POLYBIUS

THE HISTORIES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN SIX VOLUMES

I

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Quare historiae huius non postrema haec laus est, quod in parte versetur rerum Romanarum longe nobilissima, sive virorum virtutem spectes, sive publica instituta aut mores, sive gestorum magnitudinem. Cum autem inter excellentis historiae condiciones doctissimi veterum hanc cum primis ponant, ut certi intervallo temporis circumscribatur, et a notabili principio ad notabilem finem perducatur, hanc historiae legem, ut quidem illis placet, a Polybio mirifice esse observatam invenimus.

Casaubon.
INTRODUCTION

Polybius was born about 208 B.C. at Megalopolis in Arcadia. His father, Lycortas, who spent the greater part of his life—more especially the years 181–168 B.C.—in the service of the Achaean League, was a friend and supporter of Philopoemen; he went as ambassador to Rome in 189, to Ptolemy Epiphanes, king of Egypt, in 186 and again in 181; and he was Strategus of the League in 184. In his youth Polybius began to take part in public affairs. He seems to have served with the Romans in the campaign of 189 against the Gauls in Asia Minor; he carried the urn of Philopoemen to burial in 183; he was associated with his father Lycortas in the embassy to Egypt in 181; and he was Hipparchus of the Achaean League for the year 169–8.

Throughout the period (181–168) of political association with his father Polybius consistently maintained the view that the supremacy of Rome in Greece must be accepted, and that the Greek states must conduct their affairs, whether singly or collectively, and preserve their freedom, without giving any offence, or cause of complaint, to the Roman republic. But there was much intriguing, in Greece and at Rome, against this policy of legal independence; and the suspicions of the Romans were so far aroused
that they came to regard the independents with no less displeasure than the avowed enemies of the republic. Thus, though the Achaean League maintained correctly enough this policy of a strict legality during the third war between Rome and Macedon (172-168), its leaders were quickly brought to account after the defeat of King Perseus at Pydna (168 B.C.), and no less than a thousand Achaeans were transported to Italy to be tried for their alleged opposition to the sovereignty of Rome. Of this company was Polybius—we hear nothing more of his father Lycortas: he may have died about this time. Quartered in Italian cities, these Greeks waited for the trial which never came; and at last in 151 B.C., when after sixteen years liberty was given to them to return home, there were less than three hundred of the thousand left to go back.

Polybius was more fortunate than the rest. He had become acquainted with Aemilius Paulus and his two sons during the campaign against Perseus and afterwards in Macedonia, and now in 167 he was allowed to remain in Rome in the house of Aemilius, to act as tutor to the two boys. This was the beginning of that famous friendship between Polybius and the younger son, who became by adoption Publius Scipio Aemilianus. Panaetius, the Stoic philosopher, was also an inmate of Aemilius Paulus' house about this time, exercising—perhaps in rivalry with Polybius—a tutorial influence upon the sons. Polybius had access through Aemilius Paulus to the best of Roman society during those sixteen years of expatriation in Italy, and he made good use of his opportunities. He studied the history and institutions of Rome, doubtless with a view to
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the history that he meant to write himself; he observed Roman life and character, in the individual and in the state; he hunted the boar with the younger sportsmen.

The Romans appreciated the ability and the versatility of Polybius, and in 149 B.C.—less than two years after his return to Arcadia—invited his assistance in the diplomatic discussions that preceded the last Punic War. And when Publius Scipio rejoined the army before Carthage in 147 as commander-in-chief, Polybius was in close attendance, to advise on questions of siege operations, or to conduct explorations on the coast of Africa in ships officially supplied. He stood by Scipio’s side while Carthage was burning (146 B.C.); and when that destruction was finished he returned to Greece, in time, if not to witness the sack of Corinth by Mummius, at any rate to modify the executions of the Romans and to rescue some of the treasures of art from destruction or deportation. And when the Roman commissioners withdrew from Greece, they left Polybius with authority to settle the details for the administration of each surviving city. Thus he came to be regarded as a public benefactor, for he had done his work well; and statues were raised to him in Megalopolis, Mantinea, Tegea, Olympia, and elsewhere.

Polybius lived for some twenty years after this work was done, but we know little or nothing about his employments. He may have joined Scipio during the siege of Numantia in Spain (134–132); he visited Egypt again; his travels in Europe, Asia, and perhaps in Africa, may have been continued and

1 Cf. vi. 56, on the moral tone of the Romans.
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extended in this period; and his literary work—there were, in addition to the History, a Life of Philopoemen in three books, a Treatise on Tactics, and a History of the Numantine War—must have occupied much of his time. A sportsman to the last, he met his death at eighty-two by an accidental fall from his horse as he was returning from the country.

The project of writing a history of the age probably suggested itself to Polybius, and was certainly developed, during the years of his detention in Italy. Expatriation loosened the links with Greece, and tightened the connexion with Rome. His original scheme was to record the rise of Rome to supremacy over the Mediterranean states in the years 220–168 B.C., i.e. from the beginning of the Second Punic War to the end of the Third Macedonian War. He subsequently extended this scheme in order to include an account of events from the first expedition of the Romans outside Italy (i.e. from the beginning of the First Punic War, in 264 B.C., the point where the history of Timaeus had ended) and to continue the record to the year (146 B.C.) which witnessed the destruction of Carthage and of Corinth. In the end the History consisted of forty books, of which the first two were introductory (προκατασκευή), the next thirty dealt with the main subject, and the last eight with the corollary. Of the forty books the first five only are preserved complete: of the rest there are only sections and fragments—numerous, it is true, but of varying length and importance—gathered from epitomes and excerpts.

Polybius was keenly alive to the greatness of his subject: he never forgot it himself, and he did
not allow his readers to forget it. "Fruitful as Fortune is in change, and constantly as she is producing dramas in the life of men, yet assuredly never before this did she work such a marvel, or act such a drama, as that which we have witnessed."^1

"What man is so indifferent or so idle that he would not wish to know how and under what form of government almost all the inhabited world came under the single rule of the Romans in less than fifty-three years (220-168 b.c.)?"^2 Thus at the outset he stated the scheme of his work; several times in the earlier books^3 he repeated the formula, for such it was, explaining in due course the extension of the scheme^4 in order to provide a proper introduction and conclusion; and in the last surviving chapter of the last book^5 he acknowledged the completion of his purpose. Careful to observe throughout the proportion and the continuity of things, he composed his treatise (πραγματεία) to be at once "catholic" (καθ᾽ όλον) in its relation to the general history of the world, and "pragmatic" or "apodeictic" in its conscious demonstration of the principle of cause and effect.^6 And so he made his work "perhaps the greatest universal history, or history of the civilized world, attempted in old times."^7 Was there ever a book, indeed, written so strictly according to plan, by a person so well qualified?

For indeed it seemed that destiny itself had called and trained Polybius to this task. The son of a statesman, he spent the first forty years of his life in actual connexion with politics, diplomacy, and war;

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^1 i. 4. ^2 i. 1. ^3 e.g. iii. 1-3, 31, 32. ^4 iii. 4. ^5 xl. 14. ^6 iii. 6-8. ^7 Mahaffy, Greek Life and Thought, p. 556.
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and he naturally came to regard it as an indispensable qualification of a historian that he should be able to record his own experiences of peace and war, describing from his own knowledge men and circumstances, events and localities. As a man of action himself, he felt the necessity of first-hand evidence wherever it was obtainable, and spared no pains to obtain it; and he had no opinion of stay-at-home historians (like Timaeus) who lived in libraries and wrote as bookmen. Nevertheless, in the technical preparation of his work Polybius was cautious and painstaking beyond all others: he was a practical man, but he did not despise theory. So for and with his travels, extensive and systematic\(^1\) as they were, he made a special study of geography—embodi
ing many of his observations in Book xxxiv., which is almost entirely geographical; and with his visits, official or unofficial, to various countries, he combined an examination of documents and records—and all, no doubt, to make his work correct, continuous, and complete. He may not have been a great general, or diplomat, or even topographer; but he was always careful, and generally right in his conclusions. He was impelled and guided by a natural instinct for truth: “For as a living creature is rendered wholly useless if deprived of its eyes, so if you take truth from history, what is left is but an idle unprofitable tale?”\(^2\) Truth, he says elsewhere, is shown by nature to mankind as supreme in divinity and power: sooner or later, truth must prevail over all opposition.\(^3\)

It is worth while to consider a little further what

\(^1\) e.g. he crossed the Alps by the pass which Hannibal was believed to have used.

\(^2\) i. 14.

\(^3\) xiii. 5.
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was the position of Polybius in Greece—for in a sense it was typical of his age—and what his point of view. He was a native of Megalopolis, a city whose very foundation in the fourth century had been an experiment in federal unity. By birth and instinct an aristocrat, he had no sympathy with democratic survivals or demagogic outbreaks. As a statesman he realized that the old Greek ideas of freedom and independence, centred in the city-state, were gone, nor ever likely to return, except so far as was possible under the suzerainty of Rome—or rather, in the reconciliation of Roman rule and Greek intellect. Early in his career he saw that the Roman power was inevitable and irresistible; and therefore he strove by skilful diplomacy to guide and keep the Achaean League, and the Greeks in general, in ways that were correct and unexceptionable. He was a Stoic, and he believed that the Roman order of things was part of a divine Providence that ruled the world. This belief, confirmed by his closer acquaintance with the Romans, and by their progress in conquest, he expounded in his History, with such detail of causes, circumstances, and consequences as to show that he understood the position and the prospects of the Romans in the Mediterranean world far more clearly than at that time they themselves were able to do.

Polybius lived in a self-conscious age, when criticism was mostly captious and destructive, and standards of right and wrong, of truth and falsehood, were unsteady and uncertain. In the History he himself criticizes other writers freely enough, often at great length, and with a severity that became

1 e.g. Timaeus in Book xii.
proverbial. Was he not nicknamed ἡπτὶματος for his treatment of Timaeus in particular? He divides historians into three classes: those who write for pay—to suit the pleasure or the plans of kings and states; those who write for rhetorical display; those who write for truth, and for the good of mankind.¹ He appreciates the power of rhetoric in history for good and ill; but he avoids such assistance in his own work, for fear that he may fail to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." He employs the vocabulary of ordinary usage; and though his statements are always clear, and generally adequate, the style is seldom remarkable or attractive. Yet in the opinion of a great historian "the narrative is a model of completeness, simplicity, and clearness"²: it is the concentration of intellect upon a task—a vital century in the history of Rome—for which something besides intellect was needed, something of moral judgement, of spiritual understanding. In this respect—the larger humanity, where a sense of imagination joins with a sense of humour to modify the mechanism of intellect—Polybius is certainly lacking; and his narrative, for all its simplicity and clearness, fails often to interest just because it is so uniformly correct, so invariably instructive.

The work of Polybius was valued in ancient times, and not least by the Romans. Was his History intended primarily for Roman readers? Possibly: but at first it would scarcely be comprehended by more than a few of them, such as the Scipionic circle.

¹ xvi. 14.
² Mommsen, History of Rome (English Translation), vol. iii. p. 467.
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And to many, if not most, of the Greeks of his own day he must have seemed something of a suspect, and no proper patriot, who could devote forty books to an outspoken appreciation of all things Roman. Yet, save for his lack of rhetoric, he was thought to have exemplified every virtue of history: his opinions were frequently quoted, his works were compressed into epitomes and reproduced in excerpts. The pity is that by such abridged editions we have been deprived of the means of forming a just estimate of his work as a whole. For what was chosen for survival in epitome or excerpt, because it appeared most interesting or important in the generations that followed his own, cannot give us the whole story as Polybius told it—the συγγραμμα καθ’ ολον και μέρος, we might almost say—nor reveal the whole mind of Polybius. Yet enough remains to establish his worth, as a historian who was generally right in point of fact and reasonable in point of view, who “accomplished what he had intended, a history to guide life, to proclaim truth, and in all sagacity to forecast the future from the past.”

For the books (i.-v.) which are still extant in complete form the best Manuscript is A, Codex Vaticanus 124, of the eleventh century. Fragments of the lost books are to be seen in F, Codex Urbinas 102, of the eleventh century, in the Constantine Excerpts, and in M, Codex Vaticanus 73, of the tenth century, a palimpsest containing excerpts. The Constantine Excerpts, so called because they

1 Wyttenbach, Praefatio ad selecta principum historicorum.
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were made by direction of the Byzantine Emperor Constantine (A.D. 912–959) as part of an Encyclopaedia of History and Political Science, give passages of Polybius arranged under various headings according to the subject matter.

H. J. EDWARDS.

The Translator died suddenly in 1921, and the Editors have seen the work through the press. The Introduction has been supplied by Colonel Edwards, C.B.
ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ ΠΡΩΤΗ

1 Εἰ μὲν τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν ἀναγράφουσι τὰς πράξεις παραλειφθαί συνέβαιν τοῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς ἱστορίας ἔπαινον, ἵσως ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὸ προτρέπεσθαι πάντας πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ παραδοχὴν τῶν τουούτων ὑπομνημάτων, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐτοιμοτέραν εἶναι τοῖς ἄνθρωποις διόρθωσιν τῆς τῶν 2 προγεγενημένων πράξεων ἐπιστήμης. ἔπει δὲ οὐ τινὲς οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ποσὸν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν ἀρχῆ καὶ τέλει κέχρηναι τούτῳ, φάσκοντες ἀληθινωτάτην μὲν εἶναι παιδείαν καὶ γυμνασίαν πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεως τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας μάθησιν, ἐναργεστάτην δὲ καὶ μόνην διδάσκαλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης μεταβολᾶς γενναίως ὑποθέσει τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν ὑπόμνησιν, δῆλον 3 ὡς οὔτε μὲν ἂν δόξαι καθήκειν περὶ τῶν καλῶς καὶ πολλοῖς εἰρημένων ταυτολογεῖν, ἥκιστα δὲ ἡμῖν. 4 αὕτω γὰρ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν πράξεων, ὑπὲρ ὧν προηρήμεθα γράφειν, ἴκανὸν ἐστὶ προκαλέσασθαι καὶ παρορμήσαι πάντα καὶ νέον καὶ πρεσβύτερον 5 πρὸς τὴν ἐντευξίν τῆς πραγματείας. τὸς γὰρ οὗτος ὑπάρχει φαίλος ἢ ράθυμος ἄνθρωπων ὡς ὅπως ἂν βούλοιτο γνώναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπι-
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BOOK I

1. Had previous chroniclers neglected to speak in praise of History in general, it might perhaps have been necessary for me to recommend everyone to choose for study and welcome such treatises as the present, since there is no more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past. But all historians, one may say without exception, and in no half-hearted manner, but making this the beginning and end of their labour, have impressed on us that the soundest education and training for a life of active politics is the study of History, and that the surest and indeed the only method of learning how to bear bravely the vicissitudes of fortune, is to recall the calamities of others. Evidently therefore no one, and least of all myself, would think it his duty at this day to repeat what has been so well and so often said. For the very element of unexpectedness in the events I have chosen as my theme will be sufficient to challenge and incite young and old alike to peruse these pages. For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what system of polity the Romans in
κρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἀπαντὰ τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν οὖν ὁλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισών ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἁρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαιῶν, ὁ πρότερον οἷς εὐρίσκεται γεγονός, τὶς δὲ πάλιν οὕτωσ ἐκπαθῆς πρὸς τὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν θεαμάτων ὡς μαθημάτων ὁς προσφυγιάτερον ἂν τὶ ποιήσατο τῆς ὑπερείας.

2 Ὁς δὲ ἐστὶ παράδοξον καὶ μέγα τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ὑπόθεσιν θεώρημα γένοιτ' ἂν οὕτως μᾶλιστ' ἐμφανές, εἰ τὰς ἐλλογυμωτάτας τῶν προγεγενημένων δυναστείων, περὶ ὅσοι συγγραφεῖς τοὺς πλείοτους διατέθειναι λόγους, παραβάλομεν καὶ συγκρίναι.

μεν πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαιῶν ὑπεροχήν. εἰδὲ δ' αἱ τῆς παραβολῆς ἄξιαν καὶ συγκρίσεως αὐταί. Πέρσαι κατὰ τινὰς καιροὺς μεγάλην ἁρχὴν κατεκτήσαντο καὶ δυναστείαν. ἄλλ' ὁσάκις ἐτόλμησαν ὑπερβῆναι τοὺς τῆς Ἀσίας ὀρους, οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ σφῶν ἐκυδώνευσαν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολλοὺς ἀμφισβητήσαντες χρόνους ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλληνῶν ἡγεμονίας, ἐπειδὴ ποτ' ἐκράτησαν, μόλις ἔτη δώδεκα κατείχον αὐτήν ἄδηρίτον. Μακεδόνες τῆς μὲν Ἐυρώπης ἧρξαν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀδριάν τόπων ἐως ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰστρον ποταμόν, δ' βραχὺ πάντες ἡλίθιος ἄρα ἀν φανείν μέρος τῆς προειρημένης χώρας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προσέλαβον τὴν τῆς Ἀσίας ἁρχῆν, καταλύσαντες τὴν τῶν Περσῶν δυναστείαν. ἄλλ' ομίῳ οὕτω, πλείοντος δόξαντες καὶ τόπων καὶ πραγμάτων γενέσθαι κύριον, τὸ πολὺ μέρος ἁκρὴν ἀπέλιπον τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀλλότριον. Σικελίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ Σαρδοὺς καὶ Τίβυς οὐδ' ἐπεβάλοντο καθάπαξ ἀμφισβητεῖν, τῆς δ' Ἐυρώπης τὰ μαχαίρατα γενὴ τῶν προσεπερίων ἠθηνὼν ἴσχυν ἐπεὶν οὐδ' ἐγί-
less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government—a thing unique in history? Or who again is there so passionately devoted to other spectacles or studies as to regard anything as of greater moment than the acquisition of this knowledge?

2. How striking and grand is the spectacle presented by the period with which I purpose to deal, will be most clearly apparent if we set beside and compare with the Roman dominion the most famous empires of the past, those which have formed the chief theme of historians. Those worthy of being thus set beside it and compared are these. The Persians for a certain period possessed a great rule and dominion, but so often as they ventured to overstep the boundaries of Asia they imperilled not only the security of this empire, but their own existence. The Lacedaemonians, after having for many years disputed the hegemony of Greece, at length attained it but to hold it uncontested for scarce twelve years. The Macedonian rule in Europe extended but from the Adriatic to the Danube, which would appear a quite insignificant portion of the continent. Subsequently, by overthrowing the Persian empire they became supreme in Asia also. But though their empire was now regarded as the greatest in extent and power that had ever existed, they left the larger part of the inhabited world as yet outside it. For they never even made a single attempt on Sicily, Sardinia, or Africa, and the most warlike nations of Western Europe were, to speak the simple truth, unknown
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7 νοσκόν. Ἐρωμαίοι γε μὴν οὐ τινὰ μέρη, σχεδὸν δὲ πᾶσαν πεποιημένοι τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπῆκοον αὐτοῖς,
. . . συν, ἀνυπέκβλητον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιγ-<νομένοις ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τεχνούς τῆς αὐτῶν>
8 δυναστεύειας . . . ἐκ τῆς γραφῆς.1 εξέσται σαφέστερον κατανοεῖν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ
tοῦ πόσα καὶ πηλίκα συμβάλλεισθαι πέφυκε τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν ὁ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας
τρόπος.
3 "Ἀρέσει δὲ τῆς πραγματείας ἦμιν τῶν μὲν χρόνων ὀλυμπιάς ἐκατοστή καὶ τετταρακοστή, τῶν δὲ πρά-
ξεων παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἐλλησιον ὁ προσαγορευθεὶς συμ-
μαχικὸς πόλεμος, ὅν πρῶτον ἐξήνεγκε μετ’ Ἀχαϊῶν
πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς Φιλίππος, Δημητρίου μὲν υἱὸς,
pατήρ δὲ Περσέως, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατ-
οικοῦσιν ὁ περὶ Κοίλης Συρίας, ὃν Ἀντίοχος καὶ
2 Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλή-
λους. ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Λιβύην
tόποις ὁ συστᾶς Ἐρωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδόνιοις, ὅν
οἱ πλεῖστοι προσαγορεύσοντο Ἀννυβιακοί. ταῦτα
d’ ἔστι συνεχῆ τοῖς τελευταίοις τῆς παρ’ Ἀράτου
3 Σικυωνίου συντάξεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρὸ τοῦτων
χρόνων ὡς ἄν εἰ σποράδας εἶναι συνέβαινε τὰς τῆς
οἰκουμένης πράξεις, διὰ τὸ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς,
ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς συντελείας αὐτῶν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ
τοὺς τόπους ἀπέχει ἐκαστά τῶν πεπραγμένων.
4 ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦτων τῶν καιρῶν οὖν εἰ σωματειδή
συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὴν ἱστορίαν, συμπλέκεσθαι τε
tὰς Ἰταλικὰς καὶ Λιβυκὰς πράξεις ταῖς τε κατὰ τὴν

1 In this passage the ms. A is partly illegible. The English is only meant to show the probable sense of what is missing.
BOOK I

to them. But the Romans have subjected to their rule not portions, but nearly the whole of the world, and possess an empire which is not only immeasurably greater than any which preceded it, but need not fear rivalry in the future. In the course of this work it will become more clearly intelligible by what steps this power was acquired, and it will also be seen how many and how great advantages accrue to the student from the systematic treatment of history.

3. The date from which I propose to begin is the 140th Olympiad [220–216 B.C.], and the events are the following: (1) in Greece the so-called Social War, the first waged against the Aetolians by the Achaeans in league with and under the leadership of Philip of Macedon, the son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, (2) in Asia the war for Coele-Syria between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator, (3) in Italy, Africa, and the adjacent regions, the war between Rome and Carthage, usually known as the Hannibalic War. These events immediately succeed those related at the end of the work of Aratus of Sicyon. Previously the doings of the world had been, so to say, dispersed, as they were held together by no unity of initiative, results, or locality; but ever since this date history has been an organic whole, and the affairs of Italy and Africa have been inter-
Δήλος τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἀπαίτησιν ἀρχήν τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας ἀπὸ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τότε τῶν καιρῶν. Ὑγάρ προειρημένων πολέμων κρατήσαντες Ῥωμαίοι Καρχηδονίων, καὶ νομίζαντες τὸ κυρώτατόν καὶ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτοῖς ἦν οὕσεις πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὀλίων ἐπιβολήν, οὕτως καὶ τότε πρῶτον ἐθάρρησαν ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰς χεῖρας ἐκτείνειν καὶ περαιοῦσαι μετὰ δυνάμεως εἰς τῇ Ἑλλάδα καὶ τούς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν τόπους.

Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦμιν ἢμίν ἢμίν συνήθη καὶ γνώριμα τὰ πολιτεύματα τὰ περί τῆς τῶν ὀλίων ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητήσαντα, ἵσως οὐδὲν ἢ ἡμᾶς ἐδει περὶ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ γράφειν, ἀπὸ ποιὰς προθέσεως ἢ δυνάμεως ὀρμηθέντες ἐνεχείρησαν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τηλικοῦτος ἔργοις. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν τοῦ Ῥωμαίων οὖν τοῦ Καρχηδονίων πολιτεύματος πρόχειρός ἐστι τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἢ προγεγενημένη δύναμις οὐδ' αἱ πράξεις αὐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ὑπελάβομεν εἶναι συντάξασθαι ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἐξής ἀνακύκλωσιν πρὸ τῆς ἱστορίας, ὑνα μηδεὶς ἐπιστὰς ἐπὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξήγησιν τότε διαπορή καὶ ζητή ποιῶς διαβουλίος ἢ ποιῶς δυνάμεις καὶ χορηγίαις χρησάμενοι Ῥωμαίοι πρὸς ταύτας ῥήμασιν τὰς ἐπιβολὰς, δι' ὅν καὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῆς θαλάττης τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο πᾶσης ἐγκρατεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτων τῶν βυβλίων καὶ τῆς ἐν ταύταις προκατασκευής δήλον ἢ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ὅτι καὶ λίαν εὐλόγους ἀφορμαίς χρησάμενοι πρὸς τῇ ἐπίνοιαν ῥήμασιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν συντέλειαν ἐξ.
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linked with those of Greece and Asia, all leading up to one end. And this is my reason for beginning where I do. For it was owing to their defeat of the Carthaginians in the Hannibalie War that the Romans, feeling that the chief and most essential step in their scheme of universal aggression had now been taken, were first emboldened to reach out their hands to grasp the rest and to cross with an army to Greece and Asia.

Now were we Greeks well acquainted with the two states which disputed the empire of the world, it would not perhaps have been necessary for me to deal at all with their previous history, or to narrate what purpose guided them, and on what sources of strength they relied, in entering upon such a vast undertaking. But as neither the former power nor the earlier history of Rome and Carthage is familiar to most of us, I thought it necessary to prefix this Book and the next to the actual history, in order that no one after becoming engrossed in the narrative may find himself at a loss, and ask by what counsel and trusting to what power and resources the Romans embarked on that enterprise which has made them lords over our land and our seas, but that from these Books and the preliminary sketch in them it may be clear to readers that they had quite adequate grounds for conceiving the ambition of a world-empire and adequate means for achieving their purpose. 4. For what gives my work its peculiar quality, and what is most remarkable in the present
μάσιν τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς καιρῶν τούτ’ ἔστων, ὅτι καθ’ ἀπερ ἡ τύχη σχέδον ἀπαντα τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης πράγματα πρὸς ἐν ἐκλίνε μέρος καὶ πάντα νεύειν ἡνάγκασε πρὸς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοτόν, οὕτως
2 καὶ δεῖ διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ μίαν σύνωπιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὸν χειρισμὸν τῆς τύχης, ὃ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων συντέλειαν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ προκαλεσάμενον ἡμᾶς καὶ παραρμήκαν πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς ἱστορίας μάλιστα τούτῳ γέγονε· σὺν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ μηδένα τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβεβλήθαι τῇ τῶν καθόλου πραγμάτων συντάξει. πολὺ γὰρ ἂν ἦττον ἔγνωγε πρὸς τούτῳ τὸ μέρος
3 ἐφιλοτημήθην. νῦν δ’ ὅρων τοὺς μὲν κατὰ μέρος πολέμους καὶ των τῶν ἀμα τούτων πράξεων καὶ πλείους πραγματευομένους, τὴν δὲ καθόλου καὶ συλλήβδην οἰκονομίαν τῶν γεγονότων, πότε καὶ πόθεν ὡρμήθη καὶ πῶς ἦσαν τὴν συντέλειαν, ταὐτήν οὐδ’ ἐπιβαλόμενον οὐδένα βασανίζειν, ὅσον γε
4 καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι, παντελῶς ὑπελαβον ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὸ μὴ παραλιπεῖν μηδ’ ἐᾶσαι παρελθεῖν ἀνεπιστάτως τὸ κάλλιστον ἀμα καθομίστων ἑπιτήρησε.
5 δεῦμα τῆς τύχης. πολλά γὰρ αὕτη καυσοποιοῦσα καὶ συνεχώς ἐναγωνιζομένη τοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν πρὸς ὅδεπι τῶν άπλῶς οὔτ’ ἐργάσατ’ ἔργον οὔτ’ ἠγωνίσατ’ ἀγώνισμα, οἶνον τὸ καθ’ ἡμᾶς.
6 ὅπερ ἐκ μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος γραφῶν τὰς ἱστορίας οὐχ οἶνον τε συνιδεῖν, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας πόλεις τις κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην ἐπελθὼν ἣ καὶ νὴ Δία γεγραμμένας χωρὶς ἀλλήλων θεσάμενους εὐθέως ὑπολαμβάνει κατανεοηκέναι καὶ τὸ τῆς ὅλης οἰκουμένης σχῆμα καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν αὐτῆς
7 θέσιν καὶ τάξιν· ὅπερ ἔστιν οὐδαμῶς εἰκός. καθό-
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age, is this. Fortune having guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and having forced them to incline towards one and the same end, a historian should bring before his readers under one synoptical view the operations by which she has accomplished her general purpose. Indeed it was this chiefly that invited and encouraged me to undertake my task; and secondarily the fact that none of my contemporaries have undertaken to write a general history, in which case I should have been much less eager to take this in hand. As it is, I observe that while several modern writers deal with particular wars and certain matters connected with them, no one, as far as I am aware, has even attempted to inquire critically when and whence the general and comprehensive scheme of events originated and how it led up to the end. I therefore thought it quite necessary not to leave unnoticed or allow to pass into oblivion this the finest and most beneficent of the performances of Fortune. For though she is ever producing something new and ever playing a part in the lives of men, she has not in a single instance ever accomplished such a work, ever achieved such a triumph, as in our own times. We can no more hope to perceive this from histories dealing with particular events than to get at once a notion of the form of the whole world, its disposition and order, by visiting, each in turn, the most famous cities, or indeed by looking at separate plans of each: a result by no means likely. He indeed who believes
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λου μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οἱ πεπεισμένοι διὰ τῆς κατὰ μέρος ἱστορίας μετρίως συνοψισθαί τὰ ὅλα παραπλήσιον τι πάσχειν, ὡς ἐν εἰ τινες ἐμψύ- χου καὶ καλοῦ σώματος γεγονότος διερρημένα τὰ μέρη θεώμενοι νομίζοιεν ἵκανως αὐτόπται γίνεσθαι

8 τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζώου καὶ καλλονῆς. εἰ γὰρ τις αὐτίκα μάλα συνθεῖς καὶ τέλειοι αὕθις ἀπεργασάμενοι τὸ ζῷον τῷ τ’ εἴδει καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς εὐπρεπείᾳ, κάπετα πάλιν ἐπιδιευκνῦν τοῖς αὐτῶις ἑκέινοις, ταχέως ἅν οἶμαι πάντα αὐτοῦς ὀμολογήσεν διότι καὶ λιῶν πολὺ τι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπελεύπτοντο πρόσθεν καὶ παραπλήσιοι τοῖς ὀνειρῶττους ἦσαν. ἐννοιαί μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν ὅλων δυνατόν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ γνώμην

9 ἀτρεκὴ σχεῖν ἀδύνατον. διὸ παντελῶς βραβὺ τι νομιστέοι συμβάλλεσθαι τῆν κατὰ μέρος ἱστορίαν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐμπειρίαν καὶ πίστιν. ἐκ μὲν τοις γε τῆς ἀπάντων πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπλοκῆς καὶ παραθέσεως, ἐτι δ’ ὀμοιότητος καὶ διαφορᾶς, μόνως ἅν τις ἐφίκοιτο καὶ δυνηθεὶ κατοπτεύσα ἁμα καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ τερπνὸν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας ἀναλαβεῖν.

10 Ἡ ποθησόμεθα δὲ ταύτης ἁρχήν τῆς βύβλου τὴν πρώτην διάβασιν εἴς Ἰταλίας Ῥωμαίων. αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶ συνεχῆς μὲν τοῖς ἀφ’ ὃν Τίμαιος ἀπελιπε, πίπτει δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ εἰκοστὴν πρὸς τοῖς ἐκατόν ὀλυμπιάδα. διὸ καὶ βητέων Ἆν εἴη πῶς καὶ πότε συντησάμενοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ τίς ἀφορμαῖς μετὰ ταῦτα χρησάμενοι, διαβαίνειν ὁρ- μῆσαι εἴς Σικελίαν. ταύτη γὰρ τῇ γῇ πρῶτον ἐπε-

11 βήσαν τῶν ἐκτὸς τόπων τῆς Ἰταλίας. καὶ βητέων αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς διαβάσεως αὐτίαν ψιλῶς, ἵνα μὴ τῆς

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that by studying isolated histories he can acquire a fairly just view of history as a whole, is, as it seems to me, much in the case of one, who, after having looked at the dismembered limbs of an animal once alive and beautiful, fancies he has been as good as an eye-witness of the creature itself in all its action and grace. For could anyone put the creature together on the spot, restoring its form and the comeliness of life, and then show it to the same man, I think he would quickly avow that he was formerly very far away from the truth and more like one in a dream. For we can get some idea of a whole from a part, but never knowledge or exact opinion. Special histories therefore contribute very little to the knowledge of the whole and conviction of its truth. It is only indeed by study of the interconnexion of all the particulars, their resemblances and differences, that we are enabled at least to make a general survey, and thus derive both benefit and pleasure from history.

5. I shall adopt as the starting-point of this book the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. This follows immediately on the close of Timaeus’ History and took place in the 129th Olympiad [264-261 B.C.]. Thus we must first state how and when the Romans established their position in Italy, and what prompted them afterwards to cross to Sicily, the first country outside Italy where they set foot. The actual cause of their crossing must be stated without comment; for if I were to seek the
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αἵτις αἰτίων ἐπιζητούσης ἀνυπόστατος ἢ τῆς ὅλης

4 ὑποθέσεως ἀρχὴ γένηται καὶ θεωρία. ληπτεόν δὲ καὶ τοῖς καυροῖς ὀμολογουμένην καὶ γνωριζομένην ἀρχὴν παρ' ἀπασί, καὶ τοὺς πράγμασι δυναμένην αὐτήν εἴς αὐτής θεωρεῖσθαι, κἂν δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις βραχύ προσαναδραμόντας κεφαλαιώδη τῶν μεταξὺ

5 πράξεων ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀνάμνησιν. τῆς γὰρ ἀρχῆς ἀγνοουμένης ἢ καὶ νη Δι' ἀμφιοβητουμένης οὐδὲ τῶν ἐξῆς οὐδὲν ὅδε περὶ ταύτης ὀμολογουμένην παρασκευασθῆ δόξα, τὸτ' ἠθῇ καὶ πᾶς ὁ συνεχής λόγος ἀποδοχῆς τυγχάνει παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούονσιν.

6 Ἔτος μὲν οὖν ἑνειστήκει μετὰ μὲν τὴν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς ναυμαχίαν ἐννεακαίδεκατον, πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἐν Δεύκτρωι μάχης ἐκκαίδεκατον, ἐν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίωι μὲν τὴν ἐπὶ 'Ανταλκίδου λεγομένην εἰρήνην πρὸς βασιλεὰ τῶν Περσῶν ἐκύρωσαν καὶ πρεσβύτερος Διονύσιος τῇ περὶ τὸν 'Ελλέπορον ποταμὸν μάχη γενικής τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν 'Ἐλληνας ἐπολιόρκει 'Ῥήγιον, Γαλάται δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἐλύσετε αὐτὴν τὴν Ἐρώμην κατείχον πλήν τοῦ

3 Καπετωλίου. πρὸς οὖς ποιησάμενοι Ὀρωμαῖοι σπουδᾶς καὶ διαλύσεις εὐδοκουμένας Γαλάταις, καὶ γενόμενοι πάλιν ἀνελπίστως τῆς πατρίδος ἐγκρατεῖς, καὶ λαβόντες οἰον ἀρχὴν τῆς συναυξήσεως, ἐπολέμουν ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς χρόνοις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγεῖτονας. 4 γενόμενοι δὲ ἐγκρατεῖς ἁπάντων τῶν Λατίνων διὰ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ἐπιτυχίᾳ, μετά ταῦτ' ἐπολέμουν Τυρρηνοῖς, ἔπειτα Κελτοῖς, ἐξῆς δὲ Σαυνίταις, τοῖς πρὸς τῆς ἀνατολᾶς καὶ τὰς ἀρκτῶν συντερμονοῦσι τῇ τῶν Λατίνων χώρᾳ.
cause of the cause and so on, my whole work would have no clear starting-point and principle. The starting-point must be an era generally agreed upon and recognized, and one self-apparent from the events, even if this involves my going back a little in point of date and giving a summary of intervening occurrences. For if readers are ignorant or indeed in any doubt as to what are the facts from which the work opens, it is impossible that what follows should meet with acceptance or credence; but once we produce in them a general agreement on this point they will give ear to all the subsequent narrative.

6. It was then the nineteenth year after the battle of Aegospotami and the sixteenth before that of Leuctra, the year in which the Spartans made the peace known as that of Antalcidas with the King of Persia, that in which also Dionysius the Elder, after defeating the Italiot Greeks in the battle at the river Elleporos, was besieging Rhegium, and that in which the Gauls, after taking Rome itself by assault, occupied the whole of that city except the Capitol. The Romans, after making a truce on conditions satisfactory to the Gauls and being thus contrary to their expectation reinstated in their home and as it were now started on the road of aggrandizement, continued in the following years to wage war on their neighbours. After subduing all the Latins by their valour and the fortune of war they fought first against the Etruscans, then against the Celts, and next against the Samnites, whose territory was conterminous with that of the Latins on the East
5 μετὰ δὲ τινὰ χρόνου Ταραντίνων διὰ τὴν εἰς τοὺς προσβευτὰς Ἦμωμαίων ἀσέλγειαν καὶ τὸν διὰ ταῦτα φόβον ἐπισπασαμένων Πύρρουν τῷ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς τῶν Γαλατῶν ἑφόδου τῶν τε περὶ Δελφοὺς φθαρέν·
6 τῶν καὶ περαιωθέντων εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, Ἦμωμαῖοι Τυρρηνοὶ μὲν καὶ Σαυνίτας ὑφ’ αὐτῶς πεποιημένοι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν Κελτῶς πολλαῖς μάχαις ἥδη νευκηκότες, τότε πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τῆς Ἰταλίας ὤρμησαν, οὐχ ὡς ὕπερ ὦθελών, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ πλείον ὧς ὕπερ ἱδίων ἥδη καὶ καθηκόντων σφίσι πολεμήσοντες, ἀθληταῖ γεγονότες ἀληθῶς τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς
7 Σαυνίτας καὶ Κελτῶς ἀγώνων. ὑποστάντες δὲ γενναίως τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον τάς τε δυνάμεις καὶ Πύρρον ἐκβαλόντες ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας, αὐθίς ἐπολέμουν καὶ κατεστρέφοντο τοὺς
8 κοινωνήσαντας Πύρρῳ τῶν πραγμάτων. γενόμενοι δὲ παραδόξως ἀπάντων ἐγκρατεῖς, καὶ ποιησάμενοι τοὺς τὴν Ἰταλίαν οἰκοῦντας ὑφ’ αὐτῶς πλῆν Κελτῶν, μετὰ ταῦτα πολιορκεῖν ἐνεχείρησαν τοὺς τότε κατέχοντας τὸ Ῥήγιον Ἦμωμαίους.
7 Ἰδοὺ γὰρ τι συνέβη καὶ παραπλήσιον ἐκατέρας ταῖς περὶ τὸν πορθμὸν ἐκτυσμέναις πόλεσιν· εἰσὶ δ’
2 αὐταὶ Μεσσήνη καὶ Ῥήγιον. Μεσσήνην μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολλοῖς ἀνώτερον χρόνοις τῶν νῦν λεγομένων καυρῶν Καμπανοὶ παρ’ Ἀγαθοκλεῖ μισθοφοροῦσιν, καὶ πάλαι περὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῆς πόλεως ὥθημισθήστε, ἀμα τῷ λαβεῖν
3 καυρὸν εὖθυς ἐπεχείρησαν παρασπονδεῖν· παρεισελθόντες δ’ ὡς φίλοι, καὶ κατασχόντες τὴν πόλιν, οὐς μὲν ἐξέβαλον τῶν πολιτῶν, οὐς δ’ ἀπ’ ἑσφάζον. πράξαντες δὲ ταῦτα, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας
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and North. After some time the Tarentines, fearing the consequences of their insolence to the Roman envoys, begged for the intervention of Pyrrhus. (This was in the year preceding the expedition of those Gauls who met with the reverse at Delphi and then crossed to Asia.) The Romans here this reduced the Etruscans and Samnites and had vanquished the Italian Celts in many battles, and they now for the first time attacked the rest of Italy not as if it were a foreign country, but as if it rightfully belonged to them. Their struggle with the Samnites and Celts had made them veritable masters in the art of war, and after bravely supporting this war with Pyrrhus and finally expelling himself and his army from Italy, they continued to fight with and subdue those who had sided with him. When, with extraordinary good fortune, they had reduced all these peoples and had made all the inhabitants of Italy their subjects excepting the Celts, they undertook the siege of Rhegium now held by certain of their compatriots.

7. For very much the same fortune had befallen the two cities on the Straits, Messene and Rhegium. Certain Campanians serving under Agathocles had long cast covetous eyes on the beauty and prosperity of Messene; and not long before the events I am speaking of they availed themselves of the first opportunity to capture it by treachery. After being admitted as friends and occupying the city, they first expelled or massacred the citizens and took
καὶ τὰ τέκνα τῶν ἡκληρηκότων, ὃς ποθ' ἢ τύχῃ διένεμε παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς παρανομίας καταρὼν ἐκάστοις, οὕτως ἔσχον· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς βίους καὶ τὴν χώραν μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι κατεῖχον. ταχὺ δὲ καὶ βαδίσως καλὴς χώρας καὶ πόλεως ἐγκρατεῖς γενόμενοι, παρὰ πόδας εὐρὸν μιμήτας τῆς πράξεως.  
6 Ἡργίνωι γάρ, καθ' ὁν καρφὸν Πύρρος εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἐπεραίωντο, καταπλαγεῖς γενόμενοι τὴν ἐφοδον αὐτοῦ, δεδιότες δὲ καὶ Καρχηδονίους θαλαττοκρατοῦντας, ἐπεσπάσαντο φυλακὴν ἀμα καὶ βοηθειαν  
7 παρὰ Ῥωμαίων. οἱ δ' εἰσελθόντες χρόνων μὲν των διετήρουν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν ἐαυτῶν πίστιν, ὄντες τετρακισχίλιοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ὅν ἤγειτο Δέκιος Καμπανός· τέλος δὲ ἐξελώσαντες τοὺς Μαμερτίνους, ἀμα δὲ καὶ συνεργοὺς λαβόντες αὐτοὺς, παρεσπόνδησαν τοὺς Ἡργίνωι, ἐκπαθεῖς ὄντες ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς πόλεως εὐκαιρίᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν Ἡργίνων περὶ τοὺς ἱδίους βίους εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκβαλόντες, τοὺς δ' ἀποσφάζαντες τῶν πολιτῶν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοὺς Καμπανοῖς κατέσχον τὴν πόλιν. οἱ δ' Ἡργίνωι μὲν ἐφερον τὸ γεγονός· οὐ μὴν εἰχὸν γε ποιεῖν οὔδεν διὰ τὸ συνέχεσθαι τοῖς προ-  
10 εἰρημένοις πολέμοις. ἔπει δ' ἀπὸ τούτων ἐγένοτο, συγκλέισαντες αὐτοὺς ἐπολιόρκουν τὸ Ἡργίνων, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προείπον. κρατήσαντες δὲ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ καταλήψει διέθεσαν, ἐκθύμως ἀμυνομένοις διὰ τὸ προοράθαι τὸ μέλλον, ζωγρία δ' ἐκυρίευσαν πλείονων ἡ τριακοσίων. ὅν  
11 ἀναπεμφθέντων εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, οἱ στρατηγοὶ προαγάγοντες εἰς τὴν ἅγοραν καὶ μαστιγώσαντες ἀπαντας κατὰ τὸ παρ', αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἐπελέκισαν, βουλόμενοι διὰ τῆς εἰς ἑκείνους τιμωρίας, καθ' ὅσον  
12 Ἡργίνωι καὶ Καρχηδονίοις εἰς τὴν ἴλῃ, τῇ ἔστι οὖσαν πολιτείαν, ἔσχον τὸν τόπον πάντας σωζόντας πολεμιστὴν ὧδ' ἐπετύχειν.  
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possession of the wives and families of their unhappy victims, just as chance assigned them at the time of the outrage. They next divided among themselves the land and all other property. Having thus possessed themselves so quickly and easily of a fine city and territory, they were not long in finding imitators of their exploit. For the people of Rhegium, when Pyrrhus crossed to Italy, dreading an attack by him and fearing also the Carthaginians who commanded the sea, begged from the Romans a garrison and support. The force which was sent, four thousand in number and under the command of Decius, a Campanian, kept the city and their faith for some time, but at length, anxious to rival the Mamertines and with their co-operation, played the people of Rhegium false, and eagerly coveting a city so favourably situated and containing so much private wealth, expelled or massacred the citizens and possessed themselves of the city in the same manner as the Campanians had done. The Romans were highly displeased, yet could do nothing at the time, as they were oeenpied with the wars I have already mentioned. But when they had a free hand they shut up the culprits in the city and proceeded to lay siege to it as I have stated above. When Rhegium fell, most of the besieged were slain in the actual assault, having defended themselves desperately, as they knew what awaited them, but more than three hundred were captured. When they were sent to Rome the Consuls had them all conducted to the forum and there, according to the Roman custom, scourged and beheaded; their object being to recover as far as possible by this punishment their reputation
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οἴοι τ᾽ ἦσαν, διορθοῦσθαι παρὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις τὴν
13 αὐτῶν πίστιν. τὴν δὲ χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν παρα-
χρῆμα τοῖς Ῥηγίνοις ἀπέδοσαν.

8 Οἱ δὲ Μαμερτίνοι, τοῦτο γὰρ τούνομα κυριεύ-
σαντες οἱ Καμπανοὶ τῆς Μεσσήνης προσηγόρευσαν
σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἐως μὲν συνεχρώντο τῇ τῶν Ῥω-
μαίων συμμαχία τῶν τὸ Ῥήγιον κατασχόντων, οὐ
μόνον τῆς ἐαυτῶν πόλεως καὶ χώρας ἀσφαλῶς κατ-
εκράτουν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς συνορούσης οὐχ ὡς
ἐτυχε παρηνώχλου τοῖς τε Καρχηδονίς καὶ τοῖς
Συρακοσίοις, καὶ πολλὰ μέρη τῆς Σικελίας ἐφορο-
2 λόγουν. ἑπεὶ δὲ ἐστερήθησαν τῆς προειρημένης
ἐπικουρίας, συγκλεισθέντων τῶν τὸ Ῥήγιον κατ-
εχόντων εἰς τὴν πολιορκίαν, παρὰ πόδας ὑπὸ τῶν
Συρακοσίων αὐτοῖ πάλιν συνεδιώχθησαν εἰς τὴν
3 πόλιν διὰ τινας τοιαύτας αἰτίας. χρόνοις οὐ πολλοῖς
πρότερον αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν Συρακοσίων διενεχθείσαι
πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ διατρίβουσαι περὶ τὴν
Μεργάνη, κατέστησαν εἰς αὐτῶν ἀρχοντας, Ἀρτεμί-
δωρὸν τε καὶ τὸν μετὰ ταύτα βασιλεύσαντα τῶν
Συρακοσίων Ἰέρωνα, νέον μὲν ὄντα κομιδή, πρὸς
δὲ τι γένος εὐφυὴ βασιλικῆς καὶ πραγματικῆς οἰκο-
4 νομίας. ὁ δὲ παραλαβόν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ παρεισελθὼν
eἰς τὴν πόλιν διὰ τινῶν οἰκείων καὶ κύριος γενό-
μενος τῶν ἄντιπολιτευομένων, οὕτως ἔχρήσατο
πράως καὶ μεγαλοπύχως τοῖς πρᾶγμασιν, ὡστε τοὺς
Συρακοσίους, καίπερ οὐδαμῶς εὐδοκουμένους ἐπὶ
tαις τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀρχαιρεσίας, τότε πάντας
ἀμοθυμαδὸν εὐδοκήσαί στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν
5 Ἰέρωνα. ὁς ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐπιυπημάτων εὐθέως
dῆλος ἢν τοῖς ὀρθῶς σκοπουμένοις μειζόνων ὀρεγό-
μενος ἐλπίδων ἢ κατὰ τὴν στρατηγίαν. θεωρῶν
20
for good faith with the allies. The city and territory of Rhegium they at once restored to the citizens.

8. The Mamertines (for this was the name adopted by the Campanians after their seizure of Messene), as long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Romans who had occupied Rhegium, not only remained in secure possession of their own city and territory but caused no little trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans about the adjacent territories, levying tribute from many parts of Sicily. When, however, they were deprived of this support, the captors of Rhegium being now closely invested, they were at once in their turn driven to take refuge in their city by the Syracusans owing to the following causes. Not many years before the Syracusan army had quarrelled with those in the city. They were then posted near Mergane and appointed two magistrates chosen from their own body, Artemidorus and Hiero, who was subsequently king of Syracuse. He was still quite young but naturally qualified to be a ruler and statesman of a kind. Having accepted the command, he gained admittance to the city through certain relatives, and after overpowering the opposite party, administered affairs with such mildness and magnanimity that the Syracusans, though by no means inclined to approve camp elections, on this occasion unanimously accepted him as their general. From his first measures it was evident at once to all capable of judging that his ambition was not limited to a mere command.
9 γὰρ τοὺς Συρακοσίους, ἐπειδὰν ἐκπέμψωσι τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, αὐτοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς στασιάζοντας καὶ καινοτομοῦντας αἰεὶ τι, 2 τὸν δὲ Λεσπύνην εἴδως καὶ τῇ προστασίᾳ καὶ τῇ πίστει πολύ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, εὐδοκιμοῦντα δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλῆθει διαφερόντως, συν- ἀπτειν κηδείαν πρὸς αὐτόν, βουλόμενος οἶνον ἐφε- δρείαν ἀπολυπεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει τούτον, ὅτ' αὐτὸν 3 ἔξεναι δέου μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις. γήμας δὲ τὴν θυγατέρα τοῦ προειρημένου, καὶ συνθεωρῶν τοὺς ἀρχαίους μισθοφόρους καχέκτας ὄντας καὶ κινητικούς, ἐξάγει στρατεύειν ὡς ἐπὶ τοὺς 4 βαρβάρους τοὺς τὴν Μεσσηνῆν κατασχόντας. ἀντι- στρατοπεδεύσας δὲ περὶ Κεντόριτα, καὶ παρα- ταξάμενος περὶ τὸν Κυμάοφρων ποταμόν, τοὺς μὲν πολιτικοὺς ἵππεις καὶ πεζοὺς αὐτὸς ἐν ἀποστήματι συνεῖχεν, ὡς κατ’ ἄλλον τόπον τοῖς πολεμίοις συμμίξων, τοὺς δὲ ξένους προβαλόμενος εἴσαε 5 πάντας ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων διαφθαρῆναι· κατὰ δὲ τὸν τῆς ἐκείνων τροπῆς καιρὸν ἀσφαλῶς αὐτὸς 6 ἀπεχώρησε μετὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας. συντελεσάμενος δὲ τὸ προκείμενον πραγματικῶς, καὶ παρηρηκὼς πάν τὸ κινητικὸν καὶ στασιώδες τῆς δυνάμεως, ἐξενολογήσας δ’ αὐτοῦ πλῆθος ἱκανοῦ μισθοφόρου, ἀσφαλῶς ἡδη τά κατὰ τὴν 7 ἀρχήν διεξῆγε. θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐκ τῶν προτερήματος θρασεῖς καὶ προπετῶς ἀναστρεφο- μένους, καθοπλίσας καὶ γυμνάσας ἐνεργῶς τὰς πολιτικὰς δυνάμεις ἐξήγε, καὶ συμβάλλει τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐν τῷ Μυλαίῳ πεδίῳ περὶ τὸν Δογγανὸν 8 καλούμενοι ποταμῶν. τροπὴν δὲ ποιόσα αὐτῶν ἱσχυράν, καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος.
9. For observing that the Syracusans, every time they dispatch their forces on an expedition accompanied by their supreme magistrates, begin quarrelling among themselves and introducing continual changes, and knowing that Leptines had a wider circle of dependents and enjoyed more credit than any other burgher and had an especially high name among the common people, he allied himself with him by marriage, so that whenever he had to take the field himself he might leave him behind as a sort of reserve force. He married, then, the daughter of this Leptines, and finding that the veteran mercenaries were disaffected and turbulent, he marched out in force professedly against the foreigners who had occupied Messene. He met the enemy near Centuripa and offered battle near the river Cyamorsus. He held back the citizen cavalry and infantry at a distance under his personal command as if he meant to attack on another side, but advancing the mercenaries he allowed them all to be cut up by the Campanians. During their rout he himself retired safely to Syracuse with the citizens. Having thus efficiently accomplished his purpose and purged the army of its turbulent and seditious element, he himself enlisted a considerable number of mercenaries and henceforth continued to rule in safety. Observing that the Mamertines, owing to their success, were behaving in a bold and reckless manner, he efficiently armed and trained the urban levies and leading them out engaged the enemy in the Mylaean plain near the river Longanus, and inflicted a severe defeat on 268 B.C.
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ζωγρία, τὴν μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων κατέπαυσε τόλμαν, αὐτὸς δὲ παραγενόμενος εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας βασιλεύς ὑπὸ πάντων προσηγορεύθη τῶν συμμάχων.

10 Οἶ δὲ Μαμερτίνου, πρότερον μὲν ἐστερημένοι τῆς ἐπικουρίας τῆς ἐκ τοῦ Ῥηγίου, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον εἶπον, τότε δὲ τοῖς ἱδίοις πράγμασι ἐπται-κότες ὀλοσχερῶς διὰ τὰς νῦν ῥηθείσας αἰτίας, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Καρχηδονίους κατέφευγον, καὶ τούτοις ἐν-

2 εχείριζον σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν ἀκραν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς Ῥωμαίοις ἐπρέσβευον, παραδίδοντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ δεόμενοι βοηθήσει σφῶς αὐτοῖς ὀμοφύλους ὑπάρ-

3 χουσι. Ῥωμαίοι δὲ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἦπόρησαν διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ἐξοφθαλμὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀλογίαν τῆς

4 βοηθείας. τὸ γὰρ μικρὸ πρότερον τοὺς ἱδίους πο-

5 λίτας μετὰ τῆς μεγίστης ἀνηρκότος τιμωρίας, ὅτι Ῥηγίνους παρεποίησαν, παραχρῆμα Μαμερτίνους

6 βοηθεῖν ζητεὶν τοῖς τὰ παραπλήσια πεποιηκόσιν οὐ

7 μόνον εἰς τὴν Μεσσηνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ῥηγίνων

8 πόλιν, δυσαπολογητὸν εἶχε τὴν ἀμαρτίαν. οὐ μὴν

9 ἀγνοοῦντες γε τούτων οὐδέν, θεωροῦντες δὲ τοὺς

10 Καρχηδονίους οὐ μόνον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, ἀλλὰ

11 καὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ὑπῆκοα πολλὰ μέρη πεποιημένους,

12 ἐτὶ δὲ τῶν νῆσων ἀπασών ἐνεκρατεῖσι ὑπάρχοντας

13 τῶν κατὰ τὸ Σαρδωνίου καὶ Ῥυρηνικὸν πέλαγος,

14 ἠγωνίαν, εἰ Σικελίας ἐτὶ κυριεύσαιεν, μὴ λιαν βα-

15 ρεῖς καὶ φοβεροὶ γείτονες αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχοιεν, κύκλῳ

16 σφᾶς περιέχοντες καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς Ἰταλίας μέρεσιν

17 ἐπικείμενοι. διὸτι δὲ ταχεῖος ύπ’ αὐτοὺς ποιή-

18 σονται τὴν Σικελίαν, μὴ τυχόντων ἐπικουρίας τῶν

19 Μαμερτίνων, προφανὲς ὑπ. κρατήσαντες γὰρ ἐγχει-

20 ριξομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς Μεσσηνίας ἐμελλον ἐν οὐδὲν

21 χρόνῳ τὰς Συρακούσας ἐπανελέσθαι διὰ τὸ πᾶσης
them, capturing their leaders. This put an end to the audacity of the Mamertines, and on his return to Syracuse he was with one voice proclaimed king by all the allies.

10. The Mamertines had previously, as I above narrated, lost their support from Rhegium and had now suffered complete disaster at home for the reasons I have just stated. Some of them appealed to the Carthaginians, proposing to put themselves and the citadel into their hands, while others sent an embassy to Rome, offering to surrender the city and begging for assistance as a kindred people. The Romans were long at a loss, the succour demanded being so obviously unjustifiable. For they had just inflicted on their own fellow-citizens the highest penalty for their treachery to the people of Rhegium, and now to try to help the Mamertines, who had been guilty of like offence not only at Messene but at Rhegium also, was a piece of injustice very difficult to excuse. But fully aware as they were of this, they yet saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides, and that they were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian Seas. They were therefore in great apprehension lest, if they also became masters of Sicily, they would be most troublesome and dangerous neighbours, hemming them in on all sides and threatening every part of Italy. That they would soon be supreme in Sicily, if the Mamertines were not helped, was evident; for once Messene had fallen into their hands, they would shortly subdue Syracuse also, as they were
9 σχεδόν δεσπόζειν τῆς Ἀλλῆς Σικελίας. ὃ προορώμενοι Ἦρωμαῖοι, καὶ νομίζοντες ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σφίσι τὸ μὴ προέσθαι τὴν Μεσσήνην, μήδ' ἔσσαι Καρχηδονίους οἰον εἰ γεφυρώσαι τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν αὐτοῖς διάβασιν, πολύν μὲν χρόνον ἐβουλεύσαντο, καὶ τὸ μὲν συνέδριον οὖδ' εἰς τέλος ἐκύρωσε τὴν γνώμην διὰ τὰς ἀρτὶ ρηθείσας αἰτίας. ἔδοκε γὰρ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀλογίαν τῆς τοῖς Μαμερτίνοις ἐπικουρίας 11 ἰσορροπεῖν τοῖς ἐκ τῆς βοηθείας συμφέρουσιν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ, πετρυμένοι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν προγεγονότων πολέμων καὶ προσδεόμενοι παντοδαπῆς ἐπανορθώσεως, ἀμα ὑπὸ τοῖς ἀρτὶ ρηθεὶς περὶ τοῦ κοινῆς συμφέρει τῶν πολέμου καὶ κατ' ἰδίαις ἐκάστοις ἀφελείας προδήλους καὶ μεγάλας ὑποδεικνύοντων 3 τῶν στρατηγῶν, ἔκριναν βοηθεῖν. κυρωθέντος δὲ τοῦ δόγματος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, προχειρισάμενοι τὸν ἐτερον τῶν ὑπάτων στρατηγὸν Ἀππιον Κλαύδιον ἐξαπέστειλαν, κελεύσαντες βοηθεῖν καὶ διαβάσειν 4 εἰς Μεσσήνην. οἱ δὲ Μαμερτίνοι τὸν μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγόν, ὡδ' κατέχοντα τὴν ἀκραν, ἐξεβαλον, τὰ μὲν καταπληξάμενοι, τὰ δὲ παραλογισάμενοι: τὸν δ' Ἀππιον ἐπεσπῶντο, καὶ τούτω 5 τὴν πόλιν ἐνεχείριζον. Καρχηδονίοι δὲ τὸν μὲν στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν ἀνεσταύρωσαν, νομίζαντες αὐτὸν ἄβουλως, ἀμα δ' ἀνάνδρως, προέσθαι τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. 6 αὐτοὶ δὲ τῇ μὲν νάυτικῇ δυνάμει περὶ Πελωριάδα στρατοπεδεύσαντες, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ στρατεύματι περὶ τὰς Σύνεις καλομενέας, ἐνεργῶς προσέκειντο τῇ 7 Μεσσήνῃ. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καυρὸν τούτον Ἰέρων, νομίζομεν εὑρίσκως ἐχεῖν τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὸ τοὺς βαρβάρους τοὺς τὴν Μεσσήνην κατέχοντας δλο- σχερῶς ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας, τίθεται πρὸς τοὺς 26
absolute lords of almost all the rest of Sicily. The Romans, foreseeing this and viewing it as a necessity for themselves not to abandon Messene and thus allow the Carthaginians as it were to build a bridge over to Italy, debated the matter for long, (11) and, even at the end, the Senate did not sanction the proposal for the reason given above, considering that the objection on the score of inconsistency was equal in weight to the advantage to be derived from intervention. The commons however, worn out as they were by the recent wars and in need of any and every kind of restorative, listened readily to the military commanders, who, besides giving the reasons above stated for the general advantageousness of the war, pointed out the great benefit in the way of plunder which each and every one would evidently derive from it. They were therefore in favour of consenting; and when the measure had been passed by the people they appointed to the command one of the Consuls, Appius Claudius, who was ordered to cross to Messene. The Mamertines, partly by menace and partly by stratagem, dislodged the Carthaginian commander, who was already established in the citadel, and then invited Appius to enter, placing the city in his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their general, thinking him guilty of a lack both of judgement and of courage in abandoning the citadel. Acting for themselves they stationed their fleet in the neighbourhood of Cape Pelorias, and with their land forces pressed Messene close in the direction of Suses. Hiero now, thinking that present circumstances were favourable for expelling from Sicily entirely the foreigners who occupied Messene, made
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Karχηδονίους συνθήκας. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ’ ἀναζεύγας
8 ἐκ τῶν Ἡσακουσῶν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὴν
προειρημένην πόλιν, καταστρατοπεδεύσας δ’ ἐκ
θατέρου μέρους περὶ τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν ὄρος καλοῦμενον
ἀπέκλεισε καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐξόδου τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει.
9 ὃ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων "Ἀππίος νυκτὸς καὶ
παραβόλως περαιωθεὶς τὸν πορθμὸν ἤκεν εἰς τὴν
10 Μεσσηνῆν. ὡρῶν δὲ πανταχόθεν ἑνεργῶς προση-
ρεικότας τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ συλλογισάμενος ἀμα
μὲν αἰσχράν, ἀμα δ’ ἐπισφαλῆ γίνεσθαι τὴν πολιο-
11 κίαν αὐτῷ, τῆς τε γῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατοῦν-
tων καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διεπε-
σβεντο πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους, βουλόμενος ἐξελέσθαι
12 τοῦ πολέμου τοὺς Μαμερτίνους. οὐδενὸς δὲ
προσέχοντος αὐτῷ, τέλος ἐπαναγκαζόμενος ἔκρινε
13 διαικινδυνεύειν καὶ πρῶτον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς Ἡσακο-
σίοις. ἔξαγαγὼν δὲ τὴν δύναμιν παρέταξε πρὸς
μάχην, ἑτοίμως εἰς τὸν ἁγῶνα συγκαταβάντος
14 αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ τῶν Ἡσακοσίων βασιλέως. ἔπὶ
πολὺν δὲ χρόνον διαγωνισάμενος ἐπεκράτησε τῶν
πολεμίων, καὶ κατεδώξε τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἔως εἰς
15 τὸν χάρακα πάντας. "Ἀππίος μὲν οὖν σκυλεύσας
τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐπανῆλθε πάλιν εἰς τὴν Μεσσηνῆν.
δ’ Ἰέρων, ὀττευσάμενος τι περὶ τῶν ὅλων πραγμά-
tων, ἐπιγενομένης τῆς νυκτὸς ἀνεχώρησε κατὰ
12 σπουδῆν εἰς τὰς Ἡσακούσας. τῇ δὲ κατὰ πόδας
ἡμέρα γνοὺς "Ἀππίος τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῶν προειρη-
μένων, καὶ γενόμενος εὐθαρσῆς, ἔκρινε μὴ μέλλειν,
2 ἄλλ’ ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. παραγγείλας
οὖν τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐν ὧρᾳ γίνεσθαι τὴν θεραπείαν,
3 ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ τὴν ἔξοδον ἐποιεῖτο. συμβαλὼν δὲ
toῖς ὑπεναντίοις πολλούς μὲν αὐτῶν ἅπεκτεινε,
an alliance with the Carthaginians, and quitting Syracuse with his army marched towards that city. Pitching his camp near the Chalcidian mountain on the side opposite to the Carthaginians he cut off this means of exit from the city as well. Appius, the Roman consul, at the same time succeeded at great risk in crossing the Straits by night and entering the city. Finding that the enemy had strictly invested Messene on all sides and regarding it as both inglorious and perilous for himself to be besieged, as they commanded both land and sea, he at first tried to negotiate with both, desiring to deliver the Mamertines from the war. But when neither paid any attention to him, he decided perforce to risk an engagement and in the first place to attack the Syracusans. Leading out his forces he drew them up in order of battle, the king of Syracuse readily accepting the challenge. After a prolonged struggle Appius was victorious and drove the whole hostile force back to their camp. After despoiling the dead he returned to Messene. Hiero, divining the final issue of the whole conflict, retreated in haste after nightfall to Syracuse. 12. On the following day Appius, learning of his retirement and encouraged thereby, decided not to delay but to attack the Carthaginians. He ordered his troops to be in readiness early and sallied forth at break of day. Engaging the enemy he slew many of them and compelled the rest to


4 τάς παρακειμένας πόλεις. χρησάμενος δὲ τοῖς εὐτυχήμασι τούτοις καὶ λύσας τὴν πολιορκίαν, λοιπὸν ἐπιπορευόμενος ἀδεώς ἐπόρθει τὴν τε τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τὴν τῶν συμμαχοῦντων αὐτοῖς χώραν, οὗδενὸς ἀντιποιούμενον τῶν ὑπαίθρων. τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον προσκαθήσασα αὐτὰς ἐπεβάλετο πολιορκεῖν τὰς Συρακούσας.

5 Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη Ἐρυμαῖων ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας διάβασις μετὰ δυνάμεως ἢδε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ τούτους ἐγένετο τοὺς καυροὺς, ἦν οἰκειοτάτην κρίναντες ἀρχήν εἶναι τῆς ὀλῆς προβέσεως, ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐποιησάμεθα τὴν ἐπίστασιν, ἀναδραμόντες ἐτί τοῖς χρόνοις, τοῦ μηδὲν ἀπόρημα καταλύειν ύπὲρ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αὐτίας ἀποδείξεων. τῷ γὰρ πῶς καὶ πότε πταίσαντες αὐτῇ τῇ πατρίδι Ἐρμαῖοι τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἠρέαντο προκοπῆς, καὶ πότε πάλιν καὶ πῶς κρατήσαντες τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐπεβάλοντο πράγμασιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπελάβομεν εἰναι παρακολουθῆσαι τοῖς μέλλονοι καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν τῆς νῦν ὑπερχύρισε δεόντως συν-8 ὀψεθαί. διόπερ οὔ χρῆ θαυμάζειν οὔδ' ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς, εάν που προσανατρέχωμεν τοῖς χρόνοις περὶ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων πολιτευμάτων. τοῦτο γὰρ ποιήσομεν χάριν τοῦ λαμβανέων ἀρχὰς τοιαύτας, έξ ὡν ἐσταὶ σαφὸς κατανοεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἔκαστοι καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς ῥημαθέντες εἰς ταύτα παρεγένοντο τὰς διαθέσεις, ἐν αἷς ὑπάρχουσι νῦν. ὁ δὴ καὶ περὶ Ἐρυμαίων ἅρτι πεποιηκαίμεν.

13 Ἀφεμένους δὲ τούτων λέγειν ὡρα περὶ τῶν προκειμένων, ἐπὶ βραχὺ καὶ κεφαλαιώδως προεκ-2 θεμένους τὰς ἐν τῇ προκατασκευῇ πράξεις. ὃν εἰσὶν
BOOK 1

retreat in disorder to the neighbouring cities. Having raised the siege by these successes, he advanced fearlessly, devastating the territory of the Syracusans and of their allies, no one disputing the open country with him. Finally he sat down before Syracuse and commenced to besiege it.

Such then was the occasion and motive of this the first crossing of the Romans from Italy with an armed force, an event which I take to be the most natural starting-point of this whole work. I have therefore made it my serious base, but went also somewhat further back in order to leave no possible obscurity in my statements of general causes. To follow out this previous history—how and when the Romans after the disaster to Rome itself began their progress to better fortunes, and again how and when after conquering Italy they entered on the path of foreign enterprise—seems to me necessary for anyone who hopes to gain a proper general survey of their present supremacy. My readers need not therefore be surprised if, in the further course of this work, I occasionally give them in addition some of the earlier history of the most famous states; for I shall do so in order to establish such a fundamental view as will make it clear in the sequel starting from what origins and how and when they severally reached their present position. This is exactly what I have just done about the Romans.

13. Enough of such explanations. It is now time to come to my subject after a brief summary of the events included in these introductory Books. To
3 Καρχηδονίους εν τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ. ταύταις συνεχῆς ὁ Λιβυκὸς πόλεμος. ὦ συνάπτει τὰ κατ᾽ Ἰβηρίαν Ἀμίλκα, μετὰ δὲ τούτων Ἄσδρούβα
4 πραχθέντα καὶ Καρχηδονίους. οἷς ἐγένετο κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἡ πρώτη Ἡρωϊκῶν διάβασις εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ ταύτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Ἔλληνος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις οἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ Κελτοῖς
5 ἀγώνες. τούτοις δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησι κὸν Κλεομενικὸς καλοῦμενος ἐνηργεῖτο πόλεμος, εἰς δὲ καὶ τὴν καταστροφὴν ἐπουσάμεθα τῆς ὅλης κατασκευῆς καὶ τῆς δευτέρας βιβλίου.
6 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ μέρος ὑπὲρ τῶν προειρημένων πράξεων οὐδὲν οὐθ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀναγ-καίον οὔτε τοῖς ἀκούοντι σχῆμα. οὐ γάρ ἱστορεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν προτιθέμεθα, μνησθῆναι δὲ κεφαλαίως προαιρούμεθα χάριν τῆς προκατασκευῆς τῶν μελλουσῶν ύφ᾽ ἡμῶν ἱστορεῖσθαι πράξεων.
7 διάπερ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων ψαυνοίτες κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τῶν προειρημένων πειρασόμεθα συνάψαι τὴν τελευτὴν τῆς προκατασκευῆς τῇ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστορίας
8 ἄρχῃ καὶ προθέσει. τούτων γὰρ τὸν τρόπον συνεχοῦς γνωμένης τῆς διηγήσεως, ἡμεῖς τε δόξομεν εὐλόγως ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ἦδη προϊστοριμένων ἐτέρως, τοῖς τε φιλομαθούσιν ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης οἰκονομίας εὐμαθῆ καὶ ῥαδίαν ἐπὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ῥηθῇ-
9 σεσῆθαι παρασκευάσομεν τὴν ἐφοδίον. βραχὺ δ᾽ ἐπι-μελέστερον πειρασόμεθα διελθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πρώτου συστάντος πολέμου Ἡρωϊκῶν καὶ Καρχηδονίους
10 περὶ Σικελίας. οὔτε γὰρ πολυχρονιστῶν τοῦτον πόλεμον εὐρεῖν ράδιον οὔτε παρασκευάς ὅλοσχερε-
BOOK I

take them in order we have first the incidents of the war between Rome and Carthage for Sicily. Next follows the war in Libya and next the achievements of the Carthaginians in Spain under Hamilcar and afterwards under Hasdrubal. At the same time occurred the first crossing of the Romans to Illyria and these parts of Europe, and subsequently to the preceding events their struggle with the Italian Celts. Contemporary with this the so-called Cleomenic war was proceeding in Greece, and with this war I wind up my Introduction as a whole and my second Book.

Now to recount all these events in detail is neither incumbent on me nor would it be useful to my readers; for it is not my purpose to write their history but to mention them summarily as introductory to the events which are my real theme. I shall therefore attempt by such summary treatment of them in their proper order to fit in the end of the Introduction to the beginning of the actual History. Thus there will be no break in the narrative and it will be seen that I have been justified in touching on events which have been previously narrated by others, while this arrangement will render the approach to what follows intelligible and easy for students. I shall, however, attempt to narrate somewhat more carefully the first war between Rome and Carthage for the possession of Sicily; since it is not easy to name any war which lasted longer, nor one which exhibited on both sides more extensive preparations,
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στέρας οὔτε συνεχεστέρας πράξεις οὔτε πλείους ἀγώνας οὔτε περιπετείας μείζους τῶν ἐν τῷ προειρήσ.

12 μένων πολέμων συμβάντων ἐκατέροις. αὐτὰ τε τὰ πολιτεύματα κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς καίρους ἀκμὴν ἀκέραια μὲν ἢ τοῖς ἐθισμοῖς, μέτρια δὲ ταῖς τύχαις,

13 πάρισα δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσι. διὸ καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις καλῶς συνθεάσασθαι τῷ ἐκατέρου τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἰδιότητα καὶ δύναμιν οὐχ οὕτως ἢ τῶν ἐπιγενομένων πολέμων ὡς ἢ τοῦτον ποιητέον τήν σύγκρισιν.

14 ὦν ᾗττον δὲ τῶν προειρημένων παρωξύνθην ἐπιστῆσαι τούτω τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐμπειρότατα δοκοῦντας γράφειν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Φιλίνων καὶ Φάβιον, μὴ δεόντως ἦμῖν ἀπηγγελκέναι τήν ἀλήθειαν. ἐκόντας μὲν οὖν ἐξεύθεσα τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνω, στοχαζόμενος ἢ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως αὐτῶν. δοκοῦσι δὲ μοι πεποιθέναι τι παρα-

3 πλήσιον τοῖς ἔρωσι. διὰ γὰρ τῆν αἰρέσιν καὶ τῆν ὀλίγην εὕνοιαν Φιλίνῳ μὲν πάντα δοκοῦσιν οἱ Καρχιδόνιοι πεπράχθαι φρονίμως, καλῶς, ἄνδρωδώς, οἱ δὲ Ὑπαμαίου τάναντια, Φαβίῳ δὲ τοῦμπαλιν τούς των. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ λοιπῷ βίῳ τήν τοιαύτην ἐπι-

4 εἰκειαν ὅσος οὖν ἂν τις ἐκβάλλῃ· καὶ γὰρ φιλό-

5 φιλον εἶναι δεὶ τῶν ἄγαθῶν ἄνδρα καὶ φιλόπατριν καὶ συμμισεῖν τοῖς φίλοις τοὺς ἔχθροι καὶ συναγάγαντ᾽

6 τοὺς φίλους. ὅταν δὲ τῷ τῆς ἱστορίας ἡθος ἀναλαμ-

βάνη τις, ἐπιλαθέσθαι χρή πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ πολλάκις μὲν εὐλογεῖν καὶ κοσμεῖν τοῖς μεγί-

στοις ἐπαίνοις τοὺς ἔχθρους, ὅταν αἱ πράξεις ἀπαι-

τῶσι τοῦτο, πολλάκις δ᾽ ἐλέγχειν καὶ ψέψειν ἐπονει-

δίστως τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους, ὅταν αἱ τῶν ἐπιτη-

δεμμάτων ἀμαρτία τοῦτό ὑποδεικνύσων. ὥσπερ 

γὰρ ζῶον τῶν ὁψεων ἀφαρεθεισῶν ἀχρειοῦται τὸ
more unintermittent activity, more battles, and
greater changes of fortune. The two states were
also at this period still uncorrupted in principle,
moderate in fortune, and equal in strength, so that a
better estimate of the peculiar qualities and gifts of
each can be formed by comparing their conduct in
this war than in any subsequent one.

14. An equally powerful motive with me for
paying particular attention to this war is that the
truth has not been adequately stated by those
historians who are reputed to be the best authorities
on it, Philinus and Fabius. I do not indeed accuse
them of intentional falsehood, in view of their character
and principles, but they seem to me to have been
much in the case of lovers; for owing to his convic-
tions and constant partiality Philinus will have it
that the Carthaginians in every case acted wisely,
well, and bravely, and the Romans otherwise, whilst
Fabius takes the precisely opposite view. In other
relations of life we should not perhaps exclude all
such favouritism; for a good man should love his
friends and his country, he should share the hatreds
and attachments of his friends; but he who assumes
the character of a historian must ignore everything
of the sort, and often, if their actions demand this,
speak good of his enemies and honour them with
the highest praises while criticizing and even
reproaching roundly his closest friends, should the
errors of their conduct impose this duty on him.
For just as a living creature which has lost its
ολον, οὖτως εξ ἑσπερίας ἀναρεθείσης τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀνωφελές γίνεται δι-'-
7 ἡμιμα. διόπερ οὔτε τῶν φίλων κατηγορεῖν οὔτε τοὺς ἐξθρούσῃ ἐπαινεῖν ὁκνητέοι, οὔτε δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς
ψέειν, ποτὲ δ' ἐγκωμίαζειν εὐλαβητέοι, ἐπειδὴ τοὺς ἐν πράγμασιν ἀναστρεφομένους οὔτ' εὐστοχεῖν αἰὲν
dυνατον οὐθ' ἀμαρτάνειν συνεχῶς εἰκός. ἀποστάντας
8 οὖν τῶν πραττόντων αὐτοῖς τοῖς πραττόμενοι ἐφαρ-
μοστέον τὰς πρεπούσας ἀποφάσεις καὶ διαλήψεις ἐν
toῖς υπομνήμασιν.
15 'Ως δ' ἔστιν ἀλήθη τὰ νῦν υφ' ἡμῶν εἰρήμενα
σκόπειν ἐκ τούτων πάρεστιν. ὁ γὰρ Φιλῖνος
ἀρχόμενος ἁμα τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς δευτέρας
βύβλου φησὶ προσκαθήσατι τῇ Μεσσήνῃ πολεμοῦν-
toὺς τε Καρχηδονίους καὶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους,
παραγενομένους δὲ τοὺς 'Ῥωμαίους κατὰ θάλατταν
eἰς τὴν πόλιν εὐθὺς ἐξελθεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους·
λαβόντας δὲ πολλὰς πληγὰς ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὴν
Μεσσήνην· αὕτης δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους
ἐκπορευθέντας οὐ μόνον πληγὰς λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ζωγρία τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἴκανοις ἀποβαλεῖν. ταῦτα
3 δ' εἰπὼν τὸν μὲν Ἱερώνα φησὶ μετὰ τὴν γενομένην
συμπλοκὴν οὖτως ἔξω γενέσθαι τοῖ φρονεῖν ὅστε
μὴ μόνον παραχρῆμα τῶν χάρακα καὶ τὰς σκηνὰς
ἐμπρόσθαντα φυγεῖν νυκτὸς εἰς τὰς Συρακοῦσας,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ φρούρια πάντα καταλυπεῖν τὰ κείμενα
κατὰ τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων χώρας· ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ
toὺς Καρχηδονίους μετὰ τὴν máχην εὐθέως ἐκλίπο-
tας τῶν χάρακα διελεῖν σφαῖς εἰς τὸς πόλεις, τῶν
d' ὑπαίθριον οὐδ' ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τολμῶν ἔτη· διὸ καὶ
συνθεωρήσαντας τοὺς ἴγομένους αὐτῶν ἀπο-
dedειλιακότας τοὺς ὄχλους βουλεύσασθαι μὴ κρίνειν
36
eyesight is wholly incapacitated, so if History is stripped of her truth all that is left is but an idle tale. We should therefore not shrink from accusing our friends or praising our enemies; nor need we be shy of sometimes praising and sometimes blaming the same people, since it is neither possible that men in the actual business of life should always be in the right, nor is it probable that they should be always mistaken. We must therefore disregard the actors in our narrative and apply to the actions such terms and such criticism as they deserve.

15. The truth of what I have just said is evident from what follows. Philinus, in commencing his narrative at the outset of his second Book, tells us that the Carthaginians and Syracusans were besieging Messene, that the Romans reaching the city by sea, at once marched out against the Syracusans, but after being severely handled returned to Messene. They next sallied out against the Carthaginians and were not only worsted but lost a considerable number of prisoners. After making these statements he says that Hiero after the engagement so far lost his wits as not only to burn his camp and tents and take flight to Syracuse the same night, but to withdraw all his garrisons from the forts which menaced the territory of Messene. The Carthaginians, likewise, he tells us, after the battle at once quitted their camp and distributed themselves among the towns, not even daring to dispute the open country further: their leaders, he says, seeing how dispirited the ranks were, resolved not to risk a
5 διὰ μάχης τὰ πράγματα· τοὺς δὲ ἦρμαίους ἐπομένους αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ μόνον τὴν χώραν πορθεῖν τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ Συρακοσίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Συρακούσας αὐτὰς προσκαθίσαντας ἐπιβαλέσθαι
6 πολιορκεῖν. ταῦτα δ', ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, τῆς πάσης ἐστὶν ἀλογίας πλήρη, καὶ διαστολῆς οὐ προσδεῖται
7 τὸ παράπαν. οὓς μὲν γὰρ πολιορκοῦντας τὴν Μεσσήνην καὶ νικώντας ἐν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς ὑπέθετο, τούτους φεύγοντας καὶ τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἐκχωροῦντας καὶ τέλος πολιορκομένους καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀποδε-
8 δειλιακότας ἀπέβηνεν· οὓς δ' ἠττωμένους καὶ πολιορκομένους ὑπεστήσατο, τούτους διώκοντας καὶ παραχρήμα κρατοῦντας τῶν ὑπαίθρων καὶ τέλος
9 πολιορκοῦντας τὰς Συρακούσας ἀπέδειξε. ταῦτα δὲ συνέδευν ἀλλήλοις οὐδαμῶς δύναται· πῶς γάρ; ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὰς ψυχάνες εἴναι τὰς πρώτας ψευδεῖς ἢ τὰς ύπέρ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀποφάσεις.
10 εἰσὶ δ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀλήθεις· καὶ γὰρ ἐξεχώρησαν οἱ Καρχηδονίων καὶ Συρακόσιοι τῶν ὑπαίθρων, καὶ τὰς Συρακούσας ἐπολιορκοῦν οἱ ἦρμαι κατὰ πόδας, ὡς δ' οὔτος φησι, καὶ τὴν Ἐχέτλαν, ἐν μέση κεμένην τῇ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων
11 ἑπαρχία. λοιπὸν ἄναγκη συγχωρεῖν τὸς ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰς ψυχάνες εἴναι ψευδεῖς, καὶ νικώντων εὐθέως τῶν ἦρμαι εὖ ταῖς περὶ τὴν Μεσσήνην συμπλο-
καὶς ἠττωμένους αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ συγγραφέως ἀπηγγέλθαι.
12 Φιλίνων μὲν οὖν παρ' ὅλην ἂν τὶς τὴν πραγ-
ματείαν εὑροί τοιοῦτον ὑπντα, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ
Φάμβου, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτῶν δειχθῆσεται τῶν καρπῶν.
13 ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπειδὴ τοὺς ἁμώος τοὺς παρεκβάσεως ἐπιμεθέθηκας, ἐπανελθόντες ἐπὶ τὰς πρά-
BOOK I

decisive engagement, and the Romans following up the enemy not only laid waste the territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but sat down before Syracuse and undertook its siege. This account is, it seems to me, full of inconsistencies and does not require a lengthy discussion. For those whom he introduced as besieging Messene and victorious in the engagements, he now represents as in flight and abandoning the open country and finally besieged and dispirited, while whose who were defeated and besieged are now stated to be in pursuit of their foes, and at once commanding the open country and finally besieging Syracuse. It is absolutely impossible to reconcile the two assertions, and either his initial statements or his account of what followed must be false. But the latter is true; for as a fact the Carthaginians and Syracusans abandoned the open country, and the Romans at once began to lay siege to Syracuse and, as he says, even to Echetla too, which lies between the Syracusan and Carthaginian provinces. We must therefore concede that Philinus's initial statements are false, and that, while the Romans were victorious in the engagements before Messene, this author announces that they were worsted.

We can trace indeed the same fault throughout the whole work of Philinus and alike through that of Fabius, as I shall show when occasion arises. Now that I have said what is fitting on the subject of this digression, I will return to facts and attempt in a
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ξεις πειρασόμεθα προστιθέντες αὖ τὸν ἐξῆς λόγον εἰς ἄλληνας ἐννοίας ἁγειν διὰ βραχέων τούς ἐντυγχάνοντας ύπὲρ τοῦ προεπιθεμένου πολέμου.

16 Προσπεσούντων γὰρ εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀππιον καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα προτερημάτων, καταστήσαντες ὑπάτους Μάνιον Ὀτακίλιον καὶ Μάνιον Ὄναλέριον τὰς τε δυνάμεις ἀπάσας ἐξαπέστελλον καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἁμφοτέροις εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν. ἔστι δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις τὰ πάντα τέτταρα στρατόπεδα Ῥωμαϊκὰ χωρίς τῶν συμμάχων, ἢ κατ' ἐναυτὸν προχειρίζοντας τούτων ἔκαστον ἀνὰ τετρακυκλίους πεζοὺς, ἀπείτες δὲ τριακοσίους. δὲν παραγενομένων ἀπὸ τε τῶν Καρχηδονίων αἱ πλείους ἀφιστάμεναι πόλεις προσεπιθέντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀπὸ τοῦ τῶν Συρακοσίων. ὁ δὲ Ἰέρων θεωρῶν τὴν διατροφὴν καὶ κατάπληξιν τῶν Σικελιωτῶν, ἀμα δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ βάρος τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν στρατοπέδων, ἐκ πάντων συνελογίζετο τούτων ἔπικυδεστέρας εἶναι τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἡ τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἑλπίδας. διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ὁρμῆσας τοῖς λογισμοῖς διεσέκεντο πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, ύπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ φιλίας ποιοῦμενος τοὺς λόγους. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι προσεδέξαντο, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὰς χορηγίας. θαλασσοκρατοῦντων γὰρ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐλαβοῦντο μὴ πανταχόθεν ἀποκλεισθῶσι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τοῦ καὶ περὶ τὰ πρὸ τοῦ διαβάντα στρατόπεδα πολλὴν ἐνδεικνύοντο ἐγεροῦντας τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. διόπερ ὑπολαβόντες τὸν Ἰέρωνα μεγάλην εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὐτοῖς παραδόθηκεν ἡ χρεία ἀσμένως προσεδέξαντο τὴν φιλίαν. ποιησάμενοι δὲ συνθήκος ἐφ' ὃ τὰ μὲν αἵμαλωτα χωρὶς λύτρων ἀποδοῦναι τῶν βασιλέα Ῥωμαίως,
narrative that strictly follows the order of events to guide my readers by a short road to a true notion of this war.

16. When news of the successes of Appius and his legions reached Rome, they elected Manius Otaciliius and Manius Valerius Consuls, and dispatched their whole armed force and both commanders to Sicily. The Romans have four legions of Roman citizens in all apart from the allies. These they enrol annually, each legion comprising four thousand foot and three hundred horse. On their arrival in Sicily most of the cities revolted from the Carthaginians and Syracusans and joined the Romans. Hiero, observing both the confusion and consternation of the Sicilians, and at the same time the numbers and powerful nature of the Roman forces, reached from all this the conclusion that the prospects of the Romans were more brilliant than those of the Carthaginians. His conviction therefore impelling him to side with the Romans, he sent several messages to the Consuls with proposals for peace and alliance. The Romans accepted his overtures, especially for the sake of their supplies; for since the Carthaginians commanded the sea they were apprehensive lest they should be cut off on all sides from the necessities of life, in view of the fact that the armies which had previously crossed to Sicily had run very short of provisions. Therefore, supposing that Hiero would be of great service to them in this respect, they readily accepted his friendly advances. Having made a treaty by which the king bound himself to give up his prisoners to the Romans without ransom, and in addition to this
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ἀργυρίου δὲ προσθεῖναι τάλαντα τούτος ἐκατόν, λοιπὸν ἦδη Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν ὡς φίλοι καὶ συμμάχοισιν
10 ἐξήρωντο τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. ὃ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἰέρων ὑποστείλας ἐαυτὸν ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥωμαίων σκέπην, καὶ χορηγῶν ἀεὶ τούτος εἰς τὰ κατεπείγοντα τῶν πραγμάτων, ἄδειῶς ἐβασίλευε τῶν Συρακοσίων τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον, φιλοστεφανῶν καὶ φιλοδοξῶν
11 εἰς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας. ἐπιφανέστατος γὰρ δὴ πάντων ὤντος δοκεῖ καὶ πλείστον χρόνον ἀπολελαυκέναι τῆς ἰδίας εὐβουλίας ἐν τε τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ τοῖς καθόλου πράγμασιν.

17 Ἐπανενεχθείσων δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, καὶ προσδεξαμένου τοῦ δήμου καὶ κυρώσων τὸς τὰς πρὸς Ἰέρωνα διαλύσεις, λοιπὸν ὑπέκειτα πάσας ἐκρυμνὸν ἐξαποστέλλειν οἱ Ῥωμαίοι τὸς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ δύο μόνον στρατόπεδα, νομίζοντες ἀμα μὲν κεκουφίσθαι τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς προσκεκχωρηκότος τοῦ βασιλέως, ἀμα δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπολαμβάνοντες
3 σύντοτε εὐπορήσειν τὰς δύναμεις τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, θεωροῦντες τὸν μὲν Ἰέρωνα πολέμων αὐτοῖς γεγονότα, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους ὀλοσχερέστερον ἑμπλεκομένους εἰς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν, ὑπέλαβον βαρυτέρας προσδείσθαι παρασκευὴς, διὶ ἢς ἀντοφθαλμεῖν δυνῆσονται τοῖς πολέμους καὶ 4 συνέχειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν. διὸ καὶ ξενολογήσαντες ἐκ τῆς ἀντιπέρας χώρας πολλοὺς μὲν Λιγυστίνους καὶ Κελτοὺς, ἐτὶ δὲ πλείους τούτων
5 Ἱβηραῖς, ἀπαντᾷς εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ἀπέστειλαν. ὅρωντες δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἀκραγαντῶν πόλιν εὐφυεστάτην οὖσαν πρὸς τὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ βαρυτάτην ἀμα τῆς αὐτῶν ἐπαρχίας, εἰς ταῦτα συνηθροεύον τὰ τε χορήγια καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, ὁρμητήριω
BOOK I

to pay them a hundred talents, the Romans henceforth treated the Syracusans as allies and friends. King Hiero having placed himself under the protection of the Romans, continued to furnish them with the resources of which they stood in urgent need, and ruled over Syracuse henceforth in security, treating the Greeks in such a way as to win from them crowns and other honours. We may, indeed, regard him as the most illustrious of princes and the one who reaped longest the fruits of his own wisdom in particular cases and in general policy.

17. When the terms of the treaty were referred to Rome, and when the people had accepted and ratified this agreement with Hiero, the Romans decided not to continue to employ all their forces in the expedition, but only two legions, thinking on the one hand that, now the king had joined them, the war had become a lighter task and calculating that their forces would thus be better off for supplies. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, when they saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that the Romans were becoming more deeply involved in the enterprise in Sicily, considered that they themselves required stronger forces in order to be able to confront their enemies and control Sicilian affairs. They therefore enlisted foreign mercenaries from the opposite coasts, many of them Ligurians, Celts, and still more Iberians, and dispatched them all to Sicily. Perceiving that the city of Agrigentum had the greatest natural advantages for making their preparations, it being also the most important city in their province, they collected their troops and
6 κρίνοντες χρήσθαι ταύτη τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον.

Τὸν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἵ μὲν πρὸς τὸν Ἰέρωνα ποιησά-μενοι στρατηγοὶ τὰς συνθήκας ἀνακεχωρήκεισαν· οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους κατασταθέντες Λεύκιος Ποστούμιος καὶ Κώντος Μαμίλιος ἦκον εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν μετὰ 7 τῶν στρατοπέδων. θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν Καρχη-δονίων ἐπιβολὴν καὶ τὰς περὶ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα παρα-σκευὰς ἐγνώσαν τολμηρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς πράγ-8 μασί· διὸ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ μέρη τοῦ πολέμου παρῆκαν, φέροντες δὲ παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀκράγαντα προσήκεισαν· καὶ στρατοπεδεύ-σαντες ἐν ὁκτὼ στάδιοι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως συνέκλει-9 σαν ἐντὸς τειχῶν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. ἀκμαζούσης δὲ τῆς τοῦ σῖτου συναγωγῆς, καὶ προφαινομένης χρονίων πολιορκίας, ὄρμησαν ἐκθυμότερον τοῦ 10 δέοντος οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τὸ σιτολογεῖν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι κατιδόντες τοὺς πολεμίους ἑσκεδασμέ-νους κατὰ τῆς χώρας, ἐξελθόντες ἐπέθεεντο τοῖς σιτο-λογοῦσι. τρεφάμενοι δὲ τούτους ῥαδίως οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ χάρακος ἀρπαγὴν ὄρμησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς 11 ἐφεδρείας. ἂλλα· ἂ τῶν ἑθισμῶν διαφόρα καὶ τότε καὶ πολλάκις ἤδη σέσωκε τὰ Ῥωμαιών πράγματα. 12 τὸ γὰρ πρόστιμον παρ' αὐτοῖς θάνατός ἐστὶ τῷ προ-εμένῳ τῶν τῶν καὶ φυγόντο τὸ παράπαν ἐξ ἐφ-12 ἐφεδρείας. διὸ καὶ τότε πολλαπλασίους ἄντας τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ὑποστάντες γενναίως πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν ἴδιων ἀπέβαλον, ἐτὶ δὲ πλείους τῶν ἑχθρῶν ἀπ-13 ἐκτείναν. τέλος δὲ κυκλώσαντες τοὺς πολεμίους ὅσον οὕτω διασπόραν τῶν χάρακα, τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀδεφθειραν, τοὺς δὲ λουποὺς ἐπικείμενοι καὶ φονεύοντες συνεδώξαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

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supplies there and decided to use it as a base in the war.

Meanwhile the Roman Consuls who had made the treaty with Hiero had left, and their successors, Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, had arrived in Sicily with their legions. On taking note of the plan of the Carthaginians, and their activity at Agrigentum, they decided on a bolder initiative. Abandoning therefore other operations they brought all their forces to bear on Agrigentum itself, and encamping at a distance of eight stades from the city, shut the Carthaginians up within the walls. It was the height of the harvest, and as a long siege was anticipated, the soldiers began gathering corn with more venturesomeness than was advisable. The Carthaginians, observing that the enemy were dispersed about the country, made a sortie and attacked the foragers. Having easily put these to flight, some of them pressed on to plunder the fortified camp while others advanced on the covering force. But on this occasion and often on previous ones it is the excellence of their institutions which has saved the situation for the Romans; for with them death is the penalty incurred by a man who deserts the post or takes flight in any way from such a supporting force. Therefore on this occasion as on others they gallantly faced opponents who largely outnumbered them, and, though they suffered heavy loss, killed still more of the enemy. Finally surrounding them as they were on the point of tearing up the palisade, they dispatched some on the spot and pressing hard on the rest pursued them with slaughter to the city.
18 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβη τοὺς μὲν Καρχηδονίους εὐλαβέστερον διακείσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθέσεις, τοὺς δὲ Ἦρωμαίους φυλακτικῶτερον χρῆσθαι ταῖς προ- 

νομαῖς. ἔπει δ’ οὐκ ἀντεξῆσαν οἱ Καρχηδονίοι πλὴν ἔως ἀκροβολισμοῦ, διελόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἦρω-

μαίων εἰς δύο μέρη τὴν δύναμιν τῷ μὲν ἐνι περὶ τὸ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως Ἀσκληπιεῖον ἐμὲν, θατέρω δὲ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Ἤρακλειαν κεκλι-

μένοις μέρεσι τῆς πόλεως. τα δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν στρα-

tοπέδων ἐξ ἐκατέρου τοῦ μέρους τῆς πόλεως ἀχυ-

ρώσαντο, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐντὸς αὐτῶν τάφρον προ-

βάλοντο χάριν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἐξιόντας ἐκ τῆς 

πόλεως ἀσφαλείας, τὴν δ’ ἐκτὸς αὐτῶν περιβά-

λοντο, φιλακὴν ποιούμενοι τῶν ἐξωθεὶν ἐπιθέσεων 

καὶ τῶν παρεισάγεσθαι καὶ παρεισπίπτειν εἰσωθότων 

eἰς τὰς πολιορκουμένας πόλεις. τα δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν 

τάφρων καὶ τῶν στρατοπέδων διαστήματα φυλακάι 

dιέλαβον, ὀχυροποιούμενοι τοὺς εὐκαίρους τῶν 

τόπων ἐν διαστάσει. τα δὲ χορήγια καὶ τὴν ἄλλην 

παρασκευὴν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι πάντες ἠθροῖζον 

αὐτοῖς καὶ παρῆγον εἰς Ἐρβησόν, αὐτὸι δ’ ἐκ ταύ-

της τῆς πόλεως οὐ μακρὰν ὑπαρχοῦσης ἄγοντες καὶ 

φέροντες συνεχῶς τὰς ἄγορὰς δαμιλὴ τάναγκα 

σφίσι παρεσκεύαζον. πέντε μὲν οὖν ἵσσως ἴμασ ἐπὶ 

tῶν αὐτῶν διέμενον, οὐδὲν ὀλοσχερὲς προτέρημα 

dυνάμενοι λαβεῖν κατ’ ἄλληλων πλὴν τῶν ἐν αὐ-

7 τοῖς τοῖς ἀκροβολισμοῖς συμβαίνοντων. συναγομέ-

νοιν δὲ τῷ λιμῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων διὰ τὸ πλῆθος 

τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συγκεκλεισμένων ἀνδρῶν, οὐ γάρ 

ἐλάττωσεν πέντε μυριάδων ὑπῆρχον, δυσχρηστούμε-

νος Ἀννίβας ἡδὴ τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ 

tῶν πολιορκουμένων δυνάμεων, διεπέμπετο συν-
18. After this the Carthaginians were more inclined to be cautious in taking the offensive, while the Romans were more on their guard in foraging. As the Carthaginians did not advance beyond skirmishing range, the Roman generals divided their force into two bodies, remaining with one near the temple of Asclepius outside the walls and encamping with the other on that side of the city that is turned towards Heraclea. They fortified the ground between their camps on each side of the city, protecting themselves by the inner trench from sallies from within and encircling themselves with an outer one to guard against attacks from outside, and to prevent that secret introduction of supplies and men which is usual in the case of beleaguered cities. On the spaces between the trenches and their camps they placed pickets, fortifying suitable places at some distance from each other. Their supplies and other material were collected for them by all the other members of the alliance, and brought to Herbesus, and they themselves constantly fetching in live stock and provisions from this city which was at no great distance, kept themselves abundantly supplied with what they required. So for five months or so matters were at a standstill, neither side being able to score any decisive advantage, nothing in fact beyond incidental success in their exchange of shots; but when the Carthaginians began to be pressed by famine owing to the number of people cooped up in the city—fifty thousand at least in number—Hannibal, the commander of the besieged forces, found himself in a difficult situation and sent
εχώς εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα τὴν τε περίστασιν δια-
8 σαφῶν καὶ βοηθεῖν παρακαλῶν. οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Καρ-
χηδόνι τῶν ἐπισυνηγμένων στρατιωτῶν καὶ θηρίων
γεμίσαντες τὰς ναῦς ἐξέπεμψαν εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν
9 πρὸς Ἀννωνα τὸν ἔτερον στρατηγὸν. οὐς συναγα-
γών τὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ δυνάμεις εἰς Ἡράκλειαν,
πρῶτον μὲν πραξικοπήσας κατέσχε τὴν τῶν Ἑρβη-
σέων πόλιν, καὶ παρείλετο τὰς ἁγορὰς καὶ τὴν τῶν
ἀναγκαίων χορηγίαν τοῖς τῶν ὑπεντάνων στρατο-
10 πέδους. ἔξοι συνέβη τούς Ἡρωμαίους ἐπὶ ἰσον πο-
λιορκεῖν καὶ πολιορκεῖσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. εἰς γὰρ
τοῦτο συνήγοντο τῇ σιτοδείᾳ καὶ σπάνει τῶν ἀναγ-
καίων ἄστε τοπλακίως βουλεύσθαι περὶ τοῦ λύειν
11 τὴν πολιορκίαν. οἱ δὲ καὶ τέλος ἔτεις εἰς ἐποίησαν, εἰ
μὴ πάσαι σπουδὴν καὶ μμιχανήν προσφερόμενος Ἰέ-
ρως τὰ μέτρια καὶ τάναγκαία σφίξαι παρεσκεύαξε
19 τῶν χορηγίων. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θεωρῶν ὁ προειρη-
μένος ἀνήρ τοὺς μὲν Ἡρωμαίους ὑπὸ τε τῆς νόσου
καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας ἀσθενῶς διακεκιμένους διὰ τὸ λοι-
μικὴν εἶναι παρ’ αὐτοῖς κατάστασιν, τὰ δὲ σφέτερα
στρατόπεδα νομίζων ἀξίοχρεα πρὸς μάχην ὑπάρχειν,
2 ἀναλαβὼν τὰ τε θηρία περὶ πεντήκοντα τὸν ἀριθ-
μὸν ὄντα καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἀπασάν προῆγε
κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἡράκλειας, παραγγέλας τοῖς
Νομάδικοῖς ἰππεῦσι προπορεύεσθαι, καὶ συνεγγί-
σασι τῷ χάρακι τῶν ἐναντίων ἐρεθίζειν καὶ πειρᾶ-
σθαι τούς ἰππεῖς αὐτῶν ἐκκαλεῖσθαι, κατείχοντα πά-
λιν ἐκκλίναις ἀποχωρεῖν, ἐὼς ὁ αὐτῶ συμμίξωσι.
3 πραξάντων δὲ τὸ συνταχθὲν τῶν Νομάδων καὶ
προσμιξάντων θατέρω τῶν στρατόπεδων, εὐθὺς οἱ
τῶν Ἡρωμαίων ἰππεῖς ἐξεχέοντο καὶ ἰθασέως ἐπ-
4 ἐκείντο τοῖς Νομάσισι. οἱ δὲ Λίβνες ὑπεχώρουν
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constant messages to Carthage explaining his position and begging for reinforcements. The Carthaginian government shipped the troops they had collected and their elephants and sent them to Sicily to Hanno their other general. Hanno concentrated his troops and material of war at Heraclea and in the first place surprised and occupied Herbesus, cutting off the enemy's camps from their provisions and necessary supplies. The result of this was that the Romans were as a fact both besieged and besiegers at the same time; for they were so hard pressed by want of food and scarcity of the necessities of life, that they often contemplated raising the siege, and would in the end have done so, had not Hiero, by using every effort and every device, provided them with a moderate amount of strictly necessary supplies. 19. In the next place Hanno, perceiving that the Romans were weakened by disease and privation, owing to an epidemic having broken out among them, and thinking that his own troops were in fit fighting condition, took with him all his elephants, about fifty in number, and all the rest of his force, and advanced rapidly from Heraclea. He had ordered the Numidian horse to precede him, and approaching the enemy's fortified camp to provoke him and attempt to draw his cavalry out, after which they were to give way and retire until they rejoined himself. The Numidians acting on these orders advanced up to one of the camps, and the Roman cavalry at once issued forth and boldly attacked them. The Africans retreated as they had been
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κατὰ τὸ παράγγελμα, μέχρι συνέμειξαν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἁννώνα, λοιπὸν τ’ ἐκ μεταβολῆς περιχυθέντες ἐπιέκειντο τοῖς πολεμίοις, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἔως εἰς τὸν χάρακα 5 συνεδίωξαν. γενομένων δὲ τούτων ἐπεστρατοπέδευσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἁννώνα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, καταλαβόμενοι τὸν λόφον τὸν καλούμενον Τόρον, ὡς δέκα 6 σταδίους ἀπέχοντες τῶν ὑπεναντίων. καὶ δύο μὲν μήνας ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, οὐδὲν ὀλοσχερές πράττοντες πλήν ἀκροβολιζόμενοι καθ’ ἐκάστην ἡμέραν. τοῦ δὲ Ἀννίβου διαπυρευμονεύμου καὶ διαπεμπομένου συνεχῶς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν Ἁννώνα, καὶ δηλοῦντος ὅτι τὰ πλήθη τὸν λιμὸν οὐχ ὑπομείνει, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους αὐτομολούσαν διὰ τὴν ἐνδείαν, ἐγὼς διακυνδυνεύων δ’ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγοῦ, οὐχ ἤττον ἐπὶ τοῦτο φερομένων καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων διὰ τὰς προειρημένας 8 αἰτίας, διὰπερ ἐξαγαγόντες ἀμφότεροι τάς δυνάμεις εἰς τὸν μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπεδίων συν- 9 ἐβαλλον ἀλλήλοις. ἐπὶ πολὺν δὲ χρόνον γενομένης τῆς μάχης τέλος ἐτρέφαντο τοὺς προκυνδυνεύοντας 10 μυσθοφόρους τῶν Καρχηδονίων οἱ Ῥωμαιοὶ. τούτων δὲ πεσόντων εἰς τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰς λυπᾶς τάξεις τὰς ἐφεστηκυίας συνέβη πάν ἑνταραχθῆναι τὸ 11 τῶν Φοινίκων στρατόπεδον. γενομένου δ’ ἐγκλιματος ὀλοσχεροῦσα οἱ μὲν πλείστοι διεθφάρμησαν αὐτῶν, τινὲς δ’ εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἀπεχώρησαν. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαιοὶ τῶν τε πλείστων ἐκμύρισαν θηρίων καὶ 12 τῆς ἐπισκευῆς ἀπάσης. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων χαρὰν καὶ διὰ τῶν κόπων Ῥαμβομέτεροι ταῖς φυλακαῖς αὐτῶν χρησαμένων, ἀπελπίσας Ἕλληνας τὰ πράγματα, καὶ νο- 50
ordered until they joined Hanno's army and then, wheeling round and encircling the enemy, they attacked them, killing many and pursuing the rest as far as the camp. After this Hanno encamped opposite the Romans, occupying the hill called Torus, at a distance of about ten stades from the enemy. For two months they remained stationary, without any action more decisive than shooting at each other every day; but as Hannibal kept on announcing to Hanno by fire-signals and messengers that the population could not support the famine, and that deserters to the enemy were numerous owing to privation, the Carthaginian general decided to risk battle, the Romans being no less eager for this owing to the reasons I stated above. Both therefore led out their forces to the space between the camps and engaged. The battle lasted for long, but at the end the Romans put to flight the advanced line of Carthaginian mercenaries, and as the latter fell back on the elephants and the other divisions in their rear, the whole Phoenician army was thrown into disorder. A complete rout ensued, and most of them were put to the sword, some escaping to Heraclea. The Romans captured most of the elephants and all the baggage. But after nightfall, while the Romans, partly from joy at their success and partly from fatigue, had relaxed the vigilance of their watch, Hannibal, regarding his situation as desperate, and thinking for the above reasons that
κύρωσεν ἐν δώρῳ καὶ κατὰ τὰς προερχόμενας αἰτίας, ὧρμησεν ἐπὶ μέσας νῦκτας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἔχων τὰς ἐνεκικάς δυνάμεις. χώσας δὲ φορμῶις ἄχυρων σεσαγμένους τὰς τάφρους ἔλαθε τοὺς πολεμίους ἀπαγαγὼν ἀσφαλῶς τὴν δύναμιν.

οἱ δὲ Ἡρωμαῖοι τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπελθοῦσις συνέντευκτον γεγονός, καὶ τῆς ουραγίας τῆς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἁν-νίβαν ἐπὶ βραχύ καθαφάμενοι, μετὰ ταῦτα πάντες ὡρμήσαν πρὸς τὰς πύλας. οὔδενὸς δὲ ἐμποδῶν αὐτοῖς ἱσταμένου παρευπαθοῦντες διήρπασαν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν σωμάτων, πολλῆς δὲ καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἐγένετο κατασκευῆς ἐγκρατεῖς. 

Τῆς δ' ἀγγελίας ἀφικομένης εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον τῶν Ἡρωμαίων ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα, περιχαρεῖς γενόμενοι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις ἐπαρθένες ὦκ ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λογισμῶν, οὐδ' ἡρ-κοῦντο σεσώκεναι τοὺς Μαμερτίνους οὐδὲ ταῖς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πολέμου γενομέναι ὠφελείς, ἐξπίσαν- 

tes δὲ καθόλου δυνατὸν εἶναι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς νῆσου, τοῦτοι δὲ γενομένου μεγαλῆ 

ἐπίδοσιν αὐτῶν λήψεθαι τὰ πράγματα, πρὸς τού- 

τοὺς ἦσαν τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ ταῖς περὶ τούτῳ τὸ 

μέρος ἐπινοίαις. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πεζικάς δυ- 


νάμεις ἐώρων κατὰ λόγον σφόσι προχωροῦντα· μετὰ 

gὰρ τοὺς τὸν Ἁκράγαντα πολιορκήσαντας οἱ κατα- 

σταθέντες στρατηγοὶ Δεύκιος Ὀυαλέριος καὶ Τίτος 

Ὑσάκιλος ἑδόκουν ἐνδεχομένως χειρίζειν τὰ κατὰ 

τῆς Σικελίας. 

τῆς δὲ θαλάττης ἀκοντὶ τῶν Καρ-

χηδονίων ἐπικρατοῦντων ἐξυγοστατείτ' αὐτοῖς ὁ πό-


λεμος· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἐξῆς χρόνοις, κατεχόντων αὐ-

τῶν ἢδη τὸν Ἁκράγαντα, πολλαὶ μὲν πόλεις προσ-

ετίθεντο τῶν μεσογαίων τοῖς Ἡρωμαίοις, ἀγωνιῶσαι 

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this was a fine opportunity for saving himself, broke out of the city about midnight with his mercenaries. By filling up the trenches with baskets packed tightly with straw he managed to withdraw his force in safety unperceived by the enemy. When day broke the Romans became aware of what had happened, and, after slightly molesting Hannibal’s rear-guard, advanced with their whole force to the gates. Finding nobody to oppose them they entered the city and plundered it, possessing themselves of many slaves and a quantity of booty of every description.

20. When the news of what had occurred at Agrigentum reached the Roman Senate, in their joy and elation they no longer confined themselves to their original designs and were no longer satisfied with having saved the Mamertines and with what they had gained in the war itself, but, hoping that it would be possible to drive the Carthaginians entirely out of the island and that if this were done their own power would be much augmented, they directed their attention to this project and to plans that would serve their purpose. As regards their military force at least they noted that all progressed satisfactorily; for the Consuls appointed after those who had reduced Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, seemed to be managing Sicilian affairs as well as possible; but as the Carthaginians maintained without any trouble the command of the sea the fortunes of the war continued to hang in the balance. For in the period that followed, now that Agrigentum was in their hands, while many inland cities joined the
τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις, ἐτὶ δὲ πλείους ἀφίσταντο τῶν
παραβαλαττῶν, καταπεπληγμέναι τὸν τῶν Καρχη-
7 δονίων στόλον. ὅθεν ὄρωντες αἰεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον εἰς
ἐκάτερα τὰ μέρη ῥοπᾶς λαμβάνοντα τὸν πόλεμον
dia tās προειρημένας αἰτίας, ἐτὶ δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἰτα-
λίαν πορθομένην πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυ-
nάμεως, τὴν δὲ Διβύνην εἰς τέλος ἀβλαβῆ διαμένον-
σαν, ἄρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ συνεμβαίνειν τοῖς Καρχηδο-
8 νίοις εἰς τὴν θάλατταν. διὸ καὶ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος
οὐχ ἦκιστα μὲ παρώρμησε ποιήσασθαι μνήμην ἐπὶ
πλείον τοῦ προειρημένου πόλεμου, χάρων τοῦ μηδὲ
tαύτην ἀγνοεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν, πῶς καὶ πότε καὶ δι’
ἀς αἰτίας πρῶτον ἐνέβησαν εἰς θάλατταν Ὀρμαῖοι.
9 Θεωροῦντες δὲ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς τρυβὴν λαμβά-
nοντα, τότε πρῶτον ἐπεβάλοντο ναυπηγεῖσθαι σκά-
10 φῆ, πεντηρικὰ μὲν ἐκατόν, εὖκοσι δὲ τριήρεις.
τῶν δὲ ναυπηγῶν εἰς τέλος ἀπείρων ὄντων τῆς
περὶ τὰς πεντήρεις ναυπηγίας διὰ τὸ μηδένα τότε
tῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κεχρῆσθαι τοιοῦτοι σκάφεις, πολλὴν
11 αὐτοῖς παρεῖχε τούτῳ τὸ μέρος δυσχερείαν. ἐξ ὅν
καὶ μάλιστα συνίδοι τις ἄν τὸ μεγαλόπυνχον καὶ
12 παράβολον τῆς Ὀρμαῖων αἱρέσεως. οὐ γὰρ οἴνον
eυλόγους ἀφορμὰς ἔχοντες, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἀφορμὰς
καθάπαξ, οὐδ’ ἑπίνοιαν οὐδέποτε ποιησάμενοι τῆς
θαλάττης, τότε δὴ πρῶτον ἐν νῦ λαμβάνοντες
οὕτως τολμηρῶς ἐνεχείρησαν ὡστε πρῶτον ἡ πειραθῆ-
nαι τοῦ πράγματος, εὐθὺς ἐπιβαλέσθαι Καρχηδονίων
ναυμαχεῖν τοῖς ἑκ προγόνων ἔχουσι τὴν κατὰ θάλατ-
13 ταῖς ἡγεμονίαις ἀδήμιτον. μαρτυρίω δ’ ἄν τις χρή-
σαντο πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν νῦν ὑπ’ ἐμοὶ λεγο-
mένων καὶ πρὸς τὸ παράδοξον αὐτῶν τῆς τόλμης.
ὠτε γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησαν διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν
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Romans from dread of their military forces, still more seaboard cities deserted their cause in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. Hence when they saw that the balance of the war tended more and more to shift to this side or that for the above reason, and that while Italy was frequently ravaged by the fleet, Libya remained entirely free from damage, they took urgent steps to get on the sea like the Carthaginians. And one of the reasons which induced me to narrate the history of this war at some length is just this, that my readers should, in this case too, not be kept in ignorance of the beginning of how, when, and for what reasons the Romans first took to the sea.

When they saw that the war was dragging on, they undertook for the first time to build ships, a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. As their shipwrights were absolutely inexperienced in building quinqueremes, such ships never having been in use in Italy, the matter caused them much difficulty, and this fact shows us better than anything else how spirited and daring the Romans are when they are determined to do a thing. It was not that they had fairly good resources for it, but they had none whatever, nor had they ever given a thought to the sea; yet when they once had conceived the project, they took it in hand so boldly, that before gaining any experience in the matter they at once engaged the Carthaginians who had held for generations undisputed command of the sea. Evidence of the truth of what I am saying and of their incredible pluck is this. When they first undertook to send their
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Μεσοήνην τὰς δυνάμεις, οὐχ οἶνον κατάφρακτος αὐτοῖς ὑπῆρξε ναῦς, ἀλλ' οὕδε καθόλου μακρὸν πλοῖον 14 οὗδε λέμβος οὐδ' εἶς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ Ταραντίνων καὶ Λοκρῶν ἔτι ὑ' Ἑλεατῶν καὶ Νεαπολιτῶν συγχρησάμενοι πεντηκοντόρους καὶ τριήρεις ἐπὶ τούτων 15 παραβόλως διεκόμισαν τοὺς ἀνδρας. ἐν δ' ἰδ' καρφῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων κατὰ τὸν πορθμὸν ἐπαναχθέντων αὐτοῖς, καὶ μιᾶς νεῶς καταφράκτου διὰ τὴν προθυμίαν προπεσοῦσης, ὥστ' ἐποκείλασαν γενέσθαι τοῖς Ὀρωμαῖοις ὑποχείριοι, ταύτῃ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι τότε πρὸς ταύτην ἑποιοῦντο τὴν τοῦ 16 παντὸς στόλου ναυπηγίαν, ὡς εἴ μὴ τοῦτο συνέβη γενέσθαι, ὅλον ὡς διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν εἰς τέλος ἄν 21 ἐκωλύθησαν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οἷς μὲν ἐπιμελές ἢ τῆς ναυπηγίας, ἐγίνοντο περὶ τὴν τῶν πλοίων κατασκευῆν, οἱ δὲ τὰ πληρώματα συναδροίσαντες ἐδίδασκον ἐν τῇ γῇ κωπηλατεῖν τὸν τρόπον 2 τούτων. καθίσαντες ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρεσίων ἐν τῇ χέρσῳ τοὺς ἀνδρας τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντας τάξιν ταῖς ἐπὶ αὐτῶν τῶν πλοίων καθέδραις, μέσον δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς στήσαντες τὸν κελευστήν, ἁμα πάντας ἀναπίπτεων ἐφ' αὐτοῖς ἀγοντας τὰς χείρας, καὶ πάλιν προνεὺς ἐξωθούντας ταύτας συνείδηζον ἀρχεσθαί τε καὶ λήγειν τῶν κινήσεων πρὸς τὰ τοῦ κελευστοῦ παραγγέλματα. 3 προκατασκευασθέντων δὲ τούτων ἁμα τῷ συντελεσθήμει τὰς ναῦς καθελκύσαντες, καὶ βραχὺν χρόνον ἐπὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν θαλάττῃ πειραθέντες, ἐπλεον παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα 4 τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. ο γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως 56
forces across to Messene not only had they not any
docked ships, but no long ships at all, not even a
single boat, and borrowing fifty-oared boats and
triremes from the Tarentines and Loerians, and also
from the people of Elea and Naples they took their
troops across in these at great hazard. On this
occasion the Carthaginians put to sea to attack them
as they were crossing, and one of their docked ships
advanced too far in its eagerness to overtake them
and running aground fell into the hands of the
Romans. This ship they now used as a model, and
built their whole fleet on its pattern; so that it is
evident that if this had not occurred they would
have been entirely prevented from carrying out their
design by lack of practical knowledge. 21. Now,
however, those to whom the construction of the
ships was committed were busy in getting them
ready, and those who had collected the crews were
teaching them to row on shore in the following
fashion. Making the men sit on rowers' benches on
dry land, in the same order as on the benches of the
ships themselves, and stationing the fugle-man in
the middle, they accustomed them to fall back all
at once bringing their hands up to them, and again
to come forward stretching out their hands, and to
begin and finish these movements at the word of
command of the fugle-man. When the crews had
been trained, they launched the ships as soon as they
were completed, and having practised for a brief
time actual rowing at sea, they sailed along the
coast of Italy as their commander had ordered. For
the Consul appointed by the Romans to the command

\[200\text{ B.C.}\]

\[a\] It is often necessary to use the word "sail," but it
should be borne in mind that the ships were propelled chiefly
by oars.
Τεταγμένος τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις Γνώσις Κορνήλιος, ὁλίγας ἡμέρας πρότερον, συντάξας τοῖς ναυάρχοις, ἐπειδὰν καταρτίσωσι τῶν στόλων, πλείω ώς ἐπὶ τῶν πορθμῶν, αὐτὸς ἀναχθεὶς μετὰ νεῶν ἐπτυκαίδεκα προκατέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Μεσσήνην, σπουδάζων τὰ κατεπέγγοντα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν παρασκευάζω τῷ 5 στόλῳ. προσπεσοῦσης δ' αὐτῷ πράξεως ἐκεῖ περὶ τῆς τῶν Λιπαραίων πόλεως, δεξάμενος τὴν ἐλπίδα προχειρότερον τοῦ δέοντος ἐπέλει ταῖς προειρημέναις 6 ναυσὶ καὶ καθωρμίσθη πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. ὃ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς Ἀννίβας, ἀκούσας ἐν τῷ Πανόρμῳ τὸ γεγονός, ἐξαποστέλλει Βοώδη τῆς γε-7 ρουσίας ὑπάρχοντα, ναῦς εἶκοσι δούς. ὦς ἐπιπλεύ-σας νυκτὸς ἐν τῷ λιμένι συνέκλεισε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Γνάων. ἡμέρας δ' ἐπιγενομένης τὰ μὲν πληρώματα πρὸς φυγήν ὄρμησεν εἰς τὴν γῆν, ὃ δὲ Γνάων ἐκπλα-γῆς γενόμενος καὶ ποιεῖν ἔχων οὐδὲν τέλος παρέδω-8 κεν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνοι τάς τε ναῦς καὶ τὸν στρατηγόν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὕποχεί-9 ριον ἔχοντες παραχρῆμα πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἀπήραν. μετ' οὐ πολλὰς δ' ἡμέρας, οὕτως ἐναργοῦς ὄντος καὶ προσφᾶτον τοῦ περὶ τὸν Γνάων ἀτυχήματος, παρ' ὀλίγον αὐτός Ἀννίβας εἰς τὸ παραπλήσιον ἀμάρ-10 τήμα προφανῶς ἐνέπεσεν. ἀκούσας γὰρ τῶν τῶν Ῥωμαίων στόλον κομιζόμενον παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν σύνεγγυς εἶναι, κατιδεῖν βουλόμενον τὸ τε πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ὀλὴν σύνταξιν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, λαβῶν πεν-τήκοντα ναῦς ἐπιπλεῖ. κάμπτον δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀκρωτήριον ἐμπίπτει τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει ποιομένοις τὸν πλοὺν, καὶ τὰς μὲν πλείους ἀπέβαλε τῶν νεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ τῶν ὑπολειφθείσων ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως διεφυγεν.
of their naval force, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, had a few days previously given orders to the captains to sail in the direction of the Straits whenever the fleet was ready, while he himself, putting to sea with seventeen ships, preceded them to Messene, being anxious to provide for all the urgent needs of the fleet. While there a proposal happened to be made to him with regard to the city of Lipara, and embracing the prospect with undue eagerness he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town. The Carthaginian general Hannibal, hearing at Panormus what had happened, sent off Boödes, a member of the Senate, giving him twenty ships. Boödes sailed up to Lipara at night and shut up Gnaeus in the harbour. When day dawned the Roman crews hastily took refuge on land, and Gnaeus, falling into a state of terror and being unable to do anything, finally surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians now set off at once to rejoin Hannibal with the captured ships and commander. But a few days later, though Gnaeus' disaster was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself came very near falling into the same error with his eyes open. For hearing that the Roman fleet which was sailing along the coast of Italy was near at hand, and wishing to get a glimpse of the numbers and general disposition of the enemy, he sailed towards them with fifty ships. As he was rounding the Cape of Italy he came upon the enemy sailing in good order and trim. He lost most of his ships and escaped himself with the remainder, which was more than he expected or hoped.
Οἱ δὲ Ἦρωμαῖοι μετὰ ταῦτα συνεγγύσαντες τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τόποις, καὶ συνεντεῖ τὸ γεγονός σύμπτωμα περὶ τὸν Γνάιον, παρατύμικα μὲν διεπέμποντο πρὸς Γάιον Βίλιον τὸν ἥγουμεν τῆς πεζῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ τούτον ἀνέμενον, ἀμα δ’ ἄκούοντες οὐ μακρὰν εἶναι τὸν τῶν πολεμίων στόλον, ἐγώοντο πρὸς παρασκευὴν τοῦ ναυμαχεῖν. 3 οὕτων δὲ τῶν πλοίων φαύλων ταῖς κατασκευαῖς καὶ δυσκινήτων, ὑποτίθεται τις αὐτοῖς βοήθημα πρὸς τὴν μάχην τοὺς ἐπικληθέντας μετὰ ταῦτα κόρακας ὑπὸ συνεβαίνει τὴν κατασκευὴν εἰσαται. στῶ- 

λος ἐν πρώρρα στρογγύλος εἰστήκη, μῆκος μὲν ὅργυϊῶν τεττάρων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλάτος τριῶν παλαιοποιεῖσθαι. 5 στῶν ἔχον τὴν διάμετρον. οὕτως αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς κορυφῆς τροχιλίαν εἰχὲ, περιετίθετο δ’ αὐτῷ κλίμαξ ἐπικαρσίας σανίσι καθηλωμένη, πλάτος μὲν 6 ποδῶν τεττάρων, τὸ δε μῆκος ἐξ ὅργυιῶν. τὸ δὲ τρῆμα τοῦ σανδόματος ἦν παράμηκες καὶ περι- ἐβαίνε περὶ τὸν στῦλον μετὰ τὰς πρῶτας εὐθέως τῆς κλιμακὸς δὴ ὅργυιάς. εἰχὲ δὲ καὶ δρύφακτῳ αὕτῃ παρ’ ἐκατέρα καθ’ ἐπιμηκῆ πλευράν εἰς γόνυ τὸ 7 βάθος. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πέρατος αὐτοῦ προσήμοστο σιδηροῦν ὁπὸ ὑπερον ἀπωξυσμένον, ἔχουν δακτύλιον ἐπὶ τῆς κορυφῆς, ὡς τὸ ὀλὸν φαινεσθαι παραπλή- 

8 σιον ταῖς σιτοποικαῖς μηχανήσεων. εἰς δὲ τούτων τὸν δακτύλιον ἐνεδέδετο κάλως, ὡς κατὰ τὰς ἐμβολὰς τῶν πλοίων ἐξαίροντες τοὺς κόρακας διὰ τῆς ἐν τῷ στῦλῳ τροχιλίας ὑφίεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρωμα τῆς ἀλλοτρίας νεὼς ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ πρώρραν, ποτὲ δ’ ἀντιπεριάγοντες <εἰς> ¹ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων

¹ I insert eis.
BOOK I

22. After this the Romans approached the coast of Sicily and learning of the disaster that had befallen Gnaeus, at once communicated with Gaius Duilius, the commander of the land forces, and awaited his arrival. At the same time, hearing that the enemy's fleet was not far distant, they began to get ready for battle. As their ships were ill-built and slow in their movements, someone suggested to them as a help in fighting the engines which afterwards came to be called "ravens." They were constructed as follows: On the prow stood a round pole four fathoms in height and three palms in diameter. This pole had a pulley at the summit and round it was put a gangway made of cross planks attached by nails, four feet in width and six fathoms in length. In this gangway was an oblong hole, and it went round the pole at a distance of two fathoms from its near end. The gangway also had a railing on each of its long sides as high as a man's knee. At its extremity was fastened an iron object like a pestle pointed at one end and with a ring at the other end, so that the whole looked like the machine for pounding corn. To this ring was attached a rope with which, when the ship charged an enemy, they raised the ravens by means of the pulley on the pole and let them down on the enemy's deck, sometimes from the prow and sometimes bringing them round when the ships collided

* The gangway (36 feet long) was composed of two parts united by a joint, the near part (12 feet long), which always remained horizontal, and the far part (24 feet long) which could be drawn up at right angles to the near part, thus reaching the top of the pole (also 24 feet long) and remaining vertical until lowered. The whole could be moved round the pole which pierced it at the junction of the two parts.
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9 προσπιπτούσας ἐμβολάς. ὃτε δὲ ταῖς σαινίσι τῶν καταστρωμάτων ἐμπαγέντες οἱ κόρακες ὁμοὶ συνδήσαιεν τὰς ναῦς, εἰ μὲν πλάγιαί παραβάλοιεν ἄλληλαις, πανταχόθεν ἐπεπήδων, εἰ δὲ κατὰ πρῶραν, δ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόρακος ἐπὶ δύο συνεχείς ἐποιοῦν- 

10 το τὴν ἐφοδον. ὥν οἱ μὲν ἧγουμένοι τὴν κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐπιφάνειαν ἐσκέπασον ταῖς τῶν θυρεῶν προβολαίς, οἱ δ' ἐπόμενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἡσφαλίζουν πλευράς ὑπὲρ τῶν δρόφακτων ὑπερτιθέ- 

11 μενοί τὰς ἔτυς τῶν ὀπλών. οὕτω μὲν οὖν τουαύτη κεχρημένοι παρασκευὴ καίρον ἐπετήρουν πρὸς ναυμαχίαν.

23 Ὅς δὲ Γάιος Βίλιος ὡς θάττον ἔγνω τὴν περι- 

πέτειαν τοῦ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἧγουμένου, παραδοὺς τὰ πεζικά στρατόπεδα τοῖς χυλιάρχοις 

2 αὐτὸς διεκομισθῇ πρὸς τὸν στόλον. πυθόμενος δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους πορθεὶν τὴν Μυλαίτην χώραν, ἐπιπλεῖ 

3 στόλῳ παντὶ. συνιδόντες δ' οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ χαρᾶς καὶ σπουδῆς ἀνήγοντο ναυσὶν ἐκατὸν καὶ 

τριάκοντα, καταφρονοῦντες τῆς ἀπειρίας τῶν Ἱρώ- 

μαίων, καὶ πάντες ἐπλεον ἀντίπρωροι τοῖς πολεμί- 

οις, οὐδὲ τάξεως καταξιώσαντες τὸν κύδινον, ἀλλ' 

4 ὡς ἐπὶ λείαν των πρόδηλον. ἤγειτο δ' Ἀννίβας 

αὐτῶν—οὖτος δ' ἦν ὁ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκκλέφας νικότος 

ἐκ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντίων πόλεως—ἐχαῖν ἐπτήρη 

5 τὴν γενομένην Πύρρου τοῦ βασιλέως. ἀμα δὲ τῶν 

πλησιάζουσιν συνθεωροῦντες ἀνανευκότας τοὺς κό- 

ρακας ἐν ταῖς ἐκάστων πρώρραις, ἐπὶ ποσῶν μὲν 

ηπόρουν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, ἐχεινόμενοι ταῖς τῶν ὀργάνων κατασκευαῖς· οὐ μήν ἀλλὰ τελέως 

κατεγνωκότες τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνέβαλον οἱ πρῶτοι 

6 πλέοντες τετολμηκότως. τῶν δὲ συμπλεκομένων
broadsides. Once the ravens were fixed in the planks of the enemy’s deck and grappled the ships together, if they were broadside on, they boarded from all sides, but if they had charged with the prow, they attacked by passing over the gangway of the raven itself two abreast. The leading pair protected the front by holding up their shields, and those who followed secured the two flanks by resting the rims of their shields on the top of the railing. Having, then, adopted this device, they awaited an opportunity for going into action.

23. As for Gaius Duilius, no sooner had he learnt of the disaster which had befallen the commander of the naval forces than handing over his legions to the military tribunes he proceeded to the fleet. Learning that the enemy were ravaging the territory of Mylae, he sailed against them with his whole force. The Carthaginians on sighting him put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, quite overjoyed and eager, as they despised the inexperience of the Romans. They all sailed straight on the enemy, not even thinking it worth while to maintain order in the attack, but just as if they were falling on a prey that was obviously theirs. They were commanded by Hannibal—the same who stole out of Agrigentum by night with his army—in the seven-banked galley that was formerly King Pyrrhus’. On approaching and seeing the ravens hauled up on the prow of each ship, the Carthaginians were at first nonplussed, being surprised at the construction of the engines. However, as they entirely gave the enemy up for lost, the front ships attacked daringly. But when the ships that came into collision were in
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σκαφῶν αὐτὸς δεδεμένων τοῖς ὀργάνοις, καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν εὔθεις ἐπιπορευμένων δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόρακος καὶ συμπλεκόμενων ἐπὶ τοῖς καταστρώμασιν, οἱ μὲν ἐφονεύοντο τῶν Καρχηδονίων, οἱ δὲ παρεδίδοσαν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκπληττόμενοι τὸ γινόμενον παραπλήσιον. 7 γὰρ πεζομαχίας συνέβαινε τὸν κόπον ἀποτελεί-σθαι. διὸ καὶ τρίακοντα μὲν τὰς πρῶτας συμβαλλόμεσας ναῦς αὐτάνδρους ἀπέβαλον, σὺν αἷς ἔγενετ' αἰχμάλωτον καὶ τὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πλοῖον. Ἀνήφας δ' ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραβόλως αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ σκάφῃ διέφυγε. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐποιεῖτο μὲν τὸν ἐπίπλουν ὡς εἰς ἐμβολήν, ἐν δὲ τῷ συνεγγίζειν θεωροῦντε ποί μὲν πρὸς προ-πλεύσασας ναυς, ἔξεκλυνον, καὶ διένευσαν τὰς τῶν ὀργάνων ἐπιβολάς. πιστεύοντες δὲ τῷ ταχυνώσθων, οἱ μὲν ἐκ πλαγίων, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πρύμναν ἐκπεριπλέουσαν ἀσφαλῶς ἠλπίζον ποιήσασθαι τὰς ἐμβολὰς. 10 πάντη δὲ καὶ πάντως ἀντιπερισταμένως καὶ συν-διαυγεύοντων τῶν ὀργάνων οὕτως ὡστε κατ' ἀνάγκην τοὺς ἐγγίσαντας συνδεδέσθαι, τέλος ἐγκλινώντες ἔφυγον οἱ Καρχηδονίων, καταπλαγέντες τὴν καυσομίαν τοῦ συμβαίνοντος, πεντήκοντα ναῦς ἀποβαλόντες. 24 Οἱ δὲ Ὁρμάιοι παραδόξως ἀντιπεποιημένοι τῆς κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐλπίδος, διπλασίας ἐπερρώθησαν 2 ταῖς ὀρμαῖσιν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. τότε μὲν οὖν προσ-σχόντες τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὴν τ' Ἀηγεσταίων ἐλυσαν πο-λιορκίαν, ἐσχάτως αὐτῶν ἦδη διακειμένως, κατὰ τὲ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀηγέστης ἀναχώρησιν Μάκελλαν πόλιν κατὰ κράτος εἶλον. 3 Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν Ἀμίλκας δ' τῶν Καρχη-δονίων στρατηγὸς δ' τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῶν πεζικῶν 64
every case held fast by the machines, and the Roman crews boarded by means of the ravens and attacked them hand to hand on deck, some of the Carthaginians were cut down and others surrendered from dismay at what was happening, the battle having become just like a fight on land. So the first thirty ships that engaged were taken with all their crews, including the commander’s galley, Hannibal himself managing to escape beyond his hopes by a miracle in the jolly-boat. The rest of the Carthaginian force was bearing up as if to charge the enemy, but seeing, as they approached, the fate of the advanced ships they turned aside and avoided the blows of the engines. Trusting in their swiftness, they veered round the enemy in the hope of being able to strike him in safety either on the broadside or on the stern, but when the ravens swung round and shifted in all directions and in all manner of ways so that those who approached them were of necessity grappled, they finally gave way and took to flight, terror-stricken by this novel experience and with the loss of fifty ships.

24. When the Romans had thus, contrary to all expectation, gained the prospect of success at sea their determination to prosecute the war became twice as strong. On this occasion they put in on the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta which was in the last stage of distress, and in leaving Segesta took the city of Macella by assault.

After the battle at sea Hamilcar, the Carthaginian commander of their land forces, who was quartered
Δυνάμεως, διατρίβοις περὶ Πάνορμον, γνώσις ἐν τοῖς Ὀρωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδους στασιάζοντας τοὺς συμμάχους πρὸς τοὺς Ὀρωμαίους περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πρωτεύων, καὶ πυθανόμενοι στρατοπεδεύουσι αὐτοὺς καθ’ ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς συμμάχους μεταξὺ τοῦ Παρώπου καὶ τῶν Θερμῶν τῶν Ἰμεραίων, ἐπιπεσοῦν αὐτοῖς αἰφνιδίως ἀναστρατοπεδεύουσι μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως σχεδὸν εἰς τετρακίσχυλους ἀπέκτεινε.

5 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτην τὴν πράξιν ὁ μὲν Ἀννίβας ἔχων τὰς διασωθεῖσας ναῦς ἀπέτελεσεν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, μετ’ οὐ πολὺ δ’ ἐκείθεν εἰς Σαρδόνα διήρε, προσλαβὼν ναῦς καὶ τινὰς τῶν ἐνδόξων τριήμαρχων.

6 χρόνοις δ’ οὐ πολλοὶς κατόπιν ἐν τῇ Σαρδόνῃ συνγκλεισθείς ὑπὸ Ὀρωμαίων ἐν τινὶ λιμένι καὶ πολλὰς ἀποβαλὼν τῶν νεῶν, παραυτικά συλληφθεῖς ὑπὸ τῶν διασωθέντων Καρχηδονίων ἀνεσταυρώθη.

7 Ὀρωμαῖοι γὰρ ἀμα τῆς θαλάττης ἦσαντο καὶ τῶν κατὰ Σαρδόνα πραγματῶν εὐθέως ἀντείχοντο.

8 Ἡ δ’ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ στρατόπεδα τῶν Ὀρωμαίων 259 B.C. κατὰ μὲν τῶν ἔξης ἐναυτὸν οὐδὲν ἄξιον ἔπραξαν λόγου, τότε δὲ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς ἐπικαθεσταμένους ἀρχοντας Ἀδιον Ἀτίλιον καὶ Γάιον Σουλπίκιον ὑμίησαν ἐπὶ τὸν Πάνορμον διὰ τὸ τὰς τῶν 258 B.C. Καρχηδονίων δυνάμεις ἑκεῖ παραχειμάζειν. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ συνεγγύσαντες τῇ πόλει μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως παρετέχαντο. τῶν δὲ πολεμίων οὐκ ἀντεξόντων, πάλιν ἐνετείθην ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ὀρμήν ἐπὶ πόλιν Ἰππάναν, καὶ ταῦτην μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου κατὰ κράτος ἔλαβον, εἰλικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ Μυτῆστρατον, πολλοὺς χρόνους ὑπομεμένηκας τὴν πολιορκίαν διὰ τὴν ὕψους τοῦ τόπου. τῶν δὲ Καμαρινίων πόλιν, μικρῷ πρότερον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀποστάσαν, τότε προσ-
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in the neighbourhood of Panormus, heard that in the Roman camp the allies and the Romans were at variance as to which had most distinguished themselves in the battles, and that the allies were encamped by themselves between the Paropus and the Hot Springs of Himera. Suddenly falling on them with his whole force as they were breaking up their camp he killed about four thousand. After this action Hannibal with the ships that escaped sailed away to Carthage and shortly after crossed from there to Sardinia, taking with him additional ships and some of the most celebrated naval officers. Not long afterwards he was blockaded in one of the harbours of Sardinia by the Romans and after losing many of his ships was summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. The Romans, I should explain, from the moment they concerned themselves with the sea, began to entertain designs on Sardinia.

The Roman troops in Sicily did nothing worthy of note during the following year; but at its close when they had received their new commanders the Consuls of that year, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus, because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. The Consuls, when they got close up to the city, offered battle with their whole forces, but as the enemy did not come out to meet them they left Panormus and went off to attack Hippana. This city they took by assault and they also took Myttistratum which withstood the siege for long owing to its strong situation. They then occupied Camarina which had lately deserted their cause, bringing up a siege battery and
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25 Τῷ δὲ ἔξης ἐνιαυτῷ Γάιος Ἀτίλιος ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρὸς Τυνδαρίδα καθομισθεὶς, καὶ συνθεασάμενοι ἀτάκτως παραπλέοντα τὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων στόλον, παραγγέλας τοὺς ἰδίους πληρώμασιν ἐπεσθαί τοῖς ἵγουμένοις, αὐτὸς ὤρμησε 2 πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔχων δέκα ναῦς ὀμοπλούσας. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνων, συνιδόντες τῶν ὑπεναντίων τοὺς μὲν ἀκρῆν ἐμβαίνοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἀναγομένους, τοὺς δὲ πρῶτοι πολὺ προεληφότας τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπι- 3 στρέφαντες αὐτοῖς ἀπήντων. καὶ κυκλώσαντες τὰς μὲν ἄλλας διεύθειμαν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ναῶν παρ᾽ οἵλον αὐτανδρόν ἔλαβον. οὐ μὲν ἀλλ’ ἀυτὴ μὲν ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις ἐξηρτυμένη καὶ ταχυαντοῦσα 4 διέφυγε παραδόξως τὸν κίνδυνον, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπιπλέοσαι κατὰ βραχὺ συνηθροί- ζοντο. γενόμεναι δὲ ἐν μετώπῳ συνεβαλλον τοῖς πολεμίοις, καὶ δέκα μὲν αὐτανδρός ναῦς ἔλαβον, ὡκτὼ δὲ κατέδυσαν. αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς τὰς Λιπαραίας καλουμένας νῆσους. 5 Ἐκ δὲ τάυτῆς τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀμφότεροι νομίζον- τες ἐφύμιλλον πεποιήσαν τὸν κίνδυνον, ὀρμήσαν ὀλοσχερόστερον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιστασθαι ναυτικὰς δυνά- 6 μεις καὶ τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν ἀντέχεσθαι πραγμάτων. αἱ δὲ πεζικαὶ δυνάμεις ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τάυτα καυροῖς οὐδὲν ἔπραξαν ἄξιον μνήμης, ἀλλὰ περὶ μικρὰς καὶ 7 τὰς τυχούσας πράξεις κατέτραβαν τοὺς χρόνους. 256 B.C. διὸ παρασκευασάμενοι, καθάπερ εἶπον, εἰς τὴν ἐπιφερομένην θερείαν ἀνήχθησαν Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν 68
making a breach in the wall. They similarly took Enna and several other small places belonging to the Carthaginians, and when they had finished with these operations they undertook the siege of Lipara.

25. Next year Gaius Atilius Regulus the Roman Consul, while anchored off Tyndaris, caught sight of the Carthaginian fleet sailing past in disorder. Ordering his crews to follow the leaders, he dashed out before the rest with ten ships sailing together. The Carthaginians, observing that some of the enemy were still embarking, and some just getting under weigh, while those in the van had much outstripped the others, turned and met them. Surrounding them they sunk the rest of the ten, and came very near to taking the admiral’s ship with its crew. However, as it was well manned and swift, it foiled their expectation and got out of danger. The rest of the Roman fleet sailed up and gradually got into close order. As soon as they faced the enemy, they bore down on them and took ten ships with their crews, sinking eight. The rest of the Carthaginian fleet withdrew to the islands known as Liparaean.

The result of this battle was that both sides thought that they had fought now on equal terms, and both threw themselves more thoroughly into the task of organizing a navy and disputing the command of the sea, while in the mean time the land forces accomplished nothing worthy of mention, but spent their time in minor operations of no significance. The Romans, therefore, after making preparations for the coming summer, set to sea with
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τριάκοντα καὶ τριακοσίαις μακράὶς ναυσὶ καταφρά-
κτοις, καὶ κατέσχον εἰς Μεσσήνην. ὃθεν ἀναχθέντες
ἐπλεον δεξιὰν ἔχοντες τὴν Σικελίαν, κάμψαντες δὲ
tὸν Πάχυννυ ὑπερῆραν εἰς Ὁκνομον διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸ
πεζὸν στράτευμα περὶ τούτους αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς
tόπους. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ πεντήκοντα καὶ τριακο-
σίαις ναυσὶ καταφράκτοις ἀναπλεύσαντες Λιυβαίῳ
προσέσχον, ἐνεύθεν δὲ πρὸς ἦρακλείων τὴν

26 Μυσάου καθωρμισθῇσαν. ἦν δὲ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων
πρόθεσις εἰς τὴν Λιβύην πλεῖν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκεῖ
περιστάν, ἵνα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις μὴ περὶ Σικελίας,
ἀλλὰ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἱδίας χώρας ὁ

cάυδονος γίνηται. τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις τάναντια
tούτων ἐδόκει· συνιδόντες γὰρ ὡς εὐεργόδος ἔστιν
ἡ Λιβύη καὶ πᾶς ὁ κατὰ τὴν χώραν λαὸς εὐχείρωτος
τοῖς ἀπαξ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμβαλοῦσιν, οὕτω οἴοι τ´ ἦσαν

3 ἐπιτρέπετεν, ἀλλὰ διακινδυνεύειν καὶ ναυμαχεῖν
ἐσπεύδουν. ὄντων δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ κωλύειν, τῶν
dὲ πρὸς τὸ βιάζεσθαι, προφανῆς ἦν ὁ μέλλων ἀγών

4 ἐκ τῆς ἐκατέρων συνιστασθαι φιλοτιμίας. οὐ μὲν
οὖν Ῥωμαιῶν πρὸς ἀμφότερα τὴν παρασκευὴν
ἀρμόζουσαν ἐποιοῦντο, πρὸς τε τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν

5 χρείαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόβασιν τὴν εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν.
διὸπερ ἐπιλέξαντες ἐκ τῶν πεζίκων στρατοπέδων
τὰς ἀρίστας χεῖρας διεῖλον τὴν πᾶσαν δύναμιν, ἦν

6 ἠμελλὼν ἀναλαμβάνειν, εἰς τέτταρα μέρη. τὸ δὲ
μέρος ἐκαστὸν διττὰς εἰχε προσηγορίας· πρῶτον
μὲν γὰρ ἐκαλέσατο στρατοπέδον καὶ πρῶτος στόλος,
καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κατὰ λόγον. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον καὶ τρίτην
ἐπωμήμιαν ἐτὶ προσειλήφηει· τριάρμοι γὰρ ὄνομα-
a fleet of three hundred and thirty decked ships of war and put in to Messene. Starting again from there they sailed with Sicily on their right hand, and doubling Cape Pachynus they came round to Ecnomus, because their land forces too happened to be just in that neighbourhood. The Carthaginians, setting sail with three hundred and fifty decked vessels, touched at Lilybaeum, and proceeding thence came to anchor off Heraclea Minoa. 26. The plan of the Romans was to sail to Africa and deflect the war to that country, so that the Carthaginians might find no longer Sicily but themselves and their own territory in danger. The Carthaginians were resolved on just the opposite course, for, aware as they were that Africa is easily accessible, and that all the people in the country would be easily subdued by anyone who had once invaded it, they were unable to allow this, and were anxious to run the risk of a sea-battle. The object of the one side being to prevent and that of the other to force a crossing, it was clear that their rival aims would result in the struggle which followed. The Romans had made suitable preparations for both contingencies—for an action at sea and for a landing in the enemy’s country. For the latter purpose, selecting the best men from their land forces, they divided into four corps the total force they were about to embark. Each corps had two names; it was called either the First Legion or the First Squadron, and the others accordingly. The fourth had a third name in addition; they were called triarii after the usage in the land forces. The whole body embarked on the ships numbered about a
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toúτων τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως περὶ τέτταρας καὶ
dέκα μυριάδας, ὥς ἂν ἐκάστης νεὼς λαμβανούσης
8 ἐρέτας μὲν τριακοσίους, ἐπιβάτας δὲ ἐκατόν εἴκοσιν.
oἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸ μὲν πλεῖον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἥμισυνο-
to πρὸς τὸν κατὰ θάλασσαν κῦνδυνον· τὸ γε μὴν
πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἢν ὑπὲρ πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας κατὰ
9 τὸν τῶν νεῶν λόγον. ἔφ' οἷς οὐχ ὅποι ἂν τις παρὼν
καὶ θεώμενος ὑπὸ τὴν ὤμην, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄκουὼν
καταπλαγεῖτο τὸ τοῦ κυνδύνου μέγεθος καὶ τὴν τῶν
πολιτευμάτων ἀμφοτέρων μεγαλομερείαν καὶ δύνα-
μιν, στοχαζόμενος ἐκ τε τοῦ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ
τῶν νεῶν πλῆθος.
10 Οἱ δὲ Ρωμαῖοι συλλογιζόμενοι διότι τὸν μὲν πλοῦν
εἶναι συμβαίνει πελάγιον, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους τα-
χυναυτεῖν, πανταχόθεν ἐπειρώντο ποιεῖσθαι τὴν
11 τάξιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ δυσπρόσοδον. τὰς μὲν οὖν
ἐξῆρεις δὴ οὐσάς, ἐφ' ὅν ἐπλεον ὁι στρατηγοὶ
Μάρκος Ἀτίλιος καὶ Λεύκιος Μάλιος, πρῶτας ἐν
μετώπω παραλλήλοις ἔταξαν. τούτων δ' ἐκατέρα
12 συνεχεῖς κατὰ μίαν ναῦν ἐπιτάττοντες τῇ μὲν τῶν
πρῶτων, τῇ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον στόλον ἐπέστησαν, ἀεὶ
καθ' ἐκάστην ναῦν ἐκατέρος τοῦ στόλου μείζον το
μεταξὺ ποιοῦντες διάστημα. ταῖς δὲ πρώρρας
13 ἐξω νεῦοντα τὰ σκάφη τήν ἐπίστασαν ἐπ' ἀλλήλους
eἰχεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον στόλον
ἀπλῶς εἰς ἐμβολὸν ἔταξαν, ἐπέβαλον τούτους ἐπὶ
μίαν ναῦν ἐν μετώπῳ τὸ τρίτον στρατόπεδον· ὅτι
14 ἐπιστάντων ἀπετελέσθη τρίγωνον τὸ πᾶν εἰδὸς τῆς
tάξεως. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτους ἐπέστησαν τὰς ἐπιπηγούς,
ῥύματα δόντες ἐξ αὐτῶν ταῖς τοῦ τρίτου στόλου

"This can only mean that the prow of each ship was
72
hundred and forty thousand, each ship holding three hundred rowers and a hundred and twenty soldiers. The Carthaginians were chiefly or solely adapting their preparations to a maritime war, their numbers being, to reckon by the number of ships, actually above one hundred and fifty thousand. These are figures calculated to strike not only one present and with the forces under his eyes but even a hearer with amazement at the magnitude of the struggle and at that lavish outlay and vast power of the two states, which may be estimated from the number of men and ships.

The Romans taking into consideration that the voyage was across the open sea and that the enemy were their superiors in speed, tried by every means to range their fleet in an order which would render it secure and difficult to attack. Accordingly, they stationed their two six-banked galleys, on which the commanders, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius, were sailing, in front and in line with each other. Behind each of these they placed ships in single file, the first squadron behind the one and the second behind the other, so arranging them that the distance between each pair of ships in the two squadrons grew ever greater. The ships were stationed in column with their prows directed outwards. Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in the form of a simple wedge, they stationed the third in a single line at the base, so that when these ships had taken their places the resulting form of the whole was a triangle. Behind these ships at the base they stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by towing-lines to the directed to the open sea and not to the ship in front of it; i.e. they were in echelon.
15 ναυσί. ταύτας δὲ κατόπιν ἐπέβαλον τὸν τέταρτον στόλον, τους τριαρίους κληθέντας, ἐπὶ μίαν παρεκτείναντες ναῦν, ὡς ὑπερτείνειν εἴ ἐκατέρου τοῦ μέρους.

16 τοὺς πρὸ ἑαυτῶν. καὶ συναρμοσθέντων πάντων κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, τὸ μὲν ὀλον ἀπετελέσθη σχῆμα τῆς τάξεως ἐμβολον, οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν μέρος ἢν κοιλὸν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῇ βάσει στερεόν, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν ἐνεργὸν καὶ πρακτικὸν, ἀμα δὲ καὶ δυσδιάλυτον.

27 Οἱ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καυρὸν παρακαλέσαντες τὰ πλῆθη διὰ βραχέων, καὶ συνυποδείξαντες αὐτοῖς ὅτι νικήσαντες μὲν τῇ ναυ-μαχίᾳ περὶ Σικελίας ποιήσονται τὸν πόλεμον, ἦττηθέντες δὲ περὶ τῆς σφητέρας πατρίδος κυνδυνεύσουσι 2 καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων, οὕτως αὐτοῖς παρῆγγελιν ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὰς ναῦς. προθύμως δὲ πάντων ποιοῦντων τὸ παραγγελλόμενον διὰ τὸ προορᾶσθαι τὸ μέλλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, εὐθαρσῶς ἀνήγγυτο καὶ 3 καταπληκτικῶς. θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων τάξιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ, καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἀρμοζομένοι, τὰ μὲν τρία μέρη τῆς αὐτῶν δυνάμεως ἐπὶ μίαν ἐταττον ναῦν, πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ἀνατείναντες τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, ὡς κυκλώσοντες τοὺς υπεναντίους, πάσας ἵστάντες ἀντιπράψους τὰς ναῦς τοῖς πολεμίοις. 4 τὸ δὲ τέταρτον εὐώνυμον τῆς ὀλῆς τάξεως ἐποίουν, 5 ἐν ἐπικαμπτίῳ νεῦν πρὸς τὴν γῆν. ἤγοντο δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων, τοῦ μὲν δεξιοῦ κέρως, ἐχὼν ἐπίπλους καὶ πεντήρεις τὰς μάλιστα ταχυναυτοῦσας πρὸς τὴν ὑπερκέρασιν, Ἄλισαν δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα 6 λειπθεῖς τῇ παρατάξει τῶν δὲ εὐωνύμων εἰχὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν Ἀμιλκας δὲ περὶ τὴν Τυνδαρίδα ναυμα-χίσας. ὃς τότε κατὰ μέσην τὴν τάξιν ποιούμενος 74.
vessels of the third squadron. Finally, behind these they stationed the fourth squadron, known as triarii, placing each ship at a greater distance from the next so that the line overlapped that in front of it at each extremity. When all had been put together in the manner I have described, the whole arrangement had the form of a wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact, and the whole effective and practical, while also difficult to break up.

27. About the same time the Carthaginian commanders briefly addressed their forces. They pointed out to them that in the event of victory in the battle they would be fighting afterwards for Sicily, but that if defeated they would have to fight for their own country and their homes, and bade them take this to heart and embark. When all readily did as they were ordered, as their general's words had made clear to them the issues at stake, they set to sea in a confident and menacing spirit. The commanders when they saw the enemy's order adapted their own to it. Three-quarters of their force they drew up in a single line, extending their right wing to the open sea for the purpose of encircling the enemy and with all their ships facing the Romans. The remaining quarter of their force formed the left wing of their whole line, and reached shoreward at an angle with the rest. Their right wing was under the command of the same Hanno who had been worsted in the engagement near Agrigentum. He had vessels for charging and also the swiftest quinqueremes for the outflanking movement. The left wing was in charge of Hamilcar, the one who commanded in the sea-battle at Tyndaris, and he, fighting as he was in the centre of the whole line,
7 τοῦ κύνδυνον ἐχρῆσατό τινι στρατηγήματι κατὰ τὸν ἄγωνα τουλίδε. τῶν γαρ Ῥωμαίων συνθεασαμένων ἐπὶ λεπτὸν ἐκτεταμένους τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, καὶ ποιησαμένων τὴν ὄρμην ἐπὶ μέσους, τὴν μὲν ἄρχὴν
8 ὁ κύνδυνος ἔλαβε τοιαύτην. ταχύ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰ μέσα Καρχηδονίων ἐκ παραγγέλματος κληνώντων πρὸς φυγὴν χάριν τοῦ διασπάσαι τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τάξιν, οὗτοι μὲν ὑπεχώρουν μετὰ σπουδῆς, οἱ δὲ
9 Ῥωμαῖοι κατόπιν ἥκολοῦθουν ἐκθῆμις. οἱ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος καὶ δεύτερος στόλος ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσιν, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον στρατόπεδον ἀπεσπάτο, τῶν μὲν ῥυμουλκούντων τὰς ἐπιθηγοῦν
10 ναῦς, τῶν δὲ τριαρίων συμμεινόντων καὶ συνεφεδρεύοντων τοῦτοις. ἔπει δὲ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον στόλον ἰκανὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐδόκουν ἀπεσπακέναι τὸτον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, συνθήματος ἀρβέντος ἐκ τῆς Ἀμιλκοῦ νεῶς μετεβάλοντο πάντες ἀμα καὶ συνέβα-
made use of the following stratagem. The battle was begun by the Romans who, noticing that the Carthaginian line was thin owing to its great extent, delivered an attack on the centre. The Carthaginian centre had received Hamilcar’s orders to fall back at once with the view of breaking the order of the Romans, and, as they hastily retreated, the Romans pursued them vigorously. While the first and second squadrons thus pressed on the flying enemy, the third and fourth were separated from them, the third squadron towing the horse-transports, and the triarii remaining with them as a supporting force. When the Carthaginians thought they had drawn off the first and second squadrons far enough from the others, they all, on receiving a signal from Hamilcar’s ship, turned simultaneously and attacked their pursuers. The engagement that followed was a very hot one, the superior speed of the Carthaginians enabling them to move round the enemy’s flank as well as to approach easily and retire rapidly, while the Romans, relying on their sheer strength when they closed with the enemy, grappling with the ravens every ship as soon as it approached, fighting also, as they were, under the very eyes of both the Consuls, who were personally taking part in the combat, had no less high hopes of success. Such then was the state of the battle in this quarter. 28. At one and the same time Hanno with the right wing, which had held its distance in the first attack, sailed across the open sea and fell upon the ships of the triarii, causing them great embarrassment and distress. Meanwhile that part of the Carthaginian
τεταγμένοι τῶν Καρχηδονίων, παραγεγονότες εἰς μέτωπον ἐκ τῆς προϋπαρχούσης τάξεως, καὶ ποιήσαντες ἀντιπρόρρους τὰς ναῦς, ἐνεβάλον τοῖς ρυμουλκοῦσι τὰς ἐπιτηγοὺς. οἱ δ' ἀφέμενοι τὰ ρύματα συνεπλέκοντο καὶ διηγωνιζόντο τοῖς πολε-3 μίοις. ὤν δὲ τριά μέρη τῆς ὀλής συμπλοκῆς καὶ τρεῖς ναυμαχίαι συνέστησαν πολὺ κεχωρισμέναι
tοῖς τόποις ἀλλήλων. τῷ δ' ἐκατέρων πάρσα τὰ μέρη γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς χειρισμὸν ἐφάμιλλον εἶναι συνέβαινε καὶ τὸν κίνδυνον. οὐ
5 μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ λόγου ἐν ἐκάστοις ἐπετελεῖτο περὶ τὴν μάχην, ὅπερ εἰκός ὅταν ἦ παραπλήσια
6 πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων. οἱ γὰρ πρῶτοι κυν-
dυνεύσαντες πρῶτοι καὶ διεκρίθησαν. τέλος γὰρ ἐκβιασθέντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀμίλκαν εἰς φυγήν ὁρμη-
7 σαν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Λεύκιος ἀνεδείτο τὰς αἰχμαλώτους
ναῦς. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος, συνορῶν τὸν περὶ τοὺς τριαρί-
ους καὶ τὰς ἐπιτηγοὺς ἀγῶνα, κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐβοήθει
tούτοις, ἔχων τοῦ δευτέρου στόλου τὰς ἀκέραιους
8 ναῦς. συνάψατος δὲ καὶ προσμύξαντος αὐτοῦ τοῖς
περὶ τὸν "Ἀννώνα, ταχέως ἀναθαρρήσαντες οἱ τριά-
ριοι, καὶ περὶ ἢδη κακῶς ἀπαλλάττοντες, πάλιν ἐπερ-
9 ρώσθησαν πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, τῶν
mὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτοῖς προσμαχομένων, τῶν
dὲ κατὰ νότον προσπίπτοντων, δυσχρηστοῦ-
μένου, καὶ παραδόξως ὑπὸ τῶν βοηθησάντων κυ-
κλούμενοι, κλίναντες πελαγίαν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ὑπο-
10 χώρησιν. κατὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν καῖρον ὁ τε Λεύκιος,
ἐπαναπλέον ἔδη καὶ θεωρῶν συγκεκλεισμένων πρὸς
τῇ γῇ τὸν τρίτον στόλου ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων
eὐωνύμου κέρατος, ὁ τε Μάρκος, ἐν ἄσφαλεῖ κατα-
lιπῶν τὰς ἐπιτηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς τριαρίους, ὀρμη-
78
force which was posted near the shore, changing their former formation and deploying into line with their prows facing the enemy, attacked the vessels which were towing the horse-transport. Letting go their tow-lines this squadron met and engaged the enemy. Thus the whole conflict consisted of three parts, and three battles were going on at a wide distance from each other. As the respective forces were in each ease of equal strength owing to their disposition at the outset, the battle also was fought on equal terms. However, in each case things fell out as one would expect, when the forces engaged are so equally matched. Those who had commenced the battle were the first to be separated, for Hamilcar's division was finally forced back and took to flight. Lucius was now occupied in taking the prizes in tow, and Marcus, observing the struggle in which the triarii and horse-transport were involved, hastened to their assistance with such of the ships of the second squadron as were undamaged. When he reached Hanno's division and came into conflict with it, the triarii at once took heart, though they had had much the worst of it, and recovered their fighting spirit. The Carthaginians, attacked both in front and in the rear, were in difficulties, finding themselves surrounded, to their surprise, by the relieving force, and giving way, they began to retreat out to sea. Meanwhile both Lucius, who was by this time sailing up and observed that the third squadron was shut in close to the shore by the Carthaginian left wing, and Marcus, who had now left the horse-transport and triarii in
11 σαν ἀμφότεροι βοηθεῖν τοῖς κινδυνεύονσι. παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἦν ἡ ἡδὴ τὸ γινόμενον πολυρκίας· καὶ πάντες ἂν ἀπολύλεισαν οὕτοι γε προφανῶς, εἰ μὴ δεδότες τοὺς κόρακας οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι περιφράξαντες μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τῇ γῇ συνέχον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐμ-
βολὰς διὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν εὐλαβῆς ἐχοντες οὐ προσ-
12 ἤσαν. ταχέως δὲ ἐπιγενόμενοι καὶ κυκλώσαντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους αὐτάνδρους μὲν ἐλα-
βον πεντήκοντα ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων, οὕτως δὲ τι-
13 νες παρὰ τὴν γῇν ἐξελίξασαι διέφυγον. ὦ μὲν οὖν κατὰ μέρος κίνδυνος τουαύτὴν ἔσχε τὴν διάθεσιν,
τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς συμπάθειας ναυμαχίας ἐγένετο κατὰ
14 τοὺς Ῥωμαίους. διεφθάρη δὲ τούτων μὲν εἴκοσι
καὶ τέτταρα σκάφη, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ὑπὲρ τριά-
κοντα. ναῦς δὲ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων αὐτάνδρος οὐ-
δεμία τοῖς πολεμίωις ἐγένεθ' ὑποχείριος, τῶν δὲ
Καρχηδονίων ἐξήκοντα καὶ τέτταρες.
29 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι προσεπιστι-
σάμενοι καὶ τὰς αἰχμαλώτους ναὺς καταρτίσαντες,
ἐτὶ δὲ τὴν ἀρμόζουσαν τοῖς προτερήμασιν ἐπι-
μέλειαν ποιησάμενοι τῶν πληρωμάτων, ἀνήγοντο
2 ποιούμενοι τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Λιβύην. προσ-
σχόντες δὲ ταῖς πρώταις πλεούσαις ναυσὶν ὑπὸ τὴν
άκραν τὴν Ἐρμαίαν ἐπονομαζομένην, ἡ πρὸ παντὸς
tοῦ περὶ τὴν Καρχηδόνα κόλπον κειμένη προτείνει
πελάγιος ὡς πρὸς τὴν Σικελίαν, καὶ προσδεξάμενοι
tὰς ἐπιπλεούσας ἑνταῦθα ναὺς, καὶ πάντα συν-
ἀθροίσαντες τῶν στόλων, ἐπέλευν παρὰ τὴν χώραν,
ἐὼς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀσπίδα καλουμένην πόλιν ἄφικοντο.
3 ποιησάμενοι δὲ τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἑνταῦθα καὶ νεωλκή-
sάντες, ἔτε δὲ τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι περιλαβόντες τὰς
ναῦς, ἐγένοντο πρὸς τὸ πολυρκεῖν αὐτήν, οὐ βου-
80
safety, hastened together to the relief of this force which was in grave peril; for the state of matters now was just like a siege, and they all would evidently have been lost if the Carthaginians had not been afraid of the ravens and simply hedged them in and held them close to the land instead of charging, apprehensive as they were of coming to close quarters. The Consuls, coming up rapidly and surrounding the Carthaginians, captured fifty ships with their crews, a few managing to slip out along shore and escape. The separate encounters fell out as I have described, and the final result of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. The latter lost twenty-four sail sunk and the Carthaginians more than thirty. Not a single Roman ship with its crew fell into the enemy's hands, but sixty-four Carthaginian ships were so captured.

29. After this the Romans, laying in a further supply of provisions, repairing the captured ships, and bestowing on their men the attention which their success deserved, put to sea and sailed towards Africa, reaching the shore with their advanced ships under the promontory known as the Hermaeum which lies in front of the whole Gulf of Carthage and stretches out to sea in the direction of Sicily. Having waited there until their other ships came up, and having united their whole fleet, they sailed along the coast till they reached the city of Aspis. Landing there and beaching their ships, which they surrounded with a trench and palisade, they set themselves to lay siege to the town, the garrison of
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λομένων ἐκουσίως σφίσι προσχωρῆσαι τῶν κατ’
εὐχόντων τὴν πόλιν. οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ
τὴν ναυμαχίαν κινδύνου τῶν Καρχηδονίων κατα-
πλεύσαντες, καὶ πεπεισμένοι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἐκ
τοῦ γεγονότος προτερήματος ἐπαρθέντας εὐθέως
ποιήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπίπλοου ἐπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχη-
δόνα, παρετήρουν ταῖς πεζικαῖς καὶ ναυτικαῖς δυνά-
5 μεσί τοὺς προκεμένους τῆς πόλεως τόπους. ἐπι-
γυνότες δὲ τοὺς Ὀμαίους ἀσφαλῶς ἀποβεβηκότας
καὶ πολιορκόντας τὴν Ἀσσίδα, τοῦ μὲν παρα-
φυλάττειν τὸν ἐπίπλοου ἀπέγνωσαν, ἱσωθροίζων δὲ
τάς δυνάμεις καὶ περὶ φυλακὴν ἐγίνοντο τῆς τε
πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας. οἱ δὲ Ὀμαίοι κυρεύ-
σαντες τῆς Ἀσσίδος καὶ φυλακὴν ἀπολύσαντες τῆς
6 πόλεως καὶ χώρας, ἔτι δὲ πρεσβευτὰς εἰς τὴν
Ῥώμην πέμψαντες τοὺς ἀπαγγελοῦντας μὲν περὶ
tῶν γεγονότων, ἑρημομένους δὲ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων,
tὶ δὲ ποιεῖν καὶ πῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι, μετὰ
dὲ ταῦτα πάση τῆς δυνάμεος κατὰ σπουδὴν ἀναζεῦ-
7 ἔαντες, ὠμοίησαν ἐπὶ τὸ πορθεῖν τὴν χώραν. οὐδενὸς
δ’ ἐμποδών ἱσταμένου, πολλὰς μὲν οἰκήσεις περιττῶς
κατεσκευασμένας διέφθειραν, πολὺ δὲ πλήθος τῆς
tετραπόδου λείας περιεβάλοντο· σώματα δὲ πλείω
8 τῶν δισμυρῶν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀνήγαγον. ἐν δὲ
τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ παρῆσαν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης οἱ διασα-
φούντες ὅτι δὲι τὸν μὲν ἐνα τῶν στρατηγῶν μένειν
ἔχοντα δυνάμεις τὰς ἄρκούσας, τὸν δ’ ἔτερον ἀπο-
9 κομίζειν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην τῶν στόλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν
Μάρκος ἐμείνεν, ὑπολειπόμενος ναῦς τετταράκοντα
καὶ πεξίους μυρίους καὶ πεντακοσίους, ὑπείς δὲ
10 πεντακοσίους· ὁ δὲ Λεύκως ἀναλαβὼν τὰ πληρώ-
ματα καὶ τὸ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων πλήθος, καὶ κομί-
which refused to surrender voluntarily. Those Carthaginians who made good their escape from the naval battle sailed home, and being convinced that the enemy, elated by their recent success, would at once attack Carthage itself from the sea, kept watch at different points over the approaches to the city with their land and sea forces. But when they learnt that the Romans had safely landed and were laying siege to Aspis, they abandoned the measures taken to guard against an attack from the sea, and uniting their forces devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs. The Romans, after making themselves masters of Aspis, where they left a garrison to hold the town and district, sent a mission to Rome to report on recent events, and to inquire what they should do in future and how they were to deal with the whole situation. They then hastily advanced with their whole force and set about plundering the country. As nobody tried to prevent them, they destroyed a number of handsome and luxuriously furnished dwelling-houses, possessed themselves of a quantity of cattle, and captured more than twenty thousand slaves, taking them back to their ships. Messengers from Rome now arrived with instructions for one of the Consuls to remain on the spot with an adequate force and for the other to bring the fleet back to Rome. Marcus Regulus, therefore, remained, retaining forty ships and a force of fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred horse, while Lucius, taking with him the ship's crews and all
σθεὶς παρὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἀσφαλῶς, ἦκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑράκλειαν, καλοῦντες

30 Οἳ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὴν χρονιωτέραν οὖσαν, πρῶτον μὲν στρατηγοὺς έαυτῶν εἴλοντο δύο, τὸν τ' Ἀννωνος Ἀσδροῦβαν καὶ Βώσταρου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Ἀμιλκάρ ἔπεμπον εἰς τὴν Ἑράκλειαν, καλοῦντες

2 κατὰ τάχος αὐτῶν. ὁ δὲ ἀναλαβὼν ἐπιπείς πεντακοσίους καὶ πεζοὺς πεντακισχίλιους παρήν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα· καὶ κατασταθεὶς στρατηγὸς τρίτος, ἐβουλεύετο μετὰ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀσδροῦβαν πώς δεί

3 χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν. ἐδοξεῖν οὖν αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ μὴ περιοράν αὐτὴν ἀδεῶς πορθομένην. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος μετὰ τινας ημέρας ἐπεπορεύετο, τὰ μὲν ἀτείχοντα τῶν ἐρυμάτων εἰς ἐφόδου διαρρήγον, τὰ δὲ τετειχισμένα πολιορκών. ἀφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς πόλιν Ἀδύν ἀξιόχρεω, περιστρατοπεδεύσας ταύτῃ συνιστατο μετὰ σπουδῆς ἔργα καὶ πολιορκίας, οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τῇ τε πόλει σπουδάζοντες βοηθήσασι καὶ τῶν ὑποθρών ἀντιποιεῖσθαι κρίνοντες ἐξῆγον τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ καταλαβόμενοι λόφον ὑπερδέξουν μὲν τῶν πολεμίων, ἀφυή δὲ ταῖς ἐαυτῶν δυνάμεσιν, ἐν τούτῳ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν.

4 λοιπὸν ἔχοντες μὲν τὰς πλείστας ἐλπίδας ἐν τοῖς ἑπεδοῦσαι καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀφεμενοὶ δὲ τῶν ἑπιπέδων χωρίων καὶ συγκλείσαντες σφαῖρας αὐτοὺς εἰς τόπους ἐρυμόνως καὶ δυσβάτους, ἐμελλόν διδάξειν τοὺς πολεμίους ὁ δέον ἤν πράττειν κατ’ αὐτῶν. ὁ δὲ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. συννοῆσαντες γὰρ οἱ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμόνες ἐμπεφερόντως ὅτι τὸ πρακτικώτατον καὶ φοβερώτατον τῆς τῶν ὑπεναντίων δυνάμεως

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the prisoners, passed safely along the coast of Sicily and reached Rome.

30. The Carthaginians, observing that the Romans were preparing for a long occupation, in the first place elected two generals from among themselves, Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno, and Bostarus, and next sent to Heraclea to Hamilcar, ordering him to return instantly. Taking with him five hundred horse and five thousand foot, he came to Carthage where, being appointed third general, he held a consultation with Hasdrubal and his staff as to what steps should be taken. They decided on marching to the assistance of the country and no longer looking on while it was plundered with immunity. A few days later Regulus began to advance, taking by assault and pillaging the un-walled places and laying siege to those which had walls. On reaching Adys, a town of some importance, he encamped about it and busied himself with raising works to besiege it. The Carthaginians, being anxious to relieve the town, and having decided to attempt to regain the command of the open country, led out their forces. They took possession of a hill which, while overlooking the enemy, was not a favourable position for their own army and there they encamped. In this manner, though their best hope lay in their cavalry and elephants, yet by quitting the level country and shutting themselves up in a precipitous place, difficult of access, they were sure to make it plain to their adversaries how best to attack them, and this is exactly what did happen. For the Roman commanders, perceiving from their experience of war that the most efficient and formidable part of the
Ηχρείωται διὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὐκ ἀνέμειναν ἐως ἐκεῖνοι καταβάντες εἰς τὰ πεδία παρετάξαντο, χρώμενοι δὲ τοῖς ιδίοις καιροῖς ἄμα τῷ φωτὶ προσβαίνον ἔξις ἐκατέρου τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὸν λόφον. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἱππεῖς καὶ τὰ θηρία τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοις ἦν ἄχρηστα τελέως· οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι πάνυ γενναίος καὶ προ-
θύμως ἐκβοηθήσαντες τὸ μὲν πρώτον στρατόπεδον ἡμάγκασαν ἐκκλιναὶ καὶ φυγεῖν· ἐπεὶ δὲ προσεόν-
tες καὶ κυκλωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ θατέρου μέρους προσβαίνοντων ἐτράπησαν, μετὰ ταῦτα πάντες εὔ-
thυς ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας ἐξέπεσον. τὰ μὲν οὖν θηρία μετὰ τῶν ἱππέων, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα τῶν ὁμαλῶν ἤματο, μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν.

οἱ δὲ Ρωμαῖοι τοὺς πεζοὺς βραχὺν ἐπιδιώξαντες τόπον καὶ τὸν χάρακα διαρπάσαντες, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάσαν ἐπιπορευόμενοι τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἀδεόως ἐπόρθουν. γενόμενοι δὲ τῆς προσαγορευ-
μένης πόλεως Τύνητος ἐγκρατεῖσ, εὐφυοῦς ὑπαρ-
χοῦσις πρὸς τὰς προκειμένας ἐπιβολάς, ἐτὶ δὲ κει-
μένης εὐκαίρως κατὰ τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς σύνεβι-
γυς ταύτης χώρας, κατεστρατοπέδευσαν εἰς αὐτὴν.

Ὁ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι μικρῶς μὲν πρότερον κατὰ
θάλατταν, τότε δὲ κατὰ γῆν ἔπταικότες, οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἀναδρόμων ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἱγουμέ-

νων ἁβουλίαν, κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐνεπεπτωκείον

δυσχερὴ διάθεσιν. άμα γὰρ τοῖς προερμήνεοις καὶ τὸ τῶν Νομάδων ἔθνος συνεπιθέμενοι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἑλάττω, πλείω δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰργάζετο κακά

τὴν χώραν. ἔξι ἄν διὰ τῶν φόβων συμφευγόντων εἰς τὴν πόλιν τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας δυσθυμία καὶ

λιμὸς ἦν ὀλοσχερής, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ
enemy's force was rendered unserviceable by their position, did not wait for the Carthaginians to come down and offer battle on the plain, but, seizing on their own opportunity, advanced at daybreak on the hill from both sides. And so their elephants and cavalry were absolutely useless to the Carthaginians, but their mercenaries sallying out with great gallantry and dash compelled the first legion to give way and take to flight; but on their advancing too far and being surrounded and driven back by the force that was attacking on the other side, the whole Carthaginian army abandoned their camp. The elephants and cavalry, as soon as they reached level ground, effected their retreat in safety, and the Romans, after pursuing the infantry for a short distance and destroying the camp, henceforth overran and plundered the country and its towns unmolested. Having made themselves masters of the town named Tunis, which was a suitable base for these raids, and also well situated for operations against the capital and its immediate environs, they established themselves there.

31. The Carthaginians, having thus been twice defeated, shortly before at sea and now on land, in both cases owing to no lack of bravery in their troops, but owing to the incompetence of their commanders, were now in a thoroughly difficult position. For, in addition to the misfortunes I have mentioned, the Numidians, attacking them at the same time as the Romans, inflicted not less but even more damage on the country than the latter. The terror-stricken inhabitants took refuge in the city of Carthage where utter despondency and extreme famine prevailed, the latter owing to overcrowding and the former
4 διὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῆς πολιορκίας. οὗ δὲ Μάρκος
όρων τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ
θάλατταν ἐσφαλμένους, καὶ νομίζων ὅσον οὕτω
κρατήσειν τῆς πόλεως, ἀγωνιών δὲ μὴ συμβῆ τὸν
ἐπιπαραγινόμενον στρατηγὸν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης φθά-
σαντα τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν πραγμάτων λαβεῖν, πρού-
5 καλεῖτο τοὺς Καρχηδονίους εἰς διαλύσεις. οἱ δ’
ἀσμένως ἀκούσαντες ἐξέμπυθαν αὐτῶν τοὺς πρώ-
τους ἄνδρας. οἱ καὶ συμμίξαντες αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον
ἀπέσχον τοῦ δέσμευν ταῖς γνώμαις ἐπὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τι
τῶν λεγομένων ὡσ’ οὐδὲ ἀκούσαντες ὑπομένειν εὐθ-
6 ναντο τὸ βάρος τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων. οὗ μὲν γὰρ Μάρ-
κος, ὃς ἦν κεκρατηκὼς τῶν ὅλων, ὅ τι ποτὲ συν-
εχώρει, πάν ὅστο δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐν χάριτι καὶ δωρεὰ
7 λαμβάνει· οὗ δὲ Καρχηδόνης θεωροῦντες ὅτι καὶ
γενομένως αὐτοῖς ὑποχειρίως οὐδὲν ἂν συνεξακο-
λουθήσαι βαρύτερον τῶν τότε προσταγμάτων, οὐ
μόνον δυσαρεστήσαντες τοὺς προτεινομένους ἔπανθ-
θον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκόψαντες τῇ βαρύτητι τοῦ Μάρ-
κου. τὸ δὲ συνέδριον τῶν Καρχηδονίων διακοῦσαν
8 τὰ προτεινόμενα παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν Ῥωμαίων,
καίπερ σχέδον ἀπεγνωκός τὰς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐλπί-
δας, ὡμοι οὕτως ἀνδρῳδὸς ἔστη καὶ γενναῖος ὡστε
πάν ὑπομένειν εἴλητο καὶ παντὸς ἔργου καὶ καιροῦ
πεῖραν λαμβάνειν, ἐφ’ ὃ μηδὲν ἄγεννες μηδ’ ἀν-
άξιον τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ πράξεων ὑπομείναι.

32 Ἡπεί δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους καταπλεῖ τις εἰς
τὴν Καρχηδόνα ξενολόγος τῶν ἀπεσταλμένων εἰς
τὴν Ἑλλάδα πρότερον [εἰς τὴν Καρχηδονίων], ἂγων
στρατιώτας πλείστους, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ξάνθιππον τινα
Λακεδαιμόνιον, ἄνδρα τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἀγωγῆς μετ-
owing to the expectation of a siege. Regulus, perceiving that the Carthaginians were utterly worsted both by land and sea and expecting to capture the city in a very short time, was yet apprehensive lest his successor in the Consulate should arrive from Rome before Carthage fell and receive the credit of the success, and he therefore invited the enemy to enter into negotiations. The Carthaginians gave a ready ear to these advances, and sent out an embassy of their leading citizens. On meeting Regulus, however, the envoys were so far from being inclined to yield to the conditions he proposed that they could not even bear listening to the severity of his demands. For, imagining himself to be complete master of the situation, he considered they ought to regard any concessions on his part as gifts and acts of grace. As it was evident to the Carthaginians that even if they became subject to the Romans, they could be in no worse case than if they yielded to the present demands, they returned not only dissatisfied with the conditions proposed but offended by Regulus's harshness. The attitude of the Carthaginian Senate on hearing the Roman general's proposals was, although they had almost abandoned all hope of safety, yet one of such manly dignity that rather than submit to anything ignoble or unworthy of their past they were willing to suffer anything and to face every exertion and every extremity.

32. Just about this time there arrived at Carthage one of the recruiting-officers they had formerly dispatched to Greece, bringing a considerable number of soldiers and among them a certain Xanthippus of Lacedaemon, a man who had been
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εσχηκότα καὶ τριβὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἐχοντα
2 σύμμετρον. ὃς διακούσας τὸ γεγονὸς ἐλάττωμα καὶ
πῶς καὶ τὶν τρόπῳ γέγονε, καὶ συνθεωρήσας τὰς
τε λοιπὰς παρασκευὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ
πλῆθος τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν ἑλεφάντων, παρατικὰ
συνελογίσατο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐνεφάνισε διότι
συμβαίνει τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὕς ὑπὸ Ἀρωμαῖων,
αὐτόὺς δὲ υφ᾽ αὐτῶν ἠττᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν
3 τῶν ἠγομένων. ταχὺ δὲ διὰ τὴν περίστασιν τῶν
toxid imposition τῶν τοῦ Ἑαυτῆπου λόγων διαδοθέντων εἰς τὰ πλῆθη
καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, ἔγνωσαν οἱ προεστῶτες ἀνα-
καλεῖσθαι καὶ πείραν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνειν. δὲ δὲ παρα-
γενόμενος εἰς τὰς χειρὰς ἑφέρε τοῖς ἄρχουσι τοὺς
ἀπολογισμοὺς καὶ παρὰ τὰ νῦν σφαλεῖσαν, καὶ
dióτι πεισθέντες αὐτῷ καὶ χρησάμενοι τοῖς ἐπιπέ-
δοις τῶν τόπων ἐν τε ταῖς πορείαις καὶ στρατο-
πεδείαις καὶ παρατάξεσιν εὐχέρως ἐαυτοῖς τε τὴν
ἀσφάλειαν διωνύσονται παρασκευάζειν καὶ τοὺς ὑπ-
5 εναντίον νικᾶν. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ δεξάμενοι τὰ
λεγόμενα καὶ πεισθέντες αὐτῷ παραχρῆμα τὰς δυ-
6 νάμεις ἐνεχείρουαν. ἦν μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ ταύτην
tὴν παρὰ τοῦ Ἑαυτῆπου διαδιδομένην φωνῆν ὁ
θροῖς καὶ λαλιὰ τῆς εὐελπίς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς.
7 ὡς δὲ ἐξαγαγὼν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὴν δύναμιν ἐν
κόσμῳ παρενέβαλε καὶ τι καὶ κινεῖν τῶν μερῶν ἐν
tάξει καὶ παραγγέλλειν κατὰ νόμους ἢξετο, τῆλι-
καῦτην ἐποίει διαφορὰν παρὰ τὴν τῶν πρότερον
στρατηγῶν ἀπειρίαν ὡστε μετὰ κραυγῆς ἐπιση-
μαίνεσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ σπεύδειν ὡς τάχιστα
συμβάλειν τοῖς πολεμίωις, πεπεισμένους μηδὲν ἄν
8 παθεῖν δεινὸν ἠγομένου Ἑαυτῆπου. τούτων δὲ
brought up in the Spartan discipline, and had had a fair amount of military experience. On hearing of the recent reverse and how and in what way it occurred, and on taking a comprehensive view of the remaining resources of the Carthaginians and their strength in cavalry and elephants, he at once reached the conclusion and communicated it to friends that the Carthaginians owed their defeat not to the Romans but to themselves, through the inexperience of their generals. Owing to the critical situation Xanthippus's remarks soon got abroad and reached the ears of the generals, whereupon the government decided to summon him before them and examine him. He presented himself before them and communicated to them his estimate of the situation, pointing out why they were now being worsted, and urging that if they would take his advice and avail themselves of the level country for marching, encamping and offering battle they could easily not only secure their own safety, but defeat the enemy. The generals, accepting what he said and resolving to follow his advice, at once entrusted their forces to him. Now even when the original utterance of Xanthippus got abroad, it had caused considerable rumour and more or less sanguine talk among the populace, but on his leading the army out and drawing it up in good order before the city and even beginning to manœuvre some portions of it correctly and give the word of command in the orthodox military terms, the contrast to the incompetency of the former generals was so striking that the soldiery expressed their approval by cheers and were eager to engage the enemy, feeling sure that if Xanthippus was in command no disaster could
γινομένων οἱ στρατηγοί συνιδόντες τοὺς ὀχλοὺς ἀνατεθαρηκότας παραδόξως ταῖς ψυχαῖς, παρακαλέσαντες αὐτοὺς τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ, μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ὑψηλῶν ἀναλαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν. αὕτη δὲ ἦν πεζοί μὲν εἰς μυρίους καὶ δισχίλιους, ἵππεῖς δὲ τετρακισχίλιοι, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐλεφάντων πλῆθος ἐγγιστὰ ποι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκατόν.

33 Οἱ δὲ Ἡρωμαῖοι θεωροῦντες τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τὰς τὸ πολείας ποιομένους διά τῶν ὠμαλῶν τόπων καὶ τὰς στρατοπεδείας τιθέντας ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτείχεοι τῶν χωρίων, κατ' αὐτὸ μὲν τούτῳ ἔξειζόμενοι διετρέποντο, τοῖς γε μὴν ὀλοίς ἔσσευδον ἐγγίσαι τοῖς 2 πολέμιοις. συνάφαντες δὲ τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἡμέραν κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ὡς δέκα στάδιας ἄποσχόντες 3 τῶν ὑπεναντίων. τῇ δὲ κατὰ πόδας οἱ μὲν προ-

4 πρακτέων εἶη κατὰ τὸ παρόν. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ προ-

5 θύμως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸν κώδυνον, συστρεφόμενοι κατὰ μέρη καὶ κατ' ὄνομα τὸν Ἐανθίππου ἀναβοῦν-

6 τες ἐξάγειν σφαῖς ἑοντο δεῖν τὴν ταχύτητην. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τὴν τε τῶν ὀχλῶν ὁμοίων καὶ προθυμίαν θεωροῦντες, ὀμα δὲ καὶ τοῦ Ἐανθίππου διαμαρτυ-

7 ρομένου μὴ παρεῖναι τὸν καιρὸν, παρῆγγειλαν τῷ μὲν πλήθει διασκευάζονται, τῷ δὲ Ἐανθίππῳ χρη-

8 σθαί τοὺς πράγμασιν ἐπέτρεψαν ὡς ποτ' αὐτῶ δοκεῖ 6 συμφέρειν. οἱ δὲ λαβὼν τὴν ἔξουσίαν, τοὺς μὲν ἐλεφάντας ἐξαγαγοῦν ἐφ' ἐνα πρὸ πάσης τῆς δυνά-

9 μεως ἐν μετώπῳ κατέστησε, τὴν δὲ φάλαγγα τῶν 7 Ἐανθιδοῦν ἐν ἀποστήματι συμμέτρω τοῦτος κατ-

10 ὀποίων ἐπέστησε. τῶν δὲ μυσθοφόρων τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξίον κέρας παρενέβαλε, τοὺς δ' εὐκινητοτάτους ὀμοῦ τοῖς ἵππεὺσι ἐκατέρου τοῦ κέρατος προεστη-
befall them. Upon this the generals, seeing the extraordinary recovery of courage among the troops, addressed them in words suitable to the occasion and after a few days took the field with their forces. These consisted of twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse and very nearly a hundred elephants.

33. When the Romans saw that the Carthaginians were marching through the flat country and pitching their camps on level ground, they were surprised indeed and somewhat disturbed by this in particular, but yet were anxious on the whole to get into contact with the enemy. On coming into touch they encamped on the first day at a distance of about ten stades from him. On the following day the Carthaginian government held a council to discuss what should be done for the present and the means thereto. But the troops, eager as they were for a battle, collecting in groups and calling on Xanthippus by name, clearly indicated their opinion that he should lead them forward at once. The generals when they saw the enthusiasm and keenness of the soldiers, Xanthippus at the same time imploring them not to let the opportunity slip, ordered the troops to get ready and gave Xanthippus authority to conduct operations as he himself thought most advantageous. Acting on this authority he sent the elephants forward and drew them up in a single line in front of the whole force, placing the Carthaginian phalanx at a suitable distance behind them. Some of the mercenaries he stationed on the right wing, while the most active he placed together with the cavalry in front of both wings. The Romans, seeing
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8 σεν. οί δὲ 'Ρωμαίοι συνιδόντες παραταττομένους
9 τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἀντεξῆσαν ἑτούμοις. καταπλητ-
tόμενοι δὲ καὶ προορόμενοι τὴν τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἐφ-
odον, προθέμενοι τοὺς γροσφομάχους πολλὰς ἐπ' ἀλλήλαις κατόπιν ἱστασαν σημείας, τοὺς δ' ἱππεῖς
10 ἐμέρισαν ἐφ' ἐκάτερον τὸ κέρας. τὴν δὲ σύμπασαν
tάξιν βραχυτέραν μὲν ἡ πρόσθεν, βαθυτέραν δὲ
ποιήσαντες, τῆς μὲν πρὸς τὰ θηρία μάχης δεόντως
ἡσαν ἐστοχασμένοι, τῆς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἱππεῖς, πολ-
lαπλασίους ὡς τὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς, ὁλοσχερῶς ἱστό-
11 χησαν. ἔπει δ' ἀμφότεροι κατὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν προ-
aρέσεις καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκάστους ἐθη-
cαν εἰς τὰς ἀρμοδοὺς τάξεις, ἔμενον ἐν κόσμῳ,
καραδοκοῦντες τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ἀλλήλων ἐπιθέσεως.

34 ἀμα δὲ τῷ τῶν Ξάνθιππον τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν θη-
ρίων παραγγείλαν προάγεν καὶ διασπάν τὰς τῶν
ὑπεναντίων τάξεις, τοῖς δ' ἱππεῦσιν ἐφ' ἐκατέρου
τοῦ κέρατος κυκλοῦν καὶ προσβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμί-
2 οῖς, τότε δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων στρατόπεδον κατὰ
tὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐθη συνενήφθησαν τοῖς ὁπλοῖς καὶ
3 συναλαλάξαντες ὀρμήσαν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους. οὶ
μὲν οὖν ἱππεῖς τῶν 'Ρωμαίων ταχέως ἀφ' ἐκατέρω
τῶν κεράτων ἐφυγον, διὰ τὸ πολλαπλασίους εἶναι
4 τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. τῶν δὲ πεζῶν οἱ ταχθέντες ἐπὶ
tοῦ λαιοῦ κέρως, ἀμα μὲν ἐκκλίνουτες τὴν τῶν θηρί-
ων ἐφοδον, ἀμα δὲ καταφρονοῦντες τῶν μισθοφόρων,
ὁρμήσαν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιόν κέρας τῶν Καρχηδονίων·
tρεψάμενοι δὲ τούτους ἐπέκειντο καὶ κατεδώκουν
5 αὐτοὺς ἔως εἰς τὸν χάρακα. τῶν δὲ κατὰ τοὺς
ἐλέφαντας ταχθέντων οἱ μὲν πρῶτοι συμπεσόντες
ὑπὸ τῆς βίας τῶν ζώων ἐξωθούμενοι καὶ καταπα-
tούμενοι σωρηδοῦν ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ διεθθείροντο,
the enemy drawn up to offer battle, issued forth to meet them with alacrity. Alarmed at the prospect of the elephants' charge, they stationed the *velites* in the van and behind them the legions many maniples deep, dividing the cavalry between the two wings. In thus making their whole line shorter and deeper than before they had been correct enough in so far as concerned the coming encounter with the elephants, but as to that with the cavalry, which largely outnumbered theirs, they were very wide of the mark. When both sides had made that general and detailed disposition of their forces that best suited their plan, they remained drawn up in order, each awaiting a favourable opportunity to attack. 34. No sooner had Xanthippus ordered the elephant-drivers to advance and break the enemy's line and the cavalry on each wing to execute a turning movement and charge, than the Roman army, clashing their shields and spears together, as is their custom, and uttering their battle-cry, advanced to the attack. As for the Roman cavalry on both wings it was speedily put to flight owing to the superior numbers of the Carthaginians; while of the infantry, the left wing, partly to avoid the onset of the elephants, and partly owing to the contempt they felt for the mercenary force, fell upon the Carthaginian right wing, and having broken it, pressed on and pursued it as far as the camp. But the first ranks of those who were stationed opposite the elephants, pushed back when they encountered them and trodden under foot by the strength of the animals, fell in heaps in the mêlée, while the formation of the
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tής γε μὴν ὀλης τάξεως τὸ σύστημα διὰ τὸ βάθος τῶν ἑφεστῶτων ἐως τινὸς ἀδιάσπαστον ἔμεινεν. 
6 ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ μὲν τὰς ἐσχάτας ἔχοντες τάξεις κυκλοῦμενοι πανταχόθεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἰππεῶν ἡμαγκάζοντο πρὸς τούτους στρεφόμενοι κινδυνεύειν, οἱ δὲ διὰ μέσων τῶν ἐλεφάντων εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἐκβιαζόμενοι καὶ κατὰ νότου παριστάμενοι τῶν θηρίων εἰς ἄκεραίων καὶ συντεταγμένην ἔμπιπτοντες τὴν τῶν Καρ-
7 χηδονίων φάλαγγα διεφθείροντο, τότε δὴ πανταχόθεν πονοῦντες, οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων συν-
επατήθησαν ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερφυοῦς βίας τῶν ζώων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ συνηκοντισθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν ἰππεῶν ἐν αὐτῶ τῷ τῆς παρατάξεως τόπῳ, τελέως 
8 δὲ τυφεὶς ὀλίγοι πρὸς φυγήν ὄρμησαν. οὐσὸν δὲ 
πεδινῶν τῶν ὑποχωρήσεων, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων καὶ τῶν ἰππεῶν ἀπώλλυτον, πεντα-
κόσιοι δ' ἵσως οἱ μετὰ Μάρκου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ φυ-
γότες μετ' ὀλίγον ὑποχείριοι γενόμενοι σὺν αὐτῶ 
9 'κείνῳ πάντες ἐξωγρήθησαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν παρὰ 
τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοις μισθοφόρων ἔπεσον εἰς ὀκτα-
κόσιοι οἱ κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ταχθέντες, 
tῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων ἐσώθησαν μὲν εἰς δισχλίους οἱ 
κατὰ τὸ δυσγμα τῶν προερημένων ἐκτὸς γενόμενοι 
10 τοῦ κινδύνου, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος διεφθάρη πλὴ
ν Μάρκου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄμα τούτῳ φυγόν-
11 των. αἱ μὲν οὖν σημαία τῶν Ῥωμαίων αἱ σωθεῖ-
12 σαι διέπεσον εἰς τὴν 'Ασπίδα παραδόξως· οἱ δὲ 
Καρχηδόνιοι τοὺς νεκροὺς σκυλεύσαντες καὶ τὸν 
στρατηγὸν ἄμα μετὰ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἄγοντες ἐπαν-
ηλθον περιχαρεῖς τοῖς παρόνσι εἰς τὴν πόλιν. 
35 Ἐν δ' Καρυῖ πολλὰ τις ἀν ὀρθῶς ἐπισημαινό-
μενοι εὐροί πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
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main body, owing to the depths of the ranks behind, remained for a time unbroken. At length, however, those in the rear were surrounded on all sides by the cavalry and obliged to face round and fight them, while those who had managed to force a passage through the elephants and collect in the rear of those beasts, encountered the Carthaginian phalanx quite fresh and in good order and were cut to pieces. Henceforth the Romans were in sore straits on all sides, the greater number were trampled to death by the vast weight of the elephants, while the remainder were shot down by the numerous cavalry in their ranks as they stood. Only quite a small body tried to effect their escape, and of these, as their line of retreat was over level ground, some were dispatched by the elephants and cavalry, and about five hundred who got away with their general Regulus shortly afterwards fell into the enemy's hands and were made prisoners, himself included. It resulted that in this battle the Carthaginians lost about eight hundred of the mercenaries, who had faced the Roman left wing, while of the Romans there were saved but about two thousand, whom the pursuit of the mercenaries I mentioned above carried out of the main battle. All the rest perished with the exception of the general Regulus and those who took to flight together with him. The maniples which escaped got through by extraordinary luck to Aspis. The Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Consul and the other captives, returned to the city in high glee at the turn of affairs.

35. In these events there will be found by one who notes them aright much to contribute to
2 βίον συντελεσθέντα. καὶ γὰρ τὸ διαπιστεῦν τῇ τύχῃ, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὰς εὐπραγίας, ἐναργέστατον ἐφάνη πᾶσι τότε διὰ τῶν Μάρκου συμπτωμάτων.
3 ὦ γὰρ μικρῷ πρότερον οὐ διδοὺς ἔλεον οὔδὲ συγγνώμην τοῖς πταίουσι παρὰ πόδας αὐτὸς ἤγετο δεη-
4 σόμενος τούτων περὶ τῆς ἐαυτοῦ σωτηρίας. καὶ μὴν τὸ παρ' Εὐριπίδη πάλαι καλῶς εἰρήθαι δο-
κοῦν ὡς "ἐν σοφὸν βούλεμα τὰς πολλὰς χέρας νικά" τότε δι' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἔλαβε τὴν πίστιν.
5 εἰς γὰρ ἀνθρώπως καὶ μία γνώμη τὰ μὲν ἀήττητα πλήθη καὶ πραγματικά δοκοῦντ’ εἶναι καθελε, τὸ
δὲ προφανῶς πεπτωκός ἀρδην πολῖτεμα καὶ τὰς ἄπνηληκυίας ψυχὰς τῶν δυνάμεων ἐπὶ τὸ κρείττον
6 ἦγαγεν. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ἐπεμνήσθην χάρων τῆς τῶν
7 ἐντυγχανόντων τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διορθώσεως. δυνεῖν
gὰρ ὄντων τρόπων πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ
βέλτιον μεταθέσεως, τοῦ τε διὰ τῶν ἱδίων συμπτω-
mάτων καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἄλλωτρών, ἐναργέστερον
μὲν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὸν. διὰ τῶν οἰκείων περι-
pετειῶν, ἀβλαβεστερον δὲ τὸν διὰ τῶν ἄλλωτρών.
8 διὸ τὸν μὲν οὐδέποθ’ ἐκουσίως αἱρετέον, ἔπει μετὰ
μεγάλων πόνων καὶ κινδύνων ποιεῖ τὴν διόρθωσιν,
tὸν δ’ ἀεὶ θηρευτέον, ἔπει χωρὶς βλάβης ἐστι συν-
9 ἰδεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιον. ἐξ ὧν συνιὸντι καλλι-
στην παιδείαν ἡγητέον πρὸς ἀλήθινον βίον τὴν ἐκ
τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας περιγνωμένην ἐμπειρίαν.
10 μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ χωρὶς βλάβης ἐπὶ παντὸς καιροῦ
καὶ περιστάσεως κριτᾶς ἀλήθινος ἀποτελεῖ τοῦ
βελτίωνος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἦμῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
εἰρήθωσι.
36 Καρχηδόνιοι δέ, κατὰ νοῦν ἀπάντων σφόσι κε-
χωρηκότων, ὑπερβολὴν χαρᾶς οὐκ ἀπέλιπον διὰ τε
the better conduct of life. For the precept to distrust Fortune, and especially when we are enjoying success, was most clearly enforced on all by Regulus's misfortunes. He who so short a time previously had refused to pity or take mercy on those in distress was now, almost immediately afterwards, being led captive to implore pity and mercy in order to save his own life. And again Euripides' words, so long recognized as just, that "one wise counsel conquers many hands" were then confirmed by the actual facts. For one man and one brain laid low that host which seemed so invincible and efficient, and restored the fortunes of a state which in the eyes of all was utterly fallen and the deadened spirit of its soldiers. This I mention for the sake of the improvement of the readers of this history. For there are two ways by which all men can reform themselves, the one through their own mischances, the other through those of others, and of these the former is the more impressive, but the latter the less hurtful. Therefore we should never choose the first method if we can help it, as it corrects by means of great pain and peril, but ever pursue the other, since by it we can discern what is best without suffering hurt. Reflecting on this we should regard as the best discipline for actual life the experience that accrues from serious history; for this alone makes us, without inflicting any harm on us, the most competent judges of what is best at every time and in every circumstance. Well, on this subject I have said enough.

36. All having now fallen out with the Carthaginians as they could best desire, there was no extravagance of rejoicing in which they did not
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tῆς πρὸς τὸν θεόν εὐχαριστίας καὶ διὰ τῆς μετ'
2 ἀλλήλων φιλοφροσύνης. Ξάνθιππος δὲ τηλικαύτην ἐπίδοσιν καὶ ῥοπὴν πουήσας τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοι πράγμασι μετ' οὗ πολὺν χρόνον ἀπέπλευσε πάλιν, φρο-
3 νίμως καὶ συνετῶς βουλευσάμενος. αἱ γὰρ ἐπιφα-
νεῖς καὶ παράδοξοι πράξεις βαρεῖς μὲν τοὺς φθό-
νους, δεξίας δὲ τὰς διαβολὰς γεννῶσιν. ὡς οἱ μὲν ἐγχώριοι διὰ τὰς συγγενείας καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων πλῆθος οἷοί τ' ἂν <εἰν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον> ἀνα-
φέρειν, οἱ δὲ ἔξοι ταχέως ύψ' ἐκατέρων τοῦτων
4 ἡττῶνται καὶ κυνδυνεύουσι. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἐτέρος
ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τῆς Ξανθίππου λόγος, ὃν πει-
ρασόμεθα διασαφεῖν οἰκειοτέρων λαβόντες τοῦ παρ-
όντος καίρον.
5 'Ρωμαίοι δὲ, προσπεσόντων φίλις παρ' ἐλπίδα
tῶν ἐν Λιβύη συμβεβηκότων, εὐθέως ἐγίνοντο πρὸς
tὸ καταρτίζειν τὸν στόλον καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξαι-
6 ρείσθαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ διασεσωμένους. οἱ δὲ
Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ ταῦτα στρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐπο-
λιώρκουν τὴν 'Ασπίδα, σπουδάζοντες ἐγκρατείς γε-
7 νέσθαι τῶν ἐκ τῆς μάχης διαφυγόντων. διὰ δὲ
tῆς γενναιότητας καὶ τόλμαν τῶν ἄνδρῶν οὐδαμῶς
ἐλεῖν δυνάμενοι τέλος ἀπέστησαν τῆς πολυρκίας.
8 προσπεσόντος δ' αὐτοῖς ἔχαρτειν τὸν στόλον τοὺς
'Ρωμαίους, καὶ μέλλειν αὖθις ἐπὶ τὴν Λιβύην ποι-
εῖσθαι τὸν πλοῦν, τὰ μὲν ἐπεσκεύαζον σκάφη, τὰ
9 δ' ἐκ καταβολῆς ἐναυτηγοῦντο. ταχὺ δὲ συμπλη-
ρώσαντες ναῦς διακοσίας ἀνήχθησαν καὶ παρεφύ-
λαττον τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν ὑπεναυτῶν.
10 Οἱ δὲ 'Ρωμαίοι τῆς θερείας ἀρχομένης καθελκύ-
sαντες πριακόσια καὶ πεινήκοντα σκάφη, καὶ
στρατηγοὺς ἐπιστήσαντες Μάρκου Λιμίλιον καὶ
indulge, paying thank-offerings to the gods and giving congratulatory entertainments. But Xanthippus, to whom this revolution and notable advance in the fortunes of Carthage was due, after a little time left again for home, and this was a very prudent and sensible decision on his part; for brilliant and exceptional achievements are wont to breed the deepest jealousy and most bitter slander. Natives of a place, supported as they are by their kinsmen and having many friends, may possibly be able to hold their own against those for some time, but foreigners when exposed to either speedily succumb and find themselves in peril. There is another account given of Xanthippus's departure which I will endeavour to set forth on an occasion more suitable than the present.

The Romans, who had never expected to receive such bad news from Africa, at once directed their efforts to fitting out their fleet and rescuing their surviving troops there. The Carthaginians after the battle encamped before Aspis and laid siege to it with the object of capturing these survivors, but as they had no success owing to the gallantry and daring of the defenders they at length abandoned the siege. When news reached them that the Romans were preparing their fleet and were about to sail again for Africa, they set to repairing the ships they had and building other entirely new ones, and having soon manned a fleet of two hundred sail, they put to sea and remained on the watch for the enemy.

In the early summer the Romans, having launched three hundred and fifty ships, sent them off under the command of Marcus Aemilius and Servius
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11 ἐπλεον παρὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς Λιβύης. συμμίξαντες δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἑρμαιαν τῷ τῶν Καρχη-δονίων στόλῳ, τούτους μὲν ἔξ ἐφόδου καὶ ῥαδίως τρεφόμενοι ναῦς ἔλαβον αὐτάνδρους ἐκατὸν δεκα-τέτταρας· τοὺς δὲ ἐν Λιβύῃ διαμείναντας νεανίσκους ἀναλαβόντες ἐκ τῆς Ἀσπίδος ἐπλεον αὖθις ἐπὶ τῆς

37 Σικελίας. διάραντες δὲ τὸν πόρον ἀσφαλῶς καὶ προσμίξαντες τῇ τῶν Καμαριναίων χώρᾳ, τηλικοῦτῳ περιέπεσον χειμώνι καὶ τηλικάυτας συμφοραῖς ὡστε μηδὲ ἄν εἰπεῖν ἄξιος δύνασθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερ-

2 βολὴν τοῦ συμβάντος. τῶν γὰρ ἐξήκοντα καὶ τεττάρων πρὸς ταῖς τρικοσσίας ναῦσιν ὀγδοκοιντα μόνον συνεβῆ περιλειφθῆναι σκάφη, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τὰ μὲν υποβήχια γενέσθαι, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς Ῥαχίας πρὸς ταῖς σπιλάσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκρωτηρίοις καταγύ-

3 μενα πλῆρη ποιήσαι σωμάτων τὴν παραλίαν καὶ ναυαγίων. ταύτης δὲ μείζω περιπέτειαν ἐν ἐνι καιρῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν οὐδ’ ἵστορησαί συμβέβηκεν.

4 ἂς τῇν αἰτίαν οὐχ οὕτως εἰς τὴν τύχην ὡς εἰς τοὺς ἄγεμόνας ἐπανοιστέουν. πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν κυβερνητῶν διαμαρτυραμένων μὴ πλεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἔξω πλευράν τῆς Σικελίας τὴν πρὸς τὸ Λιβυκὸν πέλαγος ἐςτραμμένην, διὰ τὸ τραχείαν εἶναι καὶ δυσπροσόμμαστον, ἀμα δὲ καὶ τὴν μὲν οὐδέπω καταλήγειν ἐπισθησάμαν, τὴν δ’ ἐπιφέρεσθαι· μεταξύ γὰρ ἐποιοῦντο τὸν πλοῦν

5 τῆς Ὀρίωνος καὶ κυνὸς ἐπιτολῆς· οὐθενὶ προσχόντες τῶν λεγομένων ἐπλεον ἔξω πελάγους, σπουδάζοντες τινας τῶν ἐν τῷ παράπλω πόλεις τῇ τοῦ γε-

6 γονότος εὐτυχήματος φαντασία καταπληξάμενοι προσλαβέσθαι. πλὴν οὕτωι μὲν μικρῶν ἐλπίδων ἔνεκα μεγάλοις περιτυχόντες ἀτυχήμασι τότε τὴν 102
Fulvius, who proceeded along the coast of Sicily making for Africa. Encountering the Carthaginian fleet near the Hermaeum they fell on them and easily routed them, capturing one hundred and fourteen ships with their crews. Then having taken on board at Aspis the lads who remained in Africa they set sail again for Sicily. 37. They had crossed the strait in safety and were off the territory of Camarina when they were overtaken by so fierce a storm and so terrible a disaster that it is difficult adequately to describe it owing to its surpassing magnitude. For of their three hundred and sixty-four ships only eighty were saved; the rest either foundered or were dashed by the waves against the rocks and headlands and broken to pieces, covering the shore with corpses and wreckage. History tells of no greater catastrophe at sea taking place at one time. The blame must be laid not so much on ill-fortune as on the commanders; for the captains had repeatedly urged them not to sail along the outer coast of Sicily, that turned towards the Libyan sea, as it was very rugged and had few safe anchorages: they also warned them that one of the dangerous astral periods was not over and another just approaching (for it was between the rising of Orion and that of Sirius that they undertook the voyage). The commanders, however, paid no attention to a single word they said, and there they were in the open sea thinking to strike terror into some of the cities they passed by the brilliancy of their recent success and thus win them over. But now, all for the sake of such meagre expectations, they exposed themselves to this great disaster, and were obliged

Sirius rises in July, Orion early in December.
7 αὐτῶν ἀβουλίαν ἔγνωσαν. καθόλου δὲ Ἡρωμαῖοι πρὸς πάντα χρώμενοι τῇ βίᾳ, καὶ τὸ προτεθὲν οἰόμενοι δεῖν κατ’ ἀνάγκην ἐπιτελεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι σφίσι τῶν ἀπαξ δοξάντων, ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν κατορθοῦσι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ὄρμην, ἐν τοιῷ δὲ προφανῶς σφάλλονται, καὶ μᾶλιτ’ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς γῆς πρὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὰ τούτων ἔργα ποιούμενοι τάς ἐπιβολὰς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ κατορθοῦσι διὰ τὸ πρὸς παραπλησίους δυνάμεις χρῆσθαι τῇ βίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ σπανίως ἀπο- τυγχάνουσιν. πρὸς δὲ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ πρὸς τὸ περιέχον ὅταν παραβάλλωνται καὶ βιαιομαχοῦσι, μεγάλοις ἐπιστρατεύσεις περιπέπτουσιν. δ’ ὁ καὶ τότε καὶ πλεονάκις αὐτοῖς ἦδη συνέβη καὶ συμβῆσαι πάσχειν, ἐξω ἂν ποτὲ διορθώσωνται τὴν τοιαύτην τόλμαν καὶ βίαν, καθ’ ἣν ὁ’νονται δεῖν αὐτοῖς πάντα καυρὸν εἶναι πλωτὸν καὶ πορευτόν.

38 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, συνέντες τὸν γεγονότα φθό- ρον τοῦ τῶν Ἡρωμαίων στόλου, καὶ νομίσαντες κατὰ μὲν γῆν ἄξιόχρεως σφᾶς εἶναι διὰ τὸ προγεγονὸς εὐτύχημα, κατὰ δὲ θάλατταν διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην τῶν Ἡρωμαίων περιπέτειαν, ὄρμησαν προθυμὸτερον ἐπὶ τε τὰς ναυτικὰς καὶ πεζικὰς παρασκευάς. καὶ τὸν μὲν Ἀσδροὺβαν εὐθὺς ἔξαπέστελλον εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν, δόντες αὐτῷ τοὺς τε προὔπαρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἡρακλείας παραγεγονότας στρατιώτας, ἀμὴ δὲ τούτως ἐλέφαντας ἐκατὸν καὶ τετταράκοντα. τούτων δ’ ἐκπέμβαντες διακοσίας κατεσκεύαζοντο ναῦς καὶ τάλλα τὰ πρὸς τὸν πλοῦν ἤτοιμαζον. ὃ δ’ Ἀσδροῦ- βας διακομισθείς εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον ἀσφαλῶς τά
to acknowledge their lack of judgement. The Romans, to speak generally, rely on force in all their enterprises, and think it is incumbent on them to carry out their projects in spite of all, and that nothing is impossible when they have once decided on it. They owe their success in many cases to this spirit, but sometimes they conspicuously fail by reason of it and especially at sea. For on land they are attacking men and the works of man and are usually successful, as there they are employing force against forces of the same nature, although even here they have in some rare instances failed. But when they come to encounter the sea and the atmosphere and choose to fight them by force they meet with signal defeats. It was so on this occasion and on many others, and it will always continue to be so, until they correct this fault of daring and violence which makes them think they can sail and travel where they will at no matter what season.

38. The Carthaginians, on hearing of the destruction of the Roman fleet, conceiving themselves to be now a match for the Romans both on land owing to their recent success and at sea owing to this disaster, were encouraged to make more extensive military and naval preparations. They at once dispatched Hasdrubal to Sicily, giving him the troops they previously had and a force which had joined them from Heraclea, together with a hundred and forty elephants. After dispatching him they began to get ready for sea two hundred ships and to make all other preparations for a naval expedition. Hasdrubal having crossed in safety to Lilybaeum occupied himself in drilling unopposed
ΤΕ ΘΕΡΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΑΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ ΕΓΥΜΝΑΖΕ, ΚΑΙ ΔΗΛΟΣ ἮΝ
5 ἈΝΤΙΠΟΥΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΩΝ ὙΠΑΙΘΡΩΝ.

Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ναυαγίας ἀνακομισθέντων
dιακοῦσαντες τὸ κατὰ μέρος, βαρέως μὲν ἦνεγκαν τὸ
γεγονός· οὐ βουλόμενοι δὲ καθάπαξ εἴκεν, αὖθις
ἐγνωσαν ἐκ δρυόχων εἰκοσι καὶ διακόσια ναυπηγεῖν·
6 οὕτω σκάψῃ. τούτων δὲ τὴν συντέλειαν ἐν τριμήνῳ
λαβόντων, ὃπερ οὐδὲ πιστεύσαν ῥάδιον, εὐθέως οἱ
κατασταθέντες ἄρχοντες Άθλος Ἀτύλιος καὶ Γνάιος
7 Κορυνήλιος καταρτίζοντες τὸν στόλον ἀνήχθησαν,
cαι πλεύσαντες διὰ πορθμοῦ προσέλαβον ἐκ τῆς
Μεσσήνης τὰ διασωθέντα τῶν πλοίων ἐκ τῆς ναυα-
γίας, καὶ κατάραντες εἰς Πάνορμον τῆς Σικελίας
τριακοσίαις ναυσίν, ἦπερ ἦν βαρυτάτῃ πόλις τῆς
8 Καρχηδονίων ἐπαρχίας, ἐνεχείρησαν αὐτὴν πολυρ-
κεῖν. συστησάμενοι δὲ κατὰ διμοῦς τόπους ἔργα
9 καὶ τάλλα παρασκευασάμενοι, προσήγαγον τὰς
μηχανάς. ῥάδιον δὲ τοῦ παρὰ θάλατταν πῦργον
πεσόντος, καὶ βιωσάμενων ταύτῃ τῶν στρατιωτῶν,
ἡ μὲν καλουμένη Νέα πόλις ἐαλώκει κατὰ κράτος·
ἡ δὲ Παλαιὰ προσαγορευμένη τούτοις συμβάντος
10 ἕκυψενεσε. διὸ καὶ ταχέως ἐνέδωκαν αὐτὴν οἱ
κατοικοῦντες, γενόμενοι δ' ἐγκρατεῖσι οὕτωι μὲν
ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἀπολύοντες φυλακὴν
tῆς πόλεως.

39 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς θερείας ἐπιγενομένης οἱ
κατασταθέντες ἄρχοντες Γνάιος Σεροῦλιος καὶ
Γάιος Σεμπρόνιος ἀνέπλευσαν παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ, καὶ
2 διάραντες εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ἀφώρισαν ἐντεύθεν
eἰς τὴν Αιβύνην. κομιζόμενοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν χώραν
ἐποιοῦντο καὶ πλείστας ἀποβάσεις. ᾗν αἰς οὐδὲν
ἀξιόλογον πράττοντες παρεγύνοντο πρὸς τὴν τῶν
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his elephants and the rest of his force, and plainly intended to dispute the possession of the open country.

The Romans, on receiving full information about the disaster from the survivors of the shipwreck, were deeply grieved, but being resolved on no account to give in, they decided to put on the stocks a fresh fleet of two hundred and twenty ships. In three months they were completed—a thing difficult to believe—and the new Consuls, Aulus 254 B.C. Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius, having fitted out the fleet, put to sea, and passing the straits picked up at Messene the ships that had escaped shipwreck. Descending with their total fleet of three hundred sail on Panormus, the most important city in the Carthaginian province, they undertook its siege. They threw up works in two places and after making the other necessary preparations brought up their battering-rams. The tower on the sea shore was easily knocked down, and, the soldiers pressing in through this breach, the so-called New Town was stormed, and the part known as the Old Town being now in imminent danger, its inhabitants surrendered it. Having taken possession of it the Consuls sailed back to Rome leaving a garrison in the town.

39. Their successors, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius 253 B.C. Sempronius, put to sea with their whole fleet as soon as it was summer and after crossing to Sicily proceeded thence to Africa, and sailing along the coast, made a number of descents in which they accomplished nothing of importance, and finally
Λωτοφάγων νήσου, ἕπολείται μὲν Μήνιγξ, οὗ 3 μακρὰν δ' ἀπέχει τῆς μικράς Σύρτεως. ἐν ἥ προσπέ-
σοντες εἴς τινα βραχέα διὰ τὴν ἀπερίαν, γενομένης
4 ἀμπώτεως καὶ καθισάντων τῶν πλοίων εἰς πᾶσαν
ήλθον ἀπορίαν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα πάλιν ἀνελπίστως
μετὰ τινα χρόνων ἐπενεχθείης τῆς θαλάττης,
ἐκρίφαντες ἐκ τῶν πλοίων πάντα τὰ βάρη μόλις
5 ἐκούφισαν τὰς ναῦς. οὐ γενομένου φυγῆ παρα-
πλήσιον ἐποίησαν τὸν ἀπόπλουν. ἀφάμενοι δὲ
6 τῆς Σικελίας καὶ κάμψαντες τὸ Διλύβαιον καθωρ-
μίσθησαν εἰς Πάνορμον. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ποιοῦμενοι
παραβόλως καὶ διὰ πόρου τῶν πλοίων εἰς τὴν Ὄρμην
πάλιν περιέπεσον χειμών τηλικοῦτο τὸ μέγεθος
ὥστε πλείω τῶν ἐκατὸν καὶ πεντήκοντα πλοίων
ἀποβαλεῖν.
7 Οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ὄρμῃ τούτων συμβάντων, καίπερ ὄν-
τες ἐν παντὶ φιλότιμοι διαφερόντως, ὁμως τότε διὰ
τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων τοῦ
μὲν ἐτὶ στόλου ἄθροιζεν ἀναγκασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν
8 πραγμάτων ἀπέστησαν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πεζικαῖς δυνάμει
τὰς υπολοίπους ἐχόντες ἐλπίδας, τους μὲν στρατη-
γοὺς ἀπέστελλον Λεύκιον Καικέλιον καὶ Γάιον Φού-
ριον καὶ στρατόπεδα μετὰ τούτων εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν,
ἐξήκοντα δὲ μόνον ἐπιλήρωσαν ναῦς χάριν τοῦ τάς
9 ἀγορᾶς κομίζειν τοὺς στρατοπέδους. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρή-
μένων περιπτετῶν συνέβη πάλιν ἐπικυδεστέρα γενέ-
10 σθα τὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων πράγματα. τῆς μὲν γὰρ
θαλάττης ἄδεως ἐπεκράτουν ἐκκεχωρηκτῶν τῶν
Ῥωμαίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πεζικαῖς δυνάμει μεγάλας
11 εἴχον ἐλπίδας. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπασχον οὐκ ἀλόγως· οἱ
γάρ Ῥωμαίοι, διαδοθείσης φήμης περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ
Λιβύη μάχης ὅτι τὰ θηρία τὰς τε τάξεις αὐτῶν
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reached the isle of the lotos-eaters, which is called Menix and is not far distant from the lesser Syrtis. Here, owing to their ignorance of these seas, they ran on to some shoals, and, on the tide retreating and the ships grounding fast, they were in a most difficult position. However, as the tide unexpectedly rose again after some time, they managed with difficulty to lighten their ships by throwing overboard all heavy objects. Their departure now was so hasty as to resemble a flight, and having made Sicily and rounded Cape Lilybaeum they anchored at Panormus. As they were rashly crossing the open sea on the way hence to Rome they again encountered such a terrific storm that they lost more than a hundred and fifty ships.

The Roman Government upon this, although in all matters they are exceedingly ambitious of success, still on the present occasion, owing to the magnitude and frequency of the disasters they met with, were obliged by the force of circumstances to renounce the project of getting another fleet together. Relying now solely on their military forces, they dispatched to Sicily with some legions the Consuls Lucius Caecilius and Gains Furius and only manned sixty ships to revictual the legions. The above disasters resulted in the prospects of the Carthaginians becoming once more brighter; for they had now undisturbed command of the sea, the Romans having retired from it, and they had great hopes of their army. These hopes were not unjustified, for the Romans, when the report circulated regarding the battle in Africa that their ranks were broken and
διασπάσαι καὶ τοὺς πλείστους διαφθείραι τῶν ἄν-
12 δρῶν, οὕτως ἴσαν κατάφοβοι τοὺς ἑλέφαντας ὡς ἐπὶ δυ' ἐνιαυτοὺς τοὺς ἐξῆς τῶν προερημένων καὶ-
ρῶν πολλάκις μὲν ἐν τῇ Διολυβαίτιδι χώρᾳ, πολλάκις δ' ἐν τῇ Σελινουντίᾳ παραταττόμενοι τοῖς πολεμίως ἐν ἔξι καὶ πέντε σταδίοις οὐκ ἔθαρρησαν οὐδὲποτε κατάρξαι τῆς μάχης οὐδ' εἰς τοὺς ὁμαλοὺς καθόλους συγκαταβηκαίναι τόπους, δεδιότες τὴν τῶν ἑλέφαντων ἔφοδον. Θέρμαν δὲ μόνον καὶ Δισπάραν ἐξεπολιορ-
κήσαν ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καυροῖς, ἀντεχόμενοι τῶν ὀρεινῶν καὶ δυσδιαβάτων τόπων. διὸ καὶ θεωροῦν-
tes ὁ Ἡρωμαίοι τῇ ἐν τοῖς πεζίκοις στρατοπέδοις πτοίαν καὶ δυσελπιστίαν, αὖθις ἐγνωσαν ἐκ μετα-
15 μελείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς θαλάττης, καὶ κατα-
sτήσαντες στρατηγοὺς Γάιον Ἀτίλιον καὶ Λεύκιον τὸν Ἁμλον ναυπηγοῦνται πεντήκοντα σκάφη, καὶ κατ-
έγραφον καὶ συνήθροιζον στόλον ἐνεργῶς.

40 Ὁ δὲ προεστὸς τῶν Καρχηδονίων Ἀσδρούβας, ὠρῶν ἀποδειλίων τοὺς Ἡρωμαίοις ἐν ταῖς προγε-
γενημέναις παρατάξεσι, πυθόμενος τὸν μὲν ἐνα τῶν στρατηγῶν μετὰ τῆς ἡμισείας διώκεις εἰς τὴν Ἰτα-
λίαν ἀπηλλάξαθα, τὸν δὲ Καυκέλιον ἐν τῷ Πανόρμῳ διατίβειν τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος ἔχοντα τῆς στρατιᾶς, βουλόμενον ἐφεδρεύσαι τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων καρ-
2 ποῖς, ἀκμαίος τῆς συγκομιδῆς, ἀναλαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ Ἡ-
λυβαίου τῆς δύναμιν ὄρμησε καὶ κατεστρατοπέ-
deusει πρὸς τοῖς ὀροῖς τῆς χώρας τῆς Παλαμίτιδος. 
3 ὁ δὲ Καυκέλιος, θεωρῶν αὐτὸν κατατεθαρρηκότα, καὶ ἱππόδαιμον ἐκκαλείθαι τὴν ὀρμήν αὐτοῦ, συν-
4 εἶχε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐντὸς τῶν πυλῶν. οἳ ἐπαι-
ρόμενος Ἀσδρούβας, ὥς οὐ τολμῶντος ἀντεξείναι 
τοῦ Καυκέλιον, θρασεῶς ὀρμήσας παντὶ τῶν στρα-

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the most of those who fell killed by the elephants, grew so afraid of these that for the two following years, though often both in the district of Lilybaeum and in that of Selinus they were drawn up at a distance of five or six stades from the enemy, they never began to attack, and in fact never would come down at all to meet the enemy on flat ground, so much did they dread a charge of the elephants. During this period all they accomplished was the reduction by siege of Therma and Lipara, keeping as they did to mountainous and difficult country. Consequently the Government, observing the timidity and despondency that prevailed in their land forces, changed their minds and decided to try their fortunes at sea again. In the consulship of Gaius Atilius and Lucius Manlius we find them building fifty ships and actively enrolling sailors and getting a fleet together.

40. The Carthaginian commander-in-chief, Hasdrubal, had noted the lack of courage which the Romans exhibited, on the occasions when they were in presence of the enemy, and when he learnt that while one of the Consuls with half the whole force had left for Italy, Caecilius and the rest of the army remained at Panormus with the object of protecting the corn of the allies—it now being the height of the harvest—removed his forces from Lilybaeum and encamped on the frontier of the territory of Panormus. Caecilius, observing Hasdrubal's aggressive spirit and wishing to provoke him to attack, kept his own soldiers within the gates. Hasdrubal gained fresh confidence from this, thinking that Caecilius did not venture to come out, and boldly advancing with his
τεύματι κατήρε διὰ τῶν στενῶν εἰς τὴν Πανορ-
5 μίτιν. φθείροντος δὲ τοὺς καρποὺς αὐτοῦ μέχρι τῆς πόλεως, ἔμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὑποκειμένης γνώμης ὁ
Καικέλιος, ἐως αὐτὸν ἐξεκαλέσατο διαβήναι τὸν πρὸ
6 τῆς πόλεως ποταμοῦ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ θηρία διεβίβασαν
οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, τὸ τηνυκαῦτα δὲ
tοὺς εὐξώνους ἔξαποστέλλων ἡρέθιζε, μέχρι πᾶν
7 αὐτοὺς ἐκτάξας τὸ στρατόπεδον ἴνα γκασε. συνθεα-
σάμενος δὲ γινόμενον ὁ προὔθετος, τυνᾶς μὲν τῶν
eὐκυνήτων πρὸ τοῦ τείχους καὶ τάφρον παρεν-
έβαλε, προστάξας, ἂν ἐγκύζῃ τὰ θηρία πρὸς αὐτοὺς,
8 χρῆσθαι τοῖς βέλεσιν ἀφθόνως, ὅταν δὲ ἐκπείξών-
ται, καταφεύγειν εἰς τὴν τάφρον, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ ταύ-
της ὀρμωμένων εἰσακοντίζειν εἰς τὰ προσπίπτοντα
9 τῶν ἔτων· τοῖς δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἁγορᾶς βαναύσως φέ-
ρεσ προσέταξε τὰ βέλη, καὶ παραβάλλειν ἔξω παρά
10 τὸν θεμέλιον τοῦ τείχους. αὐτὸς δὲ τὰς σημαίας
ἔχων ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν κέρας τῶν ὑπεναυτῶν
κευμένης πύλης ἐφειστήκει, πλείους αἰεὶ καὶ πλείους
11 ἔπασοστέλλων τοῖς ἀκροβολιζομένοις. ἀμα δὲ τῷ
τούτων ὀλοσχεροστέραις γενέσθαι τὴν συμπλοκὴν
ἀντιφιλοδοξοῦντες οἱ τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἐπιστάται πρὸς
tὸν Ἀσδρούβαν, καὶ βουλόμενοι δὲ αὐτῶν ποιῆσαι
τὸ προτέρημα, πάντες ἄρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς προκυμο-
νεύοντας· τρεφόμενοι δὲ τούτως ῥαδίως συνεδίω-
12 ἐξαν εἰς τὴν τάφρον. προσπέσοντως δὲ τῶν θη-
ρίων, καὶ τιτρωσκομένων μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεί-
χους τοξεύοντων, συνακοντιζομένως δὲ ἐνεργοῖς καὶ
πυκνοῖς τοῖς ύσσοις καὶ τοῖς γρόσφοις ὑπὸ ἀκεράιων
13 τῶν πρὸ τῆς τάφρου διατεταγμένων, συμβελῆ γινό-
μενα καὶ κατατραγματιζόμενα ταχέως διεταράχθη,
καὶ στραφέντα κατὰ τῶν ἴδιων ἐφέρετο, τοὺς μὲν
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whole force, descended through the pass on the territory of Panormus. Caecilius, adhering to his original plan, let him ravage the crops up to the walls, until he had led him on to cross the river that runs in front of the town. Once the Carthaginians had got their elephants and other forces across, he kept sending out light-armed troops to molest them, until he had compelled them to deploy their whole force. When he saw that what he had designed was taking place he stationed some of his light troops before the wall and the trench, ordering them, if the elephants approached, not to spare their missiles, and when driven from their position, they were to take refuge in the trench and sallying from it again shoot at those elephants they met. Ordering the lower classes of the civil population to bring the missiles and arrange them outside at the foot of the wall, he himself with his maniples took up his position at the gate which faced the enemy’s left wing and kept sending constant reinforcements to those engaged in shooting. When this latter force more generally engaged with the enemy, the drivers of the elephants, anxious to exhibit their prowess to Hasdrubal and wishing the victory to be due to themselves, all charged those of the enemy who were in advance and putting them easily to flight pursued them to the trench. When the elephants reached the trench and began to be wounded by those who were shooting from the wall, while at the same time a rapid shower of javelins and darts fell on them from the fresh troops drawn up before the trench, they very soon, finding themselves hit and hurt in many places, were thrown into confusion and turned on their own troops,
ἀνδρας καταπατοῦντα καὶ διαφθείροντα, τὰς δὲ τά-
14 ξεῖς συγχέοντα καὶ κατασπώντα τὰς αὐτῶν. ὁ καὶ κατιδὼν ὁ Καικέλιος ἔξηγε τὴν δύναμιν ἐνεργῶς· καὶ συμπεσῶν ἐκ πλαγίου κατὰ κέρας τεταραγμέ-
νοις τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀκεραίους ἔχων καὶ συντεταγ-
mένους, τροπὴν ἐποίει τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἱσχυρᾶν, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἡμάγκασε φεύγειν προτροπάδην. θηρία δὲ σὺν αὐ-
15 τοῖς μὲν Ἡνδοὶς ἔλαβε δέκα, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τοὺς Ἡνδοὺς ἀπερριφότον, μετὰ τὴν μάχην περιελασάμε-
16 νος ἐκυρίευσε πάντων. ταῦτα δὲ ἐπιτελεσάμενος ὡμολογουμένως αἶτιος ἔδοκε γεγονέναι τοῖς Ἡρω-
μαίουν πράγμασι τοῦ πάλιν ἀναθαρρῆσαι τὰς πεζικάς δυνάμεις καὶ κρατῆσαι τῶν ὑπαίθρων.

41 Τοῦ δὲ προτερήματος τούτου προσπεσόντος εἰς τὴν Ἡρώμην, περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν οὐχ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς πολεμίους ἡλαττῶσθαι τῶν θηρίων ἐστερημένους, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς ἱδίους τεθαρρηκέναι τῶν ἑλεφάν-
2 τῶν κεκρατηκότας. διὸ καὶ πάλιν ἐπερρώσθησαν διὰ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν εἰς τὸ μετὰ στόλου καὶ ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐκκέμπεις, σπουδάζοντες εἰς δύναμιν
3 πέρας ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ πολέμῳ. παρασκευασθέντων δὲ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων πρὸς τὴν ἐξαισθητὴν ἐπλεον οἱ στρατηγοὶ διακοσίας ναυσίν ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς Σικελίας.

4 ἔτος δὲ ἦν τῷ πολέμῳ τετταρεσκαϊδέκατον. καθορ-
κυσθέντες δὲ πρὸς τὸ Λιλύβαυον, ἀμα καὶ τῶν πε-
ζικῶν ἐκεῖ στρατοπέδων αὐτών ἀπηνηκτότων, ἐνεγει-
ρουν πολυρκείν, ὅτι κρατήσαντες ταύτης ῥαδίως
5 μεταβιβάσουσι τὸν πόλεμον εἰς τὴν Λιβύην. σχε-
δόν δὲ περὶ γε τούτου τοῦ μέρους καὶ τῶν Καρ-
χιδονίων οἱ προεστῶτες ἀμοδόξουν καὶ τοὺς αὐ-
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trampling down and killing the men and disturbing and breaking the ranks. Caecilius, on seeing this, made a vigorous sally and falling on the flank of the enemy, who were now in disorder, with his own fresh and well-ordered troops inflicted a severe defeat on them, killing many and compelling the rest to quit the field in headlong flight. He took ten elephants with their mahouts, and after the battle, having penned up the others who had thrown their mahouts, he captured them all. By this exploit he was universally acknowledged to have caused the Roman land forces to pluck up courage again and gain the command of the open country.

41. When news of this success reached Rome it caused great rejoicing, not so much because of the enemy being weakened by the loss of their elephants as because of the confidence which the capture of these gave to their own troops. They were consequently encouraged to revert to their original plan of sending out the Consuls to the campaign with a fleet and naval force; for they were eager by all means in their power to put an end to the war. When all that was required for the expedition was ready, the Consuls set sail for Sicily with two hundred ships. This was in the fourteenth year of the war. Anchoring off Lilybaeum, where they were joined by their land forces, they undertook its siege, thinking that if it fell into their possession it would be easy for them to transfer the war to Africa. On this matter at least the Carthaginian Government agreed more
6 τοὺς εἶχον λογισμοὺς τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. διὸ καὶ τάλλα πάρεργα ποιησάμενοι περὶ τὸ βοηθεῖν ἐγίνοντο καὶ παραβάλλοντο καὶ πάν υπομένειν ὑπέρ τῆς προ-
ειρημένης πόλεως διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀφορμὴν κατα-
λείποντο σφίσι, πάσης δὲ τῆς ἀλλης Σικελίας ἐπι-
krateῖν Ῥωμαίους πλὴν Δρεπάνων.

'Ἰνα δὲ μὴ τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσι τοὺς τόπους ἀσαφῆ τα
λεγόμενα γίνηται, πειρασόμεθα διὰ βραχέων ἁγα-
γεῖν εἰς ἐννοιαν τῆς εὐκαιρίας καὶ θέσεως αὐτῶν
42 τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας. τὴν μὲν οὖν σύμπασιν Σικε-
λίαν τῇ θέσει τετάχθαι συμβαίνει πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλιαν
καὶ τάκεινς πέρατα παραπλησίως τῇ τῆς Πελοπο-

2 νῦσσον θέσει πρὸς τὴν λοιπὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὰ
ταύτης ἀκρα, τούτῳ δ' αὐτῶν διαφέρειν ἄλληλων,
ἡ 'κείμη μὲν χερρόνησός <ἐστιν, αὐτὴ δὲ νῆσος·
ἡς μὲν γὰρ ὁ μεταξὺ τόπος ἑστὶ πορεύτως, ἦσ δὲ
3 πλωτός. τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς Σικελίας ἐστὶ μὲν
τρίγωνον, αἱ δὲ κορυφαὶ τῶν γωνιῶν ἑκάστης
4 ἀκρωτηρίων λαμβάνουσι τάξεις, ὡς τὸ μὲν πρὸς
μεσημβρίαν νεῦον, εἰς δὲ τὸ Σικελικὸν πέλαγος
5 ἀνασεῖν, Πάχυνοι καλεῖται, τὸ δ' εἰς τὰς ἄρκτους
κεκλιμένον ὄριζει μὲν τὸν πορθμὸ τὸ πρὸς δύσεις
μέρος, ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς Ἰταλίας ως δεκαδύο στάδια,
6 προσαγορεῦεται δὲ Πελοπόν. τὸ δὲ τρίτον τέτρα-
pπται μὲν εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν Λιβύην, ἐπίκειται δὲ τοῖς
προκειμένοις τῆς Καρχηδόνος ἀκρωτηρίως εὐκαί-
ρως, διέχον ως χιλίους σταδίους, νεῦε δ' εἰς χει-
μεριών δύσεις, διαιρεῖ δὲ τὸ Λιβυκὸν καὶ τὸ Σαρ-
7 δῶν πέλαγος, προσαγορεῦεται δὲ Λιλύβαιον. ἐπὶ
δὲ τούτῳ πόλις ὀρμώνυμος κεῖται τῷ τόπῳ, περὶ ᾗν
tότε συνέβαινε τοὺς Ῥωμαίους συνίστασθαι τὴν πο-
λιορκίαν, τείχεσι τε διαφερόντως ἱσφαλισμένην καὶ
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or less with the Romans, sharing their estimate of the place's value; so that, shelving all other projects, they devoted their whole attention to the relief of this city and were ready to undertake every risk and burden for this purpose; for if it fell, no base was left for them, as the Romans were masters of all the rest of Sicily except Drepana.

To prevent my narrative from being obscure to readers owing to their ignorance of the geography, I will try to convey briefly to them an idea of the natural advantages and exact position of the places referred to. 42. Sicily, then, as a whole occupies the same position with regard to Italy and its extremity that the Peloponnese occupies with regard to the rest of Greece and its extremity, the difference lying in this, that the Peloponnese is a peninsula whereas Sicily is an island, the communication being in the one case by land and in the other by sea. Sicily is triangular in shape, the apices of all three angles being formed by capes. The cape that looks to the south and stretches out into the Sicilian Sea is called Pachynus, that on the north forms the extremity of the western coast of the Strait; it is about twelve stades distant from Italy and is called Pelorias. The third looks towards Africa itself, and is favourably situated as a base for attacking the promontories in front of Carthage, from which it is distant about one thousand stades. It is turned to the south-west, separating the Libyan from the Sardinian Sea, and its name is Lilybaeum. On the cape stands the city of the same name, of which the Romans were now opening the siege. It is excellently defended both by walls and by a deep moat all round, and on the
πέριξ τάφρω βαθεία καὶ τενάγεσιν ἐκ θαλάττης, δι’ ὧν ἔστων εἰς τοὺς λιμένας εἰσπλοῦσ πολλῆς δεόμενος ἐμπειρίας καὶ συνηθείας.

8 Ταύτῃ δὲ προσστρατοπεδεύσαντες εξ ἐκατέρου μέρους οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι καὶ τείχει διαλαβόντες, ἢρξαντο προσάγειν ἔργα κατὰ τὸν ἐγγίστα κείμενον τῆς θαλάττης πύργων ὡς πρὸς τὸ Διβυκὸν πέλαγος. προσκατασκευάζοντες δ’ ἄεὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις καὶ παρεκτείνοντες τῶν ἔργων τὰς κατασκευὰς, τέλος εξ πύργους τοὺς συνεχεῖς τῷ προειρήματι κατέβαλον, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς πάντας ἀμα κρισοκοπεῖς ἐνεχείρησαν. γενομένης δ’ ἐνεργοῦ καὶ καταπληκτικῆς τῆς πολιορκίας, καὶ τῶν πύργων τῶν μὲν ποιούντων ἀν’ ἐκάστην ἡμέραν, τῶν δ’ ἐρειπομένων, ἀμα δὲ 11 καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἐπιβαινόντων ἄεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐντὸς τῆς πόλεως, ἢν ἰσχυρὰ διατροπή καὶ κατάπληξις παρὰ τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις, καίπερ ὄντων ἐν τῇ πόλει χωρίς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν τῶν 12 μισθοφόρων εἰς μυρίους, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὁ γε στρατηγὸς αὐτῶν Ἰμιλίκων οὐδὲν παρελείπε τῶν δυνάτων, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀντουκοδομῶν, τὰ δ’ ἀντιμεταλλεύων οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχε τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.

13 ἔτι δὲ καθ’ ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἐπιπορευόμενος καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἔγχειρῶν, εἰ πως δύνατο πῦρ ἐμβαλεῖν, πολλοὺς ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ μέρους καὶ παραβόλοις ἁγώνας δὴ συνίστατο καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτωρ, οὕτω πλεῖος ἐνιότε ψινεσθαί νεκροὺς ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συμπλοκαῖς τῶν εἰωθότων πίπτειν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεις.

43 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καίρους τούτους τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς τῶν τὰς μεγίστας χώρας ἔχοντων ἐν τοῖς μι-
side facing the sea by shoaly water, the passage through which into the harbour requires great skill and practice.

The Romans encamped on either side of the city, fortifying the space between their camps with a trench, a stockade, and a wall. They then began to throw up works against the tower that lay nearest the sea on the Libyan side, and, gradually advancing from the base thus acquired and extending their works, they succeeded at last in knocking down the six adjacent towers, and attacked all the others at once with battering rams. The siege was now so vigorously pursued and so terrifying, each day seeing some of the towers shaken or demolished and the enemy's works advancing further and further into the city, that the besieged were thrown into a state of utter confusion and panic, although, besides the civil population, there were nearly ten thousand mercenaries in the town. Their general, Himilco, however, omitted no means of resistance in his power, and by counter-building and counter-mining caused the enemy no little difficulty. Every day he would advance and make attempts on the siege works, trying to succeed in setting them on fire, and with this object was indeed engaged by night and day in combats of so desperate a character, that at times more men fell in these encounters than usually fall in a pitched battle.

43. About this time some of the superior officers in the mercenary force, after talking the
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στοφόρους, συλλαλήσαντες έαυτοίς ύπερ τοῦ τήν πόλιν ένδουναι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ πεπεισμένοι πειθαρχήσειν σφίσι τοὺς ύποτεταγμένους, ἐξεπήδησαν νυκτὸς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ διελέγοντο τῷ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγῷ περὶ τούτων. ὁ δὲ Ἀχαῖος Ἀλέξων, ὁ καὶ τοῖς Ἀκραγαντίνοις κατὰ τοὺς ἔπανω χρόνους αὐτίς γενόμενος τῆς σωτηρίας, καθ’ ὅν καίρον ἐπεβάλλοντο παρασπονδεῖν αὐτοὺς οἱ τῶν Συρακουσίων μυσθοφόροι, καὶ τότε πρῶτος συνεῖς τῷ πρᾶξιν ἀνήγγειλε τῷ στρατηγῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. ὁ δὲ διακόουσα παραχρήμα συνήγη τοὺς καταλειπομένους τῶν ἥγεμόνων, καὶ παρεκάλει μετὰ δήησεως, μεγάλας δωρεὰς καὶ χάριτας ὑπισχυόμενοι, έαν ἐμμείνωσι τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν πίστει καὶ μὴ κοινωνήσωσι τοῖς ἐξεληλυθόσι.

3 τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. δεχομένων δὲ προθύμως τοὺς λόγους, εὑθέως μετ’ αὐτῶν ἀπέστειλε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς Κελτοὺς Ἀννίβαν τὸν υἱὸν τὸν Ἀννίβου τοῦ μεταλλάξαντος ἐν Σαρδώνι διὰ τὴν προγεγεννημένην ἐν τῇ στρατείᾳ πρὸς αὐτοὺς συνήθειαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἅλλους μυσθοφόρους Ἀλέξωνα διὰ τὴν παρ’ ἐκείνου νοις ἀποδοχῆν αὐτοῦ καὶ πίστιν οἱ καὶ συναγαγόντες τὰ πλῆθη καὶ παρακαλέσαντες, ἐτι δὲ πιστωσάμενοι τὰς προτεινομένας ἐκάστους δωρεὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ῥαδίως ἔπεισαν αὐτοὺς μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. διὸ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, τῶν ἐκπειθήσαντων ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐρχομένων πρὸς τὰ τείχη, καὶ βουλομένων παρακαλέσως καὶ λέγειν τι περὶ τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπαγγελλας, οὐχ οἷον προσεῖχον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς οὖν ἀκούειν ἤξίων, βάλλοντες δὲ τοῖς λόθιοι καὶ συνακοντύζοντες ἀπεδώξαν ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους. Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν οὖν διὰ τὰς προειρή-
matter over among themselves and in the full conviction that their subordinates would obey them, escaped from the town by night to the Roman camp and made proposals to the Consul for the surrender of the city. But the Achaean Alexon, who had on a former occasion saved the Agrigentines, when the Syracusan mercenaries had formed a project of breaking faith with them, was now too the first to get wind of what was going on and informed the Carthaginian general. Himilco on hearing of it at once summoned the remaining officers and urgently implored their aid, promising them lavish gifts and favours if they remained loyal to him and refused to participate in the plot of those who had left the city. On their readily consenting, he bade them return at once to their troops, sending with them to the Celts Hannibal, the son of that Hannibal who died in Sardinia, as they had served under him and were well acquainted with him, while to the other mercenaries he sent Alexon, owing to his popularity and credit with them. They called a meeting of the soldiery and partly by entreating them, partly moreover by assuring them that each man would receive the bounty the general had offered, easily persuaded them to bide by their engagements. So, afterwards, when the officers who had quitted the city advanced openly to the walls and attempted to entreat them and tell them of the promises made by the Romans, not only did they pay no attention but would not lend ear to them at all, and chased them away from the wall with stones and other missiles. The Carthaginians, then, for the above reasons very
μένας αὐτίας παρὰ μικρὸν ἦλθον ἀπολέσαι τὰ πράγματα, παρασπονδηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων. Ἀλέξων δὲ πρὸτερον Ἀκραγαντίνοις ἐσώσε διὰ τὴν πίστιν οὐ μόνον τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν ἔλευθερίαν, τότε δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι αὐτίος ἐγένετο τοῦ μὴ σφαλήναι τοῖς ὀλίσθαι.

44 Οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Καρχηδόνι τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν εἰ- δότες, συλλογιζόμενοι δὲ τάς ἐν ταῖς πολιορκίαις χρείας, πληρώσαντες στρατιωτῶν πεντήκοντα ναῦς, καὶ παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς ἀρμόζουσι λόγοις τῆς πράξεως, τὸν ἐπὶ τούτους τεταγμένον Ἀμίλιαν, δὲ ἦν Ἀμίλικον μὲν ύπό, τριήμαρχος δὲ καὶ φίλος Ἀτάρβου πρώτος, ἐξαπέστειλαν κατὰ σπουδῆν, ἐντελώς μὴ καταμελήσας, χρησάμενον δὲ σὺν καιρῷ 2 τῇ τόλμῃ βοηθήσαι τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις. οἱ δὲ ἀν- αχθεῖς μετὰ μυρίων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ καθορισθεῖς ἐν ταῖς καλουμέναις Αἰγοῦσαις, μεταξὺ δὲ κειμέ- ναις Λιυβαῖου καὶ Καρχηδόνος, ἐπετηρεὶ τὸν πλοῦν. 3 λαβὼν δὲ οὐρίνων καὶ λαμπρὸν ἄνεμων, ἐκπετάσας πᾶσι τοῖς ἀρμόνοις καὶ κατούρωσας ἐπὶ αὐτὸ τὸ στόμα τοῦ λιμένος ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν, ἔχων καθ- ωπλυσμένους καὶ πρὸς μάχην ἑτοίμους τοὺς ἀνδρασ 4 ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, τὰ μὲν αἰφνιδίου γενομένης τῆς ἐπιφανείας, τὰ δὲ φο- βούμενοι μὴ σὺν τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑπὸ τῆς βίας τοῦ πνεύματος συγκατενεχθῶσιν εἰς τὸν λιμένα τῶν ὑπεναντῶν, τὸ μὲν διακωλύει τὸν ἑπίπλουν τῆς βοηθείας ἀπέγγυσαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θαλάττης ἐστησαν 5 καταπεπληγμένου τῆς τῶν πολεμίων τόλμαν. τὸ δ’ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος ἱθρουσμένον ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη πάν ἀμα μὲν ἡγουμία τὸ συμβησόμενον, ἂμα δ’ ἐπὶ 122
narrowly escaped a complete disaster due to the treachery of their mercenaries, and Alexon, who had previously saved by his loyalty not only the city and district but the laws and liberties of Agrigentum, now was the cause of the Carthaginians being saved from total ruin.

44. The Carthaginian government knew nothing of all this, but calculating the requirements of a besieged town, they filled fifty ships with troops. After addressing the soldiers in terms befitting the enterprise, they sent them off at once under the command of Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, trierarch and most intimate friend of Adherbal, with orders not to delay, but at the first opportunity to make a bold attempt to relieve the besieged. Setting sail with ten thousand troops on board, he came to anchor off the islands called Aegusae, which lie between Lilybaeum and Carthage, and there awaited favourable weather. As soon as he had a fine stern breeze he hoisted all sail and running before the wind sailed straight for the mouth of the harbour, his men drawn up on deck armed ready for action. The Romans, partly owing to the suddenness of the fleet's appearance and partly because they feared being carried into the hostile harbour by the force of the wind together with their enemies, made no effort to prevent the entrance of the relieving force, but stood out at sea amazed at the audacity of the Carthaginians. The whole population had assembled on the walls in an agony of suspense on the one hand as to what would happen, and at the same time so overjoyed at the unexpected prospect of
τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς ἐλπίδος ὑπερχαρέσ ὑπάρχον μετὰ κρότου καὶ κραυγῆς παρεκάλει τοὺς εἰσπλέοντας. 6 Ἀννίβας δὲ παραβόλως καὶ τεθαρρηκότως εἰσδραμὼν καὶ καθορμισθεὶς εἰς τὸν λυμέα μετ᾿ ἀσφαλείας ἀπεβίβασε τοὺς στρατιώτας. οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει πάντες οὗς οὕτως ἦσαν ἔπι τῇ τῆς βοηθείας παρουσίᾳ περιχαρείς, καὶ περί μεγάλην ἐλπίδα καὶ κέρα προσεληφότες, ὡς ἔπι τῷ μή τετολμηκεναι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους κωλύσαι τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

45 Ἕμιλκων δ’ ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως στρατηγοῦς, θεωρῶν τὴν ὀρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν τῶν μὲν εἰ τῇ πόλει διὰ τὴν παρουσίαν τῆς βοηθείας, τῶν δὲ παραγεγονότων διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν περιεστώτων κακῶν, βουλόμενος ἀκεραίοις ἀποχρήσασθαι ταῖς ἐκατέρων ὀρμαίς πρὸς τὴν διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐπίθεσιν τοῖς ἔργοις, συνήγα γὰρ πάντας εἰς ἐκκλησίαν.

3 παρακαλέσας δὲ τῷ καυρῷ τὰ πρόσοντα διὰ πλείονον, καὶ παραστήσας ὀρμὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων τοῖς κατ’ ἴδιαν ἀνδραγαθήσας καὶ τὰς κατὰ κοινὸν ἐσομένας χάριτας αὐτοῖς καὶ δωρεάς παρὰ Καρχηδονίων, ὀμοθυμαδὸν ἐπισημαινομένων καὶ βοώτων μὴ μέλλειν, ἀλλ’ ἄγεις αὐτοῖς, τότε μὲν ἐπαινέσας καὶ δεξάμενος τὴν προθυμίαν ἀφῆκε, παραγγείλας ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ἐν πραξιᾷ καὶ πεθαρχεῖν τοὺς ἡγουμένους. 4 καὶ ὁ ἡρωικὸς παρὰ Καρχηδονίων, ὀμοθυμαδὸν ἐπισημαινομένων καὶ βοώτων μὴ μέλλειν, ἀλλ’ ἄγεις αὐτοῖς, τότε μὲν ἐπαινέσας καὶ δεξάμενος τὴν προθυμίαν ἀφῆκε, παραγγείλας ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ἐν πραξιᾷ καὶ πεθαρχεῖν τοὺς ἡγουμένους. 5 καὶ ὁ ἡρωικὸς παρὰ Καρχηδονίων, ὀμοθυμαδὸν ἐπισημαινομένων καὶ βοώτων μὴ μέλλειν, ἀλλ’ ἄγεις αὐτοῖς, τότε μὲν ἐπαινέσας καὶ δεξάμενος τὴν προθυμίαν ἀφῆκε, παραγγείλας ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ἐν πραξιᾷ καὶ πεθαρχεῖν τοὺς ἡγουμένους.
succour that they kept on encouraging the fleet as it sailed in by cheers and clapping of hands. Hannibal, having entered the harbour in this hazardous and daring manner, anchored and disembarked his troops in security. All those in the city were delighted not so much at the arrival of the relief, although their prospects were much improved and their force increased thereby, as at the fact that the Romans had not ventured to try to prevent the Carthaginians from sailing in.

45. Himilco, the commander of the garrison, seeing that all were full of spirit and confidence, the original garrison owing to the arrival of relief, and the newcomers owing to their ignorance as yet of the perilous situation, desired to avail himself of this fresh spirit in the ranks and make another attempt to fire the enemy's works. He therefore summoned the soldiers to a general assembly, and addressing them at some length in words suitable to the occasion, roused them to great enthusiasm by his lavish promises of reward to those who distinguished themselves personally, and his assurance that the force as a whole would be duly recompensed by the Government. On their all applauding him and shouting to him not to delay but to lead them on at once, he dismissed them for the present after praising them and expressing his pleasure at their eagerness, ordering them to retire to rest early and obey their officers. Soon afterwards he summoned the commanding officers and assigned to each his proper place in the assault, giving them the watchword and informing them of the hour. He ordered all the commanders with the whole of their forces to be on the spot at the morning
6 ἐωθυνής εἶναι φυλακῆς. τῶν δὲ πεθαρχησάντων, ἐξαγαγών τὴν δύναμιν ἄμα τῷ φωτὶ κατὰ πλείους
7 τόπους ἐνεχείρει τοῖς ἔργοις. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι διὰ τὸ προορᾶσθαι τὸ μέλλον οὐκ ἀργῶς οὐδ’ ἀπαρα-
σκεύως εἶχον, ἀλλ’ ἐτοίμως ἐβοήθουν πρὸς τὸ δεό-
μενον καὶ διεμάχοντο τοῖς πολεμίωις ἐρρωμένως.
8 πάντων δὲ ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ συμπεσόντων ἄλληλοις
ἡν ἀγών παράβολος πέριξ τοῦ τείχους. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἦσαν οὐκ ἐλάττους δισμυρίων, οἱ
9 δ’ ἐξωθέν ἔτι πλείους τούτων. οὕς δὲ συνέβαινε
τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐκτὸς τάξεως ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην ἀνα-
μίξει κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν προαρέσεις, τοσοῦτῳ λαμπρό-
tερος ἦν ὁ κίνδυνος, ὡς ἂν ἐκ τοσοῦτον πλήθους
κατ’ ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ ἱκνόν οἶον εἰ μονομαχικῆς συν-
estώσης περὶ τοὺς ἁγωνιζομένους τῆς φιλοτιμίας.
10 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἡ τε κρανῇ καὶ τὸ σύστρεμμα δια-
11 φέρον ἦν πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔργοις. οἱ γὰρ ἀρχήθεν
ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τούτῳ παρ’ ἀμφοῖν ταχθέντες, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ
τῷ πρέψασθαι τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ
προέσθαι ταῦτα, τηλικαύτην ἐποιοῦντο φιλοτιμίαν
καὶ σπουδήν, οἱ μὲν ἐξώσαντες σπεύδοντες, οἱ δ’ οὐ-
dαμῶς εἶξαν τούτους τολμῶντες, <ὡστε> διὰ τὴν
12 προθυμίαν τέλος ἐν αὐταῖς μένοντες ταῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς
χώρας ἀπέθυγκαν. οἱ γε, μὴν ἄμα τούτους
ἀναμεμγμένους, δᾶδα καὶ στυππίον καὶ πῦρ ἔχοντες,
οὕτω τολμηρῶς καὶ πανταχόθεν ἄμα προσπιτῶντες
ἐνέβαλλον ταῖς μηχαναῖς ὡστε τοὺς Ῥωμαίους εἰς
tὸν ἐσχατὸν παραγενέσθαι κίνδυνον, μὴ διώμε-
13 νους κατακρατῆσαι τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιβολῆς. ὁ
dὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς, θεωρῶν ἐν μὲν τῷ
κίνδυνῳ πολλοὺς ἀποθνῄσκοντας, οὐ δ’ ἐνεκα ταῦτ’
watch, and his orders having been executed, he led the whole force out as it was getting light and attacked the works in several places. The Romans, who had foreseen what was coming, were not idle or unprepared, but promptly ran to defend the threatened points and opposed a vigorous resistance to the enemy. Soon the whole of both forces were engaged, and a desperate fight was going on all round the walls, the salliers numbering not less than twenty thousand and the force outside being rather more numerous. Inasmuch as they were fighting confusedly and in no order, each man as he thought best, the battle was all the more fierce, such a large force being engaged man to man and company to company, so that there was something of the keenness of single combat in the whole contest. It was, however, particularly at the siege-works themselves that there was most shouting and pressure. For those on both sides whose task from the outset was on the one hand to drive the defenders from the works, and on the other not to abandon them, exhibited such emulation and resolution, the assailants doing their very best to turn the Romans out, and the latter refusing to give way, that at last owing to this resolute spirit the men remained and fell on the spot where they had first stood. Yet, in spite of all, the bearers of pine-brands, tow, and fire intermingled with the combatants, attacked the engines from every side, hurling the burning matter at them with such pluck that the Romans were in the utmost peril, being unable to master the onset of the enemy. But the Carthaginian general, observing that many were falling in the battle, and that his object of
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ἐπραττεν, οὐ δυναμένους κρατῆσαι τῶν ἑργῶν,
ἀνακαλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἔαυτοῦ παρῆγγειλε τοῖς σαλπι-σταῖς. οὐ δὲ Ρωμαίοι παρ᾽ οὐδὲν ἐλθόντες τοῦ
πάσας ἀποβαλεῖν τὰς παρασκευὰς, τέλος ἐκράτησαν
τῶν ἑργῶν καὶ πάντα διετήρησαν ἀσφαλῶς. ὁ
μὲν οὖν Ἀμώβας μετὰ τὴν χρείαν ταύτην ἐξ-
ἐπλευσε νῦκτωρ ἐτί μετὰ τῶν νεῶν λαθῶν τοὺς
πολεμίους εἰς τὰ Δρέπανα πρὸς Ἀτάρβαν τὸν τῶν
2 Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸν. διὰ γὰρ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν
τοῦ τόπου καὶ τὸ κάλλος τοῦ περὶ τὰ Δρέπανα λυ-
μένος ἂεὶ μεγάλην ἐποιοῦντο σπουδὴν οὐ Καρχηδό-
3 νοι περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν αὐτοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦ
Λιμυβαίου τοῦτον ἀπέχει τῶν τόπων ὡς ἂν ἔκατον
καὶ εἰκοσι στάδια.

4 Τοῖς δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Καρχηδόνι βουλομένους μὲν εἴδεναι
τὰ περὶ τὸς Λιμυβαίου, οὐ δυναμένους δὲ διὰ τὸ
τοὺς μὲν συγκεκλείσθαι, τοὺς δὲ παραφυλάττεθαι
φιλοτίμως, ἐπηγγείλατο τις ἀνὴρ τῶν ἐνδόξων,
Ἀμώβας ἐπικαλούμενος Ῥόδιος, εἰσπλεῦσας εἰς
tὸ Λιμυβαίον καὶ γενόμενος αὐτόπτης ἄπαντα
διασαφήσεων. οὐ δὲ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας μὲν ἀσμέ-
νως ἦκουσαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπίστευσαν γε διὰ τὸ τῷ στόλῳ
τοὺς Ρωμαίους ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἐσπλοῦν στόμα-
6 τοῖς ἐφορμεῖν. οὐ δὲ καταρτίσας τὴν ἰδίαν ναῦν ἀν-
ήχθη: καὶ διάρας εἰς τινὰ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ Λιμυβαίου
κειμένων νῆσων, τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἱμέρα λαβῶν εὐ-
καίρως ἀνεμον οὕρον περὶ τετάρτην ἄραν ἀπάν-
tῶν τῶν πολεμίων ὀρόντων καὶ καταπεπληγμένων
7 τὴν τόλμην εἰσέπλευσε. καὶ τὴν κατόπιν εὐθέως
8 ἐγίνετο περὶ ἀναγωγῆν. οὐ δὲ τῶν Ρωμαίων στρα-
τηγὸς βουλομένος ἐπιμελέστερον τὸν κατὰ τὸν εἰσ-
πλοῦν τόπον τηρεῖν, ἐξηρτυκώς ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ δέκα
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taking the works was not being attained, ordered his trumpeters to sound the retreat. Thus the Romans who had come very near losing all their siege-material, at length were masters of their works, and remained in secure possession of them.

46. As for Hannibal he sailed out after the action while it was still night, unobserved by the enemy, and proceeded to Drepana to meet the Carthaginian commander there, Adherbal. Owing to the convenient situation of Drepana and the excellency of its harbour, the Carthaginians had always given great attention to its protection. The place lies at a distance of about a hundred and twenty stades from Lilybaeum.

The Carthaginians at home wishing to know what was happening at Lilybaeum, but being unable to do so as their own forces were shut up in the town and the Romans were active in their vigilance, one of their leading citizens, Hannibal, surnamed the Rhodian, offered to sail into Lilybaeum and make a full report from personal observation. They listened to his offer eagerly, but did not believe he could do this, as the Romans were anchored outside the mouth of the port. But after fitting out his own ship, he set sail, and crossed to one of the islands that lie before Lilybaeum, and next day finding the wind happily favourable, sailed in at about ten o’clock in the morning in full sight of the enemy who were thunderstruck by his audacity. Next day he at once made preparations for departure, but the Roman general, with the view of guarding the entrance more carefully, had fitted out in the night
naüs tás ἀριστα πλεούσας, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ λιμένος ἐστῶς ἐθεώρει τὸ συμβαίνον, ὄμοιως δὲ καὶ 9 πάν τὸ στρατόπεδον· αἳ δὲ νῆς τοῦ στόματος ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν μερῶν, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἦν δυνατὸν ἐγχυστα τοῖς τενάγεσι προσάγειν, ἐπείχουν, ἐπτερωκυίαι πρὸς τὴν ἐμβολὴν καὶ σύλληψιν τῆς ἐκπλείως μελλοῦσης 10 νεώς. ὃ δὲ Ῥόδιος ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ποιησάμενος οὕτως κατανέστη τῶν πολεμίων τῇ τε τόλμῃ καὶ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν ὢστ’ οὐ μόνον ἄρωτον ἐξέπλευσε τὴν ναῦν ἑχθὼν καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρας, οἶνον ἐστώτα παραδραμών τὰ σκάφη τῶν ὑπ.

11 εναντίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ βραχὺ προπλεύσας ἐπέστη περώσας τὴν ναῦν, ὡς ἂν εἰ προκαλούμενοι τοὺς 12 πολεμίους. οὐδενὸς δὲ τολμῶντος ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἀντανάγεσθαι διὰ τὸ τάχος τῆς εἰρεσίας, ἀπέπλευσε καταναστάς μιᾷ νηὶ παντὸς τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων στόλου.

13 καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἥδη πλεονάκης ποιῶν ταῦτο τοῦτο μεγάλην χρεῖαν παρεῖχετο, τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίους ἄει τὰ κατεπείγοντα διασαφῶν, τοὺς δὲ πολιορκουμένους εὐθαρσεῖς παρασκευάζων, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους 47 καταπληττόμενος τῷ παραβόλω. μέγιστα δὲ συνεβάλλετο πρὸς τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ τὸ διὰ τῶν προβραχέων ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἀκριβῶς σεσημεῖοθαν τὸν 2 εἰσπλουν· ὑπεράρας γὰρ καὶ φανόμενος ἐπειτ’ ἄν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν μερῶν ἔλαμβανε τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης πῦργον κατὰ πρῶραν οὕτως ὡστε τοῖς πρὸς τὴν Λιβύην τετραμμένους πῦργους τῆς πόλεως ἐπιπροσθεῖν ἄπασιν· δι’ οὗ τρόπου μόνως ἐστὶ δυνατὸν ἐξ οὐρίας τοῦ κατὰ τὸν εἰσπλοῦν στόματος 3 εὐστοχεῖν. τῇ δὲ τοῦ Ῥωμίων τόλμη πιστεύσαντες καὶ πλείους ἀπεδάρρησαν τῶν εἰδότων τοὺς τόπους τὸ παραπλήσιον ποιεῖν· εἷς ὡς ὁ Ῥωμαῖοι δυσχρη-
ten of his fastest ships, and now he himself and his whole army stood by the harbour waiting to see what would happen. The ships were waiting on either side of the entrance as near as the shoals would allow them to approach, their oars out and ready to charge and capture the ship that was about to sail out. But the "Rhodian," getting under weigh in the sight of all, so far outbraved the Romans by his audacity and speed that not only did he bring his ship and her whole crew out unhurt, passing the enemy's ships just as if they were motionless, but after sailing on a short way, he pulled up without shipping his oars as if to challenge the enemy, and no one venturing to come out against him owing to the speed of his rowing, he sailed off, after thus having with one ship successfully defied the whole Roman fleet. After this he several times performed the same feat and was of great service by continuing to report at Carthage the news of most urgent importance, while at the same time he kept up the spirits of the besieged and struck terror into the Romans by his venturesomeness. 47. What tended most to give him confidence was that from experience he had accurately noted the course to be followed through the shoals in entering. For as soon as he had crossed and come into view, he would get the sea-tower on the Italian side on his bows so that it covered the whole line of towers turned towards Africa; and this is the only way that a vessel running before the wind can hit the mouth of the harbour in entering. Several others who had local knowledge, gaining confidence from the "Rhodian's" audacity, undertook to do the same, and in consequence the Romans, to whom this was a
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στούμενοι τῷ συμβαίνοντι χωννύειν τὸ στόμα τοῦ
4 λιμένος ἐπεχείρησαν. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ πλείστον
μέρος τῆς ἑπιβολῆς οὐδὲν ἦννυν διὰ τὸ βάθος τῆς
θαλάττης καὶ διὰ τὸ μηθὲν δύνασθαι τῶν ἐμβαλλο-
μένων στήναι μηδὲ συμμείναι τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τε τοῦ κλύδωνος καὶ τῆς τοῦ ῥοῦ βιάς τὸ
ριπτούμενον εὐθέως ἐν τῇ καταφορᾷ παρωθεῖσθαι
5 καὶ διασκορπίζεσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τίνα τόπον ἔχοντα
βραχέα συνεστή χώμα μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας,
ἐφ' ὃ τετρήρης ἐκτρέχουσα νυκτὸς ἐκάθισε καὶ τοῖς
πολεμίοις ὑποχείριοι ἐγένετο, διαφέρουσα τῇ κατα-
6 σκεύῃ τῆς ναυπηγίας. ἦς οἱ 'Ῥωμαίοι κρατήσαντες
καὶ πληρώματι καταρτίσαντες ἐπιλέκτω, πάντας
7 τοὺς εἰσπλέοντας, μάλιστα δὲ τὸν 'Ῥόδιον, ἐπετή-
ροῦν. ὥς δὲ κατὰ τύχην εἰσπλέοντας νυκτὸς μετὰ
ταῦτα πάλιν ἀνήγετο φανερῶς. θεωρῶν δ' ἐκ
καταβολῆς αὐτῶ τὴν τετρήρη συνεξορμήσασαν,
8 γνῶν τὴν ναῦν διετράπη. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον
ἀρμῆσεν ὡς καταταχῆσων τῇ δὲ τοῦ πληρώματος
παραπεκύνα καταλαμβανόμενος, τέλος ἐπιστρέψας
9 ἡναγκάσθη συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις. καταπροτε-
ρούμενος δὲ τοὺς ἐπιβατικοὺς διὰ τε τὸ πλῆθος καὶ
dia τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐγένετο τοῖς ἔχθροῖς
10 ὑποχείριοι. οἱ δὲ ἉΡωμαίοι, κυριεύσαντες καὶ
tαύτης τῆς νεώς εὗ κατεπεκενασμένης, καὶ καταρτί-
sαντες αὐτὴν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, οὕτως ἐκώλυθαν
tοὺς κατατολμῶντας καὶ πλέοντας εἰς τὸ Διλύ-
βαιον.

48 Τῶν δὲ πολυορκουμένων ταῖς μὲν ἀντοικοδομίαις
ἐνεργῶς χρωμένων, τοῦ δὲ λυμαϊνόσθαι καὶ δια-
φθείρειν τὰς τῶν ὑπεναντίων παρασκευασάν ἀπεγγνω-
2 κότων, γίνεται τις ἀνέμου στάσις ἑξουσα τηλικαύτην
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great annoyance, tried to fill up the mouth of the harbour. For the most part indeed their attempt was resultless, both owing to the depth of the sea, and because none of the stuff that they threw in would remain in its place or hold together in the least, but all they shot in used to be at once shifted and scattered as it was sinking to the bottom, by the surge and the force of the current. However, in one place where there were shoals a solid bank was formed at the cost of infinite pains, and on this a four-banked ship which was coming out at night grounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. This ship was of remarkably fine build, and the Romans, after capturing it and manning it with a select crew, kept watch for all the blockade-runners and especially for the "Rhodian." It so happened that he had sailed in that very night, and was afterwards sailing out quite openly, but, on seeing the four-banked vessel putting out to sea again together with himself and recognizing it, he was alarmed. At first he made a spurt to get away from it, but finding himself overhauled owing to the good oarsmanship of its crew he had at length to turn and engage the enemy. Being no match for the boarders, who were numerous and all picked men, he fell into the enemy's hands. His ship was, like the other, very well built, and the Romans when they were in possession of her fitted her out too for this special service and so put a stop to all this venturesome blockade-running at Lilybaeum.

48. The besieged were still counterbuilding energetically though they had renounced their effort to spoil or destroy the enemy's works, when there arose a turbulent storm of wind, blowing with
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βίαν καὶ φορὰν εἰς αὐτὸς τὰς τῶν μηχανημάτων προσαγωγὰς ὡστε καὶ τὰς στοὰς διασαλεύειν καὶ τοὺς προκειμένους τούτων πύργους τῇ βίᾳ βαστά-3 ξειν. ἐν ὅ καιρῷ συννοήσαντες τινες τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν μισθοφόρων τὴν ἐπιτηδείατη τῆς περιστά-σεως πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἔργων διαφθοράν προσφέρουσι
4 τῷ στρατηγῷ τῆς ἐπίνοιαν. τοῦ δὲ δεξαμενοῦ καὶ ταχέως ἐτοιμάσαντος πάν τὸ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἁρμό-ζον, συντραφέντες οἱ νεανίσκοι κατά τριττοὺς τό-5 πους ἐνέβαλον πῦρ τοῖς ἔργοις. ὡς δὲ ἄν τῶν μὲν κατασκευασμάτων διὰ τὸν χρόνον εὐ παρεσκευα-σμένων πρὸς τὸ βαδίως ἐμπρησθῆναι, τῆς δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος βίας φυσώσῃ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν πῦργων καὶ μηχανημάτων, τὴν μὲν νομὴν τοῦ πυρὸς ἐνεργοῦ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι καὶ πρακτικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἐπάρ-κειαν καὶ βοήθειαν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις εἰς τέλος ἀπρα-
6 κτον καὶ δυσχερῆ. τουαῦτην γὰρ ἐκπλήξειν παρίστα τὸ συμβαίνον τοῖς βοηθοῦσιν ὡστε μῆτε συννοῆσαι μῆτε συνιδεῖν δύνασθαι τὸ γινόμενον, ἀλλά ἀπο-σκοτουμένους ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς αὐτοὺς φερομένης λυγύους καὶ τῶν φεβαλύων, ἐτι δὲ τῆς τοῦ καπνοῦ πολυ-πληθίας, οὐκ ὄλιγους ἀπόλλυσαι καὶ πῖπτειν, μὴ δυναμένους ἐγγίσαι πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς βοή-
7 θειαν. ὅσον δὲ μειζὼν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν δυσ-
χρηστίαν περὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους διὰ τὰς προερη-
μένας αὐτίας, τοσοῦτοι πλεῖον εὐχρηστία περὶ τοὺς
8 ἐνείνας ἥν τὸ πῦρ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπισκοπὸν καὶ βλάπτειν δυνάμενον πάν εξεφυσάτο καὶ προσωθεῖτο κατὰ τῶν ὑπεναντίων, τὸ δὲ βαλλόμενον ἥ ριπτοῦ-
μενον ἐπὶ τε τοὺς βοηθοῦντας καὶ τὴν τῶν ἔργων διαφθοράν εὐστοχον μὲν ἐπεγίνετο διὰ τὸ συνορᾶν τοὺς ἀφιέντας τὸν πρὸ αὐτῶν τόπον, πρακτικῶν δὲ

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such violence and fury on the actual apparatus for advancing the engines, that it shook the protecting sheds from their foundations and carried away the wooden towers in front of these by its force. During the gale it struck some of the Greek mercenaries that here was an admirable opportunity for destroying the works, and they communicated their notion to the general, who approved it and made all suitable preparations for the enterprise. The soldiers in several bodies threw fire on the works at three separate points. The whole apparatus being old and readily inflammable, and the wind blowing very strongly on the actual towers and engines, the action of the flames as they spread was most effective, whereas the efforts of the Romans to succour and save the works were quite the reverse, the task being most difficult. The defenders were indeed so terrified by the outbreak that they could neither realize nor understand what was happening, but half blinded by the flames and sparks that flew in their faces and by the dense smoke, many of them succumbed and fell, unable even to get near enough to combat the actual conflagration. The difficulties that the enemy encountered for these various reasons were immense, while the exertions of the incendiaries were correspondingly facilitated. Everything that could blind or injure the enemy was blown into flame and pushed at them, missiles and other objects hurled or discharged to wound the rescuers or to destroy the works being easily aimed because the throwers could see in front
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διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι σφοδρὰν τὴν πληγήν, συνεργοῦσθις
9 τοῖς βάλλουσι τῆς τοῦ πνεῦματος βίας. τὸ δὲ πέρας
tοιαύτην συνέβη γενέσθαι τὴν παντελείαν τῆς κατα-
θθορᾶς ὡστε καὶ τὰς βάσεις τῶν πύργων καὶ τὰ
10 στύπτη τῶν κριῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀνχρεωθήναι. τού-
tων δὲ συμβάντων, τὸ μὲν ἐτι διὰ τῶν ἐργῶν πο-
lιορκεῖν ἀπέγνωσαν οἱ 'Ρωμαίοι: περιταφρεύσαντες
de καὶ χάρακι περιλαβόντες κύκλῳ τὴν πόλιν, ἐτι
de τῆς ἱδίας στρατοπεδείας τεῖχος προβαλόμενοι, τῷ
11 χρόνῳ παρέδοσαν τὴν πράξειν. οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ Λιλυ-
βαίῳ τὸ πεπτωκός ἔξοικοδομησάμενοι τεῖχος εὐθαρ-
σώς ὑπέμενον ἵδι τὴν πολιορκίαν.

49 Εἰς δὲ τὴν 'Ρώμην προσπεσόντων τούτων, καὶ
μετὰ ταῦτα πλειώνων ἀναγγελλόντων διότι συμβαί-
νει τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου πληρωμάτων τὸ πλεῖστον
μέρος ἐν τε τοῖς ἐργοῖς καὶ τῇ καθόλου πολιορκίᾳ
2 διεφθάρθαι, σπουδὴ κατέγραφον ναύτας, καὶ συναι-
θροίσαντες εἰς μυρίων ἐξέπεμψαν εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν.
3 ὅν διὰ τοῦ πορθμοῦ περαιωθέντων καὶ πεζῇ παρα-
gενομένων εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, συναγαγὼν τοὺς
χιλιάρχους ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν 'Ρωμαίων Πόπλιος
Κλαύδιος ἑφή καρδὸν εἶναι πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ Δρέπανα
4 παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ. τὸν γὰρ στρατηγὸν τῶν Καρχη-
dονίων Ἀτάρβαν τὸν τεταγμένον ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἀπαρά-
sκευον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ἀγνοοῦσα μὲν τὴν
παρουσίαν τῶν πληρωμάτων, πεπεσμένον δὲ μὴ
dύνασθαι πλεῖν τῶν αὐτῶν στόλων διὰ τὴν γεγενημέ-
νην ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ καταθυρῶν τῶν ἀνδρῶν. προ-
5 χείρως δ' αὐτῶν συγκατατιθεμένων, εὐθέως ἐνεβί-
βαζεί τά τε προὐπάρχουτα καὶ τά προσφάτως παρα-
gεγονότα πληρώματα, τοὺς δ' ἐπιβάτας ἐκ παντὸς
ἐπέλεξε τοῦ στρατεύματος ἔθελοντ' τοὺς ἀρίστους,
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of them, while the blows were most effective as the strong wind gave them additional force. At the end the completeness of the destruction was such that the bases of the towers and the posts that supported the battering-rams were rendered useless by the fire. After this the Romans gave up the attempt to conduct the siege by works, and digging a trench and erecting a stockade all round the city, at the same time building a wall round their own encampment, they left the result to time. But the garrison of Lilybaeum rebuilt the fallen portions of the wall and now confidently awaited the issue of the siege.

49. On the news reaching Rome, and on it being reported from various quarters that the greater part of the crews of their fleet had perished in the works or in the siege operations in general, they set about actively enlisting sailors, and when they had collected about ten thousand dispatched them to Sicily. These reinforcements were ferried over the straits and thence proceeded on foot to the camp, where on their arrival the Roman Consul, Publius Claudius Pulcher, called a meeting of the Tribunes and told them that now was the time to attack Drepana with the whole fleet. The Carthaginian general Adherbal who commanded there was, he said, unprepared for such a contingency, as he was ignorant of the arrival of the crews, and convinced that their fleet was unable to take the sea owing to the heavy loss of men in the siege. On the Tribunes readily consenting, he at once embarked the former crews and the new arrivals, and chose for marines the best men in the whole army, who readily volunteered as the
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άτε δὴ τοῦ μὲν πλοῦ δύνεγγυς ὄντος, τῆς δ' ὑφε-
6 λείας ἐτοίμου προφανομένης. ταῦτα δὲ παρα-
σκευασάμενος ἀνήχθη περὶ μέσας νύκτας, λαθὼν τοὺς
πολέμιους. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἀθροὺς ἐπλευ, δεξιάν
7 ἔχων τὴν γῆν. ἀμὰ δὲ τῷ φωτὶ τῶν πρῶτων ἐπὶ
tὰ Δρέπανα νεῶν ἐπιφανομένων, κατιδὼν Ἄτάρ-
βας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐξενίσθη διὰ τὸ παράδοξον. 8
ταχὺ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος, καὶ νοησας τὸν ἐπί-
πλου τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἔκρυε παντὸς ἐργον πεί-
ραιν λαμβάνειν καὶ πάν ὑπομένειν χάριν τοῦ μὴ
περιδεῖν σφᾶς εἰς πρόδηλον συγκλεισθέντας πο-
λιορκίαν. διόπερ εὐθέως τὰ μὲν πληρώματα συν-
10 ἤγε πρὸς τῶν αὐγαλῶν, τοὺς δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
μυθοφόρους ἡθροίζε μετὰ κηρύγματος. τῶν δὲ
συλλεχθέντων, ἐπεβάλετο διὰ βραχέων εἰς ἔννοιαν
αὐτοὺς ἄγες τῆς τε τοῦ νικᾶν ἐλπίδος, ἐὰν τολμή-
σωσι ναυμαχεῖν, καὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ δυσχρη-
11 στίας, ἐὰν καταμελλήσωσι προϊόμενοι τὸν κίνδυ-
νον. ἐτούμως δ' αὐτῶν παρορμηθέντων πρὸς τὴν
ναυμαχίαν, καὶ βοώντων ἄγειν καὶ μὴ μέλλων,
ἐπαινέσας καὶ δεξάμενος τὴν ὀρμὴν παρήγγειλε κατὰ
12 τάχος ἐμβάϊεν, καὶ βλέποντας πρὸς τὴν αὐτὸν
ναῦν ἐπεσθαί τάύτη κατὰ πρύμναν. διασαφῆς
δὲ τὰ προειρημένα κατὰ σπουδὴν πρῶτος ἐποιεῖτο
tὸν ἀνάπλουν, ὅπ' αὐτὰς τὰς πέτρας ἔπι θάτερα
50 μέρη τοῦ λιμένος ἔξαγων τοῦ τῶν πολεμίων εἰσ-
πλου. Πόπλιος δ' ὧ τῶν Ῥωμαιῶν στρατηγός, θεω-
ρῶν τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δόξαν οὔτ'.
2 εἱκοντας οὔτε καταπεπληγμένους τὸν ἐπίπλουν, ἀλλὰ
πρὸς τῷ ναυμαχεῖν ὄντας, τῶν δὲ σφετέρων νεῶν
tὰς μὲν ἐντὸς ἤδη τοῦ λιμένος οὔσας, τὰς δ' ἐν
αὐτῷ τῷ στόματι, τὰς δὲ φερομένας ἐπὶ τὸν εἰσ-
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voyage was but a short one and the prospect of booty seemed certain. After making these preparations he put to sea about midnight unobserved by the enemy, and at first sailed in close order with the land on his right. At daybreak when the leading ships came into view sailing on Drepana, Adherbal was at first taken by surprise at the unexpected sight, but soon recovering his composure and understanding that the enemy had come to attack, he decided to make every effort and incur every sacrifice rather than expose himself to the certainty of a blockade. He therefore at once collected the crews on the beach and summoned by crier the mercenaries from the city. On all being assembled he tried in a few words to impress on their minds the prospect of victory if they risked a battle, and the hardships of a siege should they delay now that they clearly foresaw the danger. Their spirit for the fight was readily aroused, and on their calling on him to lead them on and not delay, he thanked them, praised their zeal, and then ordered them to get on board at once, and keeping their eyes on his ship, to follow in his wake. Having made these orders quite clear to them he quickly got under weigh and took the lead, making his exit close under the rocks on the opposite side of the harbour from that on which the Romans were entering. 50. Publius, the Roman commander, had expected that the enemy would give way and would be intimidated by his attack, but when he saw that on the contrary they intended to fight him, and that his own fleet was partly inside the harbour, partly at the very mouth, and partly still sailing up to enter,
3 πλοὺν, πάσας ἀναστρέφειν παρήγγειλε καὶ ποιεῖ
σθαι τὸν πλοῦν ἔξω πάλιν. ἑνθα δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐν
tῷ λιμένι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὸν εἰσπλοῦν ἐκ τῆς
μεταβολῆς συμπιπτουσῶν, οὐ μόνον θόρυβος ἦν ἐκ
4 τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπλετος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ταρσοὺς ἑθραύ-
ουθ’ αἱ νῆς ἀλλήλαις συγκρούονσαι. ὃμως δ’ οὖν
αἱ τοὺς ἀνατρέχοντες ἐκτάττοντες οἱ τριήμαρχοι
παρ’ αὐτὴν τὴν γῆν ταχέως ἐποίουν ἀντιπρώρρος
5 τοῖς πολεμίοις. ο’ δὲ Πόπλιος αὐτὸς ἐπέπλευ μὲν
ἀρχήθην κατόπιν ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ, τότε δ’ ἐπι-
στρέφας κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος
6 ἑλαβε τὴν εὐώνυμον τῆς ὀλης δυνάμεως τάξιν.
Ἀτάρβας δ’ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ὑπεράρας τὸ
λαίῳ τῶν πολεμίων [Ῥωμαίων], ἔχων πέντε ναῦς
ἐπίπλους, ὑπέστησε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ναῦν ἀντιπρώρρον
7 τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ πέλαγος μέρους·
ἄμα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων αἰε τοῖς συνάπτοναι
8 προσεπιταττομένους ταῦτ’ ποιεῖν παραγγείλας διὰ
tῶν ὑπηρετῶν, καταστάντων δὲ πάντων εἰς μέτω-
πον σημήνας διὰ τῶν συνθημάτων, τὰς μὲν ἄρχας
ἐποιεῖτο τὸν ἐπίπλου ἐν τάξει, μενόντων πρὸς τῇ
9 γῇ τῶν Ῥωμαίων διὰ τὸ προσδέχεσθαι τάς ἐκ τοῦ
λιμένος ἀνατρεχούσας ναύς. ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε με-
51 γάλα τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐλαττωθῆναι πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ γῇ
ποιησαμένους τὴν συμπλοκήν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύνεγγυς
2 αὐτῶν ἦσαν, ἀρθέντων τῶν συνθημάτων ἐφ’ ἐκα-
tέρας τῆς ναυαρχίδος, συνέβαλλον ἀλλήλους. τὸ
μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἱσόρροπος ἦν ὁ κίνδυνος, ὡς ἀν
3 ἀμφοτέρων τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐκ τῆς πεζίκης δυνάμεως
ἐπιβάτων χρωμένων· αἰε δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπερείχον οἱ
4 Καρχηδόνιοι διὰ τὸ πολλά προτερήματα παρ’ ὅλον
ἔχειν τὸν ἀγώνα. τῷ τε γὰρ ταχυναυτεῖν πολὺ
he gave orders for them all to put about and sail out again. On the ships already in the harbour fouling those which were entering owing to their sudden turn there was not only great confusion among the men but the ships had the blades of their oars broken as they came into collision. The captains, however, bringing the ships as they cleared the harbour into line, soon drew them up close to the shore with their prows to the enemy. Publius himself from the start had been bringing up the rear of the entire fleet, and now veering out to sea without stopping his course, took up a position on the extreme left. At the same time Adherbal, outflanking the enemy's left with five beaked ships, placed his own ship facing the enemy from the direction of the open sea. As the other ships came up and joined getting into line, he ordered them by his staff officers to place themselves in the same position as his own, and when they all presented a united front he gave the signal to advance that had been agreed upon and at first bore down in line on the Romans, who kept close to the shore awaiting those of their ships that were returning from the harbour. This position close inshore placed them at a great disadvantage in the engagement. 51. When the two fleets approached each other, the signals for battle were raised on both the admirals, and they closed. At first the battle was equally balanced, as the marines in both fleets were the very best men of their land forces; but the Carthaginians gradually began to get the best of it as they had many advantages throughout the whole struggle. They
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περιήγαν διὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς ναυπηγίας καὶ τὴν τῶν πληρωμάτων ἔξυν, ἢ τε χώρα μεγάλα συνεβάλ- 5 λετ' αὐτοῖς, ἀτε πεποιημένων τὴν ἐκταξιν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸ πέλαγος τῶν. εἴτε γὰρ πιεζοῦτο τινες ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, κατόπιν ἀνεχώρουν ἀσφαλῶς
6 διὰ τὸ ταχυναυτεῖν εἰς τὸν ἀναπεπταμένον τόπου κάπετ' ἐκ μεταβολῆς τοῖς προσπίπτοις τῶν διω- κότων, τοτε μὲν περιπλέοντες, τοτε δὲ πλάγιοι προσπίπτοντες στρεφομένοι καὶ δυσχρηστοῦσι διὰ τὸ βάρος τῶν πλοίων καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν
7 πληρωμάτων ἐμβόλας τε συνεχεῖς ἐδίδοσαν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν σκαφῶν ἐβαπτίζον. εἴτε κυνυνεύοι τις τῶν συμμάχων, ἐτοίμως παρεβοήθουν ἔξω τοῦ δευ- νοῦ καὶ μετ' ἀσφαλείας, παρὰ τὰς πρῦμνας κατὰ
8 τὸ πέλαγος ποιούμενοι τὸν πλοῦν. τοῖς γε μὴν Ἄρμαναῖος τάναντια τούτων συνέβαινε· τοῖς τε γὰρ πιεζομένοις οὖχ ἢν εἰς τούπισθεν δυνατὸν ἀποχω- ρεῖν, πρὸς τῇ γῇ ποιουμένους τὸν κύδυνον, αἰεὶ δὲ τὸ θλιβόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ πρόσωπον σκάφος ἢ τοῖς βραχέσι περιπίπτον ἐκάθιζε κατὰ πρῦμναν ἢ
9 πρὸς τὴν γῆν φερόμενον ἐπώκελλε. διεκπλεῖν μὲν ὅπως τὰ τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν καὶ κατόπιν ἐπιφαί- νεσθαι τοῖς ἡδή πρὸς ἔτερους διαμαχομένοις, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ναυμαχεῖν ἐστὶ πρακτικότατον, ἀδυνάτως εἰχὼν, διὰ τῇ βαρύτητα τῶν πλοίων, προσέτι
10 δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν πληρωμάτων. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐπιβοηθεῖν τοῖς δεομένοις κατὰ πρῦμναν ἐδώναντο διὰ τὸ συγκεκλεῖσθαι πρὸς τῇ γῇ καὶ μηδὲ μικρὸν ἀπολείπεσθαι τόπον τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπαρκεῖν τῷ
11 δεομένῳ. τοιαύτης δὲ δυσχρηστίας ὑπαρχούσης περὶ
much surpassed the Romans in speed, owing to the superior build of their ships and the better training of the rowers, and their position was very favourable to them, as they had freely developed their line in the open sea. For if any ships found themselves hard pressed by the enemy it was easy for them owing to their speed to retreat safely to the open water and from thence, fetching round on the ships that pursued and fell on them, they either got in their rear or attacked them on the flank, and as the enemy then had to turn round and found themselves in difficulty owing to the weight of the hulls and the poor oarsmanship of the crews, they rammed them repeatedly and sunk many. Again if any other of their own ships were in peril they were ready to render assistance with perfect security to themselves, as they were out of immediate danger and could sail in open water past the sterns of their own line. It was, however, just the opposite with the Romans. Those in distress could not retire backwards, as they were fighting close to the land, and the ships, hard pressed by the enemy in front, either ran on the shallows stern foremost or made for the shore and grounded. To sail on the one hand through the enemy's line and then appear on the stern of such of his ships as were engaged with others (one of the most effective manoeuvres in naval warfare) was impossible owing to the weight of the vessels and their crews' lack of skill. Nor again could they give assistance where it was required from astern, as they were hemmed in close to the shore, and there was not even a small space left for those who wished to come to the rescue of their comrades in distress. Such being their difficult
τὸν ὅλον ἀγῶνα, καὶ τῶν μὲν καθιζόντων ἐν τοῖς βραχέοις, τῶν δὲ ἐκπεπτόντων σκαφῶν, κατιδών ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν 'Ῥωμαίων τὸ συμβαίνον, ἀφιμῆς πρὸς φυγήν, ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων παρὰ τὴν γῆν ἐξ- ελίξας, καὶ σὺν αὐτῶ περὶ τριάκοντα νῆες, αὕτερ
12 ἐτυχον ἐγγὺς οὖσαν. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν σκαφῶν, ὅν- των ἐνενήκοντα καὶ τριῶν, ἐκφεύγασαν οἱ Καρχη- 
δόνοι, καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων, ὅσοι μὴ τῶν ἀνθρῶν 
tὰς ναῦς εἰς τὴν γῆν ἐκβαλόντες ἀπεχώρησαν.
52 Γενομένης δὲ τῆς ναυμαχίας τοιαύτης, Ἀτάρβας 
μὲν εὐδοκίμει παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, ὡς δὲ αὐτῶν 
καὶ διὰ τὴν ἱδίαν πρόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν κατωρθῶν-
2 κὼς, Πόσπιος δὲ παρὰ τοῖς 'Ῥωμαίοις ἠδόξει καὶ 
διεβέβλητο μεγάλως, ὡς εἰκῇ καλογίστως τοῖς πράγ-
μασι κεχρημένοις, καὶ τὸ καθ' αὐτῶν οὐ μικροῖς 
3 ἐλαττώμασι περιβεβληκός τὴν 'Ῥώμην· διὸ καὶ 
μετὰ ταῦτα μεγάλαις ζημίαις καὶ κινδύνωις κριθεὶς 
περιέπεσεν.
4 Ὑ μὴν οὖ γε 'Ῥωμαίοι, καίπερ τοιούτων συμβε-
βηκότων, διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων φιλοτιμίαν οὔδὲν 
ἀπέλειπον τῶν ἐνδεχόμενων, ἀλλ' εἰχοῦν τῶν 
5 ἔξῆς πραγμάτων. διὸ καὶ συνάψαντος τοῦ κατὰ τὰς 
ἀρχαιεσιάς χρόνου, στρατηγοὺς ὑπάτους κατα-
stήσαντες παρατάκτα τὸν ἔτερον αὐτῶν ἔξεπεμ-
pον Λεύκου 'Ἰούνιον, τάς τε συναρχίας παρακομί-
ζοντα τοῖς τὸ Λιλύβαιον πολιορκοῦσα καὶ τᾶς ἄλλας 
ἀγορᾶς καὶ χορηγίας τῷ στρατοπέδῳ· πρὸς δὲ καὶ 
παραπομποὺς τούτους ἐπλήρωσαν ἔξηκοντα ναῦς.
6 ὦ δὲ 'Ἰούνιος ἀφικόμενος εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην, καὶ 
προσαλβῶν τὰ συνημνηκότα τῶν πλοίων ἀπὸ τοῦ 
στρατοπέδου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Σικελίας, παρεκομίσθη 
κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς τὰς Συρακοῦσας, ἔχων ἐκατὸν 
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BOOK I

position in every part of the battle, and some of the ships grounding on the shallows while others ran ashore, the Roman commander, when he saw what was happening, took to flight, slipping out on the left along shore, accompanied by about thirty of the ships nearest to him. The remainder, ninety-three in number, were captured by the Carthaginians, including their crews, with the exception of those men who ran their ships ashore and made off.

52. The battle having resulted so, Adherbal gained a high reputation at Carthage, the success being regarded as due to his foresight and boldness. Publius, on the contrary, fell into ill repute among the Romans, and there was a great outcry against him for having acted rashly and inconsiderately and done all a single man could to bring a great disaster on Rome. He was accordingly brought to trial afterwards, condemned to a heavy fine, and narrowly escaped with his life.

Yet so determined were the Romans to bring the whole struggle to a successful issue, that, notwithstanding this reverse, they left undone nothing that was in their power, and prepared to continue the campaign. The time for the elections was now at hand, and accordingly when the new Consuls were appointed they dispatched one of them, Lucius Junius Pullus, with corn for the besiegers of Lilybaeum and such other provisions and supplies as the army required, manning sixty ships to act as a convoy to him. Junius, on arriving at Messene and being joined by the ships from Lilybaeum and the rest of Sicily, coasted along with all speed to Syracuse,

a This is a mistake; L. Junius was one of the consuls of 249 B.C., the colleague of Publius.
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εἴκοσι σκάφη καὶ τὴν ἀγοράν σχεδὸν ἐν ὀκτακο-
7 σίαις ναυσὶ φορτηγοῖς. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ παραδοὺς τοὺς
ταμίας τὰς ἡμισείας φορτηγοὺς καὶ τινὰ τῶν μα-
κρῶν πλοίων ἐξαπέστειλε, διακομισθῆναι σπουδά-
8 ζων τῷ στρατόπεδῳ τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. αὐτὸς
δ’ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ὑπέμενε, τοὺς τε κατὰ
πλούν ἀφυστεροῦντας ἐκ τῆς Μεσσήνης ἀναδεχό-
μενος καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς μεσογαίου συμμάχων
σῶν προσαναλαμβάνων.

53 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Ἀτάρβας μὲν ἄν-
δρας τοὺς ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ ληφθέντας καὶ τὰς αἰ-
χμαλάτους νῆσας ἐξαπέστειλεν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα,
2 Καρθάλωνα δὲ τὸν συνάρχοντα δοὺς τριάκοντα ναῦς
ἐξέπεμψε πρὸς αῖς ἔχον αὐτὸς ἐβδομήκοντα κατ-
3 ἐπλευσε, προστάξας ἄφων προσπεσόντα ταῖς ὀρμοῦ-
σις παρὰ τὸ Λιυβαῖον τῶν πολεμίων ναυσίν, δὲν
μὲν ἀν δυνατὸς ἢ κυριεύσαι, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς τύρ
4 ἐμβαλεῖν. πεισθέντος δὲ τοῦ Καρθάλωνος καὶ
ποιησαμένου τὸν ἑπίπλουν ὑπὸ τὴν ἐσωθινήν, καὶ τὰ
μὲν ἐμπιπρώντος, τὰ δ’ ἀποσπώντος τῶν πλοίων,
μεγάλην συνέπεσε γενέσθαι ταραχήν περὶ τὸ τῶν
5 Ῥωμαίῶν στρατόπεδον. προσβοθοῦντων γὰρ αὐ-
τῶν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ γυνομένης κραυγῆς, συν-
νοῆσας Ἰμίλκων ὁ τὸ Λιυβαῖον τηρῶν, καὶ θεωρῶν
ηδὴ τῆς ἡμέρας ὑποφαινούσης τὸ συμβαίνον, ἐπ-
6 ἀποστέλλει τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως μισθοφόρους. οἱ δὲ
Ῥωμαίοι, τοῦ δεινοῦ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς περιστάν-
τος, ὦν εἰς μικρὰν οὐδ’ εἰς τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἦλθον
7 διατροπῆν. ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος, ὄλυγα
τῶν σκαφῶν τὰ μὲν ἄτοσπάσας, τὰ δὲ συντρίβας,
μετὰ ταῦτα μικρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ Λιυβαίου παρακομι-
σθεῖς ὦς ἐφ’ Ὅρακλείως ἐτῆρει, βουλόμενος διακω-
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having now a hundred and twenty ships and the supplies in about eight hundred transports. There he entrusted half the transports and a few of the war-ships to the Quaestors and sent them on, as he was anxious to have what the troops required conveyed to them at once. He himself remained in Syracuse waiting for the ships that were left behind on the voyage from Messene and procuring additional supplies and corn from the allies in the interior.

53. At about the same time Adherbal sent the prisoners from the naval battle and the captured ships to Carthage, and giving Carthalo his colleague thirty vessels in addition to the seventy with which he had arrived, dispatched him with orders to make a sudden descent on the enemy's ships that were moored near Lilybaeum, capture all he could and set fire to the rest. When Carthalo acting on these orders made the attack at dawn and began to burn some of the ships and carry off others, there was a great commotion in the Roman camp. For as they rushed to rescue the ships with loud cries, Himilco, the commander of the garrison, heard them, and as day was just beginning to break, he saw what was happening, and sent out the mercenaries from the town to attack the Romans also. The Romans were now in danger from all sides and in no little or ordinary distress. The Carthaginian admiral, having made off with a few ships and broken up others, shortly afterwards left Lilybaeum, and after coasting along for some distance in the direction of Heraclea remained on the watch, as his design was to intercept
8 λύειν τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον πλέοντας. προσαγγελάντων δὲ τῶν σκοπῶν πλήθος ἤκανον πλοίων προσφέρεσθαι παντοδαπῶν καὶ συνεγγύζειν, ἀναχθεῖς ἔπλει, συμμίξας σπείδων διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐκ τοῦ προγεγενημένου προτερήματος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν Συρακούσων προαπεσταλμένοις ταμίαις ἀνήγγειλαν οἱ προπλέειν εἰ-10 θυσίμενοι λέμβοι τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. οἱ δὲ νομίζαντες οὐκ ἄξιόχρεως σφάς αὐτοὺς εἶναι πρὸς ναυμαχίαν, καθωρμίσθησαν πρὸς τὶ πολισμάτων τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοὺς ταττομένων, ἀλῆμεν μὲν, σάλοις δ' ἔχον καὶ προβολὰς περικλειόνωσαν ἐκ τῆς γῆς11 εὐφυεῖς. οὐ ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἀπόβασιν, καὶ τοὺς τε καταπέλτας καὶ τοὺς πετροβόλους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστήμας, προσεδόκων τὸν ἐπίπλουν12 τῶν ὑπεναντίων. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι συνεγγύσαν13 τέσ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλοντο πολιορκεῖν τούτους, ὑπολαβόντες τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας καταπλαγέντας εἰς τὸ πολισμάτων ἀποχωρήσειν, τῶν δὲ πλοίων ἀσφαλῶς κυριεύσεως οὐ προχωρούσης δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος, ἀλλὰ τούναντιον ἀμυνομένων γεναιῶς, καὶ τοῦ τόπου πολλὰς ἔχοντος καὶ παντοδαπὰς δυσχρησίας, ὅλη γὰ14 τῶν τὰς ἄγορᾶς ἔχόντων πλοίων ἀποστάσαντες ἀπ- ἐπλευσαν πρὸς τινα ποταμὸν, ἐν δ' καθορμισθέντες ἐπετήρουν τὸν ἀνάπλουν αὐτῶν.

54 Ὅ δ' ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ὑπολειφθεῖσι στρατηγοῖς, ἐπεὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐπετέλεσε, κάμψας τὸν Πάχυνον ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ Διλύβαυον, οὐδὲν εἶδος τῶν περὶ τοὺς προπλέοντας συμβεβηκότων. δ' δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναῶρος, ση-

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the ships that were on their way to join the army. When his look-out men reported that a considerable number of ships of every variety were approaching and at no great distance, he got under weigh and sailed towards them eager to engage them, as after the recent success he had great contempt for the Romans. The approach of the enemy was also announced by the light boats that usually sail in front of a fleet to the Quaestors who had been sent on in advance from Syracuse. Considering themselves not strong enough to accept a battle, they anchored off a certain small fortified town subject to the Romans, which had indeed no harbour, but a roadstead shut in by headlands projecting from the land in a manner that made it a more or less secure anchorage. Here they disembarked, and setting up the catapults and mangonels procured from the fortress, awaited the enemy's attack. The Carthaginians on their approach at first thought of besieging them, supposing that the crews would be afraid and retreat to the city, and that they would then easily possess themselves of the ships; but when their hopes were not realized, the enemy on the contrary making a gallant defence, and the situation of the place presenting many difficulties of every kind, they carried off a few of the ships laden with provisions and sailed away to a certain river where they anchored, and waited for the Romans to put out to sea again.

54. The Consul, who had remained in Syracuse, when he had concluded his business there, rounded Cape Pachynus and sailed in the direction of Lilybaeum in entire ignorance of what had befallen the advance force. The Carthaginian admiral, when his
μηνάντων τῶν σκοπῶν αὐτῶ τάλιν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀναχθεῖς ἐπλεῖ μετὰ σπουδῆς, 
βουλόμενος αὐτοῖς ὡς πλεῖστον ἀπέχουσι τῶν οἱ-
3 κείων νεών συμβαλεῖν. ὁ δὲ Ἰούνιος κατιδών ἐκ 
pολλοῦ τοῦ στόλου τῶν τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ 
πλήθος τῶν σκαφῶν, οὔτε συμβαλεῖ τολμῶν οὔτ' 
ἐκφυγεῖν ἔτι δυνατὸς ἢν διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τοὺς 
pολεμίους, ἐγκλίνας εἰς τόπους τραχεῖς καὶ κατὰ 
4 πάντα τρόπων ἐπισφαλεῖς καθωρμίσθη, κρίνων αἱ-
ρετώτερον ὑπάρχειν ὁ τι δέοι παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ τοῖς 
pολεμίοις αὐτάνδρον τὸ σφέτερον στρατόπεδον ὑπο-
5 χείριν ποιῆσαι. συνιδὼν δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τούτου 
γεγονός ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος, τὸ μὲν παρα-
βάλλεσθαι καὶ προσάγειν τοιούτους τόπους ἀπεδο-
kίμασε, λαβὼν δ' ἄκραν τινὰ καὶ προσορμισθεὶς 
tαύτη, μεταξὺ τῶν στόλων ἑτορίε καὶ προσεῖχε τὸν 
6 νοῦν ἀμφιτέρως. ἐπιγενομένου δὲ χειμῶνος καὶ 
περιστάσεως προφανομένης ἐκ τοῦ πελάγους ὅλο-
σχερεστέρας, οὐ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων κυβερνῆται 
διὰ τε τὴν τῶν τόπων καὶ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἐμ-
περίαν προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον καὶ προλέγοντες 
τὸ συμβησμένον, ἔπεισαν τὸν Καρθάλωνα φυ-
geῖν τὸν χειμώνα καὶ κάμψαι τὴν ἄκραν τοῦ Πα-
7 χύνου. πεισθέντος δὲ νοσέχοι, οὕτως μὲν πολλὰ 
μοχθῆσαντες καὶ μόλις ὑπέραντες τῇν ἄκραν ἐν 
8 ἀσφαλεῖ καθωρμίσθησαν, οἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαιῶν στό-
lοι, τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐπιγενομένου καὶ τῶν τῶν τόπων εἰς 
tέλος ὑπαρχόντων ἄλμενων, οὕτως διεφθάρησαν 
ὡςτε μηδὲ τῶν ναυαγίων μηδὲν γενέσθαι χρήσιμων, 
ἀλλ' ἀμφιτέρους αὐτοὺς ἄρδην καὶ παραλόγως 
ἀχρεωθήσαν. 

55 Τούτων δὲ συμβάντος, τὰ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδο-
look-outs again reported that the enemy were in sight, put to sea and sailed with all haste, as he wished to engage them at as great a distance as possible from their own ships. Junius had sighted the Carthaginian fleet for some time, and noticed the number of their ships, but he neither dared to engage them nor could he now escape them, as they were so near. He therefore diverted his course to a rugged and in every way perilous part of the coast and anchored there, thinking that, no matter what happened to him, it would be preferable to his whole force of ships and men falling into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral, on seeing what Junius had done, decided not to incur the risk of approaching such a dangerous shore, but, gaining a certain cape and anchoring off it, remained on the alert between the two fleets, keeping his eye on both. When the weather now became stormy, and they were threatened with a heavy gale from the open sea, the Carthaginian captains who were acquainted with the locality and with the weather signs, and foresaw and prophesied what was about to happen, persuaded Carthalo to escape the tempest by rounding Cape Pachynus. He very wisely consented, and with great labour they just managed to get round the cape and anchor in a safe position. But the two Roman fleets, caught by the tempest, and the coast affording no shelter at all, were so completely destroyed that not even the wrecks were good for anything. In this unlooked for manner, then, the Romans had both their fleets annihilated.

55. Owing to this occurrence the hopes of the
vών αὖθις ἀνέκυψε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιρρεπεστέρας εἶχε
2 τὰς ἐλπίδας, οἱ δὲ Ὁρωμαῖοι, πρότερον μὲν ἐπὶ πο-
σον ἦτυχηκότες, τότε δ’ ὁλοσχερῶς, ἐκ μὲν τῆς θα-
λάττης ἐξέβησαν, τῶν δ’ ὑπαίθρων ἐπεκράτουν·
Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τῆς μὲν θαλάττης ἐκυρίευον, τῆς δὲ
3 γῆς οὖχ ὄλως ἀπῆλπισον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντες
ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς ὄλους ἑσχετλίαζον, οἳ τ’ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ Λυσίβαδον στρατόπεδα, διὰ τὰ προ-
4 ειρημένα συμπτῶματα· τῆς γε μὴν προθέσεως οὐκ
ἀφίσταντο τῆς κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν
ἐχορῆγον κατὰ γῆν ἀπροφασίστως, οἳ δὲ προσ-
5 εκαρτέρουσιν ταύτη κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. δ’ δ’ Ἰούνιος,
ἀνακομισθεῖς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐκ τῆς ναυαγίας
καὶ περιπαθῆς ὄν, ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸ καυνοτομῆσαι
τι καὶ πραξαί τῶν δεόντων, σπουδάζων ἀναμαχέ-
6 σασθαί τὴν γεγενημένην περιπέτειαν. διὸ καὶ βρα-
χείας αὐτῶ παραπεσούσης ἀφορμῆς, καταλαμβάνει
πραξικοπήσας τὸν Ἑρυκά, καὶ γίνεται τοῦ τε τῆς
7 Ἀφροδίτης ἱερῶ καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἑγκρατῆς. δ’ δ’
Ἑρυξ ἔστι μὲν ὄρος παρὰ θαλασσα τῆς Σικελίας
ἐν τῇ παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κεμένη πλευρὰ μεταξὺ
Δρεπάνων καὶ Πανόρμου, μᾶλλον δ’ ὀμορον καὶ
συνάπτων πρὸς τὰ Δρέπανα, μεγέθει δὲ παρὰ πολὺ
diaφέρον τῶν κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὄρων πλὴν τῆς
8 Αἴτινης. τούτου δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς κορυφῆς, οὐ-
σης ἐπιπέδου, κεῖται τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τῆς Ἑρυ-
κίνης ἱερῶν, ὀπερ ὀμολογουμένως ἐπιφανεστάτων ἐστὶ
tὸ τε πλούτῳ καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ προστασίᾳ τῶν κατὰ
9 τὴν Σικελίαν ἱερῶν· ἡ δὲ πόλις ὑπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν κο-
ρυφὴν τέταται, πάνω μακρὰν ἔχουσα καὶ προσάντη
10 πανταχόθεν τὴν ἀνάβασιν. ἐπὶ τε δὴ τὴν κορυφὴν
ἐπιστήσας φυλακῆν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ Δρεπά-
BOOK I

Carthaginians rose again, and it seemed to them that the fortune of war was inclining in their favour, while the Romans, on the contrary, who had been previously to a certain extent unlucky but never had met with so complete a disaster, relinquished the sea, while continuing to maintain their hold on the country. The Carthaginians were now masters of the sea and were not hopeless of regaining their position on land. Subsequently, though all, both at Rome and in the army at Lilybaeum, continued to lament their whole situation after these recent defeats, yet they did not abandon their purpose of pursuing the siege, the government not hesitating to send supplies over land, and the besiegers keeping up the investment as strictly as they could. Junius, returning to the army after the shipwreck in a state of great affliction, set himself to devise some novel and original step that would be of service, being most anxious to make good the loss inflicted by the disaster. Therefore on some slight pretext offering itself, he surprised and occupied Eryx, possessing himself both of the temple of Venus and of the town. Eryx is a mountain near the sea on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy. It is situated between Drepana and Panormus, or rather it is adjacent to Drepana, on the borders, and is much the biggest mountain in Sicily after Etna. On its summit, which is flat, stands the temple of Venus Erycina, which is indisputably the first in wealth and general magnificence of all the Sicilian holy places. The city extends along the hill under the actual summit, the ascent to it being very long and steep on all sides. He garrisoned the summit and also the approach from Drepana, and

- This is not a fact.
Οι δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες αὐτῶν Ἀμίλκαν τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπικαλοῦν, τούτῳ τὰ κατὰ τὸν στόλον ἐνεχείρισαν. ὅσοι παραλαβὼν τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις ἄρμησε πορθήσων τὴν Ἰταλιάν. ἔστο δὲ ἦν ὁκτωκαιδέκατον τῷ 3 πολέμῳ. κατασύρας δὲ τὴν Δοκρίδα καὶ τὴν Βρεττιανὴν χώραν, ἀποπλέων ἐντεῦθεν κατήρε παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ πρὸς τὴν Πανορμίτιν, καὶ καταλαμβάνει τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Εὐριτῆς λεγόμενον τόπον, ὅσοι κεύται μὲν Ἐρυκος καὶ Πανόρμου μεταξὺ πρὸς θαλάττης, πολὺ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δοκεῖ διαφέρειν τῶν ἐπιτηδείως τητὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν στρατοπέδων καὶ χρονισμῶν. 4 ἔστι γὰρ ὅρος περίτομον ἐξανεστηκός ἐκ τῆς περικεμένης χώρας εἰς ὕψος ἰκανόν. τούτου δ' ἦ περίμετρος τῆς ἀνω στεφάνης οὐ λείπει τῶν ἐκατὸν σταδίων, ὥφ' ἦς ὁ περιεχόμενος τόπος εὐβοτος ὑπάρχει καὶ γεωργήσιμος, πρὸς μὲν τὰς πελαγίους πυνιάς εὐφυῶς κείμενος, θανάσιμων δὲ θηρίων εἰς 5 τέλος ἀμοιρός. περιέχεται δὲ κρήμνοις ἀπροσίτως ἕκ τε τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν μέρους καὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὴν μεσόγαιαν παρηκτὸς, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων 6 ἐστίν ὀλγῆς καὶ βραχείας δεόμενα κατασκευῆς. ἔχει δ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ μαστόν, ὅσοι ἀμα μὲν ἀκροτόλεως, ἀμα δὲ σκοπῆς εὐφυῶς λαμβάνει τἀξιω κατὰ τῆς 7 ύποκειμένης χώρας. κρατεῖ δὲ καὶ λιμένος εὐκαίρου πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ Δρεπάνων καὶ Λιλυβαίου δρόμον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰταλιάν, ἐν ὑ τίθης ὕδατος ἀφθονον ὑπάρχει. 8 προσόδους δὲ τὰς πάσας ἔχει πρωτὰς δυσχερεῖς,
jealously guarded both these positions, especially the latter, in the conviction that by this means he would securely hold the city and the whole mountain.

56. The Carthaginians shortly afterwards appointed *247 B.C.* Hamilcar surnamed Barcas to the command and entrusted naval operations to him. He started with the fleet to ravage the Italian coast (this, I should say, was in the eighteenth year of the war) and after laying waste Locris and Bruttium quitted those parts and descended with his whole fleet on the territory of Panormus. Here he seized on a place called Hercte [*a*] lying near the sea between Eryx and Panormus, and thought to possess peculiar advantages for the safe and prolonged stay of an army. It is an abrupt hill rising to a considerable height from the surrounding flat country. The circumference of its brow is not less than a hundred stades and the plateau within affords good pasturage and is suitable for cultivation, being also favourably exposed to the sea-breeze and quite free of animals dangerous to life. On the side looking to the sea and on that which faces the interior of the island, this plateau is surrounded by inaccessible cliffs, while the parts between require only a little slight strengthening. There is also a knoll on it which serves for an acropolis as well as for an excellent post of observation over the country at the foot of the hill. Besides this Hercte commands a harbour very well situated for ships making the voyage from Drepana and Lilybaeum to Italy to put in at, and with an abundant supply of water [*b*]. The hill has only three approaches,

*a* Now Monte Pellegrino.

*b* This cannot be the harbour of Palermo, which was in the hands of the Romans, and must be looked for on the opposite side of Monte Pellegrino.
9 ἐν δὲ καταστρατοπεδεύσας παραβόλως Ἀμιλκας, ὡς ἂν μήτε πόλεως οἰκείας μήτ' ἄλλης ἐλπίδος μηδεμίας ἀντεχόμενος, εἰς μέσους δὲ τοὺς πολέμους ἑαυτὸν δεδωκός, ὃμως οὐ μικροὺς οὐδὲ τοὺς τυχόντας Ρωμαίοις ἀγώνας καὶ κινδύνους παρεσκεύασε.

10 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ὁρμώμενος κατὰ θάλατταν τὴν παραλίαν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπορθεὶς μέχρι τῆς

11 Κυμαίων χώρας, δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ γῆν παραστρατοπεδεύσαντων αὐτῶν ἩΡωμαίων πρὸ τῆς Πανομι-

τών πόλεως ἐν ἦσως πέντε στάδιοι, πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους ἀγώνας συνεστήσατο κατὰ γῆν σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἐνιαυτοὺς. περὶ δὲ οὖν οἶον τε διὰ τῆς γρα-
all difficult, two on the land side and one from the sea. Here Hamilcar established his quarters, at great risk indeed, since he had neither the support of any of their own towns nor any prospect of support from elsewhere, but had thrown himself into the midst of the enemy. Notwithstanding this, the peril to which he put the Romans, and the combats to which he forced them, were by no means slight or insignificant. For in the first place he would sally out with his fleet from this place, and devastate the coast of Italy as far as Cyme, and next, after the Romans had taken up a position on land in front of the city of Panormus and at a distance of about five stades from his own camp, he harassed them by delivering during almost three years constant and variously contrived attacks by land. These combats I am unable to describe in detail here. 57. For as in a boxing-match when two champions, both distinguished for pluck and both in perfect training, meet in the decisive contest for the prize, continually delivering blow for blow, neither the combatants themselves nor the spectators can note or anticipate every attack or every blow, but it is possible, from the general action of each, and the determination that each displays, to get a fair idea of their respective skill, strength, and courage, so it was with these two generals. The causes or the modes of their daily ambuscades, counter-ambuscades, attempts, and assaults were so numerous that no writer could properly describe them, while at the same time the narrative would be most tedious as well as unprofitable to the reader. It is rather by a general pronouncement about the two men and the result of their rival efforts that a notion of the facts
5 θεί τῶν προειρημένων. οὔτε γὰρ τῶν εἰς ἱστορίας στρατηγημάτων οὔτε τῶν ἐκ τοῦ καυροῦ καὶ τῆς ὑποκειμένης περιστάσεως ἐπινοημάτων οὔτε τῶν εἰς παράβολον καὶ βίαιον ἀνηκόντων τόλμαν οὐδὲν παρ-
6 ελείφθη. κρίσιν γε μὴν ὁλοσχερῇ γενέσθαι διὰ πλεί-
ous αὐτίας οὐχ οἶνον τῇ ἡν. αἱ τῇ γὰρ δυνάμεις ἀμ-
φοτέρως ἦσαν ἔφαμιλλοι, τὰ τε κατὰ τοὺς χάρακας ὀμοῖς ἀπρόσιτα διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα, τὸ τε διάστημα
7 τῶν στρατοπέδων βραχὺ παντελῶς. ὅπερ αὐτιῶν ἦν
μάλιστα τοῦ τὰς μὲν κατὰ μέρος συμπτώσεις ἀπαύ-
στους γίνεσθαι καθ’ ἡμέραν, ὁλοσχερές δὲ συν-
8 τελείωθαι μηδέν. τούτους γὰρ αὐτοὺς αἰεί συνέβαινε
διαφθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκάς, τοὺς ἐν χειρῶν
νόμων περιπεσόντας. οἱ δ’ ἄπαξ ἐγκλώντες εὐθέως
ἐκτὸς τοῦ δεινοῦ πάντες ἦσαν ὑπὸ ταῖς αὐτῶν
ἀσφαλείαις, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐκυδνύμενον.

58 Ὑ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ ἁγαθὸς βραβευτὴς ἡ τύχη
μεταβιβάσασα παραβόλως αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ προειρη-
μένου τόπου καὶ τοῦ προϋπάρχοντος αὐθόματοι εἰς
παραβολώτερον ἀγώνυμοι καὶ τόπον ἐλάττω συν-
2 έκκλεισεν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀμίλκας, τῶν Ἡρωμαίων τῶν Ἑρυκ
τηροῦντων ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς κορυφῆς καὶ παρὰ τῇ τῆς ρίζαν,
καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κατελάβετο τῇ πόλιν τῶν Ἑρυ-
κάνων, ἦτις ἦν μεταξὺ τῆς τε κορυφῆς καὶ τῶν πρὸς
3 τῇ ρίζῃ στρατοπεδευσάντων. εὖ οὖ συνέβαινε παρα-
βόλως μὲν ὑπομένεως καὶ διακυδνυμένως πολιορ-
κουμένος τους τὴν κορυφὴν κατέχοντας τῶν Ἡρω-
μαίων, ἀπίστως δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους αντέχειν, τῶν
τε πολεμίων πανταχόθεν προσκεμένων καὶ τῶν χο-
ρημῶν οὐ ραδίως αὐτοῖς παρακομιζομένων, ὅσ ἂν
τῆς θαλάττης καθ’ ἕνα τόπον καὶ μίαν πρόσοδον
ἀντεχομένως. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐνταῦθα πάσαις
158
can be conveyed. Nothing was neglected; neither traditional tactics nor plans suggested by the occasion and by actual pressure of circumstances, nor those strokes which depend on a bold and strong initiative. Yet there were several reasons why no decisive success could be obtained. For the forces on each side were evenly matched; their trenches were so strong as to be equally unapproachable, and they were at a quite small distance from each other, this being the chief reason why there were daily conflicts at certain points, but no decisive engagement. The losses in these combats consisted only of those who fell in the hand-to-hand fighting, while the side which once gave way used to get out of danger at once behind their defences, from whence they would issue again and resume the fight.

58. But Fortune, however, like a good umpire, unexpectedly shifted the scene and changed the nature of the contest, confining both in a narrower field, where the struggle grew even more desperate. The Romans, as I said, had garrisons at Eryx on the summit of the mountain and at the foot. Hamilcar now seized the town which lies between the summit and the spot at the foot where the garrison was. The consequence of this was that the Romans on the summit—a thing they had never expected—remained besieged and in considerable peril, and that the Carthaginians, though it is scarcely credible, maintained their position though the enemy were pressing on them from all sides and the conveyance of supplies was not easy, as they only held one place on the sea and one single road connecting with it. However, here again both sides employed
4 μὲν ἄμφοτεροι ταῖς πολιορκητικαῖς ἐπινοοίσι καὶ βίαις χρησάμενοι κατ' ἄλληλων, πάν δὲ γένος ἐνδείας ἀνασχομένου, πάσης δ' ἐπιθέσεως καὶ μάχης πείραν λαβόντες, τέλος οὐχ, ὡς Φάβιος φησιν, ἔξαδυνα-τοῦτας καὶ περικακοῦτας, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἀπαθεῖς κάηττητοι τινες ἄνδρες, ἵερον ἐποίησαν τὸν στέφανον. πρότερον γὰρ ἡ 'κείνους ἄλληλων ἐπικρατή-σαι, καίπερ δ' ἐτη πάλιν ἐν τούτω τῷ τόπῳ δι- αγωνισμένους, δι' ἄλλου τρόπου συνέβη λαβεῖν τὸν πόλεμον τὴν κρίσιν.

7 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Ἔρυμα καὶ τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις τοιαύτην ἔσχε διάθεσιν. τὰ δὲ πολιτεύματ' ἣν ἄμφοτέρων παραπλήσια τοῖς ψυχομαχοῦσι τῶν εὐγενῶν ὀρνίθων. ἐκεῖνοι τε γὰρ πολλάκις ἀπολωλεκότες τὰς πτέρυγας διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν, αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ μένοντες ἐκβάλλουσι τὰς πληγάς, ἐως ἂν αὐτομάτως ποτὲ περιπεσόντες αὐτοῖς καιροὶ ἄλληλων διαδράξωνται, κάπετα τούτου γενομένου συμβῆ τὸν ἐτέρον αὐτῶν προπεσεῖν' οἳ τε Ἶρωμαίοι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι κάμνοντες ἤδη τοῖς πό

9 νοις διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν κυνδύων εἰς τέλος ἀπῆλγουν, τὴν τε δυνάμιν παρελεύντο καὶ παρείντο διὰ τὰς πολυχρονίους εἰσφορὰς καὶ δαπάνας. ὦμος δὲ Ἶρωμαίοις ψυχομαχοῦσι, καίπερ ἐτη σχεδὸν ἢδη πέντε τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν πραγμάτων ὀλοσχερῶς ἀφεστηκότες διὰ τάς περιπετείας καὶ διὰ τὸ πε- πείσθαι δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πεζικῶν δυνάμεως κρινεῖν 2 τῶν πόλεμων, τότε συνορώντες οὐ προχωροῦν αὐτοῖς τούργοι κατὰ τοὺς ἐκλογισμοὺς καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν τόλμαν τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἤγεμόνος, ἔκρυναν τὸ τρίτον ἀντιπουήσασθαι τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυτικαῖς δυνά- μεσιν ἐλπίδων, ὑπολαμβάνοντες διὰ τῆς ἐπινοιας
every device and effort that the siege demanded: both endured every kind of privation and both essayed every means of attack and every variety of action. At length not, as Fabius Pictor says, owing to their exhaustion and sufferings, but like two uninjured and invincible champions, they left the contest drawn. For before either could get the better of the other, though the struggle in this place lasted for another two years, the war had been decided by other means.

Such then was the condition of affairs at Eryx and as far as regarded the land forces. We may compare the spirit displayed by both states to that of game cocks engaged in a death-struggle. For we often see that when these birds have lost the use of their wings from exhaustion, their courage remains as high as ever and they continue to strike blow upon blow, until closing involuntarily they get a deadly hold of each other, and as soon as this happens one or other of the two will soon fall dead. So the Romans and Carthaginians, worn out by their exertions owing to the continual fighting, at length began to be apathetic, their strength paralysed and their resources exhausted by protracted taxation and expense. But, in spite of all, the Romans, as if fighting for their lives, although they had for nearly five years utterly withdrawn from the sea owing to their disasters and their belief that they would be able to decide the war by the aid of their land forces alone, now, when they saw that chiefly owing to the bold action of the Carthaginian general they were not making the progress on which they had reckoned, decided again for the third time to court the prospect of success at sea. They thought that this course, if they could
ταύτης, εἰ καὶ ἱππίως ἐγένετο τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, μόνως ἀν 
οὔτως πέρας ἐπιθείναι τῷ πολέμῳ συμφέρον. δὲ 
καὶ τέλος ἐποίησαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐξεχώρησ 
σαν τῆς θαλάττης ἐξαντες τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης συμ-
πτόμαις, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐλαττώθεντες τῇ περὶ τὰ 
5 Δρέπανα ναυμαχία. τότε δὲ τρίτην ἐποίησαν ταύ-
tὴν τῆν ἐπιβολὴν, δι' ἂς νυκήσαντες καὶ τὰ περὶ 
tὸν Ἕρυκα στρατόπεδα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀποκλεί 
σαντες τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν χορηγίας τέλος ἔπεθηκαν 
6 τοῖς ὀλοισ. ἤν δὲ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τὸ πλεῖον ψυχο-
μαχία. χορηγία μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπῆρξε πρὸς τὴν πρό-
θεσιν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς· οὐ μήν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν 
προεστῶτων ἀνδρῶν εἰς τὰ κοινὰ φιλοτιμῶν καὶ 
7 γενναιότητα προσευρέθη πρὸς τὴν συντέλειαν. κατὰ 
γὰρ τὰς τῶν βίων εὐκαιρίας καθ' ἑνα καὶ δύο καὶ 
τρεῖς υφίσταντα παρέξεων πεντήρη κατηρτισμένην, 
ἐφ' ὃ τὴν δαπάνην κομοῦνται, κατὰ λόγον τῶν 
8 πραγμάτων προχωρησάντων. τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ 
ταχέως ἑτοιμασθέντων διακοσίων πλοίων πεντηρὶ-
kῶν, ὃν ἐποίησαν τὴν ναυτηγίαν πρὸς [παρά-
δειγμα] τὴν τοῦ Ἡρώδου ναῦν, μετὰ ταύτα στρατη-
γοῦν καταστήσαντες Γάιον Δυνατίου ἐξέπεμψαν ἄρ-
9 χομένης τῆς θερείας. δὲ καὶ παραδόξως ἐπιφανεῖ 
τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τόποις τὸν τε περὶ τὰ Δρέ-
pανα λυμένα κατέσχε καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὸ Διλύβαιον 
ὄρμους, παντὸς ἀνακεχωρηκτός εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τοῦ 
10 τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναυτικοῦ. συστησάμενος δὲ περὶ 
tὴν ἐν τοῖς Δρεπάνοις πόλιν ἔργα καὶ τῆλα πρὸς 
tὴν πολιορκίαν παρασκευασάμενος, ἀμα μὲν ταύτη 
11 προσεκαρτέρει τὰ δυνατὰ ποιῶν, ἀμα δὲ προορώ-
μενος τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Καρχηδονίων στόλου, καὶ 
μυθιμονεύων τῆς ἔξ ἀρχῆς προθέσεως ὃτι μόνως
but strike a deadly blow, was the only way of bringing the war to a favourable conclusion. And this they finally accomplished. It was yielding to the blows of Fortune that they had retired from the sea on the first occasion; the second time it was owing to their defeat at Drepana, but now they made this third attempt, and through it, by gaining a victory and cutting off the supplies from the sea of the Carthaginian army at Eryx, they put an end to the whole war. The attempt was indeed of the nature of a struggle for existence. For there were no funds in the public treasury for this purpose; but yet, owing to the patriotic and generous spirit of the leading citizens, enough was found to carry out the project; as either one, two, or three of them, according to their means, undertook to provide a quinquereme fully equipped on the understanding that they would be repaid if all went well. In this way a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes was rapidly got ready, all built on the model of the "Rhodian's" ship. They then appointed Gaius Lutatius to the command and dispatched him at the beginning of summer. Suddenly appearing off the coast of Sicily, he seized on the harbour of Drepana and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum, the whole Carthaginian navy having retired to their own country. First of all he constructed works round the city of Drepana and made all preparations for its siege, but while continuing to prosecute this by every means in his power, he foresaw that the Carthaginian fleet would arrive, and was not forgetful of the original motive of the expedi-
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dύναται διὰ τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν κυνδύνου κρίσεως τὰ ὀλά τυχεῖν, οὐκ ἀχρεῷν οὐδ’ ἄργον εἰδ’ γίνε
tὸν χρόνον, ἀλλ’ ἂν ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἀναπείρας καὶ μελέτας ποιών τοῖς πληρώμασιν οἰκεῖως τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, τῇ τε λοιπῇ τῇ κατὰ τὴν διάιταν ἐπι-
μελεία προσκαρτέρων, ἀθλητὰς ἀπετέλεσε πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον ἐν πάνι βραχεὶ χρόνῳ τοὺς ναύτας.

60 Ὁ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, παρὰ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν προσ-
πεσόντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πεπλευκέναι στόλῳ τοὺς Ὀρω-
μαίους καὶ πάλιν ἄντιποιείσθαι τῆς θαλάττης, παρ-
2 αυτίκα κατηρτίζουν τὰς ναύς, καὶ πληρώσαντες σί-
tον καὶ τῶν ἁλλῶν ἐπιτηδείων, ἐξεπεμπτὸν τὸν στό-
lον, βουλόμενοι μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἐρυκα
3 στρατόπεδα τῶν ἀναγκαίων. κατέστησαν δὲ καὶ 
στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως "Ἀνωνα· ὃς 
ἀναχθεῖς καὶ κατάρας ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰερὰν καλομενήν 
νῆσον ἔσπευδε τοὺς πολεμίους λαθῶν διακόμισθή-
nαι πρὸς τὸν Ἐρυκα, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀγορὰς ἀποθε-
σθαι καὶ κουφύσαι τὰς ναύς, προσλαβῶν δ’ ἐπιβά-
tας ἐκ τῶν μισθοφόρων τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους καὶ Βάρ-
καν μετ’ αὐτῶν, οὕτως συμμίσγειν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.

4 Ὁ δὲ Αὐτάτιος συνείς τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν 
"Ἀνωνα, καὶ συλλογισάμενος τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν, 
ἀναλαβὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατεύματος τοὺς ἀρί-
stους ἀνδρὰς ἐπέλευσε πρὸς τὴν Ἀἰγούσσαν νῆσον
5 τὴν πρὸ τοῦ Λιλβαίου κειμένην. καντάδθα παρα-
καλέσαι τὰ πρέποντά τῶν καρφὺ τὰς δυνάμεις δι-
εσάφει τοῖς κυβερνήταις ὡς ἐσομένης εἰς τὴν αὐρήν
6 ναυμαχίας. ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἐωθινὴν, ἢδη τῆς ἡμέρας 
ὑποφανοῦσης, ὅρῳν τοῖς μὲν ἐναντίοις φορῶν ἀνε-
μον καταρρέοντα καὶ λαμπρόν, σφίσι δὲ δυσχερῆ 
γνώμενον τὸν ἀνάπλουν πρὸς ἀντίον τὸ πνεῦμα,

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tion, the belief that it was only by a sea battle that the war could be decisively finished. He did not, then, allow the time to pass uselessly and idly, but every day was spent in exercising and practising the crews properly for this purpose. He also paid unremitting attention to the matter of training, so that in a very short time he got his sailors into perfect condition for the anticipated battle.

60. When the unexpected news reached Carthage that the Romans were at sea with a fleet and were again disputing the naval supremacy, they at once got their ships ready, and filling them with corn and other provisions, dispatched their fleet on its errand, desiring that the troops at Eryx should be in no need of necessary supplies. Hanno, whom they had appointed to the command, set sail and reached the so-called Holy Isle from whence he designed to cross as soon as possible to Eryx, unobserved by the enemy, and, after lightening the ships by disembarking the supplies, to take on board as marines the best qualified mercenaries together with Barcas himself and then engage the enemy. Lutatius, learning of Hanno's arrival and divining his intentions, took on board a picked force from the army and sailed to the island of Aegusa which lies off Lilybaenum. There, after exhorting his troops as became the occasion, he informed the captains that the battle would take place next day. In the early morning, just as day was breaking, he saw that a brisk breeze was coming down favourable to the enemy, but that it had become difficult for himself to sail up against the wind, the
κοίλης καὶ τραχείας οὐσῆς τῆς θαλάττης, τὸ μὲν 7 πρῶτον διηπόρει τί δεῖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παρούσι. συλ-
λογιζόμενος δ’ ὃς ἐὰν μὲν παραβάλληται χειμώνος
οὕντος, πρὸς "Ἀννώνα ποιήσεται τὸν ἁγώνα καὶ πρὸς
αὐτάς τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ πρὸς ἐτὶ γέμοντα
8 τὰ σκάφη, ἐὰν δὲ τηρῶν εὐδίαν καὶ καταμέλλων
έασθι διάραι καὶ συμμεξί νοθιώνεφώ οἷων πολεμίως,
πρὸς τε τὰς ναῦς εὐκυφήτους καὶ κεκου-
φισμένας ἀγωνιεῖται πρὸς τε τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας
τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατευμάτων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον
πρὸς τὴν Ἀμίλκου τόλμην, ἦς οὐδὲν ὢν τὸτε φο-
9 ῥον κατέστησε τοῖς πολεμίωις τὸν στόλον. οἱ δὲ
Καρχηδονίωι κατιδόντες τὸν διάπλουν αὐτῶν προ-
κατέχοντας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, καθελόμενοι τοὺς ἱστοὺς
καὶ παρακαλέσαντες κατὰ ναῦν σφάς αὐτοὺς, συν-
2 ἐβαλλον τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. τῆς δ’ ἐκατέρων παρα-
σκευής τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔχουσις διάθεσιν τῇ περὶ τὰ
Δρέπανα γενομένη ναυμαχία, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐκατέρωσ
3 τῆς μάχης εἰκότως ἐναντίον ἀπέβη. οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι
μὲν γὰρ τὴν τε ναυπηγίαν μετειλήφεσαν, καὶ τὰ βάρη
πάντα χωρίς τῶν πρὸς τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἐπιτηδείων
ἐξετέθειντο· τὰ τε πληρώματα συγκεκριμένα δια-
φέρουσιν αὐτοῖς τὴν χρείαν παρείχετο, τοὺς τ’
ἐπιβάτας κατ’ ἐκλογὴν ἄνδρας ἀπαραχωρήτους ἐκ
4 τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων εἶχον. περὶ δὲ τοὺς
Καρχηδονίους τάναντία τούτοις ὑπήρχεν. αἱ μὲν
γὰρ νῆς γέμουσαι δυσχρήστως διέκειντο πρὸς τὸν

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sea too being heavy and rough. At first he hesitated much what to do under the circumstances, but reflected that if he risked an attack now that the weather was stormy, he would be fighting against Hanno and the naval forces alone and also against heavily laden ships, whereas if he waited for calm weather and by his delay allowed the enemy to cross and join the army, he would have to face ships now lightened and manageable as well as the pick of the land forces and above all the bravery of Hamilcar which was what they dreaded most at that time. He therefore decided not to let the present opportunity slip. When he saw the Carthaginian ships under full sail he at once got under weigh. As his crews easily mastered the waves owing to their good training, he soon brought his fleet into a single line with their prows to the enemy. 61. The Carthaginians, seeing that the Romans were intercepting their crossing, lowered their masts and cheering each other on in each ship closed with the enemy. As the condition of each force was just the reverse of what it had been at the battle of Drepana, the result also was naturally the reverse for each. The Romans had reformed their system of shipbuilding and had also put ashore all heavy material except what was required for the battle; their crews rendered excellent service, as their training had got them well together, and the marines they had were men selected from the army for their steadfastness. With the Carthaginians it was just the opposite. Their ships, being loaded, were not in a serviceable condition for battle, while
κίνδυνον, τὰ δὲ πληρώματα τελέως ἢν ἀνάσκητα καὶ πρὸς καὶρὸν ἐμβεβλημένα, τὰ δ᾽ ἐπιβατικὰ νεο-
σύλλογα καὶ πρωτόπειρα πάσης κακοπαθείας καὶ
5 παντὸς δεινοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μηδέποτ᾽ ἢν ἐτί τοὺς
Ῥωμαίους ἐλπίζαι τῆς θαλάττης ἀντιπούχασθαι
καταφρονήσαντες ὕλιγῳρουν τῶν ναυτικῶν δυνά-
6 μεων. τοιγαροθν ἀμα τῷ συμβαλεῖν κατὰ πολλα
μέρη τῆς μάχης ἐλαττοῦμενοι ταχέως ἐλείφθησαν,
καὶ πεντήκοντα μὲν αὐτῶν ναὸς κατέδυσαν, ἐβδο-
7 μῆκοντα δ᾽ ἐάλωσαν αὐτάνδροι· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλη-
θὸς ἐπαράμενον τοὺς ἵπτος καὶ κατουρώσαν αὐθίς
ἀπεχώρει πρὸς τὴν Ἰεραν νήσουν, εὔνυχῶς καὶ παρα-
δόξως ἐκ μεταβολῆς αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν δέοντα κα-
8 ρὸν τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργήσαντος. ὁ μὲν οὖν
Ῥωμαῖων στρατηγὸς ἀποπλεύσας πρὸς τὸ Διλύ-
βαιον καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰχμαλώτων
πλοίων καὶ τῶν σωμάτων οἰκονομίαν ἐγίνετο,
μεγάλην οὐσαν· οὐ γὰρ πολὺ τῶν μυρίων ἔλειπε
σωμάτων τὰ ληφθέντα ζωγρία κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον.

62 Οἳ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, προσπεσούσης αὐτοῖς ἄπροσ-
δοκήτως τῆς ὑπητῆς, ταῖς μὲν ὀρμαῖς καὶ ταῖς φιλο-
τυμίαις ἀκμῇν ἔτοιμοι πολεμεῖν ἤσαν, τοῖς δὲ λογι-
2 σμοῖς ἐξηπόρουν. οὔτε γὰρ χορηγεῖν ἔτι ταῖς ἐν τῇ
Σικελία δυνάμεσιν οἴοι τ᾽ ἤσαν, κρατούντων τῆς
θαλάττης τῶν ὑπεναντίων· ἀπογόντες δὲ ταῦτας,
καὶ προδότας τρόπον τινα γενόμενοι, ποιαις χειρὶν
3 ἥ ποιους ἡγεμόνι πολεμήσειαν οὐκ εἴχον. διόπερ
ὀξέως διαπεμψάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπέτρεψαν
ἐκείνῳ περὶ τῶν ὅλων. δὲ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἐποίησεν
4 ἔργον ἡγεμόνος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φρονίμου. μέχρι μὲν
γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγου ἤν τις ἐλπίς ἐν τοῖς ὑποκει-
μένοις, οὐδὲν τῶν παραβόλων ἥ δεινῶν δοκοῦντων
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the crews were quite untrained, and had been put on board for the emergency, and their marines were recent levies whose first experience of the least hardship and danger this was. The fact is that, owing to their never having expected the Romans to dispute the sea with them again, they had, in contempt for them, neglected their navy. So that immediately on engaging they had the worst in many parts of the battle and were soon routed, fifty ships being sunk and seventy captured with their crews. The remainder raising their masts and finding a fair wind got back to Holy Isle, very fortunate in the wind having unexpectedly gone round and helping them just when they required it. As for the Roman Consul he sailed away to Lilybaeum and the legions, and there occupied himself with the disposal of the captured ships and men, a business of some magnitude, as the prisoners made in the battle numbered very nearly ten thousand.

62. Even on hearing of this unexpected defeat the Carthaginians, had they let themselves be guided by passion and ambition, would readily have continued the war, but when it came to a matter of cool calculation they were quite at a loss. For one thing they were no longer able to send supplies to their forces in Sicily as the enemy commanded the sea, and if they abandoned and in a manner betrayed them, they had neither other men nor other leaders with whom to pursue the war. They therefore at once sent a message to Barcas giving him full powers to deal with the situation. Hamilcar acted thoroughly like the good and prudent leader he was. As long as there had been some reasonable hope in the situation he had left no means, however perilous and
εἶναι παρέλυτεν, ἀλλὰ πάσας τὰς τοῦ νυκῶν ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν ἑλπίδας, εἰ καὶ τις ἄλλος ἦγεμόνων, ἐξ-5 ὦλεγξεν. ἔπειδὴ δὲ περιέστη τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῶν κατὰ λόγον οὐδὲν ἔτι κατελείπετο πρὸς τὸ σῶζειν τοὺς ὑποταττομένους, πάνω νουνεχὼς καὶ πραγμα-6 τικῶς εἰξάς τοῖς παροῦσιν ὑπὲρ σπουδῶν καὶ δια-7 λύσεων ἐξαπέστειλε πρεσβευτάς. τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ νομιστέον ἦγεμόνον εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι βλέπειν τὸν τε 7 τοῦ νυκῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ λείποντας καιρὸν. 8 τοῦ δὲ Λυτατίου προβῆμως δεξαμένου τὰ παρακα-λούμενα διὰ τὸ συνειδέναι τοῖς σφητέροις πράγμασι 9 τετρυμένους καὶ κάμνουσιν ἡδὴ τῷ πολέμῳ, συνεβῇ τέλος ἐπιθείμα τῇ διαφορᾷ τοιούτων τυχῶν συνθῆ- κών διαγραφεισῶν. "ἔπι τοῦσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Ἀρ-χηδονίους καὶ Ῥωμαίοις, ἕναν καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ τῶν Ῥωμαίων συνδοκῇ. ἐκχωρεῖν Σικελίας ἀπάσης Καρχηδονίους καὶ μῆ πολεμεῖν Τιέρων μηδ' ἐπι-φέρειν ὀπλα Συρακοσίους μηδ' τῶν Συρακοσίων 10 συμμάχους. ἀποδοῦναι Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις χωρὶς λύτρων ἀπαντάς τοὺς αἴχμαλωτοὺς. ἀρ-γυρίου κατενεχκείν Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις ἐν 11 έτεσιν εἰκοσί διαχίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντ' 12 Εὐβοικά." τούτων δ' ἔπανενεχθέντων εἰς τὴν 13 Ῥώμην, οὗ προσεδέξατο τὰς συνθήκας ὁ δήμος, ἀλλ' ἐξαπέστειλεν ἄνδρας δέκα τοὺς ἐπισκεφομένους 2 υπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων. οἱ καὶ παραγενόμενοι τῶν 3 ἐπὶ πράγματον. οἱ καὶ παραγενόμενοι τῶν μὲν ὅλων οὐδὲν ἔτι μετέθηκαν, βραχέα δὲ προσεπετει- ναν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. τὸν τε γὰρ χρόνον τῶν 4 φόρων ἐποίησαν ἡμῖν, χίλια τάλαντα προσθέντες, 5 τῶν τε νήσων ἐκχωρεῖν Καρχηδονίους προσεπετει- ξαν, ὅσι μεταξὺ τῆς Ἰταλίας κεῖνται καὶ τῆς 6 Σικελίας.

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venturesome it seemed, unemployed, and if there ever was a general who put to proof in a war every chance of success, it was he. But now that fortunes were reversed and there was no reasonable prospect left of saving the troops under his command, he showed his practical good sense in yielding to circumstance and sending an embassy to treat for peace. For our opinion should be that a general ought to be qualified to discern both when he is victorious and when he is beaten. Lutatius readily consented to negotiate, conscious as he was that the Romans were by this time worn out and enfeebled by the war, and he succeeded in putting an end to the contest by a treaty more or less as follows.

“There shall be friendship between the Carthaginians and Romans on the following terms if approved by the Roman people. The Carthaginians to evacuate the whole of Sicily and not to make war on Hiero or bear arms against the Syracusans or the allies of the Syracusans. The Carthaginians to give up to the Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians to pay to the Romans by instalments in twenty years two thousand two hundred Euboean talents.” 63. But when these terms were referred to Rome, the people did not accept the treaty, but sent ten commissioners to examine the matter. On their arrival they made no substantial changes in the terms, but only slight modifications rendering them more severe for Carthage: for they reduced the term of payment by one half, added a thousand talents to the indemnity, and demanded the evacuation by the Carthaginians of all islands lying between Sicily and Italy.
4 Ο μὲν οὖν Ρωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις συστάς περὶ Συκελλίας πόλεμος ἐπὶ τοιούτως καὶ τοιούτων ἐσχε τὸ τέλος, ἐτή πολεμηθεὶς εἰκοσὶ καὶ τέτταρα συνεχῶς, πόλεμος ὁν ἦμεις ἦσαν ἀκοῇ μαθόντες 5 πολυχρονιώτατος καὶ συνεχέστατος καὶ μέγιστος. ἐν ὦ χωρὶς τῶν λοιπῶν ἀγώνων καὶ παρασκευῶν, καθάπερ εἰπομεν ἀνώτερον, ἀπαξ μὲν οἱ συνάμφων πλείσυν ἡ πεντακοσία, πάλιν δὲ μικρῷ λειτούσιν ἐπτακοσίοις σκόφεσι πεντηρικοῖς ἐναμάχησαν πρὸς 6 ἀλλήλους. ἀπέβαλον γε μὴν Ρωμαίοι μὲν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τούτῳ πεντήρεις μετὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυαγίαις διαφθαρεισῶν εἰς ἐπτακοσίας, Καρχηδόνιοι δὴ 7 εἰς πεντακοσίας. ὥστε τοὺς θαυμάζοντας τὰς Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Πτολεμαίου καὶ Δημητρίου ναυαχίαις καὶ τοὺς στόλους εἰκότως ἀν περὶ τούτων ἱστορήσαντας ἐκπεπλήξατο τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν πράξεων. 8 εἰ δὲ τις βουληθείς συλλογίσασθαι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πεντηρικῶν πλοίων πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις, αἰς οἱ τε Πέρσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας καὶ πάλιν Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐναμάχουν, οὔδὲν γὰρ καθόλου δυνηθεὶς τηλικαύτας δυνάμεις εὑρεῖν 9 ἐν θαλάττῃ διηγουμενήν. ἐξ ὦν δὴλον τὸ προτεθὲν ἦμιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡς οὐ τύχῃ ὉΡωμαίων, καθάπερ ἐνῳ δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἐλλήνων, οὐδὲν αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ λιαν εἰκότως ἐν τοιούτως καὶ τηλικούτως πράγμασιν ἐνασκήσαντες οὐ μόνον ἐπεβάλοντο τῇ τῶν ὀλίων ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ δυναστείᾳ τολμηρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ 64 καθίκοντο τῆς προθέσεως. καὶ τὶ δῆποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτίον, ἀπορήσαι τις ἂν, ὅτι κεκρατηκότες τῶν ὀλίων καὶ πολλαπλασίαν ἐχοντες ὑπεροχὴν νῦν ἡ πρόσθεν οὐτ' ἄν πληρώσαι τοσαύτας ναῦς οὔτ' ἀναπλεῦσαι 2 τηλικούτως στόλους δυνηθεῖν; οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ 172
Such then was the end of the war between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of Sicily, and such were the terms of peace. It had lasted without a break for twenty-four years and is the longest, most uninterrupted, and greatest war we know of. Apart from all the other battles and armaments, the total naval forces engaged were, as I mentioned above, on one occasion more than five hundred quinqueremes and on a subsequent one very nearly seven hundred. Moreover the Romans lost in this war about seven hundred quinqueremes, inclusive of those that perished in the shipwrecks, and the Carthaginians about five hundred. So that those who marvel at the great sea-battles and great fleets of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius would, if I mistake not, on inquiring into the history of this war, be much astonished at the huge scale of the operations. Again, if we take into consideration the difference between quinqueremes and the triremes in which the Persians fought against the Greeks and the Athenians and Lacedaemonians against each other, we shall find that no forces of such magnitude ever met at sea. This confirms the assertion I ventured to make at the outset that the progress of the Romans was not due to chance and was not involuntary, as some among the Greeks choose to think, but that by schooling themselves in such vast and perilous enterprises it was perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal dominion, but executed their purpose. 64. Some of my readers will wonder what can be the reason why, now that they are masters of the world and far more puissant than formerly, they could neither man so many ships, nor put to sea with such large fleets.
μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σαφῶς ἔξεσται τὰς αἰτίας κατανοεῖν, ὅταν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔξήγησιν αὐτῶν τῆς πολιτείας ἔλθωμεν. ὑπὲρ ἧς οὐθ' ἦμιν ἐν παρέγραφῳ ἦ-
3 τέον οὔτε τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἀργῶς προσεκτεόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ θέαμα καλὸν, σχεδὸν δ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀγνωστὸν ἔως τοῦ νῦν, χάριν τῶν περὶ αὐτῆς συγ-
4 γεγραφότων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦνταὶ, οἱ δ' ἀσαφῆ
5 καὶ τελέως ἀνωφελὴν πεποίηται τὴν ἔξήγησιν. πλὴν ἐν γε τῷ προερχόμενῳ πολέμῳ τάς μὲν τῶν πολι-
τευμάτων ἄμφοτέρων προαιρέσεις ἐφαμίλλους εὐροὶ τις ἀν γεγενημένας, οὐ μόνον ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς μεγαλοπρεπεῖς, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ περὶ τῶν
6 πρωτεύων φιλοτιμία, τοὺς γε μὴν ἀνδρὰς οὐ μικροῖς, πολλῷ δὲ γενναιότεροὺς ἐν παντὶ Ὀρμαίοις· ἡγε-
μόνα δὲ καὶ γνώμη καὶ τόλμη θετέων ἀριστον Ἀμιλ-
καν τῶν τότε γεγονέναι τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπικαλούμενον, πατέρα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν Ὀλυμπίου τοῦ μετὰ ταύτα πολεμήσαντος Ὀρμαίοις.
65 Μετὰ δὲ τὰς διαλύσεις ταύτας ὑδιὸν τι καὶ
2 παραπλῆσιον ἄμφοτέρους συνεβη παθεῖν. ἐξεδέξατο
γὰρ πόλεμος ἐμφυλίος Ὀρμαίοις μὲν ὁ πρὸς τοὺς
Βαλέσκους καλομένους, ὅν ταχεώς καὶ συμφερόντως
ἐπιτελεσαν, ἐν ὁλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐγκρατεῖς γενόμενοι
3 τῆς πόλεως αὐτῶν, Καρχηδονίους δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐ-
τὸν καίρον ὡς μικρὸς οὐδ' εὐκαταφρονητὸς ὁ πρὸς
tοὺς ἐξένου καὶ τοὺς Νομάδας καὶ τοὺς ἀμα τού-
4 τοὺς ἀποστάντας Λίβνας, ἐν δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ μεγά-
λους ύπομεινάντες φόβους τέλος οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς
χώρας ἐκινδύνευσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν
5 καὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν πόλεμον
τοῦτον ἐπιστήσατο μὲν ἄξιον δὲ πλείους αἰτίας, ἐπὶ
κεφαλαίον δὲ καὶ διὰ βραχέων αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι
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Those, however, who are puzzled by this, will be enabled to understand the reason clearly when we come to deal with their political institutions, a subject not to be treated incidentally by the writer or followed inattentively by the reader. It offers a noble spectacle and one almost wholly unrevealed hitherto, owing to the incompetence of the authors who have dealt with it, some of whom sinned from lack of knowledge, while the account given by others is wanting in clearness and entirely unprofitable. As regards, however, the war of which we are speaking, one will find its purpose and prosecution on the part of the two states equally characterized on both sides by enterprise, by lofty spirit, and above all by ambition for supremacy. In individual courage indeed the Romans were far superior, but the general to whom the palm must be given both for daring and for genius is Hamilcar called Barcas, the actual father of that Hannibal who afterwards made war on the Romans.

65. Shortly after this treaty it so happened that both states found themselves placed in circumstances peculiarly similar. For at Rome there followed a civil war against the Falisci, but this they brought to a speedy and favourable conclusion, taking Falerii in a few days. But the war the Carthaginians had to face was no little or contemptible one, being against their mercenaries, the Numidians and those Libyans who joined in the revolt. In this war they encountered many great perils and finally were in danger of losing not only their territory, but their own liberty and the soil of their native town. For several reasons I think it worth my while to call attention to this war, and, according to the plan I stated at the outset, to give a summary and brief
6 τὴν ἐξήγησιν κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. τὸν τε γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς λεγόμενον ἀσπονδοὺ πόλε- 
μου, τίνα φύσιν ἔχει καὶ διάθεσιν, μάλιστ' ἂν τις 
7 ἐκ τῶν τότε γεγονότων ἐπιγνώσθε, τοὺς τε χρωμέ- 
νους μισθοφορικαὶς δυνάμει τίνα δεὶ προορᾶσθαι 
καὶ φυλάττεσθαι μακρὸθεν ἐναργεῖστα' ἂν ἐκ τῆς 
tότε περιστάσεως συνθεωρῆσει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις 
tί διαφέρει καὶ κατὰ πόσον ἡθη σύμμετρα καὶ βάρ- 
8 βαρα τῶν ἐν παιδείας καὶ νόμοις καὶ πολιτικοῖς 
ἐθεσιν ἐκτεθραμμένων· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον τῶς αἰτίας 
ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς καιροῖς πεπραγμένων κατα- 
νοήσεις, δὴ ἂς ὁ κατ᾽ Ἀννίβαυν συνέστη Ῥωμαίοις 
9 καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πόλεμοι. ὑπὲρ οὐ διὰ τὸ μὴ μό- 
νον παρὰ τοῖς συγγραφεῖσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς 
πεπολεμηκόσιν ἐτὶ νῦν ἁμφισβήτησθαι τὰς αἰτίας, 
χρήσιμον ἔστι τὴν ἀληθινωτάτην παραστήσαι διά- 
λημνὶ τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν.

66 Ὁς γὰρ θάττων ἐπιτελεσθεισῶν τῶν προερημέ- 
νων διαλύσωσιν ἀποκατέστησε τὰς περὶ τῶν Ἐρυκα 
dυνάμεις εἰς τὸ Λυδικὸν οὐΒάρκας, εὐθέως αὐ- 
tὸς μὲν ἀπέθητο τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως 
στρατηγὸς Γέσκων ἐγίνετο περὶ τὸ περαιοῦν τοὺς 
2 στρατιώτας εἰς τὴν Διβύν. προϊόδεμον δὲ τὸ 
μέλλον ἐμφρόνως ἐνεβίβαξε κατὰ μέρη διαφόρων αὐ-
3 τοὺς καὶ διαλέιμμα τοιῶν τῆς ἐξαποστολῆς, βου- 
λόμενος ἀναστροφὴν διδόναι τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς 
tὸ τοὺς καταπλεύσαντας καὶ μισθοδοτηθέντας τὰ 
προσοφελόμενα τῶν ὄφων ἄνθρωπος ἀπαλλαττο- 
mένους ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνος εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν πρὶν ἣ 
4 τοὺς ἐξῆς περαιοῦμενος ἐπικαταλάβειν. ὁ μὲν οὖν 
Γέσκων ἑχόμενος ταύτης τῆς ἐννοιας οὕτως ἔχειριζε 
5 τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐξαποστολὴν. οὐ δὲ Καρχηδόνοι τὰ
narrative of it. In the first place one could not find a better illustration of the nature and character of what is vulgarly known as a truceless war than the circumstances of this one, and secondly one can see very clearly from all that took place what kind of dangers those who employ mercenary forces should foresee and take early precautions to avert, as well as in what lies the great difference of character between a confused herd of barbarians and men who have been brought up in an educated, law-abiding, and civilized community. But the most important thing is that from these events one can get an idea of the causes of the Hannibalic war. As it is still a matter of dispute, not only among historians, but among the combatants, what were the actual causes of this latter war, it will be useful to students of history if I lay before them the explanation that is nearest to the truth.

66. It is this. When, at once on the conclusion of the treaty, Barcas had transferred his forces from Eryx to Lilybaeum he immediately resigned his command, and Gesco the commandant there took steps for sending the troops over to Africa. Foreseeing what was likely to happen, he very wisely embarked them in detachments and at certain intervals in order to give the Carthaginians time to pay them their arrears as they arrived and to pack them off to their own countries before the next batch that crossed could catch them up. Such was the idea Gesco had, and he managed to dispatch the troops in this manner, but the Carthaginians
μὲν οὐκ εὐποροῦμενοι χρημάτων διὰ τὰς προγεγενημένας δαπάνας, τὰ δὲ καὶ πεπεισμένοι παραιτήσεσθαι τοὺς μισθοφόρους μέρος τι τῶν προσοφειλεμένων ὦψων, ἐὰν καὶ συναθροίσωσι καὶ δέξωνται πάντας εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, παρακατείχον ἐκεῖ τοὺς καταπλέοντας διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ συν-6 εἶχον ἐν τῇ πόλει. γινομένων δὲ πλειόνων ἄδικημάτων καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑποδόμενοι τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὴν συμβαίνουσαν ἀκρασίαν ἤξισαν τοὺς ἤγεμόνας, ἐως ἃν ἐτοιμασθῇ μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὰς σιταρχίας αὐτοῖς, προσδέξωνται δὲ τοὺς ἀπολειπομένους, ἀναχωρῆσαι πάντας εἰς τινα πόλιν τὴν προσαγορευμένην Σίκκαν, λαβόν-7 τας εἰς τὰ κατεπείγοντα χρυσοῖν ἐκαστον. προθύμῳ δὲ συνυπακούσαντων πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον, καὶ βουλομένων αὐτοῦ καταλιπεῖν τὰς ἄποσκευὰς, καθ-άπερ καὶ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ὑπῆρχον, ὡς θάττον ἐσομένης τῆς ἐπανόδου πρὸς τοὺς ὦψωνισμοὺς,

8 ἀγωνιῶντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι μῆποτε διὰ χρόνου παραγεγονότες, καὶ τυνὲς μὲν τέκνων, ἐνοὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν ἰμείροντες, οἱ μὲν οὐκ ἐκπορευθέντοι τὸ παράπαν, οἱ δ' ἐκπορευθέντες άθικα ἀνακάμπτοσι πρὸς ταῦτα, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ μηδὲν ἤττων ἄδικημα γίνεται κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ταῦτα προορώμε-9 νοί μετὰ πολλῆς ἀπευθείας οὐδαμῶς βουλομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἠγάκασαν τὰς ἄποσκευὰς μεθ' ἀντίων ἀπαγαγεῖν. οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι συναναχθέν-τες εἰς τὴν Σίκκαν, καὶ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου τετευχότες ἀνέσεως καὶ σχολῆς, ὀπερ ἀφιεστατον ὅπαρ-χει ξενικάις δύναμεσι, καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀρχηγον καὶ μόνου αὐτῶν γίνεται στάσεως, διήγον

11 ἀδεῶς. ἀμα δὲ ῥαθυμοῦντες, τυνὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐξ-178
partly because, owing to their recent outlay, they were not very well off for money, and partly because they were convinced that the mercenaries would let them off part of their arrears of pay, once they had got them all collected in Carthage, detained them there on their arrival in this hope, confining them to the city. As they committed frequent offences there both by night and by day, the government in the first place, suspicious of their numbers and their present licentious spirit, asked their commanding officers, until arrangements had been made for paying them in full and those who were still missing had arrived, to withdraw them all to a town called Sicca, each man receiving a gold stater for pressing expenses. The troops readily consented to leave the capital, but wished to leave their baggage there, as they had formerly done, thinking that they would be soon returning to be paid off. The Carthaginians, however, were afraid lest, longing to be with their wives or children after their recent protracted absence, they might in many cases refuse to leave Carthage, or, if they did, would come back again to their families, so that there would be no decrease of outrages in the city. In anticipation then of this, they compelled the men, much against their will and in a manner calculated to cause much offence, to take their baggage with them. The mercenaries, when assembled in Sicca, lived in a free and easy manner, having not enjoyed for a long time relaxation of discipline and leisure, things most prejudicial to a force raised abroad, and nearly always the very arch-instigators and sole causes of mutiny. At the same time, as they had nothing else to do, some of them began
12 Καρχηδονίους: πάντες δ' ἀναμμυνησκόμενοι τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων, ὥς οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἐπισφαλεῖς τῶν καρπῶν παρακαλοῦντες σφᾶς ἐπεποίηντο, μεγάλας εἶχον ἐλπίδας καὶ μεγάλῃν προσδοκίαν τῆς ἐσο-μένης περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπανορθώσεως. διόπερ ἀμα τῷ συλλεχθῆναι πάντας εἰς τὴν Σικκᾶν, καὶ παραγγέλμενον "Ἀνώνα τὸν ὑπάρχοντα στρατηγόν ἐν τῇ Λιβύη τότε τῶν Καρχηδονίων μὴ οἶον τὰς ἐλπίδας καὶ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας ἐκπληροῦν, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον λέγοντα τὸ βάρος τῶν φόρων καὶ τὴν καθόλου στενοχωρίαν τῆς πόλεως ἐγχειρεῖν παραιτεῖσθαι μέρος τι τῶν ἐξ ὁμολόγου προσφειλομένων ὁφων-νῶν, εὐθέως διαφορὰ καὶ στάσις ἐγεννᾶτο καὶ συν-δρομαὶ συνεχείς ἐγένοντο, ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ γένη, ποτὲ 3 δ' ὁμοὶ πάντων. ὡς δ' ἀν μὴθ' ὁμοεθνῶν μηθ' ὁμογλώττων ὑπαρχόντων, ἢν ἀμιξίας καὶ θορύβου καὶ τῆς λεγομένης τύρβης πλῆρες τὸ στρατόπεδον.

4 Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ ἂεὶ χρώμενοι ποικίλαις καὶ μισθοφορικά δυνάμεις, πρὸς μὲν τὸ μη ταχέως συμφρονήσαντας ἀπειθεῖν μηθ' δυσκαταπλήκτους εἶναι τοῖς ἡγουμένοις ὀρθῶς στοχάζονται, ποιοῦτες ἐκ 5 πολλῶν γενῶν τὴν δύναμιν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ γενομένης ὀργῆς ἢ διαβολῆς ἢ στάσεως διδάξαυ καὶ πράγμαι καὶ μεταθέναι τοὺς ἡγουμένας ὀλοσχερῶς ἀστο-6 χόουν. οὐ γάρ οἷον ἀνθρωπίνη χρήσθαι κακία συμβαίνει τὰς τοιαύτας δυνάμεις, ὅταν ἀπαξ εἰς ὀργῆν καὶ διαβολὴν ἐμπέσωσι πρός τινας, ἀλλ' ἀπο-
reckoning up the total pay due to them, all to their own advantage, and having arrived at a most exorbitant result, submitted that this was the sum they should demand from the Carthaginians. The whole force remembered the promises the generals had made to them in critical situations, and had great hopes and indeed quite expected that the government would thus correct in their favour the account of the sum they had earned. 67. The consequence was that when the total force was assembled at Sicca, and when Hanno, who was then commander-in-chief in Africa, came there and not only said that it was impossible to meet their claims and fulfil their hopes, but on the contrary tried by dwelling on the present heavy taxation and general distress of Carthage to induce them to renounce some of their stipulated wage, it produced at once a spirit of disension and sedition, and the soldiers began to hold constant meetings, sometimes of particular nations and sometimes general. As they were neither all of the same nationality nor spoke the same language, the camp was full of confusion and tumult and what is known as περίβης or turbulence. For the Carthaginian practice of employing hired troops of various nationalities is indeed well calculated to prevent them from combining rapidly in acts of insubordination or disrespect to their officers, but in cases of an outburst of anger or of slanderous rumours or disaffection it is most prejudicial to all efforts to convey the truth to them, to calm their passions, or to conciliate the culprits. Indeed, such forces, when once their anger is aroused against anyone, or slander spreads among them, are not content with mere human wickedness, but end by becoming like
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θηριοῦσθαι τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ παραστατικὴν λαμβάνων διάθεσιν. δὲ καὶ τὸτε συνέβη γενέσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦς. ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ μὲν Ἰβηρεῖς, οἱ δὲ Κελτοί, των δὲ Λιγυστῶνοι καὶ Βαλλαρεῖς, οὐκ οἷγοι δὲ μιξέληνες, οὐν οἱ πλείους αὐτόμολοι καὶ δούλοι. 

7 τὸ δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῶν ἦν Λίβνες. διόπερ οὔτ' ἐκκλησιάσασα συναθροίσατα πάντας ὁμοί δυνατῶν ἦν οὔτ' ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν εὑρέσθαι πρὸς τούτο μηχανήν. πῶς γὰρ οἶον τε; τὸν μὲν γὰρ στρατηγὸν εἰδέναι τὰς ἐκάστων διαλέκτων ἀδύνατον· διὰ πλείωνων δ’ ἐρμηνεύων ἐκκλησιάζεων, ἀμα τετράκις καὶ πεντάκις περὶ ταύτου λέγοντα πράγματος, σχε- 

8 δὸν ὡς εἴπειν ἐτὶ τοῦ πρόσθεν ἀδυνατώτερον. λοιπὸν ἦν διὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ποιεῖσθαι τὰς αξιώσεις καὶ παρακλήσεις· ὅπερ ἐπειρᾶτο τὸτε συνεχῶς ποιεῖν ὁ Ἀννων. ἁκίμη δὲ καὶ τούτους συνέβαινεν ὁ μὲν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν λεγομένων, δὲ καὶ συναινέσαντας ἐνίοτε τῷ στρατηγῷ τάναντι πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναγγέλλειν, τοὺς μὲν δὲ ᾄνοιαν, τοὺς δὲ διὰ κακίαν. ἔξ ὡς ἢν ἀσαφείας, ἀπιστίας, ἁμι- 

τοῖς παρηκολουθηκότα τούτον ἐκπεπομφέναι. τέλος δ’ οὖν ἀπαξιώσαντες μὲν τὸν Ἀννώνα, διαπιστησάντες δὲ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόνων, ἐξοργισθέντες δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, ὁρμήσαν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ἀπέχοντες ὡς ἃν ἐκατόν καὶ εἰκοσι πέντε τῆς Καρχηδόνος ἐπὶ τῷ καλουμένῳ Τύνητι, πλείους ὄντες τῶν δισμυρίων. 182
wild beasts or men deranged, as happened in the present case. Some of these troops were Iberians, some Celts, some Ligurians, and some from the Balearic islands; there were a good many Greek half-breeds, mostly deserters and slaves, but the largest portion consisted of Libyans. It was therefore impossible to assemble them and address them as a body or to do so by any other means; for how could the general be expected to know all their languages? And again to address them through several interpreters, repeating the same thing four or five times, was, if anything, more impracticable. The only means was to make demands or entreaties through their officers, as Hanno continued to attempt on the present occasion, and even these did not understand all that was told them, or at times, after seeming to agree with the general, addressed their troops in just the opposite sense either from ignorance or from malice. The consequence was that everything was in a state of uncertainty, mistrust and confusion. For one thing, they thought the Carthaginians had acted purposely in not communicating with them through the generals who were acquainted with their performances in Sicily and who had made them the promises of bounties, but in sending one who had not been present on any of those occasions. At length, then, refusing to treat with Hanno, thoroughly distrusting their divisional officers, and highly indignant with the Carthaginians, they marched on the capital and encamped at a distance of about one hundred and twenty stades from Carthage at the place called Tunis. They were more than twenty thousand in number.
Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τότε πρὸ ὁφθαλμοῦ ἔλαμβαν τὴν αὐτῶν ἁγνοιαν, ὅτ’ ἦν οὐδὲν ὁφέλος. μεγάλα μὲν γὰρ ἦμαρτον, εἰς ἕνα τόπον ἀθροίσαντες τοσοῦτο πλῆθος μισθοφόρων, ἔχοντες οὐδεμιᾶν ἐλπίδα πολεμικῆς χρείας εἰς ταῖς πολιτικαῖς δυναμεῖς, μεσι, τοῦτον δὲ μεῖζὸν ἐτι, προέμενοι τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας καὶ σὺν τούτοις τὰς ἀποσκευὰς οἷς ἔζην ὁμόροις χρησαμένους ἀσφαλέστερον μὲν αὐτοῦς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ὑποτιπτῶντων, εὐπειθεστέρους δ’ ἐκεῖνοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ παρακολούθειν, οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ καταπλαγέντες τὴν στρατοπεδεύαν πάν ὑπέμενον, σπουδάζοντες εξιλάσσασθαι τὴν ὁργὴν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς τὰ ἐπιτηδείων ἁγοράς ἐκπέμποντες δαμιλείς ἐπώλουν, καθὼς ἐκεῖνοι βουλοῦντο καὶ τάττουεν τὰς τιμὰς, τῶν τῆς γερουσίας ἀεὶ τινας ἔξαπέστελλον πρέσβεις, ὑπισχυόμενοι ποιήσειν πάν ὅ, τι ποτ’ ἀν αὐτοὺς ἀξιώσαιεν εἰ κατὰ δύναμιν. ἦν δὲ πολὺ τὸ καθ’ ἐκάστην ἡμέραν παρὰ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐπινοοῦμενον, ἀτε δὴ κατατεθαρρυκότων μὲν καὶ συντεθεωρηκότων τὴν κατάπληξιν καὶ πτοίαν τῶν Καρχηδόνων, περιφρονηματισμένοι δὲ καὶ πεπεισμένοι διὰ τοὺς προγεγονότας αὐτοῖς ἐν Σικελίᾳ πρὸς τὰ Ἔρωμαίκα στρατόπεδα κυνίσουσιν μὴ οἴον Καρχηδόνιον αὐτοφθαλμήσαι ποτ’ ἀν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς, ἄλλα μηδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδένα βαδίσω. διόπερ ἀμα τῷ συγχωρῆσαι τὰ περὶ τῶν ὁφνίων αὐτοῖς τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους εὐθεῶς ἐπέβαινον, καὶ τῶν τεθνεωτῶν ὑππολ αἵττου τὰς ἀξιας. προσδεξαμένων δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, πάλιν τῆς προσοφειλομένης συμμετρίας ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου τὴν μεγίστην γεγονυῖαν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ την ἐφασκὸν αὐτοὺς δεῖν.
68. Now, when there was no mending, it was brought home to the Carthaginians how blind they had been. For they had committed two great mistakes. The first was in collecting at one place so large a body of mercenaries while themselves they could hope for nothing from the fighting power of their civic force. Their second error was even more serious, to let out of their hands the women and children of the mercenaries as well as their movables, all which would have served as hostages, giving themselves greater security in their deliberations about the circumstances and ensuring a more favourable reception for their demands. Still now, in their alarm at the troops encamping so near, they were ready to put up with anything in their eagerness to propitiate them, sending out lavish supplies of provisions which they sold to them at any price they chose to pay and constantly dispatching envoys from the Senate, promising to meet all their demands as far as it was in their power. These increased daily, the mercenaries continuing to invent new claims, gaining confidence as they witnessed the terror and cowardice of the Carthaginians, and being convinced in their arrogance, owing to their success in Sicily against the Roman legions, that not only the Carthaginians, but any other people in the world would not readily face them in arms. When, therefore, the Carthaginians had agreed to their claims for pay, they went a step further and asked for the value of the horses they had lost. This also was conceded, whereupon they maintained that they ought to get the value of the rations of corn due to them for a considerable time at the highest price corn had stood
κομίζεσθαι. καθόλου δ' ἀεὶ τι νέον καὶ κανὼν προσεξεύρισκον, εἰς ἀδύνατον ἐκβάλλοντες τὴν διά-
lυσιν, διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς καχέκτας καὶ στασιώδεις ἐν
αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάν τὸ δυνατὸν ὑποσχυμένων τῶν Καρχηδονίων, κατένευσαν ἐπι-
τρέψειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἐνὶ τῶν ἐν
Σικελία γεγονότων στρατηγῶν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν ἦν
'Αμίλκαν τὸν Βάρκαν, μεθ' οὗ συγκεκυδυνεύκεσαν ἐν τῇ Σικελία, δυσχερῶς εἶχον, δοκοῦντες οὐχ
ἡκοτα δι' ἐκείνου ὀλυγωρεῖσθαι, τῷ μῆτε πρε-
σβεύειν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὴν τε στρατηγίαν ἐκουσίως
δοκεῖν ἀποτεθεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ Γέσκωνα πάνυ δι-
ἐκείνῳ φιλανθρώπως, ὅσ ἐγεγόνει μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ
στρατηγός, ἐπεποίητο δ' αὐτῶν πρόνοιαν τὴν ἐν-
δεχομένην ἐν τε τοῖς ἅλλοις καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τὴν
ἀνακομιδὴν. διόπερ ἐπέτρεψαν τούτων περὶ τῶν
ἀμφισβητουμένων. ὅσ παραγενόμενος κατὰ θάλατ-
tαν μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων, καὶ προσπλεύσας πρὸς
tὸν Τύνητα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λαμβάνων τοὺς ἠγε-
μόνας, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συναθροίζων κατὰ γένη τοὺς
πολλοὺς, ἃ μὲν ἐπετίμα περὶ τῶν γεγονότων, ἃ δὲ
διδάσκειν ἐπειράτο περὶ τῶν παρόντων· τὸ δὲ πλεῖον
παρεκάλει πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ἀξίων αὐτοὺς εὑρον
ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχής μισθοδόταις. τέλος δ' ὠρ-
μησε πρὸς τὸ διαλύειν τὰ προσοφειλόμενα τῶν
ὁψωνίων, κατὰ γένη ποιούμενος τὴν μισθοδοσίαν.
ἡν δὲ τις Καμπανὸς ἡμώνοιλόκως παρὰ τῶν Ῥω-
μαίων δοῦλος, ἔχων σωματικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τόλμαν
ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς παράβολον, ὠνομα Σπέιδιος.
οὕτως εὐλαβοῦμενος μὴ παραγενόμενος αὐτὸν ὁ
dεσπότης κομίσηται, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Ῥωμαίων νόμους
αἰκισθεῖς διαφθαρῆ, πάν ἐτόλμα καὶ λέγειν καὶ
at during the war. In short they always went on devising some new claim, putting matters off so as to make it impossible to come to terms, a great many of them being disaffected and mutinous. However, on the Carthaginians promising to concede everything in their power, they agreed to refer the disputed points to one of the generals who had been present in Sicily. Now to Hamilcar Barcas, with whom they had served there, they were ill disposed, thinking that it was largely his fault that they had been slighted, since he never came himself as an envoy to them and was believed to have resigned his command voluntarily. But being very favourably inclined to Gesco, who had been general in Sicily and had been full of attention to them in other matters and in that of their transport, they submitted the points in dispute to him. 69. Gesco, on reaching Tunis by sea bringing the money, at first conferred privately with the officers, and subsequently held meetings of the troops according to their nationalities. He rebuked them for their past conduct, attempted to enlighten them about the present, but most of all dwelt on the future, begging them to show themselves well-disposed to those in whose pay they had been from the outset. Finally he proceeded to discharge their arrears, paying off each nationality separately. There was a certain Campanian, a runaway Roman slave, called Spendius, a man of great physical strength and remarkable courage in war. He was afraid of his master coming to claim him, when, if given up, he would by Roman law be tortured and put to death. He therefore hesitated at nothing in his endeavour both by speech
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πράττειν, σπουδάζων διακόψαι τὰς διαλύσεις τὰς
6 πρὸς Καρχηδονίους. ἀμα δὲ τούτῳ καὶ Λίβυς τις
Μάθως, ὃς ἦν μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ τῶν συνεστρατευ-
μένων, πλείστα δὲ κεκυνάκως κατὰ τὰς προειρημένας
ταραχὰς. ἀγωνίων οὖν μὴ τίς καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν
λοιπῶν δίκην, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐγένετο γνώμης τοῖς
7 περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον. καὶ λαμβάνων τούς Λίβυας
ὑπεδείκνυε διότι μετὰ τὸν ὁψωνισμὸν χωρισθέντων
τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν εἰς τὰς πατρίδας ἀπερείσονται
καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ὀργὴν εἰς αὐτούς οἱ Καρχη-
δόνιοι, καὶ βουλήσονται διὰ τῆς εἰς σφᾶς τιμωρίας
8 ἀπαντᾶς καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ Λιβυῇ. ταχύ
δὲ προσανασεισθέντες οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λό-
γους, καὶ λαμβανόμενοι βραχείας ἀφορμής ἐκ τοῦ
tὸν Γέσκωνα τὰ μὲν ὁψωνία διαλύειν, τὰς δὲ τιμὰς
tοῦ τε σῖτου καὶ τῶν ἱππῶν ὑπερτίθεσθαι, συν-
9 έτρεχον εὐθέως εἰς ἐκκλησιάν. καὶ τοῦ μὲν Σπεν-
δίου καὶ τοῦ Μάθω διαβαλλόντων καὶ κατηγοροῦν-
tῶν τοῦ τε Γέσκωνος καὶ τῶν Καρχηδόνων ἠκούον,
cαὶ προσέδοχον ἐπιμελώς τὸν νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις.
10 εἰ δὲ τίς ἐτερος προπορευθείη συμβουλεύσων, οὐδὲ
αὐτὸ τούτῳ περιμείνατε ἐως τοῦ γνώναι πότερον
ἀντερῶν ἡ συνειρήσησιν πάρεστι τοῖς περὶ τὸν
Σπένδιον, παραχρῆμα βάλλοντες τοῖς λίθοις ἀπ-
11 έκτεινον. καὶ πολλοὺς δὴ τῶ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ κατὰ
tὰς συνδρομὰς καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν
12 διέφθειρον. καὶ μόνον τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦτο κοινῇ συν-
ισχαν τὸ βάλλε διὰ τῷ συνεχῶς αὐτὸ πράττειν. μά-
lιστα δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐποίουν, ὅποτε μεθυσθέντες ἀπὸ
13 τῶν ἀρίστων συνδράμοιμεν. διόπερ ὅτε τὶς ἀρξαίο-
τα βάλλε λέγειν, οὕτως ἐγίνετο πανταχόθεν ἀμα καὶ
tαχέως ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι διαφυγεῖν τῶν ἄπαξ

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and action to break off the negotiations with the Carthaginians. He was supported by a Libyan called Matho, who was indeed a freeman and a member of the force, but had taken a leading part in the late disturbances. Consequently he stood in great fear of being singled out to bear the whole penalty and therefore was of one mind with Spendius. Taking the Libyans aside, he pointed out to them that when the other nations departed to their own countries after being paid off, they would be left to bear the whole weight of the wrath of the Carthaginians, whose object it would be by the punishment they inflicted on them to terrorize all their Libyan subjects. The men were soon stirred by such arguments, and availing themselves of the slender pretext that Gesco while discharging their pay postponed the compensation for the horses and corn, they at once held a meeting. When Spendius and Matho began to traduce and accuse Gesco and the Carthaginians, they were all ears, and listened with great attention, but if anyone else came forward to offer an opinion, they did not even wait to find out if he were going to speak in favour of Spendius or against him, but at once stoned him to death. Numbers both of the officers and privates perished thus in the different meetings, and in fact this phrase "Stone him" was the only one that became intelligible to all the different nations, owing to the frequency of the act. They used to behave thus mostly when they held meetings after their morning meal in a drunken condition, so that the moment anyone called out "Stone him," the stones flew from all sides and so quickly that it was impossible for anyone who once came forward to address them to escape. As,
14 προελθόντων. πλὴν οὖνενος ἐτι τολμῶντος συμβουλεύειν διὰ ταύτην τὴν αὐτίαν, κατέστησαν αὐτῶν στρατηγοὺς Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον.

70 ὁ δὲ Γέσκων ἔωρα μὲν τὴν ὅλην ἀκαταστασίαν καὶ παραχέων, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιούμενος τὸ τῇ πατρίδι συμφέρον, καὶ θεωρῶν ὅτι τούτων ἀποθημωθέντων κινδυνεύουσι προβανῶσι Καρχηδόνωι τοῖς ὀλοὶς πράγμασι, παρεβάλλετο καὶ προσεκαρτέρει, ποτὲ μὲν τοὺς προεστῶτας αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας λαμβάνων, ποτὲ δὲ κατὰ γένη συναθροίζων καὶ παρακαλῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν Λιβύων οὐδέπω κεκομισμένων τὰς συταρχίας, οἰομένων δὲ δεῖν ἀποδεδόθαι σφίσι, καὶ προσιόντων θρασέως, βουλόμενος ὁ Γέσκων ἐπιπλήξει τὴν προπέτειαν αὐτῶν, Μάθω τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀπαιτεῖν ἐκέλευεν. οἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωργίσθησαν ὡστ’ οὐδέ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀναστροφῆν δόντες ἠρμήσαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὸ διαρράξειν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν χρημάτων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συλλαμβάνειν τὸν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς μετ’ αὐτοῦ Καρχηδόνιοι. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ τὸν Σπένδιον ὑπολαμβάνωντες τάχιστ’ ἄν οὕτως ἐκκαυθήναι τὸν πόλεμον, εἰ παράνομον τι πράξειαν καὶ παράσπονδον, συνήργουν τοῖς τῶν ὀχλῶν ἀπονοίαις, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀποσκευὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀμα τοῖς χρήμασι διήρπαζον, τὸν δὲ Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ δήσαντες ὑβριστικῶς εἰς φυλακὴν παρεδίδοσαν. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπολέμοιν ἥδη φανερῶς πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδόνιοις, συνυμμοσίας ἀσεβείς καὶ παρὰ τὰ κοινά τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἑθη ποιησάμενοι. Ο μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ξένους καὶ Λιβυκὸς ἐπικλήθεις πόλεμος διὰ ταύτα καὶ τοιαύτην ἔλαβε τὴν
for this reason, no one dared any longer to express an opinion, they appointed Matho and Spendius Generals.

70. Gesco saw how complete was the disorganization and disturbance, but valuing more than anything the interest of his country and foreseeing that if these troops became utterly deaf to all considerations of humanity, Carthage would evidently be in the gravest danger, he persisted, at great personal risk, in his conciliatory efforts, sometimes conferring privately with their officers, and at other times summoning and addressing meetings of the separate nations. The Libyans, however, had not yet received their pay, and considering it overdue, came to him to demand it in a very insolent manner, when Gesco, thinking to rebuke their presumption, told them to go and ask Matho their "General" for it. This aroused their anger to such a pitch, that without a moment's delay they, first of all, seized on what money they could lay their hands on, and next arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians who were with him. As for Matho and Spendius, thinking that the most expeditious means of fanning the flame would be to commit some violation of law or good faith, they co-operated in the excesses of the soldiery, plundering the personal effects as well as the money-chests of the Carthaginians, and after subjecting Gesco and those with him to the outrage of putting them in fetters, sent them to prison. From this time forward they were at open war with Carthage, having bound themselves by certain impious oaths contrary to the principles recognized by all mankind.

Such then was the origin and beginning of the war against the mercenaries, generally known as the
8 ἀρχὴν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω συντελεσάμενοι τὰ προειρημένα παρατύκα μὲν ἔξαπέστελλον πρέσβεις ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην πόλεις, παρακαλοῦντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δεόμενοι σφίζει βοηθεῖν καὶ
9 συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην ἔτοιμως συν-
υπακουσάντων αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Καρχη-
δονίων ἀπόστασιν, καὶ τὰς τε χορηγίας καὶ τὰς βοη-
θείας προθύμως ἔξαποστέλλοντων, διελόντες σφαῖς
πολιορκεῖν ἑνεχείρησαν οἱ μὲν τὴν Ἱτύκην, οἱ δὲ
toús Ἰππακρίτας, διὰ τὸ ταῦτας τὰς πόλεις μὴ βού-
λεσθαι μετασχεῖν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀποστάσεως.

71 Καρχηδονίοι δὲ τοὺς μὲν κατ’ ιδίαν βίοις ἀεὶ
dιεξαγαγόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας γεννημάτων,
tὰς δὲ κοινὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ χορηγίας ἀθροίζοντες
ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην προσόδων, ἔτι δὲ πολεμεῖν
2 εἰθισμένοι ἕξενικαὶ δυνάμεις, τότε πάντων ἀμα τοῦ-
tῶν οὐ μόνον ἐστερημένοι παραλόγως, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ’
avτῶν ὀρῶντες ἐκαστὰ τῶν προειρημένων ἐπιστρέ-
φοντα, τελέως ἐν μεγάλῃ δυσθυμίᾳ καὶ δυσελπιστικῇ
cathéstasan, ἀτε παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν αὐτοῖς τῶν
3 πραγμάτων ἀποβεβηκότων. τετρυμένοι γὰρ ἐν τῷ
περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ συνεχῶς, ἤλπιζον ἐπιτελεσθεῖ-
σῶν τῶν διαλύσεων ἀναπνοῆς των τεῦξεθαι καὶ
4 καταστάσεως εὐδοκομένης. συνέβαλε δ’ αὐτοῖς
tάναντία· μείζονος γὰρ ἐνόστατο πολέμου καταρχὴ
5 καὶ φοβερωτέρου. πρόςθεν μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ Σικελίας
ἡμιφιλῆτον Ὀρμαίοις, τότε δὲ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν
καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἐμελλὼν κινδυνεύσειν, πόλεμον
6 ἀναλαμβάνοντες ἐμφύλιον. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὕχ
ὁπλῶν πλῆθος, οὔ ναυτικὴ δύναμις, οὐ πλοῖων κατα-
σκευῇ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἦν, ὡς ἀν τοσαύτα τις ναυμα-
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Libyan war. Matho, having so far carried out his purpose, at once sent envoys to the Libyan towns urging them to strike a blow for liberty and imploring their support and practical assistance. Hereupon, when nearly all the Libyans had agreed to join in the revolt against Carthage and willingly contributed troops and supplies, they divided their forces into two and undertook the sieges of Utica and Hippaecriae, since these cities had refused to participate in the rebellion.

71. The Carthaginians had ever been accustomed to depend for their private supplies on the produce of the country, their public expenses for armaments and commissariat had been met by the revenue they derived from Libya, and they had always been in the habit of employing hired soldiers. At the present moment not only did they find themselves deprived of all these resources at one blow, but actually saw them turned against themselves. Consequently they fell into a state of utter depression and despondency, things having turned out quite otherwise than they expected. For they had been much worn by the long continued war for Sicily, and had hoped that the peace would procure them some rest and a grateful period of tranquillity, and what happened was just the reverse, as they were now threatened by the outbreak of a greater and more formidable war. In the former case they were disputing the dominion of Sicily with the Romans, but now they were about to fight for their own existence and that of their native city. Besides neither had they a sufficient supply of arms, nor a proper navy, nor the material left to construct one, so many had been the battles in which they
χίας περιπετειωμένων. καὶ μὴν οὔθε χορηγιῶν διά-
θεσις οὔθε φίλων οὔθε συμμάχων τῶν βοηθησόντων
7 ἐξωθεὶν ἐλπὶς οὔθε ἤτυσον ὑπήρχε. διὸ καὶ τότε
σαφῶς ἔγνωσαν ἥλικην ἔχει διαφορὰν ἕξενικὸς καὶ
8 διαπόντιος πόλεμος ἐμφυλίου στάσεως καὶ ταραχῆς.

Οὐχ ἦκιστα δ’ αὐτοὶ σφίσι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τη-
λικούτων κακῶν ἐγεγόνεσαν αὐτοῖς. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν
προγεγονότα πόλεμον εὐλόγους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ὑπο-
λαμβάνοντες, πικρῶς ἐπεστάτησαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν
2 Ἀιβύνην ἄνθρωπων, παραιροῦμενοι μὲν τῶν ἀλλων
πάντων τῶν καρπῶν τοὺς ἡμίσεις διπλασίους δὲ
ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς φόρους ἢ πρὸς ἐπιτάττοντες, συγ-
γνώμην δὲ τοῖς ἀπόροις ἡ συμπεριφορὰν οὔθ᾽ ἦπ-
3 τινοῦν ἐπ᾽ οὖν τῶν πραπτομένων διδόντες, θαυ-
μάζοντες δὲ καὶ τιμῶντες τῶν στρατηγῶν οὐ τοὺς
πρῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως τῷ πλῆθει χρωμένους,
ἀλλὰ τοὺς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἐτοιμάζοντας πλείστας χορη-
γίας κάπισκενάς, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πικρό-
4 τατα χρωμένους, ὅτι εἰς ἤπ᾽ Ἀινων. τοιγαροῦν οἱ
μὲν ἄνδρες οὐχ οἶδ᾽ ὑπακλησεως πρὸς τὴν ἀπό-
5 στασιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀγγέλου μονὸν ἐδεήθησαν· αἱ δὲ γυ-

ναῖκες αἱ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον ἀπαγομένους περι-


ορῶσαι τοὺς σφετέρους ἄνδρας καὶ γονεῖς πρὸς τὰς
εἰσφορὰς, τότε συνομνύονσά κατὰ πόλεις ἐφ᾽ ὃ
μηδὲν κρύφειν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐταῖς, ἀφαιροῦ-
μεναί τὸν κόσμον εἰσέφερον ἀπροφασίστως εἰς τοὺς
6 ὀφνιομασμοῖς. καὶ τοιαύτην παρεσκεύασαν εὐπορίαν
τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον ὡστε μὴ μόνον
dιαλύσαι τὰ προσοφειλόμενα τῶν ὀφνίων τοῖς μι-
θοφόροις κατὰ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας, ἃς ἐποίησαντό πρὸς
tὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συνεχὲς εὐπορή-
7 σαι χορηγίας. οὕτως οὔδεποτε δεὶ πρὸς τὸ παρόν
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had been engaged at sea. They had not even the means of providing supplies and not a single hope of external assistance from friends or allies. So it was now that they thoroughly realized how great is the difference between a war against a foreign state carried on over sea and civil discord and disturbance.

72. They had chiefly themselves to thank for all these grievous mischances. During the former war they had thought themselves reasonably justified in making their government of the Libyans very harsh. They had exacted from the peasantry, without exception, half of their crops, and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen without allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abatement to the poor. They had applauded and honoured not those governors who treated the people with gentleness and humanity, but those who procured for Carthage the largest amount of supplies and stores and used the country people most harshly—Hanno for example. The consequence was that the male population required no incitement to revolt—a mere message was sufficient—while the women, who had constantly witnessed the arrest of their husbands and fathers for non-payment of taxes, solemnly bound themselves by oath in each city to conceal none of their belongings, and stripping themselves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to the war fund. Matho and Spendius were thus so well off that not only could they pay the soldiers their arrears, as they had promised in inciting them to mutiny, but found themselves furnished with ample means for a protracted war. This teaches us that it is the right policy not only to look to the
μόνον, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀποβλέπειν ἀεὶ τοὺς ὁρθῶς βουλευομένους.

73 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ ἐν τοιούτοις κακοῖς ὀντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, προστησάμενοι τὸν Ἀνωνα στρατηγὸν διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τοῦτον καὶ πρότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἑκατοντάπτυλον τῆς Διβύης καταστρέψασθαι, συνήθρουζον μὲν μισθοφόρους, καθὼπλιζον δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἥλικιας τῶν πολιτῶν· ἐγύμναζον δὲ 2 καὶ συνυνταττον τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἢπείς· παρεσκευάζον δὲ καὶ τὰ περιλπῇ τῶν πλοίων, τρυπής καὶ πεντηκοντόρως καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀκατών. οἱ δὲ περὶ 3 τὸν Μάθω, παραγενομένων αὐτοῖς εἰς ἐπτὰ μυριάδας ἐπιδιείλτησιν τούτους ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιόρκουσι τοὺς Ἰτυκαίους καὶ τοὺς Ἰππακρίτας, βεβαίως δὲ τὴν ἐν τῷ Τύνητι στρατοπεδεῖαν κατέχουσιν, ἀποκεκλείσαν δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπάσης τῆς ἐκτὸς Διβύης. ἢ γὰρ Καρχηδῶν αὐτὴ μὲν ἐν κόλπῳ 4 κεῖται, προτεινοῦσα καὶ χερρονησίζουσα τῇ θέσει, τὸ μὲν τῇ θαλάττῃ, τὸ δὲ τὶ καὶ λίμνη περιεχομένη κατὰ τὸ πλείστον· οὐ δὲ συνάπτων ἱσθμὸς αὐτὴν τῇ 5 Διβύη τὸ πλάτος ὡς εὕκοσι καὶ πέντε σταδίων ἐστὶ. τούτου δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος νεύοντος μέρους οὐ μακρὰν ἢ τῶν Ἰτυκαίων κεῖται πόλις, ἐπὶ δὲ βατέρου παρὰ τὴν λίμνην ὁ Τύνης. ἐὰν δὲν 6 ἐκατέρων τὸτε στρατοπεδεύσασιν οἱ μισθοφόροι, καὶ διακλείσασιν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, λοιπὸν ἐπεβουλευον αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει, καὶ ποτὲ 7 μὲν ἡμέρας, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ νύκτωρ παραγωγόμενοι πρὸς τὸ τείχος, εἰς φόβους καὶ θορύβους ὀλοσχερεῖς ἐνέβαλλον τοὺς έιδον.

74 ''Ἀνων δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐνδεχομένως ἐγώνετο· καὶ γὰρ ἣν πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εὐφυής· 196
BOOK I

present, but to look forward still more attentively to the future.

73. Yet, although the Carthaginians were in such straits, they first of all appointed Hanno to the command, as he had, they thought, on a former occasion brought matters concerning Hecatompylus in Libya to a satisfactory conclusion; they next busied themselves with enrolling mercenaries and arming the citizens of military age. They also mustered and drilled their civic cavalry and got ready what ships they had left, consisting of triremes, quinqueremes and the largest of their skiffs. Meanwhile Matho, when about seventy thousand Libyans had joined him, divided them into several forces with which he maintained unmolested the sieges of Utica and Hippaeritae, secured his main camp at Tunis and thus shut out the Carthaginians from all outer Libya. Carthage, I should explain, lies in a gulf, on a promontory or peninsula surrounded mostly by the sea and in part by a lake. The isthmus which connects it with Libya is about twenty-five stades in width and on the side of this isthmus which faces the sea, at no great distance from the capital, lies Utica, while Tunis is on the other side by the lake. So that the mutineers, encamped now as they were before both of these towns and thus shutting off Carthage from the land, continued to threaten the capital itself, appearing before the walls sometimes by day and sometimes by night and creating the utmost terror and commotion within.

74. Hanno was doing fairly well in the matter of outfit, his talent lying in that direction, but
ἐξορμήσας δὲ μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἔτερος ἦν· καὶ
2 γὰρ τοῖς καιροῖς ἀστόχως ἔχρητο καὶ τοῖς ὦλοις
πράγμασιν ἀπείρως καὶ νωθρῶς. διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν
3 πρῶτον εἰς Ἰτύκην παραβοηθήσας τοῖς πολιορκου-
μένοις καὶ καταπληξάμενος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους τῷ
πλῆθει τῶν θηρίων· εἰχὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐκατὸν
ἐλεφάντων· καὶ μετὰ ταύτα λαβὼς προτερήματος
ἀρχὴν ὀλοσχεροῦς οὕτως ἔχρησατο κακῶς ὥστε
κυνωνεύσαι προσαπολέσαι καὶ τοὺς πολιορκο-
μένους. κομίσας γὰρ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κατα-
4 πέλτας καὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀπάσας τὰς
πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν παρασκευάζων, καὶ στρατοπε-
δεύσας πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἐνεχείρησε προσβάλλειν
πρὸς τὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων χάρακα. τῶν δὲ θηρίων
5 βιασμένων εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν, οὐ δυνάμενοι
τὸ βάρος οὐδὲ τὴν ἐφοδίων οἱ πολέμιοι μεῖναι,
πάντες ἐξέπεσον ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας. καὶ πολλοὶ
μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον τρωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων,
6 τὸ δὲ διασωζόμενον μέρος πρὸς των λόφων ἐρυ-
μοῦ καὶ σύμφυτον ἔμενε, πιστεῦον ταῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν
7 τῶν τόπων ἀσφαλείας. ὃ δ' Ἀννων, εἰθισμένος
Νομάσι καὶ Λίβυσι πολεμεῖν, οὕτως ὅταν ἀπαξ ἐγ-
κλίνωσι, ποιοῦνται τὴν φυγήν ἐπὶ δὺ ἡμέρας καὶ
τρεῖς ἑκτοπίζοντες αὐτοὺς, ὑπολαβὼν καὶ τότε πέ-
ρας ἔχειν τοῦ πολέμου καὶ νευκηκέναι τοῖς ὦλοις,
8 τῶν μὲν στρατιωτῶν ὀλυγώρησε καὶ καθόλου τῆς
παρεμβολῆς, αὐτὸς δ' εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐγί-
9 νετο περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν. οἱ δὲ συμ-
πεφευγότες τῶν μυσθοφόρων εἰς τὸν λόφον, σύν-
tροφοί μὲν γεγονότες τῆς Βάρκα τόλμησι, συνήθεις
δ' ἐκ τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν ἀγώνων πολλάκις τῆς αὐ-
τῆς ἡμέρας ποτὲ μὲν ὑποχωρεῖν, ποτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἐκ
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when it came to taking the field with his forces, he was another man. He had no idea how to avail himself of opportunities and generally showed an entire lack of experience and energy. For instance, as regards Utica, he began by coming to the help of the besieged and terrifying the enemy by his strong force of elephants, of which he had no less than a hundred; but when, in consequence of this, he had a chance of gaining a decisive success, he made such poor use of his advantage that he very nearly brought a catastrophe on the besieged, as well as on himself. For bringing from Carthage catapults, missiles and all requirements for a siege and encamping before the city he undertook the assault of the enemy's entrenched camp. When the elephants forced their way into the camp, the enemy unable to face the weight of their attack all evacuated it. Many of them were mangled and killed by the elephants, but those who escaped rallied on a steep hill overgrown with brushwood, relying on the natural security of the position. Hanno had been accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who once they give way continue their flight for two or three days, trying to get as far away as possible. Thinking then, on the present occasion too, that the war was over and he had secured a complete victory he took no precaution for the safety of his army and camp, but entered the city and occupied himself with the care of his person. The mercenaries, who had rallied on the hill, were men schooled in the daring tactics of Barcas and accustomed from their fighting in Sicily to make in one day repeated retirements followed by fresh
10 μεταβολής ἐγχειρεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τότε συν-
ιδόντες τὸν μὲν στρατηγὸν ἀπηλλαγμένον εἰς τὴν
πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς διὰ τὸ προτέρημα ῥαθύ-
11 μοῦντας καὶ διαρρέοντας εἰκ τῆς στρατοπεδελας, συ-
στραφέντες ἐπιτίθενται τῷ χάρακι, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν
αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἤγαγκασαν φυ-
12 γεῖν αἰσχρῶς ὑπὸ τὰ τείχη καὶ τὰς πύλας. ἐκυρίευ-
σαν δὲ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ἀπάσης καὶ τῆς τῶν πολιορ-
κουμένων παρασκευῆς. ἦν "Ἄνων πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους
ἐκκομίσας εἰκ τῆς πόλεως ἐποίησε τοῖς ἔχθροῖς
13 ὑποχείριον. οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ τοῦτον τὸν καίρον
οὕτως ἀνεστράφη νωθρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετ’ ὅλιγας
ὁμέρως περὶ τὴν καλομυενὴν Γόρζαν ἀντστρατοπε-
δευσάντων αὐτῷ τῶν πολεμίων, λαβὼν καίρους
δῖς μὲν ἐκ παρατάξεως εἰς τὸ νικᾶν, δῖς δ’ ἔξ ἔπι-
14 θέσεως, οτὲ καὶ στρατοπεδευντῶν σύνεγγυς αὐτῷ
τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀμφοτέρους δοκεῖ τοῦτοισ εἰκῇ
καὶ παραλόγως προέσθαι.
75 Διόπερ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, θεωροῦντες αὐτῶν κακῶς
χειρίζοντας τὰς πράξεις, Ἀμίλκαν τὸν ἐπικαλοῦ-
2 μενον Βάρκαν αὕτης προεστήσαντο, καὶ τοῦτον ἐξ-
έπεμπον εἰς τὸν ἑνεστώτα πόλεμον στρατηγὸν, δόν-
τες ἐβδομήκοντα μὲν ἐλέφαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπισυν-
ημένους τῶν μισθοφόρων καὶ τοὺς ἄτομοληκότας
ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ἀμα δὲ τούτους πολιτικοὺς ἐπ-
πεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς, ὡστε τοὺς σύμπαντας εἰς μυρίουσ
3 ὑπάρχειν. ὅσ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην εὐθέως ἔξοδον κατα-
πληξάμενος τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἤττησε
μὲν τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν τῆς
Ἰτύκης πολιορκίαν, ἔφανη δ’ ἄξιος τῶν προγεγονό-
των ἔργων καὶ τῆς παρά τῷ πλήθει προσδοκίας.
4 τό δὲ πραξαθέν ἢν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ περὶ τὴν χρείαν ταῦ-
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attacks. At present, on seeing that the general was absent in the city, while the troops were at their ease owing to their success and streaming out of their camp, they drew themselves up and attacked the camp, putting many to the sword and compelling the rest to take refuge ignominiously under the walls and at the gates. They captured all the baggage and all the artillery of the besieged, which Hanno had brought out of the town and added to his own, thus putting it in the enemy’s hands. This was not the only occasion on which he acted so negligently, but a few days later at a place called Gorza, when the enemy were encamped opposite him and owing to their proximity he had four opportunities of beating them, twice in a pitched battle and twice by a surprise attack, he is said in each case to have thrown them away by his heedlessness and lack of judgement.

75. The Carthaginians, in consequence, seeing that he was mismanaging matters, again appointed Hamilcar Barcas to the command and dispatched him to this war, giving him seventy elephants, all the additional mercenaries they had been able to collect, and the deserters from the enemy, besides their burgher forces, horse and foot, so that in all he had about ten thousand men. Hamilcar, on his very first expedition, struck terror into the enemy by the unexpectedness of the attack, cowing their spirit, raising the siege of Utica, and showing himself worthy of his past exploits and of the high expectations of the populace. What he accomplished in this campaign was as follows. On
τὴν τοιοῦτον. τῶν γεωλόφων τῶν ἐπὶζευγνύντων τὸν αὐχένα τὸν συνάπτοντα τὴν Καρχηδόνα πρὸς τὴν Λιβύην ὄντων δυσβάτων, καὶ χειροποιήτους ἐχόντων διεκβολαὶ ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, συνέβαινε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω πάντας τοὺς διὰ τῶν προειρημένων λόφων εὐκαίριως κειμένους τόπους φυλακαίς δι-5 εὐληφέναι, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι τοῦ προσαγορευμένου Μακάρα ποταμοῦ διείργοντο τικά τινας τόπους πα-6 ραπλησίως τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξοδοῦν, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ ῥεύματος ἀβάτων κατὰ τὸ πλείστων ὑπάρχοντως, μιᾶς δ’ οὐσίας ἐπ’ αὐτῷ γεφύρας, καὶ ταύτην τηρεῖν τὴν δίοδον ἀσφα-7 λᾶς, τόλμου ἐπ’ αὐτῆς ὁμοδομικότατος. ἦς δὲν συν-8 ἑβαυνε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους μὴ οἶκον στρατοπέδῳ τῆς χώρας ἐπιβαίνειν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς κατ’ ἱδίαν θέ-9 λοντας διαπεσεῖν ῥᾴδιος ἀν δύνασθαι λαθεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. εἰς ἀ βλέπων Ἀμίλκας, καὶ παῦστος πράγματος καὶ καιρὸν πείραν λαμβάνων διὰ τὸ δυσ-10 χρηστεῖν περὶ τὴν ἐξοδον, διενοήθη τι τοιοῦτον. 8 τοῦ προειρημένου ποταμοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰς θάλατταν ἐκβολὴν συνθεωρησάς κατὰ τινας ἀνέμων στάσεις ἀποθυνούμενον τὸ στόμα καὶ τεναχώδη γινομένην τὴν παρ’ αὐτὸ τὸ στόμα πάροδον, ποιῆσας εὐτρεπὴ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἐξοδον, καὶ κρύπτων ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν, ἔτηρε τὸ προειρημένον 9 σύμπτωμα. παραπεσόντως δὲ τοῦ καιροῦ, νυκτὸς ἐξορμήσας ἔλαβε πάντας ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ τὸν προ-10 ειρημένον τόπον διαβιβάσας τὴν δύναμιν. παρα- δόξου δὲ τοῦ πράγματος φανέντος καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς υπεναντίοις, ο μὲν Ἀμίλκας προῆγε διὰ τοῦ πεδίου, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τοὺς 76 τὴν γέφυραν φυλάττοντας. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Σπεν-
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the neck of land connecting Carthage with Libya is a chain of hills difficult of access and with several passes to the country artificially cut in them. Matho had posted guards in all those spots which were favourable for the passage of the hills. In addition to this there is a river called Macaras which shuts off in certain places the access from the town to the country. This river is for the most part unfordable owing to the volume of water, and there is only one bridge, which Matho had also secured, building a town at the bridge-head. So that not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to reach the country with an army, but it was not even an easy matter for single persons wishing to get through to elude the vigilance of the enemy. Hamilcar, seeing all these obstacles, after passing in review every means and every chance of surmounting this difficulty about a passage, thought of the following plan. He had noticed that when the wind blew strongly from certain quarters the mouth of the river got silted up and the passage became shallow just where it falls into the sea. He therefore got his force ready to march out, and keeping his project to himself, waited for this to occur. When the right time came he started from Carthage at night, and without anyone noticing him, had by daybreak got his army across at the place mentioned. Both those in the city and the enemy were taken by surprise, and Hamilcar advanced through the plain making for the guardians of the bridge. 76.

* The same as Bagraclas.
διον συνέντες τὸ γεγονός ἀπήντων εἰς τὸ πεδίον καὶ παρεβολήθουν ἀλλήλοις, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὴν γέφυραν πόλεως ὄντες οὐκ ἐλάττουσι μυρίων, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰτύκης ύπὲρ τοὺς μυρίους καὶ πεντακισχι-2 λίους. ἔπει δ' εἰς σύνοπτον ἰκὸν ἀλλήλοις, νομί-3 σαντες ἐν μέσῳ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπειληφέναι, σπουδῇ παρηγγύσων ἁμα παρακαλοῦντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ συνήπτουν τοὺς πολέμιοις. δ' ΄Αμίλκας ἦγε μὲν τὴν πορείαν πρῶτους ἔχων τοὺς ἑλέφαντας, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς ἰππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους, τελευ-4 ταία δὲ τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὁπλῶν. κατιδων δὲ προχει-5 ρότεροι ἐπιφερομένους τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἀναστρέ-6 φεις παρήγγειλε πάσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῖ. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτοπορείας ἀναστρέφαντας σπουδῇ ποι-7 εἰσθαὶ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἐκέλευσε· τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τῆς ὁμαργίας ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχοντας ἐξ ἐπιστροφῆς περι-8 σπῶν ἐξέταττε πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἑπιφάνειαν. 6 οἱ δὲ Λίβνες καὶ μισθοφόροι, νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς καταπεπληγμένους φυγεῖν, λύσαντες τὴν τάξιν ἐπ-9 ἐκείντο καὶ συνήπτουν εἰς τὰς χειρὰς ἑρρωμένως, 7 ἁμα δὲ τῷ τοὺς ἰππεῖς συνεγγίσαντας τοῖς παρα-10 τεταγμένοις ἐκ μεταβολῆς ὑποστῆναι, τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἑπάγειν, ἐκπλαγεῖς γυνόμενοι διὰ τὸ παρά-11 δοξον οἱ Λίβνες ἐγκλίναντες εὐθέως ἐφευγον, ὡς 8 ᾧν εἰκῇ καὶ σποράδην ἐπικείμενοι. λοιπὸν οἱ μὲν τοῖς κατόπιν ἐπιφερομένους περιπίπτοντες ἐσφάλ-9 λοντο, καὶ διέθειρον αὐτοὺς τε καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους· οἱ δὲ πλείους συνεπατήθησαν, ἐκ χειρὸς τῶν ὑπ-9 πέων ἐπικεφαλίων αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν θηρίων. ἀπ-
Spendius, on learning what had happened, put his two forces in movement to meet in the plain and render mutual assistance to each other, those from the town near the bridge being not less than ten thousand in number and those from Utica over fifteen thousand. When they got in sight of each other, thinking that they had caught the Carthaginians in a trap between them, they exhorted each other with loud shouts and advanced to attack. Hamilcar was advancing in the following order. In front were the elephants, after them the cavalry and light-armed troops and last of all the heavy-armed. When he saw that the enemy were attacking him in such precipitation he ordered his whole force to face about. He bade those in front, after facing about, retire with all speed, and reversing the order of those who originally were in the rear he deployed them to await the onslaught of the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries, thinking that the Carthaginians were afraid of them and retreating, broke their ranks and fell on them vigorously. But when the cavalry, on approaching the line of hoplites, wheeled round again and faced the Libyans, while at the same time the remainder of the Carthaginian army was coming up, the enemy were so much surprised that they at once turned and fled panic-stricken, in the same loose order and confusion in which they had advanced. Consequently some of them came into collision with their comrades who were advancing in their rear with disastrous effect, causing the destruction both of themselves and the latter, but the larger number were trampled to death, the cavalry and elephants attacking them at close quarters.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ολοντο μὲν οἷον εἰς ἐξακισχιλίους τῶν Λιβύων καὶ τῶν ξένων, ἐάλωσαν δὲ περὶ δυσχιλίους· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διεφυγον, οἱ μὲν εἰς τὴν πρὸς τῇ γεφύρα πόλιν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἰτύκη παρεμβολήν. Λμῖκας δὲ ποιῆσας τὸ προτέρημα τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον, εἰπέτο κατὰ πόδας τοῖς πολεμίοις, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς γεφύρας πόλιν ἐξ ἐφόδου κατέσχε, προεμένων καὶ φευγόντων εἰς τὸν Τύνητα τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πολεμίων, τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν κυρὰν ἐπιπορευόμενος τὰς μὲν προσήγετο, πλείστας δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἐξήρει. τοὺς δὲ Καρχηδονίους βραχῶ τι θάρσους ἐνειργάσατο καὶ τόλμησ, ἐπὶ ποσὸν αὐτοὺς ἀπαλλάξας τῆς προγεγενημένης δυσελπιστίας.

77 Ὅ δὲ Μάθως αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἰππα-κριτῶν πολυρκίας ἐσέμενε, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Αὐ-τάρτον τὸν τῶν Γαλατῶν ἠγεμόνα καὶ Σπένδιον 2 ἑκεσθαι τῶν ὑπεναντίων συνεβούλευε, τὰ μὲν πεδία φεύγοντας διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν παρὰ τοὺς ὑπεναν-τίοις ἱππέων καὶ θηρίων, ταῖς δὲ ὑπωρείαῖς ἀντι-παράγοντας καὶ συνεπτυθεμένους κατὰ τὰς ὑπο- 3 πιπτούσας ἀεὶ δυσχερείας. ἀμα δὲ ταῖς ἐπινοοῖς ταύταις καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Νομάδας καὶ τοὺς Λίβνας ἐξέπεμπε, δεόμενος βοηθεῖν σφίσι καὶ μὴ κατα- 4 προτέσθαι τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καίρον. Ὅ δὲ Σπένδιος, προσλαβῶν ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος ἀφ' ἐκάστου τῶν γενῶν τοὺς πάντας εἰς ἐξακισχιλίους, προῆγε, ταῖς ὑπωρείαις ἀντιπαράγον τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, ἑξών ἀμα τοὺς προειρημένους καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ Αὐτα- 5 ρίτου Γαλάτας, ὄντας εἰς δυσχιλίας. τὸ γὰρ λοιπὸν μέρος αὐτῶν τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς συστήματος ἱτυμο- λήκει πρὸς τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸν Ἴρμκα 6 στρατοπεδείαις. τοῦ δ᾽ Αμῖλκου παρεμβεβληκότος 206
About six thousand Libyans and mercenaries fell and nearly two thousand were made prisoners. The rest escaped, some to the town by the bridge and some to the camp before Utica. Hamilcar after this victory followed closely on the retreating enemy and took the town by the bridge, the enemy in it deserting it and flying to Tunis. He next traversed the rest of the country, winning over some towns and taking others by assault. He thus restored some confidence and courage to the Carthaginians, delivering them in a measure from their previous despondency.

77. Matho for his own part continued to prosecute the siege of Hippacritae, advising Antaritus, the leader of the Gauls, and Spendius to harass the enemy, keeping away from the plains owing to the numbers of the cavalry and elephants opposed to them but marching along the foothills parallel to the Carthaginians and descending on them whenever they were on difficult ground. While adopting this plan he at the same time sent messages to the Numidians and Libyans, begging them to come to his assistance and not lose the chance of gaining their freedom. Spendius, taking with him from Tunis a force of about six thousand men drawn from all the nationalities, advanced along the slopes parallel to the Carthaginians. He had also with him Antaritus and his Gauls numbering only about two thousand, the rest of the original corps having deserted to the Romans when encamped near Eryx. Hamilcar
ἐν τοῖς πεδίων πανταχόθεν ὁρεσὶ περιεχομένω, συνέβη τὰς παρὰ τῶν Νομάδων καὶ Λιβύων βοηθείας εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τούτου συνάψαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Σπέν-7 διον. γενομένης δὲ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τῆς μὲν τῶν Λιβύων ἐπιστρατοπεδεῖας αἰφνιδίου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον, τῆς δὲ τῶν Νομάδων ἀπ’ οὐρᾶς, τῆς δὲ περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον ἐκ πλαγίου, μεγάλην αὐτοῖς ἀποριάν συνέβη περιστῆναι καὶ ὄνειφενκτόν.

78 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τούτου Ναραύας, ὅσα μὲν Νομάδων ἐνδοξοτάτων εἰς, ὅπερ δὲ καὶ πλήρης ὅρμης πολεμικῆς, οὕτως ἂν μὲν οἰκείως διέκειτο πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, πατρικὴν ἔχων σύστασιν, τότε δὲ μᾶλλον παρωρμηθῆ διὰ τὴν Ἀμίλκου τοῦ 2 στρατηγοῦ καταξίωσιν. διὸ καὶ νομίσας ἔχειν εὐφυὴ καιρὸν πρὸς ἐντευξὶν αὐτῷ καὶ σύστασιν, 3 ἤκει eἰς τὴν στρατοπεδείαν, ἔχων περὶ αὐτῶν Νομάδας εἰς ἐκατόν. καὶ συνεγγύσας τῷ χάρακι τολμηρῶς ἔμενε, κατασείων τῇ χειρὶ. τοῦ δ’ Ἀμίλκου θαυμάσαντος τὴν ἐπιβολὴν, καὶ προπέμψαντός τινα τῶν ἱππέων, εἰς λόγους ἑφ’ ὑπαίθρεσθαι 5 συνελθεῖν τῷ στρατηγῷ. διαποροῦντος δ’ ἀκμῆν καὶ διαπιστοῦντος τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡγεμόνος, παραδόυσι τὸ Ναραύας τὸν ἱππον καὶ τὰς λόγχας τοῖς 6 µεθ’ αὐτοῦ, παρὴν ἀνοπλὸς εὐθαρσῶς εἰς τὴν παρεμβολὴν. οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ὑθαύμαζον, τὰ δὲ κατε-7 πλήθυντο τὴν τόλμαν· ὀμως δὲ προσεδέξαντο καὶ συνὴλθον εἰς τὰς χεῖρας. δ’ δὲ παραγενόμενος εἰς λόγους ἑφ’ ἑαυτὶ μὲν Καρχηδονίους εὐνοεῖν, μάλιστα δ’ ἐπιθυμεῖν Βάρκα γενεσθαι φίλος· διὸ καὶ νῦν παρεῖναι συνταθησόμενοι αὐτῷ καὶ κοινωνήσων 8 ἀδόλως παντὸς ἔργου καὶ πάσης ἐπιβολῆς. Ἀμίλκας δὲ ταῦτ’ ἀκούσας οὕτως ἑσθη Μεγάλως ἐπὶ τῷ 208
had established his camp in a plain surrounded by mountains, and just at this time Spendius was joined by the Numidian and Libyan reinforcements. The Carthaginians, suddenly finding the additional force of Libyans in their front, and that of the Numidians in their rear, while Spendius was on their flank, were in a very difficult situation, from which it was not easy to extricate themselves.

78. There was a certain Naravas, a Numidian of high rank and full of martial spirit. He had always had that attachment to the Carthaginians which was traditional in his family, and it was now strengthened by his admiration for Hamilcar. Thinking that this was a favourable opportunity for meeting Hamilcar and introducing himself, he rode up to the camp escorted by about a hundred Numidians. Coming close to the palisade he remained there quite fearlessly making signals with his hand. Hamilcar was much astonished at his venturesomeness and sent out a horseman to meet him, when he said that he desired an interview with the general. The Carthaginian leader remaining still much amazed and distrustful, Naravas handed over his horse and his spears to his attendants, and very boldly came into the camp unarmed. The Carthaginians looked on in mingled admiration and amazement at his daring, but they met and received him, and when he was admitted to the interview, he said that he wished all the Carthaginians well but particularly desired the friendship of Barcas, and this was why he had come to introduce himself and offer his cordial assistance in all actions and enterprises. Hamilcar, on hearing this, was so delighted at the young man's courage in
κατὰ τὴν παρουσίαν θάρσει καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἐντεύξειν ἀπλότητι τοῦ νεανίσκου, ὡς οὐ μόνον εὐδόκησε κοινωνὸν αὐτὸν προσλαβέσθαι τῶν πρά-ξεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν θυγατέρα δῶσειν ἐπηγγείλατο 9 μεθ’ ὀρκού, διαφυλάξαντος αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς Καρχη-δονίους πίστιν.

Γενομένων δὲ τῶν ὁμολογιῶν, ὃ μὲν Ναραύας ἤκε τοὺς ὄφ’ αὐτὸν τεταγμένους ἔχων Νομάδας, 10 ὁντας εἰς δισχίλιον, ὃ δ’ Ἀμίλκας, προσ-γενομένης αὐτῷ τῆς χειρὸς ταύτης, παρετά-ξατο τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον συνάσκαντες ἐπὶ ταῦτα τοῖς Δίβυσι καὶ κατα-βάντες εἰς τὸ πεδῖον συνεβαλλον τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. 11 γενομένης δὲ μάχης ἱσχυρᾶς, ἐνίκων οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀμίλκαν, καλῶς μὲν τῶν θηρίων ἀγωνισμένων, ἐπιφανεστάτην δὲ τοῦ Ναραύα παρασχομένου 12 χρείαν. ὃ μὲν οὖν Αὐτάρτιτος καὶ Σπένδιος δι-έφυγον, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἐπέσον μὲν εἰς μυρίους, 13 ἐάλωσαν δ’ εἰς τετρακισχίλιον. ἐπιτελεσθέντος δὲ τοῦ κατορθώματος, Ἀμίλκας τοῖς μὲν βουλομέ-νοις τῶν αἰχμαλώτων μεθ’ ἕαυτοῦ συντρατεύειν ἐξουσίαν ἔδωκε καὶ καθώπλιξε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν 14 πολεμίων σκύλοις, τοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους ἄθροι-σας παρεκάλει, φάσκων, ἐως μὲν τοῦ ἕνων συγγνώ-μην αὐτοὶς ἔχειν τῶν ἡμαρτημένων. διὸ καὶ συγ-χωρεῖν τρέπεσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἱδίας ὀρμᾶς οὗ ποτ’ 15 ἀν ἐκαστός αὐτῶν προαιρήται. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δι-ηπειλήσατο μηθένα φέρειν ὅπλων πολέμιων κατ’ αὐτῶν, ὡς, εἰν ἄλῳ τις, ἀπαρατήτου τευξόμενον τυμηρίας.

79 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς οἱ τὴν Σαρδόνα [τὴν υήσου] παραφυλάττοντες τῶν μισθοφόρων, 210
coming to him and his simple frankness at their interview that not only did he consent to associate him in his undertakings but swore to give him his daughter in marriage if he remained loyal to Carthage.

The agreement having thus been made, Naravas came in with the Numidians under his command, about two thousand in number, and Hamilcar, thus reinforced, offered battle to the enemy. Spendius, after effecting a junction with the Libyans, descended into the plain and attacked the Carthaginians. The battle was a stubborn one, but ended in the victory of Hamilcar, the elephants fighting well and Naravas rendering brilliant services. Autaritus and Spendius escaped, but with the loss of about ten thousand killed and four thousand prisoners. After the victory Hamilcar gave permission to those of the prisoners who chose to join his own army, arming them with the spoils of the fallen enemies; those who were unwilling to do so he collected and addressed saying that up to now he pardoned their offences, and therefore they were free to go their several ways, wherever each man chose, but in future he threatened that if any of them bore arms against Carthage he would if captured meet with inevitable punishment.

79. About the same time the mercenaries who garrisoned Sardinia, emulous of the exploits of Matho
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ξηλώσαντες τούς περι τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον,
2 ἐπιτίθενται τοῖς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ Καρχηδονίους. καὶ τὸν
μὲν τὸτε παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὄντα βοηθάρχον Βώσταρον
συγκλείσαντες εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν μετὰ τῶν ἐαυτοῦ
3 πολιτῶν ἀπέκτειναν. αὕτης δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων
στρατηγὸν ἐξαποστειλάντων μετὰ δυνάμεως "Ἀννω-
να, καπείτα καὶ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων ἐγκαταλιπτού-
4 σών τὸν Ἀννωνα, καὶ μεταθεμένων πρὸς σφάς,
γενόμενοι ξωγρία κύριοι τοῦ προειρημένου, παρατί-
κα τούτον μὲν ἀνεστάυρωσαν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παρηλ-
λαγμένας ἐπινοοῦντες τιμωρίας, πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ
νῆσῳ Καρχηδονίους στρεβλοῦντες ἀπέκτειναν καὶ
tὸ λοιπὸν ἦδη ποιησάμενοι τὰς πόλεις υφ’ ἐαυτοῦς
5 εἶχον ἐγκρατῶς τὴν νῆσον, ἐως οὐ στασιάσαντες
πρὸς τοὺς Σαρδονίους ἐξέπεσον υπ’ ἐκεῖνοι εἰς
6 τὴν Ἰταλίαν. ἦ μὲν οὖν Σαρδὼ τούτον τὸν πρότον
ἀπηλλοτρώθη Καρχηδονίων, νῆσος καὶ τῷ μεγέθει
καὶ τῇ πολυανθρωπίᾳ καὶ τοῖς γεννήμασι δια-
7 φέρουσα. τῷ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ πολὺν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς
πεποίησαν λόγον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθ’ εἶναι
tautologeivn υπὲρ τῶν ὁμολογομένων.

8 Μάθως δὲ καὶ Σπένδιος, ἀμα δὲ τούτως Αὐτάριτος
ὁ Γαλάτης, ὑπιδόμενοι τὴν Αμιλκοῦ φίλανθρωπίαν
εἰς τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, καὶ φοβηθέντες μὴ τῷ
τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ψυχαγωγηθέντες ὀρμήσωσι πρὸς τὴν
ὑποδεικνυμένην ἀσφάλειαν οὐ τε Ἀἰβυνες καὶ τὸ τῶν
μισθοφόρων πλῆθος, ἐβουλεύοντο πῶς ἢν καινοτομή-
santēs τι τῶν πρὸς ἀσβεσθαν εἰς τέλος ἀποθηρω-
9 σειαν τὰ πλῆθη πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. ἔδοξεν
ὁ δὲ τούτων γραμματοφόρον εἰςήγαγον, ὡς ἀπεσταλ-
μένου ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Σαρδόνος αἱρετιστῶν. ἦ δ’
212
and Spendius, attacked the Carthaginians in the island. They began by shutting up in the citadel and putting to death Bostar, the commander of the foreign contingent, and his compatriots. Next, when the Carthaginians sent Hanno over in command of a fresh force, this force deserted him and joined the mutineers, who thereupon took him prisoner and at once crucified him. After this, devising the most exquisite tortures, they tortured and murdered all the Carthaginians in the island, and when they had got all the towns into their power continued to hold forcible possession of Sardinia, until they quarrelled with the natives, and were driven out by them to Italy. Thus was Sardinia lost to the Carthaginians, an island of great extent, most thickly populated and most fertile. Many authors have described it at length, and I do not think it necessary to repeat statements which no one disputes.

Matho and Spendius, as well as the Gaul Autaritus, were apprehensive of the effect of Hamilcar’s leniency to the prisoners, fearing that the Libyans and the greater part of the mercenaries might thus be won over and hasten to avail themselves of the proffered immunity. They therefore set themselves to devise some infamous crime which would make the hatred of the troops for Carthage more savage. They decided to call a general meeting and at this they introduced a letter-bearer supposed to have been sent by their confederates in Sardinia. The letter
ἐπιστολὴ διεσάφει τὸν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς μετ’ αὐτοῦ πάντας, οὐς παρεσπόνδησαν ἐν τῷ Τύνητι, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, φυλάττειν ἐπιμελῶς, ὡς πραττόντων τινῶν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου τοὺς Καρχη-δονίως ὑπὲρ τῆς τούτων σωτηρίας. λαβόμενος δὲ τῆς ἀφορμῆς ταύτης ὁ Ἐπένδιος, πρῶτον μὲν παρεκάλει μὴ πιστεύειν τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων γεγενημένην φιλανθρωπίαν πρὸς τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους· οὐ γὰρ σῶσαι προαιρούμενον αὐτὸν ταῦτα βεβουλεῦσαι περὶ τῶν ἀλόντων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀφέσεως ἡμῶν ἐγκρατῆ γενέσθαι σπουδάζοντα, πρὸς τὸ μὴ τινάς, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἡμᾶς ἀμα τιμωρήσασθαι πιστεύσαντας αὐτῷ. πρὸς δὲ τούτως φυλάττεσθαι παρῆνε μὴ προέμενοι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Γέσκωνα καταφρονηθῶσι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἔχθρῶν, μεγάλα δὲ βλάψωσι τὰς ἱδίας πράξεις, ἀνδρὰ τοιοῦ- τον καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν ἔσαντες διαφυγεῖν, δὴ εἰκὸς ἔχθρον αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι φοβερώτατον. ἔτι δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ παρῆν ἄλλος γραμματοφόρος, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος ἀπεσταλμένος, παρα- πλήσια τοῖς ἐκ τῆς Σαρδόνοις διασαφῶν. ἐφ’ ὑπὸ Αὐτάριτος ὁ Γαλάτης ἐπιβαλὼν μίαν ἐφὴ σωτηρίαν εἶναι τοῖς ἐαυτῶν πράγμασι τὸ πάσας ἀπογνώναι 2 τὰς ἐν Καρχηδονίως ἐλπίδας. ἐὼς δὲ ἃν ἀντέχηται τις τῆς ἐκείνων φιλανθρωπίας, οὐ δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ἀληθῶν γενέσθαι τῶν τοιοῦτων σύμμαχοι. διότι πρὶν τούτων πιστεύει, τούτως ἀκούειν, τοῖς τοι- ούτως προσέχειν τὸν ἵνα, οὕτως ἂν ἂν τῶν ἀπεχθεστάτων καὶ πικροτάτων εἰσαγγέλλωσι κατὰ Καρχηδονίων· τοὺς δ’ ἐναντία τούτως λέγοντας 3 προδότας καὶ πολεμίους Ἥγεισθαι παρῆνε. ταῦτα δ’ εἰπὼν συνεβούλευε τὸν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς 4 προδότας καὶ πολεμίους ἤγεισθαι παρῆνε. ταῦτα δ’ εἰπὼν συνεβούλευε τὸν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς
advised them to keep careful guard over Gesco and all the others whom they had, as above narrated, treacherously arrested at Tunis, since some persons in the camp were negotiating with the Carthaginians about their release. Spendius, seizing on this pretext, begged them in the first place to have no reliance on the Carthaginian general's reported clemency to the prisoners. "It is not," he said, "with the intention of sparing their lives that he has taken this course regarding his captives, but by releasing them he designs to get us into his power, so that he may take vengeance not on some, but on all of us who trust him." Moreover, he warned them to take care lest by giving up Gesco and the others they incur the contempt of their enemies and seriously damage their own situation by allowing to escape them so able a man and so good a general, who was sure to become their most formidable enemy. He had not finished his speech when in came another post supposed to be from Tunis with a message similar to that from Sardinia. 80. Antaritus the Gaul was the next speaker. He said that the only hope of safety for them was to abandon all reliance on the Carthaginians. Whoever continued to look forward to clemency from them could be no true ally of their own. Therefore he asked them to trust those, to give a hearing to those, to attend to those only who bring the most hateful and bitterest accusations against the Carthaginians, and to regard speakers on the other side as traitors and enemies. Finally, he recommended them to torture and put to
μετ’ αυτοῦ συλληφθέντας καὶ τοὺς ὑστερον γενομένους αἰχμαλώτους τῶν Καρχηδονίων αἰκισμαέ-5 νους ἀποκτείνας. πρακτικότατος δ’ ἦν οὕτως ἐν ταῖς συμβουλίαις διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ 6 συνιέναι. πάλαι γὰρ στρατεύομενος ἦδει διαλέγε-σθαι φονικιστὶ· ταύτῃ δὲ πως ὦι πλείστοι συνε-σαίνοντο τῇ διαλέκτῳ διὰ τὸ μῆκος τῆς προγεγενή-7 μένης στρατείας. διότερ ἐπανέσαντος αὐτὸν ὁμο-θυμαδὸν τοῦ πλήθους, οὕτως μὲν εὐδοκιμῶν ἀν-8 εχώρησε. πολλῶν δὲ προπορευομένων ἄφ’ ἐκάστου γένους ἁμα, καὶ βουλομένων αὐτὴν παρατείθαι τῇ αἰκίᾳ διὰ τὰς γεγενημένας ἐκ τοῦ Γέρσκων 9 δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἱδίαν διάλεκτον συμβουλεύοντος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ παρεγυμνώθη διότι τὴν τιμωρίαν παραι-ντοῦτα, καὶ τις ἐκ τῶν καθημένων εἰπὲ Βάλλε, 10 πάντας ἁμα κατέλευσαν τοὺς προπορευθέντας. καὶ τούτους μὲν, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ θηρίων διεθβαρμένους, 11 ἐξεφερον οἱ προσήκοντες. τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν Γέ-σκωνα λαβόντες, ἠντας εἰς ἐπτακοσίους, ἦγον ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος οἱ περὶ τὸν Σπέιδιον· καὶ προαγα-γόντες βραχὺ πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας πρὸς τοὺς ἔπει 12 ἀπέκοπτον τὰς χείρας, πυούμενοι τῇ ἄρχῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ Γέρσκους, ὅπερ βραχὴ χρόνῳ πρότερον ἐκ πάν-των Καρχηδονίων προκρίναντες ἀνέδειξαν μὲν εὐεργετὴν αὐτῶν, ἑπέτρεψαν δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀμφιβο-θωμένων. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰς χείρας ἀπέκοψαν, ἡκρω-τηρίαξαν τοὺς ταλαιπώρους· κολοβώσαντες δὲ καὶ συντρίψαντες τὼν σκέλετον ἔτι ζωντας ἔρριμπαν εἰς τῶν τάφρον. 13 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, τοῦ δυστυχήματος αὐτοῖς 216
death not only Gesco and those arrested with him, but all the Carthaginians they had subsequently taken prisoners. He was much the most effective speaker in their councils, because a number of them could understand him. He had been a long time in the service and had learned Phoenician, a language which had become more or less agreeable to their ears owing to the length of the previous war. His speech therefore met with universal approbation, and he retired from the platform amid applause. Numerous speakers from each nationality now came forward all together, maintaining that the prisoners should be spared at least the infliction of torture in view of Gesco's previous kindness. Nothing, however, they said was intelligible, as they were all speaking together and each stating his views in his own language. But the moment it was disclosed that they were begging for a remission of the sentence someone among the audience called out "Stone them," and they instantly stoned all the speakers to death. These unfortunates, mangled as if by wild beasts, were carried off for burial by their friends. Spendius and his men then led out from the camp Gesco and the other prisoners, in all about seven hundred. Taking them a short distance away, they first of all cut off their hands, beginning with Gesco, that very Gesco whom a short time previously they had selected from all the Carthaginians, proclaiming him their benefactor and referring the points in dispute to him. After cutting off their hands they cut off the wretched men's other extremities too, and after thus mutilating them and breaking their legs, threw them still alive into a trench.

81. The Carthaginians, when news came of this
$\begin{align*}
\text{THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS}\\
\text{άναγγελθεντος, ποιεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν εἶχον, ἐσχετλια-}\\
\text{ζων δὲ, καὶ περιπαθεῖς γινόμενοι τῇ συμφορᾷ πρὸς}\\
\text{μὲν Ἀμίλκαν καὶ τὸν ἔτερον τῶν στρατηγῶν "Ἀν-}\\
\text{νωνα προσβευτάς ἐξέπεμπον, δεόμενοι βοηθεῖν καὶ}\\
\text{2 τιμωρεῖν τοῖς ἡτυχηκόσι. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἡσεβηκότας}\\
\text{κήρυκας ἐξαπέστειλον περὶ τῆς τῶν νεκρῶν ἀνα-}\\
\text{3 ρέσεως. οὐ δὲ οὕτω ἔδοσαν, προεῖπον τε τοῖς παρ-}\\
\text{οῦσι μὴτε κήρυκα πέμπτεν πρὸς σφᾶς μὴτε πρε-}\\
\text{σβευτήν, ὡς τῆς αὐτῆς κολάσεως ὑπομενοῦσας τοὺς}\\
\text{4 παραγενομένους ἥς νῦν Γέσκων τέτευχε. πρὸς δὲ}\\
\text{τὸ λοιπὸν ἔδογματοποίησαν καὶ παρῆνέσαν αὐτοῖς,}\\
\text{ὅν μὲν ἄν λάβωσι Καρχηδόνιων, τιμωρησαμένους}\\
\text{ἀποκτένειν. δὲν δὲ ἄν τῶν συμμαχοῦστων αὐτοῖς,}\\
\text{ἀποκόψαντας τὰς χειρὰς αὕθις εἰς Καρχηδόν' ἀπο-}\\
\text{πέμπτεν. ὁ δὲ καὶ διετέλεσαν ἐπιμελῶς ποιοῦντες.}\\
\text{5 διόστερ εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων οὐκ ἂν τις εἰπεῖν ὁκνή-}\\
\text{σειν ὡς οὐ μόνον τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ}\\
\text{ταῦ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς γεννωμένων ἐλκῶν καὶ φυμά-}\\
\text{των ἀποθηριωθῶσαν συμβαίνει καὶ τελέως ἀβοήθητα}\\
\text{6 γίνεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα τὰς ψυχὰς. ἐπὶ τε γὰρ}\\
\text{τῶν ἐλκῶν, ἕαν μὲν θεραπείαν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις προσ-}\\
\text{άγγῃ τις, ὅπ' αὐτῆς ἐνίστε ταύτης ἐρεθηζόμενα θάτ-}\\
\text{τον ποιεῖται τὴν νομήν. ἕαν δὲ πάλιν ἀφῆ, κατὰ}\\
\text{τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν φύσιν φθείροντα τὸ συνεχές οὐκ ὦσχε}\\
\text{7 παῦλαν, ἕως ἂν ἀφανίσῃ τὸ ὑποκείμενον: ταῖς τε}\\
\text{ψυχαῖς παραπλησίως τοιαύτης πολλάκις ἐπιφύνονται}\\
\text{μελανίαι καὶ σηπεδόνες ὅστε μηδὲν ἀσβεστερον}\\
\text{ἀνθρώπος μηδ' ωμότερον ἀποτελεῖσθαι τῶν ξώνων.}\\
\text{8 οἷς ἔαν μὲν συγγνώμην τινὰ προσάγῃς καὶ φιλαν-}\\
\text{θρωπίαν, ἐπιβουλῆν καὶ παραλογισμὸν ἤγούμενοι}\\
\text{τὸ συμβαίνον ἀπιστώτεροι καὶ δυσμενέστεροι γί-}\\
\text{νονται πρὸς τοὺς φιλανθρωποῦντας: ἕαν δὲ ἀντι-}
\end{align*}$
unhappy event, could take no action, but their indignation was extreme, and in the heat of it they sent messengers to Hamilcar and their other general Hanno imploring them to come and avenge the unfortunate victims. To the assassins they sent heralds begging that the bodies might be given up to them. Not only was this request refused but the messengers were told to send neither herald nor envoy again, as they would meet with the same fate that had just befallen Gesco. With regard to treatment of prisoners in the future, the mutineers passed a resolution and engaged each other to torture and kill every Carthaginian and send back to the capital with his hands cut off every ally of Carthage, and this practice they continued to observe carefully. No one looking at this would have any hesitation in saying that not only do men's bodies and certain of the ulcers and tumours afflicting them become so to speak savage and brutalized and quite incurable, but that this is true in a much higher degree of their souls. In the case of ulcers, if we treat them, they are sometimes inflamed by the treatment itself and spread more rapidly, while again if we neglect them they continue, in virtue of their own nature, to eat into the flesh and never rest until they have utterly destroyed the tissues beneath. Similarly such malignant lividities and putrid ulcers often grow in the human soul, that no beast becomes at the end more wicked or cruel than man. In the case of men in such a state, if we treat the disease by pardon and kindness, they think we are scheming to betray them or take them in, and become more mistrustful and hostile to their would-be benefactors, but if, on the
τιμωρη, διαμιλλώμενοι τοίς θυμοῖς οὐκ ἔστι τι
τῶν ἀπειρημένων ὡς δεινῶν ὁποῖον οὐκ ἀναδέχονται,
σὺν καλῷ τιθέμενοι τὴν τοιαύτην τόλμαν. τέλος δὲ
ἀποθηριωθέντες ἐξέστησαν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως.
10 τῆς δὲ διαθέσεως ἀρχηγὸν μὲν καὶ μεγίστην μερίδα
νομιστέον ἐκείνη μοχθῆρα καὶ τροφὴν ἐκ παιδῶν κα-
κῆν, συνεργά δὲ καὶ πλείω, μέγιστα δὲ τῶν συν-
εργῶν, τὰς ἀεὶ τῶν προστάτων ὑβρεῖς καὶ πλεο-
νεξίας. δὲ δὴ τότε συνέβανε καὶ περὶ μὲν τὸ σύ-
στημα τῶν μισθοφόρων, ἐτὶ δὲ μᾶλλον περὶ τοὺς
ἡγεμόνας αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν.
82 Ἀμίλκας δὲ, δυσχρηστούμενος τῇ τῶν πολέμων
ἀπονοίᾳ, τὸν μὲν Ἀνυνα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐκάλει, πε-
πεισμένος ἀθροισθέντων ὁμοῦ τῶν στρατοπεδῶν
2 θάττον ἐπιθήσεων τέλος τοῖς ὀλοίς. τῶν δὲ πολε-
μών οὕς ποτὲ κρατήσει, τοὺς μὲν ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ
dισφθείρε, τοὺς δὲ ζωγρία πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰσαναχθέν-
tας ὑπέβαλλε τοῖς θηρίοις, μίαν ὀρὼν λύσιν ταῦ-
την, εἰ δυνηθεὶς τοὺς ἔχθρους ἀρδην ἀφαίνεσαί.
3 Δοκούντων δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπικυνδεστέρας
ἐλπίδας ἔχεις ἤδη κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, γίνεται τις
ὁλοσχερὴς καὶ παράδοξος περὶ αὐτοῦς παλίρροια τῶν
4 πραγμάτων. οἱ τε γὰρ στρατηγοὶ συνελθόντες ἐπὶ
tαυτὸ διεστάσασαν πρὸς σφᾶς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὡστε
μὴ μόνον τοὺς κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν παραλιπέναι κα-
ροῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλὰς ἀφορμὰς
dιδόναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλους
5 φιλονεικίαν. δὲ δὴ καὶ συνέντευς οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τῷ
μὲν ἐνὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι προσέταξαν,
tῶ δὲ ἐτέρῳ μένειν, ὅπλα ἄν εἶναι προκρίνοισ
6 συν. ἀμα δὲ τούτους καὶ τὰς παρακομιζομένας ἀγο-
contrary, we attempt to cure the evil by retaliation they work up their passions to outrival ours, until there is nothing so abominable or so atrocious that they will not consent to do it, imagining all the while that they are displaying a fine courage. Thus at the end they are utterly brutalized and no longer can be called human beings. Of such a condition the origin and most potent cause lies in bad manners and customs and wrong training from childhood, but there are several contributory ones, the chief of which is habitual violence and unscrupulousness on the part of those in authority over them. All these conditions were present in this mercenary force as a whole and especially in their chiefs.

82. This desperation of the enemy made Hamilcar anxious, and he begged Hanno to join him, being convinced that if both armies united, an end would be put sooner to the whole war. Meanwhile he continued to put to the sword those of the enemy who were conquered in the field, while those brought to him captive prisoners he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death, as it was clear to him that the rebellion would never be stamped out until the enemy were utterly exterminated.

The prospects of the Carthaginians now seemed much brighter, but the tide suddenly turned completely against them. For when the two generals met, they quarrelled so seriously, that this difference caused them not only to neglect many opportunities of striking a blow at the enemy, but to afford many such to the latter. The Carthaginians perceiving this, ordered one of the two to leave his post and the other to remain in sole command, leaving the choice to the troops. In addition to this
ΤΗΣ ΗΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

ρᾶς ἐκ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς καλομένων Ἐμπορίων, ἐφ' αἰσ ἐίχον τάς μεγίστας ἐλπίδας περὶ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, διαφθαρήναι συνέβη 7 κατὰ θάλατταν ὀλοσχερῶς ὑπὸ χειμώνος. τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν Σαρδόνα, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προείπον, ἐτύχανεν ἀπηλλοτριωμένα, μεγάλας αὐτοῖς αἰεὶ ποτε χρείας παρεχομένης τῆς νήσου ταύτης κατὰ τὰς 8 περιστάσεις. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἡ τῶν Ἰππακριτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἰτυκαίων ἀπέστη πόλις, αὐτίνες ἐτύχανον μόναι τῶν κατὰ τὴν Διβύνην οὐ μόνον τὸν ἑνεστῶτα πόλεμον ἀναδεδεγμέναι γενναίως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κατ᾽ Ἀγαθοκλέα καιροὺς καὶ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἔφοδον εὐγενῶς ὑπομεμενηκυίας, καὶ συνλήβηδην οὐδέποτε 9 βεβουλευμέναι Καρχηδονίοις οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον. τὸτε δὲ χαρὶς τῆς ἀλόγου πρὸς τοὺς Δίβυνας ἀποστάσεως καὶ διὰ τῆς μεταθέσεως εὐθείας τούτοις μὲν τὴν μεγίστην οἰκείοτητα καὶ πίστιν ἐναπεδεύξαντο, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπαραίτητον ὅργην ἑνεστή- 10 σαντο καὶ μίσος. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ παραβεβοηθηκότας αὐτοῖς παρ’ ἐκείνων, ὄντας εἰς πεντακοσίους, καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα τούτων ἀποκτείναντες ἀπαντας ἔρρι- φαν κατὰ τὸν τείχος, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐνεχείρισαν τοῖς Δίβυσι: τοῖς γε μὲν Καρχηδονίους οὐδὲ θάβαι συν- 11 ἐχώρησαν τοὺς ἤτυχηκότας αὐτομένους. τοῦτων δὲ συμβαίνοντων, οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπέν- διον, ἐπαρθένες τοὺς συμβεβηκόσι, πολιορκεῖν 12 ἐνεχείρησαν αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχηδόνα. Βάρκας δὲ παραλαβὸν Ἀννίβαν τὸν στρατηγὸν· τοῦτον γὰρ ἐξαπέστειλαν οἱ πολίται πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις, ἐπεὶ τὸν "Ἀννώνα τὸ στρατόπεδον ἔκρυνε δεῖν ἀπαλ- λάττεσθαι, κατὰ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων αὐτοῖς
they suffered the total loss at sea in a storm, of the supplies they were conveying from the place they call Emporiae, supplies on which they entirely relied for their commissariat and other needs. And again, as I said above, they had lost Sardinia, an island which had always been of great service to them in difficult circumstances. The severest blow of all, however, was the defection of Hippaeritae and Utica, the only two cities in Libya which had not only bravely faced the present war, but had gallantly held out during the invasion of Agathocles and that of the Romans; indeed they never had on any occasion given the least sign of hostility to Carthage. But now, apart from their unjustifiable defection to the cause of the Libyans, their sympathies so suddenly changed, that they exhibited the greatest friendship and loyalty to the rebels, while beginning to show every symptom of passionate and determined hatred of Carthage. After butchering the troops the Carthaginians had sent to assist them, about five hundred in number, together with their commander, they threw all the bodies from the wall, and surrendered the city to the Libyans. They would not even give the Carthaginians the permission they requested to bury their unfortunate compatriots. Matho and Spendius in the meantime, elated by these events, undertook the siege of Carthage itself. Barcas had now been joined in the command by Hannibal, the general whom the citizens had dispatched to the army, on the soldiers voting that Hanno should be the one to retire, when the decision was left in their hands by the Carthaginians at the
δοθείσαιν ἑπιτροπὴν περὶ τὰς γενομένας τῶν στρα-
τηγῶν στάσεις πρὸς Ἀλλήλους. ἐδιόπερ Ἀμίλκας,
ἐχὼν τούτον τε καὶ Ναραύαν, ἐπήει τὴν χώραν,
διακλείσαν τὰς χορηγίας τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ
Σπένδιον, μεγίστην αὐτῷ παρεχομένου χρείαν περὶ
tε ταύτα καὶ τάλλα Ναραύα τοῦ Νομάδος.

14 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ὑπαίθρους δυνάμεις ἐν
33 τούτοις ἦν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι περικλειόμενοι παν-
tαχόθεν ἠναγκάζοντο καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὰς συμμα-
2 χίδων πόλεων ἐλπίδας. 'Ἰέρων δ' ἄει μὲν ποτὲ κατὰ
tὸν ἑνεστῶτα πόλεμον μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο σπουδὴν
3 εἰς πᾶν τὸ παρακαλούμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, τότε δὲ καὶ
μᾶλλον ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο, πεπεισμένος συμφέρειν ἑαυτῷ
καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δυναστείαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν
Ῥωμαίων φιλίαν τὸ σύζευγαν Καρχηδόνιον, ἴνα μὴ
παντάπασιν ἐξῆ τὸ προτεθὲν ἀκοντὶ συντελεῖσθαι
τοῖς ἰσχύοις, πάνυ φρονίμως καὶ νονιχώς λογί-
4 ζόμενοι. οὐδὲποτε γὰρ χρὴ τὰ τοιαύτα παραρᾶν,
onδὲ τηλικαύτην οὔδενι συγκατασκευάζειν δυνα-
στείαν, πρὸς ἔναν οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ὀμολογουμένων ἐξ-
5 ἐσται δικαίων ἀμφισβητεῖν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ
Ῥωμαίοι τηροῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας δίκαια
6 προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον. ἐν ἀρχαῖς μὲν γὰρ
ἐγένετο τὶς ἀμφισβήτησις εἰς ἀμφοῖν διὰ των
7 τοιαύτας αἰτίας. τῶν Καρχηδόνιων τόσον πλέοντας εἰς
Ἰταλίας εἰς Λιβύην καὶ χορηγοῦντας τοῖς πολεμίοις
καταγόντων ὡς αὐτούς, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀθροισθέντων
τούτων εἰς τὴν φυλακὴν εἰς τοὺς πεντακοσίους,
8 ἡγανάκτησαν οἱ Ῥωμαίοι. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα διαπρε-
σβευόμενοι, καὶ κομισάμενοι διὰ λόγον πάντας, ἐπὶ
tοσοῦτον εὐδόκησαν ὅστε παραχρῆμα τοῖς Καρχη-
δόνιοις ἀντιδωρήσασθαι τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους παρ’
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time the two generals had quarrelled. Accompanied then by this Hannibal and by Naravas, Hamilcar scoured the country, intercepting the supplies of Matho and Spendius, receiving the greatest assistance in this and all other matters from the Numidian Naravas.

Such were the positions of the field forces. The Carthaginians, being shut in on all sides, were obliged to resort to an appeal to the states in alliance with them. Hiero during the whole of the present war had been most prompt in meeting their requests, and was now more complaisant than ever, being convinced that it was in his own interest for securing both his Sicilian dominions and his friendship with the Romans, that Carthage should be preserved, and that the stronger Power should not be able to attain its ultimate object entirely without effort. In this he reasoned very wisely and sensibly, for such matters should never be neglected, and we should never contribute to the attainment by one state of a power so preponderant, that none dare dispute with it even for their acknowledged rights. But now the Romans as well as Hiero observed loyally the engagements the treaty imposed on them. At first there had been a slight dispute between the two states for the following reason. The Carthaginians when they captured at sea traders coming from Italy to Africa with supplies for the enemy, brought them in to Carthage, and there were now in their prisons as many as five hundred such. The Romans were annoyed at this, but when on sending an embassy, they recovered all the prisoners by diplomatic means, they were so much gratified, that in return they gave back to the Carthaginians all
αὐτοῖς ἀιχμαλώτους ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Σικελίαν πολέμου.

9 ἀπὸ δὲ τούτοις τοῦ καιροῦ πρὸς ἐκάστα τῶν παρα-
καλουμένων ἐτοίμως καὶ φιλανθρώπως ὑπῆκουν.

10 διὸ καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐπέτρεψαν τοῖς
ἐμπόροις ἐξαγαγεῖν αἰεὶ τὸ κατεπείγον, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς
πολεμίους ἐκώλυσαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ
Σαρδόνι μισθοφόρων, καθ᾽ ὧν καιρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Καρ-
χηδονίων ἀπέστησαν, ἐπισπωμένων αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν
νῆσον σὺν ὑπῆκουσαν· τῶν δ᾽ Ἰτυκαίων ἐγχειρι-
ζόντων σφάς, οὐ προσεδέξαντο, τηροῦντες τὰ κατὰ
τὰς συνθήκας δίκαια.

12 Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν οὖν τῆς παρὰ τῶν προερμιμέ-
νων φίλων τυγχάνοντες ἐπικουρίας ὑπέμενον τῇ

84 πολιορκίαν. τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον
οὐχ ἤττον πολιορκεῖσθαι συνεβαίνει ἡ πολιορκεῖν.

2 εἰς τοιαύτην γὰρ αὐτοὺς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄμιλκαν ἐν-
δεικνύον καθισταντο τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, ὡστ᾽ ἀναγκα-

3 οὐχὶ τέλος αὐτοῖς διαλύσαι τὴν πολιορκίαν. μετὰ
δὲ των χρόνων ἀδροίσαντες τῶν τε μισθοφόρων
tοὺς ἄριστους καὶ Λιβύους, τοὺς ἀπαντάς εἰς πεν-
tακυσμύριον, μεθ᾽ ὧν ἤν καὶ Ζάρκας ὁ Λίβυς ἔχων
tοὺς ὑφ᾽ ἀυτὸν ταττομένους, ὄρμησαν αὐθις ἀντι-

5 παράγειν εν τοῖς ὑπαίθριοι καὶ τηρεῖν τοὺς περὶ
τὸν Ἄμιλκαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πεδινῶν τόπων ἀπει-

χοντο, καταπεταγμένοι τὰ θηρία καὶ τοὺς περὶ
τὸν Ἀρακαν ἔπεισι, τοὺς δ᾽ ὀρέων καὶ στενοὺς

6 ἐπειρώντο προκαταλαμβάνειν. ἐν οἷς καιροῖς συν-

ήσθη ταῖς μὲν ἐπιβολαίς καὶ τόλμαις μηδὲν αὐτοῦς
λείπεσθαι τῶν ὑπεναντίων, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπειρίαν

πολλάκις ἐλαττοῦσθαι. τότε γὰρ ἤν, ὡς ἑουκε, συν-

ιδεῖν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας πηλίκην ἔχει διαφορὰν
ἐμπειρία μεθοδικὴ καὶ στρατηγικὴ δύναμις ἀπειρίας

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the remaining prisoners from the Sicilian war and henceforth gave prompt and friendly attention to all their requests. They gave permission to their merchants to export all requirements for Carthage, but not for the enemy, and shortly afterwards, when the mercenaries in Sardinia on revolting from Carthage invited them to occupy the island, they refused. Again on the citizens of Utica offering to surrender to them they did not accept, but held to their treaty engagements.

The Carthaginians, then, on thus obtaining assistance from their allies continued to withstand the siege. 84. But Matho and Spendius were just as much in the position of besieged as of besiegers. Hamilcar had reduced them to such straits for supplies that they were finally forced to raise the siege. A short time afterwards, collecting a picked force of mercenaries and Libyans to the number of about fifty thousand and including Zarzas the Libyan and those under his command, they tried again their former plan of marching in the open parallel to the enemy and keeping a watch on Hamilcar. They avoided level ground, as they were afraid of the elephants and Naravas' horse, but they kept on trying to anticipate the enemy in occupying positions on the hills and narrow passes. In this campaign they were quite equal to the enemy in courage and enterprise, but were often worsted owing to their want of tactical skill. This was, it seems, an opportunity for seeing by the light of actual fact, how much the methods gained by experience and the skill of a general, differ from a soldier's inexperience
7 καὶ τριβῆς ἀλόγου στρατιωτικῆς. πολλοὺς μὲν γὰρ 
αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς κατὰ μέρος χρείας ἀποτεμνόμενον 
καὶ συγκλείων ὠσπερ ἄγαθὸς πεπεντῆς, ἀμαχεῖ 
8 διέφθειρε, πολλοὺς δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὀλοσχερέσι κινοῦνοι 
τοὺς μὲν εἰς ἐνέδρας ἀνυπονοήτους ἐπαγόμενος 
ἀνήρει, τοὺς δὲ ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως ποτὲ μὲν 
μεθʼ ἡμέραν, ποτὲ δὲ νύκτωρ, ἐπιφανώμενος ἑξ- 
ἐπληττεν· ὅπως λάβοι ζωγρίᾳ, πάντας παρέβαλ- 
9 λὲ τοῖς θηρίοις. τέλος δὲ ἐπιστρατοπεδεύσας αὐτοῖς 
ἀνυπονοήτως ἐν τόποις ἀφύεσι μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἐκεί- 
νων χρείαν, εὐφυέσι δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἕαυτοῦ δύναμιν, 
εἰς τοῦτ’ ἠγαγε περιστάσεως ὡστε μήτε διακιν- 
δυνεῖν τολμῶντας μήτ’ ἀποδράναι δυναμένους διὰ 
τὸ τάφρω καὶ χάρακε περιειλήφθαμε πανταχόθεν τέ- 
λος ὑπὸ τῆς λιμοῦ συναγομένους ἔσθιεν ἀλλήλων 
10 ἀναγκασθήμαι, τοῦ δαμονίου τῆς οἰκείων ἀμοιβὴν 
αὐτοῖς ἐπιφέροντος τῇ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας ἀσεβεία καὶ 
11 παρανομία. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸν κίνδυνον οὐκ ἐτόλ- 
μων ἔξεναι, προδῆλοι τῆς ἔτητης καὶ τῆς τιμωρίας 
τοῖς ἄλογομένοις ὑπαρχοῦσης, περὶ δὲ διαλύσεως 
οὐδ’ ὑπενόουν ποιεῖσθαι μνήμην, συνειδότες σφίξι 
12 τὰ πεπραγμένα. προσανέχοντες δ’ ἀεὶ ταῖς ἐκ τοῦ 
Τύνητος βοηθείας διὰ τὰς τῶν ἤγουμενῶν ἐπαγ- 
γελίας πάν ὑπέμενον ποιεῖν κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν. 
85 ἐπεὶ δὲ κατεχρήσατο μὲν ἀσεβῶς τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, 
τροφῆ ταύτη χρωμένοι, κατεχρήσατο δὲ τὰ δου- 
λικὰ τῶν σωμάτων, ἐβοήθηε δ’ ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος οὐ- 
2 δεῖς, τότε προδῆλοι τῆς αἰκίας διὰ τὴν περικάκη- 
σιν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν τοῖς ἤγουμεν ὑπαρχοῦσης, ἔκρι- 
ναν οἱ περὶ τὸν Λύταριτον καὶ Ζάρζαν καὶ Σπέν- 
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in the art of war and mere unreasoning routine. For in many partial engagements, Hamilcar, like a good draught-player, by cutting off and surrounding large numbers of the enemy, destroyed them without their resisting, while in the more general battles he would sometimes inflict large loss by enticing them into unsuspected ambuscades and sometimes throw them into panic by appearing when they least expected it by day or by night. All those he captured were thrown to the elephants. Finally, taking them by surprise and encamping opposite to them in a position unfavourable for action on their part but favouring his own strong point—generalship—he brought them to such a pass, that not daring to risk a battle and unable to escape, as they were entirely surrounded by a trench and palisade, they were at last driven by famine to eat each other—a fitting retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all law human and divine in their treatment of their neighbours. They did not venture to march out and do battle, as they were faced by the certainty of defeat and condign punishment for all captured, and they did not even think of asking for terms, as they had their evil deeds on their conscience. Always expecting the relief from Tunis that their leaders continued to promise them, there was no crime against themselves that they scrupled to commit. 85. But when they had used up their prisoners in this abominable manner by feeding on them, and had used up their slaves, and no help came from Tunis, and their leaders saw that their persons were in obvious danger owing to the dreadful extremity to which the soldiers were reduced, Autaritus, Zarzas and Spendius decided to
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διον ἐγχειρίζειν ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ δια-
3 λαλεῖν περὶ διαλύσεως Ἀμίλκα. πέμψαντες οὖν
κήρυκα καὶ λαβόντες συγκώμια περὶ πρεσβείας,
4 ἦκον ὄντες δέκα πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους. πρὸς
οὖς Ἀμίλκας ὁμολογίας ἔποιησατο τοιαῦτα· ἔξ-
ειναι Καρχηδόνιος ἐκλέξεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων οὖς
ἀν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται δέκα· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἀφ-
5 ἴναι μετὰ χιτῶνος. γενομένων δὲ τούτων, εὐθέως
Ἀμίλκας ἐφῆ τοὺς παρόντας ἐκλέγεσθαι κατὰ τὰς
ὁμολογίας. τῶν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Αὐτάρτον καὶ
Σπένδιον καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἠγε-
μόνων τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐκφυρέεσθαι οἱ Καρχηδό-
6 νιοί. τῶν δὲ Λιβύων, ἔπει τὴν σύλληψιν ἱσθοντο
τῶν ἠγεμόνων, νομισάντων, αὐτοὺς παρεσπονδήθηκαν
diὰ τὸ τὰς συνθήκας ἄγνοεῖν, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν
7 αὐτὰν ὁρμησάντων ἐπὶ τὰ ὀπλα, περιστήσας αὐτοῖς
Ἀμίλκας τὰ τε θηρία καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἄπαν-
τας διέφθειρε πλείους ὄντας τῶν τετρακισμυρίων
περὶ τὸν τόπον τὸν Πρίονα καλοῦμενον· δὲν συμ-
βαίνει διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ σχήματος πρὸς τὸ νῦν
εἰρημένον ὀργανον ταύτης τετευχέναι τῆς προση-
γορίας.

86 Πράξας δὲ τὰ προδεδηλωμένα τοῖς μὲν Καρχη-
δόνιοις αὖθις ἐλπίδα παρέστησε μεγάλην πρὸς τὸ
βέλτιον, καὶ περὶ ἀπεγνωσόσιν ἱδῇ τὴν σωτηρίαν·
αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ Ναραία καὶ μετ' Ἀννίβου τὴν χώ-
2 σαν ἔπηει καὶ τὰς πόλεις. προσχωροῦντων δὲ καὶ
μετατιθεμένων πρὸς αὐτοὺς τῶν Λιβύων διὰ τὸ
γεγονὸς εὐτύχημα, ποιησάμενοι τὰς πλείστας πόλεις
ὑφ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἦκον ἐπὶ τὸν Γύνητα, καὶ πολιορκεῖ
3 ἐνεχείρησαν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω. κατὰ μὲν οὖν
τὴν ἀπὸ Καρχηδόνος πλευράν προσεστρατοπέδευσεν
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BOOK I

give themselves up to the enemy and discuss terms with Hamilcar. They therefore dispatched a herald, and when they had obtained leave to send envoys, they went, ten in all, to the Carthaginians. The terms Hamilcar made with them were, that the Carthaginians might choose from the enemy any ten they wished, the remainder being free to depart with one tunic apiece. These terms having been agreed to, Hamilcar at once said that by virtue of them he chose the ten envoys. By this means the Carthaginians got into their power Autaritus, Spendius, and the other principal leaders. The Libyans, when they learnt of their officers’ arrest, thought they had been betrayed, as they were ignorant of the treaty, and rushed to arms, but Hamilcar, surrounding them with his elephants and the rest of his forces, cut them all to pieces. They numbered more than forty thousand. The scene of this slaughter was a place called the Saw from its resemblance to that tool.

86. By this achievement Hamilcar again made the Carthaginians very hopeful of better fortune, although by this time they had nearly given up all for lost. In conjunction with Naravas and Hannibal he now raided the country and its towns. The Libyans in general gave in and went over to them owing to the recent victory, and after reducing most of the cities, they reached Tunis and began to besiege Matho. Hannibal encamped on the side of
‘Αννίβας, κατά δὲ τὴν ἀπέναντι ταύτης ‘Αμίλκας. 4 μετὰ δὲ ταύτα προσαγαγόντες πρὸς τὰ τείχη τοὺς περὶ τὸν Σπενδίου αἷμαλῶτος ἐσταύρωσαν ἐπὶ 5 φανῶς. οὗ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω, κατανοήσαντες τὸν Ἀννίβαν ῥαθύμως καὶ κατατεθαρηκότος ἀναστρεφόμενον, ἐπιθέμενοι τῷ χάρακι πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπέκτειναν, πάντας δὲ εξέβαλον ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας, ἐκκύρευσαν δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀποσκευής ἀπάσης, ἔλαβον δὲ καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν Ὁ Ἀννίβαν ἡμ— 6 γρία. τούτον μὲν οὖν παραχρῆμα πρὸς τὸν Σπενδίου σταυρὸν ἀγαγόντες καὶ τιμωρησάμενοι πικρῶς, ἐκεῖνον μὲν καθεῖλον, τούτον δὲ ἀνέθεσαν ξώντα καὶ περικατέσφαξαν τριάκοντα τῶν Καρχηδο— νίων τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους περὶ τὸ τῷ Σπενδίου 7 σῶμα, τῆς τύχης ὦσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἐκ παραθέσεως ἁμφοτέρους ἐναλλαξ διδούσης ἀφορμᾶς εἰς ὑπερβο— 8 λὴν τῆς κατ’ ἄλληλων τιμωρίας. ὁ δὲ Βάρκας ὡς μὲν ςυνήκε τὴν ἐπίθεσιν τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως διὰ τὴν ἀπόστασιν τῶν στρατοπέδων· οὐδὲ μὴν συνεϊς οὐδ’ οὕτως κατετάχει πρὸς τὴν βοήθειαν διὰ τὰς 9 μεταξύ δυσχωρίας. διότι ἀναζεύγας ἀπὸ τοῦ Τύ— νητος, καὶ παρελθὼν ἐπὶ τὸν Μακάραν ποταμὸν, κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρὸς τῷ στόματι τοῦ ποταμοῦ καὶ τῇ θαλάττῃ. 87 Οὗ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, παραδόξου τῆς περιπετείας αὐτοῖς φανείσης δυσθύμως καὶ δυσελπίστως εἶχον πάλιν· ἀρτι γὰρ ἀναθαρροῦντες ταῖς φυχαῖς παρὰ 2 πόδας ἐπιπτον αὕθις ταῖς ἐξπίσων. οὐ μὴν ἠφ— 3 ἱσταντο τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ πρὸς τῆν σωτηρίαν. διὸ καὶ τριάκοντα μὲν τῆς γερουσίας προχειρισάμενοι, καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὸν πρότερον μὲν ἀπελθόντα στρα— τηγὸν Ἡλιονα, (τότε δ’ ἐπαναγαγόντα) σὺν δὲ 232
the town next Carthage and Hamilcar on the opposite side. Their next step was to take Spendius and the other prisoners up to the walls and crucify them there in the sight of all. Matho noticed that Hannibal was guilty of negligence and over-confidence, and attacking his camp, put many Carthaginians to the sword and drove them all out of the camp. All the baggage fell into the rebel's hands and they made Hannibal himself prisoner. Taking him at once to Spendius' cross they tortured him cruelly there, and then, taking Spendius down from the cross, they crucified Hannibal alive on it and slew round the body of Spendius thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank. Thus did Fortune, as if it were her design to compare them, give both the belligerents in turn cause and opportunity for inflicting on each other the cruellest punishments. Owing to the distance between the two camps it was some time before Hamilcar heard of the sortie and attack, and even then he was slow to give assistance owing to the difficult nature of the interjacent ground. He therefore broke up his camp before Tunis and on reaching the river Macaras, encamped at its mouth by the seaside.

87. The suddenness of this reverse took the Carthaginians by surprise, and they became again despondent and low-spirited. It was only the other day that their spirits had begun to revive; so they at once fell again. Yet they did not omit to take steps for their safety. They appointed a committee of thirty senators and dispatched them to Hamilcar accompanied by Hanno, the general who had previously retired from command, but now resumed it,
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tούτοις τοὺς ὑπολοίπους τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις καθοπλίσαντες, οἷον ἐσχάτην τρέχοντες ταύτην, ἐξαιπ-4 ἐστελλον πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν, ἐντελάμενοι πολλὰ τοῖς τῆς γεροντίας κατὰ πάντα τρόπον διαλύει τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐκ τῆς προγεγενημένης διαφορᾶς καὶ συμφρονεῖν σφᾶς ἀναγκάσαι, βλέπαντας εἰς τὰ παρ-5 ὁντα τῶν πραγμάτων. ὃν πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους διαθεμένων λόγους, ἐπειδὴ συνήγαγον ὁμώς τοὺς στρατηγούς, ἡγακάσθησαν συγχωρεῖν καὶ πείθε-6 σαί τοῖς λεγομένοις οἱ περὶ τῶν "Ἀννωνα καὶ τὸν Ὁλ. νίοις, ὥστε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω, δυσχρηστουμένους ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος κυδύνους, πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐποίη-7 σαντο περὶ τὴν Δέπτεν προσαγωρευμένην καὶ τινὰς τῶν ἅλων πόλεων, τέλος ἐπὶ τὸ διὰ μάχης κρίνειν ὅρμησαι τὰ πράγματα, προθύμως ἔχοντων πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος καὶ τῶν Ἐρυθρών. Διόπερ ἀμφότεροι τούτο προθέμενοι παρεκάλουν μὲν πάντας τοὺς συμμάχους πρὸς τὸν κυδύνουν, συνήγουν δὲ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἄν μέλλοντες ἐκκυβεύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὦλων. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκατέρω ἤν τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἑτομα, παρατάσαμεν συν-10 ἐβαλον ἀλλήλους ἐξ ὁμολογίας. γενομένου δὲ τοῦ νικημάτος κατὰ τοὺς Ἐρυθρών, οἱ μὲν πλείοντο τῶν Λιβύων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸς κυδύνως διεφθάρσαν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τινὰ πόλιν συμφυγοῦντες μετ’ οὗ πολὺ παρέδοσαν ἑαυτοὺς, ὃ δὲ Μάθως ὑποχειρίους ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ζωγρία.

88 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἅλλα μέρη τῆς Ἀλβίνης μετὰ τὴν 2 μάχην εὐθέως ὑπήκουσε τοῖς Ἐρυθρών. ἦ δὲ τῶν Ἰσπακρατῶν καὶ τῶν Ἰτυκαίων πόλεις ἐμενον, 234
and by all their remaining citizens of military age, whom they had armed as a sort of forlorn hope. They enjoined these commissioners to put an end by all means in their power to the two generals' long-standing quarrel, and to force them, in view of the circumstances, to be reconciled. The senators, after they had brought the generals together, pressed them with so many and varied arguments, that at length Hanno and Barcas were obliged to yield and do as they requested. After their reconciliation they were of one mind, and consequently everything went as well as the Carthaginians could wish, so that Matho, unsuccessful in the many partial engagements which took place around Leptis and some other cities, at length resolved to decide matters by a general battle, the Carthaginians being equally anxious for this. Both sides then, with this purpose, called on all their allies to join them for the battle and summoned in the garrisons from the towns, as if about to stake their all on the issue. When they were each ready to attack, they drew up their armies confronting each other and at a preconcerted signal closed. The Carthaginians gained the victory, most of the Libyans falling in the battle, while the rest escaped to a certain city and soon afterwards surrendered, but Matho himself was taken prisoner.

88. The rest of Libya at once submitted to Carthage after the battle, but Hippacritae and Utica
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

οὐδεμίαν ἀφορμὴν ἔχουσαι πρὸς διάλυσιν διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλείπεσθαι σφίσι τόπον ἐλέους μηδὲ συγγνώ-

3 μης κατὰ τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολάς. οὕτως καὶ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς ἀμαρτίας μεγάλην ἔχει διαφορὰν ἡ με-

τριώτης καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἀνήκεστον ἐπιτηδεύειν ἐκού-

4 σίως. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ παραστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἢ μὲν Ἄνων, ἢ δὲ Βάρκας, ταχέως ἤναγκασαν αὐτῶν ὀμολογίας ποιήσασθαι καὶ διαλύσεις εὐδοκομένας Καρχηδονίους.

5 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Λιβυκὸς πόλεμος εἰς τουτήν ἀγα-

γών περίτασαν Καρχηδονίους τούν ἐσχε τὸ τέλος, ὥστε μὴ μόνον κυριεύσαν πάλιν τῆς Λιβύης τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς αὐτούς τῆς ἀπο-

6 στάσεως τιμωρήσασθαι καταξίως: τὸ γὰρ πέρασά ἄγα-

γόντες οἱ νέοι τὸν θρίαμβον διὰ τῆς πόλεως πάσαν

7 αἰκίαν ἐναπεδείξαντο τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω. τρία

μὲν οὖν ἦτη καὶ τετταράς ποι ὁμιὰς ἐπολέμησαν

οἱ μισθοφόροι πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους πόλεμον ὅτι ἤμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄκοη μαθόντες πολὺ τι τοὺς ἄλλους

8 ὀμότητι καὶ παρανομία διεννυχότα. Ἡ Ῥωμαίοι δὲ κατὰ τὸν καὶ ρόν τοῦτον ἕπο τῶν ἐκ τῆς Σαρδόνος

αὐτομολιστῶν μισθοφόρων πρὸς σφᾶς ἐκκληθέν-

τες ἐπεβάλοντο πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν προειρήμενην νήσου.

9 τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ἀγανακτοῦντων, ὡς αὐτοῖς

καθηκούσης μᾶλλον τῆς τῶν Σαρδῶν Δυναστείας,

καὶ παρασκευαζομένων μεταπορεύεσθαι τοὺς ἀπο-

10 στήσαντας αὐτῶν τῆς νήσου, λαβόμενοι τῆς ἀφο-

ριμῆς ταύτης οἱ Ῥωμαίοι πόλεμον ἐξήφισαντο πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐπὶ Σαρδόνιος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ποιεὶσθαι τὴν παρα-

11 σκευὴν. οἱ δὲ παραδόξως διαπεφευγότες τὸν προ-
still held out, feeling they had no reasonable grounds to expect terms in view of their having been so proof to all considerations of mercy and humanity when they first rebelled. This shows us that even in such offences it is advantageous to be moderate and abstain from unpardonable excesses. However, Hanno besieging one town and Barcas the other soon compelled them to accept such terms and ransom as the Carthaginians thought fit to impose.

This Libyan war, that had brought Carthage into such peril, resulted not only in the Carthaginians regaining possession of Libya, but in their being able to inflict exemplary punishment on the authors of the rebellion. The last scene in it was a triumphal procession of the young men leading Matho through the town and inflicting on him all kinds of torture. This war had lasted for three years and four months, and it far excelled all wars we know of in cruelty and defiance of principle.

The Romans about the same time, on the invitation of the mercenaries who had deserted to them from Sardinia, undertook an expedition to that island. When the Carthaginians objected on the ground that the sovereignty of Sardinia was rather their own than Rome’s, and began preparations for punishing those who were the cause of its revolt, the Romans made this the pretext of declaring war on them, alleging that the preparations were not against Sardinia, but against themselves. The Carthaginians, who had barely escaped destruction in this
εἰρημένον πόλεμον, κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἄφυως δια-
κείμενοι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν πρὸς τὸ πάλιν ἀναλαμβά-
12 νεῖν τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀπέχθειαν, εὐξαντεῖς τοῖς
καιροῖς οὐ μόνον ἀπέστησαν τῆς Σαρδόνος, ἀλλὰ
καὶ χίλια τάλαντα καὶ διακόσια προσέθηκαν τοῖς
Ῥωμαίοις, ἐφ᾽ ὑ μὴ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἀναδέξασθαι
tὸν πόλεμον. ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἐπράχθη.
last war, were in every respect ill-fitted at this moment to resume hostilities with Rome. Yielding therefore to circumstances, they not only gave up Sardinia, but agreed to pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents to the Romans to avoid going to war for the present.
1 Ἐν μὲν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βυβλίῳ διασαφήσαμεν πότε ὁ Ῥωμαίοι συντηρήσαμεν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τοὺς ἐκτὸς ἐγχειρεῖν ἦρξαντο πράγμασιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτως πῶς εἰς Σικελίαν διέβησαν καὶ δι᾽ ἀς αὐτίας τὸν περὶ τῆς προειρημένης νόσου συνεστήσαντο πόλεμον πρὸς Καρχηδόνιον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πότε πρῶτον συνίστασθαι ναυτικὰς ἦρξαντο δυνάμεις, καὶ τὰ συμβάντα κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκατέρως ἐως τοῦ τέλους, ἐν ὡς Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἐξεχώρησαν πάσης Σικελίας, ὁ Ῥωμαίοι δὲ ἐπεκράτησαν τῆς ὅλης νόσου πλὴν τῶν ύφ᾽ Ἰέρωνα ταττομένων μερῶν.

3 ἔξης δὲ τούτως ἐπεβαλόμεθα λέγειν πῶς στασιάζαντες οἱ μισθοφόροι πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους τὸν προσαγορευθέντα Λιβυκὸν πόλεμον ἔξεκασαν, καὶ τὰ συμβάντα κατὰ τούτον ἀσβηκματα μέχρι τίνος προβηθεν καὶ τίνα διέξοδον ἔλαβε τὰ παράλογα τῶν ἔργων, ἐως τοῦ τέλους καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἐπι-κρατείας. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ συνεχὴ τούτως περισσόμεθα δηλοῦν κεφαλαιώδως ἐκάστων ἐπιμαύσαντες κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν.

4 Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ ὡς θάττον κατεστήσαντο τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, εὐθέως Ἀμίλκαν ἐξαπέστειλον δυνάμεις συντηρήσαντες εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν τόπους. ὁ δὲ ἀναλαβὼν τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν
BOOK II

1. In the preceding book I stated in the first place at what date the Romans having subjected Italy began to concern themselves in enterprises outside the peninsula; next I narrated how they crossed to Sicily and what were their reasons for undertaking the war with Carthage for the possession of that island. After relating when and how they first built a navy, I pursued the history of the war until its end, at which the Carthaginians evacu- ated all Sicily, and the Romans acquired the whole island except Hiero's dominions. In the next place I set myself to describe how the mercenaries mutinied against Carthage and set ablaze the so-called Libyan war; I described all the terrible atrocities committed in this war, all its dramatic surprises, and their issues, until it ended in the final triumph of Carthage. I will now attempt to give a summary view, according to my original project, of the events immediately following.

The Carthaginians, as soon as they had set the affairs of Libya in order, dispatched Hamilcar to Spain entrusting him with an adequate force. Taking with him his army and his son Hannibal now about
ΤΗΣ ΕΘΝΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΗΒΙΟΥΣ

Αννίβας, οντά τότε κατά τήν ήλικίαν ἑτών ἐννέα, καὶ διαβάς κατά τάς Ἡρακλέους στήλας ἀνεκτάτο τά κατά τήν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοις. 7 διατρίβας δ' ἐν τοῖς τόποις τούτοις ἐτή σχεδὸν ἐννέα, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν πολέμιω, πολλοὺς δὲ πειθοὶ ποιήσας Ἰβηρίων ὑπηκόους Καρχηδόνι, κατέστρεψε 8 τόν βίον ἁξίως τῶν προγεγεγενημένων πράξεων. πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς ἀνδρῳδεστάτους καὶ μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχοντας παραταττόμενοι, καὶ χρώμενοι τολμηρῶς καὶ παραβόλως ἐαυτῷ κατὰ τόν τοῦ κινδύνου καὶ 9 ρόν, ἐρρωμένως τόν βίον μετῆλλαξε. τήν δὲ στρατηγικάν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι παρέδοσαν Ἀσδρούβα, τῷ ἱνόμου κηδεστῇ καὶ τρυμπάρχῳ.

2 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καίρους τούτους Ῥωμαίοι τήν πρώτην διάβασαν εἰς τήν Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Εὐρώπης ἐπεβάλοντο ποιεῖσθαι μετὰ δυνάμεως. 2 ἄπερ οὐ παρέργως, ἄλλα μετ' ἐπιστάσεως θεωρητέον τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀληθινῶς τήν τε πρόθεσιν τήν ἠμετέραν συνθεάσασθαι καὶ τήν αὐξήσιν καὶ 3 κατασκευὴν τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυναστείας. ἔγνωσαν δὲ 4 διαβάινειν διὰ τινας τοιαύτας αἰτίαις. Ἁγρων ὁ τῶν Ἰλλυρίων βασιλεὺς ἦν μὲν υἱὸς Πλευράτου, δύναμιν δὲ πεζῆν καὶ ναυτικὴν μεγίστην ἑσχε τῶν πρὸ 5 αὐτοῦ βεβασιλευκότων ἐν Ἰλλυρίοις. οὕτως ὑπὸ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φιλίππου πατρὸς πεισθεὶς χρήμασιν ὑπέσχετο βοηθῆσειν Μεδιωνίοις ὑπὸ Αἰτωλῶν πο- 6 λιορκομένοις. Αἰτωλοὶ γὰρ οὐδαμῶς δυνάμενοι πείσαι Μεδιωνίοις μετέχειν σφίσαι τῆς αὐτῆς πολι- 7 τείας, ἐπεβάλοντο κατὰ κράτος ἑλεῖν αὐτοὺς. στρατεύσαντες οὐν πανδημεία, καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύσαν- 8 τες αὐτῶν τήν πόλιν, κατὰ τὸ συνεχές ἐπολυρκοῦν, σάσαν βίαιν προσφέροντες καὶ μηχανῆν. συνάψαν- 242
nine years of age, he crossed the straits of Gibraltar and applied himself to subjugating Spain to the Carthaginians. In this country he spent about nine years during which he reduced many Iberian tribes to obedience either by force of arms or by diplomacy, and finally met with an end worthy of his high achievements, dying bravely in a battle against one of the most warlike and powerful tribes, after freely exposing his person to danger on the field. The Carthaginians handed over the command of the army to Hasdrubal his son-in-law and chief naval officer.

2. It was at this period that the Romans first crossed with an army to Illyria and that part of Europe. This is a matter not to be lightly passed over, but deserving the serious attention of those who wish to gain a true view of the purpose of this work and of the formation and growth of the Roman dominion. The circumstances which decided them to cross were as follows: Agron, king of Illyria, was the son of Pleuratus, and was master of stronger land and sea forces than any king of Illyria before him. Demetrius, the father of Philip V., had induced him by a bribe to go to the assistance of the town of Medion which the Aetolians were besieging. The Aetolians being unable to persuade the Medionians to join their league, determined to reduce them by force. Levying all their forces they encamped round the city and strictly besieged it, employing every forcible means and every device. The date
τος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου τῶν ἀρχαίρεσιῶν, καὶ δέον στρατηγὸν ἔτερον ἀιρεῖσθαι, καὶ τῶν πολιορκουμένων ἥδη κακῶς διακειμένων, καὶ δοκοῦντων ἀν' ἐκάστην ἥμεραν ἐνδώσειν ἐαυτοὺς, δ' προοπάρχον στρατηγὸς προσφέρει λόγον τοῖς Λιτωλοῖς, φάσκων, ἐπειδὴ τὰς κακοπαθείας καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους αὐτὸς ἀναδείκται τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν, δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν λαφύρων, ἐπὰν κρατήσωσι, καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐαυτῷ συγχωρεῖσθαι.

τινῶν δὲ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν προϊόντων πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀμφισβητοῦντων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ παρακαλοῦντων τὰ πλήθη μὴ προδιαλαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' ἀκέραιον ἦν, ὡς ἦν τῷ λογίῳ τουτοῦ ἐπειδή καὶ τὸν στέφανον, ἔδωξε τοῖς Λιτωλοῖς, ὡς ἀπαγαγώσατο στρατηγὸς κρατήσῃ τῆς πόλεως, κοινὴν ποιεῖν τῷ προοπάρχοντι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν λαφύρων καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ὀπλῶν.

3 Δεδομένων δὲ τούτων, καὶ δέον τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἥμερα γενέσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν παράληψιν τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθάπερ ἔθος ἔστιν Λιτωλοῖς, προσπλέουσι τῆς νυκτὸς ἐκατὸν λέμβοι πρὸς τὴν Μεδιώνιαν, κατὰ τοὺς ἔγχιστα τόπους τῆς πόλεως, ἐφ' ὅλον ἦσαν Ἰλι-

2 λυροὶ πεντακισχίλιοι. καθορμισθέντες δὲ, καὶ τῆς ἥμερας ἐπιγενομένης ἐνεργοὶ καὶ λαθραῖν ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἀπόβασιν, καὶ χρησάμενοι τῇ παρ' αὐτοῖς εἰθυσμένη τάξει, προῆγον κατὰ σπείρας ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Λιτωλῶν στρατοπεδίαν. οἱ δ' Λιτωλοὶ, συνέντευξε τὸ γυνόμενον, ἔπι μὲν τῷ παραδόξῳ καὶ τῇ τολμῇ τῶν Ἰλυρῶν ἦσαν ἐκπλαγεὶς· πεφρονηματισμένοι δ' ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου, καὶ καταπιστεύσαντες ταῖς ἰδίαις δυνάμεσι, κατὰ ποσὸν εὐθαρσῶς εἰ- 4 χον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πολὺ μέρος τῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν
of the annual elections was now at hand, and they had to choose another Strategus. As the besieged were in the utmost extremity and were expected to surrender every day, the actual Strategus addressed the Aetolians, maintaining that as it was he who had supported the dangers and hardships of the siege, it was only just, that, on the town falling, he should have the privilege of dealing with the booty and inscribing with his name the shields dedicated in memory of the victory. Some, more especially the candidates for the office, disputed this, and begged the people not to decide the matter in advance, but leave it, as things stood, to Fortune to determine to whom she should award this prize. The Aetolians hereupon passed a resolution, that if it was the new Strategus whoever he might be, to whom the city fell, he should share with the present one the disposition of the booty and the honour of inscribing the shields.

3. This decree had been passed, and next day the election was to be held, and the new Strategus was to enter at once into office, as is the practice of the Aetolians, when that night a hundred boats containing a force of five thousand Illyrians arrived at the nearest point on the coast to Medion. Anchoring there they landed, as soon as it was daylight, with promptitude and secrecy, and forming in the order customary in Illyria, advanced by companies on the Aetolian camp. The Aetolians, on becoming aware of it, were taken aback by the unexpected nature and boldness of the attack, but having for many years ranked very high in their own estimation and relying on their strength, they were more or less confident. Stationing the greater part of their
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ἐπιεύων αὐτοῦ πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις παρενέβαλλον, μέρει δὲ των τῆς ἱπποῦ καὶ τοῖς εὐξώνοις τοὺς ὑπερδείεισι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ χάρακας εὐφυῶς κειμένους τόπος προκατελάμβανον.

5 οἱ δὲ Ἰλλυροὶ τοὺς μὲν ἑλαφροὺς ἐξ ἐφόδου προσπεσόντες τῷ τε πληθεὶς καὶ τῷ βαρεὶ τῆς συντάξεως ἐξέωσαν, τοὺς δὲ μετὰ τούτων ἵππεις συγκινδυνεύοντας ἵνα γάκασαν ἀποχωρήσαι πρὸς τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὀπλῶν. λοιπὸν ἐξ ὑπερδείου ποιούμενοι τὴν ἐφοδον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ τεταγμένους, ταχέως ἐτρέψαντο, συνεπιθεμένων τοῖς Λιτωλοῖς ἄμα καὶ τῶν 7 Μεδιωνίων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, ἐτὶ δὲ πλείους αἰχμαλώτους ἐλαβον τῶν δ' ὀπλῶν καὶ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ἐγένοντο 8 πάσης ἐγκρατείας. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἰλλυροὶ πράξαντες τὸ συνταχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ διακομίσαντες τὴν ἀποσκευὴν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ωφέλειαν ἐπὶ τοὺς λέμβους εὐθέως ἀνήγγελτον, ποιούμενοι τῶν 4 πλοῶν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. οἱ δὲ Μεδιώνοι τετευχότες ἀνελπίστον σωτηρίας, ἀθροισθέντες εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐβουλεύοντο περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ περὶ τῆς 2 τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐπιγραφῆς. ἐδοξεὶ οὖν αὐτοῖς κοινῆς ποιήσεως τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ τῶν ἁρχῶν τῶν Λιτωλῶν ἔχοντο καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸ μέλλον προπορεύεται 3 ὀμένων κατὰ τὸ τῶν Λιτωλῶν δόγμα, τῆς τύχης ὠσπερ ἐπίτηδες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐπὶ τῶν ἱκείνοις συμβαινόντων ἐνδεικνυμένης τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν. ὁ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἑχθρῶν αὐτοὶ προσεδόκων ὁσον ἦδη πείσεσθαι, ταῦτα πράττεν αὐτοῖς ἱκεῖνοι παρέδωκεν ἐν πάνω βραχεὶ χρόνῳ κατὰ τῶν 5 πολεμίων. Λιτωλοὶ δὲ τῇ παραδόξῳ χρησίμενοι συμφορᾷ πάντας ἐδύδαξαν μηδέποτε βουλεύεσθαι 246
hoplites and cavalry on the level ground just in front of their lines, they occupied with a portion of their cavalry and their light-armed infantry certain favourable positions on the heights in front of the camp. The Illyrians, charging the light infantry, drove them from their positions by their superior force and the weight of their formation, compelling the supporting body of cavalry to fall back on the heavy-armed troops. After this, having the advantage of attacking the latter, who were drawn up on the plain, from higher ground, they speedily put them to flight, the Medionians also joining in the attack from the city. They killed many Aetolians and took a still larger number of prisoners, capturing all their arms and baggage. The Illyrians, having thus executed the orders of their king, carried off to their boats the baggage and other booty and at once set sail for home. 4. The Medionians, thus unexpectedly saved, met in assembly and discussed, among other matters, that of the proper inscription for the shields. They decided, in parody of the Aetolian decree, to inscribe them as won from and not by the present Aetolian chief magistrate and the candidates for next year's office. It seemed as if what had befallen this people was designed by Fortune to display her might to men in general. For in so brief a space of time she put it in their power to do to the enemy the very thing which they thought the enemy were just on the point of doing to themselves. The unlooked-for calamity of the Aetolians was a lesson to mankind never to
περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ὡς ἡδή γεγονότος, μηδὲ προ-
κατελπίζειν βεβαιομένους ὑπὲρ ἃν ἀκμὴν ἐνδεχό-
μενόν ἐστὶν ἄλλως γενέσθαι, νέμειν δὲ μερίδα τῷ
παραδόξῳ πανταχῇ μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὄντας, μάλιστα
δ' ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς.

6 Ὅ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἀγρων, ἐπεὶ κατέπλευσαν οἱ
λέμβοι, διακούσας τῶν ἡγεμόνων τὰ κατὰ τὸν κῦ-
δυνον, καὶ περιχαρῆς γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ δοκεῖν Αἴτω-
λον τοὺς μέγιστον ἔχοντα τὸ φρόνημα νευκηκε-
ναι, πρὸς μέθας καὶ τινὰς τοιαύτας ἄλλας εὐωχίας
τραπεῖς ἐνέπεσεν εἰς πλεύριτι· ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἐν

7 ὅλγαις ἡμέραις μετῆλλαξε τὸν βίον. τὴν δὲ βασι-
λείαν ἡ γυνὴ Τεύτα διαδεξαμένη τὸν κατὰ μέρος
χειρισμὸν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐποιεῖτο διὰ τῆς τῶν

8 φιλῶν πίστεως. χρωμένη δὲ λογισμοῖς γνωακεῖος,
καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ γεγονός εὐτύχημα μόνον ἀπο-
βλέπουσα, τῶν δ' ἐκτὸς οὐδὲν περισκεπτομένη,
πρῶτον μὲν συνεχώρησε τοῖς κατ' ἰδίαν πλέουσι

9 λήξεσθαι τοὺς ἐντυχάνοντας, δεύτερον δ' ἀθροίσασα
στόλον καὶ δύναμιν οὐκ ἐλάττω τῆς πρότερον ἐξ-
ἐπεμβε, πᾶσαν γὴν ἀποδείξασα πολεμιᾶν τοῖς Ἡγοῦ-

5 μένοις. οἱ δ' ἐξαποσταλέντες τὴν μὲν πρῶτην ἐπι-

βολὴν ἔσχον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡλείαν καὶ τὴν Μεσσηνίαν·

ταύτας γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰς χώρας Ἰλυριοῦ πορθοῦντες δι-

2 ετέλουν. διὰ γὰρ τοῦ μήκος τῆς παραλίας καὶ διὰ τὸ

μεσογαῖας εἶναι τὰς δυναστευοῦσας ἐν αὐταῖς πό-

λεις μακραὶ καὶ βραδεῖα λίαν ἐγίνοντο τοῖς προ-

ειρημένοις αἱ παραβοήθειαι πρὸς τὰς ἀποβάσεις τῶν

Ἰλυριῶν. ὅθεν ἀδειώς ἐπέτρεχον καὶ κατέσυρον ἀεὶ

3 ταύτας τὰς χώρας. οἱ μὴν ἄλλα τότε γενόμενοι

τῆς Ἡπείρου κατὰ Φοινίκην προσέσχον ἐπιστισμοῦ

4 χάριν. συμμιξάντες δὲ τῶν Γαλατῶν τισῶν, οἱ

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discuss the future as if it were the present, or to have any confident hope about things that may still turn out quite otherwise. We are but men, and should in every matter assign its share to the unexpected, this being especially true of war.

King Agron, when the flotilla returned and his officers gave him an account of the battle, was so overjoyed at the thought of having beaten the Aetolians, then the proudest of peoples, that he took to carousals and other convivial excesses, from which he fell into a pleurisy that ended fatally in a few days. He was succeeded on the throne by his wife Teuta, who left the details of administration to friends on whom she relied. As, with a woman's natural shortness of view, she could see nothing but the recent success and had no eyes for what was going on elsewhere, she in the first place gave letters of marque to privateers to pillage any ships they met, and next she collected a fleet and a force of troops as large as the former one and sent it out, ordering the commanders to treat all countries alike as belonging to their enemies. The expedition began by making a descent on Elis and Messenia, lands which the Illyrians had always been in the habit of pillaging, because, owing to the extent of their sea-board and owing to the principal cities being in the interior, help against their raids was distant and slow in arriving; so that they could always overrun and plunder those countries unmolested. On this occasion, however, they put in at Phoenice in Epirus for the purpose of provisioning themselves. There they fell in with certain Gaulish soldiers, about eight hundred
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μισθοφοροῦντες παρὰ τοῖς Ἡπειρώτασι διέτριβον ἐν τῇ Φοινίκῃ, τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες εἰς ὄκτακουσίως, καὶ κοινολογηθέντες τούτοις περὶ προδοσίας τῆς πόλεως ἐξέβησαν, συγκαταθεμένων σφίσι τῶν προειρημένων, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐξ ἐφόδου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ κύριοι κατέστησαν, συνεργησάντων ἔσωθεν αὐτοῖς 5 τῶν Γαλατῶν. οἱ δ᾿ Ἡπειρώται πυθόμενοι τὸ γεγονός ἐβοήθουν πανδημεί μετὰ σπουδῆς. παραγενόμενοι δὲ πρὸς τὴν Φοινίκην, καὶ προβαλόμενοι τὸν παρὰ τὴν πόλιν ρέοντα ποταμὸν, ἐστρατοπέδευσαν, τῆς ἐπὶ αὐτῷ γεφύρας ἀνασπάσαντες τὰς σαβ-
νίδας ἀσφαλείας χάριν, προσαγγελθέντος δ᾿ αὐτοῖς Σκερδιλαίδαν ἔχοντα πεντακυκλίως Ὀλυμπιοῦς παραγίνεσθαι κατὰ γῆν διὰ τῶν παρ’ Ἀντιγόνειαν στενῶν, μερίσαντες αὐτῶν τινας ἐξαπέστελεν παραφυλάξοντας τὴν Ἀντιγόνειαν. αὐτοὶ δὲ τὰ τε λοιπὰ ραθύμως διήγον, ἀπολαύοντες τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀνέδην, τῶν τε κατὰ τὰς φυλακὰς καὶ προκοι-
τίας ὁλιγώρουν. οἱ δ᾿ Ὀλυμπιοὶ συνεντεύκτη γειμιόμον καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν ραθυμίαν, ἐκπορεύονται νυκτὸς: καὶ τῇ γεφύρᾳ σανίδας ἐπιβαλόντες τὸν τε ποταμὸν ἀσφαλῶς διέβησαν καὶ λαβόντες ὀχυρὸν 8 τόπον ἔμειναν τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς. ἐπι-
γενομένης δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ παραταξιμένων ἀμφο-
τέρων πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, συνεβὴ λειψθῆναι τοὺς Ἡπει-
ρώτας, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν πεσεῖν, ἐτὶ δὲ πλείους ἀλῶναί, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς διαφυγείν ὃς ἐπ᾽ Ἀττιτά-
νων.

6. Οὕτως μὲν οὖν τοιούτως περιπεσόντες ἄτυχή-
μασι, καὶ πάσας ἀπολέσαντες τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπί-
δας, ἐπρέσβευν πρὸς τοὺς Λιτωλοὺς καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος, δεόμενοι μὲθ’ ἱκετηρίας σφίσι βοη-
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in number, at present in the employ of the Epirots. They approached these Gauls with a proposal for the betrayal of the city, and on their agreeing, they landed and captured the town and its inhabitants by assault with the help from within of the Gauls. When the Epirots learnt of this they hastened to come to help with their whole force. On reaching Phoenice they encamped with the river that runs past the town on their front, removing the planking of the bridge so as to be in safety. On news reaching them that Scerdilaïdas with five thousand Illyrians was approaching by land through the pass near Antigonia, they detached a portion of their force to guard Antigonia, but they themselves henceforth remained at their ease, faring plenteously on the produce of the country, and quite neglecting night and day watches. The Illyrians, learning of the partition of the Epirot force and of their general remissness, made a night sortie, and replacing the planks of the bridge, crossed the river in safety and occupied a strong position where they remained for the rest of the night. When day broke, both armies drew up their forces in front of the town and engaged. The battle resulted in the defeat of the Epirots, many of whom were killed and still more taken prisoners, the rest escaping in the direction of Atintania.

6. The Epirots, having met with this misfortune and lost all hope in themselves, sent embassies to the Aetolians and to the Achaean league imploring their
2 Θείν. οἱ δὲ κατελεύσαντες τὰς συμφορὰς αὐτῶν ὑπῆκουσαν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα παραβοθοῦντες ἦκον
3 εἰς Ἐλίκρανον. οἱ δὲ τὴν Φωικήν κατασχόντες,
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παραγενομενοὶ μετὰ Σκερδιλαίδου
πρὸς τὸ χωρίον παρεστρατοπέδευσαν τοῖς βεβοηθ.
4 θηκόσι, Βουλόμενοι συμβαλεῖν. δυσχρηστούμενοι δὲ
dιὰ τὰς δυσχωρίας τῶν τόπων, ἀμα δὲ καὶ προσπε-
σόντων παρὰ τῆς Τεύτας γραμμάτων, δὲ ἄν ψετο
dein autous tnh tachisth tis oikou anachorein dia
to tinai twn 'Illyriw anfetothekei prois touc Dar-
5 daveis, outw lephtatapantes tnh "Hpeiron anoxas
6 epousanta prois touc 'Hpeirwta. ev aiis ta mei
elleuthera sωmata kai tnh polin apolutroswantes
autois, ta de doulika kai tnh loipnh skenhn anafa-
labontes eis touc lembous, oi mene apteplesoun, oi
de peri ton Skerdiilaidan pei mei polin anechorsean
7 dia twn parα tnh 'Antigoneian stenewn, ou mikrα
oude tnh tuxousan katasplexw kai fobon energeasap-
menoi tois taSta paralias oikous twn 'Ellhinw.
8 ekastoi gar theoreuntes tnh oxurwta thn amai kai
dunastatathn polin twn ev 'Hpeirw paralagon
outou eixhndrapodiomevnh, oukete peri twon apo th
χωρας ήγωνων, kathaper ev tois emprosthein kro-
nous, allα peri sfoi autwn kai twon polewv.
9 Oi δ' 'Hpeirwta paradozous diasesteuropein, to-
soytou anpiechon tov peiražewn amunesthai tois ήδι-
kikostas h xarw anpodidwv tois bothiaswv, wste
tovnanti dianprosebemenei prois twn Teuton
summaqiana ethente meta' 'Askaranwv prois touc 'Il-
10 luriwv, kath' h bi ekeinoi men kata tous ezhis kai-
rovs synrghoun, tois δ' 'Achais kai tois Aitwlois
11 anteptratou. ex evn eneunth katafaneis akritos
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succour. Both leagues took pity on their situation and consented, and shortly afterwards this relieving force reached Helicranum. The Illyrians in Phoenice at first united with Scerdilaïdas, and advancing to Helicranum encamped opposite the Achaeans and Aetolians, and were anxious to give battle. But the ground was very difficult and unfavourable to them, and just at this time a dispatch came from Teuta ordering them to return home by the quickest route, as some of the Illyrians had revolted to the Dardanians. They therefore, after plundering Epirus, made a truce with the Epirots. By the terms of this they gave up to them the city and its free population on payment of a ransom; the slaves and other goods and chattels they put on board their boats, and while the one force sailed off home, Scerdilaïdas marched back through the pass near Antigonia. They had caused the Greek inhabitants of the coast no little consternation and alarm; for, seeing the most strongly situated and most powerful town in Epirus thus suddenly taken and its population enslaved, they began to be anxious not, as in former times, for their agricultural produce, but for the safety of themselves and their cities.

The Epirots, thus unexpectedly saved, were so far from attempting to retaliate on the wrongdoers or from thanking those who had come to their relief, that, on the contrary, they sent an embassy to Teuta, and together with the Acarnanians entered into an alliance with Illyria, engaging in future to co-operate with the Illyrians and work against the Achaeans and Aetolians. Their whole conduct showed them...
μὲν κεχρημένου τότε τοίς ευεργέταις, ἀφρόνως δ’ εξ ἀρχῇς βεβουλευμένου περὶ τῶν καθ’ αὐτούς πραγ-μάτων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἄντας παραλόγως περιπέσειν τινὶ τῶν δεινῶν οὗ τῶν παθόντων, τῆς 2 τύχῃς δὲ καὶ τῶν πραξάντων ἐστίν ἐγκλῆμα, τὸ δ’ ἀκρίτως καὶ προφανῶς περιβάλειν αὐτοὺς ταῖς με-γίσταις συμφοραῖς ὁμολογομένων ἐστὶ τῶν πασχόν-3 των ἀμάρτημα. διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τύχῃς πταίου-σιν ἔλεος ἐπεται μετὰ συγγνώμης κάπικουρία, τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀβουλίαν δὲνειδος καπιτήμης 4 συνεξακολουθεῖ παρὰ τοῖς εὗ φρονοῦσιν. ἀ δὴ καὶ τότε παρὰ τῶν ‘Ελλήνων εἰκότως ἢν τοῖς 5 ’Ηπειρώταις ἀπηντήθη. πρῶτον γὰρ τίς οὐκ ἢν 6 τὴν κοινὴν περὶ Γαλατῶν φήμην ὑπιδόμενον εὐλαβηθεὶς τούτους ἐγχειρίσατο πόλιν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πολ-λὰς ἀφορμὰς ἔχουσαν εἰς παρασπόνδησιν; δεύτερον τίς οὐκ ἢν ἐφυλάξατο τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ συστήματος ἐκείνου προαίρεσιν; οἳ γε τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἐξέτεσον ἢκ τῆς ἱδίας, συνδραμόντων ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς τῶν ὁμο-εθνῶν, διὰ τὸ παρασπόνδησαι τοὺς αὐτῶν οἰκεῖους 7 καὶ συγγενεῖς· ὑποδεξαμένων γε μὴν αὐτοὺς Καρχη-δονίων διὰ τὸ κατεπείγεσθαι πολέμω, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον γενομένης τινὸς ἀντιρρήσεως τοῖς στρατιώταις πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ὑπὲρ ὀφωνίων ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐπεβά-λουτο διαρπάζειν τὴν τῶν Ἁκραγαντίνων πόλιν, φυλακῆς χάριν εἰσαχθέντες εἰς αὐτὴν, ὄντες τότε 8 πλείους τῶν πρισχιλῶν· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παρεἰσαγαγόντων αὐτοὺς πάλιν εἰς ’Ερυκα τῆς αὐτῆς χρείας ἐνεκεν, πολυορκοῦντων τὴν πόλιν Ἄρωμαιών, ἐπ-εχείρησαν μὲν καὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς συμπολιορ-9 κομένους προδοῦναι· τὴς δὲ πράξεως ταύτης ἀπο-
not only to have acted now towards their benefactors without judgement, but to have blundered from the outset in the management of their own affairs. 7. For we are but men, and to meet with some unexpected blow is not the sufferer's fault, but that of Fortune and those who inflict it on him; but when we involve ourselves by sheer lack of judgement and with our eyes open in the depth of misfortune, everyone acknowledges that we have none to blame but ourselves. It is for this reason that those whom Fortune leads astray meet with pity, pardon and help, but if their failures are due to their own indiscretion, all right-thinking men blame and reproach them. And in this case the Greeks would have been amply justified in their censure of the Epirots. To begin with would not anyone who is aware of the general reputation of the Gauls, think twice before entrusting to them a wealthy city, the betrayal of which was easy and profitable? In the second place who would not have been cautious in the ease of a company with such a bad name? First of all they had been expelled from their own country by a general movement of their fellow-countrymen owing to their having betrayed their own friends and kinsmen. Again, when the Carthaginians, hard pressed by the war, received them, they first availed themselves of a dispute about pay between the soldiers and generals to pillage the city of Agrigentum of which they formed the garrison, being then about three thousand strong. Afterwards, when the Carthaginians sent them on the same service to Eryx, then besieged by the Romans, they attempted to betray the city and those who were suffering siege in their company, and when this plan fell through, they deserted to
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10 τῆς τῆς ᾿Ερυκύνης ἱερῶν. διὸ σαφῶς ἐπεγνωκότες Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν ἁσβέσειν αὐτῶν, ἀμα τῷ διαλύσασθαι τὸν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους πόλεμον οὐδὲν ἐπούσαντο προαγαιάτερον τοῦ παραπλάσαντα αὐτοὺς ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς πλοῖα καὶ τῆς ᾿Ιταλίας πάσης ἐξορίστους κατα-

11 στήσαν. οὖς Ῥηπερώται τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν νόμων φύλακας ποιησάμενοι, καὶ τῇ εὐδαιμονε-

12 στάτῃ πόλιν ἐγχρείσαντες, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως φανεῖσαν αὐτοί τῶν συμπτωμάτων αὐτοῖς αἰτίων γεγονότες;

2 Ῥωμαίοι καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνωτέρω μὲν χρόνους συνεχῶς

3 μένων ἄνηγον. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, παρακούσαντες τὸν

4 πρὸ τοῦ χρόνου τῶν ἐγκαλοῦντων τοῖς Ἰλυροῖς,

5 καὶ Λευκίων Κορογκανίων. ὡς δὲ Τευτα, καταπλευ-

6 σάντων πρὸς αὐτὴν τῶν ἑκ τῆς Ῥηπερῶν λέμβων, Καταπλαγείσα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος τῆς ᾿Αγομέ-

7 νῆς κατασκευῆς· πολὺ γὰρ ᾿Η φωνῇ διεφερε τότε τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ῥηπερῶν πόλεων εὐδαιμονία. διπλα-
the Romans. The Romans entrusted them with the guard of the temple of Venus Erycina, which again they pillaged. Therefore, no sooner was the war with Carthage over, than the Romans, having clear evidence of their infamous character, took the very first opportunity of disarming them, putting them on board ship and banishing them from the whole of Italy. These were the men whom the Epirots employed to guard their laws and liberties and to whom they entrusted their most flourishing city. How then can they be acquitted of the charge of causing their own misfortunes?

I thought it necessary to speak at some length on this subject in order to show how foolish the Epirots were, and that no people, if wise, should ever admit a garrison stronger than their own forces, especially if composed of barbarians.

8. To return to the Illyrians. For a long time previously they had been in the habit of maltreating vessels sailing from Italy, and now while they were at Phoenice, a number of them detached themselves from the fleet and robbed or killed many Italian traders, capturing and carrying off no small number of prisoners. The Romans had hitherto turned a deaf ear to the complaints made against the Illyrians, but now when a number of persons approached the Senate on the subject, they appointed two envoys, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to proceed to Illyria, and investigate the matter. Teuta, on the return of the flotilla from Epirus, was so struck with admiration by the quantity and beauty of the spoils they brought back (Phoenice being then far the wealthiest city there), that she
σίως ἐπερρώσθη πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄδικον. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα τότε μὲν ἑπέσχε διὰ τὰς ἐγχωρίους παραχάς, καταστησαμένη δὲ ταχέως τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ἀποστάντας Ἰλλυρίους ἐπολιόρκει τὴν Ἰσσαν
6 διὰ τὸ ταύτην ἔτι μόνον ἀπειθεῖν αὐτῇ. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καῖρον τοῦτον κατέπλευσαν οἱ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις. καὶ δοθέντος αὐτοῖς καῖρο ὑπὸ ἐντεν-ξίν διελέγοντο περὶ τῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς γεγονότων ἀδικημάτων. ἢ δὲ Τεύτα καθόλου μὲν παρ’ ὅλην τὴν κοινολογίαν ἀγρόωχος καὶ λίαν ὑπερηφάνως αὐτῶν
8 διήκουν. καταπαυσάντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, κοινῇ μὲν ἐφὴ πειράσθαι φροντίζειν ὅτι μηδὲν ἀδίκημα γίνη-
tαι Ῥωμαίοις ἐξ Ἰλλυρίων. ἵδια γε μὴν οὐ νόμιμον εἶναι τοῖς βασιλεύσι κωλύειν Ἰλλυρίοις τὰς κατὰ
9 θάλασσας ωφελείας. ο δὲ νεώτερος τῶν πρεσβευ
tῶν, δυσχεράνας ἐπὶ τοῖς εἱρμηνεύοις, ἔχρησατο παρ-ρησία καθηκούση μὲν, οὐδαμῶς δὲ πρὸς καῖρον.
10 εἴπε γὰρ ὅτι Ῥωμαίοις μὲν, ὧς Τεύτα, κάλλιστον έθος έστὶ τὰ κατ’ ἱδίαν ἀδικηματα κοινῇ μετα-
11 πορεύεσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις. πειρα-
σόμεθα δὴ θεοῦ βουλομένου σφόδρα καὶ ταχέως ἀναγκάσαι σε τὰ βασιλικὰ νόμιμα διορθώσασθαι πρὸς
12 Ἰλλυρίους. ἢ δὲ γυναικοθύμως κάλογιστως δεξα-
μένη τῇ παρρησίᾳ, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξωργίσθη πρὸς τὰ ρηθέν ὡς ἀληθερήσασα τῶν παρ’ ἀνθρώποις ὁρισμένων δικαίων ἀποπλέουσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαποστεί-
λαί τινας τῶν παρρησιασάμενον τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπο-
13 κτείναι. προσπέσοντος δὲ τοῦ γεγονότος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, διοργισθέντες ἐπὶ τῇ παρανομίᾳ τῆς γυναι-
κὸς εὐθέως περὶ παρασκευὴν ἐγίνοντο, καὶ στράτο-
πεδα κατέγραφον καὶ στόλον συνήθροιζον.
was twice as eager as before to molest the Greeks. For the present, however, she had to defer her projects owing to the disturbance in her own dominions; she had speedily put down the revolt elsewhere, but was engaged in besieging Issa, which alone still refused to submit to her, when the Roman ambassadors arrived. Audience having been granted them, they began to speak of the outrages committed against them. Teuta, during the whole interview, listened to them in a most arrogant and overbearing manner, and when they had finished speaking, she said she would see to it that Rome suffered no public wrong from Illyria, but that, as for private wrongs, it was contrary to the custom of the Illyrian kings to hinder their subjects from winning booty from the sea. The younger of the ambassadors was very indignant at these words of hers, and spoke out with a frankness most proper indeed, but highly inopportune: "O Teuta," he said, "the Romans have an admirable custom, which is to punish publicly the doers of private wrongs and publicly come to the help of the wronged. Be sure that we will try, God willing, by might and main and right soon, to force thee to mend the custom toward the Illyrians of their kings.” Giving way to her temper like a woman and heedless of the consequences, she took this frankness ill, and was so enraged at the speech that, defying the law of nations, when the ambassadors left in their ship, she sent emissaries to assassinate the one who had been so bold of speech. On the news reaching Rome, the outrage created great indignation and they at once set themselves to prepare for an expedition, enrolling legions and getting a fleet together.
9 'Η δὲ Τεύτα, τῆς ὠρας ἐπιγενομένης, ἐπισκευάσασα λέμβους πλείους τῶν πρότερον ἔξαπέστειλεν ἐπὶ τὴν Εὐλάδα τόπους. ὃν οἱ μὲν διὰ πόρον τῶν πλοίων ἐπὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ἐποιοῦντο, μέρος δὲ τι προσέσχε τοῖς τῶν Επιδαμνίων λιμέναι, λόγῳ μὲν ὑδρείας κατασκευαμοῦ χάριν, ἔργῳ

3 ὅ ἐπιβουλής καὶ πράξεως ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν. τῶν δ᾽ Ἕπεδαμνίων ἀκάκων ἀμα καὶ ῥαθύμως αὐτοὺς παραδεξαμένων, εἰσελθόντες ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς περιζώμασιν ὡς ὑδρευόμενοι, μαχαίρας ἔχοντες ἐν τοῖς κεραμίως, οὕτως κατασφάζαντες τοὺς φυλάττοντας τὴν πύλην ταχέως ἐγκρατεῖς ἐγένοντο τοῦ πυλῶνος.

4 ἐπιγενομένης δὲ κατὰ τὸ συντεταγμένον ἑνεργώς τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων βοηθείας, παραδεξάμενου τοῦ
5 τοὺς βασιλεὺς κατείχον τὰ πλείστα τῶν τειχῶν. τῶν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπαρασκεύασαν μὲν διὰ τὸ παράδοξον, ἐκθύμως δὲ βοηθοῦντων καὶ διαγωνιζομένων, συνέβη τοὺς Ἑλληνίδοις ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀντιποιήσασθαι τῶν
6 σαμμένους τέλος ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. Ἕπεδαμνίων μὲν οὖν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει διὰ μὲν τὴν ὀλιγωρίαν ἐκινδύνευσαν ἄποβαλείν τὴν πατρίδα, διὰ δὲ τὴν εὐφυχίαν ἀβλαβῶς ἐπαιδεύθησαν πρὸς τὸ
7 μέλλον. τῶν δ᾽ Ἑλληνίδοι οἱ προστότες κατὰ σπουδὴν ἀναχθέντες, καὶ συνάψαντες τοὺς προπλέονσι, κατήραν εἰς τὴν Κέρκυραν· καὶ ποιησάμενοι καταπληκτικήν τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἐνεχείρησαν πολιορκεῖν τὴν
8 πόλιν. ὃν συμβαμβαίνοντο οἱ Κέρκυραιοι, δυσχρήστοι καὶ δυσεπίστως διακείμενοι τοῖς ὀλοίσ, ἐπροσβεβοῦντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ τοὺς Λιτωνοὺς, ἀμα δὲ τούτοις Ἀπολλωνιάται καὶ Ἕπεδαμνίοι, δύομενοι σφίξαν βοηθεῖν κατὰ σπουδὴν καὶ μὴ περιδεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναστάτους γενομένους ὑπὸ 260
9. Teuta, when the season came, fitted out a larger number of boats than before and dispatched them to the Greek coasts. Some of them sailed through the strait to Corecyra, while a part put in to the harbour of Epidamnus, professedly to water and provision, but really with the design of surprising and seizing the town. They were received by the Epidamnians without any suspicion or concern, and landing as if for the purpose of watering, lightly clad but with swords concealed in the water-jars, they cut down the guards of the gate and at once possessed themselves of the gate-tower. A force from the ships was quickly on the spot, as had been arranged, and thus reinforced, they easily occupied the greater part of the walls. The citizens were taken by surprise and quite unprepared, but they rushed to arms and fought with great gallantry, the result being that the Illyrians, after considerable resistance, were driven out of the town. Thus the Epidamnians on this occasion came very near losing their native town by their negligence, but through their courage escaped with a salutary lesson for the future. The Illyrian commanders hastened to get under weigh and catching up the rest of their flotilla bore down on Corecyra. There they landed, to the consternation of the inhabitants, and laid siege to the city. Upon this the Corecyreans, in the utmost distress and despondency, sent, together with the peoples of Apollonia and Epidamnus, envoys to the Achaeans and Aetolians, imploring them to hasten to their relief and not allow them to be driven from
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9 τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν. οἱ δὲ διακούσαντες τῶν πρέσβεων, καὶ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς λόγους, ἐπλήρωσαν κοινῆ τάς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δέκα ναῦς καταφράκτους, καταρτίσαντες δὲ ἐν ὁλίγαις ἥμεραις ἐπλευν ἐπὶ τῆς Κερυκύρας, ἔπιζοντες λύσειν τὴν πολιορκίαν. οἱ δ’ Ἰλλυριοὶ, συμπαραλαβόντες Ἀκαρνάνων ναὸς κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν οὕςας ἐπὶ τὰ καταφράκτους, ἀνταναχθέντες συνεβαλῶν τοῖς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σκάφεσι περὶ 2 τοὺς καλομένους Παξοῦς. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀκαρνάνες καὶ τῶν Ἀχαϊκῶν νεῶν αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ταχθείσαι πάρισον ἐποίουν τὸν ἁγώνα καὶ διέμενον ἀκέραιοι κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκὰς πλῆν τῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς τοὺς 3 ἄνδρας γινομένων τραυμάτων. οἱ δ’ Ἰλλυριοὶ ζεύξαντες τοὺς παρ’ αὐτῶν λέμβους ἀνὰ τέταρας συνεπλέκοντο τοῖς πολεμίοις. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄδικων ὁλιγώρουν, καὶ παραβάλλοντες πλαγίους συνήργουν 4 ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων. οὔτε δὲ τρώσαντα καὶ δεθέντα κατὰ τὰς ἐμβολὰς δυσχρήστως (διέκειτο πρὸς τὸ παρόν) τὰ τῶν ἀντιπάλων σκάφη, προσκρεμαίνοντες αὐτοῖς περὶ τοὺς ἐμβόλους τῶν ἐξεγγεμένων λέμβων, τότ’ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἐπὶ τὰ καταστρώματα τῶν Ἀχαϊκῶν νεῶν κατεκράτουν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐπιβατῶν. καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τεττάρῳ μὲν πλοίων ἐκφυρέσαν τετρημκὶς, μίαν δὲ πεντήρην σὺν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἄνδρασι ἐβύθισαν, ἐφ’ ὡς ἐπλεί Μάργος ὁ Καρπονεύς, ἀνήρ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τὸ κοινὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματι πεποιηκὼς μέχρι 5 τῆς καταστροφῆς. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαρνάνας διαγωνίζομεν, συνιδόντες τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς προτέριμα, καὶ πιστεύοντες τῷ ταχυμαντεῖν, ἐπονωρῶσαν ἅσφαλὼς τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν 6 ἐποιήσαντο. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν πλῆθος, φρονή-
their homes by the Illyrians. The two Leagues, after listening to the envoys, consented to their request, and both joined in manning the ten decked ships belonging to the Achaeans. In a few days they were ready for sea and sailed for Corcyra in the hope of raising the siege. 10. The Illyrians, now reinforced by seven decked ships sent by the Acarnanians in compliance with the terms of their treaty, put to sea and encountered the Achaean ships off the island of Paxi. The Acarnanians and those Achaean ships which were told off to engage them fought with no advantage on either side, remaining undamaged in their encounter except for the wounds inflicted on some of the crew. The Illyrians lashed their boats together in batches of four and thus engaged the enemy. They sacrificed their own boats, presenting them broadside to their adversaries in a position favouring their charge, but when the enemy's ships had charged and struck them and getting fixed in them, found themselves in difficulties, as in each case the four boats lashed together were hanging on to their beaks, they leapt on to the decks of the Achaean ships and overmastered them by their numbers. In this way they captured four quadriremes and sunk with all hands a quinquereme, on board of which was Margos of Caryneia, a man who up to the end served the Achaeans most loyally. The ships that were engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing the success of the Illyrians, and trusting to their speed, made sail with a fair wind and escaped home in safety. The Illyrian forces, highly elated by their
κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καίροὺς τῶν τὰς υπότους ἀρχὰς ἐχόντων Γνάει μὲν Φουλοῦσι φέρει ναυσὶ διακοσιάς ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης, Ἀδὼς δὲ Ποστοῦμος τὰς πεζικὰς ἐχὼν δυνάμεις ἐξώρυμα. τὴν μὲν οὖν πρῶτην ἐπιβολὴν ἐσχε πλεῖν ο Γνάς ἐπὶ τῆς Κέρκυρας, ὑπολαμβάνων ἐτὶ καταλήψεσθαι τὴν πολιορκεῖν τὴν πόλιν.

κιάν ἀκριτὸν ὑπερῆσας δὲ τῶν καιρῶν ὅμως ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον ἐπελεί, βουλόμενος ἃμα μὲν ἐπιγνώναι σαφῶς τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἃμα δὲ πειραν λαβεῖν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ Δημήτριον προσαγγέλλομένων. ο γὰρ Δημήτριος ἐν διαβολαῖς ὃν καὶ φόβοιμενος τὴν Τεύταν διεπέμπτο πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, ἐπαγγέλλομεν τὴν τε πόλιν ἐγχειρεῖν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πράγματα παραδώσειν, ὃν ἦν αὐτὸς κύριος. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀσμένως ἰδόντες, τὴν τε φρούραν παρέδοσαν τῶν Ἰλλυρίων μετὰ τῆς τοῦ Δημήτριον γνώμης, αὐτοὶ τε σφᾶς ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐδωκαν παρακληθέντες εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν, μιὰν ταύτην ὑπολαβόντες ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὸν μέλλουτα ἀρχόν πρὸς τὴν Ἰλλυρίων παρανομίαν. Ῥωμαίοι δὲ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς Κερκυραίους εἰς τὴν φιλίαν.
success, continued the siege with more security and confidence, and the Corcyreans, whose hopes were crushed by the repulse of their allies, after enduring the siege for a short time longer, came to terms with the Illyrians, receiving a garrison under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. After this the Illyrian commanders at once sailed off and coming to anchor at Epidamnus, again set themselves to besiege that city.

11. At about the same time one of the Consuls, Gnaeus Fulvius, sailed out from Rome with the two hundred ships, while the other, Aulus Postumius, left with the land forces. Gnaeus' first intention had been to make for Corcyra, as he supposed he would find the siege still undecided. On discovering that he was too late, he none the less sailed for that island, wishing on the one hand to find out accurately what had happened about the city, and on the other hand to put to a test the sincerity of communications made to him by Demetrius. Accusations had been brought against the latter, and being in fear of Teuta he sent messages to the Romans undertaking to hand over to them the city and whatever else was under his charge. The Corcyreans were much relieved to see the Romans arrive, and they gave up the Illyrian garrison to them with the consent of Demetrius. They unanimously accepted the Romans' invitation to place themselves under their protection, considering this the sole means of assuring for the future their safety from the violence of the Illyrians. The Romans, having admitted the Corcyreans to their
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ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀπολλωνίας, ἔχοντες εἰς τὰ κατά-
λυστα τῶν πραγμάτων ἤγερον γὰρ τὸν Δημήτριον.

κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ Ποστούμιος τὰς πε-
ζικὰς διεβιβάζει δυνάμεις ἐκ τοῦ Βρεντεσίου, πεζοῦς

μὲν εἰς δυσμυρίους, ἵππεις δὲ περὶ δισχυλίους. ἂμα
dὲ τῷ προσέχειν ἐκατέρας ὁμοίώς τὰς δυνάμεις πρὸς
tὴν Ἀπολλωνίαν ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων ἀποδεξαμένων
καὶ δόντων ἐαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν παραχρήμα
πάλιν ἀνήχθησαν, ἄκοιντες πολιορκεῖσθαι τὴν

Ἐπίδαμνον. οἱ δὲ Ἰλλυρίων συνέντευξε τὴν ἐφοδον
tῶν Ῥωμαίων, ὀυδὲνι κόσμῳ λύσαι τῇ πολιορ-
kιαν ἐφυγον. Ῥωμαίου δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἐπιδαμνίους
παραλαβόντες εἰς τὴν πίστιν, προῆγον εἰς τοὺς ἑκοῦ
τόπους τῆς Ἰλλυρίδος, ἄμα καταστρεφόμενοι τοὺς

Ἀρδιαῖους. συμμείζαντων δὲ προσβεβλητῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ
πλειώνων, ὅσοι παρὰ τῶν Παρθίων ἦκον ἐπιτρέ-
pοντες τὰ καθ’ αὐτοὺς, δεξάμενοι τούτους εἰς τὴν

φιλίαν, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν Ἀτιν-
τάνων προσεληλυθότας προῆγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰσσαν,
diὰ τὸ καὶ ταύτην ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰλλυρίων πολιορκεῖ-

σθαί τὴν πόλιν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ καὶ λύσαι τῇ πολιορκίᾳ,
προσεδέξαντο καὶ τοὺς Ἰσσαίους εἰς τὴν

ἐαυτῶν πίστιν. εἶλον δὲ καὶ πόλεις τυγᾶς Ἰλλυρί-
δας ἐν τῷ παράπλω κατὰ κράτος. ἐν αἷς περὶ Νου-
πρίαν ὡς μόνον τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἄπεβαλον πολλοὺς,

ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν χιλιάρχων τυγᾶς καὶ τῶν τμίαν. ἐκυ-
ρίευσαν δὲ καὶ λέμβων εἰκοσὶ τῶν ἀποκομιζόντων

tὴν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ὁφελείαν. τῶν δὲ πολιορκοῦν-
tων τὴν Ἰσσαν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Φάρῳ διὰ τὸν Δημή-
τριον ἀβλαβεῖς ἔμεναν, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐφυγον

eἰς τὸν Ἀρβανία σκεδασθέντες. ἦ δὲ Τεύτα πάνω
μετ’ ὀλίγων εἰς τὸν Ῥίζονα διεσώθη, πολιορμάτων
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friendship, set sail for Apollonia, Demetrius in future acting as their guide. Simultaneously Postumius was bringing across from Brundisium the land forces consisting of about twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse. On the two forces uniting at Apollonia and on the people of that city likewise agreeing to put themselves under Roman protection, they at once set off again, hearing that Epidamnus was being besieged. The Illyrians, on hearing of the approach of the Romans, hastily broke up the siege and fled. The Romans, taking Epidamnus also under their protection, advanced into the interior of Illyria, subduing the Ardiaei on their way. Many embassies met them, among them one from the Parthini offering unconditional surrender. They admitted this tribe to their friendship as well as the Atintanes, and advanced towards Issa which was also being besieged by the Illyrians. On their arrival they forced the enemy to raise the siege and took the Issaeans also under their protection. The fleet too took several Illyrian cities by assault as they sailed along the coast, losing, however, at Nutria not only many soldiers, but some of their military tribunes and their quaestor. They also captured twenty boats which were conveying away agricultural produce to save it from pillage. Of the besiegers of Issa those now in Pharos were allowed, through Demetrius' influence, to remain there unhurt, while the others dispersed and took refuge at Arbo. Teuta, with only a few followers, escaped to
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εὖ πρὸς ὀχυρότητα κατεσκευασμένων, ἀνακεχωρηκός μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης, ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δὲ κείμενον τῷ Ῥίζον ποταμῷ. ταῦτα δὲ πράξαντες, καὶ τῷ Δήμουρῷ τοὺς πλείστους ὑποτάξαντες τῶν Ἰλλυρίων, καὶ μεγάλην αὐτῷ περιθέντες δυναστείαν ἀνεχώρησαν εἰς τὴν Ἑπιδαμνὸν ἀμα τῷ στόλῳ καὶ τῇ πεζικῇ δυνάμει. Γνάιος μὲν οὖν Φουλούτος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἀπέπλευσε, τὸ πλεῖον ἐχθρὸν μέρος τῆς τε ναυτικῆς καὶ πεζικῆς στρατιάς. ὁ δὲ Ποστούμιος, ὑπολειπόμενος τεταράκοντα σκάφη, καὶ στρατοπεδον ἐκ τῶν περικεμένων πόλεων ἄθροίσας, παρεχείμαζε, συνεφεδρεύων τῷ τε τῶν Ἀρδιαίων ἔδειδε 2
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς δεδωκόσιν εἰαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν πίστιν. ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἐαρινήν ὤραν ἡ Τεύτα διαπρεσβευσμένη πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ποιεῖται συνθήκας, ἐν αἰσ εὐδόκησε φόρους τε τοὺς διαταχθέντας ούσει πάσης τ’ ἀναχωρήσεων τῆς Ἰλλυρίδος πλὴν ὅλων τῶν, καὶ τὸ συνέχον ὁ μάλιστο πρὸς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας διέτεινε, μὴ πλεύσειν πλέον ἡ δυνα λέμβοις ἔξω τοῦ 3
Λίσσου, καὶ τούτοις ἀνόπλοις. Ὧν συντελεσθέντων ὁ Ποστούμιος μετὰ ταῦτα πρεσβευτὰς ἑξαπέστειλε πρὸς τε τοὺς Λιτωλοὺς καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαίων ἔθνων. οἱ καὶ παραγενόμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ἀπελογισάμενοι τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς διαβάσεως, ἐξῆς δὲ τοῦτοι τὰ πεπραγμένα διεξῆλθον, καὶ τὰς συνθήκας παραγένωσαν, ἃς ἑπετοιήτο πρὸς τοὺς Ἰλλυρίους. 4
τυχόντες δὲ παρ’ ἐκατέρου τῶν ἔθνων τῆς καθηκούσης φιλανθρωπίας αὖθις ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Κέρκυραν, ἱκανοῦ τινος ἀπολελυκότες φόβου τούς Ἐλλήνας διὰ τὰς προειρημένας συνθήκας. οὐ γὰρ τισιν, ἀλλὰ πάσι, τότε κοινοὶ ἑκροῦς εἶναι συνέβαινε τοὺς Ἰλλυρίους. 5
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Rhizon, a small place strongly fortified at a distance from the sea and situated on the river Rhizon. After accomplishing so much and placing the greater part of Illyria under the rule of Demetrius, thus making him an important potentate, the Consuls returned to Epidamnus with the fleet and army.

12. Gnaeus Fulvius now left for Rome with the greater part of both forces, and Postumius, with whom forty ships were left, enrolled a legion from the cities in the neighbourhood and wintered at Epidamnus to guard the Ardiaeans and the other tribes who had placed themselves under the protection of Rome. In the early spring Teuta sent an embassy to the Romans and made a treaty, by which she consented to pay any tribute they imposed, to relinquish all Illyria except a few places, and, what mostly concerned the Greeks, undertook not to sail beyond Lissus with more than two unarmed vessels. When this treaty had been concluded Postumius sent legates to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues. On their arrival they first explained the causes of the war and their reason for crossing the Adriatic, and next gave an account of what they had accomplished, reading the treaty they had made with the Illyrians. After meeting with all due courtesy from both the leagues, they returned to Corehya, having by the communication of this treaty, delivered the Greeks from no inconsiderable dread; for the Illyrians were then not the enemies of this people or that, but the common enemies of all.
7 Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη διάβασις Ἦρωμαιών μετὰ δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Εὐρώπης, ἐτὶ δ’ ἐπιπλοκὴ μετὰ προσβείας εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόπους, τοιάδε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἕγενετο τὰς αὐτὰς. ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς καταρχῆς Ἦρωμαιοι μὲν εὐθέως ἄλλους προσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστειλαν πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ὅτε δὲ καὶ Κορινθιοὶ πρῶτον ἀπεδέξαντο μετέχειν Ἦρωμαιος τοῦ τῶν Ἰσθμίων ἄγωνος.

13 Ἀδρούβας δὲ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἀπελίπομεν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, νονεχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς χειρίζον τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν τε τοῖς ὅλοις μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο προκοπὴν τὴν τε παρὰ μὲν τισὶν Καρχηδόνα, παρὰ δὲ τισὶ Καυνῆν πόλιν προσαγορευμένην κατασκευάσας, ὦ μικρὰ, μεγάλα δὲ συνεβάλλετο Καρχηδονίως εἰς πραγμάτων λόγων, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τοῦ τόπου πρὸς τε τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, περὶ ἡς ἡμεῖς εὐφυεστέρον καυρὸν λαβόντες ὑποδέξομεν τὴν θέσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν χρέιαν, ἣν ἀμφοτέραις δύναται παρεχεσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις χώραις. ὅν καὶ θεωροῦντες Ἦρωμαιοι μεῖζων καὶ φοβέρωτέραν ἓδη συνιστάμενον δυναστείαν, ὀρμησάν ἐπὶ τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν. εὐρόντες δὲ σφᾶς ἐπικεκομημένους ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν χρόνοις καὶ προειμένους εἰς τὸ μεγάλην χειρὰ κατασκευάσασθαι Καρχηδονίως, ἀνατρέχεις ἐπειρῶντο κατὰ δύναμιν. αὐτόθεν μὲν οὖν ἐπιτάττειν ἡ πολεμεῖν οὐ κατετόλμων τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις διὰ τὸ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Κελτῶν φόβον ἐπικρέμασθαι τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι καὶ μόνον οὐ καθ’ ἐκάστην ἡμέραν προσδοκᾶν τὴν ἔφοδον 270
Such were the circumstances and causes of the Romans crossing for the first time with an army to Illyria and those parts of Europe, and of their first coming into relations through an embassy with Greece. But having thus begun, the Romans immediately afterwards sent envoys to Athens and Corinth, on which occasion the Corinthians first admitted them to participation in the Isthmian games.

13. We have said nothing of affairs in Spain during these years. Hasdrubal had by his wise and practical administration made great general progress, and by the foundation of the city called by some Carthage, and by others the New Town, made a material contribution to the resources of Carthage, especially owing to its favourable position for action in Spain or Africa. On a more suitable occasion we will describe its position and point out the services it can render to both these countries. The Romans, seeing that Hasdrubal was in a fair way to create a larger and more formidable empire than Carthage formerly possessed, resolved to begin to occupy themselves with Spanish affairs. Finding that they had hitherto been asleep and had allowed Carthage to build up a powerful dominion, they tried, as far as possible, to make up for lost time. For the present they did not venture to impose orders on Carthage, or to go to war with her, because the threat of a Celtic invasion was hanging over them, the attack being indeed expected.
6 αὐτῶν. καταψήσαντες δὲ καὶ πραῦνατες τῶν Ἀ- 
σδρούβαν οὕτως ἐκρωναν ἐγχειρεῖν τοὺς Κελτῶς 
καὶ διακινδυνεύειν πρὸς αὐτοὺς, οὐδέποτε ἂν ὑπο-
λαμβάνοντες οὐχ οἶνον δυναστεύσαι τῶν κατὰ τὴν 
Ἰταλίαν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἄσφαλῶς οἰκήσαι τὴν ἕαυτῶν
7 πατρίδα τούτων ἐχοντες ἐφέδρους οὕς ἁνδρας.
διόπερ ἀμα τῷ διαπρεσβευσάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Ἄ-
σδρούβαν ποιήσασθαι συνθήκας, ἐν αἰς τὴν μὲν ἅλλην
Ἰβηρίαν παρεσινων, τὸν δὲ καλούμενον Ἰβηρα
ποταμὸν οὐκ ἐδει Καρχηδονίους ἐπὶ πολέμῳ δια-
βαίνεω, εὐθέως ἐξήνεγκαν τὸν πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν
Ἰταλίαν Κελτῶς πόλεμον.
14 Τ'περ ὅν δοκεῖ μοι χρήσιμον εἶναι κεφαλαιώδη μὲν
ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν, ἢν τὸ τῆς προκατασκευῆς
οἰκεῖον συσσώσμεν κατὰ τὴν ἔξ ἅρχης πρόθεσιν,
ἀναδραμεῖν δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις ἐπὶ τὴν ἅρχην, ἔξ ὅτον
2 κατέσχον οἱ προερημένοι τὴν χώραν. ἡγούμαι γὰρ
τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἱστορίαν οὕ οὐ μόνον ἅξιαν εἶναι
γνώςεως καὶ μνήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τελέως ἀναγκαίαν,
χάριν τοῦ μαθεῖν τίσι μετὰ ταῦτα πιστεύσας ἀνδράσι
καὶ τόποις Ἀννίβας ἐπεβάλετο καταλύεω τὴν
3 Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν. πρῶτον δὲ περὶ τῆς χώρας
ῥητέον ποίη τές ἐστι καὶ πῶς κεῖται πρὸς τὴν ἅλλην
Ἰταλίαν. οὕτως γὰρ ἔσται καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις
dιαφέροντα κατανοεῖν βέλτιον, ὑπογραφέντων τῶν
περὶ τές τόπους καὶ τὴν χώραν ἰδιωμάτων.
4 Τῆς δὴ συμπάθης Ἰταλίας τῷ σχήματι τριγωνο-
ειδοῦς ὑπαρχούσης, τὴν μὲν μίαν ὁρίζει πλευράν
αὐτῆς τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολάς κεκλιμένην ὅ τ' Ἰόνιος
πόρος καὶ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ὁ κατὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν κόλ-
πος, τὴν δὲ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν καὶ δυσμάς τετραμ-
5 μένην τὸ Σικελικόν καὶ Γυρρηνικὸν πέλαγος. αὐταὶ
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from day to day. They decided, then, to smooth down and conciliate Hasdrubal in the first place, and then to attack the Celts and decide the issue by arms, for they thought that as long as they had these Celts threatening their frontier, not only would they never be masters of Italy, but they would not even be safe in Rome itself. Accordingly, after having sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty, in which no mention was made of the rest of Spain, but the Carthaginians engaged not to cross the Ebro in arms, they at once entered on the struggle against the Italian Celts.

14. I think it will be of use to give some account of these peoples, which must be indeed but a summary one, in order not to depart from the original plan of this work as defined in the preface. We must, however, go back to the time when they first occupied these districts. I think the story is not only worth knowing and keeping in mind, but quite necessary for my purpose, as it shows us who were the men and what was the country on which Hannibal afterwards relied in his attempt to destroy the Roman dominion. I will first describe the nature of the country and its position as regards the rest of Italy. A sketch of its peculiarities will help us better to comprehend the more important of the events I have to relate.

Italy as a whole has the shape of a triangle of which the one or eastern side is bounded by the Ionian Sea and then continuously by the Adriatic Gulf, the next side, that turned to the south and west, by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian Seas. The
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δ' οἱ πλευραὶ συμπίπτουσι πρὸς ἄλληλας κορυφῆν ποιοῦσι τοῦ τριγώνου τὸ προκειμένον ἀκρωτηρίῳ τῆς Ἰταλίας εἰς τήν μεσημβρίαν, δ' προσαγορεύεται μὲν Κόκυνθος, διαρεῖ δὲ τὸν Ἰόνιον πόρον καὶ τὸ

6 Σικελικὸν πέλαγος. τήν δὲ λοιπὴν τὴν παρὰ τέκνα ἄρκτος καὶ τὴν μεσόγαιαν παρατείνουσαν ὀρίζει κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἢ τῶν Ἀλπεων παρώρεια, Λαμ-βάνουσα τὴν μὲν ἄρχην ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὸ Σαρδῶν πέλαγος τόπων, παρήκουσα δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρι πρὸς τὸν παντὸς Ἀδρίου μυχὸν, πλὴν βραχέος, δ' προκαταλήγουσα λείπει τοῦ μὴ

7 συνάπτειν αὐτῷ. παρὰ δὲ τὴν προειρημένην παρώρειαν, ὃν δὲ νοεῖν ὡς ἂν εἰ βάσιν τοῦ τριγώνου, παρὰ ταύτην ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας ὑπόκειται πεδία τῆς συμπάσης Ἰταλίας τελευταία πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους, ὑπὲρ όν ὁ νῦν δὴ λόγος, ἀρέτη καὶ μεγέθει διαφέροντα τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὁσα πέπτωκεν

8 ὑπὸ τὴν ήμετέραν ἱστορίαν. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἕλθων εἶδος καὶ τῆς ταῦτα τὰ πεδία περιγραφοῦσης γραμμής τριγωνωσειδὲς. τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τὴν μὲν κορυφὴν ἢ τε τῶν Ἀπεννίνων καλομένων ὄρων καὶ τῶν Ἀλπεων σύμπτωσις οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ

9 Σαρδῶν πελάγους ὑπὲρ Μασσαλίας ἀποτελεῖ τῶν δὲ πλευρῶν παρὰ μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρκτων, ὡς ἐπάνω προεῖπον, τάς Ἀλπεις αὐτὰς ἐπὶ δισχιλίους

10 καὶ διακοσίους σταδίους παρῆκειν συμβαίνει, παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας τὸν Ἀπεννίνον ἐπὶ τρισχι-λίους ἔξακοσίους. βάσεως γε μὴν τὰξιν λαμβάνει τοῦ παντὸς σχῆματος ἢ παραλία τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ἀ-δρίαν κόλπου, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος τῆς βάσεως ἐστιν ἀπὸ πόλεως Σύρης ἐως ἐπὶ τὸν μυχὸν ὑπὲρ τοὺς δισχι-

12 λίους σταδίους καὶ πεντακοσίους, ὡστε τὴν πᾶσαν

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apex of the triangle, formed by the meeting of these two sides, is the southernmost cape of Italy known as Cocynthus and separating the Ionian Strait from the Sicilian Sea. The remaining or northern and inland side of the triangle is bounded continuously by the chain of the Alps which beginning at Marseilles and the northern coasts of the Sardinian Sea stretches in an unbroken line almost to the head of the whole Adriatic, only failing to join that sea by stopping at quite a short distance from it. At the foot of this chain, which we should regard as the base of the triangle, on its southern side, lies the last plain of Italy to the north. It is with this that we are now concerned, a plain surpassing in fertility any other in Europe with which we are acquainted. The general shape of the lines that bound this plain is likewise triangular. The apex of the triangle is formed by the meeting of the Apennines and Alps not far from the Sardinian Sea at a point above Marseilles. Its northern side is, as I have said, formed by the Alps themselves and is about two thousand two hundred stades in length, the southern side by the Apennines which extend for a distance of three thousand six hundred stades. The base of the whole triangle is the coast of the Adriatic, its length from the city of Sena a to the head of the gulf being more than two thousand five hundred stades; so that the whole circumference of

a Siniglia.
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περίμετρον τῶν προειρημένων πεδίων μὴ πολὺ λεί-

15 πειν τῶν μυρίων σταδίων. περὶ γε μὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς
οὐδ’ εἶπεν ῥάδιον. οὕτω τε γὰρ τοσαύτην ἀφθονίαν
ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, ἄστ’ ἐν τοῖς
καθ’ ἡμᾶς καιροῖς πολλάκις τεττάρων ὅβολον εἶναι
τῶν πυρῶν τὸν Σικελικὸν μέδιμον, τῶν δὲ κρι-
θῶν δυνέν, τοῦ δ’ οὖν τὸν μετρητὴν ἰσόκριθον.

2 ἑλύμου γε μὴν καὶ κέγχρου τελέως ὑπερβάλλουσα
δαφίλεια γίνεται παρ’ αὐτοῖς. τὸ δὲ τῶν βαλά-
νων πλῆθος τὸ γυνόμενον ἐκ τῶν κατὰ διάστημα
δρυμῶν ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις ἐκ τούτων ἀν τις μάλιστα

3 τεκμῆραιτο̂ν· πλείστων γὰρ ῥίκων ἱερείων κοπτομέ-
νων ἐν Ἡταλίᾳ διὰ τε τὰς εἰς τοὺς ίδίους βίους καὶ
tὰς εἰς τὰ στρατόπεδα παραθέσεις, τὴν ὁδοχερε-
στάτην χορηγίαν ἐκ τούτων συμβαίνει τῶν πεδίων

4 αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν. περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ μέρος εὐωνίας
καὶ δαφίλειας τῶν πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ἀνηκόντων οὐ-

5 τοῖς ἀν τις ἀκριβέστατα κατανοήσειε· ποιοῦνται γὰρ
τὰς καταλύσεις οἱ διοδεύοντες τὴν χώραν ἐν τοῖς
πανδοκείσι, οὐ συμφωνοῦντες περὶ τῶν κατὰ μέ-
ρος ἐπιτηδείων, ἀλλ’ ἐρωτῶντες πόσον τὸν ἄνδρα

6 δέχεται. ὥσ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ παρέλειται τοὺς
καταλύσεις οἱ πανδοκεῖσ, ὡς ἴκανα πάντ’ ἔχειν τὰ
πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, ἡμιασσαρίων· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν τέταρ-
τον μέρος ὅβολον· σπανίως δὲ τοῦθ’ ὑπερβαίνοισι.

7 τὸ γε μὴν πλῆθος τῶν ἄνδρων, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ
κάλλος τῶν σωμάτων, ἐτι δὲ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολέμους
tόλμαν, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων σαφῶς ἐσται κατα-
μαθεῖν.

8 Ῥῶν δ’ Ἀλπεων ἐκατέρας τῆς πλευράς, τῆς ἐπὶ
tῶν Ρώδανον ποταμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα
πεδία νευόσης, τοὺς βουνῶδεις καὶ γεωρδεῖς τόπους
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the plain is not much less than ten thousand stades. 15. Its fertility is not easy to describe. It produces such an abundance of corn, that often in my time the price of wheat was four obols per Sicilian medimnus\(^a\) and that of barley two obols, a metretes of wine costing the same as the medimnus of barley. Panic and millet are produced in enormous quantities, while the amount of acorns grown in the woods dispersed over the plain can be estimated from the fact that, while the number of swine slaughtered in Italy for private consumption as well as to feed the army is very large, almost the whole of them are supplied by this plain. The cheapness and abundance of all articles of food will be most clearly understood from the following fact. Travellers in this country who put up in inns, do not bargain for each separate article they require, but ask what is the charge per diem for one person. The innkeepers, as a rule, agree to receive guests, providing them with enough of all they require for half an *as* per diem, *i.e.* the fourth part of an obol, the charge being very seldom higher. As for the numbers of the inhabitants, their stature and beauty and their courage in war, the facts of their history will speak.

16. The hilly ground with sufficient soil on both slopes of the Alps, that on the north towards the Rhone and that towards the plain I have been

\(^a\) About 5 Roman *modii* or 10 gallons. The *metretes* of wine was about 9 gallons.
κατοικοῦσιν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀρδανῆ καὶ τὰς ἀρκτεύσεις ἐστραμμένους Γαλάται Τρανσαλπίνων προσαγορεύμενοι, τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ πεδία Ταυρίσκω καὶ Ἀγώνες καὶ πλείω γένη βαρβάρων ἔτερα. Τρανσαλπίνων γε μὴν οὔ διὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τοῦ τόπου διαφόραν προσαγορεύονται, τὸ γὰρ τράνς ἐξηγημενομένον ἐστι πέραν· διὸ τοὺς ἐπι-έκεινα τῶν Ἀλπεων Τρανσαλπίνους καλοῦσι. τὰ δ' ἀκρα διὰ τῇ τραχύτητα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς ἐπι-μενούσης ἀεὶ χώνος ἀοίκητα τελέως ἐστί. τὸν δ' Ἀπεννώνον ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ὑπὲρ Μασσαλίας καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰς Ἀλπεις συμπτώσεως Λιγυ-στίνου κατοικοῦσιν, καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ Τυρρηνικὸν πέ-λαγος αὐτοῦ πλευράν κεκλιμένην καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ 2 πεδία, παρὰ θάλασσαν μὲν μέχρι πόλεως Πίσης, ἡ πρώτη κεῖται τῆς Τυρρηνίας ὡς πρὸς τὰς δυ-σμάς, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεσόγαιαν ἐως τῆς Ἀρρητίων 3 χώρας. ἔξῆς δὲ Τυρρηνοῖ· τούτους δὲ συνεχεῖς ἐκά-τερον τὸ κλίμα νέμονται τῶν προερημένων ὁρῶν 4 Ἐμβροι. λοιπὸν δὲ μὲν Ἀπεννώνος, ἀπέχοι τῆς κατὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν θαλάττης στάδιοις ὡς ἂν εἰ πεντακο-σίους, ἀπολείπει τὰ πεδία, δεξίου ἀπονεύων, καὶ διὰ μέσης τῆς λοιπῆς Ἑλλάδος δύνης εἰς τὸ Σικελικὸν 5 κατατείνει πέλαγος. τὸ δ' ἀπολειπόμενον μέρος πεδινὸν τῆς πλευρᾶς ἐπὶ θάλασσαν καὶ πόλιν καθήκει 6 Ἐμβροι. δ' ἐδὲ Πάδος ποταμός, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ποιητῶν Ἡράκλεως θρυλούμενος, ἔχει μὲν τὰς πηγὰς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀλπων ὡς πρὸς τὴν κορυφὴν μᾶλλον τοῦ προερημένου σχῆματος, καταφέρεται δ' εἰς τὰ πεδία, 7 ποιούμενος τὴν ρύθμιν ὡς ἐπὶ μεσημβρίαν. ἀφικο-μενὸς δ' εἰς τοὺς ἐπιπέδους τόπους, ἐκκλίνας τῷ ἱέματι πρὸς ἐω φέρεται δ' αὐτῶν· ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν 278
describing, is inhabited in the former case by the Transalpine Gauls and in the latter by the Taurisci, Agones and several other barbarous tribes. Transalpine is not a national name but a local one, *trans* meaning "beyond," and those beyond the Alps being so called. The summits of the Alps are quite uninhabitable owing to their ruggedness and the quantity of snow which always covers them. 16. The Apennines, from their junction with the Alps above Marseilles, are inhabited on both slopes, that looking to the Tyrrhenian sea and that turned to the plain, by the Ligurians whose territory reaches on the seaboard-side as far as Pisa, the first city of western Etruria, and on the land side as far as Arretium. Next come the Etruscans, and after them both slopes are inhabited by the Umbrians. After this the Apennines, at a distance of about five hundred stades from the Adriatic, quit the plain and, turning to the right, pass along the centre of the rest of Italy as far as the Sicilian sea, the remaining flat part of this side of the triangle continuing to the sea and the city of Sena. The river Po, celebrated by poets as the Eridanus, rises in the Alps somewhere near the apex of the triangle and descends to the plain, flowing in a southerly direction. On reaching the flat ground, it takes a turn to the East and flows through the plain,

*Arczzo.*

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ΤΑ ΗΣΤΟΡΙΑΔΕΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

εκβολήν δυσι στόμασιν εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὸν Ἀδριανό τὸποὺς· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἀπότειμεται μέρος τῆς πε-
διάδος χώρας εἰς τὰς Ἀλπεῖς καὶ τὸν Ἀδριατικὸν
8 μυχόν. ἀγεὶ δὲ πλῆθος ὕδατος οὐδενὸς ἐλαττον
τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ποταμῶν, διὰ τὸ τὰς ρύσεις
tὰς ἐπὶ τὰ πεδία νευοῦσας ἀπὸ τε τῶν Ἀλπεῶν καὶ
tῶν Ἀπεννίνων ὅρῶν εἰς τοῦτον ἐμπίπτειν ἀπάσας
9 καὶ πανταχόθεν. μεγίστω δὲ καὶ καλλίστῳ βεύ-
mατι φέρεται περὶ κυνὸς ἐπίτολήν, αὐξόμενος ὑπὸ
tοῦ πλῆθους τῶν ἀνατηκομένων χιώνων ἐν τοῖς
10 προειρημένοις ὀρεσίν. ἀναπλεῖται δ’ ἐκ θαλάττης
κατὰ τὸ στόμα τὸ καλούμενον Ὀλανα σχεδὸν ἐπὶ
11 δυσχίλιοις σταδίους. τὴν μὲν γὰρ πρώτην ἐκ
τῶν πηγῶν ἔχει ρύσιν ἀπλήν, σχίζεται δ’ εἰς δύο
μέρη κατὰ τοὺς προσαγορευομένους Τριγάβολους·
tούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔτερον στόμα προσοναμάζεται
12 Παδόα, τὸ δ’ ἔτερον Ὀλανα. κεῖται δ’ ἐπὶ τούτω
λιμήν, οὐδενὸς τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀδριανὸν ὑπὸ
παρεκόμενος ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ καθομιζομένοις.
παρὰ γε μὴν τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις ὁ ποταμὸς προσαγο-
13 ρεῖται Βόδεγκος. τάλλα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν
tοῦτον ἱστορούμενα παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησί, λέγω δὴ
tὰ περὶ Φαέθοντα καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου πτώσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ
dάκρυα τῶν αἰγείρων καὶ τοὺς μελανείμονας τοὺς
περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν οἰκοῦντας, οὐς φασὶ τὰς ἐσθή-
tας εἰσέτι νῦν φορεῖν τοιαύτας ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ Φαέ-
14 θοντα πένθους, καὶ πάσαν δὴ τὴν τραγικήν καὶ
ταύτη προσεσοκύναι ὕλην, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ παρόντος
ὑπερθησόμεθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ λιῶν καθήκεν τῷ τῆς
προκατασκευῆς γενέι τὴν περὶ τῶν τοιουτῶν ἀκρι-
15 βολγίαν. μεταλαβόντες δὲ καίρον ἀρμόττουτα
ποιησόμεθα τὴν καθήκουσαν μνήμην, καὶ μάλιστα
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falling into the Adriatic by two mouths. It cuts off the larger half of the plain, which thus lies between it on the south and the Alps and head of the Adriatic on the north. It has a larger volume of water than any other river in Italy, since all the streams that descend into the plain from the Alps and Apennines fall into it from either side, and is highest and finest at the time of the rising of the Dog-star, as it is then swollen by the melting of the snow on those mountains. It is navigable for about two thousand stades from the mouth called Olana; for the stream, which has been a single one from its source, divides at a place called Trigaboli, one of the mouths being called Padua and the other Olana. At the latter there is a harbour, which affords as safe anchorage as any in the Adriatic. The native name of the river is Bodencus. The other tales the Greeks tell about this river, I mean touching Phaëthon and his fall and the weeping poplar-trees and the black clothing of the inhabitants near the river, who, they say, still dress thus in mourning for Phaëthon, and all similar matter for tragedy, may be left aside for the present, detailed treatment of such things not suiting very well the plan of this work. I will, however, when I find a suitable occasion make proper mention of all

"Middle of July."
διὰ τὴν Τιμαιοῦ περὶ τοὺς προειρημένους τόπους ἀγνοιαν.

17 Πλὴν ταῦτα γε τὰ πεδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἐνέμοντο Τυρρηνοὶ, καθʼ οὓς χρόνους καὶ τὰ Φλεγραῖα ποτε καλούμενα τὰ περὶ Καπνῆν καὶ Νάωλην. ἂ δὴ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς ἐμποδῶν εἶναι καὶ γνωρίζοντες μετά 2 γάλην ἐπʼ ἀρετῇ δόξαν εὐληφε. Διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἵστο- ῥοῦντας τὰς Τυρρηνῶν δυναστείας οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖν ἥλιον τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐπὶ τὴν νῦν κατεχομένην ὑπ’ αὐτῶν χώραν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα πεδία καὶ 3 τὰς ἐκ τοῦτων τῶν τόπων ἀφορμὰς. οἷς ἐπιμυγ- νύμενοι κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν Κελτοὶ καὶ περὶ τὸ κάλλος τῆς χώρας ὀφθαλμάσαντες, ἐκ μικρᾶς προ- φάσεως μεγάλη στρατιά παραδόξως ἐπελθόντες ἐξ- ἐβαλον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὸν Πάδου χώρας Τυρρηνοὺς καὶ 4 κατέσχον αὐτοὶ τὰ πεδία. τὰ μὲν οὖν πρῶτα καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς τοῦ Πάδου κείμενα Λάοι καὶ Λεβέκιοι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον Ἰνσομβρῆς κατάκησαν, δ’ ἐμπόδιον ἐθνὸς ἦν αὐτῶν’ ἐξῆς δὲ τούτων παρὰ 5 τὸν ποταμὸν Γονομάνοι. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν Ἄδριαν ἦδι προσήκουσα γένος ἀλλο πάνυ παλαιὸν διακατ- ἐσχύς’ προσαγορεύονται δ’ Οὐνένετοι, τοῖς μὲν ἔθεσι καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ βραχυ διαφέροντες Κελτῶν, γλώττῃ 6 δ’ ἀλλοις χρώμενοι. περὶ ὧν οἱ τραγῳδογράφοι πολύν τινα πεποίηται λόγον καὶ πολλὴν διαστέθην- 7 ταὶ περατεῖαν. τὰ δὲ πέραν τοῦ Πάδου τὰ περὶ 8 τὸν Ἀπεινώνοι πρῶτοι μὲν Ἄναρες, μετὰ δὲ τούς 9 τοὺς Βοῖοι κατάκησαν’ ἐξῆς δὲ τούτων ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ἄδριαν Λίγγονες, τὰ δὲ τελευταία πρὸς θαλάττῃ Σήμωνες.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιφανέστατα τῶν κατασχόντων τοὺς προειρημένους τόπους ἐθνῶν ταῦθ’ ὑπήρχεν. ὡκοιν
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this, especially as Timaeus has shown much ignorance concerning the district.

17. The Etruscans were the oldest inhabitants of this plain at the same period that they possessed also that Phlegraean plain in the neighbourhood of Capua and Nola, which, accessible and well known as it is to many, has such a reputation for fertility. Those therefore who would know something of the dominion of the Etruscans should not look at the country they now inhabit, but at these plains and the resources they drew thence. The Celts, being close neighbours of the Etruscans and associating much with them, cast covetous eyes on their beautiful country, and on a small pretext, suddenly attacked them with a large army and, expelling them from the plain of the Po, occupied it themselves. The first settlers at the eastern extremity, near the source of the Po, were the Laevi and Lebecii, after them the Insubres, the largest tribe of all, and next these, on the banks of the river, the Cenomani. The part of the plain near the Adriatic had never ceased to be in the possession of another very ancient tribe called the Veneti, differing slightly from the Gauls in customs and costume and speaking another language. About this people the tragic poets tell many marvellous stories. On the other bank of the Po, by the Apennines, the first settlers beginning from the west were the Anares and next them the Boii. Next the latter, towards the Adriatic, were the Lingones and lastly, near the sea, the Senones.

These are the names of the principal tribes that settled in the district. They lived in unwalled
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10 δὲ κατὰ κόμας ἀτειχίστους, τῆς λοιπῆς κατασκευῆς ἁμοιροί καθεστῶτες. διὰ γὰρ τὸ στιβαδοκοίτειν καὶ κρεαφαγεῖν, ἐτὶ δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὰ κατὰ γεωργίαν ἄσκειν, ἀπλοὺς εἰχον τοὺς βίους, οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης ἄλλης οὔτε τέχνης παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ παράπαν γινωσκομένης. ὑπορξὶς γε μὴν ἐκάστοις ἦν θρέμματα καὶ χρυσὸς διὰ τὸ μόνα ταῦτα κατὰ τὰς περιστάσεις ραδίως δύνασθαι πανταχῇ περιαγαγεῖν καὶ μεθιστάναι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν

12 προαιρέσεις. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἐταιρείας μεγίστην σπουδὴν ἐποιοῦντο διὰ τὸ καὶ φοβερώτατον καὶ δυνατώτατον εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτον ὅσ ἂν πλείστους ἔχειν δοκὴ τοὺς θεραπεύοντας καὶ συμπεριφερομένους αὐτῶ.

18 Τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄρχας οὐ μόνον τῆς χώρας ἐπεκράτουν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς πολλοὺς ὑπηκόοις 2 ἐπεποίησαντο, τῇ τόλμῃ καταπεπληγμένοι. μετὰ δὲ των χρόνων μάχη νικήσαντες 'Ρωμαίους καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τούτων παραταξαμένους, ἐπόμενοι τοῖς φεύγουσι τρισὶ τῆς μάχης ἡμέραις ύπεροι κατέσχον αὐτήν

3 τὴν Ῥώμην πλὴν τοῦ Καπιτωλίου. γενομένου δ' ἀντισπάσματος, καὶ τῶν Οὐενέτων ἐμβαλόντων εἰς τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν, τότε μὲν ποιησάμενοι συνθῆκας πρὸς 'Ρωμαίους καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀποδόντες, ἔπαν

4 ἠλθον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς ἐμφυλίοις συνείχοντο πολέμοις, ἐνοι δὲ καὶ τῶν τὰς Ἀλπεῖς κατοικούντων ὁρμὰς ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ συνηθροίζοντο πολλάκις ἐπ' αὐτοὺς, θεωροῦντες ἐκ παραθέσεως

5 τὴν παραγεγενημένην αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίαν. ἐν ὧν καῳρῷ 'Ρωμαίοι τὴν τε σφετέραν δύναμιν ἀνέλαβον καὶ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Αττινοὺς αὕθης πράγματα συν-

6 εστήσαντο. παραγεγερμένων δὲ πάλιν τῶν Κελτῶν 284.
villages, without any superfluous furniture; for as they slept on beds of leaves and fed on meat and were exclusively occupied with war and agriculture, their lives were very simple, and they had no knowledge whatever of any art or science. Their possessions consisted of cattle and gold, because these were the only things they could carry about with them everywhere according to circumstances and shift where they chose. They treated comradeship as of the greatest importance, those among them being the most feared and most powerful who were thought to have the largest number of attendants and associates.

18. On their first invasion they not only conquered this country but reduced to subjection many of the neighbouring peoples, striking terror into them by their audacity. Not long afterwards they defeated the Romans and their allies in a pitched battle, and pursuing the fugitives, occupied, three days after the battle, the whole of Rome with the exception of the Capitol, but being diverted by an invasion of their own country by the Veneti, they made on this occasion a treaty with the Romans, and evacuating the city, returned home. After this they were occupied by domestic wars, and certain of the neighbouring Alpine tribes, witnessing to what prosperity they had attained in comparison with themselves, frequently gathered to attack them. Meanwhile the Romans re-established their power and again became masters of Latium. Thirty years.
"Αλβαν στρατεύματι μεγάλω μετά τήν τής πόλεως καταλήψιν ἔτει τριμοστῶ, τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐτὸλμησαν ἀντεξαγαγεῖν Ῥωμαίοι τὰ στρατόπεδα, διὰ τὸ παραδόξου γενομένης τῆς ἑφόδου προκαταληφθῆναι καὶ μὴ καταταχῆσαι τάσ τῶν συμμάχων ἀθροίσαν-7 τας δυνάμεις. αὕτως δ’ ἐξ ἐπιβολῆς ἐτέρας ἔτει δω- δεκάτω μετὰ μεγάλης στρατιάς ἐπιτορευομένων, προαιρομένων καὶ συναγείραντες τοὺς συμμάχους, μετὰ πολλῆς προθυμίας ἀπήντων, σπεύδοντες συμ-8 βαλεῖν καὶ διακανδυνεύσαι περὶ τῶν ὅλων. οἱ δὲ Γαλάται καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἑφόδου αὐτῶν καὶ διαστα-σίάσαντες πρὸς σφός, νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης φυγῆ παραπλησίαν ἐπονήσαντο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἱ-9 κείαν. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τοῦ φόβου τρικαλιδεκα μὲν ἐτή τὴν ἧσυχίαν ἔσχον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνορώντες αὐξανομένην τὴν Ῥωμαίων δύναμιν, εἰρήνην ἐπον-19 ἡσαντο καὶ συνθῆκας. ἐν αἱς ἐτή τριάκοντα μεί-ναντες ἐμπεδῶσ, αὕτως γενομένου κυνήματος ἐκ τῶν Ῥωμασιλπίνων, δείσαντες μὴ πόλεμος αὐτῶν ἐγερθῇ βαρὺς, ἀπὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐτρεφαν τὰς ὀρμᾶς τῶν ἐξ-αισθαμένων, δυσρωφοροῦντες καὶ προτιθέμενοι τὴν συγγένειαν, ἐπὶ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις παρόξυναν καὶ μετ-2 ἐσχον αὐτῶς τῆς στρατείας. ἐν ἦ τὴν ἑφόδου ποι-νομένων διὰ Τυρρηνίας, ὡμοί συστρατευομένων σφίσι Τυρρηνῶν, καὶ περιβαλόμενοι λείας πλῆθος, ἐκ μὲν τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐπαρχίας ἀσφαλῶς ἐπανήλθον. 3 εἰς δὲ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀφικόμενοι, καὶ στασιάσαντες περὶ τὴν τῶν εἰλημμένων πλευνεξίαν, τῆς τε λείας καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν δυνάμεως τὸ πλείστον μέρος δι-4 ἐφθειραν. τούτῳ δὲ σύνηθεσ ἐστὶ Γαλάταις πράτ-πετειν, ἐπειδὰν σφετερίσωνται τι τῶν πέλας, καὶ μά-λιστα διὰ τὰς ἀλόγους οἰνοφλυγίας καὶ πλησμονάς.

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after the occupation of Rome, the Celts again appeared before Alba with a large army, and the Romans on this occasion did not venture to meet them in the field, because, owing to the suddenness of the attack, they were taken by surprise and had not had time to anticipate it by collecting the forces of their allies. But when, twelve years later, the Celts again invaded in great strength, they had early word of it, and, assembling their allies, marched eagerly to meet them, wishing for nothing better than a decisive battle. The Gauls, alarmed by the Roman advance and at variance among themselves, waited until nightfall and then set off for home, their retreat resembling a flight. After this panic, they kept quiet for thirteen years, and then, as they saw how rapidly the power of the Romans was growing, they made a formal peace with them, to the terms of which they adhered steadfastly for thirty years. 19. But then, when a fresh movement began among the Transalpine Gauls, and they feared they would have a big war on their hands, they deflected from themselves the inroad of the migrating tribes by bribery and by pleading their kinship, but they incited them to attack the Romans, and even joined them in the expedition. They advanced through Etruria, the Etruscans too uniting with them, and, after collecting a quantity of booty, retired quite safely from the Roman territory, but, on reaching home, fell out with each other about division of the spoil and succeeded in destroying the greater part of their own forces and of the booty itself. This is quite a common event among the Gauls, when they have appropriated their neighbour’s property, chiefly owing to their inordinate drinking and
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5 metà δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἔτει τετάρτῳ συμφρονήσαντες ἀμα Σαουνίται καὶ Γαλάται παρετάξαντο Ἦρωμαιοις ἐν τῇ Καιμερτίων χώρᾳ καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἔν τῷ κινδύνῳ διέφθειραν. ἐν ὧν καιρῷ προσφιλονεικήσαντες πρὸς τὸ γεγονός ἐλάττωμα, αὐτοῖς Ἦρωμαιοι μετ’ ὀλγάς ἢμέρας ἐξῆλθον, καὶ συμβαλόντες πάσι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις ἐν τῇ τῶν Σεντινατῶν χώρᾳ πρὸς τοὺς προειρημένους τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἦν αγκασαν προτροπά-7 δὴν ἐκάστους εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν φυγεῖν. διαγενομένων δὲ πάλιν ἐτῶν δέκα παρεγένοντο Γαλάται μετὰ μεγάλης στρατιάς, πολιορκήσαντες τὴν Ἀρρη-8 τίνων πόλιν. Ἦρωμαιοι δὲ παραβοηθήσαντες, καὶ συμβαλόντες πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἠττήθησαν. ἐν δὲ τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ Λευκίου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τελευτή-9 σαντος Μάνων ἐπικατέστησαν τὸν Κόριον. οὐ πρεσβευτὰς ἐκπέμψαντος εἰς Γαλατίαν ὑπὲρ τῶν αἱχ-10 μαλῶτων, παρασποράδησαν ἐπανείλοντο τοὺς πρε-σβεις. τῶν δὲ Ἦρωμαιων ὑπὸ τῶν θυμὸν ἐκ χειρὸς ἐπιστρατευσαμένων, ἀπαντήσαντες συνεβαλον οἱ Σή-11 νωνες καλούμενοι Γαλάται. Ἦρωμαιοι δ’ ἐκ παρα-τάξεως κρατήσαντες αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπ-έκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐξέβαλον, τῆς δὲ χώρας ἐγένοντο πάσης ἐγκρατεῖς. εἰς ὃν καὶ πρώτην τῆς12 Γαλατίας ἀποκιάν ἐστελαν τὴν Σήμην προσαγο-ρευμενήν πόλιν, ὡμόνυμον οὖσαν τοῖς πρότερον13 αὐτὴν κατοικοῦσιν Γαλάταις, ὑπὲρ ὅς ἀρτίως διεσα-φήσαμεν, φάσκοντες αὐτὴν παρὰ τὸν Ἀδριαν ἐπὶ τῷ πέρατι κείθαι τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδίων.14 οἱ δὲ Βοῖοι, θεωροῦντες ἐκπεπτωκότας τοὺς Σή-νωνας, καὶ δείσαντες περὶ σφῶν καὶ τῆς χώρας, μὴ πάθωσι τὸ παραπλήσιον, ἐξεστράτευσαν παν-288
surfeiting. Four years later the Gauls made a league with the Samnites, and engaging the Romans in the territory of Camerinum inflicted on them considerable loss; but the Romans, determined on avenging their reverse, advanced again a few days after with all their legions, and attacking the Gauls and Samnites in the territory of Santinum, put the greater number of them to the sword and compelled the rest to take precipitate flight each to their separate homes. Again, ten years afterwards, the Gauls appeared in force and besieged Arretium. The Romans, coming to the help of the town, attacked them in front of it and were defeated. In this battle their Praetor Lucius Caecilius fell, and they nominated Manius Curius in his place. When Manius sent legates to Gaul to treat for the return of the prisoners, they were treacherously slain, and this made the Romans so indignant that they at once marched upon Gaul. They were met by the Senones, whom they defeated in a pitched battle, killing most of them and driving the rest out of their country, the whole of which they occupied. This was the first part of Gaul in which they planted a colony, calling it Sena after the name of the tribe who formerly inhabited it. This is the city I mentioned above as lying near the Adriatic at the extremity of the plain of the Po. 20. Hereupon the Boii, seeing the Senones expelled from their territory, and fearing the same fate for themselves and their own land, implored the aid of the Etruscans and
ΤΗΣ ΗΙΣΤΟΡΙΕΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

2 δημεῖ παρακαλέσαντες Τυρρηνοὺς. ἀθροισθέντες δὲ περὶ τὴν Ὁάδμονα προσαγορευμένην λίμνην παρ-3 ετάξαντο Ἦρωι τοὺς. ἐν δὲ τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ Τυρρη-νόν μὲν οἱ πλείστοι κατεκόπτουσαν, τῶν δὲ Βοῖων
4 τελέως ὀλίγοι διέφυγον. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα τῷ κατὰ πό-
δας ἐνιαυτῷ συμφρονήσαντες αὕτης οἱ προείρημέ-
νοι καὶ τοὺς ἀρτὶ τῶν νέων ἠβοῦντας καθοπλίσαν-
5 τες παρετάξαντο πρὸς Ἦρωι τοὺς. ἤτηθέντες δ' ὀλοσχερῶς τῇ μάχῃ μόλις εἶχαν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, καὶ δια-
πρεσβευόμενοι περὶ σπονδῶν καὶ διαλύσεων, συν-
3 θῆκας ἔθεντο πρὸς Ἦρωι τοὺς. τάστα δὲ συνέβαινε
γίνοντα τῷ τρίτῳ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς Πύρρου δια-
βάσεως εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, πέμπτῳ δὲ τῆς Γαλατῶν
7 περὶ Δελφοῦς διαφθορᾶς. ἐν γὰρ τούτος ἡ τύχη
τοῖς καρποῖς ὡς ἣν εἶ λοιμικὴν τινα πολέμου διάθεσιν
8 ἐπέστησε πᾶσι Γαλάταις. ἕκ δὲ τῶν προείρημένων
ἀγώνων δύο τὰ κάλλιστα συνεκύρησε Ἦρωι τοὺς
γὰρ κατακόπτεσθαι συνήθειας ἐσχηκότες ὑπὸ Γα-
λατῶν οὐδὲν ἠδύναντο δευτέρον ἑδῶν οὐδὲ προσ-
9 δοκῆσαι τῶν αὐτοῖς ἡ δεποχαίριαν. εἷς δὲ πρὸς
τε Πύρρον ἀθληταί τέλειοι γεγονότες τῶν κατὰ πό-
10 λεμον ἔργων συγκατέστησαν τὴν τε Γαλατῶν τὸλ-
μαν ἐν καρπῷ καταπληξάμενοι λοιπὸν ἀπερισπάστως
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πρὸς Πύρρον περὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπο-
λέμουν, μετὰ δὲ τάστα πρὸς Καρχηδονίους ὑπὲρ τῆς
Σικελίωτῶν ἀρχῆς δυνηωνίζοντο.

21 Γαλάται δ' ἐκ τῶν προείρημένων ἐλπισσωμάτων
ἐτῇ μὲν πέντε καὶ τετταράκοκτα τὴν ἄχυραν ἐξῄσχον,
2 εἰρήνην ἄγοντες πρὸς Ἦρωι τοὺς. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ μὲν
αὐτόπται γεγονότες τῶν δεινῶν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἐξεχώ-
ρησαν διὰ τῶν χρόνων, ἐπεγένοντο δὲ νέοι, θυμοῦ
μὲν ἀλογίστου πλῆρεις, ἀπειροῦ δὲ καόρατοι παν-
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marched out in full force. The united armies gave battle to the Romans near Lake Vadimon, and in this battle most of the Etruscans were cut to pieces while only quite a few of the Boii escaped. But, notwithstanding, in the very next year these two peoples once more combined and arming their young men, even the mere striplings, again encountered the Romans in a pitched battle. They were utterly defeated and it was only now that their courage at length gave way and that they sent an embassy to sue for terms and made a treaty with the Romans. This took place three years before the crossing of Pyrrhus to Italy and five years before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi; for it really seems that at this time Fortune afflicted all Gauls alike with a sort of epidemic of war. From all these struggles the Romans gained two great advantages. In the first place, having become accustomed to be cut up by Gauls, they could neither undergo nor expect any more terrible experience, and next, owing to this, when they met Pyrrhus they had become perfectly trained athletes in war, so that they were able to daunt the courage of the Gauls before it was too late, and henceforth could give their whole mind first to the fight with Pyrrhus for Italy and afterwards to the maintenance of the contest with Carthage for the possession of Sicily.

21. After these reverses, the Gauls remained quiet and at peace with Rome for forty-five years. But when, as time went on, those who had actually witnessed the terrible struggle were no more, and a younger generation had taken their place, full of unreflecting passion and absolutely without experi-
3 τὸς κακοῦ καὶ πάσης περιστάσεως, αὕθις ἦρξαντο τὰ καθεστώτα κυνεῖν· δ' φύσιν ἔχει γίνεσθαι, καὶ τραχύνεσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων πρὸς Ἦρωμαίους,
4 ἐπισπάσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἀλπεων Γαλάτας. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον χωρίς τοῦ πλῆθους δι' αὐτῶν τῶν ἤγουμένων ἐν ἀπορρήτοις ἐπράττετο τὰ προερή-
5 μένα. διὸ καὶ παραγενομένων τῶν Τρανσαλτίνων ἐως Ἀρμίνιον μετὰ δυνάμεως, διαπιστῆσαντα τὰ πλῆθη τῶν Βοών καὶ στασιάσαντα πρὸς τε τοὺς ἑαυτῶν προεστῶτας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παραγενούντας, ἀνείλον μὲν τοὺς ἓδοιοι βασιλεῖς Ἀτην καὶ Γάλα-
6 τον, κατέκοψαν δ' ἄλληλους, συμβαλόντες ἐκ παρα-
7 τάξεως. ὅτε δὴ καὶ Ἦρωμαιοι κατάφοβοι γενόμενοι τὴν ἐφοδον, ἐξῆλθον μετὰ στρατόπεδου· συνέντευ
de τὴν αὐθαίρετον καταφθοράν τῶν Γαλατῶν, ἀνεχώρησαν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦ-
8 τον τὸν φόβον ἔτει πέμπτῳ, Μάρκου Λεπέδου στρα-
9 τηγοῦντος, κατεκληρούχησαν ἐν Γαλατία Ἦρωμαιοι τὴν Πικεντίην προσαγορευμένην χώραν, ἐξ ἡς νικήσαντες ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Σήνωνας προσαγορευμέ-
10 νοὺς Γαλάτας, Γαίου Φλαμυνίου ταῦτην τὴν δημ-
11 αγωγίαν εἰσηγησαμένου καὶ πολιτείαν, ἢν δὴ καὶ Ἦρωμαιοι ὡς ἐποὺς εἰπεῖν φατέον ἀρχηγον μὲν γε-
12 νέσθαι τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον τοῦ δήμου διαστροφῆς, ἀιτίαν δὲ καὶ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα πολέμου συστάντος
13 αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς προειρημένους. πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν Γαλατῶν ὑπεδύοντο τὴν πράξιν, μάλιστα δ' οἱ Βοώι, διὰ τὸ συντερμοῦντα τῇ τῶν Ἦρωμαιῶν χώρᾳ, νομίσαντες οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἤγεμονίας ἐτι καὶ δυ-
14 ναστείας Ἦρωμαιοὺς τὸν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ποιήσασθαι πόλεμον, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὀλοσχεροῦς ἐξαιναστάσεως καὶ καταφθορᾶς.
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ence of suffering or peril, they began again, as was natural, to disturb the settlement, becoming exasperated against the Romans on the least pretext and inviting the Alpine Gauls to make common cause with them. At first these advances were made secretly by their chiefs without the knowledge of the multitude; so that when a force of Transalpine Gauls advanced as far as Ariminum the Boian populace were suspicious of them, and quarrelling with their own leaders as well as with the strangers, killed their kings, Atis and Galatus, and had a pitched battle with the other Gauls in which many fell on either side. The Romans had been alarmed by the advance of the Gauls, and a legion was on its way; but, on learning of the Gauls' self-inflicted losses, they returned home. Five years after this alarm, in the consulship of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the Romans divided among their citizens the territory in Gaul known as Picenum, from which they had ejected the Senones when they conquered them. Gaius Flamininus was the originator of this popular policy, which we must pronounce to have been, one may say, the first step in the demoralization of the populace, as well as the cause of the war with the Gauls which followed. For what prompted many of the Gauls and especially the Boii, whose territory bordered on that of Rome, to take action was the conviction that now the Romans no longer made war on them for the sake of supremacy and sovereignty, but with a view to their total expulsion and extermination.
Διόπερ εὐθέως τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἠθνῶν, τὸ τε τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων καὶ Βοών, συμφρονήσαντα διεπέμποντο πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὰς Ἀλπεῖς καὶ περὶ τῶν Ῥοδανῶν ποταμῶν κατοικοῦντας Γαλάτας, προσαγορευομένους δὲ διὰ τὸ μισθοῦ στρατεύειν Γαισάτους. 2 ἡ γὰρ λέεις αὐτὴ τοῦτο σημαίνει κυρίως. ὅπερ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι Κογκολιτάνῳ καὶ Ἀννηρέστῳ παρατίκα μὲν χρυσίῳ προτείναντες πλῆθος, εἰς τὸ μέλλον δὲ ὑποδεικνύντες τὸ μέγεθος τῆς Ῥωμαιῶν εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς ἁγαθῶν, ἐὰν κρατήσωσι, προυτρέποντο καὶ παράξενον 3 πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ Ῥωμαιῶν στρατεύαν. Ῥαδίως δὲ ἐπείσαν, ἀμία τοῖς προειρημένους διδόντες μὲν τὰ πιστὰ περὶ τῆς αὐτῶν συμμαχίας, ἀναμμηνέσκοντες δὲ τῆς 4 τῶν ἱδίων προγόνων πράξεως αὐτοὺς. ἐν ἥ ’κεινοι στρατεύσαντες οὐ μόνον ἐνίκησαν μαχόμενοι Ῥωμαιοὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐξ ἐφόδου κατ- 5 ἐσχόν αὐτὴν τὴν Ῥώμην’ γενόμενοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀπάντων ἐγκρατείς, καὶ τῆς πόλεως αὐτῆς ἐπτὰ μῆρας κυρεύσαντες, τέλος ἠθελοντί καὶ μετὰ χάριτος παραδόντες τὴν πόλιν, ἀθραυστοῦ καλαπεινοῦ ἑαυτοῖς ἑξέχοντες τὴν ὀφέλειαν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπ- 6 αὐγήθουν. ἄν ἁκούοντες οἱ περὶ αὐτοὺς ἑγεμόνες οὕτω παρωρμήθησαν ἐπὶ τὴν στρατεύαν ὡστε μηδὲνοτε μήτε πλείους μήτε ἐιδοχοτέρους μήτε μαχμωτέρους ἄνδρας ἐξελθεῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων τῆς 7 Γαλατίας. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καίρους τούτους Ῥωμαιοῖ τὰ μὲν ἁκούοντες, τὰ δὲ καταμαντεύομενοι τὸ μέλλον, εἰς φόβους ἐνέπιπτον συνεχεῖς καὶ ταραχὰς 8 ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὡστε ποτὲ μὲν στρατόπεδα καταγράφειν καὶ σύτου καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ποιεῖσθαι παρασκευάς, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἔξαγεν ἐπὶ τοὺς 294.
22. The two largest tribes, therefore, the Insubres and Boii, made a league and sent messengers to the Gauls dwelling among the Alps and near the Rhone, who are called Gaesatae because they serve for hire, this being the proper meaning of the word. They urged and incited their kings Concolitanus and Aneroestus to make war on Rome, offering them at present a large sum in gold, and as to the future, pointing out to them the great prosperity of the Romans, and the vast wealth that would be theirs if they were victorious. They had no difficulty in persuading them, as, in addition to all this, they pledged themselves to be loyal allies and reminded them of the achievement of their own ancestors, who had not only overcome the Romans in combat, but, after the battle, had assaulted and taken Rome itself, possessing themselves of all it contained, and, after remaining masters of the city for seven months, had finally given it up of their own free will and as an act of grace, and had returned home with their spoil, unbroken and unscathed. When the kings had been told all this, they became so eager for the expedition that on no occasion has that district of Gaul sent out so large a force or one composed of men so distinguished or so warlike. All this time, the Romans, either hearing what was happening or divining what was coming, were in such a state of constant alarm and unrest, that at times we find them busy enrolling legions and making provision of corn and other stores, at times marching to the
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όρους, ὡς ἤδη παρόντων εἰς τὴν χώραν τῶν πολεμίων, οὐδέπω κεκυκνηκότων ἐκ τῆς οικείας τῶν Κελ-9 τῶν. οὐκ ἐλάχιστα δὲ συνήργησε καὶ Καρχηδο-νίως τούτῳ τὸ κύνημα πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάσασθαι τὰ 10 κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀσφαλῶς. Ὁρμαίοι γάρ, ὡς καὶ πρόσθεν ἡμῖν εὑρηταί, κρίνοντες ἀναγκαιότερα ταῦτα διὰ τὸ πρὸς ταῖς πλευραῖς αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν παροῦν ἡγαγκάζοντο τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, σπουδάζοντες πρότερον ἐν καλῷ θέσθαι τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Κελτοὺς. 11 διόπερ ἀσφαλισάμενοι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν Ἀσδροῦβαν ὁμολογοῦν, ὕπερ ὅν ἄρτι δεδηλώκαμεν, ἐνεχείρησαν ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐν τοῦ-τοῖς καυροῖς πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολε-μίους, νομίζοντες συμφέρειν σφίσι τὸ διακριθῆναι πρὸς τούτοις.

23 Οἱ δὲ Γαισάται Γαλάται συντησάμενοι δύναμιν πολυτελῆ καὶ βαρείαν, ἣκον ὑπεράραντες τὰς Ἀλ-πεῖς εἰς τὸν Πάδον ποταμὸν ἔτει μετὰ τὴν τῆς χώ-2 ρας διάδοσιν ὑγίως. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων καὶ Βοϊῶν γένος ἐμείνε γενναίως ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιβολαῖς, οἱ δ' Ἰουνέτοι καὶ Γονομάνοι, διαπρε-σβευσάμενοι Ὁρμαίων, τοῦτοι εἶλοντο συμμαχεῖν. 3 διὸ καὶ μέρος τι τῆς δυνάμεως καταλιπεῖν ἡγαγκά-σθησαν οἱ βασιλεῖς τῶν Κελτῶν φυλακῆς χάριν τῆς 4 χώρας πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ τούτων φόβον. αὐτοὶ δ' ἐξ-άραντες παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι κατασκευάσασθων ὠρμηθαν, προούμενοι τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ Τυρρη-νίας, ἔχοντες πέξους μὲν εἰς πεντακισμύριον, ἦπ-5 πεῖς δὲ καὶ συνωρίδας εἰς δισμύριον. Ὁρμαίοι δ' ὡς θάττον ἤκουσαν τοὺς Κελτοὺς ὑπερβεβληκέναι τᾶς Ἀλπεῖς, Λεύκιον μὲν Λιμίλιον ὑπατον μετὰ δυνάμεως ἐξαπέστειλαν ὡς ἐπ᾽ Ἀρμίνου, τηρήσοντα
frontier, as if the enemy had already invaded their territory, while as a fact the Celts had not yet budged from their own country. This movement of the Gauls contributed in no small measure to the rapid and unimpeded subjugation of Spain by the Carthaginians; for the Romans, as I stated above, regarded this matter as of more urgency, since the danger was on their flank, and were compelled to neglect the affairs of Spain until they had dealt with the Gauls. They therefore secured themselves against the Carthaginians by the treaty with Hasdrubal, the terms of which I stated above, and threw their whole effort into the struggle with their enemies in Italy, considering it their main interest to bring this to a decisive conclusion.

23. The Gaesatae, having collected a richly equipped and formidable force, crossed the Alps, and descended into the plain of the Po in the eighth year after the partition of Picenum. The Insubres and Boii held stoutly to their original purpose; but the Veneti and Cenomani, on the Romans sending an embassy to them, decided to give them their support: so that the Celtic chiefs were obliged to leave part of their forces behind to protect their territory from invasion by these tribes. They themselves marched confidently out with their whole available army, consisting of about fifty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse and chariots, and advanced on Etruria. The Romans, the moment they heard that the Gauls had crossed the Alps, sent Lucius Aemilius, their Consul, with his army to Ariminum to await
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ταύτη τῶν ἐναπτών τὴν ἐφοδον, ἐνα δὲ τῶν ἐξα-
6 πελέκεων εἰς Τυρρηνίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔτερος τῶν
υπάτων Γάιος Ἁτίλιος προεξεληλυθὼς ἔτυχεν εἰς
7 Σαρδόνα μετὰ τῶν στρατοπέδων, οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ
πάντες περιδιεἰς ἴσων, μέγαν καὶ φοβερῶν αὐτοῖς
ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐπιφέρεσθαι κίνδυνον. ἔπαιχον δὲ
τοῦτ' εἰκότως, ἔτι περὶ Γαλατῶν ἐγκαθημένου ταῖς
8 ψυχαῖς αὐτῶν τοῦ παλαιοῦ φόβου. διὸ καὶ πρὸς
ταύτην ἀναφέροντες τὴν ἐννοιαί τὰ μὲν συνήθροι-
ζον, τὰ δὲ κατέγραφον στρατόπεδα, τοῖς δ' ἐτούμοις
9 εἶναι παρήγγελλον τῶν συμμάχων. καθόλου δὲ τοῖς
ὑποτεταγμένοις ἀναφέρειν ἐπέταξαν ἀπογραφάς τῶν
ἐν ταῖς ἥλικίαις, σπουδάζοντες εἰδέναι τὸ σύμπαν
10 πλῆθος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς δυνάμεως. σίτου
dὲ καὶ βελῶν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιτηδείοττος πρὸς
πόλεμον τηλικαύτην ἐποίησαντο κατασκευὴν ἥλικην
11 οὐδεὶς πω μημονεύει πρότερον. συνηγρεῖτο δ' 12
αὐτοῖς πάντα καὶ πανταχόθεν ἔτοιμως. καταπε-
πλήγμενοι γὰρ οἱ τῆς Ἰταλίαν οἰκοῦντες τὴν τῶν
Γαλατῶν ἐφοδον, οὐκέτι Ῥωμαῖοι ἴροντο συμμα-
χεῖν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς τούτων ἤγεμονίας γίνεσθαι τὸν
πόλεμον, ἀλλὰ περὶ σφῶν ἐνόμιζον ἑκατον καὶ τῆς
ἰδίας πόλεως καὶ χώρας ἐπιφέρεσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον.
13 διόπερ ἔτοιμως τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις ὑπήκοον.
24 Ἰνα δὲ συμφανεῖ σὲ αὐτῶν γένηται τῶν ἔργων
ἡλικίως Ἀνίβας ἐτόλμησε πράγμασιν ἐπιθέσθαι
[μετὰ δὲ τάύτα] καὶ πρὸς ἡλικίαν δυναστείαν παρα-
βόλως ἀντοφθαλμήσας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο καθίκετο τῆς
προβέσεως ὡστε τοῖς μεγίστοις συμπτώμασι περὶ-
2 βάλλειν Ῥωμαίοις, ῥητέον ἂν εἰη τῆς παρασκευῆς
καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς τὸτε δυνά-
3 μεως. μετὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐξεληλύθει τέτταρα

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the attack of the enemy, and one of their Praetors to Etruria, their other Consul, Gains Attilius, being absent in Sardinia with his legions. There was great and general alarm in Rome, as they thought they were in imminent and serious peril, and this indeed was but natural, as the terror the old invasion had inspired still dwelt in their minds. Being, therefore, in this state of profound apprehension, they busied themselves mustering and enrolling their own legions and ordered those of the allies to be in readiness. All their subjects in general were commanded to supply lists of men of military age, as they wished to know what their total forces amounted to. Of corn, missiles and other war material they had laid in such a supply as no one could remember to have been collected on any previous occasion. On every side there was a ready disposition to help in every possible way; for the inhabitants of Italy, terror-struck by the invasion of the Gauls, no longer thought of themselves as the allies of Rome or regarded this war as undertaken to establish Roman supremacy, but every man considered that the peril was descending on himself and his own city and country. So there was great alacrity in obeying orders.

24. But, that it may appear from actual facts what a great power it was that Hannibal ventured to attack, and how mighty was that empire boldly confronting which he came so near his purpose as to bring great disasters on Rome, I must state what were their resources and the actual number of their forces at this time. Each of the Consuls was in
στρατόπεδα Ἦρσμαϊκα, πεντάκις μὲν χιλίους καὶ
dιακοσίους πεζικούς, ἵππεις δὲ τριακόσιους ἔχον
4 ἕκαστον. σύμμαχοι δὲ μεθ’ ἐκατέρων ἦσαν οἱ συν-
άμφω πεζοὶ μὲν τρισμύριοι, δισχίλιοι δ’ ἵππεις.
5 τῶν δ’ ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ προσβοηθήσαντων εἰς τὴν
Ῥώμην Σαβίνων καὶ Τυρρηνῶν ἱππεῖς μὲν ἦσαν
eἰς τετρακισχίλιους, πεζοὶ δὲ πλεῖοι τῶν πεντακι-
6 σάριων. τούτους μὲν ἀθροίσαντες ὡς ἔπετε Τυρρη-
νίας προεκάθισαν, ἐξαπέλεκυν αὐτοῖς ἡγεμόνα συ-
7 στήσαντες. οἱ δὲ τὸν Ἀπεννίνον κατοικοῦντες Ὁμ-
βροὶ καὶ Σαρσανάτων συνήχθησαν εἰς δισμυρίους,
μετὰ δὲ τούτων Οὐένετοι καὶ Γονομάνοι δισμύριοι.
8 τούτους δ’ ἔταξαν ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρων τῆς Γαλατίας, ὥσ-
ἐμβαλόντες εἰς τὴν τῶν Βοῖων χώραν ἀντιπερι-
σπώσας τοὺς ἐξεληλυθότας. τὰ μὲν οὖν προκαθ-
9 ἴμενα στρατόπεδα τῆς χώρας ταῦτ’ ἦν. εἰ δὲ τῇ
Ῥώμη διέτριβον ἱππομασμένῳ χάριν τῶν συμβαι-
νόντων ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις, ἐφεδρείας ἔχοντες τάξειν,
Ῥωμαίων μὲν αὐτῶν πεζοὶ δισμύριοι, μετὰ δὲ
tούτων ἱππεῖς χίλιοι καὶ πεντακόσιοι, τῶν δὲ συμ-
10 μάχων πεζοὶ μὲν τρισμύριοι, δισχίλιοι δ’ ἵππεις.
καταγραφαὶ δ’ ἀνηνέχθησαν Λατίνων μὲν ὀκτακισ-
μύριοι πεζοί, πεντακισχίλιοι δ’ ἱππεῖς, Σαυνιτῶν
dὲ πεζοὶ μὲν ἐπτακισμύριοι, μετὰ δὲ τούτων ἱππεῖς
11 ἐπτακισχίλιοι, καὶ μὴν Ἰαπύγων καὶ Μεσσαπίων
συνάμφω πεζῶν μὲν πέντε μυριάδες, ἱππεῖς δὲ μύ-
12 ριοὶ σὺν ἐξακισχίλιοι, Λευκανῶν δὲ πεζοὶ μὲν τρισ-
mύριοι, τρισχίλιοι δ’ ἵππεις, Μαρσῶν δὲ καὶ Μα-
ρουκίων καὶ Φρεντανῶν, ἐτὶ δ’ Οὐεστίνων, πεζοὶ
μὲν δισμύριοι, τετρακισχίλιοι δ’ ἵππεις. ἔτι γε
13 μὴν καὶ Σικελία καὶ Τάραντι στρατόπεδα δύο παρ-
eφύδρευν, ὅν ἐκάτερον ἦν ἀνὰ τετρακισχίλιους
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command of four legions of Roman citizens, each consisting of five thousand two hundred foot and three hundred horse. The allied forces in each Consular army numbered thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse. The cavalry of the Sabines and Etruscans, who had come to the temporary assistance of Rome, were four thousand strong, their infantry above fifty thousand. The Romans massed these forces and posted them on the frontier of Etruria under the command of a Praetor. The levy of the Umbrians and Sarsinatae inhabiting the Apennines amounted to about twenty thousand, and with these were twenty thousand Veneti and Cenomani. These they stationed on the frontier of Gaul, to invade the territory of the Boii and divert them back from their expedition. These were the armies protecting the Roman territory. In Rome itself there was a reserve force ready for any contingency consisting of twenty thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, all Roman citizens, and thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse furnished by the allies. The lists of men able to bear arms that had been returned were as follows. Latins eighty thousand foot and five thousand horse, Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand horse, Iapygians and Messapians fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse, Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani, and Vestini twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. In Sicily and Tarentum were two reserve legions, each consisting of four thousand
14 καὶ διακοσίους πεζούς, ἵππεις δὲ διακοσίους. 'Ῥωμαίων δὲ καὶ Καμπανῶν ἡ πλῆθος πεζῶν μὲν εἰς εἰκοσί καὶ πέντε κατελέχθησαν μυριάδες, ἵππεων δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς δύο μυριάσιν ἐπῆσαν ἐπὶ τρεῖς χιλιάδες.

15 ὥστε εἶναι τὸ [κεφάλαιον τῶν μὲν προκαθημένων τῆς Ῥώμης δυνάμεων πεζοί μὲν ὑπὲρ πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδες, ἵππεων δὲ εἰς ἐπτὰ μυριάδας· ἠφ' οὖς 'Αννίβας ἠλάττους ἠχών δυσμυρίων ἐπέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐν τοῖς ἔξής σαφέστερον ἐκποίησε κατανοεῖν.

25 Οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ κατάραντες εἰς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν ἐπετρεφθέντο τὴν χώραν, πορθοῦντες ἄδεως· οὐδενὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀντιτατομένου, τέλος ἐπὶ αὐτὴν ἀφροσίαν 2 τὴν Ῥώμην. ἢδη δ' αὐτῶν περὶ πόλιν οὖν τῷ καλεῖται μὲν Κλουσίων, ἀπέχει δ' ἡμερῶν τριῶν ὅδ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥώμης, προσαγγέλλεται διότι κατόπιν αὐτοῖς ἐπονται καὶ συναπτοῦναι αἱ προκαθήμεναι 3 τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐν τῇ Τυρρηνίᾳ δυνάμεις. οἱ δ' ἀκούσαντες ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς ἀπῆντων, σπεύδοντες τούτως 4 συμβαλεῖν. ἐγγύσαντες δ' ἀλλόλους ἢδη περὶ δυσμᾶς ἥλιον, τότε μὲν ἐν συμμέτρῳ διαστήματι κατά 5 στρατοπεδεύσαντες ἦλισθησαν ἄμφότεροι. τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης πῦρ ἀνακαύσαντες οἱ Κελτοὶ τοὺς μὲν ἵππεις ἀπέληπτον, συντάξαντες ἄμα τῷ φωτὶ συμφανεῖσι γενομένουσι τοῖς πολέμιοις ὑποχωρεῖν κατὰ 6 τὸν αὐτὸν στίβον. αὐτοὶ δὲ λαθραίαν ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ὅπε ἐπὶ πόλιν Φαίσολαν, αὐτοὶ παρενέβαλον, πρόθεσιν ἔχοντες ἄμα μὲν ἐκδέχεσθαι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἤππεις, ἄμα δὲ παραδόξως ἐνοχλήσαι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἤππεις, ἄμα δὲ παραδόξως ἐνοχλήσαι 302
two hundred foot and two hundred horse. Of Romans and Campanians there were on the roll two hundred and fifty thousand and about twenty-three thousand horse; so that the total number of Romans and allies able to bear arms was more than seven hundred thousand foot and seventy thousand horse, while Hannibal invaded Italy with an army of less than twenty thousand men. 25. On this matter I shall be able to give my readers more explicit information in the course of this work.

The Celts, descending on Etruria, overran the country without let or hindrance and, as nobody appeared to oppose them, they marched on Rome itself. When they had got as far as Clusium, a city three days' journey from Rome, news reached them that the advanced force which the Romans had posted in Etruria was on their heels and approaching. On hearing this, they turned to meet it, eager to engage it. At sunset the two armies were in close proximity, and encamped for the night at no great distance from each other. After nightfall, the Celts lit their camp-fires, and, leaving orders with their cavalry to wait until daybreak and then, when visible to the enemy, to follow on their track, they themselves secretly retreated to a town called Faesulae and posted themselves there, their intention being to wait for their cavalry, and also to put unexpected difficulties in the way of the enemy's
7 τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐφοδον. οἳ δὲ Ἰωμαιοὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης συνιδόντες τοὺς ἑππείς αὐτοὺς, καὶ νομίζοντες τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἀποδεδρακέναι, κατὰ σπουδὴν ἢκολούθων τοῖς ἑππεύσι κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ἀποχώρησιν. ἀμα δὲ τῷ συνεγγίζειν τοῖς πολεμίοις διαναστάντων τῶν Κελτῶν, καὶ συμπεσόντων αὐτοῖς, ἦν ἄγων τᾶς ἀρχάς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν βλασί. τέλος δὲ καθ- υπερεχόντων τῶν Κελτῶν τῇ τόλμῃ καὶ τῷ πλήθει, συνέβη διαφθαρῆναι μὲν τῶν Πομαίων οὐκ ἐλάτ- τους ἐξακολουθῶν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς φεύγειν. ὃν οἱ πλείους πρὸς τινὰ τόπον ἐρυμινὸν ἀποχωρήσαντες ἐμενον. οὐς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἱ Κελτοὶ πολιορκεῖν ἐπεβάλοντο. κακῶς δ' ἀπαλλάττουσιν κτὶ τῆς προγε- γενομένης εἰς τῇ νυκτὶ πορείας καὶ κακοπαθείας καὶ ταλαιπωρίας, ὀρμησάν πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν καὶ θέρα- πείας, φυλακὴν ἀπολιπόντες τῶν ἱδίων ἑπτῶν περὶ τὸν λόφον, πρόθεσιν ἔχοντες κατὰ τὴν ἐπιούσαν πολιορκεῖν τοὺς συμπεσευγότας, ἐὰν μὴ παραδώσων ἑαυτοὺς ἐκουσίως.

26 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Δεύκιος Ἀλμίλιος ὁ προκαθήμενος ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀδριανὸ τόπων ἀκούσας τοὺς Κελτοὺς διὰ Τυρρηνίας ἐμβεβληκότας συνεγγίζει τῇ Ἰωμῆ, παρῆν βοηθῶν κατὰ σπουδὴν εὐνυχίως εἰς δέοντα καιρὸν. καταστρατοπεδεύσαν- τος δ' αὐτοῦ σύνεγγυς τῶν πολεμίων, κατιδόντες τὰ πυρὰ καὶ νοήσαντες τὸ γεγονός οἱ συμπεσευγότες ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον, ταχέως ἀναθαρρήσαντες ἐξ- απέστειλαν αὐτῶν τινὰς τῆς νυκτὸς ἀνόπλους διὰ τῆς ὤλης ἀναγγελοῦντας τῷ στρατηγῷ τὸ συμβεβη- 3 κός. ὃ δὲ διακούσας, καὶ θεωρῶν οὐδὲ διαβούλοις αὐτῷ καταλειπόμενον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστῶτων, τοῖς μὲν χιλιάρχοις ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ παρῆγγελε τοὺς πεζοὺς 304.
attack. At daybreak, the Romans, seeing the cavalry alone and thinking the Celts had taken to flight, followed the cavalry with all speed on the line of the Celts' retreat. On their approaching the enemy, the Celts issued from their camp and attacked them, and a conflict, at first very stubborn, took place, in which finally the numbers and courage of the Celts prevailed, not fewer than six thousand Romans falling and the rest taking to flight. Most of them retreated to a hill of some natural strength where they remained. The Celts at first attempted to besiege them, but as they were getting the worst of it, fatigued as they were by their long night march and the suffering and hardships it involved, they hastened to rest and refresh themselves, leaving a detachment of their cavalry to keep guard round the hill, intending next day to besiege the fugitives, if they did not offer to surrender.

26. At this very time Lucius Aemilius, who was in command of the advanced force near the Adriatic, on hearing that the Celts had invaded Etruria and were approaching Rome, came in haste to help, fortunately arriving in the nick of time. He encamped near the enemy, and the fugitives on the hill, seeing his camp-fires and understanding what had occurred, immediately plucked up courage and dispatched by night some unarmed messengers through the wood to announce to the Consul the plight they were in. On hearing of it and seeing that there was no alternative course under the circumstances, he ordered his Tribunes to march

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εξάγεων, αυτός δὲ τοὺς ἵππεις ἀναλαβὼν καθηγεῖτο τῆς δυνάμεως, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὸν

προειρημένον βουνόν. οὐ δὲ τῶν Γαλατῶν ἦγε-μόνες, ἀφορώντες τὰ πυρὰ τῆς νυκτὸς καὶ συλλογι-ζόμενοι τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν πολεμίων συνήδρευν. ὁ Ανηρεόστης δὲ βασιλεὺς γνώμην εἰσέφερε λέγων ὅτι δεῖ τοσαῦτας λεῖας ἐγκρατεῖς γεγονότας, ἣν γὰρ, ὅς ἔουσε, καὶ τὸ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων πλῆθος, ἔτι δὲ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ἢς ἔχουν, ἀμύθητον.

διόπερ ἐφὶ δεῖν μὴ κινδυνεύειν ἐτὶ μηδὲ παραβάλλε-σθαι τοῖς ὀλοις, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀδεὼς ἐπανάγειν. ταῦτα δ' ἀποσκευασμένους καὶ γενομένους εὐ-ζώνους αὕτης εγχειρεῖν ὀλοσχερῶς, ἐὰν δοκῇ, τοῖς

Ῥωμαίων πράγμασι. δόξαντος δὲ σφίσι κατὰ τὴν Ἀνηρεόστην γνώμην χρήσασθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν, οὗτοι μὲν τῆς νυκτὸς ταῦτα βουλευσάμενοι, πρὸ φωτὸς ἀναξευξάντες προῆγον παρὰ θάλατταν διὰ τῆς

Τυρρηνῶν χώρας. δ' ὁ Λεύκιος, ἀναλαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ βουνοῦ τὸ διασφέρομενον τοῦ στρατοπέδου μέρος ἀμα- τὰς ἵδιας δυνάμεις, τὸ μὲν διακινδυνεύειν ἐκ παρατάξεως οὐδαμῶς ἐκρίνε συμφέρειν, ἐπιτηρεῖν δὲ μάλλον καιροὺς καὶ τόπους εὐφυεῖς, ἐπόμενος, εὰν ποὺ τι βλάψαι τοὺς πολεμίους ἢ τῆς λείας ἀπο-σπάσαι δυνηθῇ.

27 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους ἐκ Σαρδόνως μετὰ τῶν στρατοπέδων Γαίου Ἀτίλιος ὑπατος εἰς Πίσας καταπεπλευκὼς προῆγε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς Ρώμην, ἐναντίαν ποιούμενος τοῖς πολεμίοις τῆς

πορείαν. ήδη δ' ἐπὶ Τελαμώνα τῆς Τυρρηνίας τῶν Κελτῶν ὑπαρχόντων, οἱ προνομεύοντες εἰς αὐτῶν ἐμπεσόντες εἰς τοὺς παρὰ τοῦ Γαίου προπο-3

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out the infantry at daybreak, he himself proceeding in advance with the cavalry towards the hill. The leaders of the Gauls, on seeing the camp-fires at night, surmised that the enemy had arrived and held a council at which the King Aneroestes expressed the opinion, that having captured so much booty (for it appears that the quantity of slaves, cattle and miscellaneous spoil was enormous), they should not give battle again nor risk the fortune of the whole enterprise, but return home in safety, and having got rid of all their encumbrances and lightened themselves, return and, if advisable, try issues with the Romans. It was decided under the circumstances to take the course recommended by Aneroestes, and having come to this resolution in the night, they broke up their camp before daybreak and retreated along the sea-coast through Etruria. Lucius now took with him from the hill the survivors of the other army and united them with his other forces. He thought it by no means advisable to risk a general battle, but decided to hang on the enemy's rear and watch for times and places favourable for inflicting damage on them or wresting some of the spoil from their hands.

27. Just at this time, Gaius Atilius, the other Consul, had reached Pisa from Sardinia with his legions and was on his way to Rome, marching in the opposite direction to the enemy. When the Celts were near Telamon in Etruria, their advanced guard encountered that of Gaius and were made prisoners. On being examined by the Consul they
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foun ἀνακρινόμενοι τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν στρατοπέδων ἀνήγγελλον, σημαίνοντες διότι τελείως σύνεγγύς εἰσιν οἱ Κέλτοι καὶ
toύτων κατόπιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Λεύκιον. οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἔπεισες ἐπὶ τοῖς προσπήπτουσι, τὰ δ' εὔελπισις γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ δοκεῖν μέσους κατὰ πορείαν ἀπειληφέναι τοὺς Κέλτους, τοῖς μὲν χιλιάρχοις παρῆγγελε τάττειν τὰ στρατόπεδα, καὶ βάδην εἰς τοὺς προσδέχεται προάγειν, καθ' ὁσον ἄν οἱ τόποι προσδέχονται τῇ

5 μετωπηδόν ἔφοδον. αὐτὸς δὲ συνιδεσμὰς εὐκαίρως λόφον κείμενον ὑπὲρ τὴν ὁδὸν, ὑφ' ὃν ἐδει παραπορευθῆναι τοὺς Κέλτους, ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἵππεῖς, ὄρμησε σπεῦδων προκαταλαβέσθαι τὴν ἀκρολοφίαν καὶ πρῶτος κατάρξαι τοῦ κυδοῦν, πεπεισμένος τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς τῶν ἐκβασιόντων πλείστον οὐτως κληρονο-

6 μήσειν. οἱ δὲ Κέλτοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀτίλιον ἄγνοοντες, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος ὑπολαμβάνοντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν Λιμίλιον περιπεπορεύσθαι τὴν νύκτα τοῖς ἱππεύσι καὶ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς τόπους, εὐθέως ἐξαπέστελλον τοὺς παρ' αὐτῶν ἱππεῖς καὶ τινὰς τῶν εὐζώνων,

7 ἀντιποιοσμένους τῶν κατὰ τὸν Βοουνὸν τόπων. ταχὺ δὲ συνεντές τὴν τοῦ Γαίου παρουσίαν ἐκ τινὸς τῶν ἀχθέντων αἰχμαλώτων, σπουδὴ παρενέβαλον τοὺς πεζούς, ποιούμενοι τὴν ἐκταξίω ἁμα πρὸς ἐκατέραν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, καὶ τὴν ἀπ' οὐρᾶς καὶ τὴν κατὰ

8 πρόσωπον· οὔς μὲν γὰρ ὑδέσαν ἐπομένους αὐτοῖς, οὔς δὲ κατὰ τὸ στόμα προσεδόκων ἀπαντήσειν, ἕκ

tε τῶν προσαγγελλόμενων τεκμαιρόμενοι καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν καίρον συμβασιόντων. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Λιμίλιον ἀκηκοότες μὲν τὸν εἰς τὰς Πίσας κατάπλουν τῶν στρατοπέδων, οὔτω δὲ προσδοκῶν-
narrated all that had recently occurred and told him of the presence of the two armies, stating that the Gauls were quite near and Lucius behind them. The news surprised him but at the same time made him very hopeful, as he thought he had caught the Gauls on the march between the two armies. He ordered his Tribunes to put the legions in fighting order and to advance thus at marching pace in so far as the nature of the ground allowed the attack in line. He himself had happily noticed a hill situated above the road by which the Celts must pass, and taking his cavalry with him, advanced at full speed, being anxious to occupy the crest of the hill before their arrival and be the first to begin the battle, feeling certain that thus he would get the largest share of credit for the result. The Celts at first were ignorant of the arrival of Attilius and imagined from what they saw, that Aemilius' cavalry had got round their flank in the night and were engaged in occupying the position. They therefore at once sent on their own cavalry and some of their light-armed troops to dispute the possession of the hill. But very soon they learnt of Gaius' presence from one of the prisoners brought in, and lost no time in drawing up their infantry, deploying them so that they faced both front and rear, since, both from the intelligence that reached them and from what was happening before their eyes, they knew that the one army was following them, and they expected to meet the other in their front. 28. Aemilius, who had heard of the landing of the legions at Pisa but had not any idea that they were already
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tes auta sunevgykein, tote saphos ek tov perı tın
lofou agwos egnwsan diosti telews egnws einai
2 symbaen teis oikeias autwn dunameis. dido kal
tous men ippiei parantika boqhsonantas exap-
hostellon tois en tı lòfow diagnwzménous, autoi
de kata tás eidioménav tásieis diakosmíasantes tois
3 pezous proýgon esti tois upenantious. oí de Kel-
toi tois men ek tów "Alpeon Gaiostous pro-
agoreuvomeños ètazan pros tìn apt' outras épifáneian
h' prosedókous tois peri tòv Aímnión, esti de tou-
4 tois tów "Ioumoibres: pros de tìn kata prósowon
tous Tauprıkous kai tois esti tade tov Pádou
katoikóntas Boiouis parénbalon, tìn ènanvian
men stásin èxontas tois proeirhménois, blepontas
de pros tìn tów tòv Gaiou stratopeòdon efodoi.
5 tás d' amákias kai synwridas èktos èkaterou tòv
kératos paréstithsan, tìn de leian eis ti tów para-
keiméon òrwv fulakíen periostássantes ÷bropóion.
6 geonéménh d' amfiostómov tís tów Keltón duná-
meos, ou mónon kataplapistikhn, allá kai praktikh
7 eínai sunebainve tìn táshe. oí men ouv "Ioumoibres
kai Boioui tás anaxurídas èxontes kai tois eupteis
8 tów ságon peri autous èxetazan. oí de Gaiostai
dia te. tìn filodofían kai tò thárous taút' aporrí-
phantas symvnoi met' autów tów óplwv prwtov tís
dunameis katésthashan, upolabóntas outrwvs èsesba
praktikwtpo, dia tò tinas tów tòpswn bataúdeis
úntas èmplekésaítoi tois ephámmasi kai parapodízewn
9 tìn tów óplwv xreían. tò men ouv prwtov autós
ò kata tòn lòfou èneiosthke kíndwnos, ápasiw ònv
stupoto, òws an áma tosoyto plíthous ippéwv
áphi èkastou tów stratopeòdon ònámiès èllhños
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so near him, now, when he saw the fight going on round the hill, knew that the other Roman army was quite close. Accordingly, sending on his cavalry to help those who were fighting on the hill, he drew up his infantry in the usual order and advanced to attack. The Celts had drawn up facing their rear, from which they expected Aemilius to attack, the Gaesatae from the Alps and behind them the Insubres, and facing in the opposite direction, ready to meet the attack of Gaius' legions, they placed the Taurisci and the Boii from the left bank of the Po. Their wagons and chariots they stationed at the extremity of either wing and collected their booty on one of the neighbouring hills with a protecting force round it. This order of the Celtic forces, facing both ways, not only presented a formidable appearance, but was well adapted to the exigencies of the situation. The Insubres and Boii wore their trews and light cloaks, but the Gaesatae had discarded these garments owing to their proud confidence in themselves, and stood naked, with nothing but their arms, in front of the whole army, thinking that thus they would be more efficient, as some of the ground was overgrown with brambles which would catch in their clothes and impede the use of their weapons. At first the battle was confined to the hill, all the armies gazing on it, so great were the numbers of cavalry from each host com-
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10 συμπεπτωκότος. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ συνέβη Γάιον μὲν τὸν ὑπατον παραβόλως ἀγωνιζόμενον ἐν χειρῶν νόμω τελευτήσαι τὸν βίον, τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεάς ἐπανενεχθῆναι τῶν Κελτῶν· τοὺς δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῖς, κινδυνεύσαντας ἐρρωμένως τέλος ἐπικρατῆσαι τοῦ τόπου καὶ τῶν ὑπεναντίων. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν πεζίκων στρατοπέδων ἦδη σύνεγγυς ὄντων ἀλλήλους ὅδιον ἦν καὶ θαυμαστὸν τὸ συμβαίνον οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ καιρῷ τότε παρούσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ποτὲ μετὰ ταῦτα δυναμένοις ὑπὸ τὴν ὄφιν λαμβάνειν ἐκ τῶν

29 λεγομένων τὸ γεγονός. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριών στρατοπέδων τῆς μάχης συνισταμένης, δῆλον ὡς ξένην καὶ παρηλλαγμένην εἰκός καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν 2 καὶ τὴν χρείαν φαίνεσθαι τοῦ συντεταγμένου. δεύτερον δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀπορήσαι τις καὶ νῦν καὶ τότε παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ὃν τὸν καιρὸν πότερον οἱ Κέλται τὴν ἐπισφαλειότάτην εἶχον χώραν, ἢ ἀμφοῖν τοῖς 3 μεροῖν ἀμα τῶν πολέμιων ἐπαγόντων αὐτοῖς, ἡ τούναντίων τῆς ἐπιτευκτικωτάτην, ἀμα μὲν ἀγωνιζόμενον πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους, ἀμα δὲ τὴν ἀφ᾽ ἐκατέρων ἀσφάλειαν ἐκ τῶν ὀπίσθεν αὐτοῖς παρασκευάζοντες, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀποκεκλεμένης πάσης τῆς εἰς τὸν πισθὲν ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ λείπεσθαι 4 σωτηρίας; ἢ γὰρ τῆς ἀμφιστώμου τάξεως ἰδιότης 5 τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν χρείαν. τοὺς γε μὴν Ῥωμαίους τὰ μὲν εὔθαρσεῖς ἐποίης τὸ μέσους καὶ πάντωθεν περιεληφέναι τοὺς πολέμους, τὰ δὲ πάλιν ὁ κόσμος αὐτοὺς καὶ θόρυμος ἐξέπληττε τῆς τῶν Κελτῶν 6 δυνάμεως. ἀναρίθμητον μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ τῶν βυ- κανητῶν καὶ σαλπιγκτῶν πλῆθος. οἷς ἀμα τοῦ παντὸς στρατοπέδου συμπαίνει ζοντος τηλικαύτην 312
bating there pell-mell. In this action Gaius the Consul fell in the mêlée fighting with desperate courage, and his head was brought to the Celtic kings; but the Roman cavalry, after a stubborn struggle, at length overmastered the enemy and gained possession of the hill. The infantry were now close upon each other, and the spectacle was a strange and marvellous one, not only to those actually present at the battle, but to all who could afterwards picture it to themselves from the reports. 29. For in the first place, as the battle was between three armies, it is evident that the appearance and the movements of the forces marshalled against each other must have been in the highest degree strange and unusual. Again, it must have been to all present, and still is to us, a matter of doubt whether the Celts, with the enemy advancing on them from both sides, were more dangerously situated, or, on the contrary, more effectively, since at one and the same time they were fighting against both their enemies and were protecting themselves in the rear from both, while, above all, they were absolutely cut off from retreat or any prospect of escape in the case of defeat, this being the peculiarity of this two-faced formation. The Romans, however, were on the one hand encouraged by having caught the enemy between their two armies, but on the other they were terrified by the fine order of the Celtic host and the dreadful din, for there were innumerable trumpeters and horn-blowers, and, as the whole army were shouting their war-cries at the same
καὶ τοιαύτην συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι κραυγήν ὅστε μὴ μόνον τὰς σάλπιγγας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς παρακείμενους τόπους συνηχοῦντας ἐξ αὐτῶν 7 δοκεῖσθαι φωνήν. ἐκπληκτικὴ δ᾽ ἦν καὶ τῶν γυμνῶν προεστῶτων ἀνδρῶν ἡ τ᾽ ἐπιφάνεια καὶ κίνησις, ὡς ἄν διαφερόντων ταῖς ἀκμαῖς καὶ 8 τοῖς εἶδεσι. πάντες δ᾽ οἱ τὰς πρώτας κατέχοντες σπείρας χρυσοῖς μανιάκαις καὶ περιχείροις ἦσαν 9 κατακεκοσμημένοι. πρὸς δὲ βλέποντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ μὲν ἐξεπλήττοντο, τὰ δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς ἐλπίδος ἀγόμενοι διπλασίως παρωξύνοντο πρὸς τὸν 30 κῦδυνον. πλὴν ἄμα τῷ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς προελθόντας ἐκ τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν σтратοπέδων κατὰ τὸν ἑθισμὸν εἰσακοντίζειν ἐνεργοὺς καὶ πυκνοὺς τοῖς βέλεσι, τοῖς μὲν ὄπισθεν τῶν Κελτῶν πολλὴν εὐχρη- 2 στιὰν οἱ σάγοι μετὰ τῶν ἀναξιρίδων παρεῖχον· τοῖς δὲ γυμνοῖς προεστῶσι παρὰ τὴν προσοδοκίαν τοῦ πράγματος συμβαίνοντος τάναντια πολλὴν ἀπορίαν 3 καὶ δυσχρηστίαν παρεῖχε τὸ γινόμενον. οὐ γὰρ δυναμένου τοῦ Γαλατικοῦ θυρεοῦ τὸν ἄνδρα περισκέπτει, ὡς γυμνὰ καὶ μείξω τὰ σώματ᾽ ἦν, τοσοῦ- 4 των συνέβαινε μάλλον τὰ βῆλη πίπτειν ἐνδοῦν. τέλος ὅ, οὐ δυνάμενοι μὲν ἀμώμασθαι τοὺς εἰσακοντίζοντας διὰ τὴν ἀπόστασιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πιπτῶντων βελῶν, περικακοῦντες δὲ καὶ δυσχρηστούμενοι τοῖς παροῦσιν, οἱ μὲν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀλογιστίας εἰκῇ προπίπτοντες καὶ διδόντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐκουσίως ἀπέθνησκον, οἱ δ᾽ εἰς τοὺς φίλους ἀναχωροῦντες ἐπὶ πόδα καὶ προδήλως ἀπο- 5 δειλώντες διέστρεφον τοὺς κατόπιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν Γαυσατῶν φρόνημα παρὰ τοῖς ἀκοντισταῖς 6 τούτω τῷ τρόπῳ κατελύθη, τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων 314
time, there was such a tumult of sound that it seemed that not only the trumpets and the soldiers but all the country round had got a voice and caught up the cry. Very terrifying too were the appearance and the gestures of the naked warriors in front, all in the prime of life, and finely built men, and all in the leading companies richly adorned with gold torques and armlets. The sight of them indeed dismayed the Romans, but at the same time the prospect of winning such spoils made them twice as keen for the fight. 30. But when the javelineers advanced, as is their usage, from the ranks of the Roman legions and began to hurl their javelins in well-aimed volleys, the Celts in the rear ranks indeed were well protected by their trews and cloaks, but it fell out far otherwise than they had expected with the naked men in front, and they found themselves in a very difficult and helpless predicament. For the Gaulish shield does not cover the whole body; so that their nakedness was a disadvantage, and the bigger they were *a* the better chance had the missiles of going home. At length, unable to drive off the javelineers owing to the distance and the hail of javelins, and reduced to the utmost distress and perplexity, some of them, in their impotent rage, rushed wildly on the enemy and sacrificed their lives, while others, retreating step by step on the ranks of their comrades, threw them into disorder by their display of faint-heartedness. Thus was the spirit of the Gaesatae broken down by the javelineers; but the main body of the Insubres,

*a* Literally "so that the more naked and the bigger they were . . ."
καὶ Βοίων ἔτι δὲ Ταυρίσκων πλήθος ἀμα τῶν τοῦς Ἦρωμαιόνς δεξαμένους τοὺς ἐαυτῶν ἀκοντιστάς προσβάλλειν σφίζει τάς σπείρας συμπεσόν τοῖς 7 πολεμίως ἐκ χειρὸς ἐποίηει μάχην ἐχυράν. διακοπ- τόμενοι γὰρ ἐμενον ἐπ' ἵσον ταῖς ψυχαῖς, αὐτῷ τούτῳ καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα λειτομένου, ταῖς τῶν 8 ὀπλῶν κατασκευαῖς. οἱ μὲν οὖν θυρεοὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν, αἱ δὲ μάχαιραι πρὸς πρᾶξιν μεγάλην διαφοράν . . . ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ Γαλατικὴν καταφορὰν ἔχειν μό- νον. ἔπει δ' ἐς ὑπερδεξίων καὶ κατὰ κέρας οἱ τῶν Ἦρωμαιῶν ἱππεῖς ἠμβαλόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου προσέ- φερον τὰς χεῖρας ἐρρωμένως, τὸθ' οἱ μὲν πεζοὶ τῶν Κελτῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς παρατάξεως τόπῳ κατεκό- πησαν, οἱ δ' ἱππεῖς πρὸς φυγὴν ὄρμησαν.

31 'Απέθανον μὲν οὖν τῶν Κελτῶν εἰς τετρακύκλοις, ἐάλωσαν δ' οὐκ ἐλάττους μυρίων, ἐν οίς καὶ 2 τῶν βασιλέων Κογκολιτάνος. δ' ἐπεὶ οὗτος αὐτῶν Ἀνηρίστας εἰς τινα τόπουν συμβιγγόν μετ' ὀλίγων προσήνεγκε τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις. 3 ο δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἦρωμαιῶν τὰ μὲν σκῦλα συν- αθρόσας εἰς τὴν Ἦρωμην ἀπέστειλε, τὴν δὲ λείαν 4 ἀπέδωκε τοῖς προσήκοισι. αὐτὸς δ' ἀναλαβὼν τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ διελθὼν παρ' αὐτῆς τὴν Λυγυστι- κὴν εἰς τὴν τῶν Βοίων ἐνέβαλε χώραν. πληρώσας δὲ τὰς ὄρμας τῶν στρατοπέδων τῆς ωφελείας ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἤκε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων εἰς τὴν 5 Ἦρωμην. καὶ τὸ μὲν Καπετώλιον ἐκδόσμησε ταῖς τῇ σημαιαῖς καὶ τοῖς μανιάκαις· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ χρυσοῦν φέλιον, δ' φοροῦσι περὶ τὸν τράχηλον οἱ Γαλάται· 6 τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς σκύλοις καὶ τοῖς αἷμαλώτοις πρὸς τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχρήσατο τὴν ἐαυτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὀριέμβου διακόσμησιν.

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BOOK II

Boii, and Taurisci, once the javeliners had withdrawn into the ranks and the Roman maniples attacked them, met the enemy and kept up a stubborn hand-to-hand combat. For, though being almost cut to pieces, they held their ground, equal to their foes in courage, and inferior only, as a force and individually, in their arms. The Roman shields, it should be added, were far more serviceable for defence and their swords for attack, the Gaulish sword being only good for a cut and not for a thrust. But finally, attacked from higher ground and on their flank by the Roman cavalry, which rode down the hill and charged them vigorously, the Celtic infantry were cut to pieces where they stood, their cavalry taking to flight.

31. About forty thousand Celts were slain and at least ten thousand taken prisoners, among them the king Concolitanus. The other king, Aneroestes, escaped with a few followers to a certain place where he put an end to his life and to those of his friends. The Roman Consul collected the spoils and sent them to Rome, returning the booty of the Gauls to the owners. With his legions he traversed Liguria and invaded the territory of the Boii, from whence, after letting his legions pillage to their heart's content, he returned at their head in a few days to Rome. He sent to ornament the Capitol the standards and torques (the gold necklets worn by the Gauls), but the rest of the spoil and the prisoners he used for his entry into Rome and the adornment of his triumph.
7 Ἡ μὲν οὖν βαρυτάτη τῶν Κελτῶν ἐφοδος οὕτω καὶ τούτω τῷ τρόπῳ διεφθάρη, πάσι μὲν Ἰτα-λιώταις, μάλιστα δὲ Ρωμαίοις, μέγαν καὶ φοβερόν
8 ἐπικρεμάσασα κάιδυνον. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ κατορθώματος
tουτου κατελπίσαντες Ρωμαιοὶ δυνήσεσθαι τοὺς
Κελτοὺς ἐκ τῶν τόπων τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον ὀλο-
σχερώς ἐκβάλειν, τοὺς τε μετὰ ταῦτα κατασταθέντας
ὑπάτους Κόιντον Φόλουν καὶ Τίτον Μάλιον
ἀμφοτέρους καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις μετὰ παρασκευῆς με-
9 γάλης ἐξαπέστειλαν ἐπὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς. οὕτωι δὲ
τοὺς μὲν Βοίους ἐξ ἐφόδου καταπληξάμενοι συν-
νηγάκασαν εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαιῶν ἑαυτοὺς δούναι πίστιν,
10 τὸν δὲ λοιπὸν χρόνον τῆς στρατείας, ἐπιγενομένων
ὀμβρῶν ἐξαισίων, ἐτὶ δὲ λομικῆς διαθέσεως ἐμ-
pεσούσης αὐτοῖς, εἰς τέλος ἀπρακτόν εἰχον.

32 Μετὰ δὲ τούτους κατασταθέντες Πόπλιος Φούριος
καὶ Γάιος Φλαμύνιος αὕθαυτος ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν Κελτικὴν
διὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀνάρων χώρας, οἷς συμβαίνει μὴ μα-
2 κραν ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας ἔχεων τὴν οἰκήσαν. οὐς εἰς
τὴν φυλίαν προσαγαγόμενοι διέβησαν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰν-
σόμβρων γῆν κατὰ τὰς συρροίας τοῦ τ’ Ἀδοα καὶ
3 Πάδου ποταμοῦ. λαβόντες δὲ πληγαὶ περὶ τε τὴν
διάβασιν καὶ περὶ τῆς στρατοπεδείαν, παραυτικα
μὲν ἔμειναν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα σπευσάμενοι καθ’ ὀμο-
4 λογίαν ἀνέλυσαν ἐκ τῶν τόπων. περιέλθοντες δὲ
πλείους ἡμέρας, καὶ διελθόντες τὸν Κλούσιον πο-
tαμόν, ἤλθον εἰς τὴν τῶν Γονομάνων χώραν, καὶ
προσλαβόντες τούτους, ὄντας συμμάχους, ἐνέβαλον
πάλιν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὰς Ἀλπεὶς τόπων εἰς τὰ τῶν
Ἰνσόμβρων πεδία καὶ τὴν τε γῆν ἔδησον καὶ τὰς
5 κατοικίας αὐτῶν ἐξεπόρθουν. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων
προεστῶτες, δεινοῦντες ἀμετάβλετον οὖσαν τὴν ἐπι-
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Thus were destroyed these Celts during whose invasion, the most serious that had ever occurred, all the Italians and especially the Romans had been exposed to great and terrible peril. This success encouraged the Romans to hope that they would be able entirely to expel the Celts from the plain of the Po; and the Consuls of the next year, Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius, were sent against them with a formidable expeditionary force. They surprised and terrified the Boii, compelling them to submit to Rome, but the rest of the campaign had no practical results whatever, owing to the very heavy rains, and an epidemic which broke out among them.

32. Next year's Consuls, however, Publius Furius and Gaius Flaminius, again invaded the Celtic territory, through the country of the Anares who dwelt not far from Marseilles. Having admitted this tribe to their friendship, they crossed into the territory of the Insubres, near the junction of the Po and Adda. Both in crossing and in encamping on the other side, they suffered some loss, and at first remained on the spot, but later made a truce and evacuated the territory under its terms. After a circuitous march of some days, they crossed the river Clusius and reached the country of the Cenomani, who were their allies, and accompanied by them, again invaded from the district at the foot of the Alps the plains of the Insubres and began to lay the country waste and pillage their dwellings. The chieftains of the Insubres, seeing that the
βολὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἔκρυναν τῆς τύχης λαβεῖν πείραν καὶ διακινδυνεύσαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀλοσχερῶς.
6 συναθροίσαντες οὖν ἀπάσας <τὰς δυνάμεις> ἐπὶ ταύτων, καὶ τὰς χρυσὰς σημαίας τὰς ἀκινήτους λεγομένας καθελόντες ἐκ τοῦ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἱεροῦ, καὶ τάλλα παρασκευασάμενοι δεόντως, μετὰ ταύτα τεθαρρηκότως καὶ καταπληκτικῶς ἀντεστρατοπέδευσαν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὄντες τὸ πλῆθος εἰς 7 πέντε μυριάδας. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι, τὰ μὲν ὄραντες σφᾶς ἐλάττους ὄντας παρὰ πολὺ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἐβούλουντο συγχρῆσθαι ταῖς τῶν συμμαχοῦντων αὐ- 8 τοῖς Κελτῶν δυνάμεις. τὰ δὲ συλλογισάμενοι τὴν τε Γαλατικήν ἀθεσίαν καὶ διότι πρὸς ὀμοφύλους τῶν προσλαμβανομένων μέλλουσι ποιεῖσθαι τὸν κύδινουν, εὐλαβήντο τοιούτοις ἀνδράσι τοιούτουν 9 κατοῦ καὶ πράγματος κοινώνειν. τέλος δ' οὖν αὐτοῖ μὲν ὑπέμειναν ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Κελτῶν σφίσι συνόντας διαβιβάσαντες εἰς τὸ πέραν ἀνέσπασαν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ ῥέθρου γε- 10 φύρας, ἄμα μὲν ἀσφαλιξόμενοι τὰ πρὸς ἐκείνους, ἄμα δὲ μίαν ἐαυτοῖς ἀπολέιποντες ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας τὴν ἐν τῷ νικαῖν, διὰ τὸ κατόπιν αὐτοῖς ἅβατον ὄντα παρακεῖσθαι τὸν προειρημένον ποτα- 11 μόν. πράξαντες δὲ ταύτα πρὸς τῶν διακινδυνεύσεων ἤσαν.
33 Δοκοῦσι δ' ἐμφρόνως κεχρῆσθαι τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ Ῥωμαίοι, τῶν χιλιάρχων ὑποδειξάντων ὡς δεῖ ποι- εῖσθαι τὸν ἀγώνα κοινῆς καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστους.
2 συνεωρικότες γὰρ ἐκ τῶν προγεγονότων κυνύνων ὅτι τοῖς τε θυμοῖς κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον, ἐως ἢν ἀκέραιον ἦ, φοβερωτάτον ἐστὶ πᾶν τὸ Γαλατικὸν 3 φύλον, αἳ τε μάχαιρα ταῖς κατασκευαῖς, καθάπερ 320
Romans adhered to their purpose of attacking them, decided to try their luck in a decisive battle. Collecting all their forces in one place, they took down the golden standards called “immovable” from the temple of Minerva, and having made all other necessary preparations, boldly took up a menacing position opposite the enemy. They were about fifty thousand strong. The Romans, on the one hand, as they saw that the enemy were much more numerous than themselves, were desirous of employing also the forces of their Celtic allies, but on the other hand, taking into consideration Gaulish fickleness and the fact that they were going to fight against those of the same nation as these allies, they were shy of asking such men to participate in an action of such vital importance. Finally, remaining themselves on their side of the river, they sent the Celts who were with them across it, and demolished the bridges that crossed the stream, firstly as a precaution against their allies, and secondly to leave themselves no hope of safety except in victory, the river, which was impassable, lying in their rear. After taking these measures they prepared for battle.

33. The Romans are thought to have managed matters very skilfully in this battle, their commanding officers having instructed them how they should fight, both as individuals and collectively. For they had observed from former battles that Gauls in general are most formidable and spirited in their first onslaught, while still fresh, and that, from the way
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ēρηται πρότερον, μίαν ἔχουσι τὴν πρῶτην κατα-
φορὰν καιρίαν, ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης εὐθέως ἀποξυστροῦ-
ται, καμπτόμεναι κατὰ μῆκος καὶ κατὰ πλάτος ἐπὶ
tosou̱nton ὥστ' ἐὰν μὴ δῶ τις ἀναστροφὴν τοῖς χρω-
ménous, ἐρείσαντας πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἀπευθύναν τῷ
ποδὶ, τελέως ἀπρακτον εἶναι τὴν δευτέραν πληγήν
4 αὐτῶν· ἁναδόντες οὐν οἱ χιλιαρχοὶ τὰ τῶν τριαρίων
dόρατα τῶν κατόπων ἐφεστῶτων ταῖς πρώταις σπεί-
ραισι, καὶ παραγγείλαντες ἐκ μεταληψεως τοῖς ξί-
φεσι χρῆσθαι, συνέβαλον ἐκ παρατάξεως κατὰ πρὸ-
5 σωπὸν τοῖς Κελτοῖς· ἀμα δὲ τῷ πρὸς τὰ δόρατα
tαῖς πρώταις καταφοραῖς χρωμένων τῶν Γαλατῶν
ἀχρεωθήναι τὰς μαχαίρας συνδραμόντες εἰς τὰς
χείρας τοὺς μὲν Κελτοὺς ἀπράκτους ἑποίησαν, ἠφ-
elόμενοι τὴν ἐκ διάρσεως αὐτῶν μάχην, ὅπερ ἵδιον
ἐστὶ Γαλατικῆς χρείας, διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς κέντημα τὸ
6 ξίφος ἔχειν· αὐτοὶ δ' οὐκ ἐκ καταφορᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐκ
dιαληψεως ὀρθαίς χρωμενοὶ ταῖς μαχαίραις, πρα-
κτικὸν τοῦ κεντήματος περὶ αὐτῶς ὑπάρχοντος, τὔ-
πτοντες εἰς τὰ στέρνα καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ πληγὴν
ἐπὶ πληγῇ φέροντες, διέφθειραν τοὺς πλείστους τῶν
παραταχαμενῶν διὰ τὴν τῶν χιλιαρχῶν πρόνοιαν.
7 ὁ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγὸς Φλαμίνιος οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ
κεχρῆσθαι τῷ προερημένῳ κυνίῳ. παρ' αὐτὴν
γὰρ τὴν ὄφριν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ποιησάμενος τὴν ἐκ-
tαξὶν διέφθειρε τὸ τῆς Ῥωμαίικῆς μάχης ὦδιον, οὐχ
ὑπολειπόμενος τόπον πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ πόδα ταῖς σπει-
8 ραῖς ἀναχώρησαν. εἰ γὰρ συνέβη βραχὺ μόνον πιε-
σθῆναι τῇ χώρᾳ τοὺς ἄνδρας κατὰ τὴν μάχην, ῥέ-
pτειν ἢν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν αὐτοὺς ἐδεί διὰ τὴν ἀστο-
9 χάν τοῦ προεστῶτος. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα γε πολλῷ νυκή-
sαντες ταῖς σφετέραις ἄρεταῖς, καθάπερ ἕπον, καὶ
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their swords are made, as has been already explained, only the first cut takes effect; after this they at once assume the shape of a strigil, being so much bent both length-wise and side-wise that unless the men are given leisure to rest them on the ground and set them straight with the foot, the second blow is quite ineffectual. The tribunes therefore distributed amongst the front line the spears of the triarii who were stationed behind them, ordering them to use their swords instead only after the spears were done with. They then drew up opposite the Celts in order of battle and engaged. Upon the Gauls slashing first at the spears and making their swords unserviceable the Romans came to close quarters, having rendered the enemy helpless by depriving them of the power of raising their hands and cutting, which is the peculiar and only stroke of the Gauls, as their swords have no points. The Romans, on the contrary, instead of slashing, continued to thrust with their swords which did not bend, inflicting very effectual penetrating wounds. Thus, striking one blow after another on the breast or face, they slew the greater part of their adversaries. This was solely due to the foresight of the tribunes, the Consul Flaminius being thought to have mismanaged the battle by deploying his force at the very edge of the river-bank and thus rendering impossible a tactical movement peculiar to the Romans, as he left the cohorts no room to fall back gradually. For had the troops been even in the slightest degree pushed back from their ground during the battle, they would have had to throw themselves into the river, all owing to their general's blunder. However, as it was, they gained a decisive victory by their own skill and valour, as I said, and
34 Τῷ δ’ ἐξῆς ἔτει, διαπρεσβευσμένων τῶν Κελτῶν ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ πάν ποιήσεων ὑπισχυομένων, ἔσπευσαν οἱ κατασταθέντες ὑπὸτοι Μάρκος Κλαύδιος καὶ Γναίος Κορυήλιος τοῦ μὴ συγχωρήθηκαί τὴν εἰρήνην αὐτοῖς. οἱ δ’ ἀποτυχόντες, καὶ κρίναντες ἐξελέγξαί τὰς τελευταίας ἐλπίδας, αὖθις ὠρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ μισθοῦσθαι τῶν περὶ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν Γασατῶν Γαλατῶν εἰς τριμμυρίους. οὐς παραλαβόντες εἶχον ἐν ἐτοίμῳ καὶ προσεδόκων τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἐφοδον. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγοὶ, τῆς ὥρας ἐπιγενομένης, ἀναλαβόντες τὰς δυνάμεις ἔγον εἰς τὴν Ἰνσομβρῶν χώραν. παραγενόμενοι δὲ καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύοντες πόλιν Ἀχέρρας, ἡ μεταξὺ κείται τοῦ Πάδου καὶ τῶν Ἀλπεών καὶ ἐπολιορκοῦν ταύτην. οἱ δ’ Ἰνσομπρεῖς, βοήθειῶν μὲν οὐ δυνάμειν, διὰ τὸ προκαταληφθῆναι τοὺς εὑφνεῖς τόπους, σπεύδοντες δὲ λύσαι τὴν πολιορκίαν τῶν Ἀχερρῶν, μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως διαβιβάσασθαι τὸν Πάδου εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἀνάρων χώραν ἐπολιορκοῦν τὸ προσαγωγοῦμενον Κλαστίδιον.

6 προσπέσοντας δὲ τὸν συμβαίνοντος τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ὑπεῖς Μάρκος Κλαύδιος καὶ τινὰς τῶν πεζικῶν ἥπειρετο, σπεύδων βοηθῆσαι τοῖς πολιορκομένοις. οἱ δὲ Κελτοί, πυθόμενοι τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, λύσαιτε τὴν πολιορκίαν ὑπήρτων καὶ παρετάξαντο. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων αὐτοῖς τοὺς ὑπεύθυνον εὖ ἐφόδου τολμηρῶς σφίσι προσπέσοντων, τὰς μὲν ἄρχας ἀντείχου. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περισταμένων καὶ κατὰ νότου καὶ κατὰ κέρας, δυσχηριστούμενοι τῇ μάχῃ, τέλος ἐτράπησαν ὑπ’.
BOOK II

returned to Rome with a quantity of booty and many trophies.

34. Next year the Celts sent ambassadors begging for peace and engaging to accept any conditions, but the new Consuls Marcus Claudius and Gnaeus Cornelius strongly urged that no peace should be granted them. On meeting with a refusal, the Celts decided to resort to their last hope and again appealed to the Gaesatae on the Rhone, and hired a force of about thirty thousand men. When they had these troops they kept them in readiness and awaited the attack of the enemy. The Roman Consuls, when the season came, invaded the territory of the Insubres with their legions. Encamping round a city called Acerrae lying between the Po and the Alps, they laid siege to it. The Insubres could not come to the assistance of the besieged, as the Romans had occupied all the advantageous positions, but, with the object of making the latter raise the siege, they crossed the Po with part of their forces, and entering the territory of the Anari, laid siege to a town there called Clastidium. On the Consuls learning of this, Marcus Claudius set off in haste with the cavalry and a small body of infantry to relieve the besieged if possible. The Celts, as soon as they were aware of the enemy’s arrival, raised the siege and advancing to meet them, drew up in order of battle. When the Romans boldly charged them with their cavalry alone, they at first stood firm, but afterwards, being taken both in the rear and on the flank, they found themselves in difficulties and were finally put to rout by the cavalry unaided,
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9 αυτῶν τῶν ἑπτάων. καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν ἐμπεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥεύματος διεφθάρησαν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων κατεκόπησαν. ἐλαβον δὲ καὶ τὰς Ἀχέρρας οἱ Ῥωμαιοὶ σῖτον γεμοῦσιν, ἐκχωρησάντων εἰς τὸ Μεδιόλανον τῶν Παλατίων, ὅσπερ ἐστὶ κυριώτατος τόπος τῆς τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων χώρας. οἷς ἐκ ποδὸς ἑπακολουθήσαντος τοῦ Γναίου, καὶ προσβαλόντος ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τὸ Μεδιόλανον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἵσυχαν ἐσχὸν· ἀπολυμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ πάλιν εἰς τὰς Ἀχέρρας, ἐπεξελθόντες καὶ τῆς οὐραγίας ἁφάμενοι θρασέως πολλοὺς μὲν νεκροὺς ἔποιήσαν, μέρος δὲ τι καὶ φυγεῖν αὐτῶν ἤναγκασαν, ἐως ὁ Γναῖος ἀνακαλεσάμενος τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πρωτοπορείας παρώρμησε στήναι καὶ συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαιοὶ, πειθαρχήσαντες τῷ στρατηγῷ, διεμάχοντο πρὸς τοὺς ἐπικείμενοι νοσ ἐνωρώστως. οἱ δὲ Κελτοί, διὰ τὸ παρὸν εὐτυχοῦς μείναντες ἐπὶ ποσὸν εὐθαρσῶς, μετ' οὗ πολὺ τραπέντες ἐφευγοῦν εἰς τὰς παρωρείας. οἱ δὲ Γναῖος ἑπακολουθήσας τὴν τε χώραν ἐπόρθει καὶ τὸ Μεδιόλανον εἰλε κατὰ κράτος. οὗ συμβαίνοντος οἱ προστώτες τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων, ἀπογυνώτες τὰς τῆς σωτηρίας ἑλπίδας, πάντα τὰ καθ' αὐτοὺς ἐπέτρεφαν τοῖς Ῥωμαιοῖς.

2 Ὁ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς Κελτοὺς πόλεμος τοιοῦτον ἐσχέ τὸ τέλος, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀπόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν τῶν ἄγωνιζομένων ἀνδρῶν, ἐτί δὲ κατὰ τὰς μάχας καὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἀπολυμένων καὶ παραττημένων, οὐδενὸς καταδεέστερος τῶν ὅστος ρημένων, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἑπιβολὰς καὶ τὴν ἀκρισίαν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος χειρισμοῦ τελέως ἐνκαταφροῦντος, διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸ πλεῖον, ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην ἀπαντὶ τὸ γινόμενον.
many of them throwing themselves into the river and being swept away by the current, while the larger number were cut to pieces by the enemy. The Romans now took Acerrae, which was well stocked with corn, the Gauls retiring to Mediolanum, the chief place in the territory of the Insubres. Gnaeus followed close on their heels, and suddenly appeared before Mediolanum. The Gauls at first did not stir, but, when he was on his way back to Acerrae, they sallied out, and made a bold attack on his rear, in which they killed a considerable number of the Romans and even forced a portion of them to take to flight, until Gnaeus, calling back the forces in advance, urged the fugitives to rally and withstand the enemy. After this the Romans, on their part obeying their Consul, continued to fight vigorously with their assailants, and the Celts after holding their ground for a time, encouraged as they were by their momentary success, were shortly put to flight and took refuge on the hills. Gnaeus, following them, laid waste the country and took Mediolanum itself by assault, (35) upon which the chieftains of the Insubres, despairing of safety, put themselves entirely at the mercy of the Romans.

Such was the end of the war against the Celts, a war which, if we look to the desperation and daring of the combatants and the numbers who took part and perished in the battles, is second to no war in history, but is quite contemptible as regards the plan of the campaigns, and the judgement shown in executing it, not most steps but
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μενον ὑπὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν θυμῷ μᾶλλον ἡ λογισμὸ
4 βραβεύσθαι. περὶ δὲν ἡμεῖς συνθεωρήσαντες μετ’
ὁλιγον χρόνον αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πε-
δίων ἐξωσθέντας, πλὴν ὁλίγων τῶν τῶν ὑπ’ αὐ-
τάς τὰς Ὀλυμπίας κειμένων, οὐκ ἐξήθημεν δεῖν οὔτε
τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐφοδον αὐτῶν ἀμημόνευτον παραλι-
πεῖν οὔτε τὰς μετὰ ταῦτα πράξεις οὔτε τὴν τελευ-
5 ταίαν ἐξανάστασιν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες οἴκειον ἱστορίας
ὑπάρχειν τὰ τοιαῦτ’ ἐπεισόδια τῆς τύχης εἰς μνή-
6 μην ἄγειν καὶ παράδοσιν τοῖς ἐπιγυνομένοις, ἣν μὴ
tελέως οἱ μεθ’ ἡμᾶς ἀνενοόητοι τούτων ὑπάρχουτε
ἐκπλήττονται τὰς αἰφνιδίους καὶ παραλόγους τῶν
βαρβάρων εὐφόδων, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἐν νῷ λαμβά-
νοντες ὡς ὀλυγχρόνων ἐστὶ καὶ λίαν εὐθαρσῶν
<τὸ τοιοῦτον>, τὴν ἐφοδον αὐτῶν ὑπομένωσι καὶ
πάσας ἐξελέγχωσι τὰς σφετέρας ἐπίπεδας πρότερον
7 ἡ παραχωρήσαι τίνος τῶν ἀναγκαίων. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς
τὴν Περσῶν ἐφοδον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐλλάδα καὶ Γαλατῶν
ἐπὶ Δελφοὺς εἰς μνήμην καὶ παράδοσιν ἡμῶν ἀγαγό-
tας οὐ μικρά, μεγάλα δ’ οἶομαι συμβεβλησθαί πρὸς
8 τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ἀγώ-
nας. οὔτε γὰρ χορηγήων οὐθ’ ὃπλων οὔτ’ ἀνδρῶν
πλῆθος καταπλαγεῖν ἂν τὶς ἀποσταί τῆς τελευταίας
ἐλπίδος, τοῦ διαγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῆς σφετέρας χώρας
καὶ πατρίδος, λαμβάνων πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ παρά-
δοξον τῶν τότε γενομένων, καὶ μημονεύσας ὡσας
μυριάδας καὶ τίνας τόλμας καὶ πηλίκας παρασκευᾶσ
η τῶν σὺν νῷ καὶ μετὰ λογισμοῦ κυδωνεύοντων
9 αἴρεσις καὶ δύναμις καθεῖλεν. ὁ δ’ ἀπὸ Γαλατῶν
φόβος οὐ μόνον τὸ παλαιὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς
10 ἴδη πλεονάκις ἐξέπληξε τοὺς Ἐλλήνας. διὸ καὶ
every single step that the Gauls took being commended to them rather by the heat of passion than by cool calculation. As I have witnessed them not long afterwards entirely expelled from the plain of the Po, except a few communities close under the Alps, I did not think it right to make no mention either of their original invasion or of their subsequent conduct and their final expulsion; for I think it is the proper task of History to record and hand down to future generations such episodes of Fortune, that those who live after us may not, owing to entire ignorance of these incidents, be unduly terrified by sudden and unexpected invasions of barbarians, but that, having a fair comprehension of how short-lived and perishable is the might of such peoples, they may confront the invaders and put every hope of safety to the test, before yielding a jot of anything they value. For indeed I consider that the writers who chronicled and handed down to us the story of the Persian invasion of Greece and the attack of the Gauls on Delphi have made no small contribution to the struggle of the Hellenes for their common liberty. For there is no one whom hosts of men or abundance of arms or vast resources could frighten into abandoning his last hope, that is to fight to the end for his native land, if he kept before his eyes what part the unexpected played in those events, and bore in mind how many myriads of men, what determined courage and what armaments were brought to nought by the resolve and power of those who faced the danger with intelligence and coolness. It is not only in old times but more than once in my own days that the Greeks have been alarmed by the prospect of a Gaulish invasion; and this especially

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μάλλον ἐγώγε παρωμηθῆν ἐπὶ τὸ κεφαλαίῳ μὲν, ἀνέκαθεν δὲ ποιήσασθαί τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων ἐξήγησαν.

36 Ἀσδροῦβας δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός, ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων παρεξέβημεν τῆς ἐξήγησεως, ἐτῇ χειρίσας ὀκτὼ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἱβηρίαν, ἐτελεύτησε δολοφονηθεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἐαυτοῦ καταλύμασι νυκτὸς ὑπὸ τίνος Κελτοῦ τὸ γένος ἐδίων ἐγένεται ἀδικημάτων,

2 οὔ μικράν, ἄλλα μεγάλην ποιήσας ἐπίδοσον τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις πράγμασιν, οὐχ οὕτω διὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἐργῶν ὡς διὰ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δυνάστασι όμιλίας. 

τὴν δὲ στρατηγίαν ὁι Καρχηδονοί τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἱβηρίαν Ἀνυῖα περεύθεσαν, ἀντὶ νέω, διὰ τὴν ὑποφανομένην ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ἀγχύνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τόλμαν. ὃς παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνθίζων δῆλος ἦν ἐκ τῶν ἐπινοημάτων πόλεμον ἐξοίσων Ρωμαίοις.

4 ὁ δὲ καὶ τέλος ἐποίησε, πάνω βραχὺν ἐπισχῶν χρόνον. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ Καρχηδονίους καὶ Ρωμαίους ἀπὸ τούτων ὑδη τῶν καρυῶν ἐν ὑποψίας ἦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ παρατρυβαῖς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπεβούλευσαν, ἀμύνασθαί σπεύδοντες διὰ τὰς περὶ Σικελίαν ἐλαττώσεις, οἱ δὲ Ρωμαιοὶ διηπίστουν, θεωροῦντες αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπιβολάς. ἐξ ὧν δὴλον ἦν τοῖς ὀρθῶς σκοπομένοις ὅτι μέλλονσι πολεμεῖν ἀλλήλους οὐ μετὰ πολὺν χρόνον.

37 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καἰροὺς Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Φιλίππος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀμια τοῖς ἀλλοις συμμάχοις συνίσταντο τὸν πρὸς Λίτωλοὺς πόλεμον τὸν προσαγορεύνοντα συμμαχικών. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐπειδὴ τὰς περὶ Σικελίαν καὶ Λιβύην καὶ τὰς ἔξοδος πράξεις διεξεύοντες κατὰ τὸ συνέχεια τῆς προκατασκευῆς ἢκομεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ τε συμμαχικοῦ καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου συντάγματος μὲν Ρωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πολέμου,
was my motive for giving here an account of these events, summary indeed, but going back to the beginnings.

36. This digression has led us away from the affairs of Spain, where Hasdrubal, after governing the country for eight years, was assassinated at night in his lodging by a certain Celt owing to wrongs of a private nature. He had largely increased the power of Carthage, not so much by military action as by friendly intercourse with the chiefs. The Carthaginians appointed Hannibal to the chief command in Spain, although he was still young, owing to the shrewdness and courage he had evinced in their service. From the moment that he assumed the command, it was evident from the measures he took that he intended to make war on Rome, as indeed he finished by doing, and that very shortly. The relations between Carthage and Rome were henceforth characterized by mutual suspicion and friction. The Carthaginians continued to form designs against Rome as they were eager to be revenged for their reverses in Sicily, while the Romans, detecting their projects, mistrusted them profoundly. It was therefore evident to all competent judges that it would not be long before war broke out between them.

37. It was about this same time that the Achaecans and King Philip began the war against the Aetolians known as the Social War. I have now given a continuous sketch, suitable to this preliminary part of my book, of events in Sicily, Libya and so forth down to the beginning of the Social War and that second war between the Romans and Carthaginians
προσαγορευθέντος δὲ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις Ἀννιβακοῦ, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καρυῶν ἐπηγγειλάμεθα ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τὸς ἑαυτῶν συντάξεως, πρέπον ἂν εἰς τούτων ἀφεμένους ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἐλλάδα μεταβαίνειν πράξεις, ῥα πανταχόθεν ὄμοιαν ποιησάμενοι τὴν προκατασκευὴν καὶ τὴν ἐφοδον ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς οὕτως ᾤδη [τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ] τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς ἱστορίας ἀρχώμεθα. ἔπει γὰρ οὐ τινὰς πράξεις, καθάπερ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, οίον τὰς Ἐλληνικὰς ἡ Περσικᾶς, ὅμοι δὲ τὰς ἐν τοῖς γνωριζομένοις μέρεις τῆς οἰκουμενῆς ἀναγράφειν ἐπικεχερήκαμεν, διὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἵδιον τι συμβεβλήσθαι τοὺς καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροὺς, ὑπὲρ δὲν σα-5 φέστερον ἐν ἐτέροις δηλώσομεν, δέον ἂν εἰη καὶ πρὸ τῆς κατασκευῆς ἐπὶ βραχὺ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων καὶ γνωριζομένων θυνῶν καὶ τόπων ἐφάσμασθαι τῆς οἰκουμενῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἰγύπτιον ἄρκοντώς ἂν ἔχοι ποιεῖ-σθαι τὴν ἀνάμνησιν ἀπὸ τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων καιρῶν, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν προγεγονότων παρ' αὐτοῖς ἱστορίαν ὑπὸ πλεῖστον ἐκδεδοόθαι καὶ γνώ-ριμον ὑπάρχειν ἅπασιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς και-ροῖς μηδὲν αὐτοῖς ἑξηλλαγμένον ἄπηντησθαι μηδὲ παράλογον ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης, ὡστε προσδεσθαι τῆς 7 τῶν προγεγονότων ὑπομνήσεως. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνως καὶ περὶ τῆς Μακεδόνων οἰκίας ἀρμότερο διὰ βραχέων ἀναδρομεῖν τοῖς χρόνοις, 8 ἐπειδὴ περὶ μὲν ταύτην ὀλοσχερῆς ἐπαναίρεσιν, περὶ δὲ τοὺς Ἀχαιῶς, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, παρά-δοχὸς αὐξήσις καὶ συμφρόνησις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς 9 καιροῖς γέγονε. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπιβαλομένων ἐν τοῖς
usually known as the Hannibalic War. This, as I stated at the outset, is the date at which I purpose to begin my history itself, and, now bidding good-bye for the present to the West, I must turn to the affairs of Greece, so that everywhere alike I may bring down this preliminary or introductory sketch to the same date, and, having done so, start on my detailed narrative. For as I am not, like former historians, dealing with the history of one nation, such as Greece or Persia, but have undertaken to describe the events occurring in all known parts of the world—my own times having, as I will more clearly explain elsewhere, materially contributed to my purpose—I must, before entering on the main portion of my work, touch briefly on the state of the principal and best known nations and countries of the world. As for Asia and Egypt, it will suffice to mention what took place there after the above date, since their previous history has been written by many and is familiar to all, besides which in our own times Fortune has wrought no such surprising change in these countries as to render any notice of their past necessary. But as regards the Achaean nation and the royal house of Macedon it will be proper to refer briefly to earlier events, since our times have seen, in the case of the latter, its complete destruction, and in the case of the Achaecans, as I said above, a growth of power and a political union in the highest degree remarkable. For while many
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παρεληλυθόσι χρόνοις ἐπὶ ταῦτῳ συμφέρον ἀγαγεῖν Πελοπόννησίως, οὐδενὸς δὲ καθικέσθαι δυνηθέντος, διὰ τὸ μὴ τῇς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς σφετέρας δυναστείας χάριν ἐκάστους ποιεῖσθαι.

10 τήν σπουδήν, τοιαύτην καὶ τηλικάυτην ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἡμᾶς καιροῖς ἔσχε προκοπῆν καὶ συντελεῖα τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ὡστε μὴ μόνον συμμαχίκην καὶ φιλικήν κοινωνίαν γεγονέναι πραγμάτων περὶ αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ νόμους χρῆσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ σταθμοῖς καὶ μέτρους καὶ νομίσμασι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀρχουσι, ποιοῦν γὰρ καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἐκάστος ταῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια.

11 βουλευταῖς, δικασταῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς, καθόλου δὲ τούτω μόνῳ διαλλάττειν τοῦ μὴ μιᾶς πόλεως διάθεσιν ἔχειν σχεδὸν τὴν σύμπασαν Πελοπόννησον τῷ μῆ τὸν αὐτὸν περίβολου ὑπάρχειν τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν αὐτῆν, τάλλα δ’ εἶναι καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἐκάστοις ταῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια.

38 Πρῶτον δὲ πῶς ἐπεκράτησε καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν οἶνομα κατὰ πάντων Πελοπόννησίων
2 οὐκ ἀχρηστὸν μαθεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ χώρας καὶ πόλεων πληθεὶ διαφέρουσιν οἱ πάτρων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐχοντες τὴν προσηγορίαν ταύτην οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔτε ταῖς τῶν 3 ἄνδρῶν ἀρεταῖς. τὸ τε γὰρ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ἔθνος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν Λακωνῶν, πληθεὶ μὲν ἄνδρῶν καὶ χώρας οὐδὲ παρὰ μικρὸν ὑπέρεχει· καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν τῆς ἄνδραγαθίας πρωτείων οὐδενὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἶο! τ’ εἰσὶν οὐδέποτε παραχωρεῖν οἱ
4 προετρημένοι. πῶς οὖν καὶ διά τὶ νῦν εὐδοκοῦσιν οὕτως τὲ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν πλήθος τῶν Πελοπόννησίων, ἀμα τὴν πολιτείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν
5 μετετεληφότες; δῆλον ὡς τῆςην μὲν λέγειν οὐδαμῶς αν εἰπὶ πρέπουν· φαύλον γὰρ· αἰτίαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἥτειν. χωρίς γὰρ ταύτης οὔτε τῶν κατὰ λόγον
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have attempted in the past to induce the Peloponnesians to adopt a common policy, no one ever succeeding, as each was working not in the cause of general liberty, but for his own aggrandizement, this object has been so much advanced, and so nearly attained, in my own time that not only do they form an allied and friendly community, but they have the same laws, weights, measures and coinage, as well as the same magistrates, senate, and courts of justice, and the whole Peloponnesus only falls short of being a single city in the fact of its inhabitants not being enclosed by one wall, all other things being, both as regards the whole and as regards each separate town, very nearly identical.

38. In the first place it is of some service to learn how and by what means all the Peloponnesians came to be called Achaeans. For the people whose original and ancestral name this was were distinguished neither by the extent of their territory, nor by the number of their cities, nor by exceptional wealth or the exceptional valour of their citizens. Both the Arcadian and Laconian nations far exceed them, indeed, in population and the size of their countries, and certainly neither of the two could ever bring themselves to yield to any Greek people the palm for military valour. How is it, then, that both these two peoples and the rest of the Peloponnesians have consented to change not only their political institutions for those of the Achaeans, but even their name? It is evident that we should not say it is the result of chance, for that is a poor explanation. We must rather seek for a cause, for every event whether probable or improbable must
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οὔτε τῶν παρὰ λόγου εἶναι δοκούντων οὐδὲν οἶον τε συντελεσθῆναι. ἔστι δ' οὖν, ὡς ἐμὴ δόξα, τοι-6 αὐτή τις. ἵσηγορίας καὶ παρρησίας καὶ καθόλου δημοκρατίας ἀληθινῆς σύστημα καὶ προαιρεσιν εἰλικρινεστέραν οὐκ ἂν εὐροὶ τις τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς 7 ὑπαρχοῦσης. αὐτὴ τινὰς μὲν ἠθελοντὴν αἱρετιστὰς εὑρε Πελοποννησίων, πολλοὺς δὲ πειθοὶ καὶ λόγω προσηγάγετο· τινὰς δὲ βιασμένη σὺν καιρῷ παραχρῆμα πάλιν εὐδοκεῖν ἐποίησεν αὐτῇ τοὺς ἀναγκα-8 θέντας. οὔδει γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπολειπομένη πλεονέκτημα τῶν ἔξ ἁρχῆς, ἵσα δὲ πάντα ποιοῦσα τοῖς ἀεὶ προσλαμβανομένοις, ταχέως καθικιεῖτο τῆς προκει-μένης ἑπιβολῆς, δύο συνεργοῖς χρωμένη τοῖς ἰσχυ-9 ῥοτάτους, ἵσοτητί καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ. διὸ ταύτῃν ἁρχηγὸν καὶ αἰτίαν ἤγγετον τοῦ συμφρονήσαντας Πελοποννησίους τὴν ὑπάρχοσαν αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίαν καταστήσασθαι.

10 Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ τὸ τῆς πολιτείας ἤδιομα τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον καὶ πρότερον 11 ὑπήρχε παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ δι' ἐτέρων μὲν πλειώνων, πρὸς δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἀρκέσει πίστευσι χάριν ἐν ἡ καὶ δεύτερον ληθῆνε μαρτύρων. 39 καθ' οὖς γὰρ καίρους ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τόποις κατὰ τὴν Μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα τότε προσαγορευμένην ἐνεπρήσθη τὰ συνέδρια τῶν Πυθαγορείων, 2 μετὰ ταῦτα γενομένου κυνήματος ὀλοσχεροῦς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, ὁπερ εἰκός, ὡς ἂν τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν ἐξ ἐκάστης πόλεως οὕτω παραλόγους δια-3 φθαρέντων, συνέβη τὰς κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους Ἑλληνικὰς πόλεις ἀναπλησθῆναι φόνοι καὶ στάσεως 4 καὶ παντοδαπῆς ταραχῆς. ἐν οἷς καίροις ἀπὸ τῶν πλείστων μερῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος προσβευόντων ἐπὶ 336
have some cause. The cause here, I believe to be more or less the following. One could not find a political system and principle so favourable to equality and freedom of speech, in a word so sincerely democratic, as that of the Achaean league. Owing to this, while some of the Peloponnesians chose to join it of their own free will, it won many others by persuasion and argument, and those whom it forced to adhere to it when the occasion presented itself suddenly underwent a change and became quite reconciled to their position. For by reserving no special privileges for original members, and putting all new adherents exactly on the same footing, it soon attained the aim it had set itself, being aided by two very powerful coadjutors, equality and humanity. We must therefore look upon this as the initiator and cause of that union that has established the present prosperity of the Peloponnesian.

These characteristic principles and constitution had existed in Achaea from an early date. There is abundant testimony of this, but for the present it will suffice to cite one or two instances in confirmation of this assertion. 39. When, in the district of Italy, then known as Greater Hellas, the club-houses of the Pythagoreans were burnt down, there ensued, as was natural, a general revolutionary movement, the leading citizens of each city having thus unexpectedly perished, and in all the Greek towns of the district murder, sedition, and every kind of disturbance were rife. Embassies arrived from most parts of Greece offering their services as peace-
τὰς διαλύσεις, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ τῇ τούτων πίστει συν-χρήσαντο πρὸς τὴν τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἐξ-
αγωγῆν. οὐ μόνον δὲ κατὰ τούτοις τοὺς καίρους
5 ἀπεδέξαντο τὴν αἰρέσιν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ
τινάς χρόνων ὀλοσχερῶς ὄρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ μιμητᾷ
6 γενέσθαι τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῶν. παρακαλέσαντες γὰρ
σφάς καὶ συμφρονήσαντες Κροτωνιάται, Συβαρῖται,
Καυλωνιάται, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπέδειξαν Διὸς Ἀμαρίου
κοινὸν ἱερὸν καὶ τόπον, ἐν ὦ τάς τε συνόδους καὶ
τὰ διαβούλια συνετέλουν, δεύτερον τοὺς ἔθισμοὺς
καὶ νόμους ἐκλαβώντες τοὺς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπεβά-
λοντο χρῆσθαι καὶ διοικεῖν κατὰ τούτους τὴν
7 πολιτείαν. ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς Διονυσίου Συρακοσίου
δυναστείας, ἕτι δὲ τῆς τῶν περιοικούντων βαρβάρων
ἐπικρατείας ἐμποδισθέντες, οὐχ ἔκοινοι, ἀλλὰ κατ’
8 ἀνάγκην αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Λακε-
δαιμονίων μὲν παραδόξως πταισάντων περὶ τὴν ἐν
Λεύκτρως μάχην, Θηβαίων δὲ ἀνελπίστως ἀντιποιη-
σαμένων τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας, ἣν ἀκρισία
περὶ πάντας μὲν τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοὺς
προερημένους, ἦς ἀν τῶν μὲν μὴ συγχωροῦντων
ἡττήσαι, τῶν δὲ μὴ πιστεύσαντων ὀτι νεικήκασιν.
9 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ τῶν ἄμφισβητομένων ἐπέτρε-
ψαν Θηβαῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μόνοι τῶν Ἑλλή-
10 νων Ἀχαιῶν, οὐ πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν ἀποβλέποντας
σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐλαχιστὴν τότε ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἶχον·
τὸ δὲ πλείον εἰς τὴν πίστιν καὶ τὴν ὀλην καλο-
kαγαθίαν. ὁμολογουμένως γὰρ ὑπὸ τὸτε ταύτην
περὶ αὐτῶν πάντες εἶχον τὴν δόξαν.
makers, but it was the Achaeans on whom these cities placed most reliance and to whom they committed the task of putting an end to their present troubles. And it was not only at this period that they showed their approval of Achaean political principles; but a short time afterwards, they resolved to model their own constitution exactly on that of the League. The Crotonians, Sybarites and Caulonians, having called a conference and formed a league, first of all established a common temple and holy place of Zeus Amarius in which to hold their meetings and debates, and next, adopting the customs and laws of the Achaeans, decided to conduct their government according to them. It was only indeed the tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse and their subjection to the barbarian tribes around them which defeated this purpose and forced them to abandon these institutions, much against their will. Again, subsequently, when the Lacedaemonians were unexpectedly defeated at Leuctra, and the Thebans, as unexpectedly, aspired to the hegemony of Greece, great uncertainty prevailed in the whole country and especially among these two peoples, the Lacedaemonians not acknowledging their defeat, and the Thebans not wholly believing in their victory. They, however, referred the points in dispute to the Achaeans alone among all the Greeks, not taking their power into consideration, for they were then almost the weakest state in Greece, but in view of their trustworthiness and high character in every respect. For indeed this opinion of them was at that time, as is generally acknowledged, held by all.

a Such as the Achaean League had.
Τότε μὲν οὖν ψιλῶς αὐτὰ τὰ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὑπῆρχε παρ' αὐτοῖς· ἀποτέλεσμα δ' ἦν πράξεις ἀξίολογος πρὸς αὐξήσειν τῶν ἱδίων ἄνήκουσα πραγμάτων οὖν ἐγίνετο, τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι φύναι προστάτην ἄξιον τῆς προαιρέσεως, ἀεὶ δὲ τὸν ὑποδείξαντα ποτὲ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχης ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι καὶ κωλύσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς Μακεδόνων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποτὲ σὺν καιρῷ προστάτας ἀξιόχρεως εὑρεῖ, ταχέως τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν ἐποίησε φανεράν, ἐπιτελεσμένη τὸ κάλλιστον ἔργον, τῇ Πελοποννησίων ὁμόνοιαν. ἦς ἀρχηγὸν μὲν καὶ καθηγεμόνα τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς "Ἀρατον νομιστέον τοῖς Σικυώνιοι, ἀγωνιστὴν δὲ καὶ τελεσιουργον τῆς πράξεως Φιλοποίμενα τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίτην, βεβαιωτὴν δὲ τοῦ μόνιμον αὐτῆς ἐπὶ ποσὸν γενέσθαι Λυκόρταν καὶ τοὺς ταυτὰ τούτω προελομένους ἄνδρας. τίνα δ' ἦν ἑκάστοις τὰ πραχθέντα καὶ πῶς καὶ κατὰ ποιόν καιροὺς πειρασόμεθα δηλοῦν, ἀἀὶ κατὰ τὸ πρέπον τῇ γραφῇ ποιούμενοι τὴν ἐπίστασιν. τῶν μέντοι γ' Ἀράτω διωκημένων καὶ νῦν καὶ μετὰ ταύτα πάλιν ἐπικεφαλαιούμενοι μνησθησόμεθα διὰ τὸ καὶ λίαν ἀληθινοὺς καὶ σαφεῖς ἐκεῖνον περὶ τῶν ἱδίων συντεταχέναι πράξεως ὑπο-μνηματισμοὺς, τῶν δὲ τοῖς ἀλλοίς ἀκριβεστέραν καὶ μετὰ διαστολῆς ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἐξήγησιν. ὑπολαμβάνω δὲ ράστην ἐμοὶ τ' ἂν γενέσθαι τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εὔπαρακολούθητον τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ ποιησάμεθα τὴν ἐπίστασιν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν, ἐν οἷς κατὰ πόλιν διαλυθέντος τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαίων ἔθνους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας βασιλέων ἄρχη πάλιν ἐγένετο καὶ σύννεφος τῶν πόλεων πρὸς ἀλλήλας. ἀφ' Ὑς αὐξανόμενον κατὰ τὸ συν-
BOOK II

Up to now, these principles of government had merely existed amongst them, but had resulted in no practical steps worthy of mention for the increase of the Achaean power, since the country seemed unable to produce a statesman worthy of these principles, anyone who showed a tendency to act so being thrown into the dark and hampered either by the Lacedaemonian power or still more by that of Macedon. 40. When, however, in due time, they found statesmen capable of enforcing them, their power at once became manifest, and the League achieved the splendid result of uniting all the Peloponnesian states. Aratus of Sicyon should be regarded as the initiator and conceiver of the project; it was Philopoemen of Megalopolis who promoted and finally realized it, while Lycortas and his party were those who assured the permanency, for a time at least, of this union. I will attempt to indicate how and at what date each of the three contributed to the result, without transgressing the limits I have set to this part of my work. Aratus' government, however, may be dealt with here and in future quite summarily, as he published a most valuable and clearly written memoir of his own career; but the achievements of the two others must be narrated in greater detail and at more length. I think it will be easiest for myself to set forth the narrative and for my readers to follow it if I begin from the period when, after the dissolution of the Achaean League by the kings of Macedonia, the cities began again to approach each other with a view to its renewal. Henceforward the League continued to grow until

a The father of Polybius.
41 ‘Ολυμπίας μὲν ἦν εἰκοστῇ καὶ τετάρτῃ πρὸς ταῖς ἐκατόν, ὅτε Πατρεῖς ἤρξαντο συμφρονεῖν καὶ Δυ-2 μαίοι, καροὶ δὲ καθ’ οὓς Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου καὶ Λυσίμαχος, ἐτὶ δὲ Σέλευκος καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Κέ-ραννος μετήλλαξαν τὸν βιον. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι περὶ τὴν προειρήμενην ὀλυμπιάδα τὸ ξῆν ἐξέλισσον. 3 τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀνώτερον τούτων χρόνους τοιαύτη 4 τις ἦν ἡ περὶ τὸ προειρημένον ἔθνος διάθεσις. ἀπὸ γὰρ Τισαμενοῦ βασιλευθέντες, ὃς ἦν ὁ Ὀρέστον μὲν νιός, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ὑρακλείδῶν κάθοδον ἐκπε-σῶν τῆς Σπάρτης κατέσχε τοὺς περὶ Ἀχαΐαν τόπους, 5 ἀπὸ τούτου κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸ γένος ἐως Ὡμύγου βασιλευθέντες, μετὰ ταύτα δυσαρεστήσαν-τες τοὺς τοῦ προειρημένου παιῶν ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ νομί-μως, ἀλλὰ δεσποτικῶς αὐτῶν ἄρχειν, μετέστησαν εἰς 6 δημοκρατίαν τὴν πολιτείαν. λοιπὸν ἦδη τοὺς ἐξῆς χρόνους μέχρι τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου δυνα-στείας ἀλλοτε μὲν ἄλλως ἐχώρει τὰ πράγματ’ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, τὸ γε μὴ κοινὸν πολέμειμα, καλάπερ εἰρήκαμεν, ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ συνέχεις ἐπει-7 ράντο. τοῦτο δ’ ἦν ἐκ δωδεκά πόλεως, ἀς ἐτί καὶ νὰν συμβαίνει διαμέενει, πλὴν Ὡμέγου καὶ Ἑλίκης τῆς πρὸ τῶν Λευκτρικῶν ὡς τῆς θαλάττης κατ-8 αποθείσης. αὐται δ’ εἰσὶ Πάτραι, Δύμη, Φαραϊ, Τριταία, Λεόντιον, Λύγου, Αἴγειρα, Πελλήνη, 9 Βοῦρα, Καρώνεια. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς υπότερους μὲν τῶν κατ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου καρων, προτέρους δὲ τῆς ἀρτι-δηθείης ὀλυμπιάδος, εἰς τοιαύτην διαφορὰν καὶ καχεξίαν ἐνέπεσον, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τῶν ἐκ Μακε-342
it reached in my own time the state of completion I have just been describing.

41. It was in the 124th Olympiad that Patrae and Dyme took the initiative, by entering into a league, just about the date of the deaths of Ptolemy son of Lagus, Lysimachus, Selencus, and Ptolemy Ceraunus, which all occurred in this Olympiad. The condition of the Achaean nation before this date had been more or less as follows. Their first king was Tisamemus the son of Orestes, who, when expelled from Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, occupied Achaea, and they continued to be ruled by kings of his house down to Ogyges. Being dissatisfied with the rule of Ogyges' sons, which was despotical and not constitutional, they changed their government to a democracy. After this, down to the reigns of Alexander and Philip, their fortunes varied according to circumstances, but they always endeavoured, as I said, to keep their League a democracy. This consisted of twelve cities, which still all exist with the exception of Olenus and of Helice which was engulfed by the sea a little before the battle of Leuctra. These cities are Patrae, Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium, Aegira, Pellene, Bura, and Caryneia. After the time of Alexander and previous to the above Olympiad they fell, chiefly thanks to the kings of Macedon, into such a state
δονίας βασιλέων, ἐν ἥ συνέβη πάσας τὰς πόλεις χωρισθείσας ἀφ’ αὐτῶν ἐναντίως τὸ συμφέρον
10 ἄγειν ἀλλήλαις. ἔξο ὁ συνέπεσε τὰς μὲν ἐμφρουροὺς αὐτῶν γενέσθαι διὰ τε Δημητρίου καὶ Κασσάν-
δρου, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δι’ Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ Γονατᾶ, τὰς δὲ καὶ τυραννεῖσθαι πλείστους γὰρ ἦ δὴ μονάρ-
χος ὅτους ἐμφυτεύσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἐλλησι, περὶ
11 δὲ τὴν εἰκοστὴν καὶ τετάρτην ὀλυμπιάδα πρὸς ταῖς ἑκατὼν, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, αὕτης ἕρξαντο
μετανοήσαντες συμφρονεῖν. ταῦτα δ’ ἦν κατὰ τὴν
12 Πύρρου διάβασιν εἰς Ἰταλίαν. καὶ πρῶτοι μὲν
συνέστησαν Δυμαῖοι, Πατρεῖς, Τριταῖες, Φαραιεῖς·
διόπερ οὗδε στήλην ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνει τῶν πόλεων
13 τούτων περὶ τῆς συμπολιτείας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
μάλιστα πως ἔτει πέμπτῳ τῆν φρουρὰν ἐκβαλόντες
Αἰγινεῖς μετέσχον τῆς συμπολιτείας· ἐξῆς δὲ τούτως
14 Βούριοι, τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείναντες. ἀμα δὲ τού-
τοις Καρυνεῖς ἀποκατέστησαν. συνιδὼν γὰρ Ἰσεᾶς
15 ὁ τῆς Καρυνείας τὸτε τυραννεύσων ἐκπεπτωκυία
μὲν ἐξ Ἀἰγινοῦ τῆν φρουράν, ἀπολωλότα δὲ τῶν ἐν
tῇ Βούρᾳ μόναρχον διὰ Μάργου καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν,
ἐαυτὸν δὲ πανταχόθεν ὅρων ὁσον οὐκ ἦδη πολε-

42 Τίνος οὖν χάριν ἐπὶ τοὺς χΡόνους τούτους ἀν-
έδραμον; ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν γένηται συμφανεῖς πῶς
καὶ κατὰ ποιόν καιρόν καὶ τίνες πρῶτοι τῶν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς Ἀχαιῶν αὐθίς ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς
2 νῦν συστάσεως, δεύτερον δ’ ἵνα καὶ τὰ τῆς προαι-
ρέσεως μὴ μόνον διὰ τῆς ἠμετέρας ἀποφάσεως, ἄλλα
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BOOK II

of discord and ill-feeling that all the cities separated from the League and began to act against each others' interests. The consequence was that some of them were garrisoned by Demetrius and Cassander and afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, and some even had tyrants imposed on them by the latter, who planted more tyrannies in Greece than any other king. But, as I said, about the 124th Olympiad they began to repent and form fresh leagues. (This was just about the date of Pyrrhus' crossing to Italy.) The first cities to do so were Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, and for this reason we do not even find any formal inscribed record of their adherence to the League. About five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their garrison and joined the League, and the Burians were the next to do so, after putting their tyrant to death. Caryneia joined almost at the same time, for Iscas, its tyrant, when he saw the garrison expelled from Aegium, and the tyrant of Bura killed by Margus and the Achaeans, and war just about to be made on himself by all the towns round, abdicated and, on receiving an assurance from the Achaeans that his life would be spared, added his city to the League.

42. Why, the reader will ask, do I go back to these times? It is, firstly, to show which of the original Achaean cities took the first steps to re-form the League and at what dates, and, secondly, that my assertion regarding their political principle may
καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων πίστεως τυγχάνῃ, 3 διότι μία τις αἱ τῶν Ἀχαϊῶν αἴρεσις ὑπῆρχε, καθ’ ἡν προτείνοντες μὲν τὴν παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἴσηγορίαν καὶ παρρησίαν, πολεμοῦντες δὲ καὶ καταγωνιζόμενοι συνεχῶς τοὺς ἢ δι’ αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν βασιλέων τὰς σφετέρας πατρίδας καταδολουμένους, τούτω τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ προθέσει τοῦτο τούργον ἐπετελέσαν, τὰ μὲν δι’ αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν συμ- 4 μάχων. καὶ γὰρ τὰ δι’ ἐκείνων συνεργήματα γεγο- νότα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐν τοῖς ἔξης χρόνοις ἐπὶ 5 τὴν τῶν Ἀχαϊῶν προαίρεσιν ἀνοιξτέον. πολλοῖς γὰρ κουνωνίσαντες πραγμάτων, πλείστων δὲ καὶ καλλίστων Ἡρωμαίοις, οὐδὲποτε τὸ παράπαν ἐπεθύ- μησαν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων οὐδὲνος ἵδια λυστε- 6 λοὺς, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ πάσης τῆς ἐαυτῶν φιλοτιμίας, ἡν παρείχοντο τοῖς συμμάχοις ἀντικατηλλάττοντο τὴν ἐκάστων ἔλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν κουνὴν ὄμοιον Πελο- 7 πονησίων. σαφέστερον δ’ ὑπὲρ τούτων ἔσται δια- λαμβάνειν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐνεργη- μάτων.

43 Εἰκοσι μὲν οὖν ἦτη τὰ πρῶτα καὶ πέντε συν- επολιτεύσαντο μεθ’ ἐαυτῶν αἱ προειρημέναι πόλεις, γραμματέα κοινῶν ἐκ περιόδου προχειριζόμεναι καὶ 2 δύο στρατηγοὺς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα πάλιν ἔδοξεν αὐ- τοῖς ἕνα καθιστάνειν καὶ τούτω πιστεῦειν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων. καὶ πρῶτος ἐτυχε τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης Μάργος 3 ὁ Καρυνεύς. τετάρτῳ δ’ ὑστερον ἔτει τοῦ προει- ρημένου στρατηγοῦντος Ἀρατος ὁ Ἡλευρόης, ἔτη μὲν ἔχων εἰκοσι, τυραννουμένην δ’ ἔλευθερώσας τὴν πατρίδα διὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς ἐαυτοῦ καὶ τόλμης, προσένεμε μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀχαϊῶν πολιτείαν, ἀρχηγ- θεῖν εὐθὺς ἐραστής γενόμενος τῆς προαιρέσεως
be confirmed by the actual evidence of facts. What I asserted was that the Achaean members always followed one single policy, ever attracting others by the offer of their own equality and liberty and ever making war on and crushing those who either themselves or through the kings attempted to enslave their native cities, and that, in this manner and pursuing this purpose, they accomplished their task in part unaided and in part with the help of allies. For the Achaean political principle must be credited also with the results furthering their end, to which their allies in subsequent years contributed. Though they took so much part in the enterprises of others, and especially in many of those of the Romans which resulted brilliantly, they never showed the least desire to gain any private profit from their success, but demanded, in exchange for the zealous aid they rendered their allies, nothing beyond the liberty and concord of the Peloponnesians. This will be more clearly evident when we come to see the League in active operation.

43. For twenty-five years, then, this league of cities continued, electing for a certain period a Secretary of state and two Strategi. After this they decided to elect one Strategus and entrust him with the general direction of their affairs, the first to be nominated to this honourable office being Margus of Carynea. Four years later during his term of office, Aratus of Sicyon, then only twenty years of age, freed his city from its tyrant by his enterprise and courage, and, having always been a passionate admirer of the Achaean polity, made his own city a member of the League. Eight years
4 αυτῶν. ὧνδόν δὲ πάλιν ἔτει στρατηγὸς αἴρεθείς τὸ δεύτερον, καὶ πραξικοπήσας τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, Ἀντιγόνου κυριεύοντος, καὶ γενόμενος ἐγκρατής, μεγάλου μὲν ἀπέλυε φόβου τοὺς τὴν Πελοπόννησον κατουκούντας, ἐλευθερώσας δὲ Κορινθίους προσήγαγεν τρος τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν. ἔπὶ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλιν δια-
6 πραξάμενος προσένεμε τοῖς Ἀχαϊοῖς, ταῦτα τ' ἐγίνετο τῷ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς Καρχηδονίων ῥήτης, ἐν ᾗ καθόλου Σικελίας ἐκχωρήσαντες πρῶτον ὑπέμειναν
7 τὸτε φόρους ἐνεγκεῖν Ῥωμαίοις. μεγάλην δὲ προ-
κοπὴν πονήσας τῆς ἐπιβολῆς εἰς ὀλίγω χρόνων, λοιπὸν ἂδη διετέλει προστατῶν μὲν τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους, πάσας δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις πρὸς ἐν τέλος ἀναφέρων· τούτῳ δ' ἦν τὸ Μακεδονίας μὲν ἐκβαλείν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, τὰς δὲ μοναρχίας καταλύσαι, βεβαιώσας δ' ἐκάστοις τὴν κοινὴν καὶ πά-
9 τριον ἐλευθεριάν. μέχρι μὲν ὅν ἦν Ἀντιγόνος ὁ Γο-
νατάς, πρὸς τε τὴν ἐκείνου πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ πρὸς τὴν Αἰτωλῶν πλεονεξίαν ἀντιτάττομεν δι-
10 ετέλει, πραγματικῶς ἐκαστὰ κεχρήζων, καίπερ εἰς τοῦτο προβάντων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδικίας καὶ τόλμης ὦστε ποιήσασθαι συνήθεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ διαιρέσεως τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους. Ἀντιγόνου δὲ μεταλλάξαντος, καὶ συνθεμένων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ συμμαχίαν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ μετασχόντων εὐγενῶς σφίσθω τοῦ πρὸς Δημήτριον πολέμου, τὰ μὲν τῆς ἀλλοτριώτητος καὶ δυσμενείας ἤρθη κατὰ τὸ παρόν, ὑπεγένετο δὲ κοινωνίκη καὶ φιλική τις αὐ-
2 τοῖς διάθεσις. Δημήτριον δὲ βασιλεύσαντος δέκα μόνον ἔτη, καὶ μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον περὶ τὴν πρώτην διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα Ῥωμαίων, ἐγε-
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after this, during his second term of office as Strategus, he contrived to get into his hands the citadel of Corinth which was held by Antigonus, thus delivering the Peloponnesians from a great source of fear, and induced the city he had liberated to join the League. He next obtained the adhesion of Megara by the same means. These events took place in the year before that defeat of the Carthaginians which forced them to evacuate Sicily and submit for the first time to pay tribute to Rome. Having in so short a space of time thus materially advanced his projects, he continued to govern the Achaean nation, all his schemes and action being directed to one object, the expulsion of the Macedonians from the Peloponnesian, the suppression of the tyrants, and the re-establishment on a sure basis of the ancient freedom of every state. During the life of Antigonus Gonatas he continued to offer a most effectual opposition both to the meddlesomeness of this king and the lust for power of the Aetolians, although the two were so unscrupulous and venturesome that they entered into an arrangement for the purpose of dissolving the Achaean League. 44. But, on the death of Antigonus, the Achaean even made an alliance with the Aetolians and supported them ungrudgingly in the war against Demetrius, so that, for the time at least, their estrangement and hostility ceased, and a more or less friendly and sociable feeling sprang up between them. Demetrius only reigned for ten years, his death taking place at the time the Romans first crossed to Illyria, and after this the tide of
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νετό τις εὖροια πραγμάτων πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπι-3 βολὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ μὸναρχοί, δυσελπιστήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ μετηλλαχέοντι μὲν τὸν Δημήτριον, ὁς ἦν αὐτοῖς ὁδὸν ἐχορηγὸς καὶ μισθοδότης, ἐπικείεται δὲ τὸν Ἀρατον, οἰο-μενον δὲν σφάς ἀποτίθεσθαι τὰς τυραννίδας, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πεισθεὶς μεγάλας δωρεὰς καὶ τιμὰς προ-τείνοντος, τοῖς δὲ μὴ προσέχουσιν ἐτί μειζον ἐπ-ανατεινομένου φόβους καὶ κινδύνους διὰ τῶν 4 Ἀχαιῶν, ὄρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ πεισθέντες ἀποθέσθαι μὲν τὰς τυραννίδας, ἐλευθερῶσαν δὲ τὰς ἑαυτῶν πατρί-5 δας, μετασχεὶν δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείας. Λυδιάδας μὲν οὖν ὁ Μεγαλοπολᾶς ἐτὶ ζῶντος Δημητρίου, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν, πάνω πραγ-ματικός καὶ φρονίμως προϊδόμενος τὸ μέλλον, ἀπετέθετο τὴν τυραννίδα, καὶ μετασχήκει τῆς 6 ἑθικῆς συμπολιτείας. Ἀριστομαχος δὲ ὁ τῶν Ἀργείων τύραννος καὶ Ξένων ὁ τῶν Ἐρμονέων καὶ Ἐκυψιμος ὁ τῶν Φλισίων τότ' ἀποθέμενον τὰς μοναρχίας ἐκουσώνησαι τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δημο-κρατίας.

45 Ὄλοσχερεστέρας δὲ γευμομένης αὐξήσεως διὰ ταῦτα καὶ προκοπῆς περὶ τὸ ἔθνος, Λιτωλοὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμφυτὸν ἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν φθονήσαντες, τὸ δὲ πλείον ἐλπίδοντες καταδιελέσθαι τὰς πόλεις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον τὰς μὲν Ἀκαρνάνων διενε-μαντο πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου, τὰς δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπ-2 εβάλοντο πρὸς Ἀντίγονον τὸν Γονατᾶν, καὶ τότε παραπλησίαις ἐλπίδων ἐπαρθέντες, ἀπετύμησαν Ἀντιγόνῳ τε τῷ κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς προ-εστῶτι Μακεδόνων, ἐπιτροπεύοντι δὲ Φιλίππου παι-δῶς ὄντος, καὶ Κλεομένει τῷ βασίλει Λακεδαμονίων 350
events seemed to flow for a time in favour of the Achaean constant purpose; for the Peloponnesian tyrants were much cast down by the death of Demetrius, who had been, so to speak, their furnisher and paymaster, and equally so by the threatening attitude of Aratus, who demanded that they should depose themselves, offering abundance of gifts and honours to those who consented to do so, and menacing those who turned a deaf ear to him with still more abundant chastisement on the part of the Achaean. They therefore hurried to accede to his demand, laying down their tyrannies, setting their respective cities free, and joining the Achaean League. Lydiades of Megalopolis had even foreseen what was likely to happen, and with great wisdom and good sense had forestalled the death of Demetrius and of his own free will laid down his tyranny and adhered to the national government. Afterwards Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xenon, tyrant of Hermione, and Cleonymus, tyrant of Phlius, also resigned and joined the League.

45. The League being thus materially increased in extent and power, the Aetolians, owing to that unprincipled passion for aggrandizement which is natural to them, either out of envy or rather in the hope of partitioning the cities, as they had partitioned those of Acarnania with Alexander and had previously proposed to do regarding Achaea with Antigonus Gonatas, went so far as to join hands with Antigonus, then regent of Macedonia and guardian to Philip,
κοινωνεῖν, καὶ συμπλέκειν ἀμφοτέρους ἁμα τὰς χεῖ-
3 ρας. ὀρῶντες γὰρ τὸν 'Αντίγονον, κυριεύοντα μὲν
tῶν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν ἁσφαλῶς, ὀμολογούμενον
de καὶ πρόδηλον ἐχθρὸν ὄντα τῶν 'Αχαιῶν διὰ τὸ
4 τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον πραξίνεται καταλαβεῖν, ὑπέλαβον, εἰ
tοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους προσλάβοντες ἐπὶ
κοινωνίας σφέτι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς προεμβιβάσαιεν εἰς
τὴν πρὸς τὸ έθνος ἀπέχθειαν, ῥαδίως ἂν καταγω-
νύσασθαι τοὺς 'Αχαιοὺς ἐν καιρῷ συνεπιθέμενοι καὶ
5 πανταχόθεν περιστήρισταντες αὐτοῖς τὸν πόλεμον. δὲ
dὴ καὶ ταχέως ἂν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἐπετεέλεσαν,
eἰ μὴ τὸ κυριώτατον παρείδον τῆς προθέσεως, οὐ
συλλογισάμενοι διότι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς 'Αρατοὺν ἔξου-
σιν ἀνταγωνιστήν, ἀνδρὰ δυνάμενον πάσης εὐστο-
6 χεῖν περιστάσεως. τοιγαροῦν ὅρμησταντες ἐπὶ τὸ
πολυπαγμονεῖν καὶ χειρῶν ἄρχειν ἀδίκων οὐχ οἶνον
ήμυσαν τι τῶν ἐπινοηθέντων, ἀλλὰ τουναντίον καὶ τὸν
'Αρατοῦ τότε προεστώτα καὶ τὸ ἐθνὸς ἐσωματοποιή-
san, πραγματικῶς ἀντιπεριστάσαντος ἐκείνου καὶ
7 λυμηναμένου τὰς ἐπιβολὰς αὐτῶν. ὥς δὲ ἔχειρίσθη
τὰ ὅλα δὴλον ἔσται διὰ τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων.

46 Θεωρῶν γὰρ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ὁ προερημένος
ἀνήρ τῶν μὲν πόλεμον τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀσχυνομέ-
nους ἀναλαβεῖν ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ διὰ τὸ καὶ λίαν
eῖναι προσφάτος τὰς ἐκ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν εὐγενείας
2 περὶ τῶν Δημητριακῶν πόλεμον εἷς αὐτοὺς, συμβου-
λευμένους δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ φθονοῦν-
tas τοῖς 'Αχαιοῖς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὡστε Κλεομένους
πεπραξικοπηκότος αὐτοὺς καὶ παρηρημένου Τεγέαν,
Μαντίνειαν, Ὀρχομενόν, τὰς Αἰτωλοῖς οὐ μόνον
συμμαχίδας ύπαρχοῦσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπολιτευο-
μένας τότε πόλεις, οὐχ οἶνον ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ
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who was still a child, and Cleomenes, king of Sparta. They saw that Antigonus was undisputed master of Macedonia and at the same time the open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to their seizure by treachery of the Aerocorinthus, and they supposed that if they could get the Lacedaemonians also to join them in their project, exciting first their animosity against the League, they could easily crush the Achaeans by attacking them at the proper time all at once and from all quarters. This indeed they would in all probability soon have done, but for the most important factor which they had overlooked in their plans. They never took into consideration that in this undertaking they would have Aratus as their opponent, a man capable of meeting any emergency. Consequently the result of their intrigues and unjust aggression was that not only did they entirely fail in their designs, but on the contrary consolidated the power of the League, and of Aratus who was then Strategus, as he most adroitly diverted and spoilt all their plans. How he managed this the following narrative will show.

46. Aratus saw that the Aetolians were ashamed of openly declaring war on them, as it was so very recently that the Achaeans had helped them in their war against Demetrius, but that they were so much of one mind with the Lacedaemonians and so jealous of the Achaeans that when Cleomenes broke faith with them and possessed himself of Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus, cities which were not only allies of the Aetolians, but at the time members of their league, they not only showed no resentment, but
3 τούτοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ βεβαιοῦντας αὐτῷ τὴν παράληψιν, καὶ τοῖς πρότερον κατὰ τῶν μηδὲν ἄδικοντων πᾶσαν ἰκανὴν ποιομένους πρόφασιν εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν τὸτε συνορῶν ἐκουσίως παρασπονδυμένους καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀπολλυόντας πόλεις ἐθελοντὴν ἐφ᾽ ὦ μονὸν ἰδεῖν ἀξιόχρεων γενόμενον
4 ἀνταγωνιστὴν Κλεομένη τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἔγων δὲν εἰς ταύτα βλέπων οὕτος τε καὶ πάντες ὁμοίως οἱ προεστῶτες τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματος πολέμου μὲν πρὸς μηδένα κατάρχειν, ἐνίστασθαι δὲ ταῖς τῶν
5 Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιβολαῖς. τὸ μὲν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τούτων ἦσαν τῶν διαλήψεων. θεωροῦντες δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ἐξής χρόνους τὸν Κλεομένην θρασεῖς ἐποικοδομοῦντα μὲν τὸ καλούμενον Ἀθῆναιον ἐν τῇ τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν χώρᾳ, πρόδηλον δὲ καὶ πικρόν ἀνα
6 δεικνύοντας σφίσι πολέμιον ἐαυτὸν, τότε δὴ συναθροίσαντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐκριναν μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀναλαμβάνειν φανερῶς τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπέχθειαν.
7 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Κλεομενικὸς προσαγορευθεὶς πόλε
47 μος τοιαύτην ἔλαβε τὴν ἀρχήν καὶ κατὰ τούτους τοὺς καροῦς. οἱ δὲ Ἀχαιοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διὰ τῆς ἰδίας δυνάμεως ὀρμησαν ἀντοφθαλμεῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἀμα μὲν ὑπολαμβάνοντες κάλλιστον εἶ
ναι τὸ μὴ δὲ ἐτέρων σφίσι πορίζεσθαι τὴν σωτηρίαν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῶν σφύξει τὰς πόλεις καὶ
2 τὴν χώραν, ἀμα δὲ βουλόμενοι καὶ τὴν πρὸς Πτο
λεμαῖον τηρεῖν φιλιὰν διὰ τὰς προγεγενημένας ευ
εργεσίας καὶ μὴ φαινέσθαι πρὸς ἐτέρους ἐκτείνων
3 τέσ τὰς χείρας, ἠδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ ποσὸν τοῦ πολέμου προβαίνοντος, καὶ τοῦ Κλεομένου τὸ τε πάτριον πολίτευμα καταλύσαντος καὶ τὴν ἐννομον βασιλείαν
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actually set their seal to his occupation. It was evident that they, who on previous occasions, owing to their lust of aggrandizement, found any pretext adequate for making war on those who had done them no wrong, now allowed themselves to be treacherously attacked and to suffer the loss of some of their largest cities simply in order to see Cleomenes become a really formidable antagonist of the Achaean. Aratus, therefore, and all the leading men of the Achaean League decided not to take the initiative in going to war with anyone, but to resist Spartan aggression. This at least was their first resolve; but when shortly afterwards Cleomenes began to fortify against them the so-called Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis, and to show himself their avowed and bitter enemy, they called the Council of the League together and decided on open war with Sparta.

This was the date at which the war known as 227 B.C. the Cleomenic war began; and such was its origin.

47. The Achaean at first decided to face the Lacedaemonian single-handed, considering it in the first place most honourable not to owe their safety to others but to protect their cities and country unaided, and also desiring to maintain their friendship with Ptolemy owing to the obligations they were under to him, and not to appear to him to be seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted for some time, and Cleomenes, having overthrown the ancient polity at Sparta and changed the constitutional 225 B.C.
eis tyrannida metasstésanatos, xroménon de kai tò
4 polemíw praktikòs kai parabólos, proorómenos
"Areatos to mello, kai dèdios thn te thn Ai'tw-
lwv apónoian kai tólmian, ekriwe pro polloj lu-
5 maíneithai thn épibolhn autw. katanovn de tov
'Antignon kai pràxen échonta kai súnesei kai pí-
steus aniptoiúmenov, tous de basileias ofádois
eidws fúsei men oudeina nomizontas oute filion
oute polemíou, taìs de tòu simférontos phífous
aièi metrountas tás èchras kai tás filías,
6 èpebáleto lalëin pròs tòv eirhmenov basileá kai
symplékein tás cheìras, upodeikvnous autw to sum-
7 bhsoménon ek tòwn pragmátov. prodhílos men ouv
autò pràttew asúmforon ēgeíto dia pléious autías.
tòv te gar Kleomén kai tòus Ai'twlous antagôni-
8 stàs paraksevàzein 'hmelle proòs thn épibolhn, tous
tè pollovs tòn 'Achaiwn diatréseis, katasfeugwv
epi tòus èchrous kai dokón ólsochorów apégwnwkei
tás ev authois élpidas. óper ëkistà faíneithai prát-
tow ev boúleto. dióper ëxon toíaun h prôseis adh-
9 lws autà dienoeito cheirízein. ëx oú pollá para
thn éautov gnwímov ëmagkàxeto kai légein kai poiein
proès tòus èkto, de òn ëmelle thn ënautin èm-
fasín upodeikvnwv tauth thn èpikrýmei thn oì-
10 konomían. óin xàrin ëniva tòutwv ouvì ev tòis úpo-
11 mnìmasi katētazexn.

48 Eidhos de tòus Megalopolítas kakopadoúntas
men tò polemíw dia to parakeimévous th Lakedaím-
movn propolemeín tòwn allwv, ou turgxánontas de

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kingship into a tyranny, showed great energy and
daring in the conduct of the campaign, Aratus,
foreseeing what was likely to happen and dreading
the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, determined
to be beforehand with them and spoil their plans.
He perceived that Antigonus was a man of energy
and sound sense, and that he claimed to be a
man of honour, but he knew that kings do not
regard anyone as their natural foe or friend, but
measure enmity and friendship by the sole standard
of expediency. He therefore decided to approach
that monarch and put himself on confidential terms
with him, pointing out to him to what the present
course of affairs would probably lead. Now for
several reasons he did not think it expedient to
do this overtly. In the first place he would thus
expose himself to being outbidden in his project by
Cleomenes and the Aetolians, and next he would
damage the spirit of the Achaean troops by thus
appealing to an enemy and appearing to have
entirely abandoned the hopes he had placed in
them—this being the very last thing he wished
them to think. Therefore, having formed this plan,
his decided to carry it out by covert means. He
was consequently compelled in public both to do
and to say many things quite contrary to his real
intention, so as to keep his design concealed by
creating the exactly opposite impression. For this
reason there are some such matters that he does not
even refer to in his Memoirs.

48. He knew that the people of Megalopolis were
suffering severely from the war, as, owing to their
being on the Laecedemonian border, they had to
bear the full brunt of it, and could not receive proper
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tής καθηκούσης ἐπικουρίας ὑπὸ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν διὰ τὸ κακείνους δυσχρηστεῖσθαι θλιβομένους ὑπὸ τῆς
2 περιστάσεως, σαφῶς δὲ γινώσκων οἶκείως διακει-
μένους αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὴν Μακεδόναν οἰκίαν ἐκ τῶν
3 κατὰ τὸν Ἀμύντου Φίλιππον εὐργεσιῶν, διειλήφει
διότι ταχέως ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ Κλεομένου πιεζόμενοι
καταφύγοιν εἶπ τὸν Ἀντίγονον καὶ τᾶς Μακεδόναν
4 εἰπίδας: κουνολογηθεὶς οὐν δὲ ἀπορρήτων περὶ τῆς
όλης ἐπιβολῆς Νικοφάνει καὶ Κερκιδᾶ τοῖς Μεγα-
λοπολίταις, οὔτες ἦσαν αὐτοῦ πατρικοὶ ξένοι καὶ
5 πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν εὐφυεῖς, ράδιως διὰ τούτων
ὁμοῖν παρέστησε τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις εἰς τὸ πρε-
sβεύειν πρὸς τοὺς 'Αχαιοὺς καὶ παρακαλεῖν πρὸς
6 τὸν Ἀντίγονον ὑπὲρ βοηθείας. οἳ μὲν οὖν Μεγαλο-
πολίται κατέστησαν αὐτοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικο-
φάνη καὶ τὸν Κερκιδᾶν πρεσβευτὰς πρὸς τε τοὺς
'Αχαιοὺς κακεῖθεν εὐθέως πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον, ἀν
7 αὐτοῖς συγκατάθηται τὸ ἔθνος. οἳ δὲ Ἄχαιοι συν-
8 ἔχωρησαν πρεσβεύειν τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις. σπουδὴ
δὲ συμμείξαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τῷ βασιλεί
dielégontο περὶ μὲν τῆς ἔαυτῶν πατρίδος αὐτὰ
τάγανκαια διὰ βραχέων καὶ κεφαλαιώδως, τὰ δὲ
πολλὰ περὶ τῶν ὅλων κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς Ἀράτου
καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις. αὐταὶ δὲ ἦσαν ὑποδεικνύονα
τὴν Λετολῶν καὶ Κλεομένους κουσογραφίαν τί δύνα-
ται καὶ ποί τείνετ, καὶ δηλοῦν ὅτι πρῶτοι μὲν
2 αὐτοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς εὐλαβητέον, ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον
Ἀντίγονον. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς Ἀχαιοὶ τὸν ἐξ ἀμ-
φοῖν πόλεμον οὐκ ἂν ὑπενέγκαιεν εὐθεώρητον εἶναί
πάσι, τοῦτο δὲ ὡς Λετολοῖ καὶ Κλεομένης κρατήσαν-
tες τούτων οὐκ εὐδοκισοῦσιν οὐδὲ μὴ μείνωσιν ἐπὶ
tῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐτὶ τοῦ πρόσθεν ῥᾷον εἶναι τῶ
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assistance from the Achaean, as the latter were themselves in difficulties and distress. As he also knew for a certainty that they were well disposed to the royal house of Macedon ever since the favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas, he felt sure that, hard pressed as they were by Cleomenes, they would be very ready to take refuge in Antigonus and hopes of safety from Macedonia. He therefore communicated his project confidentially to Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis who were family friends of his own and well suited for the business, and he had no difficulty through them in inciting the Megalopolitans to send an embassy to the Achaeans begging them to appeal to Antigonus for help. Nicophanes and Cercidas themselves were appointed envoys by the Megalopolitans, in the first place to the Achaeans and next, if the League consented, with orders to proceed at once to Antigonus. The League gave its permission and the ambassadors hastened to meet the king. They said no more than was strictly necessary on the subject of their own city, treating this matter briefly and summarily, but dwelt at length on the general situation, in the sense that Aratus had directed and prompted. 49. He had charged them to point out the importance and the probable consequences of the common action of the Aetolians and Cleomenes, representing that in the first place the Achaeans were imperilled by it and next and in a larger measure Antigonus himself. For it was perfectly evident to all that the Achaeans could not hold out against both adversaries, and it was still more easy for any person of intelligence to see that, if the Aetolians and Cleomenes were successful, they
3 νοῦν ἐχομι συνιδεῖν. τὴν τε γὰρ Αἰτωλῶν πλεονεξίαν ὦν ὦν τοῖς Πελοποννησίων οροίς εὐδοκῆσαι ποτ' ἄν περιληφθεῖσαν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς τῆς
4 Ἑλλάδος, τὴν τε Κλεομένους φιλοδοξίαν καὶ τὴν ὅλην ἔπυβολὴν κατὰ μὲν τὸ παρόν αὐτῆς ἐφίσθαι τῆς Πελοποννησίων ἁρχῆς, τυχόντα δὲ ταύτης τὸν προειρημένον κατὰ πώδας ἄνθεξθαι τῆς τῶν Ἕλλη-
5 νων ἡγεμονίας. ἦς οὖν οἰον τε καθικέσθαι μή οὐ
6 πρόσθεν καταλύσαντα τὴν Μακεδόνων ἁρχῆν. σκο-
πεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ἥζιον, προορῶμενον τὸ μέλλον, πότερον συμφέρει τοῖς οφέτεροις πράγμασι μετ' Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πρὸς Κλεο-
μένη πολεμεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἕλληνων ἡγεμονίας ἡ
προέμενον τὸ μέγιστον ἔθνος διακινδυνεύειν εἰς Θετ-
tαλία πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ Βοιωτούς, ἡτὶ δ' Ἀχαιῶν καὶ
Λακεδαιμονίους, ὑπὲρ τῆς Μακεδόνων ἁρχῆς.
7 ἦκαν μὲν οὖν Αἰτωλοὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς
γεγενημένην εὔνοιαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Δημήτριον καιροῖς
eντρεπόμενοι τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ὑποκρίνωντα, καθὰ-
περ καὶ νῦν, πολεμήσειν αὐτοὺς ἐφασαν τοὺς Ἀχαι-
οὺς πρὸς τὸν Κλεομένη; καὶ μὲν ἡ τύχη συνεπι-
λαμβάνεται, μή δεῖσθαι χρείας τῶν βοηθησόντων:
8 ἄν δ' ἀντιπέπτη τὰ τῆς τύχης, Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ συνεπι-
τίθωνται, προσέχειν αὐτὸν παρεκάλους τοῖς πράγ-
μασιν, ἵνα μὴ πρόσηκα τοὺς καιροὺς, ἑτὶ δ' δυνα-
9 μένοι σύζεσθαι Πελοποννησίους ἔπαρκέσθαι. περὶ δὲ
πίστεως καὶ χάριτος ἀποδόσεως ῥαθυμεῖν αὐτοῦν
ὡντο δεῖν. τῆς γὰρ χρείας ἐπιτελουμένης αὐτοῦν
εὐρήσειν τὸν Ἄρατον εὐδοκουμένας ἀμφότεροις
10 ὑποσχυόντο πίστεις. ὦμοίως δ' ἐφασαν καὶ τὸν
καιρὸν τῆς βοηθείας αὐτοῦν ὑποδείξειν.
would push their advantage further. The Aetolian schemes of territorial aggrandizement would never stop short of the boundaries of the Peloponnesian or even those of Greece itself, while Cleomenes' personal ambition, and far-reaching projects, though for the present he aimed only at supremacy in the Peloponnesian, would, on his attaining this, at once develop into a claim to be over-lord of all Hellas, a thing impossible without his first putting an end to the dominion of Macedon. They implored him then to look to the future and consider which was most in his interest, to fight in the Peloponnesian against Cleomenes for the supremacy of Greece with the support of the Achaean and Bocotian, or to abandon the greatest of the Greek nations to its fate and then do battle in Thessaly for the throne of Macedon with the Aetolians, Bocotians, Achaean, and Spartans all at once. Should the Aetolians, still pretending to have scruples owing to the benefits received from the Achaean in their war with Demetrius, continue their present inaction, the Achaean alone, they said, would fight against Cleomenes, and, if Fortune favoured them, would require no help; but should they meet with ill-success and be attacked by the Aetolians also, they entreated him to take good heed and not let the opportunity slip, but come to the aid of the Peloponnesians while it was still possible to save them. As for conditions of alliance and the return they could offer him for his support, they said he need not concern himself, for once the service they demanded was being actually rendered, they promised him that Aratus would find terms satisfactory to both parties. Aratus himself, they said, would also indicate the date at which they required his aid.
'Ο μὲν οὖν Ἀντίγονος ἀκούσας ταῦτα, καὶ δόξας ἀληθινῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς ὑποδεικνύει τὸν Ἀρατον, προσεῖχε τοῖς ἔξης πραττομένοις ἐπιμελῶς.

2 ἔγραφε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις, ἐπαγγελλόμενος βοηθήσεως, ἐὰν καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τοῦτο βουλο-3 μένους ἦ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη καὶ Κερκιδᾶν ἐπανελθόντων εἰς οἰκον, καὶ τὰς τε παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιστολάς ἀποδότων καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν εὐ-4 νοιαν αὐτοῖ καὶ προθυμίαν διασαφούντων, μετεωρισθέντες οἱ Μεγαλοπολίται προθύμως ἔσχον ἐναὶ πρὸς τὴν σύνοδον τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἐπισπάσασθαι τῶν Ἀντίγονον καὶ τὰ πράγματα κατὰ 5 σπουδὴν ἐγχειρίζειν αὐτῶ. ὁ δὲ Ἀρατος, διακούσας κατ' ἱδίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τὴν τοῦ βασι-6 λέως αἰρεσιν, ἦν ἐχοι πρὸς τε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν, περιχαρῆς ἦν τῷ μὴ διακενήσει πεποίη-7 σθαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν μηδ' εὔρησθαι κατὰ τὴν τῶν Ακ-8 τωλῶν ἑλπίδα τὸν Ἀντίγονον εἰς τέλος ἀπηλλοτριω-9 μένον ἔαυτοι. πάνυ δὲ πρὸς λόγον ἡγεῖτο γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ τούς Μεγαλοπολίτας προθύμους εἶναι διὰ 10 τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φέρειν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον τὰ πράγματα. 11 μάλιστα μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐπάνω προεῖπον, ἔσπευδε μηδ' προσδεηθῆναι τῆς βοηθείας· εἰ δ' εἴ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τοῦτο δέοι καταφεύγειν, οὐ μόνον ἡβούλετο δι' αὐ-12 τοῦ γενέσθαι τὴν κλῆσιν, ἑτὶ δὲ μάλλον εἰς ἀπάν-13 τῶν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. ἡγομένα γάρ, εἰ παραγενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ κρατήσας τῷ πολέμῳ τοῦ Κλεομέ-14 νους καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀλλοτρότερον τι βου-15 λεύσοιτο περὶ τῆς κουνῆς πολιτείας, μῆποθ' ὁμο-16 λογουμένως τῶν συμβαινόντων αὐτὸς ἀναλάβῃ τὴν 17 αἰτίαν, δόξαντος δικαίως τοῦτο πράττειν διὰ τὴν ἐξ 18 αὐτοῦ προγεγενημένην ἀδικίαν περὶ τὸν Ἀκροκό-19 θαλάτη.
50. Antigonus, having listened to them, felt convinced that Aratus took a true and practical view of the situation, and carefully considered the next steps to be taken, promising the Megalopolitans by letter to come to their assistance if such was the wish of the Achaeans too. Upon Nicophanes and Cercidas returning home and delivering the king's letter, assuring at the same time their people of his goodwill towards them and readiness to be of service, the Megalopolitans were much elated and most ready to go to the Council of the League and beg them to invite the aid of Antigonus and at once put the direction of affairs in his hands. Aratus had private information from Nicophanes of the king's favourable inclination towards the League and himself, and was much gratified to find that his project had not been futile, and that he had not, as the Aetolians had hoped, found Antigonus entirely alienated from him. He considered it a great advantage that the Megalopolitans had readily consented to approach Antigonus through the Achaeans; for, as I said above, what he chiefly desired was not to be in need of asking for help, but if it became necessary to resort to this, he wished the appeal to come not only from himself personally, but from the League as a whole. For he was afraid that if the king appeared on the scene and, after conquering Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians, took any measures the reverse of welcome regarding the League, he himself would be universally blamed for what happened, as the king would seem to have justice on his side owing to Aratus' offence against the house of Macedon in
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10 ptvdov els rrjv

11

MaKcSovojv OLKiav.

SioTrep aixa tu)

TTapeXdovras tovs MeyaXoTToXlras els ro kolvov ßovXevTijptov TO. re ypoinfiara rols 'Axo-iocg eTTiheiKWvai /cat hiaaa^eiv rrjV 6Xt]v evvotav rod ßautXecDS,
TTpos Se rovTOLs d^iovv e7naTrdaaa9aL rov Avrtyovov TTjv TaxlcrTr]v , eivai 8e /cat ro TrXrjdos em rijs
avrrjs opfxrjs, npoeXOajv "Aparog, /cat rtjv re rod
ßaacXecüs rrpodvfxlav aTroSe^dfxevos /cat rrjv rcx)V ttoXX<x)v StaAyyi/'tv eTraLveaas, TrapeKoXei hid TrXeiovcjv
pidXtara puev TTeipdadai St' avrojv crw^eiv /cat ras
TToXeLS /cat rrjv xojpav ovhev yap eivai rovrov /caAedv 8 dpa irpos rovro
Atoi^ ovSe uvix(f)opd}repov
ro piepos dvTLßaLvr] rd rrjs rvx'TjS, Trporepov e(f}7]
Setv e^eXey^avras ndaas rds ev avrols eATrt'Sa? rore

51 Kara(f)evy€LV
vapbivov

he

V7TOKeLpi€va)V

rds rcov (jiiXujv ßorjOeias. eTncrrjpirjrod ttXtjOovs, eSo^e pieveiv em 'rcjv
/cat St' avrdJv emreXeZv rov evearojra

errL

erreL Se YlroXepiaLos aTToyvovs p-ev ro
edvos KAeo/xeVet x^prjyetv erreßdXero, ßovXopcevos
avrdv eTraXeicfieiv em rov ^Avrcyovov Sta ro TrXeLovs
iXmSas exetv ev rots AaKeSaipuovtoLs rjTrep ev rols

2 TToXepLOV.

3

'AxatoXs rov SvvaadaL hiaKarexeiv rds rcov ev Ma/ceSovLa ßaacXecjov emßoXds, ol S' 'A;\;atot to pikv
TTpdJrov r)Xarra)6r]Gav irepl rd AvKaiov, avpurXaKevres Kard iropeiav roJ KXeopLevei, rd Se Sevrepov

TTapard^eojs rjrrrjdrjaav ev rols AahoKeiois KaXovrrjs MeyaAoTToAtTtSo?, ore /cat AfStaSa?
eireae, rd Se rpirov oXoaxepdJs eTrraicrav ev rfj
Au/xata Trept rd KaXovptevov 'E/caro/x^atoi^, Trai/4 SrjpLel StaKLvSuvevovres , ror^ yjSr) rcov irpayp-aroiv
ovKeri hidovrojv dvaarpo(f)r]v T^my/ca^e ra irepie/c

pLevois

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the case of the Acrocorinthus. Therefore, when the Megalopolitans appeared before the General Council of the League, and showing the king’s letter, assured them of his friendly sentiments, at the same time begging the Achaeans to ask for his intervention at once, and when Aratus saw that this was the inclination of the Achaean also, he rose, and after expressing his gratification at the king’s readiness to assist them and his approval of the attitude of the meeting, he addressed them at some length, begging them if possible to attempt to save their cities and country by their own efforts, that being the most honourable and advantageous course, but, should adverse fortune prevent this, then, but only when they had no hope left in their own resources, he advised them to resort to an appeal to their friends for aid. 51. The people applauded his speech, and a decree was passed to leave things as they were for the present and conduct the war unaided. But a series of disasters overtook them. In the first place Ptolemy threw over the League and began to give financial support to Cleomenes with a view of setting him on to attack Antigonus, as he hoped to be able to keep in check more effectually the projects of the Macedonian kings with the support of the Lacedaemonians than with that of the Achaean. Next the Achaean were worsted by Cleomenes while on the march near the Lyceum and again in a pitched battle at a place in the territory of Megalopolis called Ladocia, Lydiades falling here, and finally their whole force met with utter defeat at the Hecatombaeum in the territory of Dyme. Circumstances now no longer permitting delay, they were compelled by their position to
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eστῶτα καταφεύγειν ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον.
5 ἐν ὦ καρδὶ πρεσβευτὴν τὸν ὑδὸν ἔξαποστείλας Ἀρατὸς πρὸς Ἀντίγονον ἐβεβαιώσατο τὰ περὶ τῆς
6 Βοηθείας. παρεῖχε δ' αὐτοῖς ἀπορίαν καὶ δυσχρη-
στίαν μεγίστην τὸ μήτε τὸν βασιλέα δοκεῖν ἃν ἄν
βοηθήσαι χωρίς τοῦ κομίσασθαί τοῦ Ἀκροκόρινθον
καὶ λαβεῖν ὀρμητήριον πρὸς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον
tὴν τῶν Κορινθίων πόλιν, μήτε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἣν
τολμῆσαι Κορινθίους ἄκοινται ἐγχειρίσαι Μακεδόνι.
7 διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὑπέρθεσεν ἐσχε τὸ διαβούλιον
χάριν τῆς περὶ τῶν πίστεων ἐπισκέψεως.

52 Ὁ δὲ Ἐκλεομένης, καταπληξάμενος τοῖς προειρ-
μένοις εὐτυχήμαι, λοιπὸν ἀδεῶς ἐπεπορεύετο τὰς
πόλεις, ἃς μὲν πεῖθων, αἰς δὲ τὸν φόβον ἀνατεινό-
μενος. προσλαβὼν δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ Καφύς,
Πελλήνην, Φενεόν, Ἀργος, Φλισοῦτα, Κλεωνᾶς,
Ἐπιδαυρόν, Ἑρμιόνα, Τροίζηνα, τελευταῖον Κό-
ρινθον, αὐτὸς μὲν προσεστρατοπέδευσε τῇ τῶν
Σικυωνίων πόλει, τοὺς δὲ Ἀχαιοὺς ἀπέλυσε τοὺς
3 μεγίστου προβλήματος. τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων τῷ
μὲν Ἀράτωι στρατηγοῦντι καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς
παραγγειλάντων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι,
πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἐκλεομένην διαπεμπόμενον καὶ καλοῦ-
τον, παρεδόθη τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀφορμῆ καὶ πρόφασις
4 ἐὐλογος. ἦς ἐπιλαβόμενος Ἀρατός καὶ προτείνας
Ἀντιγόνῳ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, κατεχόντων Ἀχαιῶν
tότε τὸν τόπον τούτον, ἔλυσε μὲν τὸ γεγονός
ἐγκλημα πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν, ἵκανὴν δὲ πίστιν παρ-
έσχετο τῆς πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα κοινωνίας, τὸ δὲ
συνέχου, ὀρμητήριον παρεσκεύασεν Ἀντιγόνῳ πρὸς
τὸν κατὰ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλεμον.
5 Ὁ δὲ Ἐκλεομένης, ἐπιγνοὺς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς συν-
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appeal with one voice to Antigonus. Aratus on this occasion sent his son as envoy to the king and ratified the terms of the alliance. They were, however, in considerable doubt and difficulty about the Acrocorinthus, as they did not think Antigonus would come to their assistance unless it were restored to him, so that he could use Corinth as a base for the present war, nor could they go to the length of handing over the Corinthians against their will to Macedon. This even caused at first an adjournment of the Council for the consideration of the guarantees they offered.

52. Cleomenes, having inspired terror by the victories I mentioned, henceforth made an unimpeded progress through the cities, gaining some by persuasion and others by threats. He annexed in this manner Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneus, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae, Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and finally Corinth. He now sat down in front of Sicyon, but he had solved the chief difficulty of the Achaecans; for the Corinthians by ordering Aratus, who was then Strategus, and the Achaecans to quit Corinth, and by sending to invite Cleomenes, furnished the Achaecans with good and reasonable ground for offering to Antigonus the Acrocorinthus then held by them. Availing himself of this, Aratus not only atoned for his former offence to the royal house, but gave sufficient guarantee of future loyalty, further providing Antigonus with a base for the war against Lacedaemon.

Cleomenes, when he became aware of the under-
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tudemévous tα πρός τον Ἀντίγονον, ἀναξεύξας ἀπὸ τοῦ Σικυώνος, κατεστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ, διαλαβὼν χάρακι καὶ τάφρων τοὺς μεταξὺ τόπον τοῦ τ' Ἀκροκορίνθου καὶ τῶν Ὀνείων καλουμένων ὅρων, πάσαν ἦδη βεβαιῶς περιεληφὼς ταῖς ἐλπίσι τὴν
6 Πελοποννησίων ἄρχην. Ἀντίγονος δὲ πάλαι μὲν ἦν ἐν παρασκευῇ, καραδοκῶν τὸ μέλλον κατὰ τὰς
7 ύποθέσεις τὰς Ἀράτου· τότε δὲ συλλογιζόμενος ἐκ τῶν προσπιπτόντων ὅσον οὐποὶ παρεῖναι τὸν Κλεο-
μένη μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς Θετταλίαν, διασπηφά-
μενος πρὸς τε τὸν Ἀρατον καὶ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁμολογημένων, ἤκεν ἔχον τὰς δυνάμεις διὰ
8 τῆς Εὐβοίας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσθμοῦ. οἱ γὰρ Αἰτωλοὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀλλοὺς καὶ τότε βουλόμενοι κωλύσαν τὸν Ἀντί-
γονον τῆς βοηθείας, ἀπείπων αὐτῷ πορεύεσθαι μετὰ δυνάμεως ἐντὸς Πυλῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, διότι κωλύσουσι
μεθ' ὀπλῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν δίοδον.
9 'Ο μὲν οὖν Ἀντίγονος καὶ Κλεομένης ἀντεστρα-
topέδευον ἄλληλοι, ὁ μὲν εἰσελθεῖν σπουδάζων εἰς Πελοπόννησον, ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης κωλύσαι τῆς εἰσ-
53 ὁδοῦ τὸν Ἀντίγονον. οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοὶ, καίπερ οὐ με-
tρίως ἠλαττωμένοι τοῖς ὀλοίς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίσταντο τῆς προθέσεως οὔτ' ἐγκατέλειπον τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλ-
2 πίδας, ἀλλ' ἀμα τῷ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν Ἀργείων ἐπαναστήναι τοῖς Κλεομενισταῖς, βοηθήσαντες καὶ
παρευπασώντες μετὰ Τιμοζένου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ,
3 κατέλαβον τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων πόλιν. ὁ δὴ καὶ νο-
mιστέοις αἰτιώτατον γεγονέναι πραγμάτων κατορθώ-
σεως. τὸ γὰρ ἐπιλαβόμενον τῆς ὀρμῆς τοῦ Κλεο-
μένους καὶ προητήσαν τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δυνάμεων τοῦτ' ἦν, ὡς ἐξ αὐτῶν φανερὸν ἐγένετο τῶν πραγ-
4 μάτων. καὶ γὰρ τὸποὺς εὐφυεστέρους προκατέχων,
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standing between the Achaeans and Antigonus, left Sicyon and encamped on the Isthmus, uniting by a palisade and trench the Aerocorinthus and the mountain called the Ass's Back, regarding confidently the whole Peloponnese as being henceforth his own domain. Antigonus had been for long making his preparations, awaiting the turn of events, as Aratus had recommended, but now, judging from the progress of events that Cleomenes was on the point of appearing in Thessaly with his army, he communicated with Aratus and the Achaeans reminding them of the terms of their treaty, and passing through Euboea with his forces, reached the Isthmus, the Aetolians having, in addition to other measures they took to prevent his assisting the Achaeans, forbidden him to advance with an army beyond Thermopylae, threatening, if he attempted it, to oppose his passage.

Antigonus and Cleomenes now faced each other, 224 B.C. the former bent on penetrating into the Peloponnesian and the latter on preventing him. 53. The Achaeans, although they had suffered such serious reverses, yet did not abandon their purpose or their self-reliance, but on Aristoteles of Argos revolting against the partisans of Cleomenes, they sent a force to his assistance and entering the city by surprise under the command of their Strategus, Timoxenus, established themselves there. We should look on this achievement as the principal cause of the improvement in their fortunes which ensued. For events clearly showed that it was this which checked Cleomenes' ardour and subdued in advance the spirit of his troops. Though his position was
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καὶ χορηγίαις δαφνεστέραις Ἀντιγόνου χρώμενος, καὶ τόλμη καὶ φιλοτιμία μείζονι παρωρμημένος, ὁμοίως ἀμα τῷ προσπεσεῖν αὐτῷ διότι κατελήφθαι συμβαίνει τῇ τῶν Ἀργείων πόλιν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, εὐθὺς ἀνάσπαστος, ἀπολυπών τὰ προδεδηλωμένα προτερήματα, φυγῇ παραπλησίαν ἐποιεῖτο τῇ ἀποχώρησιν, δείσας μὴ πανταχόθεν αὐτὸν περιστῶσιν 6 οἱ πολέμιοι. παραπεσοῦν δ' εἰς Ἀργος, καὶ κατὰ ποσὸν ἀντιποινασάμενοι τῆς πόλεως, μετὰ ταῦτα γενναῖος μὲν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, φιλοτίμως δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων ἐκ μεταμελείας αὐτῶν ἁμυναμένων, ἀποπεσόν καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, καὶ ποιημάτων τὴν πορείαν διὰ Μαντινείας, οὕτως ἐπανήλθεν εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην.

54 ὁ δ' Ἀντιγόνος ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον εἰσελθὼν παρέλαβε τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, οὐδένα δὲ χρόνον μείνας εἶχετο τῶν προκειμένων καὶ παρῆν 2 εἰς Ἀργος. ἐπανέσας δὲ τοὺς Ἀργείους, καὶ καταστημάτως τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, αὖθις ἐκ ποδὸς ἥκινεν, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ Ἀρ-3 καδίας. ἐκβαλὼν δὲ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐκ τῶν ἐποικο-δομηθέντων χωρίων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους κατὰ τε τὴν Ἀιγίνην καὶ Βελιμνάτην χώραν, καὶ παραδόσα τὰ φρούρια Μεγαλοπόλεις, ἦκε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν 4 σύνοδον εἰς Λύγιον. ἀπολογισάμενος δὲ περὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτῶν καὶ χρηματίσας περὶ τῶν μελλόντων, ἐτι δὲ κατασταθεῖς ἄγρευμοι ἅπαντων τῶν συμ-5 μάχων, μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον μὲν των παραχεμάζον διέτριβε περὶ Σικυώνα καὶ Κόρινθον. τῆς δ' ἐαρινῆς ὄφρας ἐνσταμένης ἀναλαβῶν τὰς δυνάμεις 6 προῆγε. καὶ διανύσας τριτάιοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν Τε-γεατῶν πόλιν, ἀπηντηκότων καὶ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν ἐν-

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stronger than that of Antigonus, and he was much better off for supplies, as well as animated by greater courage and ambition, no sooner did the news reach him that Argos had been seized by the Achaeans than he instantly took himself off, abandoning all these advantages, and made a precipitate retreat, fearing to be surrounded on all sides by the enemy. Gaining entrance to Argos he possessed himself of part of the city, but, on the Achaeans making a gallant resistance, in which the Argives joined with all the zeal of renegades, this plan broke down too, and, marching by way of Mantinea, he returned to Sparta.

54. Antigonus now safely entered the Peloponnese and took possession of the Acrocorinthus and, without wasting any time there, pushed on and reached Argos. Having thanked the Argives and put matters in the city on a proper footing, he moved on again at once, making for Arcadia. After having ejected the garrisons from the forts that Cleomenes had built there to command the country in the territory of Aegys and Belbina, and handed over these forts to the Megalopolitans, he returned to Aegium where the Council of the Achaean League was in session. He gave them an account of the measures he had taken and arranged with them for the future conduct of the war. They hereupon appointed him generalissimo of all the allied forces, and after this he retired for a short time to his winter quarters near Sicyon and Corinth. Early in spring he advanced with his army and reached Tegea in three days. Here the Achaeans joined him, and the
tautha, perioratopedeousas ἦρξατο πολυρκείν αὖ-7 τήν. τῶν δὲ Μακεδώνων ἐνεργῶς χρωμένων τῇ τε λουτῇ πολυρκία καὶ τοῖς ὑφύγμασι, ταχέως ἀπελ-πίσαντες οἱ Τεγεάται τὴν σωτηρίαν παρέδωσαν αὖ-8 τοὺς. ὃ δ’ Ἀντίγονος, ἀσφαλισάμενος τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, εἶχε τοῖς τὸ συνεχὲς τῶν ἡξῆς, καὶ προῆ-9 κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν. ἐγγύσας δὲ τῷ Κλεομένει προκαθημένῳ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ χώρας κατεπε'-10 ραξε, καὶ συνίστατο τινας ἀκροβολισμοὺς. προσπε-ςόντος δὲ διὰ τῶν κατασκόπων αὐτῷ τοὺς ἔξ Ὁρ-χομενοῦ στρατιώτας παραβεβηθηκέναι πρὸς τὸν Κλεομένη, παρατυπικά ποιησάμενος ἀναξιγνή ὅπει-11 γετο. καὶ τὸν μὲν Ὁρχομενοῦ ἔξ ἐφόδου κατὰ κρά-τος εἶλε: μετά δὲ ταῦτα περιστρατοπεδεύσας τὴν12 τῶν Μαντινέων ἐπολιόρκει τόλιν. τεχὺ δὲ καὶ ταὐτην καταπληξαμένων τῶν Μακεδώνων καὶ λα-βόντων ὑποχείριον, ἀναξεύτας προῆ γε τὴν ἐφ’13 Ἡραίας καὶ Τελφούσης. παραλαβὼν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα14 τὰς πόλεις, ἐθελοῦτην προσχωρησάντων αὐτῷ τῶν κατοικοῦντων, οὔτως ἦδη συνάπτοντος τοῦ χειμῶνος παρῆν εἰς Αἴγιον πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύνωδον.15 καὶ τοὺς μὲν Μακεδόνας ἔπ’ οἶκου διαφήκε πάντας16 εἰς τὴν χειμασίαν, αὐτὸς δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς διελέγετο καὶ συνδιενοεῖτο περὶ τῶν ἐνεστῶτων.

55 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καίρους τούτους συνθεωρῶν ὁ Κλεομένης τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις διαφεμένας, τὸν δ’ Ἀντίγονον μετὰ τῶν μισθοφόρων ἐν Αἴγιοι διατρί-βουτα, καὶ τριῶν ἥμερῶν ὄθον ἀφεστώτα τῆς Μεγά-2 λῆς πόλεως, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ταύτην εἰδῶς δυσφύλα-κτον οὕσαι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν, τότε δὲ καὶ βαθύμως τηρουμένην διὰ τὴν Ἀντιγόνου παρουσίαν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀπολωλότας τοὺς
BOOK II

siege of the city was opened. The Macedonians conducted the siege energetically, especially by mining, and the Tegeans soon gave up all hope of holding out and surrendered. Antigonus, after securing the city, continued to pursue his plan of campaign and advanced rapidly on Laconia. He encountered Cleomenes posted on the frontier to defend Laconia and began to harass him, a few skirmishes taking place; but on learning from his scouts that the troops from Oechomenus had left to come to the aid of Cleomenes, he at once hastily abandoned his position and, breaking up his camp, withdrew. He surprised Oechomenus, and captured it by assault, and after this he laid siege to Mantinea which likewise the Macedonians soon frightened into submission, and then he advanced on Heraea and Telphusa which the inhabitants surrendered to him of their own accord. The winter was now approaching. Antigonus came to Aegium to be present at the meeting of the Achaean Synod, and dismissing all his Macedonians to their homes for the winter, occupied himself in discussing the present situation with the Achaeans and making joint plans for the future.

55. Cleomenes at this juncture had observed that Antigonus had dismissed his other troops and, keeping only his mercenaries with him, was spending the time at Aegium at a distance of three days' march from Megalopolis. He knew that this latter city was very difficult to defend, owing to its extent and partial desolation, that it was at present very carelessly guarded owing to the presence of Antigonus in the Peloponnese, and above all that it had lost the
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πλείστους τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸ
3 Δύκαιον καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τῇ περὶ Λαδόκεια μάχῃ,
λαβὼν συνεργοὺς τινας τῶν ἐκ Μεσσήνης φυγάδων,
οῖ διατρίβουσες ἑτύγχανον ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ πόλει,
παρεισῆλθε διὰ τούτων λάθρα νυκτὸς ἐντὸς τῶν
4 τειχῶν. τῆς δ' ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης παρ' ὅλιγον
ηλθε τοῦ μη μόνον ἐκπεσείν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς οἷοις
κυδυνεύσαι διὰ τὴν εὐφυχίαν τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν.
5 οἱ δ' καὶ πρισὶ μησὶ πρότερον αὐτῷ συνέβη παθεῖν
παρευσπεσόντι κατά τὸν Κωλαιόν προσαγορεύμενον
6 τόπον τῆς πόλεως. τότε δὲ τῷ πλήθει τῆς δυνά-
μεως καὶ τῷ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς εὐκαίρους
tόπους καθίκετο τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, καὶ πέρας ἐκβαλὼν
7 τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας κατέσχε τὴν πόλιν. γενόμενος
δ' ἐγκρατής οὐτώς αὐτὴν πικρῶς διέφθειρε καὶ
δυσμενῶς ὅστε μηδ' ἔλπισα μηδένα διότι δύνατ' 8
ἀν συνοικισθῆναι πάλιν. τούτῳ δὲ ποιήσατι μοι
δοκεῖ διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὰς τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις παρὰ
μόνοις Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ Στυμφαλίοις μηδέποτε
dυνηθῆναι μηδ' αἱρετισθῆναι καὶ κοινωνῶν τῶν ἱδίων
9 ἐλπίδων μήτε προδότην κατασκευάσασθαι. τὸ μὲν
gάρ Κλειτορίων φιλελεύθερον καὶ γενναίον εἰς
ἀνὴρ κατήχονε διὰ τὴν ἔαυτον κακίαν, Θεάρκης' 10
ὅν εἰκότως ἔξαρνούνται Κλειτόριοι μὴ φύσι παρὰ
σφίσι, γενέσθαι δ' ὑποβολμιαίον ἐξ Ὠρχομενοῦ τῶν
ἐπηλύδων τινὸς στρατιωτῶν.

56 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Ἀράτω
γεγραφότων παρ' εἰς ἀποδοχῆς ἀξιοῦται Φύλαρ-
χος, ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν ἁγία γράφων
2 αὐτῶ, χρήσιμον εἰς εἰς, μάλλον δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν,
ἔρατων προηγημένοις κατακόλουθείν περὶ τῶν Κλεο-
greater part of its citizens of military age in the battles at the Lycaeum and at Ladoecia. He therefore procured the co-operation of certain Messenian exiles then living in Megalopolis and by their means got inside the walls secretly by night. On day breaking, he came very near not only being driven out, but meeting with complete disaster owing to the bravery of the Megalopolitans, who had indeed expelled and defeated him three months previously when he entered the city by surprise in the quarter called Colaeum. But on this occasion, owing to the strength of his forces, and owing to his having had time to seize on the most advantageous positions, his project succeeded, and finally he drove out the Megalopolitans and occupied their city. On possessing himself of it, he destroyed it with such systematic cruelty and animosity, that nobody would have thought it possible that it could ever be re-inhabited. I believe him to have acted so, because the Megalopolitans and Stymphalians were the only peoples from among whom in the varied circumstances of his career he could never procure himself a single partisan to share in his projects or a single traitor. For in the case of the Clitorians their noble love of freedom was sullied by the malpractices of one man Thearcæs whom, as one would expect, they naturally deny to have been a native-born citizen, affirming that he was the son of a foreign soldier and foisted in from Orchomenus.

56. Since, among those authors who were contemporaries of Aratus, Phylarchus, who on many points is at variance and in contradiction with him, is by some received as trustworthy, it will be useful or rather necessary for me, as I have chosen to rely on Aratus' narrative for the history of the Cleomenic
μενικῶν, μή παραλιπεῖν ἀσκεπτον τούτο τὸ μέρος, ἢνα μή τὸ ἤθελος ἐν τοίς συγγράμμασιν ἱσόδυνα- 
3 μοῦν ἀπολείπωμεν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. καθόλου 
μὲν οὖν ὁ συγγραφεὺς οὗτος πολλὰ παρ’ ὅλην τὴν 
4 πραγματείαν εἰκή καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν εἰρήκε. πλὴν περὶ 
μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιτιμᾶν κατὰ 
τὸ παρόν οὔτ’ ἐξακριβοῦν· ὦσα δὲ συνεπιβάλλει 
τοῖς υἱ’ Ἰμιῶν γραφομένους καιροῖς, ταύτα δ’ ἔστι 
τὰ περὶ τῶν Κλεομενικῶν πόλεμον, ὅπερ τούτων 
5 ἀναγκαίον ἔστιν Ἰμιῶν διευκρινεῖν. ἔσται δὲ πάν-
τως ἄρκοντα ταύτα πρὸς τὸ καὶ τὴν ὅλην αὐτοῦ 
προαιρέσει καὶ δύναμιν ἐν τῇ πραγματείᾳ κατα-
6 μαθεῖν. βουλόμενος δὴ διασαφεῖν τὴν ἰμότητα τῆν 
’Αντιγόνου καὶ Μακεδόνων, ἀμα δὲ τούτοις τῆν 
’Αράτου καὶ τῶν ’Αχαιῶν, φησὶ τοὺς Μαντινέας 
γενομένους ὑποχειρίως μεγάλους περιπεσεῖν ἀτυχή-
μασί, καὶ τὴν ἀρχαιοτάτην καὶ μεγίστην πόλιν τῶν 
κατὰ τὴν ’Αρκαδίαν τηλικαύτας παλαίσαι συμφο-
ραίς ὡστε πάντας εἰς ἐπίστασαν καὶ δάκρυα τοὺς 
7 Ἑλλήνας ἀγαγεῖν. σπουδάζων δ’ εἰς ἐλεον ἐκκα-
λεῖσθαι τούς ἀναγινώσκοντας καὶ συμπαθεῖς ποιεῖν 
τοῖς λεγομένους, εἰσάγει περιπλοκὰς γνωακῶν καὶ 
κόμας διερριμένας καὶ μαστῶν ἐκβολάς, πρὸς δὲ 
τούτοις δάκρυα καὶ θρήνους ἀνδρῶν καὶ γνωακῶν 
ἀναμιξέ τέκνους καὶ γονεύσῃ γηραιοῖς ἀπαγομένων. 
8 ποιεῖ δὲ τούτῳ παρ’ ὅλην τὴν ἱστορίαν, πειρόμενος 
ἐν ἐκάστοις αἰεὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τιθέναι τὰ δεινά. 
9 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἁγεννέσ καὶ γνωακῶδες τῆς αἱρέσεως 
αὐτοῦ παρεῖςθω, τὸ δ’ τῆς ἱστορίας οἰκεῖον ἀμα 
10 καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξεταζέσθω. δεῖ τοιγαροῦ οὐκ ἐκ-
πλήττειν τὸν συγγραφέα περατεύομεν διὰ τῆς 
ἰστορίας τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐνδεχομέ-
war, not to leave the question of their relative credibibility undiscussed, so that truth and falsehood in their writings may no longer be of equal authority. In general Phylarchus through his whole work makes many random and careless statements; but while perhaps it is not necessary for me at present to criticize in detail the rest of these, I must minutely examine such as relate to events occurring in the period with which I am now dealing, that of the Cleomenic war. This partial examination will however be quite sufficient to convey an idea of the general purpose and character of his work. Wishing, for instance, to insist on the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians and also on that of Aratus and the Achaeans, he tells us that the Mantineans, when they surrendered, were exposed to terrible sufferings and that such were the misfortunes that overtook this, the most ancient and greatest city in Arcadia, as to impress deeply and move to tears all the Greeks. In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers he treats us to a picture of clinging women with their hair dishevelled and their breasts bare, or again of crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery. This sort of thing he keeps up throughout his history, always trying to bring horrors vividly before our eyes. Leaving aside the ignoble and womanish character of such a treatment of his subject, let us consider how far it is proper or serviceable to history. A historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures, nor should he, like a tragic

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a Clinging either to each other or to the altars of their gods.
the histories of polybius

νους λόγους ζητεῖν καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα τοῖς ὑπο-κειμένοις ἐξαρκισθαι, καθάπερ οἱ τραγῳδιογρά-φοι, τῶν δὲ πραξθέντων καὶ ῥηθέντων καὶ ἀλή-θειαν αὐτῶν μημονεύειν πάμπαν, κἂν πάνυ μέτρια

11 τυγχάνωσιν ὄντα. τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἱστορίας καὶ τραγῳδίας ὁ ταύτων, ἀλλὰ τούπαντιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ
dεὶ διὰ τῶν πιθανωτάτων λόγων ἐκπλήξαι καὶ φυχ-αγωγήσαι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τοὺς ἀκούόντας, ἐνθάδε
dὲ διὰ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἐργῶν καὶ λόγων εἰς τὸν
pάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πείσαι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦν-

12 τας, ἐπειδὴ περ ἐν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἤγεῖται τὸ πιθανόν,
κἂν ἢ ψεῦδος, διὰ τὴν ἀπάτην τῶν θεωμένων, ἐν
dὲ τούτοις τάληθες διὰ τὴν ὄφελειαν τῶν φιλο-

13 μαθοῦντων. χωρίς τε τούτων τὰς πλείστας ἢμῖν ἔξ-

ηγεῖται τῶν περιπτειῶν, οὐχ ὑποτιθεὶς αὐτίαν καὶ

14 τρόπον τοῖς γνωμένοις, ἄν χωρίς οὔτε ἔλεειν εὐ-

λόγως οὔτε ὀργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως δυνατὸν ἐπ'

15 οὐδενὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων. ἐπεὶ τίς ἀνθρώπων οὐ
dεινόν ἤγεῖται τύπτεσθαι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους; ἀλλ' ὄμως,

16 ἡμῶν, ἐάν μὲν ἄρχουν ἀδίκων χειρῶν πάθη τις
tοῦτο, δικαίως κρίνεται πεποιθέναι· ἐάν δ' ἐπὶ
dιορθώσει καὶ μαθήσει ταύτα τοῦτο γίνηται, προσ-ἐτι καὶ τιμῆς καὶ χάριτος οἱ τύπτοντες τοὺς ἐλευ-

15 θέρους ἄξιονται. καὶ μὴν τὸ γε τοὺς πολίτας ἀπο-

κτεινώναι μέγιστον ἀσέβημα τίθεται καὶ μεγίστων
ἀξίων προστίμων· καίτοι γε προφανῶς ὁ μὲν τῶν
cλέπτην ἢ μοιχὸν ἀποκτείνας ἀθῶος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ τῶν

16 προδότην ἢ τύραννον τιμῶν καὶ προεδρίας τυγ-

χάνει παρὰ πᾶσιν. οὔτως ἐν παντὶ τὸ τέλος κεῖται

a Literally "a reserved seat in the theatre or elsewhere."
poet, try to imagine the probable utterances of his characters or reckon up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals, but simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace. For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates, since in the one case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, the purpose being to create illusion in spectators, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer benefit on learners. Apart from this, Phylarchus simply narrates most of such catastrophes and does not even suggest their causes or the nature of these causes, without which it is impossible in any case to feel either legitimate pity or proper anger. Who, for instance, does not think it an outrage for a free man to be beaten? but if this happen to one who was the first to resort to violence, we consider that he got only his desert, while where it is done for the purpose of correction or discipline, those who strike free men are not only excused but deemed worthy of thanks and praise. Again, to kill a citizen is considered the greatest of crimes and that deserving the highest penalty, but obviously he who kills a thief or adulterer is guiltless, and the slayer of a traitor or tyrant everywhere meets with honour and distinction. So in every such case the final criterion
tής διαλήψεως ὑπὲρ τούτων οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τελουμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς αἰτίαις καὶ προαίρεσει τῶν πραττόντων καὶ ταῖς τούτων διαφοράῖς.

57 Μαντινεῖς τοίνυν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἑγκαταλιπόντες τὴν μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν ἔθελον τὴν Ἀιτωλοῖς ἑνεχείρισαν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, μετὰ 2 δὲ ταύτα Κλεομένει. γεγονότες δ' ἐπὶ τοιαύτης προαίρεσεως καὶ μετέχοντες τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας ἔτει τετάρτῳ πρότερον τῆς Ἀντιγόνου παρουσίας ἐάλωσαν κατὰ κράτος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν,

3 Ἀρατοῦ πραξικοπήσαντος αὐτῶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν δ' καιρῷ τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχον τοῦ παθεῖν τι δεινὸν διὰ τὴν προειρημένην ἁμαρτίαν, ὡς καὶ περιβόητον συνεκβη γενέσθαι τὸ πραχθὲν διὰ τὴν δἐυτηστα τῆς κατὰ 4 τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀμφοτέρων μεταβολῆς. ἀμα γὰρ τῷ κατασχεῖν τὴν πόλιν "Ἀρατος παραντικα μὲν τοῖς υφ' αὐτῶν ταττομένοις παρῆγγελλε μηδένα μηδενὸς 5 ἀπεσθαί τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἔξης δὲ τούτοις τούς Μαντινεάς συναθροίσας παρεκάλεσε θαρρεῖν καὶ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν Ἰδίων. ὑπάρξειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν 6 πολιτευμένοις μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. τοῖς δὲ Μαντινεύσιν ἀνυπονοητοῦ καὶ παραδόξου φανείσης τῆς ἑλπίδος, παραντικα πάντες ἐπὶ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐγέ- 7 νοτο γνώμης. καὶ πρὸς οὖς μικρῷ πρότερον μαχόμενοι πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπείδον ἀπολλυμένοις, οὐκ ὅλοις δ' αὐτῶν βιαίως τραύμασι περιπεσόντας, τούτοις εἰς τὰς Ἰδίας οἰκίας εἰσαγό-μενοι καὶ ποιησάμενοι σφίσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀναγκαίως ὁμεστίοις, οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπτον τῆς μετ' ἄλληλων 8 φιλοφροσύνης, και τοῦτ' εἰκότως ἐποίουν. οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' εἴ τινες ἀνθρώπων εὐγνωμονεστέρους ἐνέτυχον πολέμιοι οὐδ' εἴ τινες ἀβλαβέστερον ἐπάλαισαν τοῖς 380
of good and evil lies not in what is done, but in the different reasons and different purposes of the doer.

57. Now the Mantineans had, in the first instance, deserted the Achaean League, and of their own free will put themselves and their city into the hands first of the Aetolians and then of Cleomenes. They had deliberately ranged themselves on his side and been admitted to Spartan citizenship, when, four years before the invasion of Antigonus, their city was betrayed to Aratus and forcibly occupied by the Achaean. On this occasion, so far from their being cruelly treated owing to their recent delinquency, the circumstances became celebrated because of the sudden revulsion of sentiments on both sides. For immediately Aratus had the city in his hands, he at once issued orders to his troops to keep their hands off the property of others, and next, calling an assembly of the Mantineans, bade them be of good courage and retain possession of all they had; for if they joined the Achaean League he would assure their perfect security. The prospect of safety thus suddenly revealed to them took the Mantineans completely by surprise, and there was an instantaneous and universal reversal of feeling. The very men at whose hands they had seen, in the fight that had just closed, many of their kinsmen slain and many grievously wounded, were now taken into their houses, and received into their families with whom they lived on the kindest possible terms. This was quite natural, for I never heard of any men meeting with kinder enemies or being less injured by what is considered the greatest of
μεγίστοις δοκοῦσιν εἶναι συμπτώμασι Μαντινέων
dιὰ τὴν Ἀράτον καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς φιλαν-
θρωπίαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προορώμενοι τὰς ἐν αὐ-
τοῖς στάσεις καὶ τὰς ὑπ' Αἴτωλῶν καὶ Λακεδαμιο-
νίων ἐπιβουλάς, προσβεύσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς
2 ἥξισαν δοῦναι παραφυλακὴν αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ πει-
σθέντες ἀπεκλήρωσαν ἐξ αὐτῶν τριακοσίων ἁνδρῶν
δὲν οἱ λαχώντες ὀρμησαν ἀπολυπόντες τὰς ἱδίας πα-
τρίδας καὶ τοὺς βίους, καὶ διέτριβον ἐν Μαντινείᾳ,
παραφυλάττοντες τὴν ἐκείνων ἠλευθεριάν ἀμα καὶ
3 σωτηρίαν. σὺν δὲ τούτους καὶ μισθοφόρους διακο-
σίους ἔξεπεμψαν, οἱ μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συνδιετήρουν
4 τὴν ὑποκειμένην αὐτοῖς κατάστασιν. μετ' οὖν πολὺ
dὲ στασιάσαντες πρὸς σφᾶς οἱ Μαντινεῖς, καὶ Λα-
κεδαμινῖοις ἐπισπασάμενοι, τὴν τε πόλιν ἐνεχείρι-
σαν καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν διατρίβοντας παρ'
αὐτοῖς κατέσφαξαν. οὐ μείζον παρασπόνδημα καὶ
5 δεινότερον οὐδ' εἰπεὶν εὔμαρές. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔδοξε
σφῶς καθόλου τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἔθνος χάριν καὶ φιλίαν
ἀθετεῖν, τῶν γε προειρημένοιν ἀνδρῶν ἐχρὴν ὅππον
φεισαμένους ἑσάσα πάντας ὑποσπόνδους ἀπελθεῖν:
6 τούτω γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πολέμιοις ἔθος ἐστὶ συγχωρεῖ-
σθαι κατὰ τοὺς κοινούς τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμους.
7 οἱ δ' ἱνα Κλεομένει καὶ Λακεδαμινῖοι ἴκανὴν παρά-
σχωντα πίστιν πρὸς τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν ἐπιβολήν, τὰ
κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δίκαια παραβάντες τὸ μέγι-
8 στὸν ἁσέβημα κατὰ προσαίρεσιν ἐπετελέσαν. τὸ γὰρ
τούτων αὐτόχειρας γενέσθαι καὶ τιμωροῦς οἴτινες
πρότερον μὲν κατὰ κράτος λαβόντες αὐτοὺς ἅθεοὺς
ἀφῆκαν, τότε δὲ τὴν ἐκείνων ἠλευθερίαν καὶ σωτη-
9 ρίαν ἐφύλαττον. πηλίκης ὀργῆς ἐστὶν ἄξιον; τί δ' ἄν
παθῶντες οὕτω δίκην δόξαιεν ἀρμόζουσαν δε-
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calamities than the Mantineans, all owing to their humane treatment by Aratus and the Achaean.

58. Subsequently, as they foresew discord among themselves and plots by the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians, they sent an embassy to the Achaean asking for a garrison. The Achaean consented and chose by lot three hundred of their own citizens, who set forth, abandoning their own houses and possessions, and remained in Mantinea to watch over the liberty and safety of its townsmen. At the same time they sent two hundred hired soldiers, who aided this Achaean force in safeguarding the established government. Very soon however the Mantineans fell out with the Achaean, and, inviting the Lacedaemonians, put the city into their hands and massacred the garrison the Achaean had sent them. It is difficult to find words to characterize the magnitude and atrocity of this act of treachery. For in resolving to forswear their friendship and gratitude, they should at least have spared the lives of these men and allowed them all to depart under terms. Such treatment is, by the common law of nations, accorded even to enemies; but the Mantineans, simply in order to give Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians a satisfactory guarantee of their good faith in this undertaking, violated the law recognized by all mankind and deliberately committed the most heinous of crimes. Vengeful murderers of the very men who previously on capturing their city had left them unharmed, and who now were guarding their liberties and lives—against such men, one asks oneself, can any indignation be too strong? What should we consider to be an adequate punishment for them? Someone might
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dωκέναι; τυχόν ἵσως εἴποι τις ἂν, πραθέντες μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν, ἐπεὶ κατεπολεμήθησαν. ἀλλὰ
10 τοῦτό γε καὶ τοῖς μηθέν ἀσέβεις ἐπιτελεσάμενοι κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους ὑπόκειται παθεῖν. οὐκοῦν ὀλοσχερότερας τινὸς καὶ μεῖζονος τυχεῖν
11 ἦσαν ἄξιοι τιμωρίας, ὡστ' εἶπερ ἕπαθον ἡ Φύλαρχὸς φήσιν, οὐκ ἔλεον εἰκὸς ἢν συνεξακολουθεῖν αὐτοῖς παρὰ τῶν Ἐλλήνων, ἔπαινον δὲ καὶ συγκατάθεσιν μᾶλλον τοῖς πράττονσι καὶ μεταπορευο-
12 μένους τὴν ἀσέβειαν αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδενὸς περαιτέρω συνεξακολουθήσαντος Μαντινείδοι κατὰ τὴν περιπέτειαν πλὴν τοῦ διαρπαγῆν οἱ τῶν βίους καὶ πραθήματα τοὺς ἐλευθέρους, ὁ συγγραφεύς αὐτῆς τῆς περατείας χάριν οὐ μόνον ψεῦδος εἰσήγηκε τὸ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀπίθανον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερ-βολὴν τῆς ἁγνοίας οὐδὲ τὸ παρακείμενον ἡδυνήθη συνεπιστήσαι, πῶς οἱ αὐτοὶ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς κυριεύσαντες Τεγεατῶν κατὰ κράτος οὐδέν
13 τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπράξαν. καίτοι γ' εἰ μὲν ἡ τῶν πραττόντων ὁμότης ἢν αἰτία, καὶ τούτους εἰκὸς ἢν πε-
pουθέναι ταύτα τοῖς υπὸ τὸν αὐτόν ὑποπεπτωκόσι
14 καιρόν. εἰ δὲ περὶ μόνους γέγονε Μαντινεῖς ἡ διαφορά, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὀργῆς ἀνάγκη διαφέρουσαν γεγονέναι περὶ τούτους.
59 Πάλιν Ἀριστόμαχον τὸν Ἀργείων φήσιν ἄνδρα τῆς ἐπιφανεστάτης οἰκίας ὑπάρχοντα, καὶ τετυρα-
νηκότα μὲν Ἀργείων, πεφυκότα δ' ἐκ τυράννων, ὑποχείριον Ἀντιγόνῳ καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς γενόμενον,
εἰς Κέγχρεας ἀπαχθῆναι καὶ στρεβλοῦμεν ἀποθανεῖν, ἀδικώτατα καὶ δεινότατα παθόντα πάντων
2 ἀνθρώπων. τηρῶν δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν ὁ συγγραφεὺς τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ιδίωμα, φωνᾶς τινας
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BOOK II

perhaps say that now when they were crushed by armed force they should have been sold into slavery with their wives and children. But to this fate the usage of war exposes those who have been guilty of no such impious crime. These men therefore were worthy of some far heavier and more extreme penalty; so that had they suffered what Phylarchus alleges, it was not to be expected that they should have met with pity from the Greeks, but rather that approval and assent should have been accorded to those who executed judgement on them for their wickedness. Yet, while nothing more serious befel the Mantineans, in this their hour of calamity, than the pillage of their property and the enslavement of the male citizens, Phylarchus, all for the sake of making his narrative sensational, composed a tissue not only of falsehoods, but of improbable falsehoods, and, owing to his gross ignorance, was not even able to compare an analogous case and explain how the same people at the same time, on taking Tegea by force, did not commit any such excesses. For if the cause lay in the barbarity of the perpetrators, the Tegeans should have met with the same treatment as those who were conquered at the same time. If only the Mantineans were thus exceptionally treated, we must evidently infer that there was some exceptional cause for anger against them.

59. Again he tells us that Aristomachus of Argos, a man of most noble birth, having himself been tyrant of Argos and being descended from tyrants, was led away captive to Cenchreae and there racked to death, no man deserving less such a terrible fate. Exercising in this case too his peculiar talent, the
πλάττει διὰ τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοῦ στρεβλουμένου προσπιτούσας τοῖς σύνεγγυς κατοικοῦσιν, ὃν τοὺς μὲν ἐκπληττομένους τὴν ἁσέβειαν, τοὺς δ' ἀπιστοῦντας, τοὺς δ' ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ τοῖς γινομένοις προσ-3 τρέχειν πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν φησί. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης τερατείας παρείσθω· δεδήλωται γὰρ ἀρ-4 κοῦντως. ἑγὼ δ' Ἀριστόμαχον, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαίους ἔτερον ἠμαρτε, κατά γε τὴν τοῦ βίου προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν εἰς πατρίδα παρανομίαν τῆς 5 μεγίστης ἄξιον κρίνω τιμωρίας. καίπερ δ' συγγραφεύς, βουλόμενος αὐξεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ παραστήσασα τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτῷ συναγαγκασθεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαθεν, οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν φησι γεγονέναι τύραννον, ἀλλὰ κὰκ τυράννων πεφυκέ-6 ναι. ταύτης δὲ μείζω κατηγορίαν ἢ πικροτέραν οὐδ' ἢ εἰπεῖν ῥαδίως δύναι' οὐδείς. αὐτὸ γὰρ τούνομα περιέχει τὴν ἁσεβεστάτην ἐμφασιν καὶ πάσας περιείληφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώπως ἁδικίας καὶ 7 παρανομίας. Ἀριστόμαχος δ' εἰ τὰς δευτάτας ὑπέμεινε τιμωρίας, ὡς οὐτόσ φησιν, ὁμοὶ οὐχ ἤκανην 8 ἐδώκεν δίκην μιᾶς ἡμέρας, ἐν ἃ παρεισπεσόντος εἰς τὴν πόλιν Ἀράτου μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιών, καὶ με-γάλους ἁγώνας καὶ κινδύνους υπομείναντος ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀργείων ἐλευθερίας, τέλος δ' ἐκπεσόντος διὰ τὸ μηδένα συγκυνηθῆναι τῶν ἐσωθὲν αὐτῷ ταξι-9 μένων, διὰ τῶν ἀπ' τοῦ τυράννου φόβου, Ἀριστό-μαχος, ἀφομῇ ταύτη καὶ προφάσει χρησάμενος, ὃς τινων συνειδότων τὰ περὶ τὴν εἴσοδον τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ὁγονοῦντα τοὺς πρῶτους τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἀδι-κήσαντας στρεβλώσας ἐναντίον τῶν ἁναγκαίων κατ-10 ἔσφαξε. παρίμημ τὰ παρ' οἷον τὸν βίου αὐτοῦ καὶ
author gives us a made-up story of his cries when on the rack having reached the ears of the neighbours, some of whom, horrified at the crime, others scarcely crediting their senses and others in hot indignation ran to the house. About Phylarchus' vice of sensationalism I need say no more, for I have given sufficient evidence of it; but as for Aristomachus, even if he had been guilty of no other offence to the Achaeans, I consider that the general tenor of his life and his lawless violence at Argos rendered him worthy of the most severe punishment. Our author, it is true, with the view of magnifying his importance and moving his readers to share his own indignation at his fate, tells us that he "not only had been a tyrant himself but was descended from tyrants." It would be difficult for anyone to bring a graver or more bitter accusation against a man. Why! the very word "tyrant" alone conveys to us the height of impiety and comprises in itself the sum of all human defiance of law and justice. Aristomachus, if it is true that he was subjected to the most terrible punishment, as Phylarchus tells us, did not get his full deserts for the doings of one day; I mean the day on which when Aratus with the Achaecans had gained entrance to the town and fought hard to free the Argives at great risk, but was finally driven out, because none of those inside the city who had agreed to join him ventured to stir owing to their fear of the tyrant, Aristomachus, availing himself of the pretext that certain persons were cognisant of the entrance of the Achaecans, put to death eighty of the leading citizens who were quite innocent, after torturing them before the eyes of their relatives. I say nothing of the crimes that he and his ancestor were
60 τῶν προγόνων ἀσεβήματα· μακρὸν γὰρ. διότερον οὖκ εὖ τίνι τῶν ὁμοίων περέπεσε δεινὸν ἥγητεόν, πολὺ δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ μηδενὸς τούτων πεῖραν λαβὼν
2 ἀθῶος ἀπέθανεν. οὖδ' Ἀντιγόνῳ προσπατέον οὐδ' Ἀράτῳ παρανομίαν, ὅτι λαβόντες κατὰ πόλεμον ὑποχείριον τύραννον στρεβλώσαντες ἀπέκτειναν, ὅν γε καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν εἰρήνην τοῖς ἀνελούσι καὶ
tιμωρησμένοις ἐπανος καὶ τιμή συνεξηκολούθει
3 παρὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις. ὅτε δὲ χωρὶς τῶν προειρημένων καὶ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς παρεστώνδησε, τί
4 παθεῖν ὅν ἄξιος; ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἀπέθετο μὲν τὴν τυ-
ραννίδα χρόνους οὐ πολλοῖς πρότερον, ὑπὸ τῶν καὶ-
ρῶν συγκλεόμενος διὰ τὸν Δημητρίου θάνατον, ἀνελπίστως δὲ τῆς ἀσφαλείας ἔτυχε περισταλεῖς ὑπὸ
5 τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πραότητος καὶ καλοκἀγαθίας· οἱ-
tines οὐ μόνον αὐτῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς τυραννίδος ἀσε-
βημάτων ἀξίημοι ἐποίησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προολαβόντες
eἰς τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μεγίστην τιμὴν περιέθεσαν, ἤγεμόνα καὶ στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν.
6 δὲ ἐπιλαθόμενοι τῶν προειρημένων φιλανθρώπων
παρὰ πόδας, ἐπεὶ μικρὸν ἐπικυδεστέρας ἐσχε τάς
ἐλπίδας ὑπέρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐν Κλεομένει, τὴν τε
πατρίδα καὶ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ προαιρέσιν ἀποσπᾶσαν ἀπὸ
tῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαστάτοις καρφοῖς προσ-
7 ἐνεμεῖ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. δὲ ὑποχείριον γενόμενον οὖκ
ἐν Κεγχρεαῖς ἔδει τὴν νύκτα στρεβλούμενον ἀπο-
θανεῖν, ὡς Φύλαρχος φήσε, περιαγόμενον δὲ εἰς τὴν
Πελοπόννησον καὶ μετὰ τιμωρίας παραδειγματιζό-
8 μενον οὕτως ἐκλιπεῖν τὸ ζῆν. ἀλλ' ὅμως τοιοῦτος
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guilty of all through their lives: it would be too long a story. 60. We must not therefore think it shocking if he met with treatment similar to what he had inflicted: it would have been much more so had he died in peace, without experiencing any such. Nor should we charge Antigonus and Aratus with criminal conduct, if having captured him in war they had tortured and put to death a tyrant, any man who killed and punished whom even in time of peace would have been applauded and honoured by all right-thinking people. When I add that in addition to all his other offences he broke his faith with the Achaeans, what fate shall we say was too bad for him? Not many years previously he had laid down his tyranny, finding himself in an embarrassed position owing to the death of Demetrius, and quite contrary to his expectation suffered no harm, being protected by the Achaeans, who showed themselves most lenient and generous; for not only did they inflict no punishment on him for the crimes he had committed during his tyranny, but receiving him into their League they invested him with the highest dignity, making him their Strategus and Commander-in-chief. But instantly dismissing from his mind all these benefits, the moment it seemed to him that his prospects would be somewhat more brilliant if he sided with Cleomenes, he broke away from the Achaeans, transferring from them to the enemy at a most critical time his personal support and that of his country. Surely when they got him into their hands, he should not have been racked to death at night in Cenchreae, as Phylarchus says, but should have been led round the whole Peloponnesus and tortured as a spectacle for the public until dead.

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οὐδὲν δέ εἶχε δεινοῦ πλήρε τοῦ καταποντισθῆναι διὰ τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς Κεγχρεαῖς τεταγμένων.

61 Χωρὶς τε τούτων τάς μὲν Μαντινέων ἡμῶν συμφοράς μετ’ αὐξήσεως καὶ διαθέσεως ἔξηγήσατο, δήλου ὅτι καθήκεν υπολαμβάνων τοῖς συγγραφέσι ταῖς παρανόμοις τῶν πράξεων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ Μεγαλοπολίτῶν γενναιότητος, ἦ περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχρήσαντο καίρους, οὐδὲ κατὰ ποσὸν ἐποιήσατο μνήμην, ἀσπέρ τὸ τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἐξαρμήθησαν τῶν πραξάντων οἰκείτερον ὑπάρχων τῆς ἱστορίας τοῦ τα καλά καὶ δίκαια τῶν ἔργων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, ηττὸν τι διορθωμένους ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ξηλωτῶν ἔργων ἦπερ ὑπὸ τῶν παρανόμων καὶ φευκτῶν πρά-ξεων. ὁ δὲ πῶς μὲν ἔλαβε Κλεομένης τὴν πόλιν καὶ πῶς ἀκέρανιν διαφυλάξας ἐξαπέστειλε παρα-χρήμα πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην γραμματόφοροι, ἀξιων αὐτοὺς ἀβλαβῆς κομματι-μένους τὴν ἕαυτῶν πατρίδα κοινωνῆσαι τῶν ἱδίων πραγμάτων, ταύτα μὲν ἢμῖν ἐδήλωσε, βουλόμενος υποδείξαι τὴν Κλεομένους μεγαλοπυχίαν καὶ μετρίω-5 τητα πρὸς τοὺς πολέμιους. ἐτὶ δὲ πῶς οἱ Μεγαλο-πολίται τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἀναγνωσκομένης οὐκ ἔα-σαειν εἰς τέλος ἀναγνωσθῆναι, μικρὸ δὲ καταλυ-σαειν τοὺς γραμματόφορος, ἐως τούτου διεσάφησε. τοῦ δ’ ἀκόλουθον καὶ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἰδιὸν ἀφειλε, τὸν ἐπαινοῦν καὶ τὴν ἐπ’ ἀγαθῶς μνήμην τῶν ἁξιο-7 λόγων προαίρεσεν. καίτοι γ’ ἐμποδῶν ἦν. εἰ γὰρ τοὺς λόγω καὶ δόγματι μόνον ὑπομείναντας πόλεμον ὑπὲρ φίλων καὶ συμμάχων ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς νομί-ζομεν, τοῖς δὲ καὶ χώρας καταφθορᾶν καὶ πολιορ-κίαν ἀναδεξαμένοις οὐ μόνον ἐπαινοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ

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Yet notwithstanding his abominable character, all the harm he suffered was to be drowned in the sea by the officers in command at Cenchreae.

61. To take another instance, Phylarchus, while narrating with exaggeration and elaboration the calamities of the Mantineans, evidently deeming it a historian's duty to lay stress on criminal acts, does not even make mention of the noble conduct of the Megalopolitans at nearly the same date, as if it were rather the proper function of history to chronicle the commission of sins than to call attention to right and honourable actions, or as if it were less improving to read of that good conduct which we should emulate than of that criminal conduct which we should shun. He tells us how Cleomenes took the city, and before doing any damage to it, sent at once a post to the Megalopolitans at Messene offering to hand it back to them uninjured on condition of their throwing in their lot with him. So much he lets us know, wishing to show the magnanimity of Cleomenes and his moderation to his enemies, and he goes on to tell how when the letter was being read out they would not allow the reader to continue until the end, and how they came very near stoning the letter-bearers. So far he makes everything quite clear to us, but he deprives us of what should follow and what is the special virtue of history, I mean praise and honourable mention of conduct noteworthy for its excellence. And yet this was obviously demanded here. For if we consider those men to be good who by speeches and resolutions only expose themselves to war for the sake of their friends and allies, and if we bestow not only praise but lavish thanks and
8 χάριτας καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς μεγίστας ἀπονέμομεν, τίνα γε χρή περὶ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν ἔχειν διάληψιν; Δὴ
9 οὐχὶ τὴν σεμνοτάτην καὶ βελτίστην; οἱ πρώτοι μὲν τὴν χώραν Κλεομένει προεῖντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πά-
λιν ὀλοσχερῶς ἔπταισαν τῇ πατρίδι διὰ τὴν πρὸς
tους 'Αχαιοὺς αἴρεσιν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, δοθείσης ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως αὐτοῖς ἔξουσίας ἀβλαβὴ
tαύτην ἄπολαβεῖν, προείλαντο στέρεσθαι χώρας,
tάφων, ἱερῶν, πατρίδος, τῶν ύπαρχόντων, ἀπάν-
tων συλλήβδην τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπους ἀναγκαιοτάτων,
χάριν τοῦ μὴ προδοῦναι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους
πίστιν. οὐ τί κάλλιον ἔργον ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γένοιτ' ἂν;
ἐπὶ τί δ' ἂν μᾶλλον συγγραφεὺς ἐπιστῆσαι τοὺς
ἀκούοντας; διὰ τίνος δ' ἔργον μᾶλλον ἂν παρ-
ορμῆσαι πρὸς φυλακὴν πίστεως καὶ πρὸς ἀληθινῶν
πραγμάτων καὶ βεβαιῶν κοινωνίαν; δὲν οὐδεμίαν
12 ἐποιήσατο μνήμην Φύλαρχος, τυφλῶτων, ὡς γ' ἐμοί δοκεῖ, περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστα συγ-
grαφεῖ καθήκοντα τῶν ἔργων.

62 Ὑπὸ μὴν ἄλλα τούτως ἐξῆς φησιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ
τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως λαφύρων ἐξακισχίλια τάλαντα
τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πεσεῖν, ὃν τὰ διασχίλια Κλεο-
2 μένει δοθήναι κατὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς. ἐν δὲ τούτως
πρῶτον μὲν τίς οὐκ ἂν δαυμάσει τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ
τὴν ἀγνοιαν τῆς κοινῆς ἐννοίας ύπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἐλ-
λημικῶν πραγμάτων χορηγίας καὶ δυνάμεως; ἢ μά-
3 λιστα δεὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἱστοριογράφοις ύπάρχειν. ἐγὼ
γὰρ οὐ λέγω καὶ ἔκεινοι τοὺς χρόνους, ἐν οἷς
υπὸ τε τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλέων, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον
ὑπὸ τῆς συνεχείας τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολέμων ἀρ-
4 δὴν κατέθαρτο τὰ Πελοποννησίων, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς
καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς πάντες ἐν καὶ ταῦτο λέ-
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gifts on those who have suffered their country to be laid waste and their city besieged, what should we feel for the Megalopolitans? Surely the deepest reverence and the highest regard. In the first place they left their lands at the mercy of Cleomenes, next they utterly lost their city owing to their support of the Achaeans, and finally, when quite unexpectedly it was put in their power to get it back undamaged, they preferred to lose their land, their tombs, their temples, their homes, and their possessions, all in fact that is dearest to men, rather than break faith with their allies. What more noble conduct has there ever been or could there be? To what could an author with more advantage call the attention of his readers, and how could he better stimulate them to loyalty to their engagements and to true and faithful comradeship? But Phylarchus, blind, as it seems to me, to the most noble actions and those most worthy of an author's attention, has not said a single word on the subject.

62. Further he tells us that from the booty of Megalopolis six thousand talents fell to the Lacedaemonians, of which two thousand were given to Cleomenes according to usage. Now in this statement one marvels first at his lack of practical experience and of that general notion of the wealth and power of Greece so essential to a historian. For, not speaking of those times, when the Peloponnesian kings and still more by continued intestinal wars, but in our own times, when all are in complete
γοντες μεγίστην καρπούσθαι δοκούσιν εὐδαμονίαιν, ὅμως ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πάσης ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπιπλῶν χωρίς σωμάτων οὐχ οἶδα τε συναχθήναι το-5 σοῦτο πλῆθος χρημάτων. καὶ διότι τοῦτο νῦν οὐκ εἰκῆ, λόγῳ δὲ τινι μᾶλλον ἀποφανόμεθα, δῆλον ἐκ
6 τούτων. τίς γὰρ ὑπὲρ 'Αθηναίων οὐχ ἐστόρηκε δι-6 ὁτι καθ' οὐσ καιρούσ μετὰ θηβαίων εἰς τὸν πρὸς
Λακεδαιμονίους ἐνέβαινον πόλεμον, καὶ μυρίους μὲν ἐξέπεμπον στρατιώτας, ἐκατόν δ' ἐπλήρουν τρή-
7 πεις, ὅτι τότε κρίναντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἀξίας ποιεῖσθαι
tὰς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον εἰσφορὰς ἐμπήκοστε τὴν τε
χώραν τὴν 'Αττικήν ἀπασαν καὶ τὰς οἰκίας, ὁμοίως
dἐ καὶ τὴν λουπὴν οὐσίαν. ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ σύμπαν
tίμημα τῆς ἀξίας ἐνέλπε τῶν ἐξακισχιλίων διακο-
8 σίοις καὶ πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις. ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἀπεοι-
κός ἂν φανεί τὸ περὶ Πελοποννησίων ἄρτι ῥήθεν
9 ὑπ' ἐμοῦ. κατὰ δὲ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς καιροὺς εξ αὐτῆς
tῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως υπερβολικῶς ἀποφανόμενος
οὐκ ἂν τις εἰπεῖν τολμήσειε πλεῖον γενέσθαι τρια-
10 κοσίων, ἐπειδὴ ἤπερ ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι διότι καὶ
tῶν ἔλευθερων καὶ τῶν δουλικῶν σωμάτων τὰ πλεῖ-
stα συνέβη διαφυγεὶν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην. μέγιστον
dὲ τῶν προειρήμενων τεκμήριον· οὐδὲνος γὰρ ὄν-
tες δεύτεροι τῶν Ἀρκάδων Μαντινεῖς οὔτε κατὰ
tὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὴν περιουσίαν, ὡς αὐτὸς
ὁπτὸς φησιν, ἐκ πολιορκίας δὲ καὶ παραδόσεως ἀλών-
tες, ὥστε μήτε διαφυγεὶν μηδένα μήτε διακλαπή-
12 ναι ῥαδίως μηδέν, ὁμοίως τὸ πάν λάφυρον ἐποίησαν
μετὰ τῶν σωμάτων κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς
tάλαντα τριακόσια.
63 Ὁ δὲ συνεχεῖς τούτω τίς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον
θαυμᾶσει; ταύτα γὰρ ἀποφανόμενος λέγει πρὸ τῆς
unison and enjoy, it is thought, very great prosperity, I assert that a sale of all the goods and chattels, apart from slaves, in the whole Peloponnese would not bring in such a sum. That I do not make this assertion lightly but after due estimate will be evident from the following consideration. Who has not read that when the Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered on the war against Sparta, sending out a force of ten thousand men and manning a hundred triremes, they decided to meet the war expenses by a property-tax and made a valuation for this purpose of the whole of Attica including the houses and other property. This estimate, however, fell short of 6000 talents by 250, from which it would seem that my assertion about the Peloponnese at the present day is not far wide of the mark. But as regards the times of which we are dealing, no one, even if he were exaggerating, would venture to say that more than three hundred talents could be got out of Megalopolis, since it is an acknowledged fact that most of the free population and the slaves had escaped to Messene. But the best proof of what I say is the following: Mantinea, both in wealth and power, was second to no city in Arcadia, as Phylarchus himself says, and it surrendered after a siege, so that it was not easy for anyone to escape or for anything to be stolen, but yet the value of the whole booty together with slaves amounted at this very period to but three hundred talents.

63. What he tells us next is still more astounding; for after this assertion about the booty, he
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παρατάξεως δέχ' ἡμέρας μάλιστα τὸν παρὰ Πτο-λεμαίου προσβευτὴν ἠλθεῖν ἀγγέλλοντα πρὸς τὸν Κλεομένη διότι Πτολεμαῖος τὸ μὲν χορηγεῖν ἀπολέγει, διαλύεσθαι δὲ παρακαλεῖ πρὸς τὸν 'Αντί-2 γονον. τὸν δ' ἀκούσαντά φησι κρίναι διὸτι δεὶ τὴν ταχύτητὰ ἐκκυβεύειν τοῖς ὀλοίς πρὸ τοῦ συνεῖναι τὰ προσπεπτοκότα τὰς δυνάμεις, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς ἱδίοις πράγμασιν ἐλπίδα τοῦ δύνα-3 σθαι μυσθοδοτεῖν. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἐξακισθεῖλών ἐγκρα-τῆς ἐγεγόνει ταλάντων κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς, τὸν Πτολεμαῖον αὐτὸν ἦδύνατο ταῖς χορηγίαις ὑπερ-4 θέσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὸν 'Αντίγονον, εἰ μὸνον τριακο-ςίων ὑπήρχε κύριος, καὶ λίαν ἰκανὸς ἦν ἀσφαλῶς
5 ὑπομένων τρίβειν τὸν πόλεμον. τὸ δ' ἀμα μὲν πάσας ἀποφαίνειν τῷ Κλεομένει τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐν Πτολεμαῖῳ διὰ τὰς χορηγίας, ἀμα δὲ τοσοῦτων χρημάτων αὐτὸν φάναι κύριον γεγονέναι κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς, πῶς οὐ τῆς μεγίστης ἀλογίας, ἐτι
6 δ' ἀσκεφθας ἐστὶ σημείον; πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἐτερα τῷ συγγραφεῖ τοιαῦτα, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους καιροὺς καὶ παρ' ὅλην τὴν πραγματείαν κατατεκταί, περὶ ὧν ἀρκεῖν ὑπολαμβάνω κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα.

64 Μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως ἀλώσων 'Αντιγόνου παραχεμάζοντος ἐν τῇ τῶν 'Αργείων πόλει, συναγάγων Κλεομένης ἀμα τῷ τὴν ἑαρῳὴν ὄραν ἐνίστασθαι καὶ παρακαλέσας τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς και-ροῖς, ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν στρατιάν ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν τῶν
2 'Αργείων χώραν, ὡς μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐδοκεῖ, παρα-βόλως καὶ τολμηρῶς διὰ τὴν χυρότητα τῶν κατὰ τὰς εἰσόδους τόπουν, ὡς δὲ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζόμενους,
3 ἀσφαλῶς καὶ νουνεχῶς. ὡς ὁρῶν γὰρ τὸν 'Αντίγονον
396
states that just ten days before the battle an envoy from Ptolemy reached Cleomenes informing him that that king withdrew his subvention and requested him to come to terms with Antigonus. He says that Cleomenes on hearing this resolved to stake his all on a battle before it reached the ears of his troops, as he had no hope of being able to meet their pay from his own resources. But if at this very time he had six thousand talents at his command, he could have been more generous than Ptolemy himself in the matter of subventions; and if he could only dispose of three hundred talents it was enough to enable him to continue the war against Antigonus with absolute financial security. But to state in one breath that Cleomenes depended entirely on Ptolemy for money and that at the very same time he was in possession of such a large sum, is a sign of the greatest levity and want of reflection. Phylarchus has made many similar statements not only about this period but all through his work. I think, however, that what I have said at such length as the plan of this history allows should suffice.

64. After the capture of Megalopolis, while Antigonus was still in winter quarters at Argos, Cleomenes at the beginning of spring collected his troops, and after addressing them in terms suitable to the occasion, led them out and invaded Argolis. Most people think that this was rash and hazardous on his part, owing to the strength of the frontier, but if we judge rightly it was really a safe and wise course. For as he saw that Antigonus had dis-
διαφεικότα τάς δυνάμεις, ἦδει σαφῶς ὡς πρῶτον μὲν τὴν εἰσβολὴν ἀκινδύνως ποιήσεται, δεύτερον ἐτὶ τῆς χώρας καταφθειρμένης ἐως τῶν τειχῶν ἀνάγκη τούς Ἀργείους θεωρῶντας τον γινόμενον ἀσχάλλευν
4 καὶ καταμέμφεσθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον. εἰ μὲν οὖν συμβαίνῃ μὴ δυνάμενον αὐτὸν ὑποφέρειν τὸν ἐπιρραπισμὸν τῶν ὀχλῶν ἐξελθεῖν καὶ διακινδυνεῦσαι τοῖς παροῦσι, πρόδηλον ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἦν αὐτῷ
5 διότι νικήσει βαδίσως. εἰ δὲ ἐμμείνας τοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀφησουχάζοι, καταπληξάμενος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους καὶ ταῖς ἱδίαις δυνάμεις θάρσος ἐνεργασάμενος ἀσφαλῶς ὑπέλαβε ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν.
6 δὲ καὶ συνεβῆ γενέσθαι. τῆς γὰρ χώρας δηομένης οἱ μὲν ὀχλοὶ συστρεφόμενοι τὸν Ἀντίγονον ἐλοιδώρουν. δὲ καὶ οἶκος γεμομοικός καὶ βασιλικῶς οὐδὲν περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενος τοῦ κατὰ λόγον
7 τὴν ἀναχώρησιν ἤγετε τὴν ἁπαξιαν. δὲ δὲ Κλεομένης κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἁρχῆς πρόθεσιν καταφθείρας μὲν τὴν χώραν, καταπληξάμενος δὲ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, εὐθυροές δὲ πεποιηκὼς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεις πρὸς τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον κίνδυνον, ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπανήλθε.

65 Τοῦ δὲ θέρους ἐνυσταμένου καὶ συνελθόντων τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐκ τῆς χειμασίας ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιάν Ἀντίγονος προῆγε μετὰ τῶν
2 συμμάχων εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν, ἔχων Μακεδόνας μὲν τοὺς εἰς τὴν φάλαγγα μυρίων, πελταστὰς δὲ τρισχιλίους, ἵππεις δὲ τριακοσίους, Ἀγριάνας δὲ σὺν τούτοις χιλίοις καὶ Γαλάτας ἄλλους τοσοῦτοις, μισθοφόρους δὲ τοὺς πάντας πέζους μὲν τρισχιλίους,
3 ἵππεις δὲ τριακοσίους. Ἀχαιῶν δὲ ἐπιλεκτοὺς πέζους μὲν τρισχιλίους, ἵππεις δὲ τριακοσίους, καὶ Μεγαλο-
missed his forces, he knew well that, in the first place, he would be exposed to no danger in invading, and secondly, that, if the country were laid waste up to the walls, the Argives on seeing it would certainly be much vexed and lay the blame on Antigonus. If, therefore, unable to support the reproaches of the people, he marched out and risked a battle with such forces as he had, the probabilities were in favour of Cleomenes gaining an easy victory; but if, adhering to his plan, he remained quiet, he thought he could, after terrifying his enemies and inspiring his own troops with fresh courage, effect a safe retreat to Laconia, as actually happened. For, when the country was being laid waste, the populace held meetings in which they heaped abuse on Antigonus; but he, like a true general and prince, paid no attention to anything but a wise conduct of affairs, and remained quiet, while Cleomenes, having carried out his intention of devastating the country and thus striking terror into the enemy and encouraging his own troops to face the coming danger, retired in safety to his own country.

65. Early in summer, on the Macedonians and Achaeans rejoining from their winter quarters, Antigonus advanced with his own army and the allies into Laconia. His Macedonian forces consisted of ten thousand to form the phalanx, three thousand peltasts, and three hundred horse. He had besides a thousand Agrianians, and a thousand Gauls, while his mercenary force numbered three thousand foot and three hundred horse. The Achaeans furnished three thousand picked infantry and three hundred horse. There were also a
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πολίτας χιλίους εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον καθωπλισμένους, ὃν ἤγειτο Κερκίδᾶς Μεγαλοπολίτης, 4 τῶν δὲ συμμάχων Βουωτῶν μὲν πεζοὺς δισχιλίους, ἐππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους, Ἡπειρωτῶν πεζοὺς χιλίους, ἐππεῖς πεντήκοντα, Ἀκαρνάνων ἄλλους τοσούτους, Ἴλιπρῶν χιλίους ἐξακοσίους, ἐφ᾿ ὅν ἦν Δημήτριος 5 ὁ Φάριος, ὦστ᾿ εἶναι πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς δισμυρίους ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἐππεῖς δὲ χιλίους καὶ διακοσίους. ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης, προσδοκῶν τὴν ἐφοδον, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας τὰς εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσβολᾶς ἀσφαλίσατο φυλακαί καὶ τάφρους καὶ δένδρων ἐκ 7 κοπαῖς, αὐτὸς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Σελλασίαν καλουμένην μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐστρατοπέδευε, τῆς πάσης ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῶστρατιάς εἰς δύο μυριάδας, στοχαζόμενος ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ταύτης ποιήσασθαι τοὺς 8 ὑπεναντίους τὴν εἰσβολήν· ὁ καὶ συνεκύρησε. δύο δὲ λόφων ἐπ᾿ αὐτῆς τῆς εἰσόδου κεμένων, ὅν τὸν μὲν Εὐαν, τὸν δ᾿ ἐτερον Ὁλυμπον καλείσθαι συμβαίνει, τῆς δ᾿ ὁδοῦ μεταξὺ τούτων παρὰ τὸν Ὁλυμπὸν ποταμὸν φεροῦσα εἰς τὴν Στάρτην, ὁ μὲν Κλεομένης, τῶν προειρημένων λόφων συνάμφω τάφρον καὶ χάρακα προβαλόμενος, ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Εὐαν ἐταξε τοὺς περιοίκους καὶ συμμάχους, ἐφ᾿ ὅν ἐπέστησε τὸν ἄδελφον Εὐκλείδαν, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν Ὁλυμπὸν κατείχε μετὰ Λακεδαμονίων καὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐφ᾿ ἑκάτερα τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς ἐππεῖς μετὰ μέρους 10 τῶν τῶν μισθοφόρων παρενέβαλεν. Ἀντίγονος δὲ παραγενόμενος καὶ συνθεωρήσας τὴν τε τῶν τῶν ὀχυρώσης καὶ τὸν Ἐλεωμένη πάσι τοῖς οἰκείους μέρεσι τῆς δυνάμεως οὕτως εὐστόχως προκατεληφότα τὰς εὐκαιρίας ὡστε παραπλήσιον εἶναι τὸ σύμπαν 11 των τῶν μισθοφόρων παρενέβαλεν. Ἀντίγονος δὲ παραγενόμενος καὶ συνθεωρήσας τὴν τε προκατεληφότα τὰς εὐκαιρίας ὡστε παραπλήσιον εἶναι τὸ σύμπαν
thousand Megalopolitans armed in the Macedonian manner under the command of Cercidas of Megalopolis. The allies consisted of two thousand Bocotian foot and two hundred horse, a thousand Epirot foot and fifty horse, the same number of Acarnanians, and one thousand six hundred Illyrians under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. His total force thus amounted to twenty-eight thousand foot and one thousand two hundred horse. Cleomenes, who expected the invasion, had occupied the other passes into Laconia, placing garrisons in them and fortifying them by means of trenches and barricades of trees, and himself encamped at a place called Sellasia, with a force of twenty thousand men, as he conjectured that the invaders would most likely take this route, as in fact they did. At the actual pass there are two hills, one called Euas and the other Olympus, the road to Sparta running between these along the bank of the river Oenous. Cleomenes, having fortified both of these hills with a trench and palisade, posted on Euas the perioeci and allies under the command of his brother Eucleides, while he himself held Olympus with the Spartans and mercenaries. On the low ground beside the river on each side of the road he drew up his cavalry and a certain portion of the mercenaries. Antigonus on his arrival observed the great natural strength of the position and how Cleomenes had so cleverly occupied the advantageous points with the portions of his force suitable in each case, that his
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σχῆμα τῆς στρατοπεδείας τῆς τῶν ἁγαθῶν ὀπλω-12 μάχων προβολῆς. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπέλευπε τῶν πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν ἀμα καὶ φυλακῆς, ἀλλ' ἦν ὁμοῦ παράταξις

66 ἐνεργὸς καὶ παρεμβολὴ δυσπρόσοδος. διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου καταπειράζει καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι προχείρως ἀπέγνω, στρατοπεδεύσας δ' ἐν βραχεὶ διαστήματι, καὶ λαβῶν πρόβλημα τὸν Γοργύλου καλούμενον ποταμῷ, τών μὲν ἡμέρας ἐπιμενῶν συνεθεώρει τὰς τε τῶν τόπων ἰδιότητας καὶ τὰς

2 τῶν δυνάμεων διαφοράς, ἀμα δὲ καὶ προδεικνύόν τών ἐπιβολὰς πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἔξεκαλείτο τὰς τῶν

3 ὑπεναντίων ἐπινοίας. οὐ δυνάμενος δὲ λαβεῖν οὐ-δὲν ἀργὸν οὐδ' ἔξοπλον διὰ τὸ πρὸς πᾶν ἔτοιμώς

4 ἀντικυνεῖσαι τὸν Κλεομένη, τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἐπι-νοίας ἀπέστη, τέλος δ' ἐξ ὁμολόγου διὰ μάχης ἀμ-φότεροι προέθεντο κρίνειν τὰς πράξεις. πάνι γὰρ εὐφυεῖς καὶ παραπλησίους ἡγεμόνας ἡ τύχη συν-

5 ἔβαλε τούτους τοὺς ἀνδρας. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς κατὰ τὸν Εὐαν δ' ἑαυτες ἀντέταξε τῶν τε Μακε-δόνων τοὺς χαλκάσπιδας καὶ τοὺς Ἡλληνοὺς, κατὰ σπείρας ἐναλλὰξ τεταγμένους, Ἀλεξάνδρου τὸν

6 Ἀκμήτου καὶ Δημήτριου τὸν Φάριον ἐπιστήσας. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτους τοὺς Ἀκαρνανᾶς καὶ Κρήτας ἐπέβαλε- τούτων δὲ κατόπιν ἦσαν δισχίλιοι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν,

7 ἐφεδρείας λαμβάνοντες τάξιν. τοὺς δ' ἰππεῖς περὶ τὸν Ὀινούντα ποταμὸν ἀντέθηκε τῷ τῶν πολεμίων ἱππικῷ, συστήσας αὐτοὺς Ἀλεξάνδρου ἡγεμόνα καὶ συμπαραθεὶς πεζοὺς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν χυλίους καὶ Με-

8 γαλοπολῶτας τοὺς ἱσοὺς. αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς μυσθοφό-ρους ἑχὼν καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας κατὰ τὸν Ὀλυμπον πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Κλεομενῆ διέγνω ποιεῖσθαι τὴν

9 μάχην. προτάξας οὖν τοὺς μυσθοφόρους ἐπέστησε
whole formation resembled the attitude of a good heavy-armed fighter ready for combat. For attack and defence alike nothing was wanting, the position being at one and the same time a fortified camp difficult to approach and a line of battle ready for action. 66. Antigonus therefore decided to make no hasty attempt to force the position and come to blows with the enemy, but encamped at a short distance with the river Gorgylus on his front, and for several days remained there noting the peculiar features of the country and the character of the forces, while at the same time, by threatening certain movements, he attempted to make the enemy show his hand. But being unable to find any weak or unprotected spot, since Cleomenes always checked him at once by a counter-movement, he abandoned this project, and finally the kings agreed to try issues in a battle: for they were very gifted and evenly-matched, these two generals whom Fortune had thus brought face to face. To confront those on Euas Antigonus drew up the brazen-shielded Macedonians and the Illyrians in alternate lines, placing them under the command of Alexander son of Aemetus, and Demetrius of Pharos. Behind these stood the Acarnanians and Cretans, and in the rear as a reserve were two thousand Achaeans. His cavalry he opposed to that of the enemy by the river Oenous under the command of Alexander and supported by a thousand Achaean and as many Megalopolitan infantry. He himself in person decided to attack Cleomenes on Olympus with the mercenaries and the rest of the Macedonians. Putting
διφαλαγγιάν ἐπάλληλον τῶν Μακεδόνων· ἐποίει δὲ
tοῦτο διὰ τὴν στενότητα τῶν τόπων. σύνθημα δ' ἤ
τοις μὲν Ἰλλυρίοις τότε ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς
πρὸς τὸν λόφον προσβολῆς, ὅταν ἰδωσιν ἀρθείσαν
ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ὁλυμπον τόπων συνδόνα· προσ-
ηρτημένοι γὰρ ἦσαν οὗτοι νυκτὸς ἐν τῷ Ποργύλῳ
ποταμῷ πρὸς αὐτὴ τῇ τοῦ λόφου ρίζῃ· τοῖς δὲ
Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ τοῖς ἐπιτεύχθη παραπλησίως,
ἐπειδὰν φοινικὸς ἐξαραθῇ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως.

67 Ἐπειδὴ δ' ὦ μὲν καιρὸς ἦκε τῆς χρείας, τὸ δὲ
σύνθημα τοῖς Ἰλλυρίοις ἀπεδόθη, παρήγγειλαν δὲ
ποιεῖν τὸ δέον οἷς ἦν ἐπιμελὲς, πάντες εὐθέως ἀνα-
δείξαντες αὐτοὺς κατήρχοντο τῆς πρὸς τὸν βουνὸν
2 προσβολῆς. οἱ δὲ μετὰ τῶν Κλεομένους ἐπέέδω ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ταχθέντες εὐζωνοί, θεωροῦντες τὰς σπείρας
τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐρήμους ἐκ τῶν κατόπων οὐσίας, κατ'
οὐράν προσπέπτοντες εἰς ὀλοσχερὴ κύδυνον ἤγου
3 τοὺς πρὸς τὸν λόφον βιαζομένους, ὥσ ἄν τὸν μὲν
περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου κατὰ πρόσωπον
αὐτοῖς ἐφεστώτων, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων κατόπων ἐπι-
κειμένων καὶ προσφερόντων τὰς χεῖρας ἐρωμένως.
4 ἐν ὧν καιρῷ συννοήσας τὸ γινόμενον, ἀμα δὲ προ-
ορῶμεν τὸ μέλλον, Φιλοποίημην ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑποδικύνειν ἐπεβάλλετο τοῖς προ-
5 εστῶσι τὸ συμβησόμενον· οὔτεδειος δὲ προσέχοντος
αὐτῳ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔφῃ ἡγεμονίας τετάχθαι μηδεπώ-
ποτε κομιδῇ τε νέον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶν, παρακάλεσας
toὺς ἐαυτοῦ πολίτας ἐνέβαλε τοῖς πολεμίοις τολμὴ-
6 ρᾶς. οὐ γενομένους ταχέως οἱ προσκείμενοι μισθο-
φόροι κατ' οὐράν τοῖς προσβαίνουσιν, ἀκούσαντες
τῆς κραυγῆς καὶ συνιδόντες τὴν τῶν ἐπιπέων συμπλο-
the mercenaries in front, he drew up the Macedonians behind them in two phalanxes with no interval between, the narrowness of the space rendering this necessary. It was arranged that the Illyrians were to begin their assault on the hill upon seeing a white flag waved from the neighbourhood of Olympus, for in the night they had succeeded in taking up a position close under the hill in the bed of the river Gorgylus. The signal for the Megalopolitans and cavalry was to be a red cloak waved by the king.

67. When the time to begin the action came, the signal was given to the Illyrians, and, the officers calling on their men to do their duty, they all instantly showed themselves and began the attack on the hill. The light-armed mercenaries, who had been posted near Cleomenes' cavalry, upon seeing that the rear of the Achaean line was exposed, attacked them from behind, and the whole force that was pressing on to the hill was thus threatened with a serious disaster, as Eucleides' troops were facing them from above while the mercenaries were vigorously attacking their rear. At this critical moment Philopoemen of Megalopolis, who saw what was happening and foresaw what was likely to happen, first attempted to call the attention of the commanding officers to it, but as no one paid any attention to him, since he had never held any command and was quite a young man, he called on his own fellow-citizens to follow him and boldly fell upon the enemy. Upon this the mercenaries who were attacking the assailants of the hill in the rear, hearing the clamour and seeing the
κήν, ἀφέμενοι τῶν προκειμένων ἀνέτρεχον εἰς τὰς ἑξ ἀρχῆς τάξεις καὶ προσεβόθθην τοῖς παρ’ αὐτῶν ἐπι- πεύσει. τοῦτον δὲ συμβάντος, ἀπερίσπαστον γενό- 7 μενον τὸ τε τῶν Ἰλλυρίων καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν ἀμα τούτων προσβαίνοντων πλῆθος ἐκθύμως ὁρ- 8 μησε καὶ τεθαρρηκτῶς ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ἐξ οὗ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα φανερὸν ἐγενήθη διότι τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν προτερήματος αὐτοὺς ἐγίνετο Φιλοπούμην.

68 οὕτω καὶ τὸν 'Ἀντίγονόν φασὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κατα- πειράζοντα πυνθάνεσθαι τοὺς ταχθέντος ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπ- πέων Ἀλεξάνδρου διὰ τὶ πρὸ τοῦ παραδοθῆναι τὸ 2 σύνθημα τοῦ κυνδύνου κατάρξατο. τοῦ δ’ ἀρνου- μένου, φάσκοντος δὲ μειράκιον τι Μεγαλοπολιτικο- προεγχειρῆσαι παρὰ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ γνώμην, εἰπεῖν διότι τὸ μὲν μειράκιον ἡγεμόνος ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι, συνθεασάμενον τὸν καρόν, ἐκείνος δ’ ἡγεμὼν ὑπά- ἄρχων μειράκιον τοῦ τυχόντος.

3 Οὐ μὴν ἄλλ’ οὐ γε περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν ὄρωντες προσβαίνοντος τὰς σπείρας, ἀφέμενοι τοῦ χρῆσθαι 4 τὰς τῶν τόπων εὐκαιρίας. τοῦτο δ’ ἦν ἐκ πολλοῦ συναντώντας καὶ προσπέπτοντας τοῖς πολεμίοις τὰ μὲν ἐκείνων στίφη συνταραττείν καὶ διαλύειν, αὐτοὺς δ’ ὑποχωρεῖν ἐπὶ πόδα καὶ μεθίστασθαι πρὸς 5 τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους αἰε τόπως ἀσφαλῶς. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν προλυμηνάμενοι καὶ συγχέαντος τὸ τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ καὶ τῆς συντάξεως ἱδίωμα τῶν ὑπεναντίων ῥαδίως 6 αὐτοὺς ἐτρέψαντο διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων εὐφυίαν· τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν ἐποίησαν, καθάπερ δ’ ἐξ ἐτοίμου 7 σφίσι τῆς νίκης ὑπαρχούσης τούναντιον ἔπραξαν. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς στάσιν ἐμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρων, ὡς ἀνωτάτω σπεύδοντες λαβεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, εἰς τὸ τὴν φυγήν ἐπὶ πολὺ καταφερῆ 406
cavalry engaged, abandoned what they had in hand and running back to their original position came to the aid of their cavalry. The Illyrians and Macedonians and the rest of this attacking force were now disengaged, and threw themselves with great dash and courage on the enemy. Thus, as became evident afterwards, the success of the attack on Eucleides was due to Philopoemen. 68. Hence it is said that subsequently Antigonus asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, to tease him, why he had begun the battle before the signal was given. On Alexander denying this and saying that a stripling from Megalopolis had begun it contrary to his own judgement, the king said that this stripling had acted like a good general and Alexander himself, the general, like an ordinary stripling.

To continue our narrative, Eucleides' troops, on seeing the enemy's lines advancing, cast away the advantage the ground gave them. They should have charged the enemy while still at a distance, thus breaking his ranks and throwing them into disorder, and then retreating slowly, have returned in safety to the higher ground. Thus having in the first instance spoilt and broken up that peculiar serried formation of the enemy so well adapted to their special equipment, they would easily have put them to flight owing to their favourable position. Instead of doing this, they acted as if the victory were already in their hand and did exactly the opposite. They remained, that is, at the summit in their original position with the view of getting the enemy as high up the hill as possible so that their flight would be for a long distance down the steep and precipitous
8 καὶ κρημνώδη γενέσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις. συνέβη δ’, ὁπερ εἰκὸς ἦν, τούναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολιπόντες αὐτοῖς ἀναχώρησαν, προσδέξάμενοι δ’ ἀκεραίους ἄμα καὶ συνεστώσας τὰς σπείρας, εἰς τούτο δυσχρηστίας ἥλθον ὡστε δι’ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ λόφου κορυφῆς δια-και μάχεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βιαζομένους. λοιπὸν ὦσον ἐκ ποδὸς ἐπιέσθησαν τῷ βάρει τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ καὶ τῆς συντάξεως, εὐθέως οἱ μὲν Ἰλλυροὶ τὴν κατά-στασιν ἐλάμβανον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν τὴν ύπὸ πόδα, διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλείπεσθαι τόπον εἰς ἀναχώρη-σιν καὶ μετάστασιν ἐαυτοῖς. ἐξ οὗ ταχέως συνέβη τραπέντας αὐτοὺς ὀλθρίων χρήσασθαι φυγῇ, κρη-μνώδη καὶ δύσβατον ἐχόντων ἐπὶ πολὺ τὴν ἀνα-χώρησιν τῶν τόπων.

69 Ὁ λαμὸς δὲ τούτως ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἅπαντας συνετελεῖτο κύδουνος, ἐκπρεπὴ ποιουμένων τὴν χρείαν τῶν Ἀχαϊ-κῶν ἰπпеῶν ἀπάντων, μάλιστα δὲ Φιλοπούμενος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τῆς αὐτῶν ἔλευθερίας συνεστάλα τὸν ὄλον ἄγωνα. καθ’ ὅν καιρὸν τῷ προειρημένῳ συν-έβη τὸν μὲν ἦππον πεσεῖν πληγέντα καιρίως, αὐτὸν δὲ πεξιμαχοῦντα περιπεσεῖν τραύματι βιαιοῦ δι’ ἀμ-φοῖν τοιν μηροῖν. οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς κατὰ τῶν Ὅλυμ-πον τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐποιοῦντο διὰ τῶν εὐζώνων καὶ μισθοφόρων τὴν συμπλοκῆν, παρ’ ἐκατέρως χειδὸν ὑπαρχόντων τοῦτων εἰς πεντακισχίλιοι. ὅπερ ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ μέρη, ποτὲ δ’ ὀλοσχερὸς συμπιπττότων, διαφέρουσαν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τῇ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν χρείαν, ὦμοι τῶν τε βασιλέων καὶ τῶν στρατοπέ-δων ἐν συνόψει ποιουμένων τὴν μάχην. ἡμιλλαντο δὲ πρὸς ἐαυτοὺς καὶ κατ’ ἀνδρά καὶ κατὰ τάγμα 6 ταις εὐθυγχύοις. οὗ δὲ Κλεομένης, ὅρων τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν πεφευγότας, τοὺς δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐπι-
slope. As might have been expected, the result was just the reverse. They had left themselves no means of retreat and on being charged by the Macedonian cohorts which were still fresh and in good order, they were so hard put to it that they had to fight with the assailants for the possession of the extreme summit. From now onwards, wherever they were forced back by the weight of their adversaries' weapons and formation, the Illyrians at once occupied the place where they had stood, while each backward step they took was on to lower ground, since they had not left themselves any room for orderly retreat or change of formation. The consequence was that very soon they had to turn and take to a flight which proved disastrous, as, for a long distance, it was over difficult and precipitous ground.

69. At this same time the cavalry action was going on, all the Achaean horsemen, and especially Philopoemen, rendering most distinguished service, as the whole struggle was for their liberty. Philopoemen's horse fell mortally wounded, and he, fighting on foot, received a serious wound through both thighs. Meanwhile the two kings at Olympus opened the battle with their light-armed troops and mercenaries, of which each had about five thousand. These, now attacking each other in detachments and now along the whole line, exhibited the greatest gallantry on both sides, all the more so as they were fighting under the eyes of the kings and their armies. Man therefore vied with man and regiment with regiment in a display of courage. Cleomenes, seeing his brother's troops in flight and the cavalry on the
πέδους ἵππείς ὁσον οὖσιν κλώντας, καταπλαγής ὁν μὴ πανταχόθεν προσδέξεταί τοὺς πολεμίους, ἢναγκάζετο διασπᾶν τὰ πρωτειχίσματα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἐξάγειν μετωπίδον κατὰ μίαν πλευρὰν τῆς 7 στρατοπεδείας. ἀνακληθέντων δὲ τῶν παρ᾽ ἐκατέροις εὐξώνων ἐκ τοῦ μεταξὺ τόπου διὰ τῆς σάλπιγγος, συναλαλάζασα καὶ καταβάλωσα τὰς σαρίσσας συνέβαλλον αἱ φάλαγγες ἀλλήλαις. ἀγώνος δὲ γενομένου κραταίου, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ πόδα ποιουμένων τῆς ἀναχώρησιν καὶ πιεζομένων ἐπὶ πολὺ τῶν Μακεδόνων ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν Λακώνων εὐφυκίας, ποτὲ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐξωθομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ βάρους τῆς τῶν Μακεδόνων τάξεως, τέλος οἱ περί τὸν Ἀντίγονον συμφράζαστες τὰς σαρίσσας, καὶ χρησάμενοι τῷ τῆς ἐπαλλήλου φάλαγγος ἰδιώματι, βία προσπεσόντες ἐξέσωσαν ἐκ τῶν ὄχυρωμάτων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄλλο πλῆθος ἔφευγε προτροπάδην φονεύμενον. ὡ δὲ Κλεομένης ἵππείς τινας ἔχων περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀπεχώρησε μετὰ τούτων 10 αὐσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς καταβὰς εἰς Γύθιον, ἡτοιμασμένων αὐτῶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πλοῦν ἐκ πλείωνος χρόνου πρὸς τὸ συμβαίνον, ἀπῆρε μετὰ τῶν φίλων εἰς 'Αλεξάνδρειαν. 11 Ἀντίγονος δ᾿ ἐγκρατῆς γενόμενος ἐξ ἐφόδου τῆς Σπάρτης, τὰ τε λοιπὰ μεγαλοψυχῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως ἐχρήσατο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, τὸ τε πολέμευμα τὸ πάτριον αὐτοῖς ἀποκαταστήσας ἐν ολίγαις ἡμέραις ἀνέζευξε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, προσαγελθέντος αὐτῶ τοὺς Ἰλλυρίους εἰσβεβληκότας 2 εἰς Μακεδονίαν πορθεὶν τὴν χώραν. οὔτως οὖν τοῦ ἡ τύχη τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων παρὰ λόγον εἰσχθε κρύειν. καὶ γὰρ τότε Κλεομένης, εἰτε 410
level ground on the point of giving way, was afraid of being charged from all sides and was compelled to pull down part of his defences and to lead out his whole force in line from one side of the camp. Each side now recalled by bugle their light-armed troops from the space between them, and shouting their war-cry and lowering their lances, the two phalanxes met. A stubborn struggle followed. At one time the Macedonians gradually fell back facing the enemy, giving way for a long distance before the courage of the Lacedaemonians, at another the latter were pushed from their ground by the weight of the Macedonian phalanx, until, on Antigonus ordering the Macedonians to close up in the peculiar formation of the double phalanx with its serried line of pikes, they delivered a charge which finally forced the Lacedaemonians from their stronghold. The whole Spartan army now fled in rout, followed and cut down by the enemy; but Cleomenes with a few horsemen reached Sparta in safety. At nightfall he went down to Gythion, where all had been prepared some time previously for the voyage in view of contingencies, and set sail with his friends for Alexandria.

70. Antigonus having attacked and taken Sparta, treated the Lacedaemonians in all respects with great generosity and humanity, and, after restoring the ancient form of government, left the city in a few days with his whole army, as he had received news that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were ravaging the country. Thus ever is it the way of Fortune to decide the most weighty issues against rule and reason. For on this occasion Cleomenes,
Τὰ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον παρείλθησε τελέως θλίγας ἡμέρας, εὑρ’ ἀναχωρήσας ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ βραχύ τῶν καιρῶν ἀντεποίησατο, διακατέσχεν ἄν τῇν ἀρχῆν.

4 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὁ γ’ Ἀντίγονος παραγενόμενος εἰς Τεγέαν, καὶ τούτοις ἀποδούσ τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν, δευτεραιός ἐντεύθεμεν εἰς "Ἀργος ἐπ’ αὐτὴν ἦλθε τῇν τῶν Ἕλληνων πανήγυριν. ἐν ἃ τιχῶν πάντων τῶν πρὸς ἀθάνατον δοξάν καὶ τιμῆν ἀνηκόντων ὑπὸ τε τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἀχαίων καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν ἔκαστης τῶν πόλεων, ὄρμησε κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς Μακεδονίαν.

6 καταλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς Ἰλυρίους ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ συμβαλλόν ἐκ παρατάξεως, τῇ μὲν μάχη κατώρθωσε, τῇ δὲ παρακλήσει καὶ κραυγῇ τῇ κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν κίνδυνον ἐκθύμως χρησάμενος εἰς αἴματος ἀναγωγὴν καὶ τινα τουαύτῃν διάθεσιν ἐμπεσόν μετ’ οὐ πολὺ

7 νόσῳ τὸν βίον μετήλλαξε, καλάς ἐλπίδας ὑποδείξας ἐν αὐτῷ πᾶσι τοῖς "Ελλησιον, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις χρείαν, ἐτι δὲ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν ἔλην

8 αἴρεσιν καὶ καλοκάγαθιάν. τὴν δὲ Μακεδόνων βασιλείαν ἀπέλυε Φιλίτπω τῷ Δημητρίῳ.

71 Τίνος δὲ χάριν ἐποιησάμεθα τὴν ἐπὶ πλείον

2 ὑπὲρ τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου μνήμην; διότι τῶν καιρῶν τούτων συναπτότων τοῖς υφ’ υμῶν ἡστορεῖσθαι μέλλουσι χρήσιμον ἔδοκεν, μᾶλλον δ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν τὸ ποιῆσαι πᾶσιν ἔναργη καὶ γνώριμον τὴν ὑπάρχον ή περὶ

3 Μακεδόνας καὶ τοὺς Ἔλληνας τότε κατάστασιν. περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καίροις καὶ Πτολεμαίον νόσῳ τὸν βίον μεταλάξαντος Πτολεμαῖος ὁ κληθεὶς

4 Φιλοπάτωρ διεδέξατο τὴν βασιλείαν. μετήλλαξε δὲ καὶ Σέλευκος ὁ Σέλευκος τοῦ Καλλινίκου καὶ
had he deferred giving battle for merely a few days, or had he, on returning to Sparta after the battle, waited ever so short a time to avail himself of the turn of events, would have saved his crown.

Antigonus however, on reaching Tegea, restored the old form of government there also, and two days later arrived at Argos just in time for the Nemean festival, at which the Achaean League and each several city heaped on him every honour they could think of to immortalize his memory. He then hastily left for Macedonia, where he found the Illyrians. Engaging them in a pitched battle, he was victorious, but in the course of the fight he strained himself so much by shouting to his troops to cheer them on that from a rupture of a blood-vessel or some such accident he fell sick and died shortly afterwards. He had aroused high hopes of himself throughout Greece, not so much by his success in the field as by his general high principles and excellence. He was succeeded on the throne of Macedon by Philip son of Demetrius.

71. Now to explain why I have dealt with this war at such length. As this period immediately precedes those times, the history of which I am about to write, I thought it would be of service, or rather that the original plan of this work made it necessary for me, to make clearly known to everyone the state of affairs in Macedonia and Greece at this time. Just about the same time Ptolemy Euergetes fell sick and died, being succeeded by Ptolemy surnamed Philopator. Seleucus, the son of the Seleucus surnamed Callinicus or Pogon, also died at this
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Πῶγωνος ἐπικληθέντος. Ὅντος ἔτει διεδέξατο τὴν
5 ἐν Συρία βασιλείαν, ἀδελφὸς ὧν αὐτῷ. παραπλη-
σιον γάρ δὴ τι συνέβη τούτοις καὶ τοῖς πρώτοις μετὰ
tὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτήν κατασχούσι τὰς ἀρχὰς
tαύτας, λέγω δὲ Σελεύκως, Πτολεμαῖως, Λυσιμάχως.
6 ἐκείνοι τε γὰρ πάντες περὶ τὴν εἰκοστὴν καὶ τετάρ-
tὴν πρὸς ταῖς ἐκατόν ὀλυμπιάδα μετήλλαξαν, καθά-
περ ἐπάνω προείπον, οὕτω τε περὶ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ
tριακοστήν.
7 'Ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπειδῆ τὴν ἐπίστασιν καὶ προκατασκευὴν
tῆς ὅλης ἱστορίας διεληλύθαμεν, δι' ὣς ὑποδεδοκτα
πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ δι' ὃς αὐτίας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν
κρατήσαντες Ἐρωμαῖοι πρῶτον ἐγχειρεῖν ᾱρξαντο
τοῖς ἐξω πράγμασι, καὶ πρῶτον ἐτόλμησαν ἀμφισβη-
8 τείν Καρχηδονίους τῆς θαλάττης, ἀμα δὲ τούτοις
καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καὶ Μακεδόνας, ὤμοιως
9 δὲ καὶ περὶ Καρχηδονίους ὑπάρχουσαν τότε κατά-
stasíaν δεδηλώκαμεν, καθήκον ἂν ἐχθραγεγονότας
ἐπὶ τοὺς καυροὺς τούτους κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
πρόθεσιν, ἐν οἷς ἐμελλόν οἱ μὲν Ἑλλήνες τὸν
συμμαχικόν, Ἐρωμαῖοι δὲ τὸν Ἀννιβάκον, οἱ δὲ
κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάν βασιλείας τὸν περὶ Κοίλης Συρίας
10 ἐνίστασθαι πόλεμον, καὶ τὴν βυβλον ταύτην
ἀφορίζειν ἀκολούθως τῇ τῶν προγεγονότων πραγ-
mάτων περιγραφῆ καὶ τῇ τῶν κεχειρικῶτων τὰ πρὸ
tοῦ δυναστῶν καταστροφῆ.
time, his brother Antiochus succeeding him. The same thing in fact occurred in the case of these three kings, as in that of the first successors of Alexander in the three kingdoms, Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, who all, as I stated above, died in the 124th Olympiad, while these kings died in the 139th.

I have thus completed this Introduction or preliminary part of my History. In it I have shown in the first place when, how, and why the Romans first entered on enterprises outside Italy and disputed the command of the sea with the Carthaginians, and next I have dealt with the state of Greece and Macedonia and with that of Carthage. So having, as was my original purpose, reached the date at which the Greeks were on the eve of the Social War, the Romans on the eve of the Hannibalic War, and the kings of Asia about to enter on the war for Coele-Syria, I must now bring this Book to its close, which coincides with the final events preceding these wars and the death of the three kings who had up to now directed affairs.

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