι αἱ
φύσεις ἐν ἀμφοῖς τοῖν ξώνων, καὶ πάντων μὲν
μετέχει γυνη ἐπιτηδευμάτων κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων

Ε δὲ ἀνήρ, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ἀσθενεότερον γυνῆ ἀνδρός.
Πάνυ γε. Ἡ οὖν ἀνδράσι πάντα προστάξομεν,
γυναικὶ δὲ οὖδέν; Καὶ πῶς; Ἀλλ' ἦστι γὰρ,
the other with difficulty; that the one with slight instruction could discover much for himself in the matter studied, but the other, after much instruction and drill, could not even remember what he had learned; and that the bodily faculties of the one adequately served his mind, while, for the other, the body was a hindrance? Were there any other points than these by which you distinguish the well endowed man in every subject and the poorly endowed?” “No one,” said he, “will be able to name any others.” “Do you know, then, of anything practised by mankind in which the masculine sex does not surpass the female on all these points? Must we make a long story of it by alleging weaving and the watching of pancakes and the boiling pot, whereon the sex plumes itself and wherein its defeat will expose it to most laughter?” “You are right,” he said, “that the one sex is far surpassed by the other in everything, one may say. Many women, it is true, are better than many men in many things, but broadly speaking, it is as you say.” “Then there is no pursuit of the administrators of a state that belongs to a woman because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man. But the natural capacities are distributed alike among both creatures, and women naturally share in all pursuits and men in all—yet for all the woman is weaker than the man.” “Assuredly.” “Shall we, then, assign them all to men and nothing to women?” “How could we?” “We shall rather, I take it, say that one woman has the remarks on women as cooks of the bachelor Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, § 234. But Xen. Mem. iii. 9. 11 takes the ordinary view. On the character of women generally cf. Laws 781 and Aristotle in Zeller trans. ii. 215. " Cf. Cratyl. 392 c ὡς τὸ δλόν εἴπειν γένος."
олμαν, ώς φήσομεν, καὶ γυνὴ ἱατρική, ἡ δὲ οὐ, καὶ μουσικὴ, ἡ δ’ ἁμονοσος φύσει. Τί μήν; Γυμνα-456 στικὴ δ’ ἀρα οὐ, οὐδὲ πολεμική, ἡ δὲ ἀπόλεμος καὶ οὐ φιλογυμναστική; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Τί δὲ; φιλόσοφος τε καὶ μισόσοφος; καὶ θυμοειδῆς, ἡ δ’ ἄθυμος; "Εστὶ καὶ ταῦτα. "Εστιν ἄρα καὶ φυλακικὴ γυνή, ἡ δ’ οὐ. ἡ οὐ τοιαύτην καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν φυλακικῶν φύσιν ἔξελεξάμεθα; Τοιαύ-την μὲν οὖν. Καὶ γυναῖκος ἄρα καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις εἰς φυλακὴν πόλεως, πλὴν οὐσα ἀσθενεστέρα ἡ ἵσχυροτέρα ἐστὶν. Φαίνεται.

Β VI. Καὶ γυναῖκες ἄρα αἱ τοιαύτη τοῖς τουούτοις ἀνδράσιν ἐκλεκτέαι ξυνοικεῖν τε καὶ ξυμφυλάττειν, ἐπείπερ εἰσὶν ἰκαναὶ καὶ ξυνγενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν. Πάνω γε. Τὰ δ’ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέα ταῖς αὐταῖς φύσεσιν; Τὰ αὐτά. Ἦκομεν ἄρα εἰς τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι, καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι ταῖς τῶν φυ-λάκων γυναίξι μουσικῆν τε καὶ γυμναστικῆν

C ἀποδιδόναι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Ὅκι ἄρα ἄδυ-νατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὀμοια ἐνομοθετοῦμεν, ἐπείπερ κατὰ φύσιν ἐτίθεμεν τῶν νόμων· ἀλλὰ τὰ νῦν παρὰ ταῦτα γυνόμενα παρὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνεται. "Εοικεν. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἐπίσκεψις ἡμῖν ἦν, εἰ δυνατά τε καὶ βέλτιστα λέγομεν; Ἡν γὰρ. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν δὴ δυνατά, διωμολογηται; Ναί. ὅτι δὲ δὴ βέλτιστα, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο δεῖ διομο- λογηθῆναι; Δὴλον. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς γε τὸ φυλα-κικῆν γυναῖκα γενέσθαι οὐκ ἀλλη μὲν ἡμῖν ἀνδρας

a Cf. Gorg. 517 c. 

b Cf. on 450 d. 

c Cf. Introd. p. xvii.
the nature of a physician and another not, and one is by nature musical, and another unmusical?" "Surely." "Can we, then, deny that one woman is naturally athletic and warlike and another unwarlike and averse to gymnastics?" "I think not." "And again, one a lover, another a hater, of wisdom? And one high-spirited, and the other lacking spirit?" "That also is true." "Then it is likewise true that one woman has the qualities of a guardian and another not. Were not these the natural qualities of the men also whom we selected for guardians?" "They were." "The women and the men, then, have the same nature in respect to the guardianship of the state, save in so far as the one is weaker, the other stronger." "Apparently.

VI. "Women of this kind, then, must be selected to cohabit with men of this kind and to serve with them as guardians since they are capable of it and akin by nature." "By all means." "And to the same natures must we not assign the same pursuits?" "The same." "We come round, then, to our previous statement, and agree that it does not run counter to nature to assign music and gymnastics to the wives of the guardians." "By all means." "Our legislation, then, was not impracticable or utopian, since the law we proposed accorded with nature. Rather, the other way of doing things, prevalent to-day, proves, as it seems, unnatural." "Apparently." "The object of our inquiry was the possibility and the desirability of what we were proposing?" "It was." "That it is possible has been admitted." "Yes." "The next point to be agreed upon is that it is the best way." "Obviously." "For the production of a female guardian, then, our educa-
This is only a more complicated case of the point of style noted on 349 d. Cf. Cratyl. 386 a, Sophist 247 a.

b Cf. on 421 a. We should not press this incidental phrase to prove that Plato would not educate all the citizens, as he in fact does in the Laws and by implication in the Politicus.

c Cf. Morley, Voltaire, p. 103: “It has been rather the fashion to laugh at the Marquise de Châtelet, for no better reason than that she, being a woman, studied Newton. . . .
tion will not be one thing for men and another for women, especially since the nature which we hand over to it is the same." "There will be no difference." "How are you minded, now, in this matter?" "In what?" "In the matter of supposing some men to be better and some worse, or do you think them all alike?" "By no means." "In the city, then, that we are founding, which do you think will prove the better men, the guardians receiving the education which we have described or the cobblers educated by the art of cobbling?" "An absurd question," he said. "I understand," said I; "and are not these the best of all the citizens?" "By far." "And will not these women be the best of all the women?" "They, too, by far." "Is there anything better for a state than the generation in it of the best possible women and men?" "There is not." "And this, music and gymnastics applied as we described will effect." "Surely." "Then the institution we proposed is not only possible but the best for the state." "That is so." "The women of the guardians, then, must strip, since they will be clothed with virtue as a garment, and must take their part with the men in war and the other duties of civic guardianship and have no other occupation. But in these very duties lighter tasks must be assigned to the women than to the men because of their weakness as a class. But the man who ridicules unclad women, exercising because it is best that they

There is probably nothing which would lead to so rapid and marked an improvement in the world as a large increase of the number of women in it with the will and the capacity to master Newton as thoroughly as she did."

^a Cf. Rousseau, Lettre à d'Alembert, "Couvertes de l'honnêteté publique."
μέναις, ἀτελῆ τοῦ γελοιοῦ δρέπων καρπῶν, οὐδὲν οἴδεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφ' ὅ γελᾶ οὐδ' ὦ τι πράττειν κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὦτὶ τὸ μὲν ὡφέλιμον καλὸν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

VII. Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖς ἐν ὠσπερ κόμια φῶμεν διαφεύγειν, τοῦ γυναικείου πέρι νόμου λέγοντες, ὃς ῥοδόν ἀναλάβεται τιθέντας, ὡς δὲ κοινῇ πάντα ἐπιτηδεύειν τούς τε φύλακας ἣμῖν καὶ τὰς φυλακίδας, ἀλλὰ πτὴ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν αὐτῶ ὡμολογεῖσθαι, ὡς δυνάται τε καὶ ὡφέλιμα λέγει; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφῆ, οὐ σμικρὸν κόμια διαφεύγεις. Φήσεις γε, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, οὐ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὅταν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὑδέας. Λέγει δὴ, ὡδι, ἐφη. Τοῦτω, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐπεται νόμος καὶ τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν τοῖς ἀλλοις, ὡς ἐγὼ μαι, ήδε. Τίς; Τὰς γυναικὰς ταῦτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάντων

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a Cf. Pindar, fr. 209 Schroeder, ἀτελῆ σοφίας καρπῶν δρέπ(ειν). Plato varies the quotation to suit his purpose.

b This is one of the chief texts for the alleged utilitarianism of Plato, a question too complicated to be settled by anything less than a comparative study of the Protagoras, Gorgias, Phaedo, Philebus, Republic (IX) and Laws. ὡφέλιμον suggests “benefit” rather than “utility.” Cf. Introd. to second volume of this translation, and supra on 339 a-b.

c Cf. Aeschyl. Septem, in fine.

d For this form of exaggeration cf. supra on 414 c, 339 b.

e On the whole topic cf. Introd. p. xxxiv, Lucian, Fugitivi 18 οὐκ εἰδότες δὲ τὸς ἱερὸς κόμιος ἔκεινος ἥξιον κοινὰς ἥγεσθαι τὰς γυναικάς, Epictet. fr. 53, p. 21, Rousseau, Émile, v: “je ne parle point de cette prétendue communauté de femmes dont le reproche tant répété prouve que ceux qui le lui font ne l'ont jamais lu.” But Rousseau dissents violently from what he calls “cette promiscuité civile qui confond partout les deux sexes dans les mêmes emplois.” Cf. further the denunciations of the Christian fathers passim, who are outdone by De Quincey’s “Otaheitian carnival of licentious
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should, "plucks the unripe fruit" of laughter and does not know, it appears, the end of his laughter nor what he would be at. For the fairest thing that is said or ever will be said is this, that the helpful is fair and the harmful foul." "Assuredly."

VII. "In this matter, then, of the regulation of women, we may say that we have surmounted one of the waves of our paradox and have not been quite swept away by it in ordaining that our guardians and female guardians must have all pursuits in common, but that in some sort the argument concurs with itself in the assurance that what it proposes is both possible and beneficial." "It is no slight wave that you are thus escaping." "You will not think it a great one," I said, "when you have seen the one that follows." "Say on then and show me," said he. "This," said I, "and all that precedes has for its sequel, in my opinion, the following law." "What?" "That these women shall all be common to all these men, and appetite, connected with a contempt of human life which is excessive even for paganism."

D πάσας εἶναι κοινάς, ἰδία δὲ μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν
συνοικεῖν· καὶ τοὺς παιδας αὐτοὺς, καὶ μήτε
γονέα ἐκγονον εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτοῦ μήτε παιδα
gονέα. Πολὺ, ἐφη, τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον μείζον πρὸς
ἀπιστίαν καὶ τὸν ὑφαντοῦ πέρι καὶ τὸν ὡφελίμου.
Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, περὶ γε τοῦ ὡφελίμου
ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἄν, ὡς οὐ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν κοινὰς
μὲν τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι, κοινοὺς δὲ τοὺς παιδὰς,
εἴπερ οἶνον τε· ἀλλ’ οἶμαι περὶ τοῦ εἰ δυνατὸν ἡ μὴ
Ε πλείστην ἀμφισβήτησιν ἄν γενέσθαι. Περὶ ἀμφο-
tέρων, ἦν δ’ ὡς, εὗ μάλ’ ἂν ἀμφισβητηθεῖσθη.
Δέιγεις, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, λόγων ἐξύστασιν· ἐγὼ δ’ ὡμην ἐκ γε
τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀποδράσεσθαι, εἰ σοι δόξειν ὡφελίμον
eῖναι, λοιπὸν δὲ δὴ μοι ἐσεθθαί περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ
καὶ μή. Ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐλαθες, ἦν δ’ ὡς, ἀποδὶδράσκων,
ἀλλ’ ἀμφοτέρων πέρι διδοῦ λόγων. Ἰφεκτέον,
ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, δίκην. τοσόνδε μέντοι χάρισαι μοι.

458 ἔσωσόν με ἐστάσαι, ὦσπερ οἱ ἀργοὶ τὴν διάνοιαν
εἰώθασιν ἐστιάσθαι υφ’ ἐαυτῶν, ὅταν μονοὶ πορεῦ-
ωνται. καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιω, πρὶν ἔξευρεῖν,
τίνα τρόπον ἔσται τι ὁ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τοῦτο παρ-
έντες, ἵνα μὴ κάμνωσι βουλεύομενοι περὶ τοῦ
δυνατοῦ καὶ μῆ, θέντες ὡς ὑπάρχον εἶναι ὁ βού-
λονται, ἥδη τὰ λοιπὰ διατάττουσι καὶ χαίρουσι
διεξιόντες οἶα δράσουσι γενομένου, ἀργοῦ καὶ
ἀλλως ψυχὴν ἐτί ἄργοτέραν ποιοῦντες. ἥδη οὖν

a A distinct suggestion of the topics of the “useful” and
the “possible” in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

b Cf. Isoc. ii. 47, on “those who in solitude do not
deliberate but imagine what they wish,” and Chesterton’s
saying, “All feeble spirits live in the future, because it is a
soft job”; cf. further on day-dreams, Schmidt, Ethik der
454
that none shall cohabit with any privately; and that
the children shall be common, and that no parent
shall know its own offspring nor any child its parent."
"This is a far bigger paradox than the other, and
provokes more distrust as to its possibility and its
utility."a

"I presume," said I, "that there would
be no debate about its utility, no denial that the
community of women and children would be the
greatest good, supposing it possible. But I take it
that its possibility or the contrary would be the chief
topic of contention." "Both," he said, "would be
right sharply debated." "You mean," said I, "that
I have to meet a coalition of arguments. But I
expected to escape from one of them, and that if you
agreed that the thing was beneficial, it would remain
for me to speak only of its feasibility." "You have
not escaped detection," he said, "in your attempted
flight, but you must render an account of both." "I
must pay the penalty," I said, "yet do me this much
grace: Permit me to take a holiday, just as men of
lazy minds are wont to feast themselves on their own
thoughts when they walk alone.b Such persons,
without waiting to discover how their desires may
be realized, dismiss that topic to save themselves the
labour of deliberating about possibilities and im-
possibilities, assume their wish fulfilled, and proceed
to work out the details in imagination, and take
pleasure in portraying what they will do when it is
realized, thus making still more idle a mind that is
idle without that.c I too now succumb to this weak-

Griechen, ii. p. 71, and Lucian's μετὰ τὰ εἴδωλα. Plato’s
description anticipates the most recent psychology in every-
thing except the term "autistic thinking."

a ἄλλως: cf. infra 495 B.
В καὶ αὐτὸς μαλθακίζομαι, καὶ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐπιθυμῶ ἀναβαλέσθαι καὶ ύστερον ἐπισκέψασθαι, ἢ δυνατά, νῦν δὲ ὡς δυνατῶν ὀντών θείς σκέψομαι, ἂν μου παρίης, πῶς διατάξουσιν αὐτὰ οἱ ἄρχοντες γυνώμενα, καὶ ὅτι πάντων ξυμφορώτατ' ἂν εἰη πραχθέντα τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς φύλαξι. ταῦτα πειράσομαι σοι πρότερα συνδιασκοπεῖσθαι, ύστερα δ' ἐκεῖνα, εἰπερ παρίης. Ἀλλὰ παρίημι, ἔφη, καὶ σκόπει. Οἶμαι τοῖνοι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰπερ ἑσονται οἱ ἄρχοντες ἄξιοι τούτου τοῦ ὄνοματος, οἳ τε τούτοις ἐπίκουροι κατὰ ταύτα, τοὺς μὲν ἐθελήσειν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπιταττόμενα, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιτάξεωσιν, τὰ μὲν αὐτοὺς πειθομένους τοῖς νόμοις, τὰ δὲ καὶ μιμομένους ὅσα ἂν ἐκεῖνοι ἐπιτρέψωμεν. Εἰκός, ἔφη. Σὺ μὲν τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξέλεξας, οὕτω καὶ τὰς γυναίκας ἐκλέξας παραδώσεις καθ' ὅσον οἶδ' τε ὁμοφυεῖς· οἳ δὲ ἀτε οἰκίας τε καὶ ξυσσίτια κοινὰ ἔχοντες, ἴδια δὲ οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον κεκτημένου, ὃμοι οὐ δὴ ἑσονται, ὅμοι δὲ ἀναμεμιγμένων καὶ ἐν γυμνασίως καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ τροφῇ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης, οἶμαι, τῆς ἐμφύτου ἄξονται πρὸς τήν ἄλληλων μίξιν. ἥς οὐκ ἄναγκαιά σοι δοκῶ λέγειν; Οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς γε, ἢ δ' ὃς, ἀλλ' ἐρωτικαῖς ἀνάγ-

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b Cf. Herod. ix. 8. He returns to the postponed topic in 466 d, but again digresses and does not take it up definitely till 471 c or rather 473 c-d. The reason is that the third wave of paradox is also the condition of the possibility of realisation. Cf. Introd. p. xvii.

c Cf. supra on 340 a-b.

d That is to say, they are to imitate or conform to our
ness and desire to postpone and examine later the question of feasibility, but will at present assume that, and will, with your permission, inquire how the rulers will work out the details in practice, and try to show that nothing could be more beneficial to the state and its guardians than the effective operation of our plan. This is what I would try to consider first together with you, and thereafter the other topic, if you allow it." "I do allow it," he said: "proceed with the inquiry." "I think, then," said I, "that the rulers, if they are to deserve that name, and their helpers likewise, will, the one, be willing to accept orders, and the other, to give them, in some things obeying our laws, and imitating them in others which we leave to their discretion." "Presumably." "You, then, the lawgiver," I said, "have picked these men and similarly will select to give over to them women as nearly as possible of the same nature. And they, having houses and meals in common, and no private possessions of that kind, will dwell together, and being commingled in gymnastics and in all their life and education, will be conducted by innate necessity to sexual union. Is not what I say a necessary consequence?" "Not by the necessities of geometry," he said, "but by principles in the details which we leave to them. So in the Laws, 770 b, 846 c, 876 e, and the secondary divinities in the Timaeus, 69 c. Cf. Polit. 301 a, and Aristot. Pol. 1261 b 2 μεῖται.

" Cf. 456 b. Plato has already explained that he means "of like nature in respect to capacity for government." There is no contradiction of the doctrine of the Politicus, 310 a (cf. Laws 773 a-b) that the mating should blend opposite temperaments. Those elements are already mixed in the selection of the guardians. Cf. supra 375 b-c, 410 d-e and Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 62, n. 481.
PLATO

καί, ἄι κινδυνεύουσιν ἐκείνων δρμύτεραι εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν τε καὶ ἐλκεῖν τῶν πολύν λεῶν.

VIII. Καὶ μάλα, εἴπον· ἀλλὰ μετὰ δὴ ταύτα, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἀπάκτως μὲν μύγνυσθαι ἄλληλοις ἦν ἔνδοξον τοὺς λοιποὺς διότι συνεισέρχομαι συνεργῶ μὲν στηρευτικῷ καὶ τῶν γενναίων ὀρνίθων μάλα συχνούσ’ ἄρ’ ὅψιν, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς, προσέσχηκάς τι νόμον γάμους τε καὶ παιδοποιίας; Τὸ ποίον; ἔφη. Πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν τούτων, καίπερ ὀντων γενναίων, ἄρ’ οὐκ εἰσὶ τινες καὶ γίγνονται ἄριστοι; Εἰςών. Πότερον οὖν ἐξ ἀπάντων ὁμοίως γεννᾶς, ἦ προβομέει ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων;

Β' Ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων. Τί δ’; ἐκ τῶν νεωτάτων ἦ ἐκ τῶν γεραυτάτων ἦ ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων ὁ τι μάλιστα; Ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων. Καὶ ἐὰν μὴ οὕτω γεννᾶται, πολὺ σοι ἤγει χεῖρον ἐσεσθαι τὸ τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τὸ τῶν κύκών γένος; Ἔγωγ’, ἔφη. Τί δὲ ἱππων οἴει, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων; ἦ ἄλλῃ τῇ ἐχειν; Ἄτοπον μέντ’ ἂν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, εἰς. Βαβαί, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ φίλε ἐταίρε, ὃς ἄρα σφόδρα

* The phrase is imitated by Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1122 d φυσικαὶς, οὐ γεωμετρικαὶς ἐλκόμενοι ἀνάγκαις.

b Cf. Laws 789 b-c.

c The riddling question to which the response is “what?” is a mannerism derived from tragedy, which becomes very

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those of love, which are perhaps keener and more potent than the other to persuade and constrain the multitude."

VIII. "They are, indeed," I said; "but next, Glaucon, disorder and promiscuity in these unions or in anything else they do would be an unhallowed thing in a happy state and the rulers will not suffer it." "It would not be right," he said. "Obviously, then, we must arrange marriages, sacramental so far as may be. And the most sacred marriages would be those that were most beneficial." "By all means." "How, then, would the greatest benefit result? Tell me this, Glaucon. I see that you have in your house hunting-dogs and a number of pedigree cocks. Have you ever considered something about their unions and procreations?" "What?" he said. "In the first place," I said, "among these themselves, although they are a select breed, do not some prove better than the rest?" "They do." "Do you then breed from all indiscriminately, or are you careful to breed from the best?" "From the best." "And, again, do you breed from the youngest or the oldest, or, so far as may be, from those in their prime?" "From those in their prime." "And if they are not thus bred, you expect, do you not, that your birds' breed and hounds will greatly degenerate?" "I do," he said. "And what of horses and other animals?" I said; "is it otherwise with them?" "It would be strange if it were," said he. "Gracious," said I, "dear friend, how imperative, then, is our need of the frequent in the later style of the Sophist, Politicus and Philebus.

This commonplace of stirpiculture or eugenics, as it is now called, begins with Theognis 184, and has thus far got no further.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ημίν δεὶ ἀκρων εἶναι τῶν ἄρχοντων, εἶπερ καὶ περὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὅσαύτως ἔχει.

C Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔχει, ἐφη· ἀλλὰ τί δή; "Οτι ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, φαρμάκοις πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι.

ιατρόν δὲ ποὺ μὴ δεομένοις μὲν σῶμασι φαρμάκων, ἄλλα διαίτῃ ἐθελόντων ύπακούειν, καὶ φαυλότερον ἐξαρκεῖν ἠγούμεθα εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ δή καὶ φαρμα-

κευένι δή, ῥίμην ὅτι ἀνδρευτέρω ἄνει τοῦ ιατροῦ. 'Ἀληθή· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί λέγεις; Πρὸς τόδε, δὴν δ’ ἐγὼ· συνών τῷ ψεῦδει καὶ τῇ ἀπάτῃ κινδυνεύει

D ἡμῖν δεήσειν χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐπ’ ὕφελεία τῶν ἄρχομεν. ἐφαμεν δὲ ποὺ εἰ φαρμάκον εἴδει πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα χρήσιμα εἶναι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς

gε, ἐφη. Ἐν τοῖς γάμοις τῶν καὶ παιδοποιίαις εἰσεί στὸ ὄρθον τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι οὐκ ἔλαχιστον. Πῶς δή; 'Δει μὲν, εἶπον, ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων

tοὺς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίσταις συγγίγνεσθαι ὡς πλειστάκις, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς φαυλοτάταις

Ε τούναντίν, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἐκγόνα τρέφειν, τῶν δὲ μὴ, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποίμνιον ὅ τι ἀκρότατον εἶναι· καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γιγνόμενα λανθάνειν πλὴν αὐτοὺς

tους ἄρχοντας, εἰ αὖ ἡ ἁγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀστασίαστος ἔσται. 'Ορθότατα, ἐφη. Ὅπως δὴ ἔορται τινες νομοθετητέαι [ἐσονται], ἐν αἷς ἐξινάξομεν τάς τε νύμφας καὶ τοὺς νυμφίους,

cαὶ θυσίαι καὶ ὑμνοι ποιητέωι τοῖς ἡμετέροις

460 ποιηταῖς πρέποντες τοῖς γυνομένοις γάμοις· τὸ

dὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ποιήσομεν,

a A recurrence to the metaphor of 389 b, as we are re-

minded below in D.

b Cf. 389 b, 414 c, and Laws 663 d ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ ψεῦδεσθαι.

Cf. on 343 a-b and Polit. 267 b-c, 268 b. αδ below merely
highest skill in our rulers, if the principle holds also for mankind.” “Well, it does,” he said, “but what of it?” “This,” said I, “that they will have to employ many of those drugs of which we were speaking. We thought that an inferior physician sufficed for bodies that do not need drugs but yield to diet and regimen. But when it is necessary to prescribe drugs we know that a more enterprising and venturesome physician is required.” “True; but what is the pertinency?” “This,” said I: “it seems likely that our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception for the benefit of their subjects. We said, I believe, that the use of that sort of thing was in the category of medicine.” “And that was right,” he said. “In our marriages, then, and the procreation of children, it seems there will be no slight need of this kind of right.” “How so?” “It follows from our former admissions,” I said, “that the best men must cohabit with the best women in as many cases as possible and the worst with the worst in the fewest, and that the offspring of the one must be reared and that of the other not, if the flock is to be as perfect as possible. And the way in which all this is brought to pass must be unknown to any but the rulers, if, again, the herd of guardians is to be as free as possible from dissension.” “Most true,” he said. “We shall, then, have to ordain certain festivals and sacrifices, in which we shall bring together the brides and the bridegrooms, and our poets must compose hymns suitable to the marriages that then take place. But the number of the marriages we will leave to the dis-
ίν' ώς μάλιστα διασώζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὸς πολέμους τε καὶ νόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκοποῦντες, καὶ μήτε μεγάλη ἡμῖν ἢ πόλις κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν μήτε σμικρὰ γίγνηται. Ὄρθως, ἐφη. Κλήροι δὴ τινες, οἷμαι, ποιητέοι κομψοί, ὥστε τὸν φαύλον ἐκεῖνον αἰτιᾶθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστης συνεργεῖςς τύχην, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη.

B IX. Καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς γε που τῶν νέων ἐν πολέμῳ ἢ ἄλλοι διὸν τε καὶ ἄλλα ἄλλα τε καὶ ἀφθονοστέρα ἢ ἐξουσία τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν ἐγκοιμήσεως, ἵνα καὶ ἄμα μετὰ προφάσεως ὡς πλείστοι τῶν παῖδων ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σπείρωντα. Ὅρθως. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἄει γιγνόμενα ἐκγόνα παραλαμβάνουσι αἱ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐφεστηκόμει ἂρ-χαί εἴτε ἀνδρῶν εἴτε γυναικῶν εἴτε ἀμφότερα· κωναὶ μὲν γάρ που καὶ ἄρχαί γυναιξὶ τε καὶ ἀνδράσιν. Ναι. Τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἄγαθῶν, δοκῶ, λαβοῦσαι εἰς τὸν σηκὸν οἶσον παρὰ τινας τροφοῦς, χωρὶς οὐκοῦσας ἐν τινι μέρει τῆς πόλεως· τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρώνων, καὶ ἕαν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπηρου γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύ-ψοισιν ὡς πρέπει. Ἐπερ μέλλει, ἐφη, καθαρόν τὸ γένος τῶν φυλάκων ἐσεθαι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τροφῆς ὁς τοὺς ἐπιμελήσονται, τὰς τε μητέρας ἐπὶ τὸν σηκὸν ἄγοντες, ὅταν σπαργῶσι, πᾶσαν μηχανὴν D μηχανώμενοι, ὅπως μηδεμία τὸ αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεται,

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a Plato apparently forgets that this legislation applies only to the guardians. The statement that ancient civilization was free from the shadow of Malthusianism requires qualification by this and many other passages. Cf. 372 c and Laws 740 d-e. The ancients in fact took it for granted.
cretion of the rulers, that they may keep the number of the citizens as nearly as may be the same, taking into account wars and diseases and all such considerations, and that, so far as possible, our city may not grow too great or too small.” “Right,” he said. “Certain ingenious lots, then, I suppose, must be devised so that the inferior man at each conjugation may blame chance and not the rulers.” “Yes, indeed,” he said.

IX. “And on the young men, surely, who excel in war and other pursuits we must bestow honours and prizes, and, in particular, the opportunity of more frequent intercourse with the women, which will at the same time be a plausible pretext for having them beget as many of the children as possible.” “Right.” “And the children thus born will be taken over by the officials appointed for this, men or women or both, since, I take it, the official posts too are common to women and men. The offspring of the good, I suppose, they will take to the pen or crèche, to certain nurses who live apart in a quarter of the city, but the offspring of the inferior, and any of those of the other sort who are born defective, they will properly dispose of in secret, so that no one will know what has become of them.” “That is the condition,” he said, “of preserving the purity of the guardians’ breed.” “They will also supervise the nursing of the children, conducting the mothers to the pen when their breasts are full, but employing every device to prevent any-

\^{b} Opinions differ whether this is euphemism for exposure. On the frequency or infrequency of this practice cf. Professor La Rue Van Hook’s article in T.A.P.A. vol. li, and that of H. Bolkestein, Class. Phil. vol. xvii. (1922) pp. 222-239.

\^{c} Cf. supra on 414 b and Aristot. Pol. 1262 a 14 ff.
καὶ ἄλλας γάλα ἔχουσας ἐκπορίζοντες, ἡν ἡ αὐταί ἴκαναι ὄς, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐπιμελήσονται, ὅπως μέτριον χρόνον θηλάσονται, ἀγρυπνίας δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον πόνον τίθαις τε καὶ τροφοῖς παραδώσουσιν; Πολλὴν βαστώνην, ἔφη, λέγεις τῆς παιδοποιίας ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν. Πρέπει γάρ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς διελθωμεν ὁ προθυμούμεθα. ἐφαμεν γάρ ἢ ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων δεῖν

Ε ἡ ἐκγωνα γίγνεσθαι. Ἀληθῆ. Ἀρ' οὖν σοι ἐπιφοιτήσεις τὸν χρόνον ἀκμῆς τὰ εἰκοσὶ ἆτη γυναῖκι, ἀνδρὶ δὲ τὰ τριάκοντα; Τὰ ποία αὐτῶν; ἔφη. Γυνακί μὲν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρξαμένη ἀπὸ εἰκοσιέτιδος μέχρι τετταρακονταέτιδος τίκτειν τῇ πόλει· ἀνδρὶ δὲ, ἐπειδὰν τὴν ἀξυτάτην ὁρμοῦ ἀκμῆν παρῇ, τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου γεννᾶν τῇ πόλει μέχρι πεντε-461 καπνητηκονταέτους. Ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν, ἔφη, αὕτη ἀκμὴ σώματος τε καὶ φρονήσεως. Ὁυκοῦν ἐὰν τε πρεσβύτερος τούτων εἶν τε νεώτερος τῶν εἰς τὸ κοῦν γεννήσεων ἂνηται, οὔτε ὅσον οὔτε δίκαιον φήσομεν τὸ ἀμάρτημα, ὡς παῖδα φιτύντος τῇ πόλει, ὃς, ἢν λάθη, γεννῆσεται οὐχ ὑπὸ θυσίων οὐδ' ὑπὸ εὐχῶν φύς, ἢς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τοῖς γάμοις εὔξονται καὶ ἱέρεια καὶ ἱερεία καὶ ἱύμπασα ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀμείνους καὶ ἐξ ὕφελίμων ὕφελι-Β ὡς ἀντέροις αεὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σκότου μετὰ δενήσ ἀκρατείας γεγονός. Ὁρθῶς,

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b Cf. supra on 458 c.

c Half humorous legal language. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1335 b 28 λειτουργεῖν...πρὸς τεκνοποιούν, and Lucan's "urbi pater est, urbique maritus" (Phars. ii. 388). The dates for marriage are given a little differently in the Laws, 464
one from recognizing her own infant. And they will provide others who have milk if the mothers are insufficient. But they will take care that the mothers themselves shall not suckle too long, and the trouble of wakeful nights and similar burdens they will devolve upon the nurses, wet and dry."

"You are making maternity a soft job for the women of the guardians." "It ought to be," said I, "but let us pursue our design. We said that the offspring should come from parents in their prime." "True." "Do you agree that the period of the prime may be fairly estimated at twenty years for a woman and thirty for a man?" "How do you reckon it?" he said. "The women," I said, "beginning at the age of twenty, shall bear for the state to the age of forty, and the man shall beget for the state from the time he passes his prime in swiftness in running to the age of fifty-five." "That is," he said, "the maturity and prime for both of body and mind." "Then, if anyone older or younger than the prescribed age meddles with procreation for the state, we shall say that his error is an impiety and an injustice, since he is begetting for the city a child whose birth, if it escapes discovery, will not be attended by the sacrifices and the prayers which the priests and priestesses and the entire city prefer at the ceremonial marriages, that ever better offspring may spring from good sires and from fathers helpful to the state sons more helpful still. But this child will be born in darkness and conceived in foul incontinence."


Cf. Horace, Odes iv. 4. 29.

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"Εφη. 'Ο αυτός δέ γ', εἶπον, νόμος, εάν τις τῶν ἐτι γεννάντων μὴ ἑυνέρξαντος ἄρχοντος ἀπτηται τῶν ἐν ἥλικια γυναικῶν νόθον γὰρ καὶ ἀνέγγυνοι καὶ ἀνέτορον φήσομεν αὐτὸν παίδα τῇ πόλει καθιστάναι. Ὄρθωτατα, ἔφη. "Οταν δὲ δὴ, οἶμαι, αἱ τε γυναίκες καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ γεννῶν ἐκβύσσι τὴν ἥλικιαν, ἀφήσομέν ποι ἐλευθέρους αὐτοὺς συγγι- C γνεσθαι ὧ ἀν ἐθέλωσι, πλὴν θυγατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ ταῖς τῶν θυγατέρων παισὶ καὶ ταῖς ἀνω μητρῶς, καὶ γυναῖκας αὕτη πλὴν νεῖει καὶ πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς τούτων εἰς τὸ κάτω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, καὶ ταύτα γ' ἡδη πάντα διακελευσάμενοι προθυμεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν μὴ ἐὼς ἑκάτερεν κύμα μηδὲ γ' ἐν, εάν γένηται, εάν δὲ τι βιάσηται, οὕτω τιθέναι, οὕς οὐκ οὐσίς τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ. Καὶ ταύτα μὲν γ', ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεται πατέρας δὲ καὶ θυγα- D τέρας καὶ α' νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες πῶς διαγνώσονται ἀλλήλων; Οὐδαμῶς, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλ' ἀφ' ἢς ἂν ἡμέρας τὶς αὐτῶν νυμφίος γένηται, μετ' ἑκείνην δεκάτῳ μηνι καὶ ἐβδόμῳ δὴ ἂν γένηται ἔγγυον, ταῦτα πάντα προσερῆξα τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα νεῖες, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἡλία θυγατέρας, καὶ ἑκείνα ἑκείνοις πατέρα, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τα τούτων ἔγγυον παιδῶν παιδὰς καὶ ἑκείνα αὐτὸν τόππους τε καὶ τηθάς, τὰ δ' ἐν ἑκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γεγονότα, ἐν ὃ αἱ μητέρες καὶ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἐγέννων, ἀδελφὰς τε καὶ E ἀδελφοὺς· ὡστε, δ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγομεν, ἀλλήλων μὴ ἀπτεσθαι· ἀδελφοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀδελφάς δώσει δ νόμος

\[a\] Cf. Laws 838 a and 924 e.
\[c\] Cf. Wundt, Elements of Folk Psychology, p. 89: "A native of Hawaii, for example, calls by the name of father.
"Right," he said. "And the same rule will apply," I said, "if any of those still within the age of procreation goes in to a woman of that age with whom the ruler has not paired him. We shall say that he is imposing on the state a base-born, uncertified, and unhallowed child." "Most rightly," he said. "But when, I take it, the men and the women have passed the age of lawful procreation, we shall leave the men free to form such relations with whomsoever they please, except \(^a\) daughter and mother and their direct descendants and ascendants, and likewise the women, save with son and father, and so on, first admonishing them preferably not even to bring to light \(^b\) anything whatever thus conceived, but if they are unable to prevent a birth to dispose of it on the understanding that we cannot rear such an offspring." "All that sounds reasonable," he said; "but how are they to distinguish one another's fathers and daughters, and the other degrees of kin that you have just mentioned?" "They won't," said I, "except that a man will call all male offspring born in the tenth and in the seventh month after he became a bridegroom his sons, and all female, daughters, and they will call him father.\(^c\) And, similarly, he will call their offspring his grandchildren\(^d\) and they will call his group grandparents and grandmothers. And all children born in the period in which their fathers and mothers were procreating will regard one another as brothers and sisters. This will suffice for the prohibitions of intercourse of which we just now spoke. But the law will allow brothers

\(^a\) Cf. Aristoph. Eccles. 636-637.
\(^b\) Cf. 363 \(d\) and Laws 899 \(e\), 927 \(b\).
συνοικεῖν, ἐάν ὁ κλῆρος ταύτη ἱμμιπτη καὶ ἡ Πυθία προσαναπαρῆ. Ὁρθότατα, ἢ δ' ὁς.

Χ. 'Η μὲν δὴ κοινωνία, ὁ Γλαύκων, αὐτῇ τε καὶ τοιαύτῃ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν τοῖς φύλαξί
σοι τῆς πόλεως· ὃς δὲ ἐπομένη τε τῇ ἀλλή πολιτείᾳ καὶ μακρῷ βελτίστῃ, δεὶ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τούτῳ βεβαιώ-
462 σασθαί παρὰ τοῦ λόγου· ἢ πῶς ποιῶμεν; Ὄντω
νὴ Δία, ἢ δ' ὁς. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ ἦδε ἀρχὴ τῆς ὁμολογίας, ἔρεσθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τί ποτε τὸ μέ-
γιστον ἁγαθὸν ἔχομεν ἐπειών εἰς πόλεως κατα-
σκευὴν, ὅδε στοχασόμενον τὸν νομοθέτην τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, καὶ τί μέγιστον κακόν, εἶτα ἐπισκέψα-
θαι, ἄρα ἃ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν εἰς μὲν τὸ τὸν ἁγαθὸν ἰχνος ἡμῖν ἀρμόττει, τῷ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀναμοστεῖ; Πάντων 
μάλιστα, ἐφη. Ἐχομεν οὖν τι μεῖζον κακόν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὅ ἂν αὐτὴν διαστᾶ
Β καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς; ἢ μεῖζον ἁγαθὸν τοῦ
ὁ ἂν ἱσυνῆ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν; Οὐκ ἔχομεν. 
Οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν ἢδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης κοινωνία ἱσυνθεῖ,
ὅταν ὅ τι μάλιστα πάντες οἱ πολίται τῶν αὐτῶν
γινομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων παραπλησίως
χαίρωσι καὶ λυπῶνται; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.
'H δέ γε τῶν τοιούτων ἱδίωσι διαλύει, ὅταν οἱ
μὲν περιαλγεῖς, οἱ δὲ περιχαρεῖς γίγνονται ἐπὶ τοῖς
C αὐτοῖς παθήμασι τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ
πόλει; Τί δ' οὖ; Ἀρ' οὖν ἐκ τούτῳ τὸ τοιόνδε
gίγνεται, ὅταν μὴ ἀμα φθέγγονται ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰ
τοιάδες ῥήματα, τὸ τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν, καὶ
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and sisters to cohabit if the lot so falls out and the Delphic oracle approves.” “Quite right,” said he.

X. “This, then, Glaucon, is the manner of the community of wives and children among the guardians. That it is consistent with the rest of our polity and by far the best way is the next point that we must get confirmed by the argument. Is not that so?” “It is, indeed,” he said. “Is not the logical first step towards such an agreement to ask ourselves what we could name as the greatest good for the constitution of a state and the proper aim of a lawgiver in his legislation, and what would be the greatest evil, and then to consider whether the proposals we have just set forth fit into the footprints of the good and do not suit those of the evil?” “By all means,” he said. “Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that distracts it and makes it many instead of one, or a greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?” “We do not.” “Is not, then, the community of pleasure and pain the tie that binds, when, so far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths?” “By all means,” he said. “But the individualization of these feelings is a dissolvent, when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings to the city and its inhabitants?” “Of course.” “And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’ and similarly with regard

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a We may perhaps infer from the more explicit reference in *Theaetet*. 193c that Plato is thinking of the “recognition” by footprints in Aeschyl. *Choeph.* 205-210.
perι του ἄλλοτρίου κατὰ ταυτά; Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν. 'Εν ἢτινι δὴ πόλει πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταυτά τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ ὁυκ ἐμὸν. αὐτὴ ἁριστὰ διοικεῖται; Πολὺ γε. Καὶ ἦτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἐχει, οἶον ὅταν ποὺ ἡμῶν δάκτυλός του πληγῇ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σώμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν

D τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ Ἰσθέτο τε καὶ πᾶσα ἄμα ἐνυπηγησε μέρους πονῆσαντος ὅλη, καὶ οὐτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ· καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὅτου ὅτων τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, περὶ τοῦ λύπης πονοῦντος μέρους καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς ῥαίξωντος. 'Ο αὐτὸς γὰρ, ἐφη, καὶ τοῦτο δ ἐρωτάς, τοῦ τουτοῦ ἐγγύτατα ἡ ἁριστα πολιτευμένη πόλις οἴκει. Ἐνὸς δὴ, οἴμαι, πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτι οὐ ἡ ἀγαθὸν ἡ κακῶν, ἡ τοιαύτη

Ε πόλις μάλιστα τε φήσει ἑαυτῆς εἰναι τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἡ ἐνυπηγήσεται ἄπασα ἡ ἐξυλπήσεται. Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, τὴν γε εὐνομον.

XI. Ὡμη ἂν εἴη, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἔπαινεν ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἦμετέραν πόλιν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ λόγου ὡμολογηματα σκοπεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ, εἰ αὐτὴ μάλιστ' ἐχει εἶτε

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*a Cf. supra 423 b, Aristot. Pol. 1261 b 16 ff., "Plato's Laws and the Unity of Plato's Thought," Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 358, Laws 664 a, 739 c-e, Julian (Teubner) ii. 459, Teichmüller, Lit. Fehden, vol. i. p. 19, Mill, Utilitarianism, iii. 345: "In an improving state of the human mind the influences are constantly on the increase which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest, which, if perfect, would make him never think of or desire any beneficial condition for himself in the benefits of which they are not included;" Spinoza, paraphrased by Höfding, Hist. of Mod. Phil. i. p. 325: "It would be best, since they seek a common good, if all could be like one mind and one body." Rabelais I. lvii. parodies Plato: "Si
to the word ‘alien’?" "Precisely so." "That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ of the same things in the same way.” "Much the best.” "And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man." For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connexions stretching to the soul for ‘integration’ with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any other member of the man the same statement holds, alike for a part that labours in pain or is eased by pleasure.” "The same,” he said, “and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism.” "That is the kind of a state, then, I presume, that, when anyone of the citizens suffers aught of good or evil, will be most likely to speak of the part that suffers as its own and will share the pleasure or the pain as a whole.” "Inevitably,” he said, “if it is well governed.”

XI. "It is time,” I said, “to return to our city and observe whether it, rather than any other, embodies quelqu’un ou quelqu’une disoit ‘beuvons,’ tous beuvoient” etc. Aristotle’s criticism, though using some of Plato’s phrases, does not mention his name at this point but speaks of rives, Pol. 1261 b 7.

b Cf. Laws 829 a.

c I so translate to bring out the analogy between Plato and e.g. Sherrington. For “to the soul” cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 328, Laws 673 a, Tim. 45 d, infra 584 c, Phileb. 33, 34, 43 b-c. Poschenrieder, Die Platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den Hippocratischen Schriften, p. 67, compares the De locis in homine, vi. p. 278 Littré.
καὶ ἄλλη τις μᾶλλον. Οὐκοῦν χρῆ, ἔφη. Τί οὖν;
463 ἐστι μὲν ποὺ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντές
tε καὶ δῆμος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ: Ἡστιν. 
Πολίτας μὲν δὴ πάντες οὗτοι ἄλληλους προσ-
erουσίν; Πῶς δ᾽ οὖ; Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τὶ
ὁ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις δῆμος τοὺς ἄρχοντας προσαγο-
ρεύει; Ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολλαῖς δεσπότας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς
δημοκρατουμέναις αὐτὸ τούνομα τοῦτο, ἄρχοντας.
Τί δ᾽ ὁ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δῆμος; πρὸς τῷ πολίτας
Β τῷ τοὺς ἄρχοντας φήσιν εἶναι; Σωτηρᾶς τε καὶ
ἐπικούρους, ἔφη. Τί δ᾽ οὗτοι τὸν δῆμον; Μισθο-
dότας τε καὶ τροφέας. Οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις
ἀρχοντες τοὺς δήμους; Δούλους, ἔφη. Τί δ᾽ οἱ
ἀρχοντες ἄλληλους; Εὐνάρχοντας, ἔφη. Τί δ᾽ οἱ
ἡμέτεροι; Εὐμφύλακας. Ἐξεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τῶν
ἀρχόντων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, εἰ τίς τινα
ἔχει προσειπεῖν τῶν ξυναρχόντων τὸν μὲν ὡς
οἰκεῖον, τὸν δ᾽ ὡς ἀλλότριον; Καὶ πολλοὺς γε.
Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν οἰκεῖον ὡς ἐαυτοῦ νομίζει τε καὶ
C λέγει, τὸν δ᾽ ἀλλότριον ὡς οὐχ ἐαυτοῦ; Οὐτως.
Τί δὲ οἱ παρὰ σοὶ φύλακες; ἐσθ᾽ ὅστις αὐτῶν
ἔχου ἄν τῶν ξυμφυλάκων νομίζαι τινὰ ἢ προσειπεῖν
ὡς ἀλλότριον; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· παντὶ γὰρ, ὥ ἄν
ἐντυγχάνῃ τις, ἡ ὡς ἄδελφῳ ἡ ὡς ἄδελφη ἡ ὡς
πατρὶ ἡ ὡς μητρὶ ἡ ὑμεῖ ἡ θυγατρὶ ἡ τούτων
ἐκγόνοις ἡ προγόνοι νομεῖ ἐντυγχάνειν. Καλ-
lιστα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, λέγεις· ἀλλ᾽ ἐτί καὶ τόδε εἰπέ·
D πότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα μόνον οἰκεία νομοθετή-
σεις, ἡ καὶ τὰς πράξεις πάσας κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα

a For these further confirmations of an established thesis
cf. on 442–443.
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the qualities agreed upon in our argument." "We must," he said. "Well, then, there are to be found in other cities rulers and the people as in it, are there not?" "There are." "Will not all these address one another as fellow-citizens?" "Of course." "But in addition to citizens, what does the people in other states call its rulers?" "In most cities, masters, in democratic cities, just this—rulers." "But what of the people in our city. In addition to citizens, what do they call their rulers?" "Saviours and helpers," he said. "And what term do these apply to the people?" "Payers of their wage and supporters." "And how do the rulers in other states denominate the populace?" "Slaves," he said. "And how do the rulers describe one another?" "Co-rulers," he said. "And ours?" "Co-guardians." "Can you tell me whether any of the rulers in other states would speak of some of their co-rulers as 'belonging' and others as outsiders?" "Yes, many would." "And such a one thinks and speaks of the one that 'belongs' as his own, doesn't he, and of the outsider as not his own?" "That is so." "But what of your guardians. Could any of them think or speak of his co-guardian as an outsider?" "By no means," he said; "for no matter whom he meets, he will feel that he is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, a mother, a son, a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of these." "Excellent," said I; "but tell me this further, will it be merely the names of this kinship that you have prescribed for them or must all their actions conform to the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{b}} \text{τά δύσματα μόνον} \text{may be thought to anticipate Aristotle's objections.}\]
πράττειν, περὶ τε τοὺς πατέρας, ὡσα νόμος περὶ πατέρας αἰδοὺς τε περὶ καὶ κηδεμονίας καὶ τοῦ ὑπῆκοον δεῖν εἶναι τῶν γονέων, ἡ μήτε πρός θεῶν μήτε πρός ἄνθρωπων αὐτῷ ἀμεινὸν ἐσεσθαι, ὡς οὔτε ὡσα οὔτε δίκαια πράττοντος ἂν, εἰ ἄλλα πράττοι ἡ ταῦτα; αὕταί σοι ἡ ἄλλαι φήμαι εἰς ἀπάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ύμνήσουσι εὐθὺς περὶ τὰ τῶν παίδων ὡτα καὶ περὶ πατέρων, οὐς ἂν αὐτοῖς
Ε τις ἀποφήνῃ, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐγγενῶν; Ἀδ- ται, ἐφη γελοίον γὰρ ἂν εἶθ, εἰ ἂνεν ἔργων οἰκεῖα ὀνόματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μόνων φθέγγοντο. Πασῶν ἃρα πόλεων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφανη- σουσιν ἐνός τινος ἡ ἢ ἡ κακῶς πράττοντος, ὡν ἐν τῇ ἐλέγομεν τὸ ῥήμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εἰ πράττει ἡ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς. Ἀληθεύσατα, ἢ δὲ ὅς.

464 Ὡκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτον τοῦ δόγματός τε καὶ ρήματος ἐφαμεν ἐπικαλολοθεῖν τὰς τε ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας κοινῆ; Καὶ ὀρθώς γε ἐφαμεν. Ὡκοῦν μάλιστα τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνήσουσιν ἕμιν οἱ πολίται, ὡν δὴ ἐμὸν ὀνομάσουσι τοῦτον δὲ κοινωνοῦντες οὔτω δὴ λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μάλιστα κοινωνίαν ἔξουσιν; Πολὺ γε. Ἀρ' οὖν τούτων αἷτια πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ καταστάσει ἡ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παῖδων κοινωνίᾳ τοῖς φύλαξι; Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ἐφη.

Β XII. Ἀλλὰ μὴν μέγιστον γε πόλει αὐτῷ ὁμο- λογήσαμεν ἀγαθὸν, ἀπεικάζοντες εἰς οἰκουμένῃ- πολιν σώματι πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ λύπης τε περὶ καὶ ἡδονῆς ὃς ἔχει. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἐφη, ὁμολογή-

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a Cf. 554 D ὅτι ὥκ ἀμεινὸν.
b Cf. the reliance on a unanimous public opinion in the Laws, 838 c-d.
c ἐπὶ ... ἐπὶ: for the preposition repeated in a different 474
names in all customary observance toward fathers and in awe and care and obedience for parents, if they look for the favour \(^a\) of either gods or men, since any other behaviour would be neither just nor pious? Shall these be the unanimous oracular voices that they hear from all the people, or shall some other kind of teaching beset \(^b\) the ears of your children from their birth, both concerning \(^c\) what is due to those who are pointed out as their fathers and to their other kin?" "These," he said; "for it would be absurd for them merely to pronounce with their lips the names of kinship without the deeds." "Then, in this city more than in any other, when one citizen fares well or ill, men will pronounce in unison the word of which we spoke: 'It is mine that does well; it is mine that does ill.'" "That is most true," he said. "And did we not say that this conviction and way of speech\(^d\) brings with it a community in pleasures and pains?" "And rightly, too." "Then these citizens, above all others, will have one and the same thing in common which they will name mine, and by virtue of this communion they will have their pleasures and pains in common." "Quite so." "And is not the cause of this, besides the general constitution of the state, the community of wives and children among the guardians?" "It will certainly be the chief cause," he said.

XII. "But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts." "And we

\(^{a}\) ὀνομάζεται θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ: cf. Sophist 289 c, Laws 1067 c.

\(^{b}\) ἀκουστικὸν ἔχουσιν ἀπὸ τῆς γενεαλογίας τῶν πατέρων.

\(^{c}\) ἐμπίστευσαν τὴν λαθρεμίαν τῶν τέκνων ἐκ γένεσιν ἑαυτῶν.

\(^{d}\) ὀνομάζεται τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ: cf. Sophist 265 c, Laws 797 c.
σαμεν. Τού μεγίστου ἁρα ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἦμιν πέφανται ἡ κοινωνία τοῖς ἐπικούροις τῶν τε παιδῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν. Καὶ μάλ', ἐφη. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τοῖς πρόσθεν γε ὁμολογοῦμεν· ἐφαμεν γάρ ποι, οὖτε οἰκίας τούτους ἱδίας δεῖν εἶναι οὖτε

C γήν οὔτε τι κτῆμα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφῆν λαμβάνοντας, μυθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς, κοινῆ πάντας ἀναλίσκειν, εἰ μέλλοιν ὄντως φύλακες εἶναι. Ὁρθῶς, ἐφη. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ, ὅπερ λέγω, τὰ τε πρόσθεν εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἑτὶ μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται αὐτοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φύλακας, καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ διαστάν τὴν πόλιν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομαξοντας μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλα ἄλλον ἄλλο, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οἰκίαν ἔλκοντα, ὃ τι ἀν δύνηται χωρίς τῶν ἄλλων

D κτήσασθαι, τὸν δὲ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἑτέραν οὕσαν, καὶ γυναῖκα τε καὶ παιδᾶς ἑτέρους, ἱδονάς τε καὶ ἀληθῶν ἐμποιοῦντας ἱδίων ὄντων ἱδίας, ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δόγματι τοῦ οἰκείου πέρι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τείνοντας πάντας εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ὁμοπαθεῖς λύπης τε καὶ ἱδονῆς εἶναι; Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Τί δαι; δίκαι τε καὶ ἑγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ οἰκή- σεται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὥς ἐπος εἴπειν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἵδιον ἐκτήσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα κοινά; ὅθεν

E δὴ ὑπάρχει τούτους ἀστασιάστοις εἶναι, ὅσα γε διὰ χρημάτων ἡ παιδῶν καὶ ἐγγυγενῶν κτήσιν ἀνθρωποί οὐσιασίζουσιν; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἐφη,

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a Cf. 416-417.
b For a similar list cf. Laws 842 D. Aristotle, Pol. 1263b 20 f., 476
were right in so agreeing.” “Then it is the greatest blessing for a state of which the community of women and children among the helpers has been shown to be the cause.” “Quite so,” he said. “And this is consistent with what we said before. For we said, I believe, that these helpers must not possess houses of their own or land or any other property, but that they should receive from the other citizens for their support the wage of their guardianship and all spend it in common. That was the condition of their being true guardians.” “Right,” he said. “Is it not true, then, as I am trying to say, that those former and these present prescriptions tend to make them still more truly guardians and prevent them from distracting the city by referring ‘mine’ not to the same but to different things, one man dragging off to his own house anything he is able to acquire apart from the rest, and another doing the same to his own separate house, and having women and children apart, thus introducing into the state the pleasures and pains of individuals? They should all rather, we said, share one conviction about their own, tend to one goal, and so far as practicable have one experience of pleasure and pain.” “By all means,” he said. “Then will not law-suits and accusations against one another vanish, one may say, from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common? So that we can count on their being free from the dissensions that arise among men from the possession of property, children, and kin.” “They will necessarily be quit objects that it is not lack of unity but wickedness that causes these evils.

* Softens the strong word oiχθσεται.
ἀπηλλάχθαι. Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ βιαίων γε οὐδ’ αἰκίας
dῖκαι δῖκαιως ἂν εἴην ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἥλιξι μὲν γὰρ
ηλίκας ἀμύνεσθαι καλὸν καὶ δἰκαίον ποὺ φήσομεν,
ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελεία τιθέντες. Ὄρθως,
465 ἐφη. Καὶ γὰρ τόδε ὀρθὸν ἔχει, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, οὕτος
δ’ νόμος· εἰ ποὺ τίς τῷ θυμῷ, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ
πληρῶν τὸν θυμὸν ἦττον ἐπὶ μείζους αὖ ἰοι στά-
σεις. Πάντα μὲν οὖν. Πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴν νεωτέρων
πάντων ἁρχεῖν τε καὶ κολάζειν προστετάζεται.
Δήλον. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε νεωτέρος πρεσβυτέρος,
ἀν μὴ ἁρχοντες προστάτωσιν, οὕτε ἄλλο βιά-
ζεσθαι ἐπιχειρήσει ποτὲ οὕτε τύπτειν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός·
οἶμαι δ’ οὐδὲ ἄλλως ἀτιμάσει· ἰκανῷ γὰρ τὸν
Β φύλακα κωλύνοντε, δέος τε καὶ αἰδῶς, αἰδῶς μὲν
ὡς γονέων μὴ ἀπτεσθαι εὐργοῦσα, δέος δὲ τὸ τῷ
πάσχοντι τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ὡς νιεῖς,
tοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀδελφοὺς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς πατέρας. Εὐμ-
βαίνει γὰρ οὕτως, ἐφη. Πανταχῇ δὴ ἐκ τῶν
νόμων εἰρήνην πρὸς ἄλληλους οἱ ἄνδρες ἄξουσιν;
Πολλὴν γε. Τούτων μὴν ἐν ξειτοῖς μὴ στασια-
ζόντων οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ποτὲ ἡ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς
τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλους διχοστάτησῃ. Οὐ γὰρ
C οὖν. Τά γε μὴν σιμφόροστα τῶν κακῶν δι’
ἀπρέπειαν ἅκινοι καὶ λέγειν, ὅν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν
εἴην, κολακείας τε πλουσίων πένητες1 ἀπορίας τε

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1 The text is probably corrupt. The genitive, singular or plural, is an easy emendation. But the harsh construction of πένητες as subject of ἰσχουσι yields the sense required.

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b One of the profoundest of Plato's many political 478
of these," he said. "And again, there could not rightly arise among them any law-suit for assault or bodily injury. For as between age-fellows we shall say that self-defence is honourable and just, thereby compelling them to keep their bodies in condition." "Right," he said. "And there will be the further advantage in such a law that an angry man, satisfying his anger in such wise, would be less likely to carry the quarrel to further extremes." "Assuredly." "As for an older man, he will always have the charge of ruling and chastising the younger." "Obviously." "Again, it is plain that the young man, except by command of the rulers, will probably not do violence to an elder or strike him, or, I take it, dishonour him in any other way. There being the two competent guardians to prevent that, fear and awe, awe restraining him from laying hands on one who may be his parent, and fear in that the others will rush to the aid of the sufferer, some as sons, some as brothers, some as fathers." "That is the way it works out," he said. "Then in all cases the laws will leave these men to dwell in peace together." "Great peace." "And if these are free from disensions among themselves, there is no fear that the rest of the city will ever start faction against them or with one another." "No, there is not." "But I hesitate, so unseemly are they, even to mention the pettiest troubles of which they would be rid, the flatterings of the rich, the embarrassments and pains of the poor in the


Cf. 371 E, 396 B, 397 D, 525 D.

καὶ ἁγνηδόνας, ὡσα ἐν παιδοτροφίᾳ καὶ χρηματισμοῖς διὰ τροφῆν ὀικετῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἱσχούσι, τὰ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἐξαρνοῦμενοι, τὰ δὲ πάντως πορισάμενοι θέμενοι παρὰ γυναῖκας τε καὶ ὀικέτας, ταμιεύειν παραδόντες, ὡσα τε, ὦ φίλε, περὶ αὐτὰ καὶ οἰα πάσχουσι, δῆλα τε δή καὶ θάνοντι καὶ οὐκ ἀξία λέγειν.

XIII. Δῆλα γάρ, ἐφη, καὶ τυφλῶ. Πάντων τε δὴ τούτων ἀπαλλάξονται, ζήσουσί τε τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου, ὡς δὲ ὀλυμπούντως ἡσυχι, μακαρώτερον. Πή; Διὰ σμικρὸν που μέρος ευδαιμονίζονται ἑκεῖνοι ὄν τούτοις ύπάρχει. ἢ τε γὰρ τῶν ἐκή καλλίων, ἢ τ’ ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου τροφή τελεωτέρα. νίκην τε γὰρ νικῶσι ἐξυμπάθης τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν, τροφή τε καὶ τῶς ἄλλως πᾶσιν, ὡσων βίος δεῖται, αὐτοὶ τε καὶ παῖδες ἀναδοῦνται.

Ε καὶ γέρα δέχονται παρὰ τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεως ζωντείς τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν. Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη, καλά. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὅτι ἐν τούτω πρόσθεν οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπέπληξέν, ὅτι τους φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαιμονον 466 ποιοῦμεν, οἷς ἔξον πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν; ἡμεῖς δὲ ποιοῦμεν, ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν, εἰ ποιοῦμεν, εἰσαῦσθαι σκεφτόμεθα, νῦν δὲ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας φύλακας ποιοῦμεν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡς οὐδ’ ὄντ᾿ ἐμεν εὐδαιμονεστάτην, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰς ἐν

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α Cf. 416 D, 548 A, 550 D.

b Proverbial. Cf. Sophist 241 D.

c Cf. 540 B-C, 621 D, Laws 715 C, 807 C, 840 A, 946-947, 964 C, Cic. Pro Flacco 31 “Olympionici esse apud Graecos prope maius et gloriosius est quam Romanes triumphant.” The motive is anticipated or parodied by Dracontion, Athenaeus 237 D, where the parasite boasts—

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bringing-up of their children and the procuring of money for the necessities of life for their households, the borrowings, the repudiations, all the devices with which they acquire what they deposit with wives and servitors to husband, and all the indignities that they endure in such matters, which are obvious and ignoble and not deserving of mention." "Even a blind man can see these," he said.

XIII. "From all these, then, they will be finally free, and they will live a happier life than that men count most happy, the life of the victors at Olympia.e" "How so?" "The things for which those are felicitated are a small part of what is secured for these. Their victory is fairer and their public support more complete. For the prize of victory that they win is the salvation of the entire state, the fillet that binds their brows is the public support of themselves and their children—they receive honour from the city while they live and when they die a worthy burial." "A fair guerdon, indeed," he said. "Do you recall," said I, "that in the preceding argument the objection of somebody or other rebuked us for not making our guardians happy, since, though it was in their power to have everything of the citizens, they had nothing, and we, I believe, replied that this was a consideration to which we would return if occasion offered, but that at present we were making our guardians guardians and the city as a whole as happy as possible, and that we were not modelling e

γέρα γὰρ αὐτῶις ταύτα τοῖς τάλύμπια
νικῶσι δέδοται χρηστότητος οὖνεκα.

d Cf. 419 E-20.
* Cf. 420 c. Omitting τό, translate "that we were not fixing our eyes on any one class, and portraying that as happy."

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ἐθνος ἀποβλέποντες ἐν αὐτῇ τούτῳ [τὸ] εὐδαιμον πλάττομεν; Μέμνημαι, ἐφη. Τί οὖν; νῦν ἢμῶν ὁ τῶν ἐπικούρων βίος, εἴπερ τοῦ γε τῶν ὀλυμπιονικῶν πολύ τε καλλίων καὶ ἀμείνων φαίνεται, μή

Β πη κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων φαινεται βίον ἢ τινῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν ἢ τὸν τῶν γεωργῶν; Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὃ γε καὶ ἐκεῖ ἔλεγον, δίκαιον καὶ ἔνταῦθα εἶπεῖν, ὅτι, εἰ οὔτως ὁ φύλαξ ἐπιχειρήσει εὐδαιμον γίνεσθαι, ὡστε μηδὲ φύλαξ εἶναι, μηδὲ ἀρκέσει αὐτῷ βίος οὔτω μέτριος καὶ βέβαιος καὶ ὃς ἢμεῖς φαίμεν ἀριστος, ἀλλὰ ἀνόητός τε καὶ μειρακιῶδης δόξα ἐμπεσόσα εὐδαιμονίας πέρι ὀρμήσει αὐτὸν διὰ δύναμιν ἐπὶ

C τὸ ἄπαντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει οἰκειοῦσθαι, γνώσεται τὸν Ἰσόδον ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἢν σοφὸς λέγων πλέον εἶναι πως ἢμους παντὸς. Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ἐφη, ἣμι-βούλω χρώμενος μενεὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ βίῳ. Συγχωρεῖς ἁρα, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίαν τοὺς ἀνδράσιν, ἢν διεληλύθαμεν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ παῖδων καὶ φυλακῆς τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, κατὰ τε πόλιν μενοῦσας εἰς πόλεμον τε ίοῦσας καὶ ἕμφιλάττειν δεῖν καὶ ἕμφηρευεῖν ὑσπέρ κύνας

D καὶ πάντα πάντη κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν κοινωνεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα πραγματές τὰ τε βέλτιστα πράξεως καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ θήλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, ἢ πεφύ-κατον πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ κοινωνεῖν; Συγχωρώ, ἐφη.

XIV. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐκείνο λοιπὸν δι-ελέοσθαι, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπους δυνατὸν ὑσπέρ

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[a] ἐπικούρων: the word here includes the rulers.
[b] κατά, "comparable to, on a level with." Cf. Apol. 17 B, Gorg. 512 B.
[c] μηδέ: cf. 420 D.
[d] Works and Days 40. So Laws 690 Ε.
our ideal of happiness with reference to any one class?" "I do remember," he said. "Well then, since now the life of our helpers has been shown to be far fairer and better than that of the victors at Olympia, need we compare it with the life of cobblers and other craftsmen and farmers?" "I think not," he said. "But further, we may fairly repeat what I was saying then also, that if the guardian shall strive for a kind of happiness that will unmake him as a guardian and shall not be content with the way of life that is so moderate and secure and, as we affirm, the best, but if some senseless and childish opinion about happiness shall beset him and impel him to use his power to appropriate everything in the city for himself, then he will find out that Hesiod was indeed wise, who said that the half was in some sort more than the whole." "If he accepts my counsel," he said, "he will abide in this way of life." "You accept, then, as we have described it, this partnership of the women with our men in the matter of education and children and the guardianship of the other citizens, and you admit that both within the city and when they go forth to war they ought to keep guard together and hunt together as it were like hounds, and have all things in every way, so far as possible, in common, and that so doing they will do what is for the best and nothing that is contrary to female human nature in comparison with male or to their natural fellowship with one another." "I do admit it," he said.

XIV. "Then," I said, "is not the thing that it remains to determine this, whether, namely, it is possible

\* \textit{την}: this order is frequent and sometimes significant in the \textit{Laws}. \textit{Cf.} 690 \textit{c}, 720 \textit{e}, 814 \textit{e}, 853 \textit{a}, 857 \textit{d}, 923 \textit{b}.
εν ἀλλοις ζωοὶς ταύτην τήν κοινωνιάν ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ὅπῃ δυνατόν; Ἔφθης, ἐφη, εἰπὼν ἦ ἐμελλον ὑπολήψεσθαι. Περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν εἰ τῷ πολέμῳ Ε ὅμως, ἐφην, δῆλον δὲ τὸν τρόπον πολεμήσουσιν. Πῶς; ἦ δὲ ὅς. "Οτι κουν ἑστρατεύσονται, καὶ πρὸς γε ἀξοῦσι τῶν παίδων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὅσιοι ἀμοί, ἵνα ὁσπερ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν θεόνται ταύτα, ἅ τελευθέντας δησεί δημιουργεῖν" πρὸς 467 δὲ τῇ θέα διακονεῖν καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ θεραπεύειν πατέρας τε καὶ μητέρας. ἤ οὐκ ἤσθησαι τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, οὐδὲ τοὺς τῶν κεραμεύων παῖδας, ὥσ πολὺν χρόνον διακονοῦντες θεωροῦσι πρῶς ἀπέτεθαν τοὺς κερα- μεύειν; Καὶ μάλα. "Η οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἐπιμελε- στερον παιδευτέον ἦ τοὺς φύλαξτοι τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐμπειρία τε καὶ θέα τῶν προσηκόντων; Καταγέ- λαστὸν μέντ' ἄν, ἐφη, εἴη. 'Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ μαχεῖται Β γε πάν ἔξων διαφερόντως παρόντων ὃν ἂν τέκη. "Εστὶν οὖτως κύνδυνος δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ σμικρὸς σφαλεῖον, οἷα δὴ ἐν πολέμῳ φίλει, πρὸς ἑαυτοῖς παίδας ἀπολέσαντας ποιήσαι καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πόλιν ἀδύνατον ἀναλαβεῖν. 'Αληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, λέγεις.

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a Cf. on 451 d. The community in this case, of course, refers only to occupations.
b μὲν γὰρ: forced transition to a delaying digression.
c So with modifications Laws 785 b, 794 c-d, 804 d-e, 806 a-b, 813-814, 829 e.
for such a community to be brought about among men as it is in the other animals, and in what way it is possible?

"You have anticipated," he said, "the point I was about to raise." "For as for their wars," I said, "the manner in which they will conduct them is too obvious for discussion." "How so," said he. "It is obvious that they will march out together, and, what is more, will conduct their children to war when they are sturdy, in order that, like the children of other craftsmen, they may observe the processes of which they must be masters in their maturity; and in addition to looking on they must assist and minister in all the business of war and serve their fathers and mothers. Or have you never noticed the practice in the arts, how for example the sons of potters look on as helpers a long time before they put their hands to the clay?" "They do," indeed. "Should these then be more concerned than our guardians to train the children by observation and experience of what is to be their proper business?" "That would be ridiculous," he said. "But, further, when it comes to fighting, every creature will do better in the presence of its offspring?" "That is so, but the risk, Socrates, is not slight, in the event of disasters such as may happen in war, that, losing their children as well as themselves, they make it impossible for the remnant of the state to recover."

"What you say is true," I replied; "but, in the

240 b, where the parasite boasts that he was a παιδομαθης in his art, and Sosipater, Athenaeus 377 r, where the cook makes the same boast, Phocyl. frag. 13 (Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus I., L.C.L.), Henry Arthur Jones, Patriotism and popular Education, Kipling, From Sea to Sea, p. 361. Greek language and satire contrasted such παιδομαθης with the ὀπτημαθης or late learners.
άλλα σὺ πρῶτον μὲν ἤγει παρασκευαστέον τὸ μὴ ποτε κινδυνεύσαι; Ὁδαμᾶς. Τί δε; εἰ ποι κινδυνεύσων, οὐκ ἐν ὧ βελτίων ἐσονται κατορθοῦντες; Κ Δήλον δῆ. Ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν οἷει διαφέρειν καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου, θεωρεῖν ἢ μὴ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον παιδας τοὺς ἃνδρας πολεμικοὺς ἐσομένους; Οὐκ, ἄλλα διαφέρει πρὸς ὃ λέγεις. Τούτῳ μὲν ἄρα ὑπαρκτέον, θεωροῦσιν τοὺς παιδας ποιεῖν, προσμηχανᾶσθαι δ’ αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλειαν, καὶ καλῶς ἐξει ἢ γάρ; Ναὶ. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν οἱ πατέρες ὡσα ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς ἐσονται ἄλλα γνωμονικό τῶν στρατεύων, ὡσα τε καὶ μὴ ἐπικύνδυνοι; Εἰκός, ἐφη. Εἰς μὲν ἄρα τὰς ἄξουσιν, εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐλαβήσονται. Ὀρθῶς. Καὶ ἀρχοντάς γε που, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, οὐ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήσουσιν, ἄλλα τοὺς ἐμπείρες τε καὶ ἡλικία ἰκανοῖς ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς εἶναι. Πρέπει γάρ. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, φήσομεν, καὶ παρὰ δόξαν πολλα πολλοῖς δὴ ἐγένετο. Καὶ μάλα. Πρὸς τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς φίλε, πτεροῦν χρῆ παιδία ὁντα εὐθὺς, ἵν’ ἀν τι δέῃ πετόμενοι ἀπο- Εφεύγωσιν. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφη. Ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀναβιβαστέον ὡς νεωτάτους, καὶ διδαξαμένους ἐπιπεύειν ἐφ’ ἵππων ἀκτεόν ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν, μὴ θυμοειδῶν μηδὲ μαχητικῶν, ἀλλ’ ο τι ποδωκεστάτων καὶ εὐνυωτάτων. οὕτω γάρ καλ- λιστά τε θεάσονται τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον, καὶ ἀσφαλέ-

a προσμηχανάσθαι: cf. supra on 414 b.
b παρὰ δόξαν: cf. Thucyd. i. 122 ἡκιστα δ’ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ, ii. 11, iii. 30, iv. 102, vii. 61.
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first place, is it your idea that the one thing for which we must provide is the avoidance of all danger?"

"By no means." "And, if they must incur danger, should it not be for something in which success will make them better?" "Clearly." "Do you think it makes a slight difference and not worth some risk whether men who are to be warriors do or do not observe war as boys?" "No, it makes a great difference for the purpose of which you speak."

"Starting, then, from this assumption that we are to make the boys spectators of war, we must further contrive a security for them and all will be well, will it not?" "Yes." "To begin with, then," said I, "will not the fathers be, humanly speaking, not ignorant of war and shrewd judges of which campaigns are hazardous and which not?" "Presumably," he said. "They will take the boys with them to the one and avoid the others?" "Rightly."

"And for officers, I presume," said I, "they will put in charge of them not those who are good for nothing else but men who by age and experience are qualified to serve at once as leaders and as caretakers of children." "Yes, that would be the proper way."

"Still, we may object, it is the unexpected b that happens to many in many cases." "Yes, indeed."

"To provide against such chances, then, we must wing c the children from the start so that if need arises they may fly away and escape." "What do you mean?" he said. "We must mount them when very young," said I, "and first have them taught to ride, and then conduct them to the scene of war, not on mettlesome war-steeds, but on the swiftest and gentlest horses possible; for thus they will have the best view of their own future business and also, if
The terms are technical. Cf. Laws 943 d ff., Lipsius, Das attische Recht (1908), ii. pp. 452 ff.

Hence: the word is chosen to give a touch of Spartan, or, as we should say, Roman severity. Cf. Sophist 235 c, 488

1 van Leeuwen: mss. θέλουσι.
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need arises, will most securely escape to safety in the train of elder guides." "I think you are right," he said. "But now what of the conduct of war? What should be the attitude of the soldiers to one another and the enemy? Am I right in my notions or not?" "Tell me what notions," he said. "Anyone of them who deserts his post, or flings away his weapons, or is guilty of any similar act of cowardice, should be reduced to the artisan or farmer class, should he not?" "By all means." "And anyone who is taken alive by the enemy we will make a present of to his captors, shall we not, to deal with their catch as they please?" "Quite so." "And don't you agree that the one who wins the prize of valour and distinguishes himself shall first be crowned by his fellows in the campaign, by the lads and boys each in turn?" "I do." "And be greeted with the right hand?" "That, too." "But I presume you wouldn't go as far as this?" "What?" "That he should kiss and be kissed by everyone?" "By all means," he said, "and I add to the law the provision that during that campaign none whom he wishes to kiss be allowed to refuse, so that if one is in love with anyone, male or female, he may be the more eager to win the prize." "Excellent," said I, "and we have already said that the opportunity of marriage will be more readily provided for the good

Aeschyl. Eumen. 148, Horace, Odes, iii. 5. 33 ff. Plutarch, De aud. poet. 30, says that in Homer no Greeks are taken prisoners, only Trojans.

d The deplorable facetiousness of the following recalls the vulgarity of Xenophon's guard-house conversations. It is almost the only passage in Plato that one would wish to blot. Helvetius, otherwise anything but a Platonist, characteristically adopts it, Lange, History of Materialism, ii. p. 86.
XV. Ἑὰν τὸις ἀλλοις καὶ αἱρέσεις τῶν τοιούτων πολλάκις παρὰ τοὺς ἀλλους ἐσονται, ἵν' ὁ τι πλείστοι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου γίγνωνται, εἰρηταὶ ἦδη. Εἴπομεν γὰρ, ἐφη.

"Ομηρος τὸν εὐδοκιμήσαντα ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ νάτοισιν ἄναντα ἐφῆ διηνεκέσσοι γεραίρεσθαι, ὡς ταύτην ὅικείαν ὀφθαλμάν τῷ ἥβωντι τε καὶ ἀνδρείω, ἐξ ἓς ἀμα τῷ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ τὴν ἵσχυν αὐξήσει. Ὁρθότατα, ἐφη. Πεισόμεθα ἄρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτα γε 'Ομηρω. καὶ γὰρ ἥμεις ἐν τε θυσίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πάσι τοὺς ἄγαθος, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἄγαθοι φαίνωνται, καὶ ὑμνοὶ καὶ ὦς νῦν δὴ Ε ἐλέγομεν τιμήσομεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐδραίς τε καὶ κρέασιν ἵδε πλείοις δεπάσσων, ἴνα ἅμα τῷ τιμάν ἄσκωμεν τοὺς ἄγαθος ἀνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας. Κάλλιστα, ἐφη, λέγεις. Εἰέν τῶν δὲ δὴ ἀποθανόντων ἐπὶ στρατείας ὅς ἂν εὐδοκιμήσας τελευτήσῃ, ἀρ' οὗ πρῶτοι μὲν φήσομεν τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους εἶναι; Πάντων γε μάλιστα. Ἀλλ' οὐ πεισόμεθα Ἡσιόδω, ἐπειδὰν τινὲς τοῦ τοιούτου γένους τελευτήσωσιν, ὡς ἄρα

469 οἷ μὲν δαίμονες ἄγνοι ἐπιχθονοι τελεύθουσιν,
ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες μερότων ἀνθρώπων;
Πεισόμεθα μὲν οὖν. Διαπυθόμενοι ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ,
πῶς χρῆ τοὺς δαίμονίους τε καὶ θείους τιθέναι καὶ
tίνι διαφόρῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ θήσομεν ἢ ἂν

a Il. vii. 321-322. Cf. also viii. 162, xii. 311.
b Cf. 415 A.

c Works and Days 121 ff. Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 437. 490
man, and that he will be more frequently selected than the others for participation in that sort of thing, in order that as many children as possible may be born from such stock." "We have," he replied.

XV. "But, furthermore, we may cite Homer too for the justice of honouring in such ways the valiant among our youth. For Homer says that Ajax, who had distinguished himself in the war, was honoured with the long chine, assuming that the most fitting meed for a brave man in the prime of his youth is that from which both honour and strength will accrue to him." "Most rightly," he said. "We will then," said I, "take Homer as our guide in this at least. We, too, at sacrifices and on other like occasions, will reward the good so far as they have proved themselves good with hymns and the other privileges of which we have just spoken, and also with seats of honour and meat and full cups, so as to combine physical training with honour for the good, both men and women." "Nothing could be better," he said. "Very well; and of those who die on campaign, if anyone's death has been especially glorious, shall we not, to begin with, affirm that he belongs to the golden race?" "By all means." "And shall we not believe Hesiod who tells us that when anyone of this race dies, so it is that they become

Hallowed spirits dwelling on earth, averters of evil, Guardians watchful and good of articulate-speaking mortals?"

"We certainly shall believe him." "We will inquire of Apollo, then, how and with what distinction we are to bury men of more than human, of divine, qualities, and deal with them according to his

\* Cf. 427 b-c.
εξηγήται; Τί δ' οὐ μέλλομεν; Καί τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον ὡς δαιμόνων οὕτω θεραπεύσομέν τε καὶ
Β προσκυνήσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θήκας· ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα νομισοῦμεν, ὅταν τις γῆρα ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ
teleutήσῃ τῶν ὅσοι ἂν διαφερόντως ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀγαθοι κριθῶσιν; Δίκαιον γοῦν, ἐφή. Τί δαί; πρὸς τοὺς πολέμιους πῶς ποιήσουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ
οἱ στρατιώται; Τὸ ποῖον δή; Πρῶτον μὲν ἀνδρα-
pοδισμοῦ πέρι δοκεῖ δίκαιον Ἑλληνας Ἑλληνίδας
πόλεις ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι, ἢ μὴ; ἄλλη ἐπιτρέπειν
catat to dunamein kai toouto ethizein, tov 'Ellh-
Cνικός γένοις φειδεσθαι, εὐλαβομένους τὴν ὑπὸ
tōn barbáron douleían; "Ολω καὶ παντὶ, ἐφη,
diaferει τὸ φειδεσθαι. Μηδὲ Ἑλλῆνα ἄρα δούλον
ekthēsai mēte autōs tois te allous "Ελλησ
oūtō εὐμβουλεύειν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη· μᾶλλον
γ' ἂν οὖν οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους τρέπουντο,
εαυτῶν δ' ἀπέχουντο. Τί δαί; σκυλεύειν, ἢν δ'
ἐγώ, τοὺς τελευτήσαντας πλῆν ὀπλων, ἐπειδὰν
νικήσωσιν, ἢ καλῶς ἔχει; ἢ οὐ πρόφασιν μὲν τοῖς
Dδεῖλοις ἔχει μὴ πρὸς τὸν μαχόμενον ἰέναι, ὡς τι
tōn deóntων δρώντας, ὅταν περὶ τῶν τεθνεῶτα
κυπτάζωσι, πολλὰ δὲ ἠδὴ στρατόπεδα διὰ τὴν
toiaútēn ἀρπαγὴν ἀπώλετο; Καὶ μάλα. Ἀν-
elèutheron δὲ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ φιλοχρήματον νεκρὸν
sulían, καὶ γυναικείας τε καὶ σμικρὰς διανοίας τὸ
poleimion nomizein to sóma toou thevenwto atoppta-

a εξηγήται: cf. 427 c.
b τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον: cf. Pindar in Meno 81 c, Phaedo
81 A.
c For this Pan-Hellenic feeling cf. Xen. Ages. 7. 6,
Hellen. i. 6. 14, Aeschines ii. 115, Isoc. Panegyricus.
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response. a " "How can we do otherwise?" "And ever after b we will bestow on their graves the tendance and worship paid to spirits divine. And we will practise the same observance when any who have been adjudged exceptionally good in the ordinary course of life die of old age or otherwise?" "That will surely be right," he said. "But again, how will our soldiers conduct themselves toward enemies?" "In what respect?" "First, in the matter of making slaves of the defeated, do you think it right for Greeks to reduce Greek cities c to slavery, or rather that, so far as they are able, they should not suffer any other city to do so, but should accustom Greeks to spare Greeks, foreseeing the danger d of enslavement by the barbarians?" "Sparing them is wholly and altogether the better," said he. "They are not, then, themselves to own Greek slaves, either, and they should advise the other Greeks not to?" "By all means," he said; "at any rate in that way they would be more likely to turn against the barbarians and keep their hands from one another." "And how about stripping the dead after victory of anything except their weapons: is that well? Does it not furnish a pretext to cowards not to advance on the living foe, as if they were doing something needful when poking e about the dead? Has not this snatching at the spoils ere now destroyed many an army?" "Yes, indeed." "And don't you think it illiberal and greedy to plunder a corpse, and is it not the mark of a womanish and petty f spirit to deem the body of the dead an enemy when the real foeman has flown

a For the following cf. Laws 693 a, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. p. 275.
c Cf. Juvenal, Sat. xiii. 189-191.
μένου τοῦ ἔχθρου, λελούπτος δὲ ὅ ἐπολέμει; ἦ
Ε ὀἴει τι διάφορον δράν τοὺς τοῦτο ποιοῦντας τῶν
κυνῶν, αἱ τοὺς λίθους οἳς ἂν βληθῶσι χαλεπαῖνουσι,
τοῦ βαλόντος" οὐχ ἀπτόμεναι; Ὄυδε σμικρόν, ἐφη.
'Εατέον ἀρα τὰς νεκροσυλίας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναρέ-
σεων διακωλύσεις: 'Εατέον μέντοι, ἐφη, νὴ Δία.
XVI. Όυδε μὴν ποὺ πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ὅπλα
οίσομεν ὡς ἀναθήσοντες, ἄλλως τε καὶ τὰ τῶν
470 Ἑλλήνων, εάν τι ἡμῶν μέλη τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους
'Ἑλλήνας εὐνοίας· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ φοβήσομέθα, μή
τι μίασμα ἢ πρὸς ἱερὸν τὰ τοιάντα ἀπὸ τῶν οἴκειων
φέρειν, εὰν μὴ τι δὴ ὁ θεὸς ἄλλο λέγῃ. 'Ορθότατα,
ἐφη. Τί δαί; γής τε τιμήσεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς
καὶ οἰκιῶν ἔμπροσθεσθαι ποιῶν τι σοι δράσουσιν
οἱ στρατιώται πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους; Σοῦ, ἐφη,
δόξαν ἀποφαινομένου ἥδεως ἂν ἀκούσαμι. 'Εμοὶ
Β μὲν τοῖνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τούτων μηδέτερα
ποιεῖν, ἄλλα τὸν ἐπέτειον καρπὸν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· καὶ
ὁν ἐνεκα, βούλει σοι λέγω; Πάνω γε. Φαινεῖται
μοι, ὦσπερ καὶ ὀνομάζεται δύο ταῦτα ὄνοματα,
πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσεις, οὐτω καὶ εἶνοι δύο, ὄντα

1 The mss. vary between βαλόντος and βάλλοντος, which
Aristotle, who refers to the passage (Rhet. 1406 b 33),
seems to have read. It might be important in the class-
room to distinguish the continuous present from the matter-
of-fact aorist.

a ἀποπταμένου: both Homer and Sappho so speak of the
soul as flitting away.

b The body is only the instrument of the soul. Cf.
Socrates’ answer to the question, “How shall we bury
you?” Phaedo 115 c ff. and the elaboration of the idea in
Acle. I. 129 ε, whence it passed into European literature.

c Quoted by Aristotle, Rhet. 1406 b. Epictetus iii. 19. 4
complains that nurses encourage children to strike the stone
on which they stumble. Cf. also Lucan vi. 220-223. Otto,
494
away and left behind only the instrument with which he fought? Do you see any difference between such conduct and that of the dogs who snarl at the stones that hit them but don’t touch the thrower?

"Not the slightest." "We must abandon, then, the plundering of corpses and the refusal to permit their burial." "By heaven, we certainly must," he said.

XVI. "And again, we will not take weapons to the temples for dedicatory offerings, especially the weapons of Greeks, if we are at all concerned to preserve friendly relations with the other Greeks. Rather we shall fear that there is pollution in bringing such offerings to the temples from our kind unless in a case where the god bids otherwise." "Most rightly," he said. "And in the matter of devastating the land of Greeks and burning their houses, how will your soldiers deal with their enemies." "I would gladly hear your opinion of that." "In my view," said I, "they ought to do neither, but confine themselves to taking away the annual harvest. Shall I tell you why?" "Do." "In my opinion, just as we have the two terms, war and faction, so there are also two things, distinguished

Sprichwörter der Römer, p. 70, cites Pliny, N.H. xxix. 102, and Pacuv. v. 38, Ribb. Trag. Cf. Montaigne i. 4, "Ainsi emporte les bestes leur rage à s’attaquer à la pierre et au fer qui les a bécées."

Plato as a boy may have heard of the Thebans’ refusal to allow the Athenians to bury their dead after Delium. Cf. Thucyd. iv. 97-101, and Eurip. Supplices.

For the practice cf. Aeschyl. Septem 275-279 and Ag. 577-579. Italian cities and American states have restored to one another the flags so dedicated from old wars. Cf. Cic. De invent. ii. 70 “at tamen aeternum inimicitiarum monumentum Graios de Graiis statuere non oportet.”

For similar caution cf. on 427 b-c.
épí δυοῖν τινοῖν διαφοράιν. λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο τὸ μὲν οἴκειον καὶ ξυγγενές, τὸ δὲ ἄλλοτριον καὶ ὕθνειον. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἴκειου ἔχθρα στάσις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἄλλοτριον πόλεμοι. Καὶ οὐδὲν γε, ἐφη, ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγεις. Ὁρὰ δὴ καὶ

C eἰ τὸδὲ πρὸς τρόπον λέγω. φημὶ γὰρ τὸ μὲν Ἐλληνικὸν γένος αὐτὸ αὐτῷ οἴκειον εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενές, τῷ δὲ βαρβαρικῷ ὕθνειόν τε καὶ ἄλλοτριον. Καλῶς γε, ἐφη. Ἐλλήνας μὲν ἄρα βαρβάρος καὶ βαρβάρους Ἐλλησὶ πολεμεῖν μαχομένους τε φήσομεν καὶ πολεμίους φύσει εἶναι, καὶ πόλεμον τὴν ἐχθραν ταύτην κλητέον. Ἐλλήνας δὲ Ἐλλησιών, ὅταν τι τοιοῦτο δρῶσι, φύσει μὲν φίλους εἶναι, νοσεῖν δ’ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τῆς Ἐλλάδας καὶ στασιάζειν, καὶ στάσιν τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἐχθραν κλητέον. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἐφη, ξυγχυρῶ ὡτὶ νομίζειν. Σκόπει δὴ, εἰπον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ νῦν ὁμολογουμένῃ στάσει, ὅτιν άν τι τοιοῦτο γένηται καὶ διαστῇ πόλις, ἐάν ἐκάτεροι ἐκατέρω τέμνωσιν ἀγροὺς καὶ οἰκίας ἐμπυρώσωσιν, ως ἀληθερώδης τε δοκεῖ ή στάσις εἶναι καὶ οὐδέτεροι αὐτῶν φιλοπόλιδες· οὔ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἐτόλμων τῇ τροφῇ τε καὶ μητέρᾳ κείρειν· ἀλλὰ μέτριον εἶναι τοὺς καρποὺς

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a I have so translated technically in order to imply that the Plato of the Republic is already acquainted with the terminology of the Sophist. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, notes 375 and 377, followed by Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 504. But most editors take διαφορά here as dissension, and construe “applied to the disagreements of two things,” which may be right. Cf. Sophist 228 a στάσιν . . . τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἐξ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν.

b Plato shared the natural feelings of Isocrates, Demosthenes, and all patriotic Greeks. Cf. Isoc. Panegyr. 157, 184, Panath. 163; Menex. 237 ff., Laws 692 c and 693 a. 496
by two differentiae. The two things I mean are the friendly and kindred on the one hand and the alien and foreign on the other. Now the term employed for the hostility of the friendly is faction, and for that of the alien is war." "What you say is in nothing beside the mark," he replied. "Consider, then, if this goes to the mark. I affirm that the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to the barbarian." "Rightly," he said. "We shall then say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature, and that war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred. Greeks, however, we shall say, are still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is sick in that case and divided by faction, and faction is the name we must give to that enmity." "I will allow you that habit of speech," he said. "Then observe," said I, "that when anything of this sort occurs in faction, as the word is now used, and a state is divided against itself, if either party devastates the land and burns the houses of the other such factional strife is thought to be an accursed thing and neither party to be true patriots. Otherwise, they would never have endured thus to outrage their nurse and mother. But the moderate and reasonable thing is thought to be that the victors shall take away the crops of the van-

It is uncritical then with Newman (op. cit. p. 430) and many others to take as a recantation of this passage the purely logical observation in Polit. 262 b that Greek and barbarian is an unscientific dichotomy of mankind. Cf. on the whole question the dissertation of Friedrich Weber, Platons Stellung zu den Barbaren.

Cf. supra 414 e, Menex. 237 e, Tim. 40 b, Laws 740 a, Aeschyl. Septem 16.
Ε ἀφαίρεσθαι τοὺς κρατοῦσι τῶν κρατουμένων, καὶ
dιανοεῖσθαι ὡς διαλλαγησομένων καὶ οὐκ ἂεὶ πο-
λεμησόντων. Πολὺ γάρ, ἐφη, ήμερωτέρων αὐτῇ ἡ
dιάνοια ἐκείνης. Τί δὲ δὴ; ἐφην· ἢν σὺ πόλιν
οἰκίζεις, οὐχ Ἕλληνις ἔσται; Δὲι γ' αὐτῇν, ἐφη.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ ἠμεροὶ ἔσονται; Σφόδρα
γε. 'Αλλ' οὐ φιλελλήνες οὐδὲ οἰκεῖαν τὴν Ἕλλαδα
ἡγησόνται, οὐδὲ κοινωνήσουσι δυτερός οἱ ἄλλοι
ἰερῶν; Καὶ σφόδρα γε. Οὐκοῦν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς

471 Ἕλληνας διαφορὰν ὡς οἰκείους στάσιν ἡγησόνται
καὶ οὐδὲ ὅνομάσουσι πόλεμον; Ὅν γάρ. Καὶ ὡς
dιαλλαγησόμενοι ἁρα διοίσονται; Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
Εὔμενίως δὴ σωφρονοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ δουλεία
κολάζοντες οὐδ' ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ, σωφρονοῦσαι ὀντες,
οὐ πολέμωι. Οὖτως, ἐφη. Οὖδ' ἁρά τὴν Ἕλλαδα
"Ελληνας ὀντές κερδοῦσιν, οὐδὲ οἰκήσεις ἐμ-
πρήσουσιν, οὐδὲ ὁμολογήσουσιν ἐν ἐκάστῃ πόλει
πάντας ἔχθρος αὐτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ
γυναικας καὶ παῖδας, ἀλλ' ὀλίγους ἂεὶ ἔχθρος

Β τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς διαφορᾶς· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πάντα
οὔτε τὴν γῆν ἑθελήσουσι κείρειν αὐτῶν, ὡς φίλων
τῶν πολλῶν, οὔτε οἰκίας ἀνατρέπειν, ἀλλὰ μέχρι
τούτου ποιήσονται τὴν διαφοράν, μέχρι οὐ ἂν οἱ
αἰτίοι ἀναγκασθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνατινῶν ἀλγοῦντων

a Cf. Epist. 354 Α, Herod. ii. 178, Isoc. Phil. 122,
Panegyr. 96, Evag. 40, Panath. 241. The word is still
significant for international politics, and must be retained
in the translation.


c The same language was frequently used in the recent
World War, but the practice was sometimes less civilized
than that which Plato recommends. Hobhouse (Mind in
Evolution, p. 384), writing earlier, said, "Plato's conclusions
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quished, but that their temper shall be that of men who expect to be reconciled and not always to wage war." "That way of feeling," he said, "is far less savage than the other." "Well, then," said I, "is not the city that you are founding to be a Greek city?" "It must be," he said. "Will they then not be good and gentle?" "Indeed they will." "And won't they be philhellenes, lovers of Greeks, and will they not regard all Greece as their own and not renounce their part in the holy places common to all Greeks?" "Most certainly." "Will they not then regard any difference with Greeks who are their own people as a form of faction and refuse even to speak of it as war?" "Most certainly." "And they will conduct their quarrels always looking forward to a reconciliation?" "By all means." "They will correct them, then, for their own good, not chastising them with a view to their enslavement or their destruction, but acting as correctors, not as enemies." "They will," he said. "They will not, being Greeks, ravage Greek territory nor burn habitations, and they will not admit that in any city all the population are their enemies, men, women and children, but will say that only a few at any time are their foes, those, namely, who are to blame for the quarrel. And on all these considerations they will not be willing to lay waste the soil, since the majority are their friends, nor to destroy the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the

(Rep. 469-471) show how narrow was the conception of humanitarian duties in the fourth century." It is, I think, only modern fancy that sees irony in the conclusion: "treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks."
doûnavi díkhn. 'Egw mèn, ἕφη, ὁμολογῶ οὗτο
δείν πρὸς τοὺς ἑναντίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους πολίτας
προσφέρεσθαι: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους ὡς νῦν οἱ
'Ελληνες πρὸς ἄλληλους. Τιθῶμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτον
C τὸν νόμον τοῖς φύλαξι, μήτε γνὴν τέμνειν μήτε
οἰκίας ἐμπιπτάναι; Θῶμεν, ἕφη, καὶ ἔχειν γε
καλῶς ταύτα τε καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν.

XVII. Ἄλλα γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ Σώκρατες, εάν
τίς σοι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτρέπῃ λέγειν, οὐδέποτε
μηνοθῆσθαι δὲ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παρωσάμενος πάντα
tαύτα εἰρήκας, τὸ ὡς δυνατῆ ἀυτὴ ἡ πολιτεία
γενέσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατή· ἐπεῖ ὦτι γε,
eἰ γένοιτο, πάντ' ἂν εмедицин ἀγαθὰ πόλει ἢ γένοιτο,
καὶ ὁ σὺ παραλείπεσθε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦτι καὶ τοῖς πο-

D λεμίσω ἀριστ' ἂν μάχοντο τῷ ἰκιστα ἀπολείπεσθε
ἄλληλους, γιγνώσκοντες τε καὶ ἀνακαλοῦντες
tαῦτα τὰ ὄνοματα ἑαυτοὺς, ἀδελφοὺς, πατέρας,
νεῖς, ἐδὲ καὶ τὸ θῆλυ συστρατεύωτο, εἴτε καὶ
ἐν τῇ ἀυτῇ τάξει εἴτε καὶ ὁπισθεν ἑπιτεταγμένον,
φόβων τε ἐνεκα τοῖς ἐχθροῖς καὶ εἴ ποτε τις
ἀνάγκη βοηθείας γένοιτο, οἴδ' ὦτι ταύτη πάντη
ἄμαχοι ἂν εἴη· καὶ οὐκοὶ γε ἄ παραλείπεται
ἀγαθά, ὅσα ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς, ὅρω. ἀλλ' ὡς ἐμοῦ

Ε ὁμολογοῦντος πάντα ταύτα ὦτι εἴη ἂν καὶ ἄλλα
γε μυρία, εἰ γένοιτο ἡ πολιτεία αὐτῆ, μηκέτι
πλεῖων περὶ αὑτῆς λέγε, ἄλλα τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑδὲ πει-
ρώμηθα ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πείθειν, ὡς δυνατὸν καὶ ὅ
472 δυνατόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐώμεν. 'Εξαίφνησ γε

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a It is a mistaken ingenuity that finds a juncture between
two distinct versions here.


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suffering of the innocent." "I," he said, "agree that our citizens ought to deal with their Greek opponents on this wise, while treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks." "Shall we lay down this law also, then, for our guardians, that they are not to lay waste the land or burn the houses?" "Let us so decree," he said, "and assume that this and our preceding prescriptions are right.

XVII. "But I fear, Socrates, that, if you are allowed to go on in this fashion, you will never get to speak of the matter you put aside in order to say all this, namely, the possibility of such a polity coming into existence, and the way in which it could be brought to pass. I too am ready to admit that if it could be realized everything would be lovely for the state that had it, and I will add what you passed by, that they would also be most successful in war because they would be least likely to desert one another, knowing and addressing each other by the names of brothers, fathers, sons. And if the females should also join in their campaigns, whether in the ranks or marshalled behind to intimidate the enemy, or as reserves in case of need, I recognize that all this too would make them irresistible. And at home, also, I observe all the benefits that you omit to mention. But, taking it for granted that I concede these and countless other advantages, consequent on the realization of this polity, don't labour that point further; but let us at once proceed to try to convince ourselves of just this, that it is possible and how it is possible, dismissing everything else." "This is a
σύ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ καταδρομήν ἐποιήσω ἑπὶ τὸν λόγον μου, καὶ οὐ συγγυγώσκεισ στραγγευμένως. Ἡ όσος γὰρ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι μόνης μου τῷ δύῳ κύματε ἐκφυγόντι νῦν τὸ μέγιστον καὶ καλεπώτατον τῆς τρικυμίας ἐπάγεις, ὃ ἐπειδὰν ἰδὴς τε καὶ ἀκούσῃς, πάνυ συγγνώμην ἔξεις, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα ὥκνουν τε καὶ ἐδεδοίκη οὕτως παράδοξον λέγειν χάριν τοῦ σύ νεότατον καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν. ὁ οὖς ἄν, ἐφη, τοιαῦτα πλείως λέγης, ἤττον ὧν ἀφεθῆσαι ψῆ ἥμιῶν πρὸς τὸ μή εἰπεῖν, πὴ δυνατῆ γίγνεσθαι αὐτῇ ἢ πολιτείᾳ· ἄλλα λέγει καὶ μὴ διάτριβε. Οὐκοίν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, πρώτων μὲν τὸν χρή ἀναμνησθῆναι, ὅτι ἥμεις ξητούντες δικαιοσύνην οἴον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄδικίαν δεύρῳ ἥκομεν. Χρῆ· ἄλλα τὶ τοῦτο γ’; ἐφη. Οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἐὰν εὑρωμεν οἴον ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη, ἄρα καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν δίκαιον ἄξιόσωμεν μηδὲν δεῖν αὐτῆς ἐκείνης διαφέρειν, οὐτῶς.

1 στραγγευμένως, “loitering.” A rare word. See Blaydes on Aristoph. Acharn. 126. Most mss. read less aptly στρατευμένως, “my stratagem.”

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a ὥσπερ marks the figurative use as τῶν in Aeschines, Tim. 135 τῶν καταδρομήν.

b Cf. Introd. p. xvii. The third wave, sometimes the ninth, was proverbially the greatest. Cf. Euthydem. 293 λ, Lucan v. 672 “decimus dictu mirabile fluctus,” and Swinburne:

Who swims in sight of the great third wave
That never a swimmer shall cross or climb.

c συγγνώμην: L. & S. wrongly with ὅτι, “to acknowledge that . . . ”

d Cf. Introd. p. xii and note d. Plato seems to overlook the fact that the search was virtually completed in the fourth book.
sudden assault," indeed," said I, "that you have made on my theory, without any regard for my natural hesitation. Perhaps you don't realize that when I have hardly escaped the first two waves, you are now rolling up against me the 'great third wave' of paradox, the worst of all. When you have seen and heard that, you will be very ready to be lenient, recognizing that I had good reason after all for shrinking and fearing to enter upon the discussion of so paradoxical a notion." "The more such excuses you offer," he said, "the less you will be released by us from telling in what way the realization of this polity is possible. Speak on, then, and do not put us off." "The first thing to recall, then," I said, "is that it was the inquiry into the nature of justice and injustice that brought us to this pass." "Yes; but what of it?" he said. "Oh, nothing," I replied, only this: if we do discover what justice is, are we to demand that the just man shall differ from it in no respect, but shall conform in every way to the ideal? Or will it suffice us if he approximate to it as nearly as possible and partake of it more than others?"

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* oîôdev: idiom atic, like the English of the translation. Cf. Charm. 164 A, Gorg. 498 A, 515 E. The emphatic statement that follows of the value of ideals as ideals is Plato's warning hint that he does not expect the literal realization of his Utopia, though it would be disillusionizing to say so too explicitly. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxi-xxxii, and my paper on Plato's Laws, Class. Phil. ix. (1914) pp. 351 and 353. This is one of the chief ideas which Cicero derived from Plato. He applies it to his picture of the ideal orator, and the mistaken ingenuity of modern scholarship has deduced from this and attributed to the maleficent influence of Plato the post-Renaissance and eighteenth-century doctrine of fixed literary kinds. Cf. my note in the New York Nation, vol. ciii. p. 238, Sept. 7, 1916.
An ideal in the plastic arts is used to illustrate the thought. Cf. Aristot. Poetics 1461 b 14, Politics 1281 b 10, Cicero, Orator ii. 3, Xen. Mem. iii. 10, Finsler, Platon u. d. aristotelische Poetik, p. 56. Polyb. vi. 47. 7 gives a different turn to the comparison of the Republic to a statue. Plato is speaking from the point of view of ordinary opinion, and it is uncritical to find here and in 501 an admission that
"That will content us," he said. "A pattern, then," said I, "was what we wanted when we were inquiring into the nature of ideal justice and asking what would be the character of the perfectly just man, supposing him to exist, and, likewise, in regard to injustice and the completely unjust man. We wished to fix our eyes upon them as types and models, so that whatever we discerned in them of happiness or the reverse would necessarily apply to ourselves in the sense that whosoever is likest them will have the allotment most like to theirs. Our purpose was not to demonstrate the possibility of the realization of these ideals." "In that," he said, "you speak truly." "Do you think, then, that he would be any the less a good painter, who, after portraying a pattern of the ideally beautiful man and omitting no touch required for the perfection of the picture, should not be able to prove that it is actually possible for such a man to exist?" "Not I, by Zeus," he said. "Then were not we, as we say, trying to create in words the pattern of a good state?" "Certainly." "Do you think, then, that our words are any the less well spoken if we find ourselves unable to prove that it is possible for a state to be governed in accordance with our words?" "Of course not," he said. "That, then," said I, "is the truth of the matter. But if, to please you, we must do our best to show how most probably and in what respect these things would be most nearly realized, again, with a view to such a demonstration, grant me the same point." "What?" "Is it possible for the artist copies the idea, which is denied in Book X. 597 e ff. Apelt, Platonische Aufsätze, p. 67.

b Cf. 372 e.
c The point is so important that Plato repeats it more specifically.
473 οἶνον τέ τι πραχθήναι ὡς λέγεται, ἣ φύσιν ἔχει πράξιν λέεις ἦττον ἀλήθειας ἐφάπτεσθαι, κἂν εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ; ἀλλὰ σὺ πότερον ὁμολογεῖς οὕτως ἢ οὐ; Ὁμολογῶ, ἐφη. Τούτο μὲν δὴ μὴ ἀνάγκαζε με, οἷα τῷ λόγῳ διηλθομεν, τοιαῦτα παντάπασι καὶ τῷ ἑργῳ δεῖν γιγνόμενα ἀποφαίνειν ἀλλ', ἐὰν οἶοι τε γενώμεθα εὑρεῖν, ὡς ἂν ἐγγύτατα τῶν εἰρημένων πόλις οἰκήσειν, φάναι ἡμᾶς ἐξευρηκέναι, ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι, ὦ σὺ ἐπι-Β τάττεις. ἥ οὐκ ἀγαπήσεις τούτων τυγχάνων; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀγαπῶν. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ἐφη.

ΧVIII. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς οὐκικε, πευρώμεθα ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, τι ποτε νῦν κακῶς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττεται, δ’ ὁ οὐχ οὕτως οἰκοῦνται, καὶ τίνος ἂν σμικρότατον μεταβαλόντος ἔλθοι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας πόλις, μάλιστα μὲν ἐνός, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δυοῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὦ τι οὐλιγίστων καὶ σμικρότατων τὴν Σύναμνων. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Ἐνός μὲν τοίνυν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, μεταβαλόντος δοκοῦμεν μοι ἔχειν δεῖξαι ότι μεταπέσοι ἂν, οὐ μέντοι σμικροῖ γε οὐδὲ ραδίου, δυνατοῦ δὲ: Τίνος; ἐφη. Ἐπ’ αὐτῷ1 δὴ, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, εἰμι, δ’ τῶν μεγίστων προεικάζομεν χύματι εἰρήσεται δ’ οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτι τε ἀτεχνῶς ὦσπερ κύμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξία κατακλύσειν. σκόπει δὲ δ’ μέλλω λέγειν. Λέγει,
anything to be realized in deed as it is spoken in word, or is it the nature of things that action should partake of exact truth less than speech, even if some deny it? Do you admit it or not?" "I do," he said. "Then don't insist," said I, "that I must exhibit as realized in action precisely what we expounded in words. But if we can discover how a state might be constituted most nearly answering to our description, you must say that we have discovered that possibility of realization which you demanded. Will you not be content if you get this? I for my part would." "And I too," he said.

XVIII. "Next, it seems, we must try to discover and point out what it is that is now badly managed in our cities, and that prevents them from being so governed, and what is the smallest change that would bring a state to this manner of government, preferably a change in one thing, if not, then in two, and, failing that, the fewest possible in number and the slightest in potency." "By all means," he said. "There is one change, then," said I, "which I think that we can show would bring about the desired transformation. It is not a slight or an easy thing but it is possible." "What is that?" said he. "I am on the very verge," said I, "of what we likened to the greatest wave of paradox. But say it I will, even if, to keep the figure, it is likely to wash us away on billows of laughter and scorn. Listen." "I am all

p. 64. The word is the expression of the thought. It is more plastic (infra 588 d, Laws 736 b) and, as Goethe says "von einem Wort lässt sich kein Iota rauben."

[\textit{εἰρησταί}: so used by the orators to introduce a bold statement. Cf. Aeschines ii. 22, Demosth. xix. 224, xi. 17, xiv. 24, xxii. 198, etc.]

[\textit{More literally "deluge or overwhelm with ridicule."}]

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This is perhaps the most famous sentence in Plato. Cf. for the idea 499 b, 540 d, Laws 711 d, 712 a, 713 e ff. It is paraphrased by the author of the seventh Epistle (324 b, 326 a-b, 328 a-b) who perhaps quotes Plato too frequently to be Plato himself. Epistle ii. 310 e, though sometimes quoted in this connexion, is not quite the same thought. It is implied in Phaedrus 252 e φιλόσοφος καὶ ἡγεμονικός, and Polit. 293 c, and only seems to be contradicted in Euthydem. 306 b. Aristotle is said to have contradicted it in a lost work (fr. 79, 1489 b 8 ff.). It is paraphrased or parodied by a score of writers from Polybius xii. 28 to Bacon, Hobbes, More, Erasmus, and Bernard Shaw. Boethius transmitted it to the Middle Ages (Cons. Phil. i. 4. 11). It was always on the lips of Marcus Aurelius. Cf. Capitol, Aurel. i. 1 and iv. 27. It was a standardized topic of compliment to princes in Themistius, Julian, the Panegyrici Latini, and many modern imitators. Among the rulers who have been
attention," he said. "Unless," said I, "either philosophers become kings in our states or those whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there is a conjunction of these two things, political power and philosophic intelligence, while the motley horde of the natures who at present pursue either apart from the other are compulsorily excluded, there can be no cessation of troubles, dear Glaucon, for our states, nor, I fancy, for the human race either. Nor, until this happens, will this constitution which we have been expounding in theory ever be put into practice within the limits of possibility and see the light of the sun. But this is the thing that has made me so long shrink from speaking out, because I saw that it would be a very paradoxical saying. For it is not easy to see that there is no other way of happiness either for private or public life." Whereupon he, "Socrates," said he, "after hurling at us such an utterance and statement as that, you must expect to be attacked by a great multitude of our men of light and leading, who forthwith will, so to speak, cast off thus compared with Plato’s philosophic king are Marcus Aurelius, Constantine, Arcadius, James I., Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. There is a partial history of the commonplace in T. Sinko’s Program, Sententiae Platonicae de philosophis regnantibus fata quae fuerint, Krakow, 1904, in the supplementary article of Karl Praechter, Byzantinische Zeitschrift, xiv. (1905) pp. 479-491, and in the dissertation of Emil Wolff, Francis Bacons Verhältnis zu Platon, Berlin, 1908, pp. 60 ff.

\* Plato’s condescension to the ordinary mind that cannot be expected to understand often finds expression in this form. Cf. supra 366 c, infra 489 c, Theaetet. 176 c, and Rep. 495 ε ἀνάγκη.

\* Lit. "many and not slight men."
474 τά ἐμίατα γυμνούς, λαβόντας ὧ τι ἐκάστω παρέτυχεν ὑπόλοιπον, θείαν διαστειμένους ὡς θαυμάσια ἐργασομένους· οὖς εἰ μὴ ἀμυνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐκφεύξει, τῷ ὄντι τωθαξάμενος δύσεις δίκην. Οὐκοῦν οὐ μοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τούτων αἴτιος; Καλῶς γ', ἐφη, ἐγὼ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ τοί σε οὐ προδώσω, ἀλλ' ἀμυνώ οἷς δύναμαι· δύναμαι δὲ εὔνοια τε καὶ τῷ παρακελεύσθαι, καὶ ἵσως ἃν ἄλλον τοῦ ἐμμελέ.

Β στερόν σου ἀποκρινοίμην. ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχων τοιοῦτον βοηθῶν πειρῶ τοὺς ἀπιστοῦσιν ἐνδείξασθαι, ὦτι ἔχει ἢ σοὶ λέγεις. Πειρατέον, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἔπειδη καὶ σοὶ οὕτω μεγάλην ξυμμαχίαν παρέχει. ἄναγκαιον οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἴ μελλομένη τῇ ἐκφεύξεσθαι οὖς λέγεις, διορίσασθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, τοὺς φιλοσόφους τίνας λέγοντες τολμῶμεν φάναι δεῖν ἁρχεῖν, ἵνα διαδήλων γενομένων δύνηται τις ἀμύνεσθαι ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὦτι τοῖς μὲν προσήκει φύσει ἀπτε- 

C σθαί τε φιλοσοφίας ἡγεμονεύειν τ' ἐν πόλει, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις μῆτε ἀπτεσθαι ἀκολουθεῖν τε τῷ ἡγουμένῳ. Ὡρα ἃν εἴη, ἐφη, ὀρίζεσθαι. Ἰθι δή, ἀκολούθησον μοι τῇδε, ἕαν αὐτό ἀμὴ γέ τῇ ἱκανώς ἐξηγησόμεθα. Ἄγε, ἐφη. Ἀναμμηνήσκειν οὖν σε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, δεήσει, ἢ μέμνησαι ὅτι ἢν ἄν φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεὶ φανήσαι αὐτόν, ἕαν ὀρθῶς λέγηται, ὦ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ μὴ, ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέργοντα;

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a Cf. Hipponax, fr. 74 (58), Theophrast. Char. 27, Aristoph. Wasps 408.
b Cf. Apol. 35 A, Theaetet. 151 A.
c τῷ δὲντι verifies the strong word τωθαξάμενος.
d Cf. Theaetet. 162 A 7. The dialectician prefers a docile respondent. Cf. Sophist 217 c, Parmen. 137 B.
e ἐπὶ δὲ μὴ: for the idiom cf. Phil. 22 A, Laws 797 e, 510
their garments and strip and, snatching the first weapon that comes to hand, rush at you with might and main, prepared to do dreadful deeds. And if you don’t find words to defend yourself against them, and escape their assault, then to be scorned and flouted will in very truth be the penalty you will have to pay.”

“'And isn’t it you,’” said I, “that have brought this upon me and are to blame?” “And a good thing, too,” said he; “but I won’t let you down, and will defend you with what I can. I can do so with my good will and my encouragement, and perhaps I might answer your questions more suitably than another. So, with such an aid to back you, try to make it plain to the doubters that the truth is as you say.”

“I must try,” I replied, “since you proffer so strong an alliance. I think it requisite, then, if we are to escape the assailants you speak of, that we should define for them whom we mean by the philosophers, who we dare to say ought to be our rulers. When these are clearly discriminated it will be possible to defend ourselves by showing that to them by their very nature belong the study of philosophy and political leadership, while it befits the other sort to let philosophy alone and to follow their leader.”

“It is high time,” he said, “to produce your definition.” “Come, then, follow me on this line, if we may in some fashion or other explain our meaning.”

“Proceed,” he said. “Must I remind you, then,” said I, “or do you remember, that when we affirm that a man is a lover of something, it must be apparent that he is fond of all of it? It will not do to say that some of it he likes and some does not.”

923 c, Demodocus’s epigram on the Chians, Aeschyl. Persae 802, Soph. O.C. 1671.
XIX. 'Αναμμήσκειν, ἕφη, ὥς ἔοικε, δεῖ· οὗ

D γὰρ πᾶν γε ἐννοεῖ. "Ἀλλα, εἰπον, ἐπρεπεν, δὲ

Γλαύκων, λέγειν ἃ λέγεις· ἀνδρὶ δὲ ἐρωτικῷ οὖν

πρέπει ἀμνημονεῖν, ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἐν ἁρα τὸν

φιλόσοφα καὶ ἐρωτικὸν ἀμή γέ τη δάκνουσι ὑπὲρ

καὶ κινοῦσι, δοκοῦντες ἄξιοι εἶναι ἐπιμελείας τῇ

καὶ τοῦ ἀσπάζεσθαι. ἦν οὖν ὁ γραφεῖτο πρὸς

τοὺς καλοὺς; ὃ μὲν, ὃ τοις συμόν, ἐπίχαρας κληθεῖς

ἐπανεθήσεται ύπ' ὕμιν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ γρυπὸν βα-

σιλικόν φατε εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δῆ διὰ μέσου τούτων

Ε ἐμμετρᾶτα ἔχειν, μέλανας δὲ ἀνδρικοὺς ἰδεῖν,

λευκοὺς δὲ θεῶν πάίδας εἶναι· μελιχλώρους δὲ καὶ

τούνομα οἷς τινὸς ἀλλο ποίημα εἶναι ἡ ἑραστοῦ

ὑποκοριζομένου τε καὶ εὐχερῶς φέροντος τὴν

ἀρχότητα, ἐὰν ἐπὶ ἁρα ἦ; καὶ ἕν λόγῳ πάσας

475 προφάσεις προφασίζεσθε τε καὶ πάσας φωνᾶς

ἀφίετε, ὡστε μηδένα ἀποβάλλειν τῶν ἀνθρώπων

ἐν ἁρα. Εἰ βούλεις, ἕφη, ἐπ' ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν

ἐρωτικῶν ὅτι οὔτω ποιοῦσιν, συγχωρῶ τοῦ λόγου

χάριν. Τί δαί; ἦν δ' ἐγὼ τοὺς φιλούνους οὐ τὰ

αὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιοῦντα ὁρᾶς, πάντα οἶνων ἐπὶ πάσης

προφάσεως ἀσπαζομένους; Καὶ μάλα. Καὶ μὴν

φιλοτιμούς γε, ὡς ἐγώμαι, καθορᾶς, ὃτι, ἀν μὴ

στρατηγηγῆσαι δύνανται, τριττυρχοῦσι, καὶ μὴ

Β ὑπὸ μειζόνων καὶ σεμνοτέρων τιμᾶσθαι, ὕπο

a Another of the famous sentences that would be worth

a monograph. Cf. Lucretius iv. 1160, Molière, Misan-

thrope, ii. 5, Horace, Sat. i. 338. F. Brunetière, Les Époques

du théâtre français, p. 76, thinks that Molière took it from

Scarron, not from Lucretius. Shakes. Much Ado, iii. i.

reverses the conceit, Santayana, Reason in Society, p. 25,

writes prettily about it.

b Cf. Aristot. Eth. i. 8. 10 ἐκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἢδυ πρὸς δ λέγεται

φιλοτιμοῦτος. Cf. the old Latin hexameters—

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XIX. "I think you will have to remind me," he said, "for I don't apprehend at all." "That reply, Glaucon," said I, "befitted another rather than you. It does not become a lover to forget that all adolescents in some sort sting and stir the amorous lover of youth and appear to him deserving of his attention and desirable. Is not that your 'reaction' to the fair? One, because his nose is tip-tilted, you will praise as piquant, the beak of another you pronounce right-royal, the intermediate type you say strikes the harmonious mean, the swarthy are of manly aspect, the white are children of the gods divinely fair, and as for honey-hued, do you suppose the very word is anything but the euphemistic invention of some lover who can feel no distaste for sallowness when it accompanies the blooming time of youth? And, in short, there is no pretext you do not allege and there is nothing you shrink from saying to justify you in not rejecting any who are in the bloom of their prime." "If it is your pleasure," he said, "to take me as your example of this trait in lovers, I admit it for the sake of the argument." "Again," said I, "do you not observe the same thing in the lovers of wine? They welcome every wine on any pretext." "They do, indeed." "And so I take it you have observed that men who are covetous of honour, if they can't get themselves elected generals, are captains of a company. And if they can't be honoured by great men

Si bene quid memini causae sunt quinque bibendi:
Hospitis adventus, praesens sitis atque futura,
Aut vini bonitas, aut quaelibet altera causa.

Cf. Theophrastus, Char. 21 (Loeb) μικροφιλοτιμίας, petty pride.

τριττυαρχοσι, "command the soldiers of a trittys" or third of one of the ten tribes.

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σμικροτέρων καὶ φαυλοτέρων τιμώμενοι ἀγαπῶσιν, ὡς ὀλως τιμῆς ἐπιθυμηται ὄντες. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Τοῦτο δὴ φαθὶ ἢ μὴ· ἄρ' ὅν ἂν τινος ἐπιθυμητικοῖν λέγωμεν, παντὸς τοῦ εἶδος τοῦτον φήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ τοῦ μὲν, τοῦ δὲ οὐ; Παντὸς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μὲν, τῆς δ' οὖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσης;

C Ἀληθῆ. Τὸν ἄρα περὶ τὰ μαθήματα δυσχεραίνοντα, ἀλλως τε καὶ νέον ὄντα καὶ μήπως λόγον ἐχόντα τί τε ἥχωστον καὶ μή, οὐ φήσομεν φιλομαθῆ οὔτε φιλόσοφον εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸν περὶ τὰ σιτία δυσχερὴ οὔτε πεινὴν φαμέν οὔτε ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν, οὔτε φιλόσιτον ἀλλὰ κακόσιτον εἶναι. Καὶ ὅρθως γε φήσομεν. Τὸν δὲ δὴ εὔχερως ἔθελοντα παντὸς μαθήματος γεύεσθαι καὶ ἀσμένως ἐπὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἴόντα καὶ ἀπλήστως ἐχόντα, τοῦτον δ' ἐν δίκη φήσομεν φιλόσοφον. ἢ γάρ; καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἔφη,

D Πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἀτοποὶ ἐσονται σοι τοιοῦτοι· οἱ τε γὰρ φιλοθεάμους πάντες ἐμοίγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμανθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι, οἰ τε φιλήκου τοιοποιταὶ τινὲς εἰσιν ὡς γ' ἐν φιλοσόφοις τιθέναι, οἱ πρὸς μὲν λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην

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a δυσχεραίνοντα, squeamish, particular, “choicy.” Cf. supra 391 e, 426 d, and Pope, Essay on Criticism, 288—

Those heads, as stomachs, are not sure the best,
Which nauseate all, and nothing can digest.

b Plato as usual anticipates objections and misunderstandings. Cf. e.g. on 487 b.

c Cf. the argument in the first sentence of Aristotle’s 514
and dignitaries, are satisfied with honour from little men and nobodies. But honour they desire and must have.” “Yes, indeed.” “Admit, then, or reject my proposition. When we say a man is keen about something, shall we say that he has an appetite for the whole class or that he desires only a part and a part not?” “The whole,” he said. “Then the lover of wisdom, too, we shall affirm, desires all wisdom, not a part and a part not.” “Certainly.” “The student, then, who is finical about his studies, especially when he is young and cannot yet know by reason what is useful and what is not, we shall say is not a lover of learning or a lover of wisdom, just as we say that one who is dainty about his food is not really hungry, has not an appetite for food, and is not a lover of food, but a poor feeder.” “We shall rightly say so.” “But the one who feels no distaste in sampling every study, and who attacks his task of learning gladly and cannot get enough of it, him we shall justly pronounce the lover of wisdom, the philosopher, shall we not?” To which Glaucon replied, “You will then be giving the name to a numerous and strange band, for all the lovers of spectacles are what they are, I fancy, by virtue of their delight in learning something. And those who always want to hear some new thing are a very queer lot to be reckoned among philosophers. You couldn’t induce them to attend a serious debate or

Metaphysics that men’s pleasure in sense-perception is a form of their love of knowledge.

φιλήκοι: the word, like curiosity in Ruskin’s interpretation, may have a higher and a lower meaning. It is used half technically of intellectual interests generally. Cf. Euthydem. 304 b. The abstract φιληκοία became a virtual synonym of culture and reading.
διατριβήν ἐκόντες οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν ἐλθεῖν, ὡσπερ δὲ ἀπομεμισθωκότες τὰ ὣτα ἐπακούσαι πάντων χορῶν περιθέουσι τοῖς Διονυσίοις, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ κώμας ἀπολειπόμενοι. τούτους οὖν πάντας καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτων τινῶν Ἐμαθητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν τεχνιδρίων φιλοσόφους φήσομεν; Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὅμοιοὺς μὲν φιλοσόφους.

XX. Τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινοὺς, ἐφη, τίνας λέγεις; Τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας, ἵν δ' ἐγώ, φιλοθεάμονας. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν γ', ἐφη, ὡρθῶς· ἀλλὰ πῶς αὕτο λέγεις; Οὐδαμῶς, ἵν δ' ἐγώ, ῥαδίως πρὸς γε ἄλλων· σὲ δὲ οἶμαι ὁμολογήσειν μοι τὸ τούνδε. Τὸ ποίον; Ἐπειδὴ ἐστιν ἐναντίων καλὸν αὐσχρῶ, δύο αὐτῶ

476 εἶναι. Πῶς δ' οὗ; Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δῦο, καὶ ἐν ἐκάτερον; Καὶ τοῦτο. Καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὕτος λόγος, αὕτο μὲν ἐν ἐκαστὸν εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίας πανταχοῦ φανταξόμενα πολλὰ

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*a* Cf. on 498 Α, and in Parmenides 126 Ε, Antiphon, who studied Eleatic dialectic in his youth, but now gives his time to horses. The word διατριβή has a long history in philosophy and literature, starting from such passages as Charmides 153 Α and Lysis 204 Α.

*b* In addition to the presentation of new plays at the city Dionysia, there were performances at the Peiraicus and in the demes.

*c* Cf. Theaetet. 201 Β 3, Sophist 240 Β οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινῶν γε, ἀλλ' ἐσκὸς μὲν.

*d* Cf. Aristot. Eth. 1098 a 32 θεατὴς γὰρ τάληθοις.

*e* Cf. 449 c.

Plato is merely restating the theory of Ideas to prepare for his practical distinction between minds that can and minds that cannot apprehend abstractions. He does not here 516.
any such entertainment, but as if they had farmed out their ears to listen to every chorus in the land, they run about to all the Dionysiac festivals, never missing one, either in the towns or in the country-villages. Are we to designate all these, then, and similar folk and all the practitioners of the minor arts as philosophers?" "Not at all," I said; "but they do bear a certain likeness to philosophers."

XX, "Whom do you mean, then, by the true philosophers?" "Those for whom the truth is the spectacle of which they are enamoured," said I. "Right again," said he; "but in what sense do you mean it?" "It would be by no means easy to explain it to another," I said, "but I think that you will grant me this." "What?" "That since the fair and honourable is the opposite of the base and ugly, they are two." "Of course." "And since they are two, each is one." "That also." "And in respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves everywhere, each as a multiplicity of enter into the metaphysics of the subject. But he does distinctly show that he is "already" aware of the difficulties raised in the Parmenides, 131 b ff., and of the misapprehension disposed of in the Sophist 252 ff. that the metaphysical isolation of the Ideas precludes their combination and intermingling in human thought and speech. For the many attempts to evade ἀλλὰ ἐν κοινω στὶ μὲν τὸν ὅτι οὐκ έστίν, cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 244, and add now Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 567, who, completely missing the point, refers to 505 α, which is also misunderstood. He adds "mit den Problemen des Sophistes hat das gar nichts zu tun; sie waren ihm noch nicht aufgestossen," which begs the question.

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``Le petit nombre des élus'' is a common topic in Plato. Cf. on 494 A.

The dream state is a very different thing for Plato from what it is for some modern sentimental Platonists. Cf. 518
aspects.” “Right,” he said. “This, then,” said I, “is my division. I set apart and distinguish those of whom you were just speaking, the lovers of spectacles and the arts, and men of action, and separate from them again those with whom our argument is concerned and who alone deserve the appellation of philosophers or lovers of wisdom.” “What do you mean?” he said. “The lovers of sounds and sights,” I said, “delight in beautiful tones and colours and shapes and in everything that art fashions out of these, but their thought is incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful in itself.” “Why, yes,” he said, “that is so.” “And on the other hand, will not those be few a who would be able to approach beauty itself and contemplate it in and by itself?” “They would, indeed.” “He, then, who believes in beautiful things, but neither believes in beauty itself nor is able to follow when someone tries to guide him to the knowledge of it—do you think that his life is a dream or a waking b? Just consider. Is not the dream state, whether the man is asleep or awake, just this: the mistaking of resemblance for identity?” “I should certainly call that dreaming,” he said. “Well, then, take the opposite case: the man whose thought recognizes a beauty in itself, and is able to distinguish that self-beautiful and the things that participate in it, and neither supposes the participants to be it nor it the participants—is his life, in your opinion, a waking or a dream state?” “He is very much awake,” he replied. “Could we not rightly, then, call the mental state of the one as knowing, know-

520 c-d, Phaedr. 277 d, Tim. 52 b, and 71 e, if rightly interpreted.
δόξαν ὡς δοξάζοντος; Πάντα μὲν οὖν. Τί οὖν,
εἰν ἥμιν χαλεπαῖνη οὖτος, ὃν φαμεν δοξάζειν ἀλλ' ὦν γιγνώσκειν, καὶ ἀμφισβητῆ ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ
Ε λέγομεν, ἐξομεν τι παραμυθεῖσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ πεί-
θειν ἡρέμα ἔπικρυπτόμενοι, ὃτι οὐχ ύπιαίνει; Δει
gε τοι δή, ἐφη. "Ἰθι δή, σκόπει τί ἐρωθεῖν πρὸς
αὐτόν. ἡ βούλει ὡδε πυνθανόμεθα παρ' αὐτοῦ,
λέγοντες, ὃς εἰ τι οἴδεν οὐδείς αὐτῷ φθένοι, ἀλλ' ἀσμενοι ἄν ἰδομεν εἰδότα τι, ἀλλ' ἥμιν εἰπε τόδε:
ὁ γιγνώσκων γιγνώσκει τί ἡ οὐδέν; οὐ οὖν μοι
ὑπὲρ ἐκεῖνον ἀποκρίνων. Ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἐφη, ὃτι
gιγνώσκει τί. Πότερον ὃν ἡ οὐκ ὄν; "Οὐ' πῶς
477 γάρ ἄν μὴ ὅν γέ τι γνωσθείη; Ἱκανός οὖν τούτο
ἐχωμεν, κἂν εἰ πλεοναχῇ σκοποίμεν, ὃτι τὸ μὲν
παντελῶς ὃν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὃν δὲ μηδαμὴ
πάντη ἀγνωστον; Ἱκανώτατα. Εἰενε' εἰ δὲ δὴ
tι οὗτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὐ μεταξὺ
ἀν κέοιτο τοῦ εἰλικρῖνως ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὖ μηδαμῆ

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a ἡρέμα: cf. Symp. 221 b. Plato's humorous use of this word is the source of Emerson's humorous use of "gently."

b For the humour of the sudden shift to the second person cf. Juvenal, Sat. i. "profer, Galla, caput."

c To understand what follows it is necessary (1) to assume that Plato is not talking nonsense; (2) to make allowance for the necessity that he is under of combating contemporary fallacies and sophisms which may seem trivial to us (cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 50 ff.; (3) to remember the greater richness of the Greek language in forms of the verb "to be"; and the misunderstandings introduced by the indiscriminate use of the abstract verbal noun "being" in English —a difficulty which I have tried to meet by varying the terms of the translation; (4) to recognize that apart from 520
ledge, and that of the other as opining, opinion?"  
"Assuredly."  "Suppose, now, he who we say opines but does not know should be angry and challenge our statement as not true—can we find any way of soothing him and gently a winning him over, without telling him too plainly that he is not in his right mind?"  "We must try," he said.  "Come, then, consider what we are to say to him, or would you have us question him in this fashion— premising that if he knows anything, nobody grudges it him, but we should be very glad to see him knowing something—but tell b us this: Does he who knows know something or nothing?  Do you reply in his behalf."  "I will reply," he said, "that he knows something."  "Is it something that is or is not c?"  "That is. How could that which is not be known?"  "We are sufficiently assured of this, then, even if we should examine it from every point of view, that that which entirely d 'is' is entirely knowable, and that which in no way 'is' is in every way unknowable?"  "Most sufficiently."  "Good. If a thing, then, is so conditioned as both to be and not to be, would it not lie between that which absolutely and unqualifiedly is metaphysics Plato's main purpose is to insist on the ability to think abstractly as a prerequisite of the higher education; (5) to observe the qualifications and turns of phrase which indicate that Plato himself was not confused by the double meaning of "is not," but was already aware of the distinctions explicitly explained in the Sophist (Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 53 ff. nn. 389 ff.)

a παντελῶς: cf. μηδαμῆ and 478 ν τάντως.  Not foreseeing modern philology Plato did not think it necessary to repeat these qualifying adverbs in 478 β ἡ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μηδὲν, which is still sometimes quoted to prove that Plato was "yet" naively unaware of the distinction between is-not-at-all (does not exist) and is-not-this-or-that.
οντος; Μεταξύ. Ούκοιν ἐπεί ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ οντὶ γνῶσις ἤν, ἀγνωσία δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ οντι,
Β ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξύ τούτῳ μεταξύ τι καὶ ἐστὶν τοιοῦτον ἀγνοιας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τι τυγχάνει ὁν
tοιοῦτον; Πάνι μὲν οὖν. Ἀρ’ οὖν λέγομεν τι
dόξαν εἶναι; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Πότερον ἄλλην δύ-
nαμιν ἐπιστήμης ἢ τὴν αὕτην; "Ἀλλην. Ἐπ’
ἄλλω ἄρα τέτακται δόξα καὶ ἐπ’ ἄλλω ἐπιστήμημι,
cατὰ τὴν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐκατέρα τὴν αὕτης.
Οὕτω. Ούκοιν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ οντὶ πέφυκε
gνῶναι ὡς ἐστὶ τὸ οὖ; μᾶλλον δὲ ὅδε μοι δοκεῖ
πρότερον ἀναγκαίον εἶναι διελέσθαι. Πῶς;
C ΧΧΙ. Φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν
οντων, αἰς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἡ δυνάμεθα καὶ
ἄλλο πᾶν ὁ τί περ ἄν δύνηται, οἶον λέγω ὅψιν καὶ
ἀκοὴν τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἂρα μανθάνεις ὁ
βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος. Ἀλλὰ μανθάνω, ἔφη.
"Ἀκουσον δὴ, ὃ μοι φαίνεται περὶ αὐτῶν· δυνάμεως
gνὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινὰ χρόαν ὅρω οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε τι
τῶν τοιοῦτων, οἶον καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, πρὸς ἂ
ἀποβλέπων ἐνα διορίζομαι παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ τὰ μὲν

1 ἐπεί Hermann: Adam reads ei eti, for which there is
some ms. authority, Burnet eti, which yields a harsh but
possible construction.

a Apart from the metaphysical question of the relativity
of all knowledge, the word ἐπιστήμη in Greek usage connotes
certainty, and so Plato and Aristotle always take it. But
more specifically that which (always) is, for Plato, is the
“idea” which is not subject to change and therefore always
is what it is, while a particular material thing subject to
change and relativity both is and is not any and every
predicate that can be applied to it. And since knowledge
in the highest sense is for Plato knowledge of abstract and
general ideas, both in his and in our sense of the word idea.
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and that which in no way is?" "Between." "Then since knowledge pertains to that which is and ignorance of necessity to that which is not, for that which lies between we must seek for something between nescience and science, if such a thing there be." "By all means." "Is there a thing which we call opinion?" "Surely." "Is it a different faculty from science or the same?" "A different." "Then opinion is set over one thing and science over another, each by virtue of its own distinctive power or faculty." "That is so." "May we say, then, that science is naturally related to that which is,\(^a\) to know that and how that which is is? But rather, before we proceed, I think we must draw the following distinctions." "What ones?"

XXI. "Shall we say that faculties,\(^b\) powers, abilities are a class of entities by virtue of which we and all other things are able to do what we or they are able to do? I mean that sight and hearing, for example, are faculties, if so be that you understand the class or type that I am trying to describe." "I understand," he said. "Hear, then, my notion about them. In a faculty I cannot see any colour or shape or similar mark such as those on which in many other cases I fix my eyes in discriminating in my thought one thing from knowledge is said to be of that which is. It is uncritical to ignore Plato's terminology and purpose and to talk condescendingly of his confusing subjective with objective certainty in what follows.

\(^a\) The history of the word δύναμις has been studied in recent monographs and its various meanings, from potenti-ality to active power, discriminated. Cf. J. Souillé, \textit{Étude sur le terme δύναμις dans les Dialogues de Platon}, Paris, 1919, pp. 96, 163 ff. But Plato makes his simple meaning here quite plain, and it would be irrelevant to bring in modern denunciations of the "old faculty psychology."
D ἀλλα εἶναι, τά δὲ ἄλλα: δυνάμεως δ΄ εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω, ἐφ’ ὃ τε ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ ταύτη ἐκάστην αὐτῶν δύναμιν ἐκάλεσα, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἔτερῳ καὶ ἔτερον ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην. τί δὲ σῦ; πῶς ποιεῖς; Ὅμως, ἐφη. Δεύτερο δὴ πάλιν, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ, ὃ ἀριστε. ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμιν τινα φης
Ε εἰναι αὐτὴν ἢ εἰς τί γένος τίθης; Εἰς τούτο, ἐφη, πασῶν γε δυνάμεως ἐρρωμενεστάτην. Τί δαί; δόξαν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἄλλο εἴδος οἴσομεν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη. ὃ γὰρ δοξάζειν δυνάμεθα, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ δόξα ἔστιν. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ὁλίγον γε πρότερον ὁμολόγεις μὴ το αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δόξαν. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἐφη, τὸ γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ταύτον ποτέ τις νοῦν ἐχων τιθείς; Καλῶς, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι ἔτερον ἐπιστήμης δόξα ὁμολογεῖται ἥμιν. "Ετερον. Ἐφ’ ἔτερῳ ἄρα ἔτερον τι δυνάμενα ἐκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν. 'Ανάγκη. 'Επιστήμη μὲν γε που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ δὲ γνῶναι ὃς ἔχει; Ναὶ. Δόξα δὲ, φαμέν, δοξάζειν1; Ναὶ. "Ἡ ταύτων ὁπερ ἐπιστήμην γυγνώσκει, καὶ ἔσται γνωστὸν τε καὶ δοξαστὸν

1 δοξάζειν] I translate Adam’s δοξάζειν, but it makes little difference.

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a Cf. my note on Simplic. De An. 146. 21, Class. Phil. xvii. p. 143.
b Cf. Ion 537 δ οὕτω καλῶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην τέχνην.
c ἐπὶ: cf. Parmen. 147 δ-ε ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὅνομάτων οὐκ ἐπὶ τινι καλεῖσι;
e For the various meanings of δόξα cf. Unity of Plato’s 524
another. But in the case of a faculty I look to one thing only—that to which it is related and what it effects, and it is in this way that I come to call each one of them a faculty, and that which is related to the same thing and accomplishes the same thing I call the same faculty, and that to another I call other. How about you, what is your practice?" "The same," he said. "To return, then, my friend," said I, "to science or true knowledge, do you say that it is a faculty and a power, or in what class do you put it?" "Into this," he said, "the most potent of all faculties." "And opinion—shall we assign it to some other class than faculty." "By no means," he said, "for that by which we are able to opine is nothing else than the faculty of opinion." "But not long ago you agreed that science and opinion are not identical." "How could any rational man affirm the identity of the infallible with the fallible?" "Excellent," said I, "and we are plainly agreed that opinion is a different thing from scientific knowledge." "Yes, different." "Each of them, then, since it has a different power, is related to a different object." "Of necessity." "Science, I presume, to that which is, to know the condition of that which is?" "Yes." "But opinion, we say, opines." "Yes." "Does it opine the same thing that science knows, and will the

Thought, p. 47 "the word δόξα may be used in this neutral, psychological sense; it may be taken unfavourably to denote mere opinion as opposed to knowledge, or favourably when true opinions and beliefs are set in antithesis to the appetites and instincts."

Plato reaffirms this strongly Tim. 51 e, where, however, νοίς is used, not ἐπιστήμη. Of course where distinctions are irrelevant Plato may use many of the terms that denote mental processes as virtual synonyms. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 47-49.
to autó; ἢ ἀδύνατον; Ἰ ἀδύνατον, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων, εἴπερ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῳ ἄλλη δύναμις πέ-
Β φυκε, δυνάμεις δὲ ἀμφότεραι ἔστον, δόξα τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλη δὲ ἐκατέρα, ἡς φαμέν· ἐκ τούτων δὴ οὐκ ἔγχωρει γνωστόν καὶ δοξαστόν ταύτων εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ ὄν γνωστόν, ἄλλο τι ἀν δοξαστὸν ἢ τὸ ὄν εἶν; "Αλλο. Ἰ ἂρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζει; ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὄν; ἐννοεῖ δὲ. οὐχ ὃ δοξάζων ἐπὶ τὶ φέρει τὴν δόξαν; ἢ οἶν τε αὖ δοξάζειν μὲν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδὲν; Ἰ ἀδύνατον. Ἰ ἂλλ' ἐν γέ τι δοξάζει ὃ δοξάζων; Ναί. Ἰ ἂλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἐν τι, ἂλλὰ μηδὲν ὁ ὀρθότατ᾽ ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο. Πάνυ γαί. Μὴ ὄντι μὴν ἄγνοιαν εἰς ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, οὖντι δὲ γνῶσιν. Ἰ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκ ἂρα οὖν οὐδὲ μὴ ὄν δοξάζει. Οὐ γάρ. Οὔτε ἂρα ἄγνοια οὔτε γνῶσις δόξα ἄν εἰη. Οὐκ ἐοικεν. Ἰ ἂρ' οὖν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶν ὑπερβαίνουσα ἡ γνῶσιν σαφηνεία ἡ ἄγνοιαν ἀσαφεία; Ὀυδέτερα. Ἰ ἂλλ' ἂρα, ἴν δ' ἐγὼ, γνώσεως μὲν σοι φαίνεται δόξα σκοτωδέστερον, ἄγνοιας δ' ἀφανότερον; Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη. Ἰ ἐντὸς δ' ἀμφότεροι κεῖται; Ναί. Ἐντὸς ἂρα ἂν εἰη τούτων δόξα. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὐν. Οὐκοῦν ἐφαμέν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἰ τι φανείῃ οἴον ἀμα ὁν τε καὶ

a Cf. Symp. 200 b, 201 d.
b Cf. on 477 c.

Plato is, of course, aware that this is true only if μὴ δὲ be taken in the absolute sense. We cannot suppose that he himself is puzzled by a fallacy which he ironically attributes to the Sophists and to Protagoras (Theaet. 167 Λ), and ridicules in the Cratylus 188 d and Euthydemus 286 c. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 53, 54. As Aristotle explicitly puts it, De interpr. 11. 11 τὸ δὲ μὴ δὲ δτί δοξαστόν οὐκ 526
knowable and the opinable be identical, or is that impossible?" "Impossible by our admissions," he said. "If different faculties are naturally related to different objects and both opinion and science are faculties, but each different from the other, as we say—these admissions do not leave place for the identity of the knowable and the opinable." "Then, if that which is is knowable, something other than that which is would be the opinable." "Something else." "Does it opine that which is not, or is it impossible even to opine that which is not? Reflect: Does not he who opines bring his opinion to bear upon something or shall we reverse ourselves and say that it is possible to opine, yet opine nothing?" "That is impossible." "Then he who opines opines some one thing?" "Yes." "But surely that which is not could not be designated as some one thing, but most rightly as nothing at all." "Yes." "To that which is not we of necessity assigned nescience, and to that which is, knowledge." "Rightly," he said. "Then neither that which is nor that which is not is the object of opinion." "It seems not." "Then opinion would be neither nescience nor knowledge." "So it seems." "Is it then a faculty outside of these, exceeding either knowledge in lucidity or ignorance in obscurity?" "It is neither." "But do you deem opinion something darker than knowledge but brighter than ignorance?" "Much so," he said. "And does it lie within the boundaries of the two?" "Yes." "Then opinion would be between the two." "Most assuredly." "Were we not saying a little while ago that if anything should

\[ \text{Cf. 477 a.} \]

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μὴ ὄν, τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταξὺ κείσθαι τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος, καὶ οὔτε ἐπιστήμην οὔτε ἄγνοιαν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἐσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξὺ αὐθάντων ἄγνοιας καὶ ἐπιστήμης; Ὅρθως. Νῦν δέ γε πέφανται μεταξὺ τούτων ὃ δῆ καλοῦμεν δόξαν. Πέφανται.

Ε ΧΧΙΙ. Ὅκείων δὴ λείποιν' ἂν ἦμῖν εὗρεῖν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰλικρίνες Ὅρθως ἃν προσαγορεύομεν, ἢν εἀν φανῇ, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐι δίκη προσαγορεύωμεν τοὺς μὲν ἄκροις τὰ ἄκρα, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀποδιδόντες. ἦν οὖν οὕτως; Οὕτως. Τούτων δὴ ὑποκειμένων λεγέ-479 τω μοι, φήσω, καὶ ἀποκρινέσθω ὁ χρηστός, ὃς αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἤγείται ἢ σει μὲν κατὰ ταυτὰ ὦσαῦτως ἑχοῦσαι, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει, ἐκείνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος, ἂν τις ἐν τῷ καλὸν φῇ εἶναι καὶ δίκαιων, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω. τούτων γὰρ δῆ, ὃ ἄριστε, φήσομεν, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μὲν τι ἔστων, ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρῶν φανήσεται; 528
turn up" such that it both is and is not, that sort of thing would lie between that which purely and absolutely is and that which wholly is not, and that the faculty correlated with it would be neither science nor nescience, but that which should appear to hold a place correspondingly between nescience and science." "Right." "And now there has turned up between these two the thing that we call opinion." "There has."

XXII. "It would remain, then, as it seems, for us to discover that which partakes of both, of to be and not to be, and that could not be rightly designated either in its exclusive purity; so that, if it shall be discovered, we may justly pronounce it to be the opinable, thus assigning extremes to extremes and the intermediate to the intermediate. Is not that so?" "It is." "This much premised, let him tell me, I will say, let him answer me, that good fellow who does not think there is a beautiful in itself or any idea of beauty in itself always remaining the same and unchanged, but who does believe in many beautiful things—the lover of spectacles, I mean, who cannot endure to hear anybody say that the beautiful is one and the just one, and so of other things—and this will be our question: My good fellow, is there any one of these many fair-and-honourable things that will

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*a Cf. 477 A-B. This is almost a standardized method with Plato. Cf. infra 609 b, Charmides 168 b, Gorgias 496 c, supra 436 b, Phileb. 11 d, 66 e, Laws 896 c.

*b Ironical. Cf. Phaedr. 266 e.

*c τινα does not mean that the theory of Ideas is a novelty here or that the terminology is new and strange. It merely says that the type of mind that is absorbed in the concrete cannot apprehend any general aspect of things. αὐτὸ and κατὰ ταυτά are the technical designation of the Idea here. Cf. my note on Phileb. 64 a, Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.
PLATO

καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὅ ὢν ἄδικος; καὶ τῶν ὀσίων, ὅ ὢν ἀνόσιος; Ὅκι, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ καλά

Βπως αὐτὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φανῆναι, καὶ ὥσα ἄλλα ἑρωτᾶς. Τί δαί; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ἦττὸν τι ἡμίσεα ἡ διπλάσια φαίνεται; Ὅδέν. Καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μὴ τι μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἡ τάναντια; Ὅκι, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ, ὅφη, ἑκαστὸν ἁμφοτέρων ἔξεταί. Πότερον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἡ ὄν ἔστιν ἑκαστὸν τῶν πολλῶν τούτοι, ὃ ἄν τις φη αὐτὸ εἶναι; Τόις ἐν ταῖς ἐστιάσεσιν, ἔφη, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἐοίκε, καὶ

C τῷ τῶν παϊδῶν αἰνίγματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ εὐνοῦχου τῆς βολῆς πέρι τῆς νυκτερίδος, καὶ ἔφʼ ὃς αὐτὸν αὐτὴν αἰνίγματι βαλείν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ οὔτʼ εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὔτε ἁμφότερα οὔτε οὐδέτερον. Ἐχεις οὖν αὐτοῖς, ἂν ὃ ἐγὼ, ὃ τι χρῆσει, ἂ ὁποι θήσεις καλλίω θέσων τῆς μεταξὺ

* Plato consciously uses mere logic to lend the emphasis and dignity of absolute metaphysics to his distinction between the two types of mind, which is for all practical purposes his main point here. If you cannot correctly define the beautiful, all your imperfect definitions will be refuted by showing that they sometimes describe what is ugly. Cf. Hippias Major 289 c and note on Rep. i. 333 e. The many concrete objects are this and are not that, and so with conscious use of the ambiguity of the copula may be said to tumble about between being and not-being. That this is the consciously intended meaning may be inferred from the fact that in Tim. 37 e, where Plato must have had in mind the conclusions of the Sophist, he still avails himself of this ambiguity to suggest an absolute being behind phenomena. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 55, 56, 60, De Platonis Idearum doctrina, pp. 48, 49.

b Cf. on 524 A, B.

* The scholiast (Hermann vi. 34) quotes the riddle in two forms. It might run in English—
not sometimes appear ugly-and-base? And of the just things, that will not seem unjust? And of the pious things, that will not seem impious? "No, it is inevitable," he said, "that they would appear to be both beautiful in a way and ugly, and so with all the other things you asked about." "And again, do the many double things appear any the less halves than doubles?" "None the less." "And likewise of the great and the small things, the light and the heavy things—will they admit these predicates any more than their opposites?" "No," he said, "each of them will always hold of, partake of, both." "Then is each of these multiples rather than it is not that which one affirms it to be?" "They are like those jesters who palter with us in a double sense at banquets," he replied, "and resemble the children's riddle about the eunuch and his hitting of the bat—with what and as it sat on what they signify that he struck it. For these things too equivocate, and it is impossible to conceive firmly any one of them to be or not to be or both or neither." "Do you know what to do with them, then?" said I, "and can you find a better place to put them than that midway

A tale there is, a man yet not a man,
Seeing, saw not, a bird and not a bird,
Perching upon a bough and not a bough,
And hit it—not, with a stone and not a stone.

The key words of the answer are eunuch, bat, reed, pumice-stone. Cf. also Athenaeus 448 ε, 452 ε, Gifford on Euthydemus 300 d. It was used in the Stoic schools of logic, and Epicurus is said to have used it to disprove Plato's statement that either the negative or the affirmative of a proposition must be true or false. Cf. Usener, Epicurea, p. 348.

*Cf. Theaetet. 157 a.*
ousias te kai tou mou eina; outhe gar pon skotow-
destera mou ontos pro to mallo mou eina. D setai, outhe fanotera ontos pro to mallo eina. 'Alybhesata, ephi. Evrhaimevo ara, ois eouken, oti ta twon polloiv pollla nomima kalou te peri kai twon allon metaxu poy kulwdeita tov te mou ontos kai tov ontos eilikrinwos. Evrhaimevo. Proswmologhsamen de ge, ei ti toioitou fanei', doxastov autod all' ou gnwstov dein legesbai, tis metaxu dynamei to metaxu planhtov alliskomenon. 'Omologhsamen. Toous ara pollla kala theo-
E menous, autod de to kalon mou orwntas moud allou epi autod agoniti dunamevous epesthai, kai pollla dikaia, autod de to dikaion mou, kai panta oatw, doxaizein phsosme apanta, ginwoskein de diw
doxizeousin oudein. 'Anagik, ephi. Ti de av toous
doxaste thewmenous kai aei kata taute oswtous onta; ar' ou ginwoskein all' ou
doxazein; 'Anagik kai taute. Oukoiv kai aspa-
lethei te kai philiein toutous mnu tauta phsosmev,

a Cf. Sophist 254a eis tin tou mou ontos skoteinhteta.
b A further thought is developed here, suggested in
479a, b. Just as the many particular horses, trees or tables
shift and change, and are and are not in comparison with
the unchanging idea of each, so the many opinions of the
multitude about justice and the good and the beautiful and
other moral conceptions change, and both are and are not
in comparison with the unalterable ideas of justice and
beauty, which the philosopher more nearly apprehends.
Thus, for the purposes of this contrast, notions, opinions, and
what English usage would call ideas, fall into the same class
as material objects. Cf. Euthyphro 6d, Phaedo 78d,
Parmen. 131d, Gorgias 488d ta twv polloiv ara nomima,
Laws 715b ta toutou dikaia, 860c tois men touvn
pollois etc., 962d ta twv polleov (of states) nomima. The
532
between existence or essence and the not-to-be? For we shall surely not discover a darker region than not-being a that they should still more not be, nor a brighter than being that they should still more be."

"Most true," he said. "We would seem to have found, then, that the many conventions b of the many about the fair and honourable and other things are tumbled about in c the mid-region between that which is not and that which is in the true and absolute sense." "We have so found it." "But we agreed in advance that, if anything of that sort should be discovered, it must be denominated opinable, not knowable, the wanderer between being caught by the faculty that is betwixt and between." "We did." "We shall affirm, then, that those who view many beautiful things but do not see the beautiful itself and are unable to follow another’s guidance d to it, and many just things, but not justice itself, and so in all cases—we shall say that such men have opinions about all things, but know nothing of the things they opine." "Of necessity." "And, on the other hand, what of those who contemplate the very things themselves in each case, ever remaining the same and unchanged—shall we not say that they know and do not merely opine?" "That, too, necessarily follows." "Shall we not also say that the one welcomes to his thought and loves the things subject practical truth of this distinction is unaffected by our metaphysics. Plato is speaking of what he elsewhere calls the εἶδωλα of justice, beauty and the like. Cf. 517 d, 532 d, Theaetet. 150 b, and "The Idea of Good in Plato's Republic," University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology, i. p. 238.

c Cf. Phaedr. 275 e, Phaedo 81 c, 82 e. Isocrates uses καλυπτομαι in similar contemptuous connotation, v. 82, xiii. 20, xv. 30.

d Cf. Aristot. Met. 989 a 33 τοῖς ἐπάγωσιν αὐτῶν.
480 ἐφ’ οἷς γνώσις ἦστιν, ἕκείνους δὲ ἐφ’ οἷς δόξα; ἦ
οὐ μνημονεύομεν, ὡτὶ φωνάς τε καὶ χρόας καλὰς
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν τούτους φιλεῖν τε καὶ
θεᾶσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ’ ἀνέχεσθαι ὡς τι
ὄν; Μεμνήμεθα. Μὴ οὖν τι πλημμελήσομεν φιλο-
δόξους καλοῦντες αὐτούς μᾶλλον ἡ φιλοσόφους,
καὶ ἄρα ἦμῖν σφόδρα χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἃν οὔτω
λέγωμεν; Οὔκ, ἂν γ’ ἐμοὶ πείθωνται, ἐφ’ τῷ
γὰρ ἀληθεῖ χαλεπαίνειν οὐ θέμις. Τοὺς αὐτὸ ἄρα
ἐκαστον τὸ ὄν ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους ἄλλ’ οὐ
φιλοδόξους κλητέον; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

* Plato coins a word which means “lovers of opinion.”
to knowledge and the other those to opinion? Do we not remember that we said that those loved and regarded tones and beautiful colours and the like, but they could not endure the notion of the reality of the beautiful itself?" "We do remember." "Shall we then offend their ears if we call them doxophiliasts\(^a\) rather than philosophers and will they be very angry if we so speak?" "Not if they heed my counsel," he said, "for to be angry with truth is not lawful." "Then to those who in each and every kind welcome the true being, lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion\(^b\) is the name we must give." "By all means."

\(^a\) Isoc. xv. 271 is conceivably an answer to this.
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like notes that float in circumstance.
We live our little lives. Unchecked we fly.
Ethereal and others, meeting but to part.
The spirit of gusts of passion, love and fear.
Aimless, without direction, having none to hinder, none to guide. But see, the air itself is moving (Whither, who can tell).
And in its steady movement all the winds are borne along to some far distant calm.
Such is our lot. In God we live and move.
By this almighty will we all are moved.
Until the eternal purpose is achieved.
And we too sink to rest in Him for ever.

November 3, 1974