This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world’s books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that’s often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book’s long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ **Make non-commercial use of the files** We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ **Refrain from automated querying** Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google’s system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ **Maintain attribution** The Google “watermark” you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ **Keep it legal** Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can’t offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book’s appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

**About Google Book Search**

Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world’s books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at [http://books.google.com/](http://books.google.com/)
SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

A SERIES OF VOLUMES FOR THE PROMOTION OF
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS

EDITED BY J. McKEEN CATTELL

VOLUME III—UNIVERSITY CONTROL
UNDER THE SAME EDITORSHIP

SCIENCE AND EDUCATION. A series of volumes for the promotion of scientific research and educational progress.


Volume II. Medical Research and Education. By Richard Mills Pearce, William H. Welch and other authors.

Volume III. University Control. By J. McKeen Cattell and other authors.

AMERICAN MEN OF SCIENCE. A Biographical Directory.

SCIENCE. A weekly journal devoted to the advancement of science. The official organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. A monthly magazine devoted to the diffusion of science.

THE AMERICAN NATURALIST. A monthly journal devoted to the biological sciences, with special reference to the factors of evolution.

THE SCIENCE PRESS

NEW YORK GARRISON, N. Y.
UNIVERSITY CONTROL

BY

J. McKEEN CATTELL
PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

TOGETHER WITH A SERIES OF TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-NINE UNSIGNED LETTERS BY LEADING MEN OF SCIENCE HOLDING ACADEMIC POSITIONS AND ARTICLES BY JOSEPH JASTROW OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, GEORGE T. LADD OF YALE UNIVERSITY, JOHN J. STEVENSON OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, J. E. CREIGHTON OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY, J. McKEEN CATTELL OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, GEORGE M. STRATTON OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, STEWART PATON OF PRINCETON, JOHN JAY CHAPMAN OF NEW YORK, JAMES P. MUNROE OF BOSTON, AND JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY

THE SCIENCE PRESS
NEW YORK AND GARRISON, N. Y.
1913
PREFACE

The substance of the essay on university control and the collection of letters from university professors were prepared for the faculties of the University of Illinois and for discussion before their committee charged with drawing up a constitution for the university. Papers on the subject were also presented at about the same time before the Society of the Sigma Xi of the University of Indiana, the Huxley Club of the Johns Hopkins University and at a joint meeting of the faculties of Lehigh University and Lafayette College. The fact that in the last two cases the presentation was in the form of an after-dinner address may account for the more frivolous and rhetorical passages and for the use of the first personal pronoun. These might have been eliminated—they have been reduced—but a reformer should be concerned with accomplishing his ends rather than with conserving his dignity.

The articles on university control forming the third part of the volume are reprinted with the consent of the authors and of the editors and publishers of the journals in which they originally appeared. The unsigned letters from university and college professors exhibit the actual diversity of opinion which exists; all the articles advocate reforms in somewhat the same direction. Consideration was given to the inclusion of articles lauding or defending the autocratic system of administration which has developed in our universities. No such article, however, appears to have been written by a professor, though a number of articles and two books of that kind have been published by university presidents.
The essay, the letters and the series of articles are printed in book form after some hesitation. They are obviously a protest against conditions and tendencies, the existence of which can not be denied and should not be concealed. But the book is intended to be an effort for construction, not an exhibition of complaint and criticism. Of the historic institutions—Sacerdotium, Imperium, Studium—the university can in our democracy best conserve the traditions of the past and guide the progress of the future. It is a great heritage which we should use wisely and transmit unimpaired.

J. McK. C.

GARRISON-ON-HUDSON, N. Y.,
January, 1913
CONTENTS

PART I

UNIVERSITY CONTROL. BY J. MCKEEN CATTELL

I. Historical Retrospect ........................................ 3
II. A Referendum on Administration ............................ 17
III. The Corporation and the President ....................... 26
IV. The Position of the Professor .............................. 36
V. The Duties of the Professor ................................. 49

PART II

LETTERS ON UNIVERSITY CONTROL

I. Letters from Harvard University ............................ 65
II. Letters from Yale University ............................... 85
III. Letters from Columbia University ......................... 92
IV. Letters from the University of Pennsylvania ............ 99
V. Letters from the Johns Hopkins University ............... 107
VI. Letters from the University of Chicago .................. 116
VII. Letters from Cornell University .......................... 130
VIII. Letters from the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
     nology .................................................... 138
IX. Letters from Institutions in New England ............... 146
X. Letters from Institutions in the Middle States .......... 165
XI. Letters from Colleges for Women .......................... 185
XII. Letters from Southern Institutions ....................... 188
XIII. Letters from the University of Wisconsin ............ 202
XIV. Letters from the University of Michigan ............... 213
XV. Letters from the Universities of Minnesota, Illinois, 
    Missouri and California ................................ 222
XVI. Letters from State Institutions in the Central and 
     Western States ......................................... 251
XVII. Letters from Private Institutions in the Central and 
      Western States ......................................... 277
XVIII. Anonymous Letters ...................................... 306
CONTENTS

PART III

ARTICLES ON UNIVERSITY CONTROL

I. The Administrative Peril in Education. By Joseph Jastrow ............................. 315

II. The Need of Administrative Changes in the American University. By George T. Ladd ...... 349

III. The Status of the American College Professor. By John J. Stevenson .................. 370

IV. The Government of American Universities. By J. E. Creighton ......................... 393

V. Concerning the American University. By J. McKeen Cattell ......................... 405

VI. Externalism in American Universities. By George M. Stratton ......................... 425

VII. University Administration and University Ideals. By Stewart Paton .................. 439

VIII. Professorial Ethica. By John Jay Chapman ....... 453

IX. Closer Relations between Trustees and Faculty. By James P. Munroe .................. 462

X. Faculty Participation in University Government. By Jacob Gould Schurman .......... 474

INDEX ........................................ 483
PART I

UNIVERSITY CONTROL

BY J. McKeen Cattell
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Published in Science for May 24 and 31, 1912.
UNIVERSITY CONTROL

I. HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

Bologna and Paris were the archetypal universities from which all others have descended and from which they have in some measure inherited their present organization and methods. In the first decades of the twelfth century Irnerius lectured at Bologna on the civil law, and Abelard at Paris on philosophy and theology. There were at the same time other eminent teachers in those cities, and students were attracted from all parts of Europe. The students in a foreign city organized themselves into guilds for mutual protection and assistance in accordance with medieval custom. These were the first universities. The lecturers, who had previously taught as the sophists at Athens and the rhetoricians at Rome, or as masters of music, dancing and gymnastics teach to-day, also organized themselves into societies or universities. There were no endowments; no academic buildings. The professors lectured at their homes or in hired houses; the academic convocations were held in churches or monasteries. When there were difficulties with the city authorities or with their colleagues, a group of professors or students might migrate and found a new studium elsewhere. Thus in the thirteenth century offshoots from Bologna gave rise to studia at Reggio, Vicenza, Arezzo, Padua, Vercelli and Siena. Oxford, the third of the great medieval universities, was probably due to a migration from Paris in 1167.

At Bologna the universities of students—who were men of maturity from all parts of Europe, as many as ten thousand at the end of the twelfth century, it is said—
obtained control, lording it over the professors by means of the boycott. At Paris the students, organized into nations, were somewhat younger, and the professors, doctors or masters, as they were indifferently named, were in control. In one respect the conditions were curiously similar to the contemporary American university, for there was a college of arts of younger students, and professional schools of theology, law and medicine. We even read of an anticipation of present tendencies in that students had to receive the degree in arts before entering the medical school. About the middle of the thirteenth century there were established colleges of residence which were endowed as eleemosynary institutions for poor students, usually under the control of the church. In England the colleges were the property of the head and fellows, who had complete control of the establishment; on the continent they were somewhat less independent. In the course of time the differences became emphasized. The continental colleges became absorbed in the university and disappeared as halls of residence, whereas at Oxford and Cambridge the colleges practically constituted the university.

It is truly remarkable that there should have been some seventy-five universities throughout Europe before the time of the invention of the printing press and amid the incessant warfare of those days. One may wonder whether love of learning may not have been greater, intellectual curiosity keener, then than now. The students, numbered by the thousand—legend puts it as high as 30,000—flocked to a university attracted by the reputation of a great teacher. The rich came with their retinues, while the poor begged their way. Irnerius at Bologna, Roscellinus and Abelard at Paris, Grossetête and Roger Bacon at Oxford, were followed by long lines of great men, teachers, scholars, founders of science.
My main concern with the medieval university is that it was extraordinarily unhierarchical, democratic, anarchic, in its organization. The university was then, as it now should be, the professors and the students. The professors, of course, had complete control of the conditions under which degrees were given and in the selection of their colleagues and successors. The doctor earned the *jus ubique docendi*; he was not employed or dismissed. There was an elected council and rectors were elected for a year or for some other short period. Only later there came to be a single rector for the entire studium. The whole paraphernalia of the modern university—endowments, buildings and grounds, trustees and president, heads of departments and deans, curricula, grades and examinations—were absent or subordinate. There were indeed all sorts of routine, customs and limitations, but the university, in an age of feudalism and of absolutism of state and church, attained a remarkable freedom, and its great performance was in large measure due to this freedom.

It further seems to be the case that the waning of the influence of the university in the course of time was largely due to the loss of freedom. As the universities obtained endowments and buildings, as their governing bodies became organized, they lost their spontaneity and creative leadership. The great philosophers, scholars and men of science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries worked in large measure outside the universities. Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Berkeley; Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz; Harvey, Huygens and Laplace; Linnaeus, Buffon, Lamarck and Cuvier; Lavoisier, Priestley and Dalton, were not university professors or not primarily such. Newton was, but he relinquished his chair at Cambridge to take a position in the mint at London. The men of science of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries worked largely in connection with the academies of science, which were then established, and in the newly founded museums, observatories and botanical gardens. This movement is analogous to the contemporary establishment of research institutions outside the universities. There was too much dogmatism, formalism, discipline, routine, control, machinery—it might have been called efficiency if they had had the word in those days—in the university, and scientific men found greater freedom and stimulus in the academies, which, though under the patronage of the court, they themselves controlled.

Toward the close of the eighteenth century the universities throughout Europe had sunk to a low level. Within a period of a few years as many as thirteen German universities became extinct—Mainz, Cologne, Bamberg, Dillingham, Duisberg, Rinteln, Helmstedt, Salzburg, Erfurt, Altdorf, Frankfort, Ingolstadt and Wittenberg. But the new era of freedom and democracy, represented and caricatured by the French revolution, gave fresh life to the universities. The centralized scheme of Napoleon aggrandized Paris at the cost of the provincial universities, which only just now are regaining their autonomy. In Germany the modern university attained its fruition. The University of Berlin, established in 1809, when the political fortunes of Prussia were at low ebb, played a great part in the regeneration of the nation. It was partly founded on the basis of the existing Academy of Science, as was the University of Munich a little later. It is possible that our newer research institutions, if placed under the control of men of science, may become the freer universities of the future.

During the nineteenth century the German universities rivaled in their influence those of the medieval period.
The advances of democracy and of science have been the great achievements of our era. In the advancement of science and to a certain extent in the maintenance of a democracy of scholarship, the German universities have been dominant forces. In Germany the university is indeed the creature of the state and subject to it. But during the nineteenth century academic freedom and the independence and influence of the professor attained a remarkable supremacy. Any student who showed ability could become a Privatdocent; if he continued to advance his subject with sufficient distinction and did not starve to death in the meanwhile he became a professor. The professorship has been maintained as a position of dignity, honor and freedom. The professor receives his appointment by the decision of his peers and holds it for life. He may lecture about as much or as little as he likes, on almost any subject, well or poorly as the case may be, with complete freedom in the expression of his views; he is but little concerned with grades, absences, discipline, routine reports, committee meetings and the like; he gives much or little attention to his students as he may choose. The rector is elected annually by the professors. The curator, the representative of the government, the efficient man who runs things, is nowhere regarded as the intellectual or social equal of the professors.

All this might be supposed to lead to abuses; but the result is there to be seen by every one—the great scholars and men of science, the contribution to national progress and to the civilization of the world. No efficient machine driven by the president of an American university can grind out such flour. I fear that the German university can not continue its great performance of the nineteenth century. This was doubtless more the result than the cause of the idealism of the people, now threatened with
submergence under wealth and luxury. The modern German university must have its fine buildings, must grow greatly in size. This is inevitable, perhaps desirable. Laboratories, libraries and collections are required on a scale not formerly imagined; there is danger, perhaps need, of more administrative machinery; and the more machinery you have, the more you must get. It seems that the professors now tend to form a bureaucratic guild, too greatly concerned with their own financial status, and too little with the welfare of the docents and associate professors, of the students and of the people. The Prussian ministry is interfering more than formerly in the selection of professors and the management of things. The German emperor, it is said, wants presidents in the American style—we could spare him at least one for each of the twenty-one German universities.

It seems remarkable that in the bureaucratic little states which have since become the German empire the universities should have been centers of liberal scholarship and free personalities. But it is perhaps generally the case that the finest exhibitions of the love of liberty and honor are made under persecution or where there are contrasted conditions. It is really quite difficult and discouraging to play the part of an academic hero or martyr nowadays. One can do it better in Russia than in the United States. Thus a hundred professors at Moscow have recently resigned owing to some interference of the government with the liberty of the professors. In that country students and professors strike, and the government institutes lockouts. They take their liberties seriously, and the professors maintain their right to choose their colleagues and their deans and rectors.

The historic English universities, Oxford and Cambridge, have been primarily groups of independent col-
leges. The master and fellows are the college; they own the buildings and endowment and divide the income among themselves. They elect their colleagues and successors and of course their head. The headship is an honorary and social position with but few executive powers or duties. Government is by town meeting and committee. There have been abuses of the monastic system, and perhaps even now too much time is spent on details of management. But high standards of scholarship and conduct have on the whole been maintained. From among the resident fellows and from the students great men have been forthcoming in every line of activity. Probably half the leaders of England in statesmanship, scholarship, science, poetry, have come from its two universities, having together no more students than one of our larger institutions; and England has produced more great men than any other nation.

The universities of Oxford and Cambridge, as distinguished from their colleges, have long had a few endowed professorships and have conducted libraries, but until recently they were essentially degree-conferring institutions. They are administered by councils elected by the resident teachers, but the ultimate control is vested, as is becoming, in the masters of art. The Church of England clergy have perhaps had more influence than is desirable, but their interference has in the main been confined to prescribing the conditions for the degree. In any case it is only a temporary phase, and a certain amount of conservatism is not so bad for a university. It would seem quite absurd to invest the ultimate control of Oxford and Cambridge in a self-perpetuating board, consisting of a score or larger crowd of business and professional men. The chancellorship is an honorary office, without executive power or influence, to which a non-resident graduate of distinction is elected. With the
specialization of knowledge and the need of laboratories, the colleges could not give all the instruction needed, and the universities of Oxford and Cambridge are becoming increasingly teaching bodies. Parliament has required the colleges to give some part of their income to the support of the university. The professors are usually nominated by boards of electors, consisting of men of distinction in the subject or in related subjects, partly from the university and partly from outside. I have never heard of the expulsion of a fellow or professor. That a professor's salary should depend on the favor of a president or that he should be dismissed without a hearing by a president with the consent of an absentee board of trustees is a state of affairs not conceivable in an English or a German university.

Harvard College was founded in 1636 by the general court of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay and placed under a board of overseers named by the court. In 1650 there was established a self-perpetuating corporation consisting of a president, a bursar and five fellows, which, however, was made responsible to the overseers. In 1865 the election of overseers was transferred from the legislature to the alumni of the college. The Collegiate School of Connecticut, subsequently named Yale College, was chartered by the legislature of the Colony of Connecticut in 1701 and placed under the control of trustees or partners, consisting of ten reverend ministers of the gospel. In 1745 the corporation received the title of The President and Fellows of Yale College. Later the governor, the lieutenant governor and six senators of the state were added to the fellows; in 1872 alumni trustees were substituted for the senators. The College of William and Mary was chartered in 1693 by the sovereigns whose names it bears. Princeton, Pennsylvania and Columbia, chartered, respectively, in 1746, 1751 and 1754,
were placed under the control of boards of trustees, and, like Harvard and Yale, either at their inception or later, were controlled by the state and received appropriations from it. In my opinion it would have been better if the relation between the state and its university had been maintained.

The colonial college was largely modeled on the Cambridge college; thus the form of the Harvard and Yale corporations—the president and fellows—was directly borrowed. At Harvard the corporation included the teachers of the college; there was much protest the first time an alumnus was elected a fellow when there was a tutor eligible. It would be interesting to trace—did time and my competence permit—the steps through which our colleges slipped from the control of the state and of the graduates and teachers into the hands of small self-perpetuating corporations, until we reach the most reactionary of all charters, that of 1810 for Columbia College, the provisions of which are as follows:

The said trustees, and their successors, shall forever hereafter have full power and authority to direct and prescribe the course of study and the discipline to be observed in the said college, and also to select and appoint by ballot or otherwise, a president of the said college, who shall hold his office during good behaviour; and such professor or professors, tutor or tutors, to assist the president in the government and education of the students belonging to the said college, and such other officer or officers, as to the said trustees shall seem meet, all of whom shall hold their offices during the pleasure of the trustees. Provided always, That no such professor, tutor, or other assistant officer shall be a trustee.

The careers of our colleges were checkered by political and church dissensions; thus, in the case of Columbia, the subordination of the professors is in part explained by distrust of their episcopalian tendencies. It seems
that the organization of our colleges was influenced not only by the college of the English universities, but also by the English endowed public school, to which it came to bear a greater resemblance.

The University of Virginia was established as a state institution by the legislature in 1819. Under the influence of Jefferson the continental university was to a certain extent followed; and both in educational and administrative methods there was much that was admirable—at least from my point of view. Under the general control of a board, the affairs of the university were administered by the faculty and its elected chairman, until after eighty years souls were once more sold for gold. The University of Indiana was established in 1820, the University of Michigan in 1837, as part of the public educational system of those states, the governing bodies being elected boards. Here was inaugurated a new movement in higher education, destined, I trust, to parallel the great performance of the medieval university and of the German university. The institutions of the Atlantic seaboard having slid into capitalistic control, there has arisen in the central west a system of higher education directly responsive to the will of the people on whose support it depends.

Prior to the last quarter of the nineteenth century we had colleges and professional schools, but no university. Yale, it is true, first offered the doctorate of philosophy in 1860, and in the early seventies the degree was given by Harvard, Columbia and Cornell. But the graduate work of a faculty of philosophy was not organized or emphasized until the opening of the Johns Hopkins University in 1876, when there arose an institution nearer to my conception of what a university should be than any elsewhere in this country or than it has been able to remain. Buildings, administration and routine instruc-
tion were subordinated to great men who attracted from the whole country the students who were to be the future leaders. In the organization of the Johns Hopkins Medical School in 1893 a contribution of nearly equal significance was made in placing the professional school on a university basis. The past two or three decades have witnessed an almost incredible growth of our universities. Columbia has now 700 instructors, 7,000 students, fifty million dollars. In spite of the materialistic standards and autocratic methods of control which this essay emphasizes—perhaps overemphasizes with a view to their correction—the development of the American university, especially of the state university, is one of the greatest achievements of our people, promising moral, social and intellectual leadership and supremacy in the course of the present century.

If here or elsewhere I have expressed opinions which seem lacking in appreciation of what is being accomplished in this country for higher education and for the advancement of science, this is only because it is not possible to put in each paragraph or even in a single essay everything that one believes. The most useful forward movements and the greatest men are subject to just criticism. It is only when the work has been accomplished and the men are dead that we may forget the faltering and the errors and eulogize the good that has been done. In our educational and scientific work, as in our business, social and political life, we must oppose with all our power the materialistic aims and autocratic usurpations which are the not unnatural accompaniments of the development of the vast resources of a new country and the passing from aristocratic to democratic control. As I wrote¹ before the present democratic movement had gathered its existing force:

¹ "The University and Business Methods," The Independent, December 28, 1905.
The applications of science—which in the first instance made democracy possible by supplying the means of subsistence with possible leisure and education for all—have in their recent developments enormously complicated modern civilization. Our methods of communication, transport and trade, of manufacture, mining and farming, have led to the doing of things on an immense scale. The individual has once more been subordinated, cruelly commercial standards prevail, and control has been seized by the strong and the unscrupulous. Those of us who are not ashamed to profess faith in democracy regard all this as a temporary phase, which will only last until intelligence has developed equal to the complexity of the environment. The only real danger is that instincts may become atrophied before reason is ready to take their place.

The trust promoter and insurance president, the political boss and government official, the university president and school superintendent, have assumed powers and perquisites utterly subversive of a true democracy. The bureaucracy is defended on the ground of efficiency; but efficiency is not a final cause. To do things is not a merit regardless of what they are, and bigness is not synonymous with greatness. There is no ground for hopelessness. Of the things done the good may last and the rest may be eliminated; bigness may become greatness. The organizers of our huge corporations have in a way made history prematurely; these vast combinations were inevitable; the trouble is that they have come before we are ready to manage them. We have no evidence that people are less competent, honest and kindly than they were; it is the difficulties and the temptations that have increased.

There is ground for maintaining that the methods of the business corporation and the political machine have been somewhat wantonly applied to educational administration in this country. On the one hand, educational institutions are not and need not become so big and complex as to require the sacrifice of freedom to supposed efficiency, and, on the other hand, those who are the university—the teachers and the students who are or have been under their influence—have far more than average intelligence. . . .
In stating frankly views that are shared by a larger proportion of my colleagues than is generally supposed, I by no means wish to adopt the attitude of a pessimist. I know well from personal experience with what unfailing courtesy and ceaseless effort a university president may conduct the affairs of his difficult office. Much has been accomplished for higher education in the United States. As the industrial trusts will in the end be directed by the world’s greatest democracy for the benefit of the people, so our educational system may give the material basis for an efflorescence of creative scholarship springing from a free and noble life.

My own academic experience has been mainly in the endowed institutions of the Atlantic seaboard. My father was president of Lafayette College from 1863 to 1883, during which period the teachers increased from nine to thirty, the students from 60 to 300, and the property from $50,000 to $1,000,000. There the personal and patriarchal system of college control was exhibited at its best. It doubtless now flourishes in many small institutions throughout the country as in the English public schools. A man such as Mark Hopkins or Thomas Arnold has been the soul of the institution. As Matthew Arnold writes in "Rugby Chapel"

... to thee was it given
Many to save with thyself;
And, at the end of thy day,
O faithful shepherd! to come,
Bringing thy sheep in thy hand.

As a fellow at the Johns Hopkins University at the zenith of its great achievement, I had again opportunity to witness the system of presidential autocracy under favorable conditions. The university was dominated by one man who was personally responsible for and to its dozen professors and two hundred students. But the patriarchal system is of necessity limited to the small institution, and it is scarcely fitted to the democracy of the
twentieth century. In a residence of six years at European universities, I had experience of the educational system, but though I was assistant at the University of Leipzig and lecturer at the University of Cambridge, I was at that time indifferent to administrative methods. These have been increasingly forced on my attention since my appointment as professor at the University of Pennsylvania and lecturer at Bryn Mawr College, and for the twenty-two years during which I have been professor at Columbia University.
II. A REFERENDUM ON ADMINISTRATION

The problems of university control were reviewed in a short article printed in *Science* some six years ago. This was reprinted with certain added footnotes, and at the beginning of December, 1911, sent to our leading men of science, who hold or have held academic positions, with the following note:

Would you be willing to give your opinion of the plan of university control here proposed? If you are so kind as to do so, I shall understand that I may quote anonymously your reply.

About 300 replies were received, and are printed practically in full in this book. The article on which the replies were based is as follows:

**University Control**

In the colleges from which our universities have developed the problem of administration was comparatively simple. The faculty and the president met weekly and consulted daily; each was familiar with the work of the entire institution; a spirit of cooperation and loyalty naturally prevailed. The trustees also understood the economy of the college and were able to work intelligently for the general good. But when a university covers the whole field of human knowledge, when it is concerned with professional work in divergent directions, when it adds research and creative scholarship to instruction, when both men and women are admitted, when there are 500 instructors and 5,000 students, it is no longer possible for each trustee and for each professor to share intelligently in the conduct of the whole institution. We appear at present to be between the Scylla of presidential autocracy and the Charybdis of faculty and trustee incompetence. The more incompetent the faculties become, the greater is the need for executive autocracy, and the greater the

---

1 Reprinted from *Science* for March 23, 1906, with footnotes added in November, 1911.
autocracy of the president, the more incompetent do the faculties become. Under these conditions it appears that the university must be completely reorganized on a representative basis. It should not be a despotism and it can not be a simple democracy. Autonomy should be given to the schools, departments or divisions. The administrative, legislative and judicial work must be done by experts, but they should represent those whom they serve.

The present writer ventures to propose tentatively the following form of organization for our larger universities, to be reached as the result of a gradual evolution:

1. There should be a corporation consisting of the professors and other officers of the university, the alumni who maintain their interest in the institution and members of the community who ally themselves with it. In the case of the state universities part of the corporation would be elected by the people. This corporation should elect trustees having the ordinary functions of trustees—the care of the property and the representation of the common sense of the corporation and of the community in university policy. The trustees should elect a chancellor and a

No sensible person would attempt to reform suddenly by a paper constitution a system which has developed in response to its environment. The boes in politics, the trust magnate in business, the university president and school superintendent, have probably conduced to a certain kind of efficiency and to an enlargement more rapid than would otherwise have been possible. What a community does is dependent on the men who compose it rather than on the laws under which they live. But a bad system may demoralize the cooperative spirit of the group and may select for it individuals who are not the most desirable. The danger of our present system of university control is that it tempts a man to play for his own hand and selects for academic work men lacking in character, individuality and genius.

A large corporation of this character places the ultimate control on a democratic basis. The members would pay annual dues, and a considerable income would thus accrue. A large number of individuals would take an active interest in the welfare and development of the institution. In the case of the state universities the people of the state are in a sense the corporation with ultimate control, and it might be undesirable to establish an intermediate body. Still the state might delegate its powers to such a corporation, and a society of members of the university might be formed, even though the regents or trustees were elected by the people or appointed by their elected governors.

The trustees or regents of an American university have absolute powers, but tend to delegate them to the president. They place a limit on the
treasurer who would represent the university in its relations with the community.

2. The professors or officers, or their representatives, should elect a president who has expert knowledge of education and of university administration. His salary should not be larger, his position more dignified or his powers greater than those of the professor.⁸

3. The unit of organization within the university should be the school, division or department, a group of men having common objects and interests, who can meet frequently and see each other daily. It should be large enough to meet for deliberation and to represent diverse points of view, but small enough for each to understand the whole and to feel responsible for it. The size of this group is prescribed by a psychological constant, its efficient maximum being about twenty men and its minimum about ten.⁷

amount of money that can be spent and sometimes use their reserve powers even in matters of educational detail. When the corporation is small, as at Harvard, it may be in active control of policies. In the private chartered institutions it is usually large, its members having but little knowledge of educational problems or of the special university under their control. There are often several trustees who take an active, though not always a wise, interest in the university, and it is a delicate problem of the president to manage such trustees. One of the most serious difficulties of the present situation is that the president owes his office, salary and powers to the trustees and must obtain their favor, whereas he is not responsible to the faculties. The professor is likely to owe his office and salary to the president, and is sometimes placed in a position that is humiliating.

⁸It might or might not be an advantage to have a chancellor, such as exists in the British universities, a man of prominence in the community, who would obtain endowments and represent the university at public functions.

⁷It may be that no president is desirable other than an annually elected rector, as in the German universities. If, however, the president were elected by the faculties for a limited term and made responsible to them, the academic situation would be greatly improved. The argument of efficiency can be adduced in favor of giving autocratic powers to one individual, but the university is the last place where such system should prevail. It is neither necessary nor desirable that things be done in haste. Administrative details can be handled promptly by a clerk or secretary. Men and women should not be subject to the judgment or whims of an individual. Security, permanence, honor, the slow growth of traditions, are essential to a true university.

⁹Such autonomy is usually possessed by medical, law and technical schools forming a part of a university. It should be extended to other divi-
4. Each school, division or department should elect its dean or chairman and its executive committee, and have as complete autonomy as is consistent with the welfare of the university as a whole. It should elect its minor officers and nominate its professors. The nominations for professorships should be subject to the approval of a board of advisers constituted for each department, consisting, say, of two members of the department, two experts in the subject outside the university and two professors from related departments. The final election should be by a university senate, subject to the veto of the trustees. The same salaries should be paid for the same office and the same amount of work. The election should be for life, except in the case of impeachment after trial. The division should have financial as well as educational autonomy. Its income should be held as a trust fund and it should be encouraged to increase this fund.

5. The departments or divisions should elect representatives when they become sufficiently large. Partly independent institutions for teaching or research can to advantage form part of a university. The separately endowed colleges of the English universities have certain advantages.

In the department-store system, which is likely to prevail in our universities, the junior professors and instructors are responsible to the head of the department and are dependent on him for advances in office and salary, while the heads of departments are in like position in relation to the dean or the president, the heads of departments and deans being named by the president. The active committees are appointed by the president; in one of our leading universities even faculty members are named by the president from among the professors, making the faculty a presidential committee. This procedure reverses the proper or, at all events, the democratic method of control, according to which officers are chosen by those whom they serve and leaders are followed because they are acknowledged as such.

The greatest possible care should be exercised in the selection of professors. Instructors and lecturers should be freely admitted to the university, but the professorship should be maintained as a high office. The alternative to permanence of tenure is competition for prizes under honorable conditions, but in this case salaries must be as large as the incomes of leaders in law, medicine and engineering. It is more economical and probably conduces to greater dignity and honor to pay adequate but moderate salaries with permanence of tenure, as in the army or the supreme court. Advances in salary should be automatic, as at Harvard, but there might to advantage be a few professorships with comparatively high salaries—the same as that of the presidency—vacancies in which would be filled by cooptation or by election by the faculties.
for such committees as are needed when they have common interests, and to a senate which should legislate for the university as a whole and be a body coordinate with the trustees. It should have an executive committee which would meet with a similar committee of the trustees. There should also on special occasions be plenums of divisions having interests in common and plenums of all the professors or officers of the university. There should be as much flexibility and as complete anarchy throughout the university as is consistent with unity and order.

It seems that the 299 replies expressing the opinions of the writers on these proposals represent with considerable accuracy the existing academic sentiment in this country among those who have been most successful in their work. They are all from men in the natural and exact sciences, who form somewhat less than half our university professors, but there is no reason to suppose that their colleagues in other departments would differ as a class in their attitude on academic questions. I wrote to scientific men because I had a list of those of highest standing and am personally acquainted with most of them. It may be that in some cases men were more likely to reply because they agreed with my views and were more likely to emphasize their agreement than their dissent. As a psychologist by trade, I judge, however, that this is more than balanced by the opposite tendency to react by objecting and to argue against a proposition proposed. Probably the replies of younger men and of less successful men would be more radical and more opposed to the existing system of university control.

*Professors and other officers should not be distracted from their work of teaching and research by administrative politics. But they should select their administrative officers and legislative committees and have opportunity to make proposals and vote on questions of educational policy. Voting by mail and the fly-leaf method of discussion of the English universities could be adopted to advantage. An elected executive committee of the faculties meeting with the executive committee of the trustees is a feasible method of improving the existing academic situation.
The letters are well worth a careful reading. We are told that every question has two sides; as a matter of fact many questions are polygons. The problems of the administration of an educational institution have many sides and many angles. They differ completely in the small college and in the large university, in the newer and in the older institutions, in the state university and in the private corporation. My paper was written with reference to the large endowed universities, especially those which have enjoyed or suffered a rapid growth in size and scope. The replies are from institutions of all kinds. Those who hold chairs in the smaller colleges may find a system fairly adequate to their needs which would be undesirable in our large universities. Those in state universities may regard as necessary a strong executive responsible to the people and professors subordinated to the public service, when they would not approve of the irresponsible autocracy of the private corporations. Professors at Harvard and Yale may take satisfaction in the long traditions and wise precedents which obtain at these universities, when they would not care to live under the system in use at Columbia and Chicago.

It was originally my intention to base this essay on an analysis of the letters received, but the exigencies of an engagement made it necessary to prepare its first version before the proofs could be obtained, the letters written and the replies received. It is indeed somewhat difficult to summarize such a large number of points of view which represent both real differences of opinion and differences due to the fact that various situations were under consideration. It seems best to print the letters, and to permit those interested to draw their own conclusions.\textsuperscript{11} The letters will be given under the institu-

\textsuperscript{11} It should be noted that my correspondents were requested only to give an opinion of the proposed plan of university control. An answer expressing general agreement or disagreement was all that might be expected. It
tion from which they come when there are as many as ten replies, the institutions otherwise being grouped. In general, the letters are placed in the order of their preference for the existing system of university control which I designate as a limited autocracy. Omissions have been made from some of the longer letters, and formal compliments, apologies and the like have been erased. Thus a large percentage of all letters begin with the phrase, "I have read with interest," etc. Other slight editorial revision, such as eliminating the paragraphs, has been undertaken, but every effort has been made not to alter in the slightest degree the opinions expressed. There is given here a table showing the source of the replies and the only classification that I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Limited Autocracy; Present System</th>
<th>Greater Faculty Control</th>
<th>Representative Democracy; Plan Proposed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johns Hopkins</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornell</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass. Inst.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle States</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. for Women</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minn. Ill. Mo. Cal.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. &amp; W. State Inst.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. &amp; W. Private Inst.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

is, therefore, gratifying that so many discuss in detail the problems of academic administration. There is a natural temptation to attempt to answer the objections to the proposed plan, especially when it seems to have been misunderstood. Any brief statement is likely to appear dogmatic and bureaucratic, even though these may be the tendencies against which it is directed. I trust that the longer discussion here given may do away with any impression that the present writer has a ready-made scheme of university control or believes that all universities should be administered in the same way.
shall attempt to make. Its validity can be judged by those who care to read the letters.

Of the 299 replies 46 are taken as favoring the system usual in this country, which is designated as a limited autocracy, 68 as favoring a system in which the faculties have greater share in control, as at Yale or the Johns Hopkins Medical School, 185 as favoring a plan of representative democracy more or less similar to the one proposed. Five sixths of those holding the most important scientific chairs at our universities believe that there should be a change in administrative methods in the direction of limiting the powers of the president and other executive officers and making them responsible to those engaged in the work of teaching and research. This is an agreement greater than I had anticipated. When eighty-five per cent. of those responsible for the conduct of a given system unite in holding that it should be altered, the case may be regarded as strong. Political and social changes are usually made on a much narrower majority. It is true that five of the six presidents who replied—they are of course at the same time men who formerly did distinguished scientific work—form part of the minority. Indeed, a large percentage of this minority consists of presidents, directors, deans and other university officials. Whether this should be interpreted as that much in favor of the present system, or that much more against it, may be left an open question.

A considerable number of professors at Harvard favor

---

12 Eighteen of the replies are from men who formerly held academic positions but are now connected with research institutions, the government service, etc., or who while holding professorships are principally engaged in other work. These replies show about the same distribution as the others, three in the first group, four in the second and eleven in the third. They are classed under the institutions with which the men are or were connected. Two replies from those previously connected with universities as teachers, but somewhat incidentally, have been omitted. They both belong to the third group.
the existing system, but their preference applies to their own situation, where the administrative autocracy is tempered. Of 19 replies from Wisconsin and Illinois, eight favor a limited autocracy, but they have in mind their system, which is not the same as that of the private universities. Probably they would in any case prefer the methods of President Van Hise and President James to those of President Draper. Those who want a strong executive responsible to the people of the state have been classed in the group favoring a limited autocracy. Thus the two replies from Columbia which are placed in this group are from men who do not trust faculty control, though, as I happen to know, they are by no means satisfied with the existing situation. If these two cases are omitted, we find that of 70 replies from Columbia, Pennsylvania, Cornell, Johns Hopkins and Chicago—these are the institutions which I had especially in mind in my proposals—only one (an executive officer) favors the existing system, eleven favor greater faculty control, and 58 a complete change which would make the administration responsible to the faculties. This is surely a condition which foretells reform or bankruptcy.
III. THE CORPORATION AND THE PRESIDENT

In a review of the different factors concerned with the administration of a university the corporation in ultimate control is the natural starting-point. It was becoming that the fellows of Yale College, a collegiate school primarily for the education of the clergy, should be representative clergymen of the state. In general the trustees of the primitive American college were competent to administer its simple economy. But even then there were difficulties. Before the American Institute of Instruction meeting in Worcester, Mass., in 1837, the Rev. Jasper Adams, president of Charleston College, gave a lecture on "The relations subsisting between the board of trustees and the faculty of the university," stating that as far as he knew this had never been the subject of special investigation. He argues that the trustees should manage the funds of their institution, while the faculty should regulate the courses of instruction and the internal administration. Professors should be appointed by the trustees on the advice of and in accordance with the wishes of the faculty. It appears that in those days there was trouble through the trustees interfering with what the faculties regarded as their rights, notably at Hamilton College, concerning which the president wrote a pamphlet entitled "A Narrative of the Embarrassments and Decline of Hamilton College," which he attributed to meddling by the trustees with the business of the faculty. At that time President Adams and President Davis seem to have regarded themselves as professors rather than as trustees. According to President Adams:
More than one board of trustees has ruined, and every board will ruin its college, which shall interfere with the province rendered appropriate to the faculty by the peculiar skill, knowledge and experience which their education, greater attention to the subject, and practical opportunities, have naturally, and as a matter of course, given them. . . . Many a faculty of a college, who felt themselves qualified, not only to sustain their institution, but to raise it to usefulness and renown, and gain for it the favor, confidence and patronage of the public, have found all their efforts discouraged, embarrassed and finally defeated by the conduct of their board of trustees. Plans of improvement, after having been matured by much labor and careful consideration, have been presented for acceptance and approbation, only to be retained with coldness and indifference, treated with neglect and finally rejected, after a hasty examination, for want of a competency to understand them. Favorable times and seasons have been permitted to pass by unimproved, and have been lost never to return, because the faculty had not power to act on the subject, and the trustees could not be induced to seize the favorable moment, and turn the occasion to the benefit of the institution. Under these circumstances, the faculty have been compelled to remain inactive, and let things take their course, or to resign their office in discouragement and disgust. In either case, the institution has been ruined.

The legal powers of trustees and regents are similar everywhere, but their actual part in the conduct of the institution varies greatly. It is likely to be larger when the board is small and when the members reside near by. In his Harris lectures on "University Administration" President Eliot says: "The best number of members for a university's principal board is seven," and with pleasing naïveté he adds a little later: "It is a curious fact that the university with the most fortunate organization in the country is the oldest university, the principal governing board, the President and Fellows of Harvard College, consisting of seven men." When the board of trustees is large and meets but rarely, there is usually an executive committee which with the president is in substantial control. The members of this committee are likely to be the friends and adherents of the president—
in practise the president is likely to select the trustees and the members of their executive committee—and the faculties and professors are supposed to communicate with the trustees only through the president. Under our existing system, there should be an elected committee of the faculties which would meet with the executive committee of the trustees. It would in addition be advisable to permit the professors and other officers to elect for limited terms representatives—not necessarily from among themselves—on the board of trustees in the manner now becoming usual for alumni representation. It is undesirable for the individual professor to tease the trustees with his needs or grievances; but there should surely be some way by which trustees and professors can consider together the problems confronting the university. A joint committee of trustees and professors such as has just now been constituted to administer the Crocker Cancer Research Fund of Columbia University is an excellent plan.

If trustees are trustees and not directors, it does not greatly matter in practise how many of them there are or how they are chosen, so long as they are men of integrity and honor, representative of the common sense of the community. Even if the trusteeship is an acknowledgment of gifts made or hoped for, no great harm is done. But a self-perpetuating board with absolute powers, even though for a generation the powers may not be abused or even used, is intolerable in a democratic community. The president and directors of industrial corporations are elected by the shareholders and are increasingly supervised by the state. In the state universities the regents are elected by the people or appointed by their representatives, and the people may be regarded as the ultimate corporation. In the case of the private universities, it would apparently be wise to have
a large corporation consisting of the professors and other officers of the university, the alumni who maintain their interest in the institution and members of the community who ally themselves with it. This corporation—or perhaps better the three groups of which it is composed—should elect the trustees. Thus there might be a board of nine trustees, one being elected annually for a three-year period by each of the three divisions of the corporation.

Several of my correspondents hold that the members of the community permitted to join the corporation of a university should be carefully selected. I should myself like to see the widest possible participation. If 10,000 or 50,000 people would join such a corporation, so much the better. They would pay dues, perhaps five or ten dollars a year, and would enjoy certain privileges such as attendance at lectures and concerts, the use of libraries, museums, rooms for meetings and the like. If many people are concerned with their university, it is well for them and for it. Some of them will become seriously interested, ready to aid with their counsel, their influence and their money. In New York City several institutions—the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the American Museum of Natural History, the Zoological Park, the Botanical Garden—are partly supported by the city, partly by boards of trustees and partly by members. The buildings are owned and the curators are paid by the city; the collections are owned and the research work is paid for by the trustees; the members have certain privileges in return for dues. In spite of obvious difficulties, the plan has worked well.

A large corporation holding the university in trust for all the people is clearly a step in the direction of public ownership. It is the ultimate fate of every corporation to be controlled by the state, and our private
universities will surely become part of the system of public education. This should develop gradually rather than through such measures as have been required to obtain control of church property in other nations. When the people own their universities they will probably see the wisdom of delegating to those concerned—namely, the officers of the university, its alumni and members of the community taking an interest in higher education and having knowledge of it—the right to elect the trustees. True democracy does not consist of government by the uninformed, but of government by those most competent, selected by and responsible to the people. In one of the leading state universities one third of the trustees are elected by the alumni; a second third might to advantage be elected by the teachers, the remaining third being elected by the people or their representatives.

When trustees in the state universities are elected by the people or their representatives and in the private universities are elected by the corporation consisting of officers of the university, alumni and members of the community, the question as to their powers and duties is perplexing. Much can be said in favor of giving them no more power than is vested in a trust company designated as trustee of an estate, and arguments can be urged in favor of a small paid board of experts having the ultimate decision on all questions. I seem to have been almost the only educational person in the country who approved of the principle of Mayor Gaynor's plan for a small paid board of education for New York City, and I should regard its present adoption as risky. This, however, is the correct method of democracy—experts selected by the people and paid for their work. The professors and other officers of the university should be such. Whether in addition to them it is desirable or
THE CORPORATION AND THE PRESIDENT

necessary to have a board to coordinate and control their work, to regulate their duties and fix their salaries, is a question which can only be settled by experience. Certainly the commission form of government is preferable to an individual autocrat.

In the academic jungle the president is my black beast. I may seem to be in the condition of the animal suffering from the complication of diseases described in a recent issue of a New England paper:

Patrolman Lindstrum went to East Elm Street recently and shot an alleged mad dog. The dog also was declared to have hydrophobia and rabies.

As a matter of fact neither barking nor biting is warranted. An eminent philosopher of Harvard University in a lecture to a class at Radcliffe is alleged to have depicted in eloquent terms the darkness of the life of him who has lost his religious faith and then to have added that the only compensation is a sense of humor. Whereat, first one and then another of the students began to weep until all the eighty girls were in tears. It is more becoming for university professors to appreciate the semi-humorous absurdity of the situation than to fail to weeping together. I once incited one of my children to call her doll Mr. President, on the esoteric ground that he would lie in any position in which he was placed. Of course, the president is by nature as truthful, honorable and kind as the rest of us, and is likely to have more ability or enterprise, or both. But he really finds himself in an impossible situation. His despotism is only tempered by resignation; and in the meanwhile he must act as though he were a statue of himself erected by public subscription. In Tennyson’s words:

Who should be king save him who makes us free.

The argument for giving a free hand to the president is that this is the way to get things done. It should, how-
ever, be remembered that it is quite as important—and this holds especially in the university—not to do the wrong thing as it is to do the right thing. The time of the president is largely occupied with trying to correct or to explain the mistakes he has made, and the time of the professor is too much taken up with trying to dissuade the president from doing unwise things or in making the best of them after they have been done. Administrative details should be attended to promptly and correctly; this is the proper business of secretaries and clerks. Then we need leaders, most of all in a democracy. But in a democracy leaders are the men we follow, not the men who drive us. In the university each should lead in accordance with his ability and his character.

The trouble in the case of the university president is that he is not a leader, but a boss. He is selected by and is responsible to a body practically outside the university, which in the private corporations is responsible to nobody. In our political organization, the mayor, governor or president has great power, too great in my opinion, if only because it demoralizes the legislature; but they are responsible to the people who elect them. I object even more to the irresponsibility of the university president than to his excessive powers. The demoralization that the president works in the university is not limited to his own office; it has given us the department-store system, the existing exhibit of sub-bosses—deans, heads of departments, presidential committees, professors appointed by, with salaries determined by, and on occasion dismissed by, the president, all subject to him and dependent on his favor.

It is not my wish to depreciate unfairly the services of the American university president. Like the promoter in business and the boss in politics, he has doubtless been
a factor natural and perhaps desirable in a given stage of evolution, when the growth of the complexity of society and the need of new adjustments have outrun the adaptability of the individual. It is probable that the president has increased appropriations and gifts; it is possible that he has promoted rather than hindered the development of the university and the extension of its work. The president, however, has not usually been the cause of gifts, professors and students, but only the means of diverting them from one institution to another, and on occasion of doing so in ways unworthy of the institution which he then misrepresents. The president has not infrequently sacrificed education to the fancied advantage of his own institution. Thus college entrance requirements have imposed studies on the high school which drive from it the majority of boys. The opposition of certain presidents of proprietary universities to a national university is not less pernicious if it results from honest prejudice. The prestige of the president is due to the growth of the university, not conversely. He is like the icon carried with the Russian army and credited with its victories. President Eliot claimed that he had never asked for a gift for Harvard. During the lean years he was regarded as a poor money-getter; when the fat years came with the increasing wealth of the alumni and of the country, this opinion was reversed, but he had not changed. President Eliot is a truly great man, but his remarks on all sorts of subjects, usually wise but occasionally otherwise, were reported everywhere, not for their wisdom, but on account of his position.

While I regard it as desirable to do what little I can to make ridiculous an institution which has become a nuisance, and while I should find my state of dependence on a president for my opportunity to serve the university intolerable if I concealed my views, I certainly do not
wish to be understood as lacking in appreciation of the fine characters and high motives of most of the men who have served as professors and later become presidents. They do not considerably, if at all, surpass in character or ability the average standard of the professorship, but they exploit before the world how high this standard is. The practice of many presidents is a sacrifice of their real convictions to the imagined exigencies of the situation. Most of them would agree that autocraty in the university is undesirable. Thus President Eliot writes:

The president of a university should never exercise an autocratic or one-man power. He should be often an inventing and animating force, and often a leader; but not a ruler or autocrat. His success will be due more to powers of exposition and persuasion combined with persistent industry, than to any force of will or habit of command. Indeed, one-man power is always objectionable in a university, whether lodged in president, secretary of the trustees, dean or head of department.

Dr. Seelye, then president of Smith College, at the inauguration of Dr. Rhees as president of Rochester University, said:

Autocracy, however, is a hazardous expedient, and is likely to prove ultimately as pernicious in a college as it is in a state. It induces too great reliance upon the distinctive characteristics of a despot, and too little upon those of a gentleman. One-man power is apt to enfeeble or to alienate those who are subject to it. . . . Successful autocrats are few, and however long their term of service, it is short compared with the life of an institution. If they leave as an inheritance a spirit which has suppressed free inquiry, and which has made it difficult to secure and retain teachers of strong personality, the loss will probably be greater than any apparent gain which may have come through the rapid achievements of a Napoleonic policy.

Under existing conditions—at least in our proprietary universities—it appears that the place which the president now fills, or wobbles about in, might be divided into three parts. There might be a chancellor, as in the English universities, a man of influence and of prominence, representing the corporation and the relations of
the institution to the community, concerned with increasing the endowment and prestige of the university. Then there might be a rector, as in the German universities, elected annually or for some other limited period by and from the faculties, presiding at academic functions and the like. In the third place, there would be a secretary or curator, an educational expert in charge of administrative details. In a real democracy and with a people appreciative of the needs and service of the university, the former two officials would become superfluous.

It must be admitted that the situation is difficult. The alumni are no longer predominantly scholars or even professional men. They have more concern for football than for the work of the professor; any university club could get on better without its library than without its bar. But the alumni of a university should be not less intelligent and wise than the electorate of the nation. In both cases the ultimate control must be democratic, unless perchance we are following false gods. Experts and intellectuals are not, as a rule, to be trusted to act for the common good in preference to their personal interests. The professors of an endowed university can not be given the ultimate control. A monastery or a proprietary medical school must ultimately be reformed from without. We need the referendum and the recall because we can not trust those placed in authority, and we fear these measures because we do not trust the people. An aristocracy is deaf; a democracy is blind. But it is our business to do the best we can under the existing conditions of human nature. Advancing democracy has burned its bridges behind it. No one believes that a city should be owned by a small self-perpetuating board of trustees who would appoint a dictator to run it, to decide what people could live there, what work they must do and what incomes they should have. Why should a university be conducted in that way?
IV. THE POSITION OF THE PROFESSOR

The Bible is often misquoted to the effect that "money is the root of all evil." The love of money and the lack of money are indeed factors in most of the difficulties of society. Next after the getting of men, the getting of money for the university is its most troublesome problem, and next after the proper treatment of men, the use of money is the most important question. He who holds the purse strings holds the reins of power. That the president should decide which professor shall be discharged and which have his salary advanced, which department or line of work shall be favored or crippled, is the most sinister side of our present system of university administration, more pernicious in the private universities, where dismissals and salaries are kept secret, than in the state universities, where salaries are published and teachers are, or should be, dismissed, as in the better public-school systems, only after definite charges.

To transfer the control of appointments and finances from the president to the professors would strike many as passing from purgatory to a worse place. A university executive said to me the other day that if the professors were in control the first thing that they would do would be to raise their own salaries. Well, perhaps worse things have been done. It may be admitted that this is what a president usually does for himself and to an extent beyond the dreams of the most avaricious professor. But there are at least two points of difference. First, the president may increase his salary by withholding a small sum from each professor, whereas the professors could only increase their salaries by obtaining the money for the purpose. Second, it is undesirable
for a president to receive three or four times the salary of the greatest scholar or teacher on the faculty, as is the case at California, Columbia and other institutions. It is subversive of decent social and educational ideals for the president of Harvard University to be permitted to build on the grounds of the university a house for himself costing $100,000, and for the trustees of Columbia University to build for their president a house which with its grounds may cost twice that amount. But it would be in the interest of the university and of society if the salaries of professors were increased. Abuses are possible, but at present whatever makes the academic career more attractive to men of genius is in the interest of all the people.

The undeniable difficulties in the way of adjusting salaries and the conflicting needs of schools and departments, whether the decision rests primarily with the president, the trustees or a committee of the faculties, may be minimized by permanence of tenure and fixed salaries, and by giving the departments financial autonomy. President Van Hise, of the University of Wisconsin, and President Butler, of Columbia University, have recently pronounced in favor of the competitive system in the university.1 The former says: "There is

1 Similarly the late E. Benjamin Andrews, then president of the University of Nebraska, concluded an article on "University Administration" (Ed. Rev., March, 1906) with the words:

It is not thought that a professor who has grown inefficient has a right to his place simply because he has wrought long for the institution, even if his service has been satisfactory... In some cases application of the competitive system appears cruel, and it may now and then be so in fact; but none who compare institutions where this procedure prevails with those using greater apparent clemency can doubt which is the juster practise on the whole and in the long run.

Several of the most distinguished university presidents have, however, defended permanence of tenure. Thus the late President Harper said in one of his quarterly statements (1901):

If an officer on permanent appointment abuses his privilege as a professor, the university must suffer and it is proper that it should suffer. This is only the direct and inevitable consequence of the lack of foresight and wisdom involved in the original appointment. The injury thus accruing to
no possible excuse for retaining in the staff of a university an inefficient man." The latter says: "A teacher who can not give to the institution which maintains him common loyalty and the kind of service which loyalty implies ought not to be retained through fear of clamor or criticism," and further in respect to equality of salaries: "In my judgment such a policy would fill the university with mediocrities and render it impossible to make that special provision for distinction and for genius which the trustees ought always to be able to make."

There are advantages in a system of severe competition for large prizes under honorable conditions, as well as in permanent tenure of office with small salaries and a free life; but confusion and harm result from running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. If there is to be competition in order to retain university chairs, then the university must be prepared to forego able men or to compete with other professions in the rewards it gives. It must offer prizes commensurate with those of engineering, medicine and law, namely, salaries as large as from ten to a hundred thousand dollars a year. It is further true that under these circumstances a man must be judged by his peers. A university which dismisses professors when the president thinks that they are inefficient or lacking in loyalty to him is parasitic on the great academic traditions of the past and of other na-

the university is moreover far less serious than would follow if, for an expression of opinion differing from a majority of the faculty or from that of the board of trustees or from that of the president of the university, a permanent officer might be asked to present his resignation. The greatest single element necessary for the cultivation of the academic spirit is the feeling of security from interference. It is only those who have this feeling that are able to do work which in the highest sense will be beneficial to humanity.

President Eliot in his book on "University Administration" writes:

The statute which defines the tenures of office throughout the university is of fundamental importance; for it is practically the expression of a contract between the university and its teachers and administrators. This contract ought to provide for life-tenures after adequate periods of probation.
tions. A single university which acts in this way will in the end obtain a faculty consisting of a few adventurers, a few sycophants and a crowd of mediocrities. If all universities adopt such a policy, while retaining their present meager salaries and systems of autocratic control, then able men will not embark on such ill-starred ships. They will carry forward scientific work in connection with industry and will attract as apprentices those competent to learn the ways of research.

Permanent tenure of office for the professor is not a unique state of privilege. A president’s wife has permanent tenure of office; he can not dismiss her because he regards her as inefficient or because he prefers another woman. Analogous social conditions make it undesirable that he should have power to dismiss a professor for similar reasons. In the army and navy, in the highest courts, to a certain extent in the civil service of every country, there is permanence of office. Indeed it is nowhere completely disregarded; service is always a valid claim for continued employment. A wife may be divorced by the courts, an army officer may be court-martialed, a judge may be impeached; but such actions are taken only after definite charges and opportunity for defence. Permanent tenure of office is intended to improve the service, not to demoralize it. It is attached to honorable offices, where public spirit and self-sacrifice are demanded, and the wages do not measure the performance. In Germany, France and Great Britain the permanence of tenure has given dignity and honor to the university chair, attracting to it the ablest men and setting them free to do their work.¹

¹ The question of pensions and the complications which have arisen through the establishment and conduct of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching have been discussed by me in various articles. I venture to quote from one of them (Science, April 2, 1909):

Permanent tenure of office doubtless implies a continuation of salary or a
Incitement to the best work of which a man is capable is not excluded from the university if the professorship itself is made a high reward, the essentials of which are permanence, freedom and honor. Men who have proved their ability for research need opportunity rather than pension in case the professor can no longer serve to advantage; and this leaves the difficulty resulting from paying a professor less than he is worth in middle life in order that he may receive more than he is worth in old age. Obviously we must face this situation; but it is emphasized and made worse by the establishment of a uniform and centralized system of pensions. It can be most conveniently met if we are sufficiently optimistic to assume that on the average the services of professors over sixty-five years of age are worth to their institutions and to the community the salaries that had previously been paid. A professor at this age may become a less efficient teacher in professional and required courses, though this is not always the case. It is, however, by no means certain that he is, on the average, a less desirable teacher in advanced and elective courses; or that his scholarship, experience, judgment and poise are not of the utmost advantage to the university. A man of this age may not have new ideas; but his research work and productive scholarship are likely to continue and to be of greater value to the world than the salary he is paid.

The institutions accepting the terms of the Carnegie Foundation for pensions on the basis of age must make retirement on a pension at sixty-five mandatory, or else they must make it a matter of arrangement between the administration and the professor. Either alternative is unfortunate. If the retirement is mandatory, the institution will lose men whom it can not afford to lose, and professors will be retired who are competent and anxious to continue their work. It will be a poor reward in the academic career to cut men off from the service of their lives and pay them part salary, when in other professions at that age they would probably have continued to be leaders and to have had an income at least twice as large as twenty years before. If the retirement is only permissory an institution might gain temporarily by retiring its less efficient men; but this would be only a mitigated form of the policy of dismissing professors whenever their places can be filled at less cost. Every institution could improve for a time its faculties by dismissing twenty per cent. of its professors; but such an undertaking would in the end be disastrous to the institution and to higher education. If only incompetent professors and those not in favor with the administration are retired at sixty-five, the pension will be far from an honor and by no means a worthy close to an academic career. It will frighten able men from it at the outset, and tempt them to desert it when they can.

It may give a sense of security to be assured of a pension in old age; but when the time comes the reduced salary will cause difficulty to those not having independent means. There will be a tendency for the professor to engage in some form of money-making and to begin early in his career. An eminent man of science has written to me that since he had been retired on
THE POSITION OF THE PROFESSOR

extraneous stimulus. Still it is true that while the lack of prizes does not considerably dampen the spirit of research, it makes the academic career less attractive to those who should be drawn to it. Most of the graduate students in our universities are men of mediocre ability, a Carnegie pension he could no longer contribute to a scientific journal, as he had to earn a living for his family by writing fiction. The community and the world are largely dependent on the university professor for the advancement of science and scholarship and for the maintenance of the best ideals, and those great services are not paid for directly. They can only be assured by attracting the best men to university chairs and then setting them free to do their work with no interference and no fear of dismissal even on half salary.

In my opinion the Carnegie Foundation would have been most wisely administered if it had agreed to give to every institution that had adopted or would adopt a half-salary pension after the age of sixty or sixty-five an endowment sufficient to defray the remaining half of the salary, so that the professor would be paid his regular salary for life. He could then retire from the teaching for which he was not fit, but could continue to give his services to his institution and to his science. Or if the allowance had been paid by the foundation directly to the professor without regard to whether or not he continued his teaching, then he could give to his institution so much service as he might render to advantage and in turn receive so much salary as he might earn.

The drawbacks of a centralized pension system may be illustrated by an example. A professor has reached the age limit with a salary of $4,000. He prefers to continue his regular teaching and research and can do so competently. If the institution had to continue his salary, it would have no inclination to relieve him of his duties, nor would it care to do so if it had to pay a pension of $2,400, for in this case the $1,600 released would not suffice for the salary of a new professor. But if the payment of the professor’s pension can be put off on the Carnegie Foundation, then the president will reflect that he can obtain a new man about equally competent for $3,000. He will thus save $1,000, and the institution will still have credit for the work of the retired professor; the students he attracts; the indirect teaching that a man engaged in research at the university can not fail to do; his valuable judgment and counsel. The institution saves $1,000 and gets $2,400 more that it could not get in any other way. At first sight it may seem that no one suffers except the dismissed professor; but in the end it will be found that the institution and higher education also suffer. . . . In order to reward a professor after long years of service, he should be relieved, not of half of his salary and the privilege of teaching, but of so much routine instruction and administration as interfere with his research. This is now done in our better universities; professors of distinction who wish to devote themselves mainly to advanced students and research work are encouraged to do so.
drifting along with the aid of fellowships and underpaid assistantships to an inglorious Ph.D. and a profession with meager rewards. Several of my correspondents write that if large income, power and honor were not attached to the presidency, there would be no prize to attract men to university work. From my point of view it is altogether demoralizing that the reward held before the investigator and teacher should be the position of an executive, politician and promoter, which takes him away from the higher work for which he is fit. It is a curious exposure of the situation when the president of our largest university can write:

Almost without exception the men who to-day occupy the most conspicuous positions in the United States have worked their way up, by their own ability, from very humble beginnings. The heads of the great universities were every one of them not long ago humble and poorly compensated teachers.  

It would be well if some universities would maintain professorships so highly rewarded and regarded that the possibility of a call would exercise a beneficial influence throughout the country, and if each university would establish from one to ten professorships having a salary and a prestige equal at least to that of the presidency.  

""The American As He Is," by President Nicholas Murray Butler.  

A considerable number of my correspondents argue against the statement in the memorandum sent them to the effect that the salary and the dignity of the presidential office should not be greater than those of the professorship. It was not, of course, intended to imply that all professors should have the same salary as the president, but only that those professors in the university whose work is of equal value to society should receive equal rewards. When the expenses of the president for clerical assistance, traveling and official entertainment are larger than those of the professor they should be defrayed by the university, as should the greater expenses of the professor for books and apparatus. It may be that under the existing system the president should have a larger salary to cover the greater risks of the trade, but the proper solution is to permit an easy return to the professorship. I do not admit that executive ability is rarer than ability in teaching and research, or that the competitive system is more desirable for the presidency than for the professorship. The buyer for a dry-goods firm may receive a larger salary than the governor of the state of New York,
Vacancies in these professorships should be filled by cooptation or election by the faculties or by a faculty committee; but even under the present system of presidential nominations, it would be better to have a few important appointments made publicly than a number of small increases in salary made secretly as the result of presidential favor.

It is awkward to urge a reform, such as an increase in the salaries of professors or the advance of a few salaries to that of the presidency, when this would become superfluous or undesirable, if society as a whole could be reorganized on a just economic basis. Elsewhere I have discussed the question as follows:

The best reward for scholarly work is adequate recognition of the work as preparation for a career in life. At Columbia University a man takes his doctor's degree at the average age of 27 years. He is fortunate if he receives immediately an instructorship at $1,000 a year; the increments of salary are $100 a year for ten years, so that at the age of 37 he receives a salary of $2,000. In a commercial community the imagination is not stirred by such figures. The university is a parasite on the scholarly impulse instead of a stimulus to it.

The first need of our universities and colleges is great men for teachers. In order that the best men may be drawn to the academic career, it must be attractive and honorable. The professorship was inherited by us as a high office which is now being lowered. Professors and scholars are not sufficiently free or sufficiently well paid, so there is a lack of men who deserve to be highly rewarded, and we are in danger of sliding down the lines of a vicious spiral, until we reach the stage where the professor and his scholarship are not respected because they are not respectable.

a United States senator or the chief justice of the United States. We do not get better university presidents by paying salaries as large as the dry-goods buyer receives; the result is a demoralization of the academic situation.

I should myself prefer to see the salaries, earnings and conveyings of others cut down rather than to have the salaries of professors greatly increased. When a criminal lawyer—to use the more inclusive term for corporation lawyer—receives a single fee of $800,000, our civilization is obviously complicated. Every professor who is as able as this lawyer and who does work more important for society can not be paid a million dollars a year. But neither is it necessary to pay him so little that he can not do his work or educate his children. I recently excused myself somewhat awkwardly for not greeting promptly the wife of a colleague by saying that men could not be expected to recognize women because they changed their frocks. She replied: "The wives of professors don't." It is better to have wit than frocks; but in the long run they are likely to be found together.

The first step of a really great university president would be to refuse to accept a larger salary than is paid to the professors. The second step would be to make himself responsible to the faculty instead of holding each professor responsible to him. The bureaucratic or department-store system of university control is the disease which is now serious and may become fatal. This subjection of the individual to the machinery of administration and to the rack wage is but an invasion of the university by methods in business and in politics from which the whole country suffers. We may hope that it is only a temporary incident in the growth of material complexity beyond the powers of moral and intellectual control, and that man may soon regain his seat in the saddle.

I myself accept the social ideal: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs; and I believe that, thanks to the applications of science, the resources of society are sufficient to provide adequately for all. But the first step to take in our present competitive system is to make rewards commensurate with effective ability and a compromise between services and needs. I have pointed out that, apart from exceptional cases, the range of individual differences in many traits is about as two to one. Thus in accuracy of perception and move-
ment, in quickness of recognition and reaction, in rate of learning and retentiveness of memory, in time and variety of the association of ideas, in validity of judgments, I have found in laboratory experiments a range of difference of this magnitude. The able student can prepare a lesson or earn the doctor's degree in about half the time required by the poorer student. For the same kind of work and under similar conditions the value of the services of an individual varies within somewhat the same limits. A good laboring man or a good clerk is worth as much as two who are mediocre. The value of genius to the world is of course inestimable. A great man of science may contribute more than even the most successful promoter—a Rockefeller, a Carnegie or a Morgan—gets. But such contributions are made possible by the organization of society as a whole, and should in large measure be distributed among its members, preferably in the direction of making further contributions possible. Scientific men should receive adequate rewards, and the surplus wealth which directly or indirectly they have produced—it must be counted by the hundreds of thousands of millions of dollars—should, in so far as this can be done to advantage, be spent on further scientific research.

The available wealth in the United States and Great Britain suffices to provide a home and the tools of production for each family and the productivity of labor to provide an annual income of about $1,000 for each producer. If waste in production and expenditure were reduced, even to the extent that now obtains among teachers and scientific men as a group, there would probably be available $1,500 for each adult, including women engaged in the care of the home, or $3,000 for each family. If this were distributed on a range of two to one in accordance with ability, the more deserving teach-
ers and scientific men with their wives would earn salaries of $4,000, in addition to owning their homes. An addition of from $250 to $1,000 should be allowed for each child requiring support and education, to be deducted in part from the incomes of those having no children, and allowance should be made for the varying cost of living in the city or the country and the like.

If the maximum income of a university professor or scientific man with a family should be from $5,000 to $10,000, no one should receive more, except to cover greater risks. There is no occupation requiring rarer ability or more prolonged preliminary training, and there is none whose services to society are greater. If there are to be money prizes—incomes of $20,000 or $100,000 or more—then they should be open to professors and investigators. Scientific ability is as rare as executive or legal ability, and is far more valuable to society. The lawyer who receives a fee of $800,000 for enabling a group of promoters to get ten times as much by evading the intent of the law, does not add to the wealth of society. The scientific man who increases the yield of the cereal crop by one per cent. adds $10,000,000 a year to the wealth of the country and five times as much to the wealth of the world. The scientific man who discovered and those who have developed the Bessemer process of making steel have, according to the estimate of Abram S. Hewitt, added $2,000,000,000 yearly to the world’s wealth. There is no reason except the imperfect adjustments of society why the lawyer should receive large rewards and the scientific man a scant salary. Those who render services to an individual or group are likely to be paid in accordance with the value of their services to the individual or group; in our competitive system those who render services to society as a whole are not paid at all, or only partially and indirectly. Of
our thousand leading men of science, 738 are employed in universities and colleges, 106 in the government service, 59 in research foundations. It is the duty of these institutions to provide adequately and liberally for their support and for their work.

The rewards of the academic and scientific career deserve detailed discussion because they are of fundamental importance to the university and to society. Professors and investigators should have adequate incomes, as large as is desirable for any social class, but above all they should have opportunity to lead a life free from distracting or dishonorable compromises. It should be emphasized that nothing here written is intended to promote a privileged class of university professors. Valparaiso University and Mr. Edison's Menlo Park Laboratory are useful, as well as Harvard University and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. My concern is only that the university should be of the greatest possible service to the people and to the world. It may be that the great bulk of routine teaching and routine research can be done most economically under the factory system, with a manager to employ and discharge the instructional force and bosses to keep each gang up to a square day's work. But then the highest productive scholarship and creative research must find refuge elsewhere than in such a university.*

It is truly distressing that our universities should be

*As President Maclaurin, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has put it (Science, Jan. 20, 1911):

The superintendent of buildings and grounds, or other competent authority, calls upon Mr. Newton.

Supt. Your theory of gravitation is hanging fire unduly. The director insists on a finished report, filed in his office by 9 a.m. Monday next; summarized on one page; type-written, and the main points underlined. Also a careful estimate of the cost of the research per student-hour.

Newton. But there is one difficulty that has been puzzling me for fourteen years, and I am not quite . . .

Supt. (with snap and vigor). Guess you had better overcome that difficulty by Monday morning or quit.
so conventional and unimaginative, each trying to follow
the lead of those bigger than itself, all lacking in fineness
and distinction. The Johns Hopkins, Clark, Stanford
and Chicago were founded one after the other with
promise of higher things, and each has relapsed into the
common mediocrity. Harvard and Yale maintain the
traditions of scholarship; the Johns Hopkins and Chicago
have not abandoned the ideals of research; Columbia
looms up with the vastness and crudeness of the metrop-
olis; the state universities exhibit the promise and the
immaturity of our democracy. But each and all unite the
scholasticism of the twelfth century with the commercial
rawness of the twentieth century. Can there not be
one university where the professor will have a study in-
stead of an office, where the ideal set before the young
instructor is something else than answering letters
promptly and neatly on the typewriter, where men are
weighed rather than counted, where efficiency and ma-
chinery are subordinated to the personality of great men?
Could there not be a university or school, dominating
some field of scholarship and research with its half-dozen
professors and group of instructors and students drawn
together by them? Might not means be devised by which
the professor would be paid for the value of his teaching,
service and research, and then be set free to do his work
how and when and where he can do it best? It is not in-
conceivable that there should be a national or state uni-
versity, with some features of the royal academies, re-
warding with fellowships men of unusual promise and
with professorships men of unusual performance, en-
dowing the individual instead of the institution.
V. THE DUTIES OF THE PROFESSOR

If it is not possible at present to have free professors and independent schools, we can at least strive for greater freedom of the individual and larger autonomy of the department within the university. As the position and salary of the professor should not depend on the favor of a president, so the department or school should be allowed substantial autonomy. There is nothing more disheartening to the members of a department or school than to have its activities prescribed or limited, its annual appropriation apportioned, by a centralized system. A great danger confronting the modern university is its own bulk. In the evolution of organic life a limit is placed on the size which an animal can attain. Its surface increases more slowly than its mass, and there must be differentiation and division of labor in order that the animal may grow and react properly to the environment. Even then a limit is fixed; it is doubtful whether apart from the nervous system a structure more complicated than that of the mammal will be reached, or that animals much larger than man will survive. Only a polyp or similar creature can conduct a pure democracy; the organization of higher animals must be more complicated. The growth in size of the American university has been large and rapid. Faculty or town-meeting methods have become difficult or impossible; the institution drifts into autocratic and bureaucratic control. A representative or delegated system of government is necessary for the university as a whole, but its divisions can maintain a family and democratic system.

President Eliot says\(^1\) that a long tenure of office will

\(^{1}\)"University Administration."
be an advantage to the president and to the university he serves, but that the chairmen of departments should be chosen for short periods and should generally be junior or assistant professors to give them opportunity and because "dangers from the domination of masterful personages will be reduced to a minimum under this system." It is not evident why it is less desirable to limit "the domination of masterful personages" in the office of the president or of the dean than in the department. But it is true that a departmental autocracy may be even worse than one on a larger scale, and for the reason that it is conducted in the dark. A president may say that a teacher "ought not to be retained through fear of clamor or criticism," but fortunately public opinion does prevent the more serious abuses to which the system is liable. In certain departments of certain universities instructors and junior professors are placed in a situation to which no decent domestic servant would submit. Clearly that is no breeding ground for genius and great personalities.

It can not be denied that the organization of the departments of a university is one of the difficult problems that confront us. The German plan, according to which the individual rather than the department is the unit, is in many ways preferable. But the American university conducts what is practically a secondary school in the first two years of the college, and it conducts professional schools which are not of university grade. The high schools and small colleges should take over the first two years of the college, establish schools of agriculture and of the mechanic arts, and conduct courses preparatory to medicine, law, engineering and teaching. In a large state, the state university would have one hundred thousand students, if it received all the young men and women between the ages of sixteen and twenty who
should continue educational work. Such education should be provided locally and in connection with productive industry, as in the admirable plan adopted by the school of engineering of the University of Cincinnati, by which students work alternate weeks in the university and in the shop. Under President Eliot, Harvard placed both its college and its professional schools on a university basis; under President Lowell, it has moved backward in the direction of making the college a school of information and culture and of requiring the professional school to begin with the elements. To such an extent is the university the plaything of its president!

For administrative and financial purposes it seems necessary to organize the university into schools, divisions or departments, although for educational purposes as much flexibility as possible should be maintained. The scope and size of such a division should depend on convenience and local conditions; rather than on logical distinctions among the subjects taught. A small college or a small medical school can be conducted to advantage under one faculty. In a large university there is no need to have a separate department for each of the oriental languages because they differ from one another more than do the European languages, though it may be desirable to have separate departments for German and French. When a medical school, or even the work in a special science, such as chemistry, becomes large, it may be advisable to organize it into partly autonomous divisions. There is no gain in economy and usually a loss in cooperation and effectiveness when the entering class of a college or professional school exceeds fifty or a hundred, and when its faculty exceeds twenty or thereabouts. Colleges should remain small; if a university must have a great crowd of college students, they should be divided among separate colleges, as in the Eng-
lish universities. These colleges should not, however, consist of freshmen, as President Lowell plans, or of students belonging to a certain social class, as is likely to happen under the fraternity and club system, but of men having common intellectual interests. Even small colleges for general education should aim to excel and to do research work in some special direction. In the large university the residential colleges and departments should coincide, so that younger men will join a group of older students and instructors having similar interests and ends in life. As I have elsewhere remarked:

The ideal is the zoological hall of the old Harvard, where apprentices of a great man and a great teacher lived together. This is told of again in the charming autobiography of Shaler. A boy from the aristocratic southern classes, with ample means and good abilities but no fixed interests, fell into this group. There he discovered his life-work and pursued it with boundless enthusiasm. Nor did the fact that he devoted himself exclusively to professional work in natural history in college prevent him from writing Elizabethan plays in his old age. The number of men of distinction given to the world from this small Agassiz group is truly remarkable.

A group of some 10 to 20 instructors, having registered primarily under them from 50 to 200 students, is a good size for a school, division or department. Each can be well acquainted with the others and take a personal and intelligent interest in all the work of the department. At the same time the number is sufficient to permit the representation of diverse kinds of work and points of view, and to make possible the election of officers and a democratic control. The chairman or head and an executive committee should of course be elected, not named by a semi-absentee president. In a group of this character questions are not usually brought to a vote. In reaching decisions each member is likely to be weighed as well as counted. In my experience the junior members of a faculty or department take too little rather than too much
share in its discussions and its control. If they obtained constitutional rights they might become more aggressive; if they should, so much the better. One of the serious difficulties of the present system is that the younger men do not share in the conduct of the university and do not feel themselves to be part of its life. Those who do not have their ideas before they are thirty are not likely to have them. The paraphernalia and camp baggage of modern civilization have become so heavy that they threaten to block its further advance. If men must devote thirty years to mere acquisition, and be kept even longer in official subjection, there is not much chance that they will do anything else thereafter. What youth can do should be joined with what age can know.

Voting rights in a department might be in proportion to the salary the officers receive; but such statutory regulations are scarcely needed. The real control is vested in the aggregate common sense of those concerned. The group may well be flexible in character. When courses of instruction and educational problems are under discussion assistants and even graduate students may be admitted to advantage. When the question is the promotion of an instructor, the group would naturally be limited to those of higher office. The chairmanship of the department might rotate among its members or the same head might be re-elected continuously, according to convenience. It by no means follows that the professor most eminent in research should be the executive head; on the contrary, it should usually be a man of competent administrative ability whose time is of less value. Every reasonable man believes in economy in administration and letting the men do things who can do them. Even the most important decisions can be left to the head of the department or its executive committee, so long as they represent and are responsible to the whole department.
The school or department should have complete control of its own educational work. So long as there is ample room for differences of opinion as to the value of different subjects and methods, it is well that there be variation and survival of the fit. Entrance requirements and degrees are among the chief obstacles to education. An instructor in Columbia University said recently to a student who had just received the highest grade assigned in the course: "Why did you take the course, if you don't want a degree?" If there must be degrees, it may be necessary to standardize them; but this should be done only to the extent of prescribing the amount of work to be done in the direction called for by the degree, this being determined by the time spent, weighted in accordance with the ability of the students. I shall print shortly statistics in regard to all doctorates of philosophy granted in the sciences by American universities. For each department of each university will be given the percentage of doctors who continued to pursue scientific work and the percentage who attained a given degree of distinction. If any police regulation is needed, such publicity is far better than the examination of a candidate before the faculty, or the requirement of all sorts of qualifications.²

²This discussion is concerned with problems of administration, not with questions of teaching and research. The latter are by far the more important; indeed, administrative methods are only of consequence in so far as they affect education within and without the university, research and the applications of knowledge. Incidentally I may remark that I should give the student the same freedom and the same democratic system that I should like to see the teacher enjoy. I should admit to the university any student and let him stay there so long as his presence did not do injury to others. I should let him choose his own work and his own methods of work, not because all kinds and methods of work are equally good, but because I regard myself as incompetent and most of my colleagues as even more incompetent to impose any system on the student. I should in large measure do away with grades, required attendance, required courses, required examinations and degrees, not because these things are not in some ways and in some
THE DUTIES OF THE PROFESSOR

Financial as well as educational autonomy should be given to the school or department. Its total income should be held as a trust fund, to be decreased only after full and public investigation. The laboratories, rooms, apparatus, equipment, library, etc., should be held in trust for the department, to be taken away against its will only for clear reasons and on the recommendation of a competent faculty committee. Under these conditions the members of a department will plan on a safe basis for the future, and will seek to increase its funds and facilities. I know of a case in which a professor obtained a gift of $100,000, made expressly "to increase the facilities of the department," and the income was assigned by the president and trustees to pay the salary of that professor against his earnest protest. I also know of a case in which a department which had built up one of the strongest laboratories in the country had those of its rooms especially devoted to research taken away and given to a weak department, to induce a certain professor to accept a call from elsewhere to the headship of the weak department. These are of course extreme cases and might seem incredible, if it were not that interference with the vested rights of departments is of frequent occurrence.

The Harvard plan of visiting committees which may take an active interest in the educational work and financial support of departments is commendable. Under the existing trustee system it might be well if one trustee would concern himself especially with one or two departments, attending their meetings and doing what he could to advance their interests. There can to advantage be within the university departments related to its educational work, but under independent control. Thus cases useful, but because on the whole they do more damage than good. So far as possible, I should let students manage their own affairs, their dormitories, fraternities and athletics, their codes of manners and of morals.
the most useful and vigorous division of Columbia University, with the possible exception of the faculty of political science, is the Teachers College, which is under its own trustees with a dean and faculty responsible to them. As a department of education under the trustees of Columbia College it would probably have had no more leadership than the departments at Harvard or Yale. The educational alliance between Columbia University and the Union Theological Seminary is far better than a school of theology under the trustees of the university. There is no valid objection to two schools of law or two schools of chemistry, independently controlled, but enjoying the advantages of educational affiliation with a university. Endowed research institutions and municipal, state or governmental bureaus can to advantage be placed near a university, contributing to and gaining from its educational work.

Appointments and the apportionment of funds are said to be questions insoluble under democratic control. But in spite of the difficulties the case is not so bad as autocratic one-man power. If there are fixed salaries with automatic increases, only three or four decisions must be made. Shall this man be appointed instructor? Shall he be appointed junior professor after five or ten years of service as instructor? Shall he be appointed full professor after five or ten years of service as junior professor? Who shall be appointed to super-professorships, if such exist? As a matter of fact under the existing system instructors and junior professors are nearly always nominated by the department or its head. They alone have the necessary information in regard to the men and the situation. The nomination of a full professor can be entrusted better to the department concerned than to a president. But such an appointment, being for life and of immense consequence, can not be too
carefully guarded. It should be passed on by a board or committee composed, say, of two members of the department, two members of allied departments and two distinguished representatives of the subject outside the university concerned. Such control would prevent undesirable inbreeding or the further deterioration of a weak department. Nominations should be made publicly—the English plan of definite candidates with printed records has much to commend it—and the power of veto should perhaps be given to the faculties as well as to the trustees.

The apportionment of the existing income of a department varies but little from year to year, and can safely be left to the department. Questions arise only when an increase which the department cannot itself obtain is wanted, and there are general funds available, but not sufficient to supply all the needs of the university. Under the existing system each head of department grabs for everything in sight, and the president plays the part of an inscrutable and sometimes unscrupulous providence in the semi-secret distribution of his favors. No scheme could be more demoralizing. The correct plan is for each department to draw up its budget, with requests for increases and the reasons clearly indicated, the proposed budgets being printed and open to all concerned. Under these conditions unreasonable claims would not often be made by the departments. Plans for new departments and new lines of work could also be submitted by any responsible group. An elected committee of professors, with the assistance of an expert curator or controller, would then pass on the various budgets and proposals and adjust them to the available income, the reductions made by the committee being of course published. The budget for the university would then go to the trustees. It may be objected that under this plan existing work
would be strengthened rather than new ground broken. But might not this be better than the existing presidential mania for expansion? It seems in fact probable that if many professors and junior instructors were concerned, there would be more new ideas than when the initiative is left to a single man, and further that wise plans would be more likely to be adopted and inexpedient schemes to be rejected.

When schools and departments have autonomy, there is no need for much super-legislation and super-administration in the university. The machinery should be as simple as may be. Departments may be united into a school or college and elect a dean and a faculty or an executive committee to coordinate the work. A department can elect members to represent it in allied departments and on the faculties of the schools and colleges with whose work it is concerned. There should be an elected council or senate to represent the entire university and an executive committee which can confer with the executive committee of the trustees. There may at times to advantage be faculty meetings or plebiscites of large groups or of all the officers of the university. Questions concerning the entire university can be discussed to advantage by the fly-leaf method of the English universities, and a vote can be taken without a general assembly at a polling booth or by mail.

There are advantages and disadvantages in large faculty meetings. When all important matters are decided by administrative officers or executive committees and only trivial questions are discussed before the faculty, usually by certain polyphasic members, its meetings are likely to fall into disrepute. Men are efficient in direct proportion to their responsibility. Further, a body of men is effective inversely as its size and directly as the time it works together. A body of
fifty men, such as the faculty to which I primarily belong, meeting for an hour three times a year, without power or responsibility, is clearly dedicated to futility. But if any one supposes that university presidents would do better under these conditions, he should call to mind the conduct of the trustees of the Carnegie Foundation. It seems to be the case that in order to make large faculties real legislative bodies, it would be necessary to devote more time to their meetings than is expedient, and perhaps more common sense than is available. All parliaments, congresses and legislatures do their work through cabinets and committees; but these are responsible to the whole body. Some such plan is necessary in the university. Still the cynical attitude toward faculty meetings common in academic circles appears to be one of the sinister symptoms resulting from the existing methods of autocratic control. It is typical of existing conditions that the most recent university school to be established—the School of Journalism of Columbia University—does not have a faculty, but an "administrative board." I belong to a club at the meetings of which each member must speak once and only once, not exceeding his share of the time, and the discussion is followed by a dinner. If faculty meetings could be made into educational and social clubs they would perform a useful function. The meetings of the faculty of arts and sciences at Harvard may give rise to complaints, but they have been of real service to the university.

Truth, openness, publicity, are the safeguards of free institutions. It is better to wash your dirty linen in public than to continue to wear it. The affairs of a university should be conducted in the full light of day. The proceedings of the trustees, the discussions and conclusions of faculties and of committees, the activities of the president, the work of professors, salaries and the pro-
visions of the budget, the appointment of officers and the rare cases in which it is necessary to dismiss a professor, should be open to all. Light is an excellent disinfectant; what is of more consequence, it is essential to healthy life and growth. "And God said, let there be light: and there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good."

Several of my correspondents argue that if the control of a university were vested in its teachers they would be distracted from their proper work of teaching and research. In a recent article on "The University President in the American Commonwealth," President Eliot writes:

Most American professors of good quality would regard the imposition of duties concerning the selection of professors and other teachers, the election of the president, and the annual arrangement of the budget of the institution as a serious reduction in the attractiveness of the scholar's life and the professorial career.

Do President Eliot and the lesser presidents and the few professors who share their views believe that university professors and other citizens of a city should not concern themselves with municipal government or vote for a president of the nation? Are we of the world's greatest democracy and in the twentieth century to revert to the theory that the common people should do the daily work imposed on them, and trust to the king and his lords to care for them?

In the preface to the first edition (1906) of the "Biographical Directory of American Men of Science," I wrote:

There scarcely exists among scientific men the recognition of common interest and the spirit of cooperation which would help to give science the place it should have in the community. It is fully as important for the nation as for men of science that scientific work should be adequately recognized and supported.

*The Educational Review, November, 1911.*
We are consequently in the fortunate position of knowing that whatever we do to promote our own interests is at the same time a service to the community and to the world.

Trade-unions and organizations of professional men, in spite of occasional abuses, have been of benefit not only to those immediately concerned, but to society as a whole. President Eliot did not obtain commendation for calling the "scab" a hero. But if it is expedient to better the conditions under which work of any kind is done, this is of the utmost importance for education and research. If we can unite to improve the conditions of the academic career, so that it will attract the best men and permit them to do their best work, we make a contribution to the welfare of society which is permanent and universal. It may be that the time has now come when it is desirable and possible to form an association of professors of American universities, based on associations in the different universities, the objects of which would be to promote the interests of the universities and to advance higher education and research, with special reference to problems of administration and to the status of the professors and other officers of the university.

The space at my disposal is exhausted and many problems directly and indirectly concerned with the control of a university remain untouched. I am well aware that this essay is written in the spirit of the advocate and the reformer, rather than from the point of view of the judge and the responsible administrator. Against most of the suggestions which have been made valid objections may be urged. The only principle that I am prepared to

---

4 This is illustrated just now by the conflict between the British Medical Association and the British government. It may seem to be of greater advantage to physicians than to the people that the government has been forced to increase the fees which it proposed to provide; but in the end the rewards and the control which physicians have obtained through their organization will be of advantage to the nation.
defend whole-heartedly is that the university should be a democracy of scholars serving the larger democracy of which it is part. A government of laws is better than a government by men; but better than either is freedom controlled by public opinion and common sense, by precedent and good-will.
PART II

LETTERS ON UNIVERSITY CONTROL

Published in part in the issues of Science for June 7 and 21, July 5 and August 9, 1912.
I. LETTERS FROM HARVARD UNIVERSITY

I am on the whole very pleasantly impressed, as you know, with the general constitution that has been worked out at Harvard: a bi-cameral arrangement for the general governing boards; one large academic faculty and several professional faculties for the boards of instruction; comparatively independent divisions and departments, with a considerable range of initiative within their own fields; a president who is, while powerful, still subject to a great many decidedly distinct and potent sorts of checks from alumni and from various boards. This constitution does not seem to me perfect. The president at Harvard has probably still too large a range of discretion. The result is certainly not bad; but is also still subject to further growth. The bi-cameral system (the "overseers" elected by the alumni, able to advise but not to initiate legislation, able also to veto; the "corporation," self-perpetuating and capable of initiating, but always subject to the overseers' veto), seems to me to work well but unevenly, since the overseers have their seasons of too great or too little activity, while the president is probably a little too potent in influencing the corporation legislatively. Nevertheless, I regard the result of the interaction between the "overseers" and the "corporation" as so useful in many crises, and so convenient both in calling out and in holding in check the interests of the alumni, that I can not be convinced of the value of your proposals 1 and 2, if they were regarded as contemplating a constitution intended to take the place of ours. I should say, in place of your proposal (1), that a bi-cameral governing body like ours is preferable to the arrangement that you prefer. Let the alumni, or in state universities perhaps some larger constituency of interested persons, elect one governing board—not one of absolute authority, but a representative and influential board, with a veto power large enough to be a significant guard, and an advisory power large enough to keep the university in touch with its public. Let there be another board, of another origin, to act
as legal owner of the property. Let this board have a real but not too potent authority as a manager of affairs. Let these two boards cooperate with mutual criticism. Then you could afford to give your president more power and dignity than you do in number (2). I do not agree that the president should be as shorn of power as you make him. Let him be reasonably limited, but not helpless. "Security, permanence, honor," are all consistent with a reasonable presidential leadership. With the spirit of your proposals (3) and (4) I am, on the whole, in sympathy, although I could not go so far as you do. I am willing, as at Harvard, to submit the appointment of officers of instruction to the veto of general governing boards; and to have those boards, as well as the faculties and other teaching "units," take part in all legislation that concerns general educational policies. A professor should have a solid tenure of office during good behavior, and should also have freedom of teaching. A department, or division, or other such small "unit" should have a large scope of discretion as to its own work. But one must keep in touch with one's alumni and one's public as to all questions of common educational policy; and this is why the legislation by general boards is needed, as well as the relative autonomy of departments and of individual teachers. You insist on the latter. To that insistence I agree; but I want the general boards to aid also in legislation. As to (5), I think that you go too far in expecting the departments or divisions to elect a senate capable of doing all their principal legislation for them. Once more—a frequent interaction with governing boards of the type of our Harvard "overseers"—boards that represent the alumni, and that can veto rather than initiate, seem to me a useful aid and check. What one wants is to get all the forces expressed in the university life, without arbitrary mutual interference, but with constant and mutual criticism, and without anarchy, although with plentiful individual freedom. On the whole that is what we have at Harvard.

I recognize the danger of your "Scylla of presidential autocracy" and "Charybdis of faculty and trustee [collective] incompetence." But I have seen so much efficiency, of the right kind,
result from the lodging of great powers in the hands of a wise and able president that I am unwilling to agree, concerning this officer, that "his salary should not be larger, his position more dignified or his powers greater than those of the professor." Of course the right man for president is hard to find, and of course the wrong man is occasionally chosen. I wish that every man accepting a university presidency might do so with assurance of the opportunity to retire at any time from the office on a respectable pension; this would be a happy way out, for the president and for the university, in many unfortunate cases; but I would not see the powers of a well-chosen, well-qualified president stinted. On the other hand, I have seen a great president content to lay his most cherished projects before a large faculty and labor year after year to bring this faculty to his own way of thinking convinced that in this assembly he had, on the whole, the most intelligent and the most fair-minded body of men in the world, for his purposes. The deliberative habits of this faculty under the president were most exasperating to those who are fond of swift decisions in educational questions, and by common consent, as matters of general interest pressed upon us, matters of detail and routine were delegated more and more to committees or to special administrative officers. Moreover, departments or divisions, as they grew in size, assumed new functions, somewhat as they should according to your plan. But through all these changes, a faculty remained a fairly coherent body, members generally, old and young, feeling that, when certain questions of general policy were up, each man of them was expected to do his duty, though comparatively few, as a rule, took an active part in the debates. Furthermore, the frequent faculty meetings, though they did not by any means make every member know every other member, tended advantageously toward general acquaintance, and individuals who, from temperament or from departmental affiliations, must differ, could at least differ more intelligently than if they had not known each other by sight. The combination which I have described, a masterful but considerate president, strong enough and fair enough to invite frank counsel, with a faculty willing to give this counsel in a broad spirit of loyalty, has existed, I believe, not in one institution alone, but in
many. With this combination formal checks and balances of authority are needless; without it they are of little avail. It seems to me the "necessary and sufficient" condition of genuine success for a university dealing with educational problems as they exist in this country. In using the term faculty I mean a body which controls the instruction leading to some degree or degrees, and I am not advocating general meetings of all the various faculties which may exist together under the university name. It is unlikely that any president could feel himself equally a master of the situation in all the various faculties, arts, law, medicine, etc., of a modern full-fledged university; but the advantage of having some one active man to preside at all meetings of these faculties, to watch, and report upon, and in a measure control, the relations of the several faculties to each other, seems great. A "chancellor" for show occasions, "to represent the university at public functions" or even "to obtain endowments," would, I think, be ineffective in comparison. As to the selection of professors, I fear that the plan of having all nominations come from departments might result in that condition of academic inbreeding which is noted in some places. At any rate, the faculty selection of professors appears to have had a tendency toward this condition in certain institutions. I am sorry to take issue with you on some of your most important propositions, for I agree with much that you maintain, and especially with your declaration that "security, permanence, honor, the slow growth of traditions, are essential to a true university." The proposition that great salaries are needed to induce able men to enter university positions, or that great salaries would bring into university professorships the best men, on the whole, for these places, I hold to be fallacious. Great salaries are not needed to call great lawyers from the gainful practise of the bar to the security and honor and sense of public service which they find on the bench. Every teacher, every "productive scholar," should feel himself to be a servant of the public, of a public wider, it may be, than any judge can serve. He should bear himself, and be honored, accordingly.
The plan which you outline is an interesting one which I should be glad to see tried as an experiment somewhere where I am not. The gravest danger I see in it is the proposition that professors be nominated by the departments. This would almost inevitably have the tendency to cause the promotion of men already in the departments, rather than the securing of the best man available, if he happened not to be there. The method of nomination by a faculty composed of only the full professors, as is the case in Germany, obviates this difficulty, since the full professors are no longer looking for advancement, and an appointment from outside will not put any one ahead of them, as would be the case for all other members of the department. I am not at all sure that even this method of selection by a faculty of full professors is superior to the present methods commonly in vogue. Yale, I believe, has such a system, and I do not see that the appointments there have been unusually strong. The main reason why I feel doubt about your scheme is that the averages of our faculties the country over are still so low intellectually. Mediocrity is the almost unbroken rule. No doubt this will improve in time; it has improved greatly during the last twenty years. At present, however, I feel that we have a better chance to secure men of intellectual alertness in the president's chair than as a composite photograph of a faculty or department. The catchwords of democracy and autocracy do not appeal to my judgment here. Of course I am with you in desiring to see the universities and colleges of the country so administered that the faculty members shall not feel that they are merely employees of the corporation (trustees), but that they have a large share in deciding policies and in the making of minor appointments. I do not believe it is necessary, to secure this end, to abolish practically, as you propose, the office of president. I doubt whether, during the present generation at least, a satisfactory substitute for the president can be devised.

The organization proposed under (1), (2), (3) and (5) depends for its success largely on the possibility of finding a man with the requisite qualifications for president, and securing his election. In throwing the responsibility for this choice directly
on the faculty it would have a wholesome effect on this body. But whether any man with no more power given him than you propose for the president could become a leader is doubtful. Certainly Mr. Eliot could not have accomplished what he did for Harvard under this plan. But conditions have changed since then, and more could be done with the plan now. Still, are not our faculties too much bound up in the supposed interests of the undergraduate and with the cruder needs of this immature person, to be willing to take any chances when it is a question of higher scholarship? Are we ripe for this plan? I hope we are; but I do not know. The method of making appointments set forth in (4) is, I believe, a wrong one. At the present time there are not enough first-rate men in mathematics in the whole country to supply even the strongest universities, and I presume the situation is similar in other subjects. It is necessary, then, to discover the man who is scientifically strong early, and moreover it is necessary to want to get the man who is scientifically strong. Now the majority of the men whose vote is necessary for a choice under your plan are not themselves scientifically first-rate men, nor do they know a first-rate man when they see him. They are going in any concrete case to impose conditions, each in itself corresponding to a desirable qualification, but all taken together such that the one (or possibly two) otherwise available first-rate men are ruled out. The result will be the choice of an eminently respectable member of society, who as he grows older will add so much more dead wood to the department and in his turn make the choice of a scientifically strong man difficult or impossible. If really strong appointments are to be made, the choice must rest ultimately with one or two men, as the president and the head of the department; and even two is sometimes too many. There have been cases at Harvard where Mr. Eliot has appointed professors from outside without the advice or consent of the departments, much to the good of the department in question. It is true that when both president and the head of a department are incompetent, good appointments are impossible. But only an act of God can save such a department.

I am inclined to think that the best form of government is
beneficent tyranny, but of course such a person as Marcus Aurelius should always be chosen as tyrant. That there are some individuals more intelligent than the average, there can be no doubt. The point is to choose these as our leaders. Personally, the less I have to do with the details of running the university, the happier I am.

I have never reflected on the matter of college administration and my opinion is therefore of no value, and might readily be reversed by study, argument or reflection. I see no reason as yet for believing in your plan. A system like that of Harvard seems to me to work well.

Your plan of a representative rather than a town-meeting faculty seems to me excellent. The rest of the plan seems to me no better than the one in use here, which has stood the test of use admirably.

I rather believe in finding the right man and then giving him a good deal of power. I confess the practical workings of democratic systems do not inspire me with confidence. In short, I believe in a centralized form of government for universities. This is more a matter of personal feeling than anything I can back with logic. I am quite ready to admit that such a system may not work well in a great many cases, though I think it is satisfactory here at Harvard. If the government of a university is to be of a democratic type, then I have very little to criticize in your circular. I don't think a president and a chancellor would work very well. Why not have the trustees elect a president who would be commander-in-chief and then let there be a vice-president chosen by the senate to represent the academic side on the board of trustees? As to units, twenty seems to me too small a number. Why not have two or three faculties of fifty or more each? General discussion is a good thing. But these are minor points.

I can do no better than state my own experience in two universities, viz., Harvard and Toronto. First, I must say that I do not regard the university professor, as such, as a progressive
entity. He appears to me on the whole to be much less progressive than the average non-academic man. As a consequence of this feature of his psychology, it is often to the advantage of the institution with which he happens to be connected, and certainly to the advantage of his more progressive colleagues, if he has any, that he should feel the spur of presidential displeasure at times. When I was connected with the University of Toronto, there were many things which badly needed setting right, so much so that the university was investigated by three royal commissions within a decade. The remedy which was finally chosen was the appointment of an autocratic president of the American type. So far as I am aware the academic machine has worked very well since this change. At Harvard the forces of conservatism, not to say the 

\textit{vires inertiae}, are quite as strong as they are in any other university I have had experience of, and I happen to know that the academic lives of some of the members of the Harvard staff, who may possibly be more progressive or energetic than their immediate colleagues, would scarcely be endurable but for the fear of the omnipotent president. This is true not only of President Eliot's régime, but also of that of the present incumbent, President Lowell. It appears to me that, on the whole, autocratic powers on the part of a university president are a necessary evil. It does appear, however, that there should be some machinery which, in cases of extreme injustice, might exercise a veto on his acts. I do not think that a president having only a limited tenure would be valuable to the university, nor do I believe that it is very desirable to make his position less dignified than it is at present. A very great desideratum at the present time seems to be a professor's protective association, which, among its functions, might insure its members against unjust loss of position, and which might also act as the advocate of professorial rights in a general way. University professors at the present time in American universities are too much at the mercy of the administration.

I hardly feel qualified to express an opinion about general university organization that would be worth while. I will outline to you the organization that we have in the Harvard Medical
School, because it seems to work satisfactorily under our conditions, and this may be of some help to you. (1) The Medical School has an independent budget made up of the income from funds given definitely to the Medical School, and of fees from students. The Medical School pays its proportionate share of the expenses of the general university, such as the president’s salary, etc. (2) The Medical School has its own faculty, which is large, as is the custom with Harvard faculties. This faculty is presided over by the university president, and bears the same relation to the corporation and to the board of overseers of the university as do other Harvard faculties. (3) All teachers appointed for more than one year are members of the medical faculty. These teachers are appointed by the corporation with the consent of the overseers on the recommendation of a committee composed of all full professors in the Medical School. (4) There is a dean of the faculty of medicine, a dean of the medical school and a dean of the dental school. The dean of the faculty of medicine is responsible for the preparation of the general business of the faculty. The dean of the schools is responsible for the individual school, its business and its budget. The deans are appointed by the corporation without vote on the part of the full professors. (5) The various departments in the medical school are organized into six divisions, each division made up of closely allied subjects. Each division elects a chairman, and each member of the component departments who has been connected with the medical school for more than one year is entitled to a vote. The six chairmen so elected, with the dean of the school, constitute a faculty council, and the faculty council has supervision of matters concerning the curriculum, the extension of the work of the medical school, etc. To it are referred recommendations from all the divisions and departments for consideration and report to the faculty. In the same way, matters brought up in the faculty touching these points are referred to the faculty council for consideration and report. (6) Assistants and instructors reappointed annually are nominated by the professors in the various departments, and their nomination referred to the division acting as a committee on these nominations. If approved by the division, these nominations are sent to the dean,
and by him to the corporation for appointment. (7) There is an administrative board of the school appointed by the corporation, which with the dean act upon matters affecting student discipline, to a certain extent financial matters, that is, discussions of appropriations and awards of scholarships, etc. This seems a rather cumbersome organization, and is probably in part the result of the accretions of time. However, under it pretty nearly every one connected with the medical school has an opportunity in one place or another to freely express his views on matters concerning the policy of the medical school, and in some way to record them by vote. At the same time, those holding more responsible positions are given an opportunity to have a proportionately larger influence on medical-school matters.

So far as the general outline of your plan is concerned, I should express approval. It may interest you if I tell you something of what we have done here in the medical school within the last two years as the result of an agitation initiated about seven years ago. Two years ago the present organization was adopted, and it works exceedingly well. The departments of the school—the department means all those which give a separate examination, or which have an assistant or full professor at its head—were organized in divisions of allied subjects. There were six such divisions, lettered A, B, C, D, E and F. Division A includes the departments of anatomy, comparative anatomy and the Warren Museum. Division B includes physiology, comparative physiology, biological chemistry, materia medica and therapeutics. Division C includes pathology, comparative pathology, bacteriology, preventive medicine and hygiene, neuropathology; Division D includes theory and practise, clinical medicine and surgery, psychiatry, pediatrics. Division E includes surgery, orthopedic surgery, obstetrics, gynecology. Division F, dermatology, syphilis, ophthalmology, otology, laryngology. Each division consists of all members of the constituent departments. Those entitled to a vote in the division are members of the faculty, instructors and assistants who have served three years or more. Each division elects its own chairman and a secretary, and matters of interest to any member
of the division are brought up for discussion at meetings held for the purpose. The chairmen are elected for terms of three years, and are not eligible for immediate reelection. The president of the university, the chairmen of the divisions and the dean of the school make up what is called the faculty council. This council considers all questions arising in regard to courses of study or extension of medical study, the general development of the medical school and the creation of new departments, and reports on the same to the faculty of medicine. Questions on such topics may originate in a division and be brought before the council for consideration, or they may originate in the council; but in such case, no matter directly concerning a division or a department shall be referred to the faculty for action until it has previously been referred to a division for discussion and recommendation to the council. Of course there are other details, but I will not make this letter too long by putting them before you. The general plan has now been working for more than two years, and seems to be meeting with entire approbation. Certainly the results are good in that they have brought together men and interests that before were drifting widely apart. It may interest you to know that this scheme is being discussed with a view to its adoption in at least two large medical schools. The essential point in which it differs from the organization of, say, the Johns Hopkins Medical School, is that it increases the dignity of the professor and does not compel a young man who has secured such rank to remain under the control and tutelage of an older professor or else change his university. The fundamental objection to the Carnegie report on medical education has always seemed to me to be the assumption that the Johns Hopkins organization is the best. In the case of that university it undoubtedly worked well, because they were fortunate in securing strong men in the beginning; but certainly the present indications are that they must either reorganize and give some of their juniors independence or else lose them.

It seems to me that the general plan outlined is excellent in so far as it gives a hand in the control of a university to those who are most intimately interested in its welfare; namely, its alumni,
its faculty and the section of the community at large which it serves. I think it is also excellent, in so far as it seeks to increase the dignity and respect in which a university chair should be held by all persons. The weakest part of the scheme, as it seems to me, lies in the direction for securing new professorial appointments. It goes without saying that each department of a university contains among its teachers expert judges of the intellectual standing of men outside the university, prominent in various lines of scholarship and achievement. In so far as the faculty members are judges of the standing of outside men, their judgments are of great value when the question of appointing a new man to an assistant professorship or a full professorship comes uppermost. On the other hand, I think that a faculty may often err in its judgments as to the type of intellectual work that should be encouraged in a university. I think that in some cases experience has shown that faculties invested with the power of appointing new professors, subject to the approval of trustees, have erred grievously in policy, by appointing men too narrowly along certain intellectual lines. For example, I can readily imagine that at some particular university, some particular subject may be taught by the faculty members in its department, who may be staunch supporters of some particular doctrine or line of work. The men in that department are naturally and properly enthusiastic and earnest in their desire to see their favorite line of intellectual work extended. If they are empowered to appoint new faculty members, they are likely, with the best and worthiest of motives, to appoint new men whose views and work lie parallel to their own. The consequence of continuing such elective policy might, in the course of years, unbalance a university seriously, developing its activities too extensively in some particular lines, to the neglect of other lines equally important. For the above reasons I consider that while the faculty of a university should have some hand in appointing new members, the president or some equivalent power should be able to prevent the university becoming too one-sided. It should lie in the hands of the president, or equivalent power, to introduce such new men into the faculty as may permit of the university work expanding harmoniously and uniformly. Of course,
the appointing power in the hands of a president tends to give
large influence to an individual. To counterbalance that tend-
ency, along the lines of your plan, it seems to me that it should
lie out of the power of the president to dismiss faculty members
except for flagrant cause. Faculty resignations should only be
exacted by faculty action. To sum up, I should like to see your
scheme amended by giving appointing power, under certain
restrictions, to college presidents, but giving dismissing power
exclusively to faculties.

The plan you propose has many advantages. In the case of a
department devoted to research it is very important that the
officers concerned, who are familiar with the subject, should have
almost complete control of the administration, especially as
regards the appointment of the staff and the plans of work. It
is a misfortune when such a department is controlled by a body
of men who have no technical knowledge of the work undertaken,
or, by personal inspection, familiarity with the investigations
actually in progress. It is particularly unfortunate when such
a body is more interested in another department of the university
and is likely to take action for the benefit of the latter at the
expense of the former. The case is like that of the stockholders
of a small railway controlled by a larger railway system. Their
interests are likely to be sacrificed for the benefit of some portion
of the system in which the directors have greater interests. As
regards the details of your plan, I think that you go too far in
reducing the powers of the president. Every university should
have one man of very high grade who would devote his entire
time to the work. He must be a man of affairs and capable of
keeping the work of the university before the influential portion
of the public. I do not believe in the English system of a non-
resident chancellor who is simply a figurehead. If the various
departments were represented on the governing board, and had
the right of nomination as proposed in your (4), the powers of
the president would be sufficiently reduced. With these modi-
cations your plan seems to me a good one.

(1) I do not see why members of the corporation should pay
annual dues. It seems to me likely that the revenue would be
smaller under this system than under the present one in which many men elected to university offices voluntarily give much time and money to worthy objects which they foster. I also think it advisable to keep in all forms of government some degree of subordination, and that the best interests of all the professors of an institution are best guarded by having the allotment of funds in the hands of men who are unhampered by personal interest in obtaining an allotment, as must be the case where a professor serves as a member of the corporation or body making allotments. The tendency would, I fear, be to work to the advantage of certain professors and departments and against a fair deal for other professors and departments. (2) I think the election of a president by the faculty might be an improvement on the present system. The matter of the salary of the president should be adjusted to circumstances. It is to be presumed that the president has unusual expenses by reason of his office, which, unless allowed for, might result in only wealthy men being able to take the position. It seems to me the president should have powers greater than the professor, but perhaps only those which pertain to the chairman of a meeting acting in accordance with parliamentary rules. I would grant him veto power in regard to financial measures. (3) Agreed to, except that a department or division may be able to conduct its affairs wisely when the number of members is less than the minimum of ten prescribed by the "psychological constant." (4) Agreed to. (5) Agreed to. My chief objection to a change from the present system of placing the control of measures involving expenditure in the hands of non-faculty members of the university lies in the innate division of professors into two groups, those with dominant administrative powers and secondary intellectual accomplishment in their professed field of work, and those with dominant studious habits and without aggressive worldly-mindedness such as characterizes the administrator busy with the affairs of his fellows. In the proposed plan it seems to me that the chances are that certain groups of men would more than now develop one-sidedness in the policies of a faculty, and that academic politics would receive an additional impulse. But I may be mistaken in this suspicion. The right of the individual professor
to vote for representatives should safeguard him in this matter and on the face of it the plan seems to give fair play.

Naturally I do not wholly agree with the proposed plan. I think it is fair to say, however, that I am wholly in sympathy with the spirit of the plan and should agree that our present autocratic government may profitably be modified in the directions which you mention. I suspect that many modifications of the plan would be suggested in connection with any attempt to put it in operation. As I understand your proposition, the chief problem is one of the rôle of the president, and in this I should heartily agree with you that scholarship and research, at least, are likely to be far safer and much more advantageously promoted under the type of administration which exists in European universities than under our own. A wise autocrat may do much to foster the life of a university, but ideal men for such positions are so rare that it seems little less than absurd for our American institutions to continue their present form of administration. I most heartily approve of division organization. With certain slight modifications we might have at Harvard a very efficient organization of this sort, but of course at present all such division units are subordinate in a great variety of ways to the president. One of the most urgent needs in our institutions, it seems to me, is a good method of choosing professors. This, I think, is wisely provided for in your plan. On the whole, I should favor experiments in the directions which you have indicated and should confidently expect that our university government might be very markedly improved. I feel that we need to take account both of American conditions and of the forms of government which have been thoroughly tested, especially in England and in Germany.

I am in sympathy with much you state in this article and fully in accord with many of your views. The question is complex, especially as between state universities and "private" universities.

I believe it would be impossible to foretell what would be the outcome of such a scheme for university organization as you
propose, if applied to our American universities. The present situation needs a remedy and your scheme has so many good points that I would favor a conservative trial of it. I am sure that the last sentence on flexibility and anarchy is what we should all strive for.

I agree with most of your suggestions. In my opinion it is practically impossible for the president of a university intelligently to preside over all the different faculties of the university.

The plan of university control outlined in your enclosure appeals to me as admirable in striving to develop a more equable division of effective powers between faculty and president than obtains in most universities at present.

I am entirely in sympathy with your effort toward the administrative improvement of our universities. Professors ought not to be employees, but members of the firm.

I sympathize heartily with the views in regard to university control which you propose, but do not feel competent to discuss the entire subject, especially paragraphs (1) and (2). I may say, however, that I have always felt that a small self-perpetuating corporation, such as that at Harvard, without age limit for its "fellows," although all members of the university are considered incapacitated at sixty-six or thereabouts, is inherently wrong and altogether autocratic. The corporation should be selected by the alumni, by the general body of instructors, or better perhaps by both, and I doubt much if the appointment should be for life.

I am quite in accord with the scheme proposed and raise a question only concerning one point which is included in (4). While in thorough sympathy with the democratic mode of control, I doubt its efficiency. In such departments as I have been connected with, the lower positions are filled more or less temporarily by men who expect to pass on to higher positions. They have not the responsibility for the department, as is the case with the professor, and, as far as my experience has been,
they lack interest in the matter of appointments and policy. Furthermore, they are not acquainted with conditions and men to the extent that the head of the department must be in order to make his department a success. In fact, I believe that the head of the department must be "czar" or "boss," so to speak, and those under him must be responsible to him in order to make such a unit a success. In fact, the executive work of a department in my opinion must be attended to by its head or a person representing him. On the other hand, I believe that it is important that all matters pertaining to the department should be discussed freely by all concerned, and of course in regard to scientific matters there should be the utmost freedom. We have an organization with the unit similar to that outlined in your plan, and it strikes me that there is apathy and a general lack of interest among the younger men.

I heartily approve the general principles of your plan of university control. A plan which secures a separation of the financial and the educational administration is, in so far, a vast improvement over the prevailing plans which ordinarily assume that one governing body may be expert both in business affairs and in educational matters. I favor, too, the more democratic control secured by your plan. I fear, however, that the corporation provided for in (1) of your plan might easily be too large and too freely constituted to be efficient. I should consider it highly unsafe to let the corporation include any "members of the community" who might be pleased to "all their own side with it" and "pay annual dues." There should be some fairly rigid qualifications for membership designed to exclude all who are not willing to give much of their time and energy to the upbuilding of the university. I see no important function in the office of a chancellor. Why should not the president best "represent the university in its relations to the community," for the university is essentially an educational institution—not a business institution? The further details of your plan, as set forth in (2)–(5), I favor without important exception. The plan of electing professors seems unnecessarily complicated perhaps. Here at Harvard the small division or department enjoys a high degree of
autonomy, especially in matters of educational nature, much as your plan proposes. I trust that your agitation of this matter may serve to direct the evolution of our universities along more desirable lines.

In regard to your interesting scheme for university control, paragraph (1) I agree with (with the possible exception of the "members of the community who ally themselves with it"). Would not the alumni of the established university be enough representation? I also agree with paragraph (2). The office should be yearly, or for not more than two years, regarded as a position of dignity, and the election come from the faculties. He should be paid during this time more than a professor, because his work will be greater, more bothersome; he will have to attend functions and dinners and should be compensated for this, particularly for the dinners. In paragraph (3) the unit of organization should be the different faculties. I am not sure about the representation in this, but I think that the representatives should be the heads of the various departments, the men who are really responsible for the character of the work in each department. There is a difficulty here with regard to the very large departments, such as history, literature or chemistry in a university. It might be difficult here to single out the one responsible man. The other plan would be by the election of representatives by the departments of the faculties. This would probably be necessary in the philosophical faculty. The maximum of representatives for each faculty should not be more than twenty. In paragraph (4) I agree fully with regard to the election of the dean and the nomination of professors. The board of advisers I also think is an available feature. One of the great difficulties which I see in university management is that of the removal or non-continuance of inefficient men holding minor positions. Of course, such minor positions, including assistant professors, should be for a term of years and at the end of this term the position should be regarded as vacant and be filled by the best man available. It is much easier to say this than to do it. Certainly in our medical schools and in the hospitals, if a man gets into a minor position he is pretty sure to go on to continual advancement irrespective
of the character of his work unless this has been very bad indeed. Nominations by a committee will not obviate this trouble because the committee will not seriously consider this.

The American college president is certainly an anomaly in education; and the wonder is that the system involving him works on the whole so well. Certainly university faculties do not seem well qualified to manage universities; and state or national educational boards are to be dreaded—Heaven save us! Does not the existence of the present system show that faculties are unbusinesslike and are willing to have some one manage for them? The present method presents a strong contrast to that of the directors of a mill or manufacturing company—where the matters germane to the industry are discussed by a board of directors with a president who is the executive officer. Imagine the feelings of the directors if the president should go to another body, on which the directors have no representative, and state the opinions of the directors as he understands them, or as he desires them to be understood. This is the condition in most of our universities. The faculties should shape the educational reforms of the universities—in a council consisting of not more than twenty men—heads of great departments. The president should carry the votes of such a council to the business and legal councils of the university to ascertain if there are practical objections to the plans of such an academic council. Why should one man assume to shape the educational future of a university?

It seems to me that the cooperation of all faculty members, above and including the rank of instructor, should be desired, but how to get this is not clear to me. If the appreciative sympathy of all the faculty is not had, the control surely will go to the "old guard" and there it will remain, not permitting the careful and at the same time progressive policies essential to the health of the university, as a whole, or it will be taken over by some clique, which would be equally undesirable. Perhaps the end could be best attained by the adoption of a near-republican form of control, by which as much authority as feasible could be delegated, but in which all faculty members including instructors
should have the right to vote and should be eligible for service on appropriate committees. The chief executive officer should be elected by this voting body, and for a definite terms of years. The professors should also be elected by the same body, but for an indefinite period. I have no comment to offer on your suggestions except the single one, that they appear to me to be sound in every particular and worthy of serious consideration. Such universities as have barely escaped shipwreck through the use of wrong policies in control could well follow the plan laid down by you with great profit.
II. LETTERS FROM YALE UNIVERSITY

It is quite unnecessary for me to speculate regarding what such a system as you propose would be. Exactly this system is in effect in New Haven. In fact, Yale University consists of a collection of separate schools. Each has its own funds and almost complete autonomy. These funds are indeed held by the corporation and president, but in the main each department spends its income as its own judgment dictates, with little interference from the university authorities. Each faculty nominates to the corporation its own new members, and, as the corporation nearly always confirms nominations, this amounts to election by the faculty. Each faculty elects its own dean, who presides over its meetings. Its committees are either appointed by the dean (never by the president) or elected by the faculty itself. Such conditions fulfill almost exactly the suggestions of your pamphlet. The question is then: Does this system of university government attain the objects to which you look? I gather from your pamphlet and from previous articles of yours that the happiness of the professor is the principal object toward which you are striving. This is certainly achieved at Yale to a degree equaled, perhaps, nowhere else in America. Of course, satisfaction with one’s position makes for loyalty and other incidental advantages; but is the happiness of the members of the faculty the principal object for which a university exists? Is not that form of university government best which provides the most ready adaptation of the university to the community which it serves? Ought not any form of university government to be judged by the degree of progressiveness of the institution having this government? I am inclined to believe from personal observation that in spite of all the advantages of democratic government which Yale enjoys—and which any university planned as you suggest would doubtless have—a more centralized control would make for great interdepartmental cooperation and a more ready adoption of new measures than is afforded by
such democratic government. After all every institution inevitably adapts itself to the views of the masters whom it serves, that is, to those from whom it obtains funds. The state universities depend upon the people of the state, the endowed universities upon their alumni. It is an article of faith with every loyal alumnus that his alma mater is perfection. With a body of "loyal" alumni viewing every change with suspicion and with a faculty thoroughly satisfied with things as they are, there would not be under the system of government which you propose any sufficient machinery for the initiation of change. There are few—if any—of the endowed universities, at least, which would not in my opinion benefit enormously from having a Woodrow Wilson in the presidential chair. Certainly the one institution that has enjoyed this advantage failed to reap the full benefits therefrom, because the presidency carried with it too little power and the other elements in the university too much.

There are many things in the statement which are in harmony with my own views. I have always been, and still am, a strong believer in the desirability of autonomy for the individual schools or departments of a university. To-day our universities are so large and so complex in character that it is impossible to have adequate control over all the varied interests of the university in the hands of a central body. I believe in the desirability of a corporation, or board of trustees, in whom rests final authority for all matters pertaining to the university; but I think that the initiative, the control and the general management of a department or school of the university should rest in a governing board or subcommittee, whatever you choose to call it—with a chairman or dean or director, who is given, subject to said board, a large measure of authority. The corporation of the university should be representative of all the interests of the university, so far as possible. Here at Yale, where alumni representation is perhaps as strong as in any university, we have been reaching out of late years further and further, so that to-day we have on our corporation various men elected from the alumni; but in addition we have what is called an alumni advisory board, a body composed of representative alumni from all over the country; but while
having no real authority, they are able after discussion among themselves to present to the corporation suggestions and advice, sometimes of great value. This, no doubt, is a move in the right direction. I have advocated, however, what I see you advise here, the desirability of a movement in the other direction, namely, of closer relationship between the corporation and the professors or other officers of the university. At present, in most institutions, if not in all, the president is the sole person on the board of trustees or on the corporation who is supposed to be in touch with the activities of the faculty or faculties. At present, however, with the large size of the university, the president does not have, and can not necessarily have, an intimate knowledge of what is going on. I believe, therefore, very thoroughly in the idea of direct or indirect representation on the corporation of the university of the faculty in the persons of say three professors; who might sometimes be the deans of the individual departments. In your third paragraph regarding the unit of organization within the university, you have outlined exactly what we have in force here. Thus, in the Sheffield Scientific School, the scientific department of Yale, our governing board, composed of permanent professors, about twenty-four in number, is the deliberative and active body, subject of course to the corporation. The size of this group is such that it is thoroughly efficient. Your fourth paragraph is likewise in harmony with our customs and our beliefs in the Sheffield Scientific School. The director is elected every five years. He is given a large measure of authority, but all the same he is subject to the governing board of the school, and there is a very distinct autonomy. Professors and assistant professors, and indeed instructors, are all selected by the governing board, or in practise by committees appointed by the governing board, subject to their approval. Nominations then go from the governing board to the corporation for confirmation. Regarding the salaries, personally I am a strong believer of having the salary the same for all officers of the same grade, subject possibly to advances on the basis of years of service.
(1) Approved, except that the treasurer should be responsible to the president, as otherwise he could hamper the actions of the president by lack of financial support. (2) The professors should elect the president to continue in office at the pleasure of the trustees and removable only by the trustees. I think his salary should be larger and his position more dignified. I do not believe in electing an executive officer and then not letting him execute. The present autocratic attitude of certain presidents would tend to be limited if they were elected by the professors and the professors were able to remonstrate to the trustees; but it is equally clear that the efficiency of the president should not be hampered by the necessity of keeping in favor with all the professors. (3) Approved. (4) There is danger of professors being required to waste too much time in executive work and keeping to themselves powers which should be delegated to executive officers. I think the president should assume the burden of finding candidates, weighing their qualifications, deciding what positions should be filled; but he should do this in consultation with committees of the professors and his action in regard to all appointments should be ratified by faculty vote. (5) The idea of general faculty meetings at occasional intervals is a good one, though as you state not much business can be transacted in such a large body. In conclusion, I would differ from the plan outlined in conferring more working power on the executive officers and leaving the professors free for teaching and research, but at the same time make the executive officers responsible to the faculty as well as to the trustees.

On the whole I think I approve of the policy you set forth. There are minor details I should wish to consider more. You know that to a very considerable degree what you advocate is the plan at Yale University. Our departments and notably this school are in great measure autonomous. It seems to work well here. It has long been a question in my own mind if a unit of 1,000 students with the necessary instructors, buildings and equipment was not as large a one as could be handled by one man as president, dean, director or what you will to obtain maximum efficiency. This in a way seems to be the army view
of it, where the regiment of about this magnitude of unit has its colonel. The kind of management that a colonel must give is what I think one should expect (the difference between the two affairs being properly considered) from a dean or director. I mean that personal supervision of matters that comes of personal knowledge. And when the university is 5,000 in size the president would do well to become a general.

I think you are correct in believing that our universities need remodeling. We have a democracy here at Yale and yet the most effective administration is in the Sheffield Scientific School, where democracy and autocracy are combined. After all administrative heads must have power to act and a good administrator does not work well hedged in by all sorts of limitations. It takes the snap out of one to work under restrictions. The more I see of democracies, the more I come to believe in a limited monarchy.

The more I see of university management the more I feel in a cloud as to what is the best thing. At the present time I haven't any definite opinions on the subject. All I can say is that to me the question of the actual formulation of rules to govern a university is much less likely to have a real influence than the spirit and ideas of the people connected with the university. I can not help thinking that the latter will be the dominant factor, whatever organization may be laid down.

I thoroughly agree with the proposed plans (3), (4), (5), in their essential details. Your views on these points are, I believe, correct. With regard to (2) my reply would depend somewhat on the interpretation of your words. The expression "expert knowledge of education" is the point at issue. Our college and university presidents ought in many cases to talk less and become more familiar with the men, i. e., teaching staff and their work. I am not at all certain that your further suggestions under (2) are expedient. Suggestion (1) does not appeal to me as presented. I do not believe in extreme democracy. However, I prefer to omit discussion of this point, as I have never given any serious thought to it.
I do not wish to be drawn into the discussion. I wish to tell you, however, that I heartily approve of the policy of Science to air the university situation. Its fearless attitude is very needful, in my humble opinion.

I am in accord with the general principles. At the present time the president of most American universities is "neither fish nor flesh nor good red herring." He is so overburdened with administrative duties that he is unable to inform himself as to the educational aspects of the different departments of the university. I speak feelingly on this point because I have been more or less intimately connected with several university medical departments, and it has been my experience that university presidents need about as much education on the subject of medical schools as ordinary intelligent laymen. I dare say the same is true of law and divinity schools, etc. I do not mean to deny that there are brilliant exceptions to this general statement. I am therefore very strongly in favor of the division of the work now accomplished by university presidents into an executive portion, to be taken care of by a chancellor or some similar officer and a board of trustees, and an educational portion, to be overseen by a trained educator. When you come to think the matter over there are singularly few college presidents who hold that position on account of special training. I agree also as to the unit of organization consisting of the school or department, that being the natural and logical unit. I also agree in the main with the machinery proposed in paragraph (4). The only inadvisable thing, to my mind, would be the constitution of a permanent board of advisers—if you mean it to be permanent. I would add that it might be wise to set a time limit upon the deanships—or directorships—whatever you care to call them. Personally, I doubt very seriously whether a single individual should be the controlling force in a department for more than ten years. Your fifth section, which proposes the senate and the plenums, I think is also desirable. I assume that this senate and the plenums would legislate regarding the educational policy rather than regarding the financial policy.
I heartily approve of your scheme for university control. In our university, as in others, the head of a department has altogether too much power—or uses it too arbitrarily. In fact, members of the faculty scarcely dare to oppose his plans or to vote against his reelection, for fear of reprisals, unjust discriminations, etc. Thus a president or head of a department may become a sort of dictator, or like a political "boss."

Your reprint is a very moderate statement of the evils arising from the present system of college and university control. The worst of these evils is probably its discouraging and deterrent effect upon the men exercising the teaching functions in this class of institutions. And if this system continues without essential modifications, this form of its evil results is likely to grow with constantly accelerating rapidity. Self-respecting and gifted and independent men will not choose a career which may at any time be cut short or even totally ruined by the caprices of a presidential "boss." For myself, and much as I love and highly as I prize the office of the teacher, I should hesitate long before accepting, were I again young and asked, under the changed conditions, to enter the life of a college or university professor. As in all similar cases, the remedy is by no means so clear as are the evils demanding a remedy. I am inclined to think that the details of any change of plan would need to differ in different institutions. Certainly they could not be precisely the same for the private and the state institution. And in both cases, care would not be of small importance to avoid changing the benevolent despot for the uncontrolled mob. It would seem also that some means should be devised for placing the control of instruction and the control of finances in largely different hands, while securing frank and cordial intercourse between the two.
III. LETTERS FROM COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

I have very little confidence in the administration of a university by a corporation or senate to represent either the alumni, or the teaching staff, or a mixture. In spite of the notable evils of one-man power, I prefer it. The one man, however, should be responsible to the community at large. Private institutions should be regulated by the state and owned and controlled by the state as soon as may be. I do believe in the partial control of its own finances by each division or school, meaning thereby an administrative unit of from ten to twenty professors. The one man in power should give the control of certain capital funds and of certain current receipts to such a division, holding them responsible for the results. I do not believe in the sharp separation of a group of professors to form a higher educational caste with a group of instructors and lecturers separated from them by a sharp gap. Perhaps you, too, do not intend that. I should have much confidence in mere publicity with respect to all these matters of administration. If the exact budget, the exact work done by each member of the teaching staff and the full reports of the debates of all trustee and faculty meetings were made entirely public, I should expect very good results.

It seems to me that in the present development of universities in this country, we are, of necessity, in the state of one-man control, and I doubt if we are ready to get out of it. Certainly I should feel that it was dangerous during the period of building up institutions to resort to any policy that would give only a temporary head. It seems to me that our safety lies in the check of publicity during this period through which we are passing.

I should assent to your propositions (1), (3) and (5) without change. I should modify (2) by giving the president a higher salary—you yourself suggest this in the footnote (8). It is a most difficult and complicated task and requires a man of first-rate ability. On the whole I agree to (4), except that I dissent.
entirely from the lock-step salary. There should be a standard salary; but the university should always be free to pay higher salaries to men of higher abilities or distinction—as you, again, recognize in footnote (8). Competition for a comparatively small number of highly priced research professorships should operate as a great spur to the higher class of activity. I believe, however, that this introduces more difficulties in the way of nominating professors by vote of the department; and this plan has also disadvantages—for instance, the difficulty of introducing fresh blood or new lines of work into a department that has got into a rut. Frankly I don’t know what is the best way to nominate professors; this is a difficult problem—perhaps the most difficult one, as I view the matter. Human nature being what it is, democracy in such matters tends, I fear, to mediocrity. On the whole I am not averse to benevolent despotism in such matters; but how shall we make sure of the benevolence?

No form of university control can be permanently defensible unless it makes for “the slow growth of traditions” and for “security, permanence and honor.” Presidential autocracy is favorable to efficiency of a certain type, but in its extreme form—that in which a president has the authority, even if he has not the character of a tyrant—is incompatible with the highest conception of a university, and the existence of such an authority could not fail to be offensive to anyone of spirit and especially to the finer sensibilities of any genuine university professor. Democracy, whether or not it be “a conspiracy of the weak against the strong,” is, as you say, impossible. Is the principle of representation adequate? If not, is it the best? I do not know. One danger of it is that it tends to foster cliques, “kitchen politics” now infecting the larger German universities, and may lead to practical oligarchy, which may be defined as a conspiracy of the strong or the unscrupulous against the weak or the scrupulous. As between an autocratic tyrant and an oligarchic tyrant the former is probably preferable, for in that case one knows against whom to level the rifle of obijuration. It would be interesting to know whether American university professors complain more of autocracy than German university professors do of “kitchen
politics." I doubt whether all professors (of given length of service) should receive the same salary. A body of professors being selected with all possible care, they will present very great, almost infinite, differences in respect to character, ability, genius—worth. Such differences ought, it would seem, to be in some measure reflected in their salaries.

I believe that an institution organized on the basis proposed would discharge the functions of the university in the best possible way, but the existing personnel of American universities might not at once adapt itself thereto. Such details have suggested themselves to me as that the plan for selecting the members to the corporation should perhaps be so construed as not to include those members of the teaching staff whose affiliations with the university were apt to be more or less temporary. It is surely a most regrettable consequence of the present administrative system that the higher a man rises in grade the more administrative duties he has to distract him from the work he has shown special fitness to do. The plan of having an executive secretary for each division or department might be examined to advantage. It is not clear to me how the matter of control of the funds would be met; i.e., how there would be determined the amount to be allotted for various purposes to the different departments. It would seem very difficult to avoid centralization here, with the natural powers it gives. The proper conception of the university renders its efficiency less dependent upon governmental system than upon the men who live under it. That governmental system is best, therefore, which attracts and maintains at the university the men most efficient for it, i.e., the men of the greatest intellect and independence therein. Other things being equal, such men are likely to be most attracted to the institution that offers the greatest possible autonomy to groups having common interests, at the same time preserving the sense of solidarity with other constituent groups. Some scheme for cooperative control is doubtless the end to be sought.

Let me say that I am so happy and contented in being detached from the present system that I am loath to disturb my serenity
by serious thinking and comment on your proposals, alluring as, offhand, they seem.

I am convinced that the present system is not the best one. I should be glad to see your plan put into operation if it could be done gradually.

Your scheme of organization for the larger universities seems to me a most excellent one.

I am very much in favor of the changes which you suggest: in fact, unless some changes are made soon, the entire university system as such will go to pieces.

In the matter of your recommendations for the carrying on of the "political" work of a university I am cordially sympathetic, but never in the great world will so discursive a set of people get together in so many diverse lines! In the nature of things I for one am convinced that we are bound in the direction of a benevolent despotism! The purse strings are after all the _ultima ratio_ in governing a university, and the people who are in the class of wealthy trustees and Carnegiean benefactors will ever want to see that some of "their men" are placed in positions of governing. So the professors will ever be employees (having more or less dignity or consideration). Alas, that I should be led to think that their powers will not include election of the president. . . . I am inclined to picture such a state as _non collegium sed utopia_. But we can at least hope and strive for the best.

Your proposed plan of university control seems to me admirable. We are just now passing through an era of autocratic government which is probably a necessary stage of development and justified by its immediate fruits. But in the long run our universities can only secure men of the highest character and ability by giving them a controlling interest in its policies. These should be determined by the faculties, who should be made independent of trustees or president. The present order of things is an inversion, based on commercial usage. The logical result ought to be much worse than the actual experience shows. Still the
contemptuous references to mere faculties and professors rather frequently emitted by some of our university magnates are not likely to impress the public with respect for our higher institutions of learning. Some of our university boards of trustees are already leavened with alumni representatives. Harvard has long had its board of overseers, a check on the autocratic powers of the corporation. Perhaps the general problem may find in this direction a gradual solution. Corporate bodies of large wealth are hard to abolish, but it is possible to trim their autocratic powers.

As a whole, your plan seems to me to be an excellent one. It would appear to me to be making for the closest possible union of those who should and would be normally interested in the welfare of the university. The one specific suggestion which I should like to make would be that the selection of the president be made on a plan resembling that followed by German universities, viz., that a rector be chosen for the term of one or two years from among the members of the different faculties. The only criticism which I would make of your article is the use of the term "complete anarchy" in your last sentence. This term I am afraid may be misunderstood readily, or, at least, understood in a sense different from what you probably intend to have it convey.

I am heartily in sympathy with most of the points which you make, and I firmly believe that they would do much to improve the condition of our university work and especially to rid us of the element of commercialism which now takes so much time and energy for many good men. I am not so sure about the minor points relating to financial autonomy of divisions, because I think of cases of departments which have been fostered by the university, but which would have suffered from lack of financial support if run on an independent basis. With regard to the term of office of a president, it seems to me that the annually elected rector of the German universities does not have time enough to get in touch with his duties and so it seems to me that a longer period would be desirable. For example, many Ameri-
can universities have deans who serve a long term of years and without bringing upon their office the criticism so often brought upon American college presidents.

The present system of governing universities is wrong, utterly and completely, and is rapidly tending to lower and degrade the standard of the university and of the individual professor. Unless the university is to become a trade school and the professor a factory boss, the system must be changed, and the university must be put on a representative basis of government. So much is clear, but it is not easy to formulate a new system which will stand the test of experience. The general proposition outlined in your circular appears fairly satisfactory, but I think there are some points which might be modified to advantage. (1) The trustees should serve for stated terms and should be divided into classes, so as to be representative of the different classes of society; a certain number should be educators, others professional men (doctors, lawyers, engineers), others business men (bankers, merchants and manufacturers). (2) The president should be nominated by the professors or officers but elected by the trustees. He should serve for a stated period. His salary, however, would of necessity be larger than that of a professor, as he would be called upon for larger expenditures in the way of entertaining, travel, etc. (4) The election of a professor should be for a stated term, not for life. He should devote his entire time and energy during the academic year to university work, and should forfeit his position if, during the academic year, he did any outside work for pay. I do not believe life tenure is best. Any man is apt to let down in his work if he feels that his position is absolutely secure for life. With proper administrative reforms and the elimination of outside work, the salaries of professors should be greatly raised. The head of a large department should receive at least $10,000; junior professors, $6,000 to $8,000. On the low salaries received to-day no man can live in comfort; hence the present necessity of adding to the salary by outside work. This outside work detracts from the efficiency of the professor, and his small efficiency tends to lower his salary.
High salaries, prohibition of outside work for pay and increased dignity of position are needed. I believe that high salaries with increased efficiency would be found economical. On the whole, I believe that your general plan would meet many of the difficulties now encountered in university life, and that it offers a very fair basis for working out the problem of university control.
IV. LETTERS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

As to heading (1) as I comprehend it the corporation would have no powers of controlling policies. In that case I approve of it. I should not approve of having policies controlled by so heterogeneous a body and one so ignorant of academic questions as are most alumni. I should approve of their having advisory powers as to policy, and direct powers in electing trustees, so that the latter may not elect themselves. (2) I am in doubt about the whole of this section. I think it would be better that the professors should nominate, say two men, to the trustees and let them elect, so that the faculties would still essentially make the choice, but the trustees have a part in the decision. If trustees are to have any usefulness their opinion should be of some value. I think if there is a president at all his powers, dignity and salary should be greater than that of a professor, as high administrative powers are rare and consequently of unusual value, and his duties, if conscientiously carried out, are more trying than those of a professor. Few men would accept them if they gained no added power or income and the position would otherwise be a sort of head-dean. I believe some such officer is necessary, in the present age, at any rate, but I do not think he should have power of appointments, but that these should come from the faculty, that is, from the unit-faculty to which the position to be filled belongs, as nominations, and be ratified by the trustees or other advisory board. I am inclined to think that the best way to hold the president in check would be to give him an unlimited term of office, but to give the faculty of the whole university power of veto by a two-thirds or three-fourths vote in any of his proposals that affect the general university, and perhaps to give the unit-faculties power to veto by a large majority vote—say four fifths, or power to demand that any policy affecting the unit be carried before the whole university faculty and voted upon; and then consider a veto the fall of the ministry. This would
probably lead to closer relations between all individuals in the faculties and the presidential policies and conflicts would be settled early by discussion rather than by quarreling. It would involve also that the faculty be officially apprised at all times of what is being planned long before it was done. This is rather half-baked, as I express it. I do think, however, that what we need is to encourage the development of enlightened and able administrators rather than to clip their wings. (3) I approve of this. (4) I highly approve having outside experts called in to decide the choice of professors and I believe this might be required in certain other matters. I do not believe it is possible to pay the same salaries for the same office. This to my mind has the fatal danger that prevails in the labor unions, with their limitations of productivity, and would interfere with progress. If one man is a greater and more important man than another he is worth more to a university than a lesser man, even though both do the same amount of actual university work. I should approve of having a certain percentage of trustees graduates of other institutions and, except in the case of state universities, have, say, half of them reside elsewhere than in the town where the university is situated. I would also require that four fifths of the trustees should themselves be university graduates of some sort. This would still leave some places to be filled by uneducated rich men who know nothing of a university’s needs—but not a majority.

I should say that the plan is an excellent one in theory, but whether we shall ever see it tried practically may be a question. Of course universities, like everything else, are a product of evolution. Such institutions in this country appear to have reached the stage where they call for an autocrat, precisely as it appears necessary to have a boss in city and state government. In process of time we may expect the important universities of the country to outgrow this condition of things, but precisely what will take its place no one can say. It is not necessary or desirable that all should be organized on one plan, and perhaps the autocrat may remain a permanent feature of some institutions.
I should very much like to see one or more of the universities of the country put into practise a plan of control along the lines that you have suggested. There is fortunately a rivalry so keen that the universities which best serve the community are going to be those that will most prosper, and service to the community depends fundamentally upon an organization which will attract and hold the best men to its faculties. I have seen thoroughly bad results under the head-professorship system and equally unfortunate conditions in departments largely autonomous, where a group of older men of similar sympathies are holding back progress with serious results. The difficulty is to strike the means by which a department may be left autonomous as long as its actions are progressive, but may be brought up with a firm hand when it appears that a group of its professors are working for selfish ends or are exhibiting evidences of servile incompetency. I am inclined to think that the best checks are through criticism freely expressed by deans and other administrative officers and by committees, and freely asked by the president. The university in which is possible such criticism and consultation among its administrative officers is most fortunate.

Excepting in some minor details, and in the matter of the status of the president, I am entirely in agreement with you. Regarding the president, it seems to me that as conditions are changing much from time to time a longer tenure of office than that of the rectors of German universities would be desirable, and I think that for many reasons it is desirable that greater power should be concentrated in one technically qualified person than your scheme seems to allow. This need not run counter to your idea of a democratic institution, since the power is, after all, delegated from the faculty to the person selected by them for the position of president. An assurance of considerable tenure of office and a somewhat distinctly higher position, both in salary and in dignity of position, should, I think, be given the person known as president.

I believe the reform in university administration which you propose to be a very desirable step in advance. Perhaps I may
be permitted to suggest an amplification in one or two points: (1) The meeting of the corporation for the election of trustees should not be under the chairmanship or influence of any of the trustees. Not uncommonly the meeting of a larger body when presided over by a member of the smaller directing body is merely a nominal affair, approving the proposition agreed upon beforehand by the members of the smaller body. The larger body usually does not take the initiative in any matter of importance whenever members of the smaller directing body take an active part in the proceedings of the larger corporation. (2) The selection of professors and instructors is a most important matter. In the past the selection has been intrusted to administrative officers who usually relied upon the judgment of one or two men prominent in the special field in which a vacancy had to be filled. In very many cases one and the same man had thus the power to fill the most important positions. Such a procedure must naturally lead to conditions somewhat similar to those found in "polities." A personal element will be of influence in the selection of men for professorships. There is danger that the man who is most frequently consulted will, perhaps against his own inclination, be forced to assume the rôle of a political "boss," and that the building up of something like a political machine will result. Men of a certain school will be preferred for the filling of the most important positions. The committee having in charge the selection of a professor should, therefore, as a matter of routine, consult a large number of representatives of a certain field of science, preferably representatives residing in more than one country, in order to eliminate any personal bias, and to effect a selection on the basis of merit. Such a committee should submit the names proposed by the various experts to the senate for final election.

In the main I thoroughly agree with your views. We are certainly sorely in need of a revision of the prevalent methods of running universities. It seems that in most institutions the board of trustees do not look upon the faculty as the living part of the university, but as a lot of laborers who should be placed upon the same basis as "hired help" generally. There is cer-
tainly vastly too much politics in professorial life, and there is too much done to please certain interests, right or wrong. In fact there are so many evils and weaknesses that are so manifest in the administration of university affairs and so desirable to be corrected that one could write an elaborate thesis on the subject without seeking for material. This must be a matter of evolution and not of revolution. Your article is in the right direction.

I think your plan of university control on the whole a very good one; but you have not stated how a university senate should be constituted and elected. Further, it seems to me that any nomination for professorship passed by the board of advisers should not be subject to the veto of the trustees.

Your plan seems to safeguard very well the interests both of the organization and of the individual.

I am in thorough sympathy with the plan of university control as outlined by you. Two factors which make for faculty incompetence, in the medical schools at least, are self-interest and the dread of unpopularity among colleagues. This is particularly true of the clinical men whose business interests are not always in accord with a university’s interests and for whom popularity is a business asset. These two factors frequently stand in the way of advances of benefit to a university.

I find your plan excellent, and approve of it. I beg to suggest that one indirect effect of the present system has not been mentioned in your indictment: namely, the policy of academic advancement of the man who draws the largest classes, rather than the man who does the best work. It has been my observation that presidential favor is frequently curried in this way, to the detriment of men whose ideals will not permit them to lower the standards of their work for popularity.

I heartily agree with your sentiments as to a strictly democratic organization, where no one man, or group of men, can set themselves up as a dictator. The corporation, to my way of thinking, should consist of several groups of men chosen from different
sources of supply. It should consist of, say, fifteen members, selected as follows: the university professors should name three, the alumni organization five, the state legislature three, the educational board of the state two and the board thus constituted elect two other members from the community at large. These should, with the academic council in joint session, elect a president and a vice-president for five years. The faculty should name the academic council to which the questions of policy should be referred, presided over by the president. The professors, assistant professors and instructors should be assembled into groups, which groups would annually elect a chairman, and preferably in rotation. His sole duty would be to preside at group committee meetings, transmit their communications to the academic council and sign bills and other documents where such signature is necessary. In other words, the chairman of the group would be executive officer of the group for one year. The salaries should be uniform for professors and assistant professors, and of a sum sufficient for their needs and proportioned according to the length of active and honorable service, beginning with a minimum and ending with a maximum. The recommendations for advancement should start in the group committees, pass through the academic council and end with the corporation.

It must be apparent to most sincere and experienced observers of academic life in America that the present deficiencies in our universities are not so much a consequence of faults of organization as of certain fundamental defects in the dominant American conceptions of what the purposes and characteristics of university activities ought to be. The form of organization prevalent in the universities is an expression of the predominant characteristics of the men who are chosen to fill the influential positions. Men whose instincts are for practical life, rather than for study and the advancement of intellectual ideals and achievement, are chosen far too frequently. This is the chief source of weakness, since such men determine what shall be taught, how it shall be taught, the degree of freedom of research and of discussion, the aims which the institution sets before itself, in short the whole course of university policy. Such men admire the business type
of man and try to imitate him; the result is that they have imposed on institutions of learning an organization better fitted for definite practical undertakings than for the diversified and largely disinterested activities of an assemblage of scholars. The system, in other words, favors the selection of men who lend themselves most readily to cooperative and directly practical undertakings—rather than of men who, like most true scholars, combine strong individuality with idealism. The evil is self-perpetuating, since almost all men will work effectively or ineffectively, according to the incentives offered; if devotion to study and research is self-penalizing, the number of men who vigorously and whole-heartedly so devote themselves is inevitably diminished. Hence, many university men deliberately prefer to perfect their capabilities in quite other directions than scholarship—even when they are not forced to do so—studying the arts of management, control, compromise, the technique of executive activity, and the like. Is it to be wondered at that the intellectual life of many institutions flags, that our scientific productivity is so far behind that of Europe, and that students of marked originality so frequently fail to receive the stimulus and opportunities they need for their proper development? Under conditions more favorable to the selection of superior men—like those hitherto prevailing in Germany, France or England—the tale would be a very different one. It is not that we lack the ability, but that it fails to realize itself because of a radically wrong basis of selection. I am well aware that there are many distinguished men in the American universities, but far fewer than there ought to be. The present organization of the universities, I repeat, is rather the expression of this deficiency than the cause of it. The fundamental cause lies in the prevailing temper and ideals of university men in this country. There are certain tendencies of American life—to a certain degree of all modern life—which a university should deliberately guard against and oppose. These are, many of them, to be counted among the more doubtful products of the democratic movement: the prevalence of mediocre or popular standards—i.e., those which the common man can reasonably hope to attain—an uncritical faith in majorities, a pessimistic estimate of the possibilities of individual
achievement, over-emphasis of the importance of cooperative activity ("team-play"). A preference for mediocrity and a disposition to neglect, disparage or hinder men of pronounced genius arise from all this. The organization of the university should therefore encourage a liberal and enlightened individualism; the tendency to make men conform to fixed standards, whether set by academic authority or by what happen to be the fashionable prejudices of the time, should be frowned down, or, still better, laughed down. Under these conditions men of distinguished ability will be far more likely than at present to make their way into universities and to produce their best work. The existing organization of the universities over-emphasizes the managerial side for the reasons I have already briefly indicated. Hence I should favor a change in the direction of a general simplification and decentralization. With reference to the reforms you propose, my opinions are very much as follows. I refer to the numbered paragraphs of your article. (1) The professors should undoubtedly form part of the corporation; alumni and other members of the community only in so far as they show real knowledge of university conditions. Such a body could be depended upon to select suitable trustees. (2) The president should be elected by the professors from among their number for a fixed term (e.g.) four years. There should be no obstacle or limit to reelection; a good man would thus hold his place. (3) and (4) I favor all possible autonomy to schools, divisions, departments and individuals. Salaries of professors should be adequate and uniform. I am inclined to urge the adoption of a system like the Italian, i.e., election of the professor by men of reputation in his own department of learning, in his own and other universities. (5) I approve of all these suggestions.
V. LETTERS FROM THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

With regard to the first proposition, the suggestion of forming a corporation consisting of the professors, officers and alumni, does not meet my approval. The only feature that makes membership in such a corporation desirable is the privilege of voting for trustees. In the first place I do not feel that this privilege alone would suffice to secure a paying membership, such as is contemplated in the proposition. In the second place, I should not like to see trustees chosen by this method. It would seem to me to carry with it all the difficulties inherent in political elections—namely, parties, electioneering machinery—a continual agitation to arouse the interest of the better element to meet the designs of those who were acting from self-interest or ignorance. The most important work of trustees, in my opinion, is to safeguard the financial interests of the university, and for this purpose they should form a small body, the individuals of which should be selected by the board itself, or in the case of state universities by some responsible authority, e. g., the governor of the state. It should be a permanent board made up of citizens of standing, men of integrity and ability, whose interest in public affairs will induce them to accept such a trust in spite of the fact that it brings work and responsibility without any personal profit. I do not feel that a board of this character can be obtained by a general election among alumni. It would be difficult or impossible for the alumni to acquire the information requisite for intelligent voting. In regard to the second proposition, I am heartily in favor of the suggestion that the president shall be appointed by the trustees upon nomination by the faculty—he should be the choice of the faculty—I believe that such a method of selection would strengthen greatly the bonds between president and faculty, especially if there was added the further provision that all appointments and appropriations be made upon recommendation of the faculty or of some board representing the
faculty and chosen from its membership by election. I do not, however, agree to the latter part of proposition (2). I believe that the presidency should be a dignified and desirable office in order to attract the best men. It should be permanent, it ought to carry a salary larger than that of the professor, and the incumbent should be charged especially with the important duty of developing the policy of the university. Some one is needed in this position who is broad-minded enough to sympathize with good movements and to see that they are pushed—to recognize when there is weakness to be overcome or strength to be encouraged. No temporary officer can be expected to keep his mind constantly upon such work. If the office is temporary and carries no special dignity or importance, men will avoid it and, if forced to take it in rotation, will regard it as a necessary evil that they are thankful to escape from. Propositions (3) and (4) meet my general approval. When the size of any department is considerable, it would seem desirable to have its own faculty and dean, to make its own nominations to the staff and its own recommendations for appropriations and other departmental expenditures. As you say, such an organization practically exists for the professional schools, although in many cases the autonomy is not carried far enough; that is to say, it does not extend to appropriations and appointments. I count it unfortunate that there is a tendency to make the deanship in such departmental faculties a practically permanent office. In the case of professional schools that are not really incorporated into the university, such a provision may be necessary, but when the department is organically united to the university the deanship, in my opinion, should be an office filled in rotation, yearly, by the professors of the department. A department is small enough for the professors themselves, as a body, to develop their policy and supervise their own needs, present and future, and the dean should be simply an administrative officer for carrying their actions into effect. The office might properly be regarded as a burdensome duty and not an honor, and the labor might be shared equally so as not to spoil the efficiency of any professor in the proper work of his own subject. In this general respect I should like to see a marked difference made between the position of the president and
the deans. The latter now generally fulfill the duties of minor presidents and there is no need, in my opinion, in one and the same university in having a group of men taken away from their proper work. It may very well lead to sharp antagonisms between individuals. In regard to proposition (5) I assume that some such representative body is necessary in large institutions where many departments exist. I would suggest that its most important function should be the recommendation of a proper division of the annual income among the several departments, in addition to acting as a final court in matters affecting the interests of all departments. It should be a representative body subject to change.

I thoroughly agree with (1) and the first part of (2); I think the president should be elected by the faculty and feel responsible to it for appointments, so far as they are in his hands, and general politics, but to the trustees for the financial part. I am inclined to favor a "rector" elected from the full professors for a period of, say, four years; his administrative work should not take him away from his department entirely. I believe that he should have a larger salary and be able to travel and entertain in the name of the university. A four years' tenure would put a man on his mettle, for I think he should be subject to reelection. I see evident weaknesses in this which I shall not discuss. (3) and (4) appeal to me and also (5) except for the last sentence. I do not believe that there is any group of men who abuse their freedom as much as do some university professors and I believe that this abuse tends to lower the average and dignity of all. You see, I am a complete Philistine on this subject. I believe that each head of a department should send the president a written report of his work at least every three months, these reports to be kept on file. I even favor the establishment of rules relating to hours. Of course I believe in absolute freedom in research, but I think it only fair that we give evidence of being worthy of our position and salary and see no reason for assuming that students and teachers are so different from the rest of mankind as not to need some control.
Along general lines I agree with you, as, for instance, that the several faculties (law, medicine, etc.) should possess autonomy, should nominate their own professors; that there should be as much flexibility and as little of the department-store system in a university organization as is consistent with the progress of research and with the advancement of learning. On these and many other points I should be at one with you, but when it comes to the details of a scheme such as you have analyzed I should wish time for study of the question—time to study the methods of university control in Germany, England and other countries—before expressing an opinion.

I think we are beginning to see indications for "university control" by the members of the faculty. Our medical faculty here is largely in control, not by right, but by assent. Such responsibility makes us more interested in educational problems, in economy of funds, and breeds loyalty, which, after all, is of the greatest importance.

I can say that the plan of university organization that you outline strikes me as in its main lines highly desirable, and in its aims altogether excellent. With its leading purpose, that of securing and developing the independence and the individuality of the professor, I am in the heartiest possible sympathy.

On the whole your plan seems to me excellent. It is in accord with the historical development of university organization, and while very different from the plan now followed in America, it seems to me that a gradual adoption of it would be beneficial.

I approve of your scheme of university control.

I read your proposal with much interest and approval. I have no suggestions to offer at the present time.

Such an organization would go a long way towards solving our present difficulties of administration, meaning by "our" those of many institutions throughout the country. My limited experience with university presidents has led me to believe that some of
them at least are incompetent. When it comes to new appointments, their lack of knowledge of suitable men to fill vacant positions is often surprising. I am fully convinced that the appointive or nominative power is best in the hands of such a committee as you suggest.

The democratic features of your plan must certainly appeal to all who are intimate with the present unsatisfactory state. I think any attempt at a modification of existing methods of university government should include some means of setting a standard for and effecting a scrutiny of the work of a department head. Existing abuse of the responsibilities of this position should not be lost sight of in your scheme.

I am very much in sympathy with your proposed plan of control of universities. In my estimation the president should have a somewhat higher salary than professors, but the differences that now exist in colleges as well as universities are unreasonable. The excessive (relatively excessive) salary commanded by certain presidents is owing to their reputation as financial agents. If a man is able to raise money for an institution he can command almost any salary. Just what bearing your plan would have on the financial management of institutions of learning could hardly be predicted. However, it would tend to bring to the head of such institutions men of scholarship rather than men of marked business abilities and such men would undoubtedly, with the cooperation of the professors, as outlined in your plan, be able to direct the real functions of educational institutions infinitely better than an autocratic business executive.

Paragraphs (2) and (4) seem to me to be very well stated; certainly I subscribe to them most heartily. I confess that paragraph (1) is not so clear to me. I see possibilities there of great confusion. The corporation might easily become so large that certain tendencies and attitudes might be forced upon the professors which are not representative of the best interests of the university. If the voting power of the corporation could be so arranged that the professorial vote would represent half of the
total and the outside members the other half, I think the plan might work very well. In regard to paragraph (3) it seems worth saying that the plan you call for is rather artificial unless you would hold to a more strict departmental grouping than I think your wording called for. Such large groupings would be hard to make and would eventually lead to friction. I think I am more in favor of autonomy for the professors than for the group, yet such a condition of affairs might lead to anarchy. The grouping psychology, philosophy, chemistry, physics, etc., are natural growths. In certain departments there are only one or two professors; such departments should be grouped by themselves and not forced to become a part of a larger whole.

I am heartily in favor of such a plan. I have been connected with German universities and have talked with a number of professors in Germany, France and England, as well as here in America. I feel very keenly that our present system will have to be modified somewhat according to your proposed plan, and it should be done as soon as possible. We are very fortunate here in Johns Hopkins University, of course, for we have, as you know, a university council which advises the president. Even here, however, there is a tendency toward an autocratic "one-man power" in the departments, in that the so-called "director" of the department has considerably more authority than is sometimes wise. Although there is sometimes talk against our "one-man system," you see that, as a whole, the wisdom of our leading men here in the university has kept things going on a sane basis. Considering the matter entirely independently of our own immediate surroundings, however, I should like to see a more democratic control established in our American universities.

I agree with you that for the successful development of the American university in the future, a change in the form of administration which at present dominates our higher institutions of learning is imperative. Certain recent developments have shown the danger of concentrating too much power in the hands of any one man. If a professor in one of our leading universities is to be dismissed not only without a trial before a jury of
professors, but even without a hearing by the president of the university in question, the dignity and honor appertaining to an American professorship would be so slight that much of the very best intellect of this country would be turned away from the universities into safer channels. The results from this cause alone would be greatly to weaken our higher institutions of learning, and to foster the already overwhelming commercialism of this country. I think the policy outlined in (1) is good, except that I would not have a chancellor. The organization should be kept as simple as possible, to avoid any unnecessary sources of autocracy finding a foothold. All financial matters should be left to the trustees, and they should be expected to secure the necessary endowment. The financial affairs of the institution should be the chief, if not the sole, function of the trustees. I agree with (2), except I would not preserve the name president, since this has now come to have a well-defined significance. I would call the officer in question, perhaps, ‘‘rector,’’ as in the German universities. He should be elected for one year, with the possibility of reelection—but in no case should be eligible for more than three years. His salary should be exactly that of a professor and his powers the same as those of any professor. His office, however, should, I think, be looked upon as even more dignified than that of a professorship. The point made in section (4), that the same salary should be paid for the same office, the same amount of work and the same tenure of office, is, I think, fundamentally important. That is, I believe, the case at Harvard, and largely the case at Yale. The opposite policy of obtaining, and especially of retaining, a professor for the smallest sum to which he, by any method, can be induced to submit, is shortsighted, and not conducive to the highest results. This method fosters discontent, and often indifference and inefficiency. It deals with the professor by the same method that a corporation deals with its hirelings, and thus detracts from the dignity and desirableness of the position. I would add that publicity in all such matters is absolutely essential to the good-will and harmonious working of an institution of learning. It might be urged as an argument in favor of the former, and against the latter, system, that one professor is inherently worth more than another;
and by the methods at present in vogue in making promotions this is true. But let no one be promoted to the rank of a full professorship in any one of our leading institutions of learning who does not measure up at least to a certain high minimum standard, and then let the salary received by a professor be determined by the years of service in his rank. If I may add a word of a general character in reference to university administration in this country, it would be: model our system as closely as possible, with the conditions existing in this country, after the German universities. Their present system of administration is the outgrowth of years, and in many cases of centuries, of experience. And what is the result? The finest system of higher education, beyond comparison, that the world has ever seen. Indeed, most of the productive men of science in this country, even to-day, have learned their lesson in the German universities, and transplanted research from Teutonic soil to this country. Such results as have been obtained in the German universities could scarcely have been reached under a system of administration that was seriously defective. It might be objected that the conditions in this country are fundamentally different with respect to higher education than those in Germany, and such an objection unfortunately contains a large element of truth. Nevertheless, we should profit by those greatest institutions of learning, adopting their system of administration as nearly as the existing conditions here will permit, and not learning the lesson of university administration all over again from the very beginning by experience. This is, I think, the real solution to the greatest problem in higher education in America to-day.

Your proposals concerning the organization of universities are absolutely in line with my own hopes. Unless the working staff of the university gets a chance to help in the shaping of broader ideals of university life their interest will always be low. The superstition of one-man power is one of the worst impediments to a wider training of a spirit of collaboration, the lack of which makes public life as well as university life an opportunistically medley. It is deplorable that to-day the man who can enlist the cooperation of some financial magnates is a most forcible element
in setting the pace in university policies. With regard to detail, I suppose the closer we keep to the English and Scotch pattern the more likely we to reach the result, on account of the anti-German feeling existing in many quarters. This would mean the adoption of having a chancellor of the university, whereas, personally, I should prefer to have a rotation of the rectorship among the faculties, similar to what exists in the Swiss universities.

I am in hearty sympathy with the underlying principles of your proposals. Taking them up separately: (1) The idea of a large corporation and of elective trustees is undoubtedly right. I think a chancellor essential. (2) The duties of the president are not given in your statement. It seems to me that the chairman of the senate might assume the responsibilities. (3) The idea of subdivision of the faculty into schools is right. I assume that in most universities the "college" would form a separate school. In which case the collegiate faculty should, of course, divide and meet at times with the members of the various other schools. (4) I believe in the financial and educational autonomy of the schools. But in regard to nominations of professors, I see no advantage in the "board of advisers"; I think the senate should have the final authority. I doubt the need of giving veto power to the board of trustees. Each school should have the duty of initiating plans for new professorships. There may be certain "standard" or minimum salaries; but I do not believe uniformity is possible or indeed advisable. (5) I would emphasize the duties of the senate, and would, I think, allow the board of trustees to appoint from the faculty a certain number of members. Certainly the membership should be small, less than twenty. The chairman, elected for one year, subject to the approval of the board of trustees, might well perform the so-called duties of the president. You do not make any definite proposal concerning means of contract with the alumni and the public. There should be, I think, an office charged with this duty. At its head should be a most capable man, not a member of the faculty, who might be also the secretary of the senate.
VI. LETTERS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

I feel very little sympathy for the type of organization which you recommend. I spent seven years in an institution which had a democratic organization of its faculty, and I am persuaded that that organization is defective in more ways than the organization at such an institution as Harvard or Chicago. It is defective first, because of the difficulty which always arises when one tries to convert a body of men to new and progressive policies. It is very much easier to get the ear of one intelligent administrator, and carry through a policy of reform, than it is to get the sympathy of a number of heads of departments. In the second place, I do not believe that heads of departments are as efficient when it comes to deciding general policies for an institution as some detached executive officer who can look beyond the interests of each of the departments. The experience of such institutions as Yale and Cornell seems to me to be conclusive against the democratic organization. They found exactly the same difficulty in Cornell and voluntarily voted away the authority which they at one time held. I am not optimistic, either, about the ability of academic men to organize their own government. I think that the specialist in science or literature prefers to have somebody develop the methods of scientific organization and relieve him of the necessity of considering these matters. In other words, an administrative officer equipped with methods of investigating his own problems seems to me to be a very proper solution of the difficulty in which we now find ourselves.

As regards your first proposition, I may say that it seems to me at least harmless. If it resulted in attaching to the university a larger group of serious-minded and intelligent persons than is at present the case, I should think it in so far useful. I am not clear that the chancellor, for whom you make provision, would be a particularly useful official, unless he were content to remain largely ornamental, as is often the case in the English universi-
ties. His usefulness in that case would be of a sort not likely to come into conflict with the policies adopted by those more directly responsible for the conduct of affairs. Your proposition under the second heading to elect a president from the members of the faculty and to give him no larger powers and no larger salary than is received by other members of the faculty strikes me as somewhat impracticable. I can not imagine any man whose intellectual capacities and attainments would justify his presence on a faculty of a first-rate modern university, who would be willing to make the sacrifice of time and strength necessary to assume administrative control under such conditions. Possibly members of the department of education might find in such a function a professionally advantageous occupation, but for other members of the faculty it could only be a time-consuming and thankless job from which the abler men would unquestionably shrink, and presumably would succeed in avoiding. The idea that the faculty should have some voice in the selection of a president I heartily approve, but our own generation seems not to be in sight of such a distribution of administrative detail as would justify any able scholar in turning his attention to this phase of university work were he not rewarded by some increase in his salary or his powers. The application of your suggestion in point three meets my hearty approval. Experience has abundantly shown that we need a smaller unit of organization with very definitely specified responsibilities if we are to secure effective and intelligent participation by members of the faculty in university government. The fly in this particular ointment comes at the point where the interests of any particular group may run counter to those of some other similar group. You provide in your fourth paragraph that such a group shall have as complete autonomy as is consistent with the welfare of the university as a whole. This means that some one has got to decide whether the welfare of the university is or is not in any given case invaded by the action of one or another department. You will then have to fall back on a larger body, or on some administrative official who may prove to be an unjust judge. I do not regard this difficulty as insuperable, but I could relate instance after instance in which it has proved practically very serious.
I approve also very heartily the spirit of your suggestion in paragraph four that nominations to professorships shall be subject to a competent advisory board. You supply a rather undue amount of machinery for this purpose, but some check of the kind represented by a competent board is certainly highly desirable. I also approve the suggestion whereby each unit should have control over the expenditure of its own funds. I feel that at the present time a large part of the most irritating difficulties which members of the university faculty encounter concerns the necessity they are under of making a purely personal appeal to the president and trustees instead of being able to distribute as they may think wise a specified portion of the university funds, and instead of being permitted to augment those funds as they may be able. Your final sentence in paragraph five is a gem. "There should be as much flexibility and as complete anarchy throughout the university as is consistent with unity and order." In other words, there should be a chaste and orderly disorder. This also I sympathize with, though the actuaries give me no reason to hope that I shall survive to see it in operation. In general I feel very strongly that the present situation has many very undesirable features attaching to it, of which not the least is that the president tends too largely to become a purely fiscal officer whose interests and outlook are almost wholly financial in character. No doubt this aspect of the great modern university must be cared for, but I think it is a great misfortune that the more purely educational and scientific interests can not be placed upon a more autonomous basis whereby for any given year at least, or indeed for any period of five years, the authorities in charge of a division of the work of the university may know to a nicety the minimum sum at their disposal, and may be permitted to expend it as it seems to them best. The subserviency to the president and trustees which the present system breeds is both morally and educationally wasteful in my judgment, and that it produces a destruction of esprit de corps and the higher forms of loyalty is too obvious to be debated.

In a general way your scheme of university organization seems to me to be an admirable one, although there are a number of
difficulties which the plan has in my mind. In the first place, I think the plan of operation would work out very much better in an organization having a considerable degree of homogeneity than in a university having a very large number of academic and professional departments with little or nothing in common, and frequently with sharply conflicting interests. Might it not happen, for example, in a school of the latter sort, that the professional interests, which are usually rather rabid in their demands on account of their practical value, would completely outweigh those of pure science and academic work? It seems to me that we might expect exactly this to happen when the law, engineering and medical faculties are brought into contact with the pure science groups, and it is especially injurious to the interests of the academic and pure science groups that the applied schools have a larger number of faculty members than the academic and strictly scientific bodies. If all productive endowment were divided up so that each general group in the university would have its own funds, and was to all intents and purposes an independent school financially, the difficulty would not be so great, but if all the funds were contained in one general endowment I think there would be serious difficulties which would prove most injurious to the things most worth while in our university. This is the most serious phase. Secondly, with regard to the constitution of the corporation. It seems to me that the admission of any very considerable body of alumni and members of the community where there is sufficient homogeneity of interests might be all right. On the other hand, would there not be the danger of getting in those who gain their popularity from their fellows through athletic contests and social position, rather than through real worth or capacity to take part in the deliberations of the corporation? It might also lead to a situation in which the faculty would be compelled to take cognizance of temporary, erratic, social beliefs. Still, leaving out these difficulties which are not insurmountable, the plan of organization proposed under (1) is probably better than that in vogue in our institution at the present time. The various provisions provided for under (2) seem to me to be rather desirable, and need, I think, no comments. I am not sure, however, that your suggestion of an annual elec-
tion of director is a wise one, because the complexities which exist in an institution of this kind, I imagine that it would take the larger part of the year for a man to learn the task before him. A period of five or ten years might be highly desirable, and I would also suggest that some sort of provision be made for referendum and recall when the administrative officer is no longer satisfactory or when his policies become unbearable to the rest of the professorial body. I think opinion would differ very much with regard to number (3), especially with regard to the size of the group which you suggest as a psychological constant. In principle, however, these aspects of university organization seem to me to be admirably conceived and very much in advance of the present arrangement. In (4) and (5) I think I have nothing to comment upon. I am in harmony with the principles expressed therein, with the single exception, under (4), that the division should have financial as well as educational autonomy. I judge that your plan would be to have a series of separate endowments for the departments. I should like very much to see this sort of thing put into operation and see how it works out.

It must be clear to every one that in the small college of earlier days the president’s ideas on college policy and the policy of his college were almost or quite identical. Furthermore, the college seems to be about as conservative an institution as we have in this democratic country. This early college president was usually conversant with practically all the subjects taught in his college. The number of subjects was limited and confined almost entirely to the classics in which the president had received his own training. Since that time the sciences and humanities have been differentiated into so many subjects that no college president pretends to known much about many of the fields of work covered in the college curriculum. It must be equally clear that in order to represent the interests of all these various departments the opinions of all must be considered. The field is certainly too broad and too specialized to enable any one man to govern all of them adequately and justly. If the faculties were incompetent that of itself would be justification for a con-
tinuation of the earlier policy, but that claim can not be upheld. Democratic government of a university would certainly make a place for utilization of the intelligence and sympathetic cooperation of the large number of men who are really interested in university administrative affairs. To speak of your propositions by number I wish to say: First, that responsibility placed upon a larger number of men is certainly desirable and your plan for securing it appeals to me. Secondly, the president certainly should be selected because of his "expert knowledge of education and university administration." I do not quite see how it would be possible to have a president and a chancellor both operating to the best advantage to the university without having their fields overlap considerably. For example, the public is quite as much interested in the educational aspects of the university as in its business aspects and in its connection with public affairs. Thirdly, the departmental unit seems best to me. Fourth, in a great many of the universities at the present time appointments to major positions are made only upon nominations which are the result of careful consideration by all the faculty of the department in question. It seems desirable that that plan should be made general. Fifth, I like the proposition of number five if we assume that the senate or the general faculty of the university has prepared a full and definitely stated constitution outlining the policies—administrative, financial and educational—of the university as a whole. This policy should be general but definite and should leave autonomy to the departments on all questions that are at all likely to concern departments only. But general policies should certainly be stated in a general constitution that would outline the functions of the university as a whole.

Your suggestion (1) seems to me a good one, in that it would restrict the powers of the board of trustees to those affairs of the university which are non-educational and at the same time dignify leadership in that very important department of university administration. I am not sure that I should like to see a university faculty, as a whole, take part in the election of the president, but it seems to me that the faculty should have influ-
ential representation by a committee composed of its most influ-
ential men, possibly elected by the faculty as a whole, on the
appointing body. The division of the interior administration
of a university into parts seems to me essential to economy, and
I think that the association of a committee or member of the
board of trustees with each of the partial faculties would tend
to a better understanding between those interested in the educa-
tional and the other work of administration. The question of
appointments and promotions seems to be a difficult one. Your
plan seems to me well suited to insure good new appointments,
but I am not so sure about appointments which are also pro-
motions. In either case it seems to me that the department con-
cerned should be well represented by an elected committee, and
the final appointive power should be vested in a number of men
rather than a single one. I do not believe that any two men
holding the same kind of position do the same amount of work,
and think that the salary should be adjusted accordingly, pos-
sibly between limits specified for the particular office in ques-
tion. Many good men are lost and others lose ambition when a
salary schedule is rigid. I like the idea of a university senate
working in coordination with the trustees, and the ideas ex-
pressed in your section (5) for bringing the trustees and faculty
into closer touch with each other.

The plan you propose seems to me to be excellent for an insti-
tution that is given over largely to teaching. In smaller col-
leges the various members of the faculty see each other fre-
fently and each keeps in touch with the work of the institu-
tion. Your plan, as I understand it, contemplates similar inti-
macy among groups in the larger organization. While I believe
that your plan would work well and be a great improvement in
an institution given over to teaching and in which the proper
care of the students and of their problems was of first impor-
tance, it seems to me that a university that attempts to make
research its highest aim would have difficulty in carrying out
your plan. At present, with the autocratic form of government
which we have here, the research men complain bitterly of the
amount of time required for committee work, faculty meetings,
etc. Your plan would increase the demands on them in this respect. Since my main interest is in the teaching side and in research in education, I should like to see your plan tried, but I feel certain that the men interested in research in science will object to it for the reason stated.

(1) This paragraph seems to me good, though the plan referred to in the footnote of deriving income from fees from members of the corporation is bad. Either the income so derived would be small or else the financial burden on the trustees would be such as to encourage the selection of trustees on the basis of their financial rating. (2) The president should be elected by the faculty, but the office of president, like that of professor, should be a permanent one for the sake of continuity and stability of administrative policy and the precise localization of responsibility. The salary should be adequate to get the best available administrator regardless of salaries paid to other officers. Much more important than the president’s salary is the control of the university budget, which should be taken out of the president’s control and lodged with the faculties or senate. (3) Good. (4) This I approve, save that I think it unnecessary that the professors’ salaries should be uniform. Footnote 8 seems to me especially sound and important. (5) This commends itself to me as good. In general, I think the plan proposed or slight modification of it is both good and practicable.

In general, the proposed scheme for university control appeals to me as excellent. I particularly approve of the statement to the effect that the fundamental difficulty in the situation lies in the fact that the president is responsible only to the trustees, while the professor is responsible both to the trustees and to the president. We are having a little experience in connection with note 6, having two practically independent institutions for research, closely affiliated with the university, and so far it has been a very satisfactory arrangement, at least from the side of the independent institution. What the university thinks of it, I can not say.
Your tentative proposal regarding the organization of our larger universities seems to me to be a lead in the right direction in that it aims to curtail the autocratic power of the president and to place the whole organization on a more democratic basis. I am not so sure, however, that the proposed changes would work out in practice, for even in some of our most democratic institutions there exists a tendency towards centralization of control. As an example of a university controlled by a corporation composed of professors, alumni and interested members of the community, one might cite the Marine Biological Laboratory at Woods Hole, where the actual administration is largely in the hands of the director. Ordinary members of the corporation have little or no voice in directing the policies or business of the institution. Although an annual meeting of the corporation might seem to furnish an opportunity for the ordinary member to exercise his franchise, this is really not the case, as all matters, including election of officers, are settled before the meeting. Thus may our most democratic bodies revert to oligarchy. It must be admitted, however, that we have in the Marine Biological Laboratory a close approximation to the ideal university conditions. In my opinion one of the most serious objections to the present autocratic type of university president lies in the fact that he may be, and sometimes is, a man of little force, readily influenced by certain of the more dominant members of the faculty, who are able to mould his policies often to their own personal ends. Thus arises favoritism, financial and otherwise, toward departments, which happen to have at their head men often of low scholastic attainments but highly endowed with the qualities of political leadership or merely with a pleasing and persuasive personality. The department headed by a man or men of scholarly tendencies and little or no time or inclination to curry favor may, and often does, fail to receive a fair amount of encouragement or support.

There is no question of the need of some reorganization. The fact of the establishment of research institutes independent of the university shows, I think, that the universities have lost the confidence of those desiring to aid research; and investigation is
the *sine qua non* of university existence. For this our organiza-
tion appears to me to be at fault, the main trouble being that
the universities are actually not in the control of their faculties.
The plan you suggest would return that control and is, therefore,
good. Your general plan strikes me as very similar, with some
additions, to that of the Marine Biological Laboratory at Woods
Hole. This has worked extremely well in that institution.
While the criticism is sometimes made that scientific men and
scholars can not be trusted to manage funds, the Marine Labora-
tory entirely disproves such a notion. No institution in the
country has made so little accomplish so much as the Woods Hole
laboratory. I am a little uncertain what the duties of the presi-
dent would be under your plan. I am inclined to think that the
only men who are really competent educators are the scholars,
and I fear you will have difficulty in finding any scholar willing
to assume the duties of a president unless he have some addi-
tional recompense either of salary or power or honor. Certainly
the president should be elected by the faculty or the trustees
should elect from two or three men nominated by the faculty.
The organization of departments into autonomous divisions is a
good scheme. We have lately adopted unofficially something of
this sort here in the form of an advisory committee of all the
biological departments. It works very well. This committee
recommends to the president on biological affairs of general
interest. As regards the organization of a department, I believe
it makes little difference whether there is a head chosen by the
president or a chairman elected by the department. I have lived
under both systems. Each is good with the right kind of men in
the department and each is bad with the wrong kind. I should
like to see the plan tried.

I thoroughly agree with your general principles, especially
with your demand that each department should have as com-
plete autonomy as possible, and that there should be as much
flexibility and as complete anarchy throughout the university
as is consistent with unity and order. But it seems to me that
your specified list of desiderata is somewhat too detailed, con-
sidering the great diversity of American universities. In par-
ticular I think that different rules ought to be laid down for the college and the university proper. I also doubt whether your method of appointing professors is the best. I think it dangerous to give any body of professors, except those in the special department concerned, a deciding influence upon the appointment.

The plan suggested seems to me to be admirable. I wish to emphasize my belief in the desirability of those features of the plan suggested in paragraphs (1) and (2), and in that part of paragraph (4) which deals with the nomination for professorships. The present system of control is, at least in most institutions, highly unsatisfactory and moreover is not really effective.

Of course, if I went through your paper with a fine comb, I could probably find something to criticize, but reading it in a proper spirit I find that it grows on me, and that the oftener I read it the more anxious I become to see it put in force. One criticism that first suggests itself is that there is nothing hard and fast about the plan, but that you offer alternatives wherever possible. This elasticity, however, is one of its good points, for the new method of controlling the university, if there is to be a new method, can not be put in force all at once in a state of perfection, but will have to be more or less experimental. It has seemed to me with the growing power of the president there has been a distinct retrogression in some directions, and that the great American universities of to-day, with their thousands of students, their hundreds of professors, are in some respects behind the small fresh-water colleges of a generation ago. The president in many cases seems to look upon the university as his own property to be exploited for his own aggrandizement. He wants to be the "whole thing," and selects his professors, not on account of their fitness or researchability, but for personal reasons, and because they will toady to him. The independent man is made to feel that he is not wanted, and although his tenure of office is theoretically for life, things are made so uncomfortable that he is glad to leave. It has seemed to me that some of the presidents do not want men on the faculty who are
bigger than they are, and although here and there a university may become great through having a truly great president the system is bad and should be eliminated.

I have read your article "University Control." It is most timely. I doubt if I can add anything of value to it. The trouble with the university president is often that he has to spread over too much ground and comes to rely upon the busybody who has the president's ear and a bagful of rumors for his "information" upon which to base promotions. Also, if he takes his job seriously he will periodically "butt in" to the doings of a department of which he has only the most superficial knowledge. The university president should adopt the principle of relying on the professor and according him full liberty in his department. If suggestions are in order, I might offer the following plan of making appointments and promotions. The department committee to nominate first appointments to assistantships and other low-grade positions. The division (department group) committee to nominate for promotions or first appointments to instructorships. The body of full professors of any faculty to nominate to professorships in that faculty. Professors in all faculties to nominate the president. All elections to be by the trustees or corporation. The president to be elected for a limited term, and subject to "recall" by the faculty. The president to confer with professors, represent them before the trustees, and the university as a whole before the public. The executive agent of the trustees (comptroller), the president, and a prominent alumnus (elected by vote of the alumni or their representatives) to constitute a "board of estimate." Such a committee would unite the needs of scholarship, the good-will of the community and the limitations of the treasury and arrange the delicate adjustment between departmental needs and university income.

I am heartily in favor of some such plan of university administration as you propose. At present in some institutions control rests in the hands of a small group of trustees who happen to have the leisure, or the money, or the energy to take a leading
part, but who are not necessarily qualified to understand the real problems of the American university. The trustees appoint the president, the president appoints the deans, the deans recommend departmental appropriations and promotions, and so a personal tinge is given to all the official relations of the regular faculty members. The present situation is purely fortuitous. Until the natural university groups are given complete autonomy, genuine university development and continuity must remain largely a matter of accident. In your plan as stated the principles outlined in sections (3) and (4) seem to me essential. Precise details must naturally be left for experiment.

Upon the whole your plan is quite in accord with my own views, and I believe that there is already a tendency among our universities toward its inauguration in part. I doubt the expediency of the chancellorship, nor do I think such a corporation as you suggest is at all practicable for the state universities, though possibly some plan whereby the elected or appointed state regents might be limited to the control of funds and to an indirect or direct veto of all matters not strictly academic might be feasible. Especially do I think that the presidency should be an elective office of the faculties. At present the highest honors and emoluments are given, not for scholarship and pedagogical excellence, but for executive and administrative ability.

I am in hearty sympathy with the proposed plan for university control. It is quite preposterous that in a republican form of government our institutions of learning should have what is practically an absolute despotism—while the universities of Europe are the most democratic in their form of administration. I doubt, however, if it be possible—without a disastrous revolution—to change the present status.

I have been president and professor in a state university, and in denominational colleges, and have added to this now my fifteen years' experience here. This simply means that I have looked at the problem of "control" from almost every angle. My conviction is that every group connected with a university
should do what it is best fitted to do. Theoretically, the trustees are fitted to conserve and increase endowments, and no more. They should have nothing to do with determining educational policies or with selecting instructors. Theoretically, the faculty are fitted to determine educational policies, to select instructors and to distribute the available funds. As I understand it, these are the views you have worked out in the details of your scheme, and so it has my general sympathy. But my long experience with faculties has led to the belief that they are made up, for the most part, of very impractical men. They seem to me to be childlike in their selfishness and their idealism. I believe that this is largely due to the fact that they have been kept in childish bondage, and this simply means that they will have to be entrusted with large administration gradually. I certainly disapprove of the autocracy of the American university president, since I have ceased to be one. No developed institution needs any such dictator. It is not right for any man to hold such a relation to his intellectual peers. The details of your various propositions may be open to discussion, but their general bearing seems to me to be sound.
VII. LETTERS FROM CORNELL UNIVERSITY

It is certainly curious, to say the least, that in a democratic country we should have developed what is apparently a monarchical system of university government, whereas in monarchical countries they have democratic systems of university control. However, I doubt whether the government of American universities is really as monarchical as it sounds, or as the organization would suggest. Of course, there are good systems of government and bad systems of government as such, but the success of any system depends in the end largely on the personality of the members of the board and of the president. It is possible to work out a thoroughly democratic system even under the monarchical form that we have established in this country. I am afraid that a discussion of this question is likely to be largely academic, for I do not see any reason for thinking that we shall be able to make any radical departures in the general philosophy of the administration of our institutions. In the case of state institutions particularly, the representatives of the people must in some way have charge of the institution; and this of itself throws the organization of the governing board into one of three or four alternatives. I am afraid myself that the plan that you have proposed would in the end prove to be too complicated, although it seems of itself to be simple. The general tendency in our busy American life is that persons will delegate their authority and their responsibilities to persons who are willing and in position to take them. My own feeling is that we must accept the general block outline of the American system, and then make changes here and there, but more particularly try to develop a better spirit of cooperation and correlation between all parts of the institution. For myself, I think that the developing of this new spirit is really the keynote to the whole situation. I think this can be developed by free public discussions of all the questions involved, just such as you yourself are making. I should not myself be so much interested in any scheme as I
should to put before the college and university people of the
country a dignified series of discussions, running over a series
of years, that would uncover the weak spots and the inefficient
and domineering practises that are likely to result in the Ameri-
can systems. I think that we should soon find ourselves able to
distinguish four or five cardinal principles around which we
could group all the varying opinions and that we could make
very great progress toward the development of a greater cooper-
ative responsibility on the part of all persons who are parts of the
institutions.

(1) I am afraid that this is not feasible. I doubt whether the
professors would pay dues. As you yourself point out, there are
special difficulties in the case of state institutions. (2) Not
feasible. The president has to travel and entertain in a way
that the professor does not. He can’t do this unless he has a
larger salary directly or indirectly. (3) Sound. (4) Sound,
except that it makes no provision for a department which has
run down and which really needs reorganizing. Of course the
members of the department are outvoted two to one, but I am not
certain how it would work. While the principle of equal salaries
is good, I don’t know whether the average university would not
be handicapped under it. (5) Sound. To my mind the worst
feature about the university situation is that the president is the
only man who explains the views of the faculties to the trustees
and vice versa. No man can do that fairly. There ought to be at
least two other members of the faculty on the board of trustees.
This would be an easy reform to put through and would elimi-
nate many, though of course not all, of the present difficulties.

While I agree with the main principles of your proposition for
university control, I could not agree with all its details. I am
heartily in accord with your proposition to limit the activities
of the American university president, particularly with refer-
ence to the appointments of professors and to their tenure of
office. At the same time it seems to me that there is need of a
more centralized organization than your plan proposes. There
surely seems to be need of a competent executive, and in private
endowed institutions there has apparently been justification for
the view that there is need of an executive who can also secure
funds for the university. It is my feeling that the activities of
the American university president should be distinctly curtailed,
and that he should receive supervision on the faculty side as he
has on the trustee side, but I am not of the opinion that the
office should be abolished. I believe the evils that have crept into
the system can be amply checked by very slight modification in
existing conditions.

In university control the wisdom of having both a chancellor
and a president is questionable. Although separate duties and
qualifications may be required of each, there would doubtless
arise occasion where there would be an overlapping of function,
giving rise to divided authority and divided responsibility. This
usually means less harmony and less efficiency. The university
executive should possess high educational and business standards.
Not all of the university's business is done through the treasur-
er's office. In this modern age why should not education and
business go hand in hand? Some universities have been able to
demonstrate that it can be done. If there are peculiar and ex-
acting qualifications demanded of the executive, it is only fair
that there should be greater compensation. In some universities
a certain number of the alumni are elected to the board of trus-
tees by their fellow alumni. Why should not the faculty elect
a certain number of their members to the board? Is there any
other group in the university which has a greater interest in its
success and welfare? A board of trustees composed of certain
members elected by the trustees themselves, others elected by the
faculty, and still others by the alumni, would be a truly represen-
tative body. (If a state university and the trustees are appointed
by the state, the election of trustees by the trustees themselves
would probably not occur.) Alumni, faculty, trustees and presi-
dent, all would participate in the administration of the univer-
sity. In this way all the constituent parts would come into
closer relation with each other, and if unity is strength in the
republic it should be so in the university. Sections (3) and (4)
of your circular seem to me very desirable.
I agree that the system of control current in American universities calls loudly for readjustment. The powers vested in the presidency should be more narrowly limited than at present, especially as regards appointment, salaries and the departmental distribution of funds. The authority of the officers of instruction should be augmented in matters directly or indirectly touching the conduct of the several departments. The trustees should be responsible to the whole university. (1) The type of "corporation" proposed might work; I am uncertain. I suspect that its most difficult occupation would be the equitable distribution of income from university properties. (2) It is absurd to declare that the president's "salary should not be larger, his position more dignified or his powers greater than those of the professor." The important point is, surely, that the authority be properly delegated, and the dignity and salary earned. (3), (4) and (5). I find myself in substantial agreement; though the prescriptions are, in part, Utopian.

The present system could no doubt be much improved. The great trouble seems to be that investigators do not give time or interest enough to such matters. They will always be too deeply buried in the laboratories and this renders the situation difficult to improve.

The plan you propose would certainly be vastly superior to the present plan. As to its details I am not competent to judge.

The form of organization outlined by you seems to me to be an ideal one and I should be prepared to endorse every paragraph as you present it.

I have read your tentative plan of university control to be reached as the result of gradual evolution with much interest. It seems to me perfectly feasible and I am certainly in hearty accord with its main purpose, viz., to do away with the despotism of the president and of the heads of departments. The present system of control in our universities is certainly not the best that could be devised and is unworthy of a democratic country like
ours. Your plan has much in it that commends itself to me from my experiences as a university professor and I hope that you may succeed in bringing about some reform of the present system at least. Intelligent discussion of the subject can certainly do no harm and it may direct attention to the matter and thus ultimately do some good.

While I may not have very definite views on the points you raise, still a few of them have of course been considered by all academic men. (1) The body of trustees should be large enough to prevent perpetuation of whims and irregularities that may creep in in times of special pressure. Footnote 2 is a good safeguard. (2) As most of my own preparation was in a German university, I heartily endorse this view. It is not a promotion when an able and active professor is asked to assume the executive duties of a president. It frequently stiffles the man and does not magnify the office. (3) These groups should not have enough autonomy to allow one group to pool its interests against those of another. It can be remedied easily by enlarging the relations you outline in (5). There is danger of lessening the community of interests with other departments when one or two groups grow in numbers and importance. Other groups may be forced to the wall. Footnotes 8 and 9 meet my hearty approval. An instructor should not feel that it is simply a matter of routine to await promotion, but rather that it lies largely with himself whether he advances.

In general, taking your plan for granted, and without going behind it at any point, I should say: It is too bureaucratic; it substitutes one mode of high organization for another. But I do not believe in organization at all; or rather, given the minimum with which an institution can exist, I should prefer to let the organizations within the institution grow at haphazard. My ideal, still in terms of your plan, would be: (1) A faculty with an annually changing chairman; (2) a board of trustees; (3) an annually changing faculty committee of say ten men, to meet with a similar trustee committee; and (4) paid permanent extra-faculty officials; registrar, treasurer, secretaries of faculty, what-
ever they may be called and as many as the size of the university may demand. Everything else in the way of predetermined or foreseen organization—directors, deans, school-units, appointing boards, etc.—I regard as cumber. And, publicity being presupposed, I should let every institution follow its own natural line of development. If I turn now to your proposal in detail, I should have the following criticisms; I can only state them dogmatically: (1) I think that the state universities are not comparable with the endowed universities; I think it will be a long time before they can possibly be universities; and I think that they are tending away from that ideal towards the development of vocational and professional schools. Your plan contemplates the perpetuation of the large universities, i.e., of the present college-university mixture. I believe that college and university should be personally and spatially separate. I do not think that one can start with the corporation; and it is not necessary to do so, as we have boards already. I mistrust alumni, in anything like equal numbers with faculty; here, I suppose, everything depends on the age of the university, the character of its student body, etc.; I can only speak from experience. I also mistrust the "community," if that means the immediate surroundings of the university. (2) All right as an intermediate measure; but I believe in annual rotation, and I think it would suffice. (3) These are natural units, and need no organization. To make them formal would have its positive disadvantages (inbreeding of ideas, cliquism) and would also do injury to the smaller divisions, which would have to be affiliated to some stronger unit. Psychology, e.g., would have to go to philosophy or education or biology. If a formal unit is required at all, I prefer a unit in which men of very varied interests are bound to meet together in behalf of the university. It would, I think, be a good thing for me to have to dine once a month with an architect, engineer, historian, agriculturalist, biologist, lawyer. These units, if necessary or advisable, might be determined by lot. (4) Far too bureaucratic. Let all business be wholly public, but let representation, appointment, etc., be settled in detail locally by the separate institutions. Do not try to measure "amount of work"; let the candidate understand the present duties of the chair, and
then, if he is elected, give him a free hand. (5) Still too bureaucratic. Let every proposed measure that finds a specified number of seconders be voted on always by the whole faculty by postcard; if a meeting is wanted, let it be demanded of the permanent secretary by a specified proportion of the whole. If the mover is keen, he can print and distribute his arguments. As the first step in advance, I should accept your suggestion of a regular joint-committee of faculty and trustees. As the second step, I should abolish all salaries of deans and directors. I should put extra-faculty permanent clerks in training. Meanwhile, if a faculty-member has to be dean or director, I should excuse him in so far from university work, but should allow him only the professorial salary. I should aim throughout at the realization, by every member of the faculty in the widest sense, that he must be both responsible and loyal to the university, i.e., to his fellow faculty-members and to the students. I should hope that in time the idea of the "university" might include the trustees; though it will, I fear, be long before the professor ceases to regard the trustee as his natural enemy, and the trustee to regard the professor as a fool to be kept harmless. I should hope, also, that in time the whole university, faculty and trustees, might be capable of combined action on definite educational lines; even if this took a generation, I should not mind. I dislike difference of title; and I should hope that in time there would be no difference, save of permanency of appointment. We should then have, perhaps, professors elect and professors designate, and that is all; perhaps we might even abolish titles altogether. I do not believe in specially high salaries within the university. A great deal of this is, under present conditions, utopian; I do not think that I could myself live up to my ideals; brutalities and jealousies warp one even against one's will. But I think that with some suffering and many relapses for a generation, the utopia might be approximated.

Your general summary of university evolution from comparatively small colleges to their present dimensions and complex interrelations I have seen with my own eyes. I think that every one who has helped in the evolution of the American university
to the present stage expected a simpler organism than actually came from their efforts; and perhaps sometimes we feel hardly willing to accept our own creation. As you say, there was comparative order and simplicity in the smaller institution; but there is now complexity, and reversing the order of the creation described in Genesis, there is considerable chaos as a result of our creative efforts. But we are not through yet, and in some such plan of representative government as you have outlined I believe a glorious youth and maturity are before the American university. To answer the questions in order: (1) This is practically the system I have lived under. (2) This seems to me an unnecessary complication. In No. 5 there would naturally be a chairman chosen for the group or groups meeting together. (3) This is entirely practicable and works well. (4) This is the kernel of the whole matter, and by contrast brings out the real difficulty in American universities. We are too much "boss ruled," and have too little of the true principles of self-government; and self-government is at the root of all permanency in a free commonwealth, whether political or educational. The method you propose, in part, I have lived under and know that it is practicable. I have also lived under a system in which overlords were appointed by a higher over-lord to rule over each province—in a word "boss rule"; and it destroys the fine spirit of a university as it does that of the state and the nation in political matters. I think that in no situation in life is leadership more desired and appreciated than in a university; but leaders, to be followed, must be chosen by, not imposed upon, a faculty group. (5) This is a logical sequence to (4).
VIII. LETTERS FROM THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

My first impression, after reading the paper through, was that some of your suggestions met with mental friction on my part. I certainly see no reason for making a president's salary the same as that of the professor. There are a hundred men who can be good professors to one who has the capacity for becoming what I would call a good president, and I can say this without criticizing in any way any president or any professor. I should say that good presidents were as rare in academic work as they are in the commercial industries, and I see no reason why they should not be paid in accordance with their abilities. This does not mean that I would wish to see all professors endowed with the abilities of a good president. A professor must be primarily a specialist in a more or less narrow field, because as man is yet constituted there are few of us capable of being exceedingly broad and exceedingly acute at the same time. The only people I would elect for life are murderers. I do not believe that the best can be got out of a system operated by men if that system is operated by means of the average opinion of the men. In other words, a democracy does not appeal to me where high quality is an aim. I should say, in general, pick the best man possible for any piece of work and supply him with assistants, which in this case would be the professors, to carry out and develop his plans. I think this is in keeping with most advance, which, when brought to final analysis, may usually be found to be an individual matter. Certainly in the matter of discovery and experimental work we find that committees can not invent, and responsibility divided is as good as shifted. I see no reason for drawing a line representing numbers or distinguishing between a college and a university, assuming that below this line a single president can well lead a college, but above it no one man can well lead a university. Possibly some university presidents are despots, but if this is the case, raising their salaries to $100,000 a year would
be likely to reduce the despotism in time. My reason for saying this is that it would become fairly obvious what a good president ought to do and be, and this price might make it attractive to men whom I think would be capable of filling the position. You would have to excuse me from being a member of the teaching staff of an institution of learning where the petty jealousies which sometimes occur between the professors were the factors in determining their or my advancement. I may be hard-hearted, but I believe in a system which requires every man to do his best and that all the time, and I hope I should be ready, as a professor, to drop my work or step back a peg or two, when some other man was capable of carrying it on better than I could. Your idea of having a unit group of men intimately connected with one particular subject appeals strongly to me, but even in that group there would have to be one man who was more or less the leader, as long as men are constituted as we are to-day.

I do not think that any system of government will ever do away with the prime importance of executive control, both in the president and the deans. The best government in the world, to my thinking, is the benevolent despotism, run on a basis of efficiency which now controls the Panama Canal Zone. I do not agree that the trustees of an American university have absolute powers. They seem to me to be rather the servants of the alumni and the faculties, particularly if they are broad-minded business man of the modern type, capable of realizing their responsibilities as public servants, and serving without salary. They are much better fitted to control than an executive body chosen by salaried professors. I agree that the division unit of from ten to twenty men is a good one, and see no objection to separate endowments for divisions, provided these endowments are regulated and managed from a central office. I think that the division should be headed by a strong dean who should retain his headship for a considerable time and even for life, if his services are satisfactory, and who with other deans would represent the division on an executive committee, meeting with the executive committee of the trustees. I do not believe in President Eliot's Harvard system of appointing junior pro-
fessors as temporary chairmen of departments. Such a system effectually prevents a department from following a consistent policy. With regard to appointments, as for example the appointment of the deans, I do not see how we can, by any mere mechanism, avoid favoritism and injustice. I do not believe that any system the world has ever seen ever produced more favoritism and injustice than the so-called representative government of American municipalities. Everything depends on the men and their personalities, and so long as our universities continue to be charitable institutions, dependent on the contributions of wealthy patrons, they will have to be more or less dependent also on the whims of those patrons. I do not see how your representative system is ever going to finance a university.

The proposed "corporation" seems to me too large and indefinite a body to exercise any other function than that of selecting representatives and supporting them by promoting public interest and generosity. The body of representatives thus elected it would seem to me more natural to call the corporation. The substitution of a chancellor, elected by the trustees, and a president, elected by the faculty, merely as "primus inter pares," seems to me to be attended with too much risk of sacrificing leadership. The European institutions, of which we naturally think in this connection, are not as a rule in a state of active organic development, nor under any obligation to appeal for continual public support. They have reached a state of comparative equilibrium as to finances, attendance and policy. If the functions referred to should be exercised here by a chancellor, the conditions would tend to become very similar to those which are now criticized. Within a division or department there should be a substantial nucleus of men of experience and long connection with the institution, but a majority of the entire group will often be inexperienced or not closely identified with the university. A completely democratic or even representative organization for such a group seems to me out of the question because it is so far from homogeneous or constant. If the group has educational and financial autonomy, the weak departments will grow weaker, the strong, stronger. The plan as a whole
seems to me to be based too much on the theory that leadership is either not very important, or that it can be exercised by almost any man who is likely to be a member of the university faculty, or that it is certain to develop tyrannical tendencies. It seems to me, on the other hand, that the average university professor is likely to be of doubtful quality as a leader of men or even as a cooperator in any form of group activity—being fundamentally an individualist. In my judgment, however, leadership of large groups is a rather unusual quality and a very important one to recognize and develop. Some of our serious difficulties in university control have been due to inefficiency in leadership and attempts to replace the real thing by inferior substitutes. To my mind the institution which can find a president who will really lead its faculty and other constituent bodies, encouraging initiative and respecting independence, is worthy of any honor or salary he is likely to receive, and in a minor degree I should say the same about a dean or head of a department (though I am perhaps not a competent witness on this latter point). What we need, in my judgment, is continued effort to educate trustees and the public up to this ideal of leadership with corresponding discrimination against false or inferior standards of efficiency, or the substitution of mere administration for leadership.

It seems to me that your plan goes too far in imitating legislative methods without the control which public interest puts upon their deliberations. Nor do I think that the modes of thought of professors train them well for administrative functions. Witness the difficulty of finding among college faculties suitable presidents and deans. As between the horns of the dilemma you figure presidential autocracy as Scylla, and I must confess that I prefer the siren to the whirlpool. I notice, however, that the Odyssey describes both Scylla and Charybdis as devouring monsters each with six heads and twelve legs, so the choice between them is small.

From a theoretical point of view the plan seems ideal, but I believe its practise impossible on account of lack of concentration of power in a supervising head, whether he be called chancellor
or president. It seems to me particularly impractical for the technical school.

It has always seemed to me that the system of administration of Harvard University was the best planned and most likely to be satisfactory in the long run of any that I know. It seems to me also that on the whole it has worked well in practice. I think that it would work still better if its visiting committees always contained a member of the board of overseers, as they frequently, perhaps usually, do, and if these committees devoted more time and thought to the purpose for which they are appointed. Certainly here we have found the kindly interest, appreciation and criticism from our own visiting committees (in this case always members of our corporation) of the greatest value. We had at one time, and for many years, a general visiting committee for the whole school from the alumni association. This did not accomplish what was hoped from it, however, since its members gave altogether too little time to the matter. A great value of our corporation visiting committee has lain in the fact that the whole working staff of each department has made acquaintance, and oftentimes a somewhat intimate acquaintance, with members of the corporation who were particularly interested in the work of the department. A few thoughts occur to me in relation to your numbered propositions, though these thoughts are hardly worthy of your consideration. (1) This proposition does not strike me very favorably as a whole. It seems to me that it might be too open to abuse from the inclusion of men who would get into the corporation to serve their personal interest rather than the interest of the university. If my understanding is correct, in the very early days of this institute the corporation was elected by the members of the Society of Arts; or at least this society, to which practically any one might belong, had a voice in the corporate management of the institute. The plan for obvious reasons worked badly and the institute shortly became a close corporation. This, however, is entirely inconclusive so far as the merits of your suggestion are concerned. If it could be assured that a chancellor would always be available who would be able and willing to devote himself heartily to the financial
interests of the university and its more public relations, leaving
to the president the educational and scientific side, I should think
such a plan would be an excellent one. But I fear such men
would be too rare to serve the purpose. (2) This proposition
would seem to imply an arrangement of the character which
obtained for so many years in the University of Virginia. This
always struck me as an admirable plan educationally, but it does
not seem to have worked satisfactorily after the institution
became larger and in need of increased endowment. (3) It
seems to me that this proposition is unquestionably a correct one.
It substantially agrees with our own departmental arrangements
which I think as a whole have worked fairly well, and any defects
in which are not incident to such a scheme as you suggest. (4)
I should agree with this as a whole for each school. I question
very much, however, whether, as at present constituted, it would
work well to have the whole faculty nominate the professors.
Perhaps with long experience conditions might make this fea-
sible. It does seem to me that if the full professors or head
professors or departmental heads could have information as to
what nominations were proposed, with the privilege or duty of
expressing their opinions, perhaps collectively, at least individu-
ally, this would be of value. I agree with your view that elec-
tion to professorships should be for life, but I would limit these
to full professorships and associate professorships. I think all
other appointments should be for fixed terms. (5) These sugges-
tions seem to me to be good, except that I think all financial
and other extra-educational matters should be relegated to the
board of trustees. Of course, the whole educational work of the
university should be absolutely in the hands of its faculty.

Harvard and Columbia, from what I hear, have suffered from
autocratic and bureaucratic executive control. This was never
the case at Yale, nor is it so at Technology. Indeed at Yale the
president seemed to have very little power, and departments like
that of mathematics were so completely in the hands of the few
full professors of the subject that the department suffered, and
with it the allied departments, through the lack of wisdom of
these few men. On the whole, I believe that the professors in a
department are less qualified to build up that department than is the president; they are apt to be much narrower than he. This difficulty you have guarded against to a certain extent. I am inclined to think that organization by departments is perhaps not the best. There should be some crossing of the different departments. Thus to the mathematical department, and having a vote in its meetings, should be representatives of the allied departments of physics, chemistry, mechanics, engineering and so on, in sufficient number to prevent the mathematicians from refusing adequately to make provision for their needs. This would alleviate a possible bad condition of clannishness. Moreover, it might bring about an arrangement whereby members of one department actually gave instruction in another. There is no reason why a teacher of physics should not occasionally take a section of mathematics or mechanics, no reason why a teacher of mathematics should not take a section of mechanics or physics and so on. Such crossing of instruction is particularly desirable both for the students and for those teachers who have a good deal of routine work; for no teacher should be so narrow that he could not teach freshmen or sophomores in at least one subject other than his specialty. In general I should think that your scheme had much to recommend it. The idea of a chancellor is good. That the president should be merely the temporary (two years) chairman of his faculty seems also advisable. But really I have no very strong feelings, for the faculties on which I have been have always been pretty democratic.

I believe there is need of improvement in the method of control of our educational institutions. So far as I feel qualified to judge I see much to commend in the plan you have proposed and little that I would criticize adversely. It seems of great importance to me that the policies of the institution should be determined by the professors, that is, by those most intimately acquainted with the educational problems; that the election of professors should be in the control of the faculty; but that the greatest possible safeguards should be exercised to prevent the entrance of incompetent or unfit members into the faculty.
Your plan of university control meets my approval most decidedly. It could not fail to prove a great advance over the existing autocratic system; and in my opinion its major features, at least, are sure to be adopted in this country. I wish that the founder or founders of our next university might see the wisdom of launching it as a republic instead of an autocracy.

I am heartily in accord with practically all your recommendations. With the increasing demands upon the presidential office, I am convinced that it is more than one man can do and do it well. Possibly this could be obviated by releasing the president from all responsibility regarding the raising of funds for the institution. I am inclined to favor your idea of the chancellor and a president, but feel that the latter should _ex officio_ be a member of the trustees. I thoroughly believe in the system you suggest in (4). I feel very strongly that the appointment and advancement of a person should not be dependent upon the will of any one man, particularly when that man is a person of whims and moods. I can point to several examples of retarded development, both to the persons concerned and the school with which they are associated, in consequence of this most unfortunate system. Where your plan has been adopted, I am informed that it has worked well.
IX. LETTERS FROM INSTITUTIONS IN NEW ENGLAND

If I should venture a purely academic opinion on the plan it would be that you attach far too little weight to the argument of efficiency. That, to my mind, is the only decisive argument—efficiency being understood to mean the accomplishment of the purposes of research and teaching for which universities are created. If a more democratic organization means more of that sort of efficiency it will surely come; if it doesn’t, it will not. Probably no single plan of organization would do in all institutions of the same size and grade. Some groups of men are fitter for successful democracy than others.

Your plan of university control seems to me rather complicated—perhaps because I have lived so long in a small college. Here we have great centralization of power in the president. He appoints all committees and is ex officio member of all and chairman of most. I have been here in three administrations, and the views of the president gave the college its special character in each. One of the three lacked force and control and the conditions then were the worst I have known. Faculty cliques arose, developing jealousies and ill feelings in large measure. I was at the Hopkins from 1876 to 1881. President Gilman was the university in large measure. His wisdom in choices and decisions and his genuine, unfailing interest in every one connected with the university won success. His great concern was to make others succeed. I never saw or heard of any personal self-interest, and I saw a great deal of him in the university and in his home.

There are many points upon which we agree, but in regard to the salient point which comes under your section (2), I do not agree with you at all. I know there are many poor college presidents, but I have little faith in the general business wisdom or judgment of college faculties and I think a strong president who allows himself to be influenced by the good judgment of the
better members of his faculty is far to be preferred to the method
you outline. I believe the same general principles applied to the
management of a successful corporation apply to college or
university management and believe the method used at Cornell
far superior to that at Yale.

I think it is necessary and absolutely essential that the presi-
dent should have more power and should have more salary and a
position somewhat more eminent than that of a professor. That
this power is grossly misused at times is notorious, but we must
consider the university situation as a whole rather than an ex-
tremely small minority of a situation. The German "Rektor"
has many advantages, but it is based upon a great many decades
of experience and upon usually excellent administrative routine
that allows but very little flexibility or growth, and is not de-
dsigned to meet the influx of new questions which is continually
arising in our new American universities.

I am interested in your suggestions, and I sympathize with the
general spirit of which they are the expression—a spirit of oppo-
sition to the present tendency to make the president an autocrat.
Nevertheless, I can not believe that the plan which you propose
would be a practicable one. I doubt the wisdom of having all
the trustees elected by a large democratic body composed chiefly
of the alumni. I believe a composite board in which part of the
members are elected by the alumni and part by the board itself
would be better, as having a certain guarantee of conservatism.
I think you go too far in making a temporary chairman of the
faculty, instead of a president. Under present conditions, I
think an American university needs a president with pretty
large powers, in order to secure unity and efficiency of admin-
istration. Great administrative capacity is rarer than scholar-
ship, capacity for scientific research and pedagogic aptitude.
Especially rare is the combination of great administrative
capacity with high scholarly qualities; and just that combination
practically is demanded of a college president. It seems to me,
therefore, that the American university must have a president
whose position must be recognized as higher and whose emolu-
ments must be greater than those of a professor. In a German university the relation of the institution to the state renders a strong administrative power in the institution itself unnecessary. The autonomy of the American university requires an effective administrative head. I do not believe in abolishing the president, but in making him a limited monarch rather than an autocrat. I think professors should be nominated by the president with the concurrence of a senate or body representing the professors. So long as a college is small, this senate may include all the full professors. As the institution increases in size, the senate must become a representative body, probably best constituted by election by the whole body of full professors. The election of professors would be made by the trustees, and would generally be merely a formal ratification of the nomination by the president and senate.

In answer to your propositions, my opinion is as follows: (1) I am not in favor of your proposed scheme. I do not believe that we can plan all our universities exactly alike, and the controlling bodies in each develop more or less according to the needs of the institution. I think as a rule the governing boards, if we except a few instances in the middle west, have not interfered very much with the duties of the faculty, and so serve their purpose fairly well in most cases as at present constituted. (2) I am partially opposed to your view on this. I believe we still need the university president in our system of education, and the chief way that I would limit his power as compared with present conditions would be to make the matter of the selection of new professors, etc., largely one of conference between the president and the members of the faculty directly concerned. (3) As I understand this proposition, I am in favor of it. (4) I agree with this proposition in the main, except that I believe the president should have some voice in the selection of the faculty, and I think it doubtful whether the election of professors for life at all institutions is desirable. (5) I am in favor of this proposition only in case it does not usurp the powers of the president and trustees, but merely limits them without destroying their efficiency.
It seems to me the question turns on the decision whether we should delegate large powers to a few, or make university control more democratic. It is about the same question that the country is facing in city government. I believe a man must have responsibility and power if he is to accomplish anything. The chief criticism which I can present to your plan is that it spreads out too thinly this responsibility. The position of chancellor as outlined would appeal to no man of force. The president would be solely an educational adviser to the faculty. Lack of a president at the University of Virginia impeded greatly the value of the university to the state for many years. According to your plan the professor is too free. I believe he should feel that he is but part of the educational system, and that his work should bear a relation to the system. His own wishes should be governed by a clear appreciation of these facts. Autonomy in the government of departments is good, but if carried too far leads to differences in methods, standards and aims, which should not exist in a university. I fear the putting of financial matters in the hands of the divisions would yield bad results. There must be begging—but keep that from the teaching force and the deans. Briefly, I believe in more centralization than you outline. I think in certain instances the power delegated to college presidents has been misused, that some are autocrats and should be subjected to control. If we could find some mean path between what we have now and what you propose we should be nearer the solution of the problem. Among the things that should be looked to are the following that suggest themselves at this time: Representation on the board of trustees, corporation or other governing body of the faculty. It does not seem right that the only official source of communication between trustees and those who are actually doing the work of education should be the president. The separation of educational and administrative problems. Many heads of departments are clerks. Provide that each professor do what he can do best. Don't make an investigator spend hours discussing in committee the number of points required for admission, etc. Make it possible, in some way, to get rid of inefficient men in the instructing corps. There are many professors who are hindering the proper work that should
be done. Make it possible for a really good man to advance as his work warrants. The lock-step system has disadvantages as well as advantages. Find a way to list, if possible, the educational efficiency of the instructing corps. I think much more harm has been done in educational institutions by retaining inefficient men than by putting out such men.

In general we have been particularly happy here under almost completely democratic government. Under the present administration things are changing. The faculty is being relieved of much of the old routine work. With this relief I believe its powers in vital matters are also being gradually reduced. The process seems automatic. For the small college at least number (2) will not be generally workable. The president's work is less pleasant, more exacting, more responsible, and more wearing than that of any professor. He has much entertaining to do, an official residence to maintain, and semi-official obligations to the community. He couldn't live on our salaries. He receives more than double the highest professor's salary. But no one of us would take the job if it were offered to us. We believe very strongly in the life tenure of professors. But I believe there ought to be some extrinsic reward for efficiency. That should not be left entirely to inner stimulus and conscience. For us there is no way to an increase in salary except a call elsewhere. Perhaps that is not a bad criterion of ability. At any rate I believe the possibility of such a call and consequent raise is better than purely automatic increases regardless of reputation or efficiency.

In a general way I can see that your plan would work better on theoretical grounds than the present one, but what would be the result in actual practise I can not tell. Certainly I think it would be a gain were there more articulation between faculty and trustees than at present, but, knowing something of the personnel of faculties and the cranks that often get in, I think that I would rather have the autocracy of a carefully chosen president than the rule of some members of faculties that I have known. I notice that you do not say whether the trustees should
be elected for a term of years, as in state universities, or for an indefinite term, as in most institutions. I think that the limited term is better, as there are often members of the board who are worse than useless, and there is no way of getting rid of them, save by poison. They have such ideas of their own importance that there is no hope of getting them to resign, and death is the only escape. I like the idea of having members of the faculty select the professors as you suggest in article (4). In fact I have always been consulted with regard to all appointments to positions in any way allied to my own department, and frequently with regard to others. But I know of one of the largest universities where the president does not consult with any of the biological department, but makes the appointments himself, and he is not a biologist. I think that there are too many faculty meetings. Most matters are better settled by small committees, for they are but matters of routine. Meetings of the faculty of a school or group need be held but three or four times a year, and then at such an hour as to prevent needless wind-chewing and thinking out loud. I regret that I can not discuss your plan more intelligently. On the whole it appeals to me, but for twenty years I have managed to fit in pretty well with existing conditions. I have not wanted any more share in the management than I have at present. I dodge all committees where possible, as I want to put my time on other work. I have also been allowed great freedom in every respect and have not suffered from any autocracy, but that of course is due to the personal characteristics of the presidents and not to any merit of the existing scheme.

It seems to me that your first point is a very important one. There should, indeed, be a corporation to include all those vitally interested in the university or college. This should certainly include the professors and officers, as well as the alumni, and should be so made up that it would have the best chance of wisely guiding the general trend of the institution and limiting the field which it should cover. I should like to see some college experiment by adding representatives of the parents and students. The board of trustees selected by them should be more
than ordinary trustees, in that, beside the care of property, they should act as a committee on policy, as in the American Association, while at the same time they should not be a close ring. (2) I doubt the wisdom of separating the functions of a chancellor who represents the university at public functions, and may stand before the community as the embodiment of its ideals, from that of president. If the president’s position is no more “dignified” or his powers no greater than those of a professor, he would, I fear, become simply a professor of pedagogics, and might narrow the scope of the institution. If thus stripped of its present scope, I see no reason why his work should not be given, as you suggest, to an elected chairman of the faculty or to the deans. I do think, however, that in any institution and in politics, even after all “progressive” steps have been taken, there will be an important field for the one leader. The object must be to restrain leadership from becoming tyranny, and to remember that in the search for truth, and the dissemination thereof, progress must be in many directions. (3) The department is a very important unit, and I think you are right regarding the size—that is, should be somewhere from ten to twenty. It should, of course, have “as complete autonomy as is consistent with the welfare of the university as a whole,” but my impression is that there is always a strife both for students’ time and for funds between the different departments. Just how such strife is to be settled must depend upon some larger body. (5) As I understand it, the “larger body” above referred to is a senate coordinate with the trustees. Whether there would not be friction between these two bodies and just how their relations would be is a point where your plan is open to question. My impression is that I should recommend very strongly the system of public hearings, that in matters concerning any man or any department a hearing should be had before the committee or body which shall finally decide upon the same, and that in case of important matters, a man or department should have the right and power to go before the committee on policy or executive committee of the whole institution, with an ultimate appeal to the corporation which selects that committee. It seems to me, too, that not only teachers, but also students, should,
as in the medieval universities, have their own part in the corporation, and balance by the rashness and radicalism of youth the conservatism of the alumni. The important matter is that the fact should be recognized that the teacher is not merely a hired man of a corporation, but has a vital interest and pride in the institution which he serves, and is quite likely able to help it in more ways than his narrow specialty. For instance, many professors in many institutions are men of large means, and are fully as able to give good financial advice as members of the board of trustees. Again, I am sure that many institutions have made mistakes by not giving their engineering faculty a chance to advise in the planning of new buildings and in similar works. With regard to professors, it seems to me that no general rule can be maintained. In certain departments it is natural and inevitable that the professor’s time should be almost wholly devoted to his university work. In other departments, I believe the best results are obtained by having one who is doing things tell others how he is doing them, and that in many cases (law, medicine, engineering) men may receive a good part of their income from other sources than their university salaries. It seems hardly possible to cover in any one plan of university control all the possible varieties that can come up, and I hardly think that your plan means to do that, but that, as you say, “there should be as much flexibility” (not only throughout the university but from one institution to another) “as is consistent with” true efficiency. That seems to be the scientific method of work. We should have many university organizations, so that by comparison we can find the better forms. One of the criticisms which I should make is that our universities are far too much alike in their general plan of administration. They vary in name, but the various parts are not so varied in function.

The central feature of the plan you propose, namely, a representative basis of control, seems an excellent one, applicable alike to the small college and the great university. Those of our colleges that place the election of certain trustees in the hands of the alumni already enjoy a large measure of representative government. To restrict this suffrage to those of the alumni who
are willing to pay annual dues may offer some advantage, but it would be a mistake, I think, to have the dues much more than nominal in amount. The suggestion that membership in the corporation be extended more generally to members of the faculty and to interested citizens is a good one, under suitable restrictions. I am heartily in accord with the proposal that the president be elected by the professors, subject to the approval of the trustees, though I should want to have him more than a mere presiding officer. American universities still need presidents, not merely vice-presidents. For this reason I should not like to see a new rector elected every year, as in Germany. Such an arrangement would be almost as objectionable as would the annual election of president of the United States. A four-year term for the university president would be better than this—but I have still to be convinced that an indefinite tenure of office is not best suited to our varied and changing conditions.

A first-class president can be more successful than a whole army of poorly qualified professors. But democracy must prevail in spite of bad legislation—and if the democracy prevails, the president is of no account, and he is no more dignified than a professor. In my day we seventy-five instructors delegated six of our number to handle all the vexatious questions that came before us, subject to the approval of the others. This plan worked well, but the decisions were sometimes overruled. I am inclined to think that if more pains are taken in the selection of trustees, and they take the necessary time to attend to the general management of the institution, good results will follow. Perhaps some of them could give all their time to their charge, upon salaries. My experience with treasurers is not favorable. They are of smaller caliber than the president and after a while become domineering and almost insulting. In general I will say that I approve your efforts to improve the methods of university control; that the present system (or that which has been employed) has not been satisfactory; and that the democracy is theoretically the true method of control. I see now more of business corporations than before. Their affairs are managed by directors—usually dominated by a president or manager.
The problems are very much the same with those of the university and perhaps something could be learned from them. So the most successful churches are those dominated by bishops. The presidents and bishops are carefully selected and usually do well. If not, the business or church concerned must suffer, just like the university.

In general purpose and outline the proposed plan of organization is a decided improvement on present methods of control. Details would naturally be worked out differently in different institutions, but if the evolution of a considerable number of universities could be directed along the proposed lines the effectiveness of both instruction and research would be greatly increased. Some institutions, with liberal charters, are perhaps free to develop toward the ideal organization provided those in control can be convinced of its feasibility and advantages. On the other hand many college and university charters are of such an iron-clad nature as to prevent any change in ultimate control. In such cases development could not be directed along the proposed lines without encountering serious legal difficulties, and the institutions concerned could not be expected to undertake the reorganization until its advantages have been clearly demonstrated elsewhere. The suggested appointment of a chancellor and a president to share some of the duties now vested in the president alone would relieve some of the friction in the present organization and might possibly be carried out while the ultimate control is still in the hands of the trustees. Some boards have, for a number of years, delegated the control of educational policy to the faculty and have seldom declined to ratify the action of the latter body in such matters. They might with equal propriety allow the faculty, or a suitable committee appointed by the professors, to nominate the president with the tacit understanding that the nomination would be respected. Such a procedure would tend to curtail the autocratic power of the president and would present many of the advantages of the proposed plan. Also the chance of securing suitably qualified men would probably be greater than by the present method. A man nominated for the presidency by the
faculty, or a committee of the professors, would be recognized by them as a leader in educational and administrative matters. Under these conditions I see no objection to allowing him considerably more power and compensation than is suggested in the proposed plan. Most faculties would be likely to progress very slowly along general educational lines without active leadership from some source. A suitably qualified president might appropriately assume the initiative in such matters, the final decision resting with the professors or their elected representatives. The general oversight of administrative details and the formulation of educational policy require considerable time and specialized abilities. For this reason I believe that it would be better to vest these functions in a single individual who could devote his entire time and energy to the purpose rather than to trust to the varying abilities of annually elected rectors. While an institution organized on the lines suggested in sections three and four of your article would be ideal from the point of view of the individual, it would require some centralizing influence in order to become an effective power in the community. This influence could be exerted, without interfering with the obvious advantages of the proposed plan, by a department of administration and policy headed by a president who owes his appointment and powers to the concurrent will of the trustees and the professors. Such a department would be organized on a different basis from the other departments of the institution and, to some extent, would be subservient to them. Its principal functions would be to investigate the educational and scientific needs of the community or other constituency of the institution, to formulate plans for meeting these needs, and to lay such plans before the faculty of the departments concerned for discussion and action. It should be expected to keep in touch with the secondary schools, to suggest modifications in entrance requirements when they become necessary, and to administer faculty regulations regarding scholarships and discipline. It might also be charged with the supervision of the official publications of the institution.

The article, I think, is a good one. The only matter in which I would take issue with it is in that of a chancellor to obtain
endowments, etc. This work should be done as it is so generally, I believe, by the president.

Your plan of university control, as stated in an article received a short time back, appears to me to be very good.

I should heartily approve the plan set forth in your article as a desirable, but far distant, ideal. For our smaller colleges I wish that a small committee elected by the faculty could form part of the trustees. Your method of electing professors seems to me a little too complex.

In general I should be strongly in favor of your proposed form of organization for larger universities. The first proposition is particularly important and I believe should apply to other than the largest universities. The fundamental principle of vesting the interests of such institutions as are of wide and general benefit in a large, representative corporation, with trustees as agents, is sound and democratic. Moreover great hospitals and similar institutions more recently founded have demonstrated its feasibility.

The reform in university government which you advocate is, I think, in the right direction. Without wasting time in emphasizing the respects in which I approve of it, I will confine my remarks to the single feature in which I do not think it so satisfactory. I doubt whether two coordinate boards, trustees and senate as described by you, the former controlling financial, and the latter purely educational, interests, would work well. One would soon dominate the other; and, as the former would hold the power of the purse, the contest would be unequal. Moreover its inauguration would require a sudden revolution and would not come as an evolution by a gradual succession of minor changes, which I believe to be the only way in which such a large change can be brought about. Much more is to be hoped, I believe, from an attempt to gradually reform our present boards of trustees by the appointment to them of educational experts elected by staffs of teachers. Our present boards consist generally of conscientious business and professional men, of more
than average ability, who have no wide acquaintance with educational requirements and policies. They are in general men of open mind and good general judgment, and what they chiefly need to increase their efficiency greatly is the advice and cooperation, on equal terms, of experts in educational questions. A first step toward this would be the appointment of a small committee of advisers, elected by the departments for limited periods, who must be consulted by the trustees in regard to specified educational questions, such as appointments. The enlargement of the number of subjects for consultation might gradually follow with a final fusion of the two bodies. I think there is a possibility of unwise haste and lack of full consideration in the attempt to bring about such a highly desirable change as you advocate. Would it not be well to print in Science brief clear abstracts of the methods of government in several typical efficient foreign universities, so that as many as possible might be stimulated to think carefully about what long experience and gradual adjustments have worked out as efficient systems? I would suggest outlines of the government of an English, a Scotch, a German, a French, and an Italian university, prepared by ones who have imbibed something of the spirit of these.

If a portion, for example, one third, of the existing board of trustees were elected by the faculty from their own number, another third similarly elected from the alumni, and the remaining third were prominent citizens, the latter portion being possibly self-perpetuating, I believe the advantages of article (1) would be secured and that some such modification might be realized. I believe most strongly in your suggestion of a chancellor, who will perform the public duties now expected of a president. Article (2) suggests a most desirable and important change. The public duties of a president being delegated to a chancellor, the more important educational responsibilities can best be carried by one in close touch with the faculty, elected by the faculty from among their own number, for a term of years. Articles (3), (4) and (5): I believe that each department should elect representatives to a university council and that this council, composed of elected representatives from the different depart-
ments, should have general supervision and control over the general policy of each department. The acts of the council would similarly be subject to review by the trustees. The members of each department should, as a body, make recommendations for vacancies in the department, and, if not vetoed by council or trustees, such nominations should be the basis of election. In my opinion the evils to be eradicated are the subserviency of president to trustees (or corporation), directors of departments to president, and department staff to director. The most serious result of the present system is the advancement of mediocre men with "pull" and the neglect of men of marked ability who will not adopt the tactics of the politician.

I find myself in favor of most of the principles which you advocate in your article on university control. Especially I am in favor of the democratic principle which you outline. But I am not sure that your conception of the position of president, as set forth in the four lines you give to the discussion of that office, is that which would make for the highest educational and administrative efficiency. (1) The corporation. I believe that your idea of a corporation is already practically in use. In old and well-established institutions the alumni constitute the corporation. "Members of the community who ally themselves with it" are generally voted into the alumni by the trustees, using the medium of honorary degrees or "degrees as in course." The English and Canadian universities have provided a means whereby a college man already the holder of a degree from some university or college of good standing may become an alumnus of another university upon the recommendation by (four or five) alumni and by the payment of a fee. Consequently it is an easy matter to enlarge the alumni to include all beneficiaries of the university who desire to mould its policies. (2) The president. When I first read your article I assumed you meant that the professors . . . should elect from their own number a president. Perhaps you do not mean this. There seems no good reason why the professors should not go outside their own number for a suitable man. But if his salary were no larger nor his position more dignified than that of a professor, there would be no need
of going outside. I am inclined to think however that his position would be more dignified by the mere fact of his election. And, too, he ought to have some powers which a professor does not have—otherwise there would be no necessity for his election. While I regard as making for the gaiety of nations the transformation which an ordinary man undergoes when he is elected president of a college, whereby he becomes possessed overnight of both omnipotence and omniscience, still I should attach to the position the dignity and responsibility which should rightly belong to the chosen executive of a democratic body. But to give such an executive very great powers or to pay him a salary three times as much as is paid to the ablest professors in the university (as is now done in some cases) would be to exalt the office of president out of all proportion to its real place in an educational institution. (3), (4), (5) Details of organization. On the whole, I am in accord with the details of organization, but I do not feel that it is necessary or advisable to pay the same salary for the same office, nor do I believe that election to a professorship should be for life. Indeed, I am strongly of the belief that it should be clearly set forth by the faculty that membership in that body is dependent upon the maintenance by its members of their mental and moral sanity. In a footnote (9) you state that ‘‘professors and other officers should not be distracted from their work of teaching and research by administrative politics.’’ But some professors must do administrative work. College organizations of all kinds—musical clubs, dramatic clubs, athletics, publications, all need the friendly counsel of members of the faculty.

In general I may say that I am in cordial sympathy with the efforts you are making to bring about a betterment of university conditions. It is obvious to any one not himself a direct beneficiary by reason of the existence of the evils of the prevailing system of university administration, either through being a president or the petted tool of a president, that a continuation of present conditions can only result in placing the intellectual life of American universities on a lower level than it has occupied in the past or than is occupied by the universities of other countries. This is inevitable for two reasons: In the first place an academic
career is becoming all the time less attractive to men of marked intellectual capacity and ability. This applies not merely to young men of this class at the beginning of their careers who are turning to other fields, where not only is the remuneration larger, but where the opportunity for a free and untrammeled intellectual development in the widest sense of the word is greater. It also applies to men who have attained eminence in university work, but who are finding conditions increasingly irksome and are only awaiting the right opportunity to leave the university. In the second place, the insistence upon a system of military subordination with its attendant train of evils, the loading of men down with innumerable routine duties of a petty character which could be better performed by clerks, and the "carrying of the university to the people" in the form of extension work, are in their very nature bound to divert the best part of the energy of the faculty (in spite of their efforts, strenuous at first, to the contrary) into channels which are intellectually on a low level. He who doubts this or who has not seen the gradual breaking down under the pressure of the system of many a promising man's ideals and ambition has not been around the universities long, or is afflicted with academic myopia. I believe that your scheme for the amelioration of these conditions is, in the main, sound. I should, however, like to mention certain matters of detail respecting each of your points taken seriatim. (1) The state universities seem to me to offer a real difficulty to the corporation plan. I doubt if the people would delegate authority to elect regents to a faculty-alumni corporation, and lacking this authority the corporation would lose a good deal, though not all, of its effectiveness. (2) I feel strongly that before we shall make much progress we must adopt the German plan of no president, but a short-term rector. Years of tradition have given a connotation to the very name "university president" in this country which makes it desirable to the interest of reform to do away with the office entirely. Let the rector be the academic head for a one, two or three year term, he to be chosen by the faculty; let there be then chosen by the corporation a chancellor or provost, who shall have no authority over any officer of the university (except his own clerks), nor any greater
voice respecting its intellectual policy that any other member of the corporation. His function shall be to represent the university at public functions and before legislative bodies, and solicit funds. He must be a wealthy man, chosen because of his position in the world, and preferably serving without salary. (3) Agreed to fully. (4) Agreed to as modified by footnote 8. I question the advisability of uniform salaries for all full professors, at least until conditions shall have very considerably changed and a new body of traditions been built up. (5) Agreed to fully. Finally there is one further point I should like to mention, as I have not seen it lately discussed except from one side. This is the dictum that the university exists primarily or solely for the students (and the "people" in the ultra-modern and "efficient" universities like Wisconsin). This dictum has of late been very frequently expressed and represents, I believe, the nearly universal opinion of the, at present, constituted "authorities" of American universities, including presidents, trustees, the Carnegie Foundation, etc. This opinion I believe to be a logical outgrowth of the autocratic system of university control. It prevails, so far as my experience goes, in no other country in the world. It constitutes in its implications the most fundamental and serious menace not only to the future of our universities, but to the future intellectual development and standing of the nation. This doctrine is utterly pernicious because it completely misconceives the function of a university, which is twofold in nature. On the one hand, it is the business of a university to distribute from the existing fund of knowledge. On the other hand, an absolutely equal coordinate function of the university is to add to the existing store of knowledge. Only within a few years has there been any organized institution other than the university to perform this function, and always we must look to the university as the chief and foremost agency in this direction. It seems to me to be to the shame and disgrace of American scholars that they have allowed a system to grow up which refuses to recognize, in a real and vital sense, contribution to knowledge as an independent and coordinate function of a university. Probably nearly every college president in the land would say if asked that he "approved of research." But a
straightforward business proposal to devote one half of the total resources of a university directly and unequivocally and freely to the purpose of extending the bounds of human knowledge would produce an epidemic of presidential heart failure fearful to imagine. Such a thing is obviously out of the question in this enlightened land. But, what is not impracticable, and what I wish to emphasize, is that it be clearly recognized that in theory if not in practise the function of a university is just precisely as much to add to knowledge as to teach, and in so far as the university exists for research it exists not primarily for the students or the "people" but for the men who are doing the research. Its debt to them is no less than to the others, and if it can not be paid materially some part of it can be paid morally. Let us all never forget to insist, in season and out, that in a university research is a right and a duty, not merely an individually and dearly bought or stolen privilege.

I am heartily in sympathy with your article. In my opinion the hysterics which prompt all the universities of the country to rush per delegation to the scene of the inauguration of a new college president, as if it were to the coming of a new messiah, is little short of ludicrous. From another point of view, to see a man like President —— celebrated in oil, at the University of Berlin as the beau ideal of American scholarship, in the very halls which have witnessed the flights of genius of a von Helmholtz, Kirchhoff, Planck, Curtius, Fischer, Monsen, van’t Hoff, Ranke (to mention only a few) is similarly discouraging.

(1) I fully join in the opinion that the present form of university government could not be worse, and that American science will not attain its optimum as long as our superior schools are under the control of philistine outsiders. (2) The system of university control which you propose is extremely attractive to me in practically all its points, and I thoroughly believe that its introduction would mark the dawn of day in American scholarship. (3) It is my belief that expression of opinion alone, timidly anonymous opinion at that, will not avail much. Something should be done. Nothing could give me greater pleasure
than to help you in every possible way to extend the influence of your ideas.

I agree with it in toto. Universities, of all things human, ought to be most completely and plastically and democratically organized. Our present autocratic system is a great national calamity and discredit. It is certainly the great obstacle to free and rapid advance of research in this country. If I were appointed a university president, I would hold the office just long enough to write my resignation and organize a committee to draw up plans for a completely democratic form of university government. The plan should not admit of "dirty politics" either, and we should have all matters of salary and departmental appropriations absolutely in the open and on the square. The idea of setting a "boss" over a group of men of professorial rank is hideous. To give him the "whip hand" to the extent of, even practically, determining fitness and tenure is tantamount to public legalization of murder. The above is exactly what I think of our present system of university government. Anything that I can do to improve it will be gladly done.
X. LETTERS FROM INSTITUTIONS IN THE MIDDLE STATES

University education is and of right should be essentially aristocratic. It is the higher intellectual activity on which a true aristocracy—an aristocracy of intellect—must be based and as historical fact has been based in every civilized country of the world except this (if by courtesy this may be called a civilized country). Efficiency in government has been well proved by experience to come through the individual. The boss, the mayor, the president, the university head, are expressions of the necessity for concentration of responsibility and control in one man. Schemes of direct nominations or commission government and of faculty control are the antagonistic conceptions. The former are in accordance not so much with the American genius as with the Anglo-Saxon practise. The latter all make for division of responsibility among a people that wants to hold some one man responsible—to blame oftener than to praise, but at least to throw the burden of blame or praise on one pair of shoulders. The person outside the university looks on the job of the university president as one which ought to, if it does not, require the free use of the locust, for he sees a man surrounded by a great army of specialists each one of whom would be false to his trust if he did not regard his own as of paramount importance in the university scheme and make all conceivable demands on its behalf; and yet the president must be the miscreant who by virtue of his eminent office must hammer down these aspirations so that they may all fit into the definite policy which it may be plausibly supposed every such great institution pursues. Like Satan, a university president is by merit raised to his bad eminence, for his activities, if for the good of the university body, must often seem harsh and heartless to the individual professor. As uneasy rests the head that wears a crown, as the policeman’s life is not a happy one, so in this matter of fitting the wheels of a great university machine so that they will move
with minimum friction the university president’s career is not to be judged by the smoothness of his countenance. A board of trustees, to a university president, is and must of its essence be a body to ensure confidence in the administration of large finances, but a body to be ignored in the execution of a scholastic policy. The latter control might wisely be placed in a cabinet of advisers chosen by the president himself from his faculties. The efficiency of our constitutional government in giving the president of the United States this power has proved itself. No one would change it and it would seem a practicable and efficient scheme for university control. It would not diminish the all-important factor of one-man power and one-man responsibility. We encourage a conviction in this country that the people know what is best for them, but in practice we cast this theory aside and give the people what we believe they need. I suspect that the university community may be in the same situation. In spite of grandiose mottoes, the American university does not yet exist where any one can learn anything on any subject. Entire freedom of expression of the best results of careful thinking and research is still restrained as a concession to the great body of conventional thinkers (including most university presidents) which make up our lagging communities. The government of a university, however, should not be hurried along by experiment with revolutionary schemes. Paper devices for the immediate reform of the language, for the abolition of war or for the overturn or unwholesome acceleration of any of nature’s evolutionary processes, whether or not backed by the wealth of the untutored Cæsars, will be of uncertain value, and it would be the part of wisdom to square any suggestion of change in the policy of an American university with the slow changes in the progress of our community life.

The small college in which I teach is governed by a benevolent autocrat, to whose wise and kindly rule our prosperity is largely due. I recognize, however, that a large university has very different administrative problems from a small college, and that the various departments should have a good deal of—perhaps complete—indepedence in the management of their affairs. I
should think, however, that the head professor of a department should not be chosen by the department, but by the president or trustees. If a department should choose its head, there is the greatest danger that other considerations than the good of the department would influence—perhaps unconsciously—the choice. Thus if the department happens to be made up of mediocre men they would be apt to choose a man of their own stamp for their head, rather than a man of first-class ability. Then, too, if the department's head owed his election to his immediate colleagues, he would be apt to feel towards them quite differently from if he had obtained his place from the president or the trustees. I am not sure that the head professor ought not to have autocratic power within his department. This is the arrangement in German and Austrian universities so far as I know them. Of course a wise administrator would consult the wishes and welfare of his associates and would run his department without friction, but at the same time he would fix the policy of the department and be responsible for its success. If the government of a department is democratic there are sure to be wire-pulling and politics, jealousies and discontent—unless indeed the men composing the department are unusually harmonious.

I am coming more and more to the conclusion that no purely mechanical form of organization will overcome the influence of individual initiative and individual inertia; I mean by this that you can not circumscribe the influence of a very aggressive man, and you can not force groups of individuals to uniform activity in parallel grooves. For this reason, I am afraid that any more elaborate plan of coordination is likely to break down of its own weight. It is not merely due to my early training that I consider the Harvard plan of university control superior to those of which I have knoweldge, or even the system proposed by yourself. We have only two bodies: one compact, and, undoubtedly, effective for proper business administration; the other representative of the loyal alumni body, and, through the visiting committees, reaching out still more effectively in the direction indicated by your footnote 2. Slight modifications of the franchise might be
adopted, such as giving the professors votes, even though they be not alumni, giving a vote for each earned degree, and, possibly, providing for a certain number of faculty representatives in the board of governors. The bi-cameral system of control has worked remarkably well at Harvard and has certainly provided for very open discussion of every proposed change of policy. I totally disagree with paragraph (2); for I believe that the president should be largely an executive officer. I fully agree with paragraphs (3), (4), (5) and (6), and think that the deans should have a larger degree of autonomy than heretofore, being, in fact, the educational heads of their respective faculties, but not, by any means, as in the flagrant case of Columbia, the personal lieutenants of the president.

I believe that there is much in the plan which is desirable. I should favor some plan which would give more authority to the faculties of our universities and less to the presidents and trustees. However, I should consider it a too radical change to give the power of appointment and removal of members of the faculty entirely into the hands of the faculty. I fear that some faculties would be split into contending factions, if they tried to elect a committee which should appoint new members, and, whether this is true or not, I am sure that if the power of removal were left to the faculties it would mean either that no members would ever be removed or that there would be dissensions which would hurt the usefulness of the universities. No doubt some will say that members of a university council should never, at most very rarely, be removed. With this I can hardly agree. Personally I should be pleased to know that no matter how indolent I might become, or how vicious doctrines I might teach, I should still be sure of my salary, but it would not conduce to the welfare of a university to have either myself or others have this assurance. When a student in college I formed the idea that some universities would be improved if some professors could be led to identify their interests with some other profession than that of teaching. Things that I have seen and heard since then have convinced me that such an idea was quite correct. I believe that such changes would be more apt to be done and done prop-
erly by a somewhat autocratic president than by a faculty. The fact that plans similar to the one suggested have worked well in other countries is well worth considering, but it is far from a proof that they would be an improvement, if adopted in our own land. This is true first because the conditions here are in many ways different from those abroad and, second, because there is no way of being sure that they are the best even for foreign countries.

Taken as a whole I think this scheme of university control is good, but I am not quite up to the point of viewing the chancellor of a university as a person having no special abilities in outlining educational policy. I am used to thinking that the head of a university ought to have a very definite knowledge of its educational work and be capable of guiding and correlating this. Instead of the proposition advanced in (2) I should be rather inclined to favor creating the position of dean of the whole faculty whose position would be as much more important than that of the every-day professor as the dean of a single school is at least, and such a man if chosen by the faculty ought in any event to be persona grata to the chancellor and in a way his educational adviser or agent in correlating the work of the university. I have not been impressed with the experience of at least two southern universities which have tried out the system of a president or chairman of the faculty, whose position was regarded as no more dignified than that of a professor. Again, I am not sure that conditions, as I understand them in most universities, would make it an advisable plan to have a committee of the whole university act as a coordinate body with the executive committee of the trustees. It seems to me that in spite of a great need to have the office of the faculty made powerful in the management of the university, in the end a body like the trustees, acting through their executive, the chancellor, must have final authority. On any other basis, I am afraid that the efforts at university management would result in a degree of anarchy greater than the optimum which your plan considers to be favorable. I am afraid that my foregoing remarks will scarcely support the opinion which I have harbored that there
should be the largest possible degree of democracy in the management of a university, and that specialists in the different branches of learning should have authority in proportion to their knowledge in shaping educational policy.

With provision (1) I am in complete agreement. In provision (2) it is stipulated that the "salary [of the president] should not be larger." Since, however, the expense of maintaining the presidential position properly is necessarily considerable, and since the administrative duties are in the nature of business affairs, I believe that a salary of from one to two thousand more a year should be paid to the president. The provision (3) is of course not one about which any legislation can be made, although it represents the ideal toward which we must work. The plan proposed in (4) is of very serious moment. Owing to the fact that our largest universities are still increasing their endowment rapidly, it is probably unnecessary to give each division financial autonomy and to encourage it to increase its trust fund. On the matter of nomination by the department of the professors, I dissent strongly from the plan. Such a plan would bring about a fixed rate of promotion based entirely upon considerations of seniority, at least if the good will within the department is to be maintained. I believe that the nominations for professorships should be made by the professors in the departments. With the remainder of this provision I agree.

(1) The board of trustees should not be self-perpetuating; new members should be elected by a meeting of the trustees, faculty, and one representative from each class which has graduated. In this manner the whole university is represented by the trustees. I do not see much need for the corporation; it is a multiplication of bodies without much corresponding benefit to the university. (2) The trustees should do all the "begging" or "hustling" for money; they tend to delegate this to the president, but this is a prostitution of the duties and responsibilities of the presidency, and a delinquency on the part of the trustees. (3) The trustees and faculty together should elect a president, one who "has expert knowledge of education and of uni-
versity administration," and who spends his time in using those abilities. When a president is drawn away from this to do the work of the trustees in providing funds, the real work of the university is left without an administrative head, and scholastic chaos is apt to result, each department going its own sweet way, and all useful coordination and cooperation thrown to the winds, leaving the institution like a ship without a helmsman. (4) I agree entirely with suggestion of paragraph (3). (5) The election of professors, nominated by the unit group or school in consultation with the president and able outsiders, should be left to the joint meeting of trustees and faculty. (6) For your senate, I would substitute joint meetings of trustees and faculty, meaning by the latter the deans and executive committees of all departments. (7) Misunderstandings between faculty and trustees are frequent. If the trustees and faculty would but meet together once in a while and exchange opinions and views they would be able to work together in harmony and jointly would constitute the most effective university senate possible, for such business as electing a president or professors down to minor details of university welfare.

In the main I agree with your plan for university control. I am in hearty sympathy with all but one of its chief features. I have watched rather carefully the system of government at Princeton for over twenty years. The features in your plan which I approve are as follows: (1) The election of trustees for definite terms by a corporation consisting of alumni, professors and other officers. (2) The division of the executive office between a chancellor and a president, in much the way you outline. We have virtually been trying such an experiment for the past year at Princeton. The election of the president, or chief administrative officer, by the faculty, would ensure his proper responsibility to that body. (3) Autonomy of each department, school or similar unit in matters which do not concern other departments. (4) Recommendations for professorships by a board of advisers constituted as you suggest, with stable tenure of office for all full professors, and equal salary for equal duties. (5) A faculty senate to settle routine matters
and questions of lesser importance affecting more than one department; and a plenum to settle graver issues. My one great objection to your scheme is its reduction of the president to a mere figurehead. We have a tradition of autocratic government at Princeton extending through at least three presidencies, and many of us who have been staunch supporters of the administration share your ideal of a university democracy. But even a president elected by his colleagues and responsible to them must be clothed with authority to settle disagreements between departments in matters of academic policy, promotion and distribution of common funds; and a certain "dignity of office" is essential to the graceful acceptance of his decisions by all concerned. Furthermore, the intricate duties and manifold responsibilities attaching even to a limited presidency demand special compensation. To comment on a few minor details: (1) Except in state universities I should not favor including in the corporation "members of the community who ally themselves with it." It might degenerate into something like the colonization of doubtful districts in politics. (2) Your statement regarding electing a president by "the professors or officers, or their representatives" is not quite clear. (3) I should not favor limiting the department or unit to twenty members, although that is probably a convenient maximum in most cases. (4) Such matters as the number of courses offered by each department and the size of its teaching force concern the whole university under Princeton's theory of a well-articulated curriculum; for this reason I believe the plenum or general faculty meeting should play a much larger rôle in academic government than you indicate.

In your plan of university control, I think that paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) are very good, particularly the arrangement for a dual headship. The arrangement in (4) for appointing professors and instructors, however, seems to me hardly superior to the "department-store method." Where similar schemes have been tried, my impression is that they have worked for uniformity of promotion irrespective of excellence. The ideal scheme should aim at the most rapid possible promotion to the highest posts of the best men. We may safely trust the interests
of the average man to the well-known tendency of all institutions. The most satisfactory method of appointments of professors which I know of is that in vogue at Cambridge University, where each chair has not only a professor but also a standing committee to elect his successor. I should think that some practicable modification of this could be worked out.

The plan of university control which you have submitted seems in my opinion an exceedingly good one. The suggestion in sections (1) and (2) that there should be a chancellor and a president with entirely different functions, is an innovation that would greatly strengthen the American university. The president could then be a man selected primarily for scholastic attainment, whose interests were centered in the advancement not only of teaching, but also of learning.

Concerning your proposed scheme of university control let me say that the various articles together with the explanatory footnotes meet my views very well. I would prefer a few changes, but these, for the most part, would be minor. If the president is elected from the faculty and possesses the required abilities for such an office in addition to his abilities as a professor I should not object to having him receive more salary while holding the office. I do not think, however, that it should be two or three times as much as the professors get, as is the case now. Neither should I object to the position being considered rather more dignified than that of the professor. I am not sure about some of the other points such as the separate endowments for the divisions, but as said before these are minor matters perhaps.

I was at one time a member of a faculty which was of itself all-powerful, and yet was absolutely non-progressive. It seems to me that, in general, the more or less complete independence of the individual departments makes for efficiency. I have often thought that the German system of having a central business management with an annually elected Rector magnificus of the professorial body to represent the university at state functions, was a plan which might well be adopted in this country. Noth-
ing can be worse for a university than the development of its president into an autocrat, when such autocracy is accompanied by a feeling of materialism which comes through pride in material accomplishments and association by preference with people who can afford the means for the development of material accomplishments.

Your outline of university control I believe to be desirable in the main. What we need is a scheme of organization which will preserve the best in our system of executive administration and eliminate the worst. I would not abolish the presidency, but would greatly curtail its powers in matters of appointment and appropriations. Most presidents, I fancy, would welcome this change.

In a general way I approve of the proposal as a whole, but feel that many matters of detail should be worked out.

In a general way the suggestions meet my views and you are at liberty to quote me as being generally in favor of it.

In your article on university control, I quite approve of what is said. I really see no reason for making any anti-critique or special commentary.

I have always been very strongly in sympathy with such anti-autocratic sentiments as you have expressed in that article and elsewhere. From my own experience in one institution, I am led to believe that the head of a department is capable of being quite as autocratic, within his own sphere, as is the president himself. Indeed, the evils attendant on such a situation had much to do with my giving up teaching some years ago. But your scheme covers intra-departmental organization, as well as the organization of the university as a whole. I should like to hope that it would be put into effect within a finite period of time. But is not the trend of great organizations to be autocratic, or at least anti-individualistic, as witness the "trusts," and the government departments here in Washington?
The plan of university control which you sent to me meets my approval so far as it goes, because it embodies the great features of the control of the English universities and those of at least one of our own great universities, and does not contain any feature which may not be adopted by any university in our country without introducing disturbing factors. I think that so far as our corporations can bring themselves to arrange the responsibilities which now devolve upon them so as to allow the operation of the plan which you propose to come into operation, so far they will advance the cause of higher education and research.

Your scheme for "University Control" appeals to me very much. It is quite a difficult question and since most institutions, as you say, have gone through a developmental period while others are under state control or denominational control, only a gradual change can be expected. It takes a broad-minded man to be a trustee. Many alumni prove wonderfully successful, while I have, alas, seen cases where much mischief was wrought by whole-hearted alumni who were unequal to the duties reposed in them. Recently a banquet was given to Professor H. E. Armstrong in London. In his speech he said the following:

"Teachers are now threatened with interference in all sorts of ways. The success of our college, I am sure, is due to the fact that we were trusted with its entire management on the educational side. The institute has exercised financial control, and all our proceedings have been regularly reported to it—but we have been left alone to do the work. My good friend Mr. Blair told us last September, in a most valuable paper 'On the Relation of Science to Industry and Commerce,' which he gave to the British Association, that the management of all technical institutions and departments of applied science should be put on a business footing. The chief need, he said, was that of a consultative committee composed of industrial or commercial leaders or experts of the highest reputation. I would suggest to Mr. Blair that he undertake an inquiry similar to that which he made into technical education into the ways of business men and manufacturers; as a result, he will find it desirable, I think, to propose
the formation of consultative committees of teachers to advise
the business men. When the two kinds of committees come
together if they are composed of sensible men, probably there
will be agreement that it is best for each party to look after its
own business."

It is a general opinion that a professorial position is secure
against the vicissitudes of business, that while the salaries may
be low there is a guarantee of permanence which compensates
for the lesser revenue. From a wide experience both in institu-
tions with which I have been connected in the past and from
watching this question as found in other schools I deem this view
unsound. I have known of professors deprived of their pro-
fessorships practically overnight by some sudden changes in the
policy of an institution, and I have known indeed whole faculties
at odds with governing bodies. Under such circumstances we
can not expect men of exceptional talent to enter university or
college life unless a revision is made in existing methods of
governing and conducting our educational institutions.

Although my experience in universities in the official capacity
of professor is very limited, I am, because of this experience, in
sympathy with the critics of the present method of the conduct
of the universities. Some of the diagnoses appear to me to be
correct, but as far as I am aware the therapeutics have been
faulty. There is not one disease, but many, in the universities,
and there is not one remedy that can be applied for the amelio-
ration of the conditions, but many drastic drugs must be used.
There can be no doubt that the control of the university should
not be in the form of a complete democracy; it must be more of
an oligarchy, the individuals making up this controlling party
being those best fitted by education, interests, etc., to have in
mind the interests of and to legislate for the university as a
whole. Since, however, there are many special interests to be
kept in mind by a university, it would appear wise to have these
various interests represented in the corporation and in the scheme
of conduct of the university as a whole. The professor is not
all-wise, even in his own special field, and it is my belief that if
professors made up a large proportion of the trustees, there would
result more anarchy than exists at present. University politics would replace university policies, and without a guiding hand, however unskillful, wreck would surely ensue. The interests of the university are too varied to be divided absolutely into separate fields, but the educational and the financial may be taken to be those with which the community are chiefly concerned. I believe these two parts of the administration of a university may be separated with success and to the great advantage of the community and the teaching body in the university. The corporation should be made up of the members of the community, the city or state or country, or those who from previous connection have the welfare of the institution at heart. In other words, those individuals who contribute to the welfare of the institution should be the corporation. The professor should be a part of this corporation, not as a professor but as any other individual. Trustees should be elected by this corporation. These trustees should represent the bodily or material university to the public, they should have care of the financial interests, the care of the property, etc. In addition to this body (which should have the main function of determining how much money should be expended, whether or not the university finances warrant the building of new buildings, the remodeling of old, etc.) there should be a legislative body whose main concern is that of education and the representation of the educational work of the university to the community. It is obvious that this second body should be composed of the professors and other instructors, those who have knowledge of educational matters, not in the sense of pedagogical, and who are most competent in their special fields to represent this interest before the community. This body should also be elective, but elections should be for short terms, two or three years without the possibility of immediate reelection, so that the professional office-holder would not result. To this body the function of passing upon all matters of educational policy, of financial administration as applied to the departments, and of electing professors and instructors would adhere. Election to this body should be by the faculties or divisions, etc. If these two bodies are called "trustees" and "council" respectively, we should say the trustees would represent the university in its
general financial relations, the council would represent the university in its educational relations. Neither should be subordinate to the other, but each should have its own distinctive function. The officers of these two bodies may be designated as appears best, whether president, chancellor, rector, or other terms, would make little difference, provided the functions of these officers were solely those of presiding, as they should be. If it becomes necessary that an officer of one of these bodies be delegated to perform certain functions in relation to the community, these officers should be appointees of each body, separately and then jointly. If a financial agent were needed by the trustees, that would be an office to fill; if a man to represent the learning of the university were needed by the council such a man should be selected by that body, but should have that place, either for the particular occasion, or for a period of time, or for life, as seemed wise. This arrangement would abolish the present anomalous position of president, who has often had no qualifications other than that he has been a successful or an unsuccessful preacher, or even that he happens to be an officer retired from the service of the government and has sufficient time on his hands to give to the institution without pay. With the third and fourth sections the writer is in general accord. I believe, however, that if vacancies or new positions were open to competition of a dignified nature and not to be filled by direct recommendation of president or professor without competition the university would benefit. I am not aware of a university in this country to which a man, dissatisfied for any reason with his present position, may apply for a vacancy, except in the lowest grades, without injuring his chances of election. All that can be done is to use personal friendship to have one’s name attracted to the presiding and electing bodies. The present scheme works, therefore, towards the creation of friendship cliques, and of bossism because of this. Much good would result from the creation in the university of visiting boards for each department of five or ten instructors and professors, such boards to be constituted of specialists in the same departmental line who would act as advisers on numerous matters of appointments, of departmental increases, etc., and whose verdict would have no earmarks of
favoritism. Such a board would be of assistance to the council in estimating the financial needs of a department as well as its educational needs, and the university would benefit in many other ways. It must be understood that such boards can not perform their functions in a proper way if they visit the university in a routine and perfunctory manner. Each board must have the interests of the special subject at heart, and be willing to give the advice best suited to the occasion. If the selection of these boards be left to the head professors in each department or be due to his nomination, little or no value may be expected of them. The selection of such a board should be left to the council, after the submission of ten to twenty names of specialists by the department, with specifications of their work and abilities. Boards of three to five members, each of whom is paid traveling expenses or an equivalent, would probably be of as great value in the selection of instructors, lecturers and other officers as well as in helping to make known the wants and needs of the department. Were some scheme like this carried out, it would probably result in the making of departments rounded, rather than lopsided because of the individual preferences and research lines of the head of a department, as is so often the case at present. There would also result an advantage to the good, capable instructor, who at present is sometimes in the subordinate position because the head of the department has little sympathy with this instructor’s research, since it is not closely identified with his own. I have no suggestion to offer which appears to me to be better than that regarding the automaticity of salary increase. I do not feel, however, that such an automatic increase would help any but the time servers, unless degrees of inefficiency were taken as methods of retarding this advance. Too often we find a man elected to a professorship, who gives up advancing and the performance of advanced work once the position has been secured. The tenure should be for life, it is true, but the teaching of students for a few hours each week should not be counted sufficient for routine advance when we consider that some of these men spend most of the time not occupied with classes on the golf-field, etc. The writer has been in an institution from which good men were permitted to go to other institutions because the
time had not come for the automatically set financial advance, and because it would have been extra-routine to give more salary to the ones who had not served the full time that others had served. Salary advances are not the only ones to be taken into account. To many a man the giving of an extra assistant is of much greater value, and should be given fuller consideration in any change in the conduct of the university. With (5) and the accompanying note (9) I am in full accord.

Reforms of any kind should not be instituted suddenly, and a reform can not take place suddenly, but I am of the opinion the naturally slow motion of university bodies will be an automatic check on too rapid change. I therefore think that the attempt to reform, however fast it may be, will do no harm. You need not worry about the evolution being too rapid. I do not feel competent to answer proposition (1). I agree most heartily to any change which puts an end to the conditions mentioned in the latter part of note (3). I believe the professors or officers should have a large say-so in the election of their president. I think though that necessarily his position will seem more dignified than that of the professor. (3) seems to me to be extremely desirable. The interrelation between the various courses of studies, loss of time due to overlapping or repetition of the same subjects, demands an understanding by the teaching staff in any specified department and an intelligent and responsible carrying out of the mutually agreed upon policies. It seems to me that this arrangement demands a very close connection between related departments such as mathematics and physics, physics and chemistry, etc. I notice that the wording of (3) includes such a suggestion. (4) I agree with in every particular. Footnote (8) is of the greatest importance. New men should be given to understand that they are on approval until the department is satisfied with their personalities and competence. I do not see any pleasant way of solving the condition necessitating dismissal, but in my opinion the weaknesses of our profession are mostly due to the retention of men lacking ability and character at this point. On the other hand, the ability and character of a worthy man should be quickly recognized and adequately com-
pensated by promotion and salary. The present conditions in
general discourage the good man and treat the unworthy one too
well. Another point of importance is the burden of administra-
tive and purely clerical work borne by the teaching staff. I do
not feel that I exaggerate in saying that teaching efficiency would
be certainly more than doubled if the teachers could be relieved
of purely clerical work. Why should a professor of Greek be an
enrolling officer, or a professor of mathematics be in charge of
the book department? It seems to me that there is a woful lack
of true efficiency in the usual arrangements in institutions of
learning. "There should be as much flexibility and as complete
anarchy throughout the university as is consistent with unity
and order." Perfect.

I think you have decidedly the right idea in this matter of uni-
versity control. Recently our various alumni clubs have been
discussing engineering-school curricula. I have attended every
one of these special club meetings, and am more than ever im-
pressed with the idea that good would come from an increased
participation of our alumni in the government of the institution.
I am therefore strongly in favor of the suggestion you make in
section (1) of your reprint. For several years the entire staff
of our department has had weekly meetings; every one expresses
his opinion without any hesitation and the common judgment of
the entire staff determines the policy of the department. Every
other department here is under the autocratic control of the
department head. This system has resulted in making our gen-
eral faculty meetings almost absolutely sterile. I, therefore,
believe that you are right in section (3) of your reprint.
Authority in educational matters is the worst thing possible as
it seems to me.

I think your scheme embodies most of the features of what it
has seemed to me desirable to evolve towards. I certainly think
that the autocratic president with practically absolute control is
a very undesirable thing to have in a really developed university.
It would take a long time to discuss a scheme like this with
reasonable fulness, so I shall not go into the matter generally.
With reference to one point, however, I think your scheme for appointing professors would be improved if the matter were left entirely to what you call the board of advisers in paragraph (4). I should not let the department nominate the candidates. I think in that way very often a department's own ideas of what is desirable in this way is apt to be what is least good for it. Any power of such appointment by the department is very apt to make weak departments stay weak or become weaker. I think the department is sufficiently represented if it forms one third of the board of electors.

I have long felt that a system of administration has grown up in this country that is now not well suited to the present conditions that surround our educational institutions. It seems to me that the present head is handicapped in many ways and an institution is very fortunate if it has an executive officer that is able to do well. So much is demanded of him along certain lines and so little in others that the man who approaches the nearest to the ideal leader is the least likely to secure the appointment or to wish it. In other words, the fault I have to find is not so much with the presidents as the method of their choice and the duties that are laid upon their shoulders. Of course, my look is from the view-point of the professor, but, after bearing that title for more than a quarter of a century, it seems to me that the plan you offer is one that should appeal to every one—trustee, president and teacher alike—as a possible way out of a dilemma that is growing more serious from year to year. In this land of the people it would be more in accord with the national spirit to have our higher educational institutions with their whole head and front faced toward the rising sun of a highly intelligent well-grounded democracy.

Your plan of "University Control" I have read several times and I find nothing to criticize. It is a logical and practical plan which recognizes existing conditions and proposes only reasonable modifications. Its application would seem to be not difficult, and very desirable. The plan in sections (3) and (4) does not apply so readily to the college or smaller institutions, but the
important parts of the plan are fully applicable. It might be well, in section (2), to specify somewhat the duties of president, since that office is the point of present friction; and since the chancellor is the new official, to differentiate his duties from that of the president. A little elaboration here will be helpful and prevent many questions.

I like very much, in a general way, the plan of university control which you propose. Our universities differ so much in plan and growth that what would be applicable to one could hardly be applicable to all. But the development from college to university has been rapid and it is full time the college faculties were given both more autonomy and more power in the administration. The danger of autocratic control is not overstated and has often led to very serious trouble. It is very desirable that the president of a university, if there be one, should be in touch and have the full approval of the college faculty. I think that one result of such a plan as you suggest would be a more gradual development, and the new schools taken into the university would be better assimilated. The trustees in my judgment now have entirely too much control, many members of the board being selected entirely for financial reasons. This has been greatly modified, however, of late years by the practise of electing new trustees from among the alumni. I am in favor of very careful selection of college professors by the faculties, with the assistance and advice of selected alumni; life tenure for the college professor with removal for cause by his colleagues; a president responsible to the university, and a chancellor or other presiding officer to look after the business matters of the university. I don't suppose any system that can be devised will even approach perfection, but we have outgrown the college president in a great many of the old colleges which are really universities in all but the name.

I am heartily in accord with your suggestions, excepting only some detail in number (5); but that is unimportant for the principle is wholly right. The only objection to the suggestion of joint committees is that men can not be secured who will do
the work required of trustees. The reply to the objection is that men unwilling or unable to devote the necessary time to familiarize themselves with the work should not be elected to boards of trustees. No self-perpetuating board of trustees will remain efficient—the there must be the sense of responsibility to some authority outside. This is especially true of college trustees, for as the boards are constituted a large proportion of the members are unfamiliar with the work which they are supposed to supervise. The college or university should be a republic, not an autocracy. The president should not be loaded down, even if he so desire, with details—he ought to have more time to prepare the public addresses which compose so great a part of his duty. The faculties should select their own officers and nominate candidates to fill vacancies in their number—all subject, of course, to confirmation by the trustees. The faculties should be directly responsible to the trustees, who should be required to make themselves familiar with the work which the professors do.

Your proposed method of university control has much to commend it and in general has my cordial approval. It is so obviously superior to the prevalent system of presidential autocracy that almost everyone who has seriously studied the problem can heartily wish it practical experimental test. It seems to me that one thing much needed along reform lines is representative democracy. There should be some method by which any professor might have open access to trustees, regents or governing board; a fair opportunity for the development of his professional manhood, self-respect and efficiency. Under existing conditions of an absentee governing board, and autocratic administrative head responsible only to said board, these rights are checked and repressed at every point, and a truculent, adulent spirit encouraged by various bribes of favoritism or conciliation. It is of small effect to establish "foundations to encourage teaching" so long as a system is tolerated which strikes at the root of self-respecting manhood and scholarly freedom. It is to be hoped that by healthy agitation along the lines you propose there may result a real evolution in university control which shall conserve the ends above suggested.
XI. LETTERS FROM COLLEGES FOR WOMEN

My experience with a college faculty is such that I am obliged to believe that the less work of administrative character entrusted to persons actively engaged in teaching, the better. I do not know any more impracticable set of people than are brought together in a college faculty, and I have come to regard our American system in which an almost autocratic control is vested in the president in all administrative matters as the best under the circumstances. It is not an ideal arrangement, but is the lesser evil.

If there is to be a president in the plan of university control, he should, it seems to me, be given scope for the exercise of expert knowledge of education and university administration, otherwise there will be no inducement for a man possessing such qualifications to accept the office. If the president were a member of the board of advisers, replacing one of the two professors from related departments, the general interests of the university would have a hearing. I am a little dubious about the wisdom of admitting two experts from the outside to this board. The plan deserves a trial and certainly avoids many of the present evils.

Your reprint on university control contains suggestions that look promising in view of the present dearth of men qualified to be university presidents of the type now standard. But it presupposes competent trustees and deans. It seems to me that it would work better for small institutions than for large ones at present: between our larger universities the rivalries are too keen for a pure democracy to conduct, and a president or a mikado as central executive and schemer is indispensable. Paragraph (1). The scheme is ideal (i.e., admirable) but lacks apparently any reciprocal control or check as between business members and academic members. Paragraph (2). This "president" is a "dean"; he ought to have a larger salary because he must bear more trivial annoyances and must forego more of the
pursuits that are attractive to scholars than the other professors. Paragraphs (3) and (5). These indicate practices now more or less prevalent, and point out well the size of convenient divisions. Paragraph (4). This section I approve in toto. It is workable, however, only at a stage well advanced in the evolution of a strong institution, where the professors are competent and public-spirited. For institutions burdened with incompetence or with graft, the prescription should be a chancellor with autocratic powers, for the reasons stated by Sir William Hamilton in his report on German universities.

I wholly approve the principle and many of the details of the plan of university control proposed in your paper. My greatest question is whether general matters—e.g., curriculum, dormitory and commons administration in a residential university—would receive sufficient attention on a plan with such emphasis on the division or department unit. But the proper development of the senate might secure this.

What I especially like about this or any similar scheme is that it involves the rescue of the professor from the position of a mere "hand" in the university machinery and the placing of him in such a relation that he is made to bear and to feel his share in the welfare of the entire institution. Instead of being made to feel a sort of truckling dependence upon the "powers," his own independent dignity and self-respect will be aroused and enhanced. Having his part in the responsibility for the whole, he is to that extent responsible for the status of his own position. I agree entirely with the statement of the circular, that the establishing of this plan must be the outcome of a slowly evolving change.

Your suggested plan of university control seems to me admirable and calculated to obviate many of the evils of the present system, which are very grave. The only criticism that occurred to me as I read it concerns the method of nominating professors. I am not sure whether a department can be trusted to nominate its own professors, even although approval and final election are
by bodies containing members chosen from outside the department. It is so often to the private interests of the members of a department to choose a colleague of mediocre ability. And if the nominating were done wholly by the department the merely negative influence of the board of advisers might not be sufficient to secure the best men.

I am heartily in agreement with you on the need of reorganizing our universities and also on most of the suggestions you offer. Decentralization appears to me necessary; and the creation of a chancellor elected by a corporation representing the community, the alumni and the teaching body; of a president elected by the professors or their representatives; and, further, the granting of certain powers to university departments—all seem to me measures that would go far towards correcting the evils of the present autocratic system of government. I notice with satisfaction that you give a share in the nomination of professors to outside experts and to professors of other university departments than the one to which the nominees belong.

The present methods in common use for managing institutions in this country are quite as complete a failure as our city governments. Without going back to the slovenly rawness of American life in general as the real basis, we may say that the piddling incompetence of faculties is responsible for the prominence of such damned scoundrels as — and —. — is another one that ought to be in jail. Harvard hasn't been run that way—it couldn't be because the faculty is too good. Eliot never bossed; he persuaded and it took him years to do it sometimes. The one thing most needed is to adopt the English system of appointing professors and so stop the inbreeding which is the bane of all our universities. Your scheme looks all right but the scheme is not important. Get good men on the faculty and the president won't have the mental and moral force to do any harm. In closing these somewhat sketchy remarks—which I hardly think you will care to quote in full!—I may say that I may be quite wrong about the unimportance of the machinery and that if you are willing to take the trouble to try to suggest practical and practicable improvements you have my hearty sympathy.
XII. LETTERS FROM INSTITUTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES

Taking the suggestions up one by one, I would say under the first heading that in the case of state universities it is very unlikely that any state would consent to give up the direct control of the institution which it supports, nor do I think that the state should give up such control. This means the election of the majority, at least, of trustees directly by the representatives of the people. Secondly, I see no possibility whatever of dividing the duties of the president between one who shall represent the university in its outer relations and one who shall take care of all of its internal affairs. The first one would be a mere figurehead and could easily be dispensed with, or, if he were a strong man and declined to be set aside, there would be increasing conflict and trouble. Again, as to the president who is to be elected by the professors or their representatives, my experience of more than thirty years would make me think that the mode of election is unwise, and I am quite sure that no one who has a satisfactory position as a professor would consent to take the office of the so-called "president" under the conditions mentioned. The only possible reasons for a professor's laying down the work of teacher and taking up that of an executive are that there must be greater dignity or greater power for service or greater salary attached. One or all of these motives must move him; otherwise the sacrifice is too great. Thirdly, as to the divisions of the university, I think that any large organization naturally falls into such divisions. The mode of appointment or electing the heads of the divisions suggested by you might prove under some circumstances a wise mode, but either the election of these officers by their colleagues or the appointment by the executive can lead to great and serious abuse. Neither method is perfect.

I do not believe that you, or any one else for that matter, have reached a remedy for the situation which has gradually
arisen in the American university. In our democratic form of government we have a condition of things which is just as intolerable. Our city governments are controlled in the greater number of instances by ignorant and corrupt political bosses; our states by political machines which in no wise represent the will of the people; and, in my opinion, the president of the United States has become, within his own party at least, as veritable a tyrant as any monarch of whom we read in history, except, of course, as concerns the power over the life and death of the citizen. We are a tax-ridden people, and I have no doubt that we pay considerably more for the necessities of life than any civilized people on the globe. It seems to me therefore that if democracy has failed in the affairs of the nation it is just as apt to fail in the life of the university, and in those few instances in which the president of the university has been elected from and by the faculty I fail to see that it has contributed anything of material importance to the development of the university, while it may have contributed to the general peace of mind of individual members of the faculty. In order to have unity and order and gradual development in our university life, we have to have a head or heads of things to whom we can look for the formulation and proper carrying out of such plans as will contribute to progress and unity and order within the university. Now the unfortunate element in the situation is that just as soon as this head or these heads are appointed they at once begin to arrogate to themselves authority and privileges which originally were never intended, and there is no one to say them nay. In the American universities it is not always the president that makes for autocracy—sometimes it is an inordinately ambitious dean, or a head professor who feels called upon to play to the grandstand. As I see it, one of the great evils of the situation is that we have delegated to the president of the university entirely too much authority, and we have come to expect of him entirely too much. We expect the president of the university to raise funds for the university, and naturally he feels that he alone should control their expenditure. He practically appoints the faculty, and naturally he insists upon the unqualified support by individual members thereof, and he has become intolerant of faculty
criticism even to the remotest degree. He is often the sole representative of the university upon public occasions and he has become practically the sole recipient of university honors. In other words, he has tended to magnify and exalt what is called executive ability far above scholarly attainment and productive scholarship. The measure of a man's usefulness in the world, even in the scholastic walks of life, has come to be measured by the number of his women stenographers and by the bulk of his mail. In all these relations we have tended to make of the president of the American university a sort of great "I am," and it can scarcely be wondered at that in the course of time he comes to share the same opinion. I have come to think, therefore, that it might be well to make a division of the duties that have gradually fallen to the lot of the president of the American university. Put the getting of money and gifts in the hands of one man. Put all matters pertaining to expenditures in the hands of a good business man. Put the appointment of professors and instructors in the hands of the university senate, composed of all the professors. Put the matter of student attendance in the hands of the registrar and the heads of departments, and put the administration of the internal affairs of the university in the hands of an administrative council consisting of the president and the deans of the university. In other words, what I think should be aimed at is a distribution of authority and in all matters of university policy and administration a consensus of the opinion of many open and independent minds. This is certainly not the case at present, nor will it become so by any mere variation in the mode of securing the appointment or election of president.

I believe that I am in sympathy with the general trend of the opinions expressed in your paper on university control. May I take up seriatim what seem to me some of the most important points? (1) Method of appointing trustees. You propose a corporation to elect trustees. I incline to believe that a corporation composed of alumni should indirectly elect a percentage of the trustees. The remaining and greater part of the body should in my opinion be self-perpetuating or (in tax-supported institu-
tions) be elected indirectly by the people. What is needed is a stable board, the members of which recognize the responsibility and honor of the position and remain open to influences of a non-personal nature. (2) Powers of the trustees. Your scheme leaves the trustees with so little power that proper men would scarcely care for the office. The election of faculty members and the creation of new chairs or unit-departments together with the drawing up of the budget of expense should, I think, still remain in the hands of the trustees—who in a general way play the part of the national government in the affairs of the German universities. (3) Your idea of the division of the university into unit-departments is something I approve of. The financial autonomy which you propose I scarcely think desirable. (4) Nomination and election of professors. Your plan for the nomination of professors by the unit-department is good. I do not think your advisory board is necessary. The university senate should pass upon the nominations, selecting two or three, and recommend them in order of preference to the trustees. (5) University senate. I agree with you that such a body is most desirable. Probably the members would best be elected by the unit-departments as you suggest. At any rate, each unit-department should be represented and the representatives should not be appointed by the president. Such a body would make all the important recommendations to the trustees, such as the creation of chairs or unit-departments with statements of the expense involved. Minority reports should be regarded as proper. It should be understood that the qualifications which fit a man for the routine duties of a deanship do not of necessity fit him for a seat in the senate. (6) President. I think with you in some points regarding this office. The faculty should participate in filling the office, possibly making nominations to be passed upon by the senate, the final election being by the trustees. The office should, I think, be better paid than the best professorship. The president should be the presiding officer of the senate, and his opinion or vote should carry extra weight. He should be the sort of man capable of carrying on the routine executive duties well, and one who would help to maintain in the university senate an interest and enthusiasm for the whole university leading to cooperative effort.
Where the university can afford to provide for ex-presidents, it would probably be well to make the appointment for a limited period, as you suggest, say for ten years. This would be a further factor, acting along with the influence of the senate, toward building up and steadily maintaining a set of guiding traditions on the importance of which you justly lay weight. At present the change in the office of president is too much of a crisis in the life of the university. (7) I agree with you that professorships should be life appointments with a possibility of removal after trial before the trustees; that the pay should be fixed with an automatic increment for all offices. Appointments below the professorship might well be made for a period. There should be no automatic promotion. (8) You make the point that the introduction of business by members of the faculty should be better provided for than it is at present. I think that you here touch upon a weak spot in American institutions. Members of the faculty, whether or not members of the senate, should be encouraged to introduce propositions to that body, through the president or otherwise.

Here I see enough of the evils of autocracy. I doubt very much if it would be possible to create a body like the "senate" of an English university consisting of all alumni who are willing to pay a small annual fee to "keep their names on the books." This you seem to have in mind in your first paragraph and note. Like many institutions in the old countries, founded on immemorial custom, it seems to work fairly well, but probably would not bear transplanting.

It is much better than the present prevailing plan. The proposal to make it work out by gradual evolution is especially good. I do not know how the ultimate committees, those of the senate and of the trustees, would work together, but however much they might disagree, the teaching body would be heard in public. I think, however, that your efforts will be in vain, as the forces now in control are too strongly entrenched.

(1) I like the democratic feature of the plan. The present method is extremely autocratic and not suited to a modern intel-
ligent democracy. (2) This is certainly a radical measure. You will be accused of having no "historical sense" or some such failing; of grafting a foreign system on an American institution. I have always been heartily in favor of your proposal; a poor hard-working scholar would be spared many a humiliation. It was the head of one of our greatest technical institutions (founded by the munificence of a steel-ribbed financial Goliath) who remarked to me: "Well, I hear that you do research work in mathematics; of course, we don't object to it," etc.—clearly hinting that they would connive at and ignore my bad habit in case I should become a member of his faculty, which I did not. (3) and (4) The "impeachment after trial" feature seems to me unnecessary and even harmful, when we take into consideration the wide-spread love of sensationalism in our country (e. g., our heresy-trials). The same body that elects might also be relied on to remove undesirable members by the force of such public opinion as will find its expression within the faculty. However, this is a minor point. I would suggest that a vacant position ought to be advertised in one or more professional periodicals. (9—footnote) Very good! Here the men who do so-called administrative work get the promotions in the way of salaries—they are the "prominent" men. If you do research work as well as teach you are looked upon as a curiosity; they don't quite know where to place you.

To the underlying principle, and to certain of the details, I heartily assent. If the two institutions with which I have been associated during the past fifteen years represent the general condition of affairs in the United States, we certainly need some method of organization which will bring some dignity to the office of professor and of the university teacher of lower rank.

While I do not agree absolutely with all the details—probably no two men would so completely agree, and some of your suggestions are alternative in form—the main ideas put forward seem to me excellent. I think one or two little additions or amplifications might be made with possible advantage. Especially is it desirable, I think, that in any system of government
there should be at every point well-fixed responsibility, admitting of no juggling or evasion. One of the worst evils of the presidential plan is often to be found in the president's nominally submitting to a faculty for discussion or vote a policy or proposed change of method when in reality the faculty contains so many of the younger men—assistant professors or even full professors—who have been appointed in name or in fact by the president, that they enquire only as to what he favors and vote blindly for that, though the result is given out as independent endorsement of the scheme in question.

I believe that I approve heartily of all that you say except as to paragraph 2. Perhaps I confuse the duties of chancellor and of president. But I take it that the time of the president will be largely taken up with the larger affairs of administration. Presumably he is a highly educated man—particularly interested in some one line. He is called upon to sacrifice his private interest in his work and to some extent his hope of advancement and reputation in his chosen line. I think the office might therefore be regarded as one of particular honor and deserving of increased pay. I do not see why giving either should affect adversely any desirable relation between the president and the faculty. If the president is elected to serve but one year increased pay might not be so necessary, but I think there would be some sacrifices in the efficiency of the office. I very much wish that you would enlarge the scheme so as to lay down certain general principles that could safely serve as a guide to other and smaller institutions. Such general principles might include such of the following as survived critical examination. (1) The number of trustees should be so limited that each might feel a large and distinct share of personal responsibility for the conduct of the institution (82, as at the University of North Carolina, is manifestly too large a body). (2) Some of the trustees should be elected by recent graduates from among their number. (Thus in a body of 15 trustees, each class upon graduation might elect one trustee to serve for three years. Perhaps a fourth could be elected for one year by alumni 3 to 6 years out of college.) The idea is to keep the trustees closely in touch with the students' points of
view of the institution, its professors, and its policies—a point of
view that I believe is always worth knowing and very often worth
heeding. If the recent graduates did not measure up to the
responsibility thus placed upon them—that fact alone should
prove a useful hint that the institution is failing to train students
properly for the affairs of life. (3) A pretty clearly defined dis-
tinction should be drawn between the temporary and the perma-
nent part of the teaching force. The minimum salary given to
any permanent member of the teaching force has a great influence
in determining the spirit of the institution, and this minimum
salary should always be sufficient to enable a man and his family
to live in accordance with the demands of the situation. Assist-
ants, instructors and others in the “trying out” period should
not be encouraged to remain indefinitely in these positions. If
it is not possible that these men, when they have proved them-
selves worthy, can become a permanent part of the institution at
a livable salary for themselves and family they should be encour-
aged to leave. (4) Every member of the permanent part of the
teaching force should have a share in determining the general
policy of the institution and should feel to some extent respon-
sible for the spirit and policy of the institution. Important
changes in policy should be passed upon by both faculty and
trustees. (5) The president should carry out the policy of the
institution as determined by faculty and trustees. He should
not be regarded as, and should never become, the sole go-between
between the faculty and trustees. This function should be per-
formed by committees subject to the control of the respective
bodies. (6) All important university committees should be
elected by the faculty or by the representatives of the various
faculties. (7) In nominations and promotions for permanent
positions the following are interested parties: First, all the per-
manent force of the department concerned. Second, the closely
related departments. Third, the university faculty as a whole.
Fourth, the president. Fifth, the trustees. The actual power of
nomination and promotion should be in the hands of a committee
suitably representing the interested parties, their action to be
subject to review by the board of trustees. In electing a presi-
dent the university faculty and the board of trustees are the
interested parties. (8) Changes in salary should be automatic, so far as possible, but some provision should be made allowing occasional exceptions to be made. There is nothing new in any of the above suggestions and doubtless they are somewhat crude and are certainly incomplete. But I believe some careful outline of the principles which should underlie a democratic university control would be helpful.

I agree with you as to the general policy suggested in your letter. The subject is a most difficult one and many-sided. At one time, when every detail of the administration was in the hands of the faculty as a whole, we were constantly inconsistent, passing laws at one meeting and repealing or changing them at another, so that I felt convinced that the whole management should be in the hands of one man, viz., the president, assuming of course that he would be an ideal head and that the advice of members of the faculty, especially on all the points concerning each department, would be constantly sought by him. But you know an ideal man is a rara avis, and I have modified my views very materially. For a small institution like ours, I think the president should be at the head, but I think it would be a wise thing to have provision made for the members of the faculty having a voice in all matters concerning election of professors and instructors, and most particularly as regards each man having equal vote with the president concerning instructors and all changes in his own department. Of course, with an ideal president all that would go without saying. Then again I have seen how an occasion might arise when the faculty, as distinguished from the president, should have a legitimate way of presenting their views on any question directly to the trustees. This would, of course, be possible even with an autocratic president, provided the members of the faculty could be induced to take any position, seemingly, even, antagonistic to the president. But you know how that is, where members of the faculty are at the mercy of the president.

The following, in my opinion, are the great needs of the university: (1) Academic freedom. (2) The segregation of the
financial work of the university from its academic work. (3) An academic senate, which will have complete control of the academic work and in which every member of the university, including its students, could have a voice. The votes in the academic senate should be graded. Say a full professor would have five votes, an assistant professor three votes, the lecturer two votes and the instructor one vote. The student senate should be a separate house and to this lower body should be delegated all matters connected with the discipline, subject to the veto or modification of the academic senate. The chancellor, or president, of the university should be an honorary officer and he should be chosen annually. The students should not so much go to universities, as they should go to Professor A, or Professor B. When I am asked where I studied in Germany I do not reply at the University of Berlin, but I say I studied with Hoffman, Helmholtz, Virchow. (4) The university should be free from the influence of endowments, money or greed. This is accomplished by the separation of the financial from the academic functions. The financial authorities should grant every year an annual budget and the academic authorities should distribute this grant, fixing the salaries of every one of the teaching force, these salaries being subject to annual fluctuations. With state institutions, the financial matters, of course, would rest with the state, as they do at the present time, but the state should not interfere with academic functions. Above all the university should be free from the scandals of the last few years which have presented dozens of spectacles of their professors defending flagrant violators of the law in the criminal courts and supporting under oath offenses against good morals and the peace and dignity of the country. (5) The autocracy and tyranny of the present system of ruling universities is contrary to every principle of academic freedom and sense of right and justice. I can not go into detail in regard to matters of administration, but I think I have given you pretty fully the basis of my own conception.

The evil of presidential autocracy is naturally most conspicuous in large institutions, like Columbia, where homogeneity is impossible, and where personal acquaintance among the different
members of the teaching corps is much restricted. Even in small institutions like that with which I am connected, having about 600 students, it becomes natural for the president to develop into a political boss, regarding athletics as of more practical importance than science or literature, taking pride almost exclusively in numerical growth, and caring nothing for scholastic standards. No single plan of reform can be generally applied, but each separate institution has to grapple with its local problems, without help from outside. Your plan of university control, as soon as I read it in 1906, had my hearty sympathy, so far as its aims are concerned; but some of its features I do not expect ever to see carried out, whatever may be the developments after the natural close of my life. As to their advisability, except in relation to colleges rather than great universities, I am unable to offer any opinion, because my experience has been limited to small institutions in which research has held only a subordinate place and good teaching has been of prime importance. What I write therefore has to be taken with due recognition of my lack of direct familiarity with the evils that have grown up in the great universities. (1) I should not favor the formation of a corporation consisting of the professors, alumni and members of the community. The inevitable result, it seems to me, would be an increase of political manipulation and intrigue. The alumni most anxious to secure election into such a body would be those who as students were most distinguished for their "college spirit." This means that the baleful influence of athletics would be intensified by the activity of its representatives in the governing body. The larger this body is the greater is the danger of the delegation of control to a small clique. Effective control requires thorough organization, frequent meetings and full attendance. Each individual member of the body has to feel that he has something personally at stake, instead of donating his time and energies to an institution in which his interest is platonic. The faculty members are the men whose interest is most direct; and a group of faculty members, picked out on account of their proved efficiency in administrative affairs, ought to be joined with a local committee of the trustees to cooperate with the president at periodic meetings, with power to limit thus
the opportunities for presidential autocracy. (2) The president should be elected by this joint committee of trustees and professors, the election being subject to confirmation by the full board of trustees. All of this committee should be admitted to the annual meetings, or special called meetings, of the full board. The president's salary should be larger than that of a professor, because his work, if he is fit for his position, is harder, and his responsibility includes a wider range. His term of office should be for a definite term of years, such as five or ten, but he should be eligible for reelection. In this reelection every full professor should have the right to vote. The German method of annually electing a rector was in force during three quarters of a century at the University of Virginia. A rector needs more than a year to become thoroughly efficient; hence by annual reelection the Virginia rector always served during a succession of years. But the plan was finally discarded a few years ago, as unsuitable for American conditions. There seems to be no probability that any American university can be induced to adopt such a plan again. It undoubtedly secured professorial freedom, but this advantage was considered to be more than offset by the absence of coordination. I do not see how reasonable discipline can be maintained on the German plan. During my own period of study in Germany I was greatly struck with the superfluity of triflers, of beer-drinking idlers, whose presence ought not to be tolerated. I believe in the imposition of frequent and rigid tests of scholarly attainment, and the prompt elimination of those who come for athletics and other "college activities." (3) With your third paragraph I am in entire agreement. (4) With your fourth paragraph I agree, except that I would object to financial autonomy for the separate departments. I think the finances should be managed at a single central office for the entire institution. (5) With your fifth paragraph I am in agreement.

Your general plan I like, yet it appears to me to be too complicated. As our great corporate industries increase in size the machinery of their administration is so completely systematized that it really becomes simple. It is just this systematization that we need in our universities as they increase in size. Each de-
partment autonomous in itself and responsible only to the next higher unit. This ultimately comes up to the head and the policy of the institution and who shall appoint the former and determine the latter. Here, it seems to me, is the great difficulty. Another way of putting it is: Where shall the ultimate authority rest? That the present systems are for the most part faulty is clear enough. What we have had here is illustrative of what is the case on a larger scale in many other universities. Up to ten years ago everything was in the hands of trustees, most of whom knew nothing of the institution except what they could learn in the one or two days of their annual meeting, and at that time they determined all the policies, elected professors, etc. It is needless to say that they rarely did anything except to defer to the views of one man, here resident, who was in touch with everything, and who really "ran the institution." The president, except for a larger salary and no duties as a teacher, was in no way different from the rest of the faculty. With the election of the present president things changed, as the former autocrat had died, and there was no one to take his place. At least there was no one on the board who had the force and was willing to busy himself with university affairs. As a result the present head soon took the reins into his hands and from that time he has "run the institution," except when in a few matters of policy some of the faculty lobbied members of the board with sufficient force to compel the president to adopt their views as his policy to avoid a defeat. It is needless to say that such compulsion in no way promoted harmony. It was a weakness of the president that he could not delegate anything. As a result all that was done was done by him. This is very wearing on a president. Now wherever the organization permits the president to become an autocrat in my opinion he will become one. The temptation is too strong for a mortal to resist. This brings me to my first constructive point. The head should not be a man but a committee. This committee should be made up of the heads of the chief divisions of the institution, and should thus represent the different chief interests. In my judgment it should number not less than three nor more than five. (Similarly in each of these chief divisions the "head" should be a committee made
up of the chairmen of the next lower committees.) This executive committee should assign the work and policy to the next lower committee and to them the lower committee should be responsible. The ultimate policy of the institution should be determined by a committee which should be made up of the executive committee above (or their representative or representatives), representatives of the board of trustees, and representatives of the alumni, no one of these three sets of representatives being in a majority. This ultimate committee should number between seven and eleven, nine being probably the best number, three from each class. Members of the teaching force should be selected and nominated by the committee of their class but elected by the next higher committee. Appeals from committee decisions should in general be carried only as far as the next higher committee. It seems to me that the plan suggested is on the lines which have proved most successful in great corporate enterprises, but it does away with the very real danger of autocracy, in that it substitutes a committee representing divergent interests, or rather sub-interests, for a single man.
XIII. LETTERS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

In response to your letter of December 1, I have to say that I am very reluctant to give an offhand opinion with reference to a comprehensive plan for the organization of a university constructed without much reference to present conditions. If I have any capacity in educational affairs it is along the lines of what to do with an existing situation rather than what should be done provided the slate were clean. Without going into a detailed discussion of your plan, it strikes me that its chief weakness is the enormous costliness in time required of the instructional staff for administration. So far as my experience goes a chief cause of complaint of professors is the amount of routine work which is required of them. You propose to have them take over the main responsibility of administration, both educational and financial, leaving the executive officers and trustees small authority. Faculties should have responsibility for educational policies. Educational and financial administration should not be required of them. I imagine if it were possible to inaugurate your scheme in a large university, it would break down of its own weight; and that the institution, because of the necessity for efficiency, would be obliged to relieve the faculty from the responsibility of administrative work.

I prefer an entirely different arrangement for university control than the one outlined. (2), for example, might draw the elective body into political movements which might be very dangerous. The idea of a university senate which you develop has always appealed to me, and from what I have seen of the way it works in one place or another, great good is accomplished by it as well as great economy of time. (3), relating to the unit of organization, I deem a university necessity. The selection of a president in my judgment is best carried out by the governing board of trustees. If the board has the interest of the institution
at heart, as they usually do, the greater likelihood is that they will receive as well as search for advice and information which will enable them to make a choice for the presidency of the institution in correspondence with its broad needs. The selection of professors in my judgment is best carried out by the president in consultation with the deans and the various professors who are likely to have charge of fields which are more or less closely related to that professor to be chosen. In general, the proposition of university control as outlined would tend to get too far away from the principle of placing the governing officers of a university in an independent position, and asking them to produce results by their powers of initiative. Believe me that I appreciate your motive in having these matters discussed, and I for one feel that you have done great good to university work and ideals by the stands that you have taken in these various lines.

While the plan you propose is ultra-democratic and in keeping with the spirit of the age, yet I believe that the experience of American institutions is not yet broad enough to enable us to adopt safely at the present time such an ideal as you set forth. We have gone beyond the autocratic type of government, but efficiency in action can not be wholly sacrificed to a theory based on democracy. University control, as now managed by unwieldy faculties, is one of the most expensive administrative processes that can be found. Universities, as they increase radically in size, must undergo a change in organization. I question whether the evils of college politics in the selection of a president by the faculty are to be preferred to the judgment of governing bodies as they are now constituted.

From the standpoint of my own academic experience, which has lain wholly in state universities, the scheme does not appeal to me as either feasible or desirable in its main outlines. One of the major drawbacks to an academic career at the present time is the conspicuous lack of great prizes to be attained through it, and this undesirable feature is accentuated in your scheme by withdrawing from the university president much of the
authority and dignity of his office. You will recall the words of Sydney Smith, who, in protesting against a proposal to use the emoluments of the bishops of the English Church to increase the stipends of the minor clergy, urged that, although himself only a country curate, the prospect of one day becoming a bishop was worth more to him than the sixpence which he would receive were the emoluments of the higher clergy equitably distributed throughout his own class. Your proposition for a corporation to be the ultimate source of authority in the control of universities also seems to me ill adapted to the condition of state universities. I conceive it to be to their interest to stand as close as possible to the people whom they serve, and I am very pleased to see an immediate responsibility to the legislature of the state. It seems to me a better ultimate control than would be a corporation such as you suggest. It is, of course, desirable that the alumni should take an interest in the affairs of the university and should exercise a considerable amount of influence over its development, but this we have been able to bring about in Wisconsin, and doubtless it can be or has been done elsewhere, without such intermediary body as you suggest. It is apparent that the above is written from the standpoint of a state university, and I can not express any opinion as to what may be needed or desirable in private foundations.

Your outline would increase the importance of the school, division or department, and diminish the authority of the president and regents or trustees. In this institution the department already has considerable autonomy and, at least in my own case, I have seen no reason to complain of misuse of authority by president or trustees. In the case of a state university such as this, I think it impossible as well as inadvisable for the state through its legislature to relinquish control to the extent suggested by you. In regard to some of the bad procedures outlined in your footnotes, I think they are possible with the present system, but I think that almost any system is open to the possibility of developing bad conditions. In this university the unit of organization is, to a considerable extent, the department, which units are grouped in larger units as schools or colleges.
Each department is governed by a departmental committee consisting of the instructional force of professorial rank. Matters relating to salaries are discussed by the departmental committee. The chairman of the departmental committee is appointed by the dean, but only after consultation with the departmental committee, so far as that committee may deem it advisable. I believe that the plan suggested by you of a senate which should legislate for the university as a whole is decidedly inferior to the practise here, where the faculty of the whole university legislates for the university as a whole. The inferiority consists in the fact that the senate is a smaller body and therefore less democratic. It results in lack of understanding of university policies on the part of those members of the faculty who are not members of the senate. Therefore it results in lack of sympathy with those policies and lack of intelligent cooperation for the welfare of the whole institution. The control of the institution by the faculty at large requires more time in the discussion of the projects, and is therefore wasteful, so far as the efficiency of the faculty is concerned; but it has such important advantages (as just outlined), that the time lost in long discussions is much more than balanced by securing a large group of men intelligently working for common purposes. On this particular point I have decided opinions, because I am familiar with the conditions in two institutions, one having a senate and the other having faculty control, and I am thoroughly convinced of the correctness of my position.

While I think that we are nearly all agreed that there are many matters of university control which certainly need improvement at the present time, nevertheless it is a difficult matter to formulate satisfactory plans for such improvement—especially any plans of general application. As you have obviously realized, the problem is different for the state universities than for the endowed institutions. The university of to-day, furthermore, is a big business concern, and I fear that there are reasons why the state universities, at least, will have to remain constructed upon somewhat such lines as are used in the conduct of large business operations in general. I might say a word briefly
on your several topics.—(1) While agreeing, in a general way, to your proposition, I think it would require a very considerable modification to better the condition of state universities. It is very desirable in my opinion that the alumni should have a considerable influence in the affairs and policies of the university, but I doubt whether, in the case of the state institution, they can be given any greater power than that exercised by every voter in the state, except in so far as they are free to influence public opinion, and in this way the legislature or other controlling bodies of the university. The present plan of appointment of the regents by the governor is far from ideal, since, at best, it is difficult to keep the board free from some political bias, and, at worst, the regents and, to some extent, the university may be used entirely for political abomination. (2) I agree with you in so far as believing that the faculty should have a greater say as to elections to its positions and to promotions within its membership than it enjoys in most institutions at the present time. Too commonly the power of appointment and advancement rests entirely in the hands of the dean or president, as the case may be, with only a nominal check in the way of approval by the regents. (3) The idea of departmental organization meets my approval, but the matter of separate endowment could probably not be worked out in state institutions. Undoubtedly, departments might often be allowed to accumulate separate funds more than is done at the present time, though I think this is not without its grave dangers. (4) I believe in as great democracy as possible within the department, but I am of the opinion that too great a gap between the position of instructor and professor, as it obtains in Germany, for example, tends to produce a very undemocratic state of affairs. Furthermore, if we may judge from many instances in German universities, it too often results in a man working hard until he has established himself in a professorship, after which he accomplishes practically nothing. (5) I agree that the departments or divisions should be as independent as is consistent with general welfare, but that so long as human nature remains the same, there will have to be a strong supervisory power in order to produce the greatest efficiency and economy. Examples could be shown in several institutions
in this country where, in lack of such control, separate departments have grown independent, overlapping each other's ground and usurping each other's functions. This not only leads to waste of effort and loss of efficiency through lack of cooperation, but also to lack of economy on account of duplication.

I am quite convinced that a greater number of trained scholars should have a responsible oversight of the development of our higher educational institutions than is now the case, but the means of bringing about such a condition are certainly difficult to formulate. Taking up your suggestions concerning university control in the order in which you have formulated them: (1) I doubt somewhat if a corporation such as you suggest would show much wisdom in the election of a board of trustees. I am inclined to think that a better board can be appointed by a responsible official such, for instance, as the governor of the state, than is likely to be elected by a loose corporation. I should somewhat prefer to have a corporation elect one individual as chancellor and let him appoint a working board to act with him. This would center responsibility and probably conduce to efficiency. If the members of the board were elected for long terms subject to recall it might be feasible for a loose corporation to elect one or two new members each year. (2) To a board of this kind it would seem to me that the professors or officers of the university, or other representatives, might nominate two or three persons for the position of president from whom one could be selected to act in this office. It would seem to me not unwise that the officer who acts as president of an educational institution should have a somewhat more dignified position and somewhat higher salary than the average professor, since he needs to act along broader lines in order to be equally efficient. (3) I quite agree with this. (4) This seems to me, on the whole, a feasible scheme. (5) This likewise seems to me feasible.

Your outline for university control already contains provision for initiative, referendum and woman suffrage. By adding the recall you will have a complete insurgent program. As an insurgent living in an insurgent atmosphere, I presume I
should favor this program on theoretical grounds, but as a matter of fact I am personally pretty well satisfied with present conditions and am not at all sure how far I should be willing to go in the direction you indicate. In short, I have not made up my mind, and am therefore sending you no definite expression of opinion.

I agree in the main with the ideas expressed in your statement. The problem is certainly much more difficult in state than in private institutions. A few reforms which do not require any deep-seated changes would have a most beneficent effect: (1) The inability of boards of regents or trustees to appoint or discharge any member of the instructional staff except on the recommendation of the president, who is alone to be held responsible. (2) Appointments in a given department should be made by the president only upon the recommendation of the department, except in the case of the appointment of a new head of a department, or the reorganization of a department. (3) Departments containing two or more full professors present a particularly hard problem. Each full professor may be supposed to be in full charge of a given field of work or "Gebiet," and the head of one branch of a subject should certainly not have any advantage over the heads of other branches of the subject in the same department. Each full professor must have complete charge of the work in his particular field. For instance, organic, inorganic, analytic and pharmaceutical chemistry should be absolutely coordinate, and the chairman should be elected by the full professors of the department. Appointment of the head of such a department by the administration can not be justified as the discontent and discord far outweigh any possible advantages. The real business of the faculty should be carried on by the president, and a senate of five to eight members elected yearly by the members of the faculty of full professorial rank and on which a man can not serve more than two or three consecutive years. A small number of this senate should be retired each year so as to preclude abrupt changes in the personnel of the senate. This will prevent too great a concentration of power in the president and the body is small enough to do effective work. The limiting
of the number of years of consecutive service will ensure absence of too much politics. This rotation is, in my opinion, essential to the success of the senate idea.

The ends which are to be sought for improvement in university control we are all agreed upon, but as to the method of attaining these ends there will doubtless be great difference of opinion. Your scheme as outlined would work well if we had the right kind of professors in our universities. It is an ideal toward which we should strive. Greater responsibility should continually be placed upon the professors as they are able to bear it, but I must confess that at the present time I can not endorse your scheme for the reason that the composition of the faculties of American universities is such that it would not prove a success. We must get men of stronger character, individuality and genius into our universities before any such scheme as you propose will succeed, and to place entire control in the hands of the faculties as they now exist would make it practically impossible to get such men on the faculties as we ought to have.

Concerning the first paragraph, I would say that the plan would apply well to state institutions, since the "corporation" would be representative of the people rather than of a temporarily dominant political party, and the directive influence of the "corporation" would tend towards continuous rather than discontinuous development. It is likely, too, that any trustee or regent elected by such a "corporation" would remain in favor, and consequently in office, as long as he served faithfully and wisely—a condition, or rather a conservation, much to be desired, since trustees, willing, working and competent, are few and far between. With the privately endowed institutions the situation is fundamentally different, since here the idea of trusteeship is dominant, the peculiar conditions of gift or bequest being paramount. I think it would be better to have your trustees elect the treasurer and have the faculty elect, or at least nominate, the chancellor. What the faculty needs is representation on every governing board. (2) There will be duties and obligations affecting the office of president that will require expenditures on his
part not liable to those holding professorial positions. If some financial arrangement is not made to provide for these expenditures, the office of president is likely to go to one who is financially equipped; and financial equipment is not invariably compatible with democratic control. (3) The provisions of this paragraph are excellent. It is substantially the organization of the departments of this university and it seems to work very well. The only serious objection that occurs to me arises in connection with the securing of funds from legislative bodies. State universities rely upon the favor of the legislature, and as long as human nature remains what it is, the over-aggressive department is very likely to thrive at the expense of the department that relies for its support solely upon the efficiency of its work. (4) The suggested mode of procedure in regard to the election of professors seems promising. If executed with great caution—as you explain in your footnote—it would be a vast improvement upon the present method. But if carried out impulsively it would work an irreparable wrong. Would not a probationary period followed by a confirmatory election be safer than a direct life appointment? (5) The faculty of every university should have a committee that can meet with a coordinate committee of the board. This meeting should be held in open session—a session where the members of the faculty can be present; where they may listen to the presentations of their representative committee and where they may hear the discussions of the trustees thereupon. Such a session would do more to correct existing difficulties than any other agency. Moreover, I believe that the average trustee would be heartily in favor of such an arrangement.

In general I cordially approve of your proposal. By this I mean that I regard the plan of university government on the basis of the principles involved in your proposal as altogether better than the present type of administration. I regard it as likely to secure in a far greater measure the highest academic results, and to make the career of a professor a more desirable and a more creditable one. I am more and more convinced that the evils of the present system are likely to grow, and that there
is an evident necessity for a radical reform which, as you suggest, should be gradually put into practise; but the principles should be carefully thought out from the first and systematically and thoroughly followed. Considering the proposal more in detail, I answer, in regard to (1) that to my mind the essential factor is to secure an elastic and democratic control of the university interests and not merely to relieve the faculty from troublesome administrative details. The second proposal I regard as the most essential of all; and I endorse cordially any system which will minimize the importance of the president, and bring the professors into direct responsible contact with the larger and permanent policies of the university. This almost inevitably requires some provision, such as your third one, for the relatively independent organization of the departments, and this in turn naturally requires a provision, such as your fourth one, for the election of professors by the faculty itself. In such a scheme, I emphasize very much the importance of a definite assignment of salaries, making the same salary for the same office and responsibility. All competition for financial favor should be removed; and any attempt to differentiate merit by financial favor is to my mind wholly unsuited to the academic life. I equally approve of your fifth provision, and indeed the several provisions are mutually complementary. It is but fair to add that the suitability of such a scheme is necessarily dependent upon the development of the university. It is, to my mind, much better suited to a well-established institution whose purposes are clear and whose clientele is established. In the smaller institutions and in the struggling ones of the west and south, it is fair to recognize that the presidential type of organization, which places the initiative in the hands of one person, has distinct advantages. It is also true that in such institutions policies are not so well fixed, and programs are subject to the uncertain approval of untrained constituencies. In such cases, it seems wise to sacrifice a desirable organization for the sake of the more immediate benefit. But this does not apply to the great institutions of the middle west and the well-established institutions of the Atlantic coast. It remains true that issues of this kind are more properly discussed in terms of the highest representatives
of university organization; and speaking of these, I have no hesi-
tation in expressing a most emphatic opinion endorsing the gen-
eral principles and many of the details of your proposals.

Your plan seems to me to embody the best ideas. It would
certainly avoid a great deal of friction which is now seen in
universities. At the University of Wisconsin, until last year, it
seemed possible for the president and the dean of a department
to elect, advance or replace a man without any one on the outside
knowing anything about it until it was all done. Of course, their
action was subject to the final approval of the board of
regents, but I think this board accepted in large measure the
recommendations put up to it by the president without further
investigation. Last year a committee on organization was ap-
pointed and several new features introduced, one of which comes
very close to number (4) in your plan, making the advancement
of instructors, etc., the action of a departmental committee.
While I do not think my opinion is worth anything on this sub-
ject, I feel that the plan you propose is an excellent one.
XIV. LETTERS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

In your paper on "University Control" you have very clearly stated the three main objections which may be raised against our present system of university administration. The plan by which you propose to remedy these evils will in general commend itself to the majority of professors, especially in the larger institutions in which, on account of the unwieldy size of the faculty, practically all matters of importance are regularly referred to committees. Such committees are appointed by the president, or, if the matter under consideration concerns a particular college, the committee, while appointed by the president, is practically the choice of the dean. Under an autocratic president or dean the same men are again and again appointed and become soon known as "administration men." Of course, to save appearances, the names of one or two "dissenters," always in a safe minority, may also appear on the list. Election of important committees by the faculty, instead of appointment, seems to me to be the first step needed in a reform. The autonomy of larger groups inside the college would be the next step. This is especially needed in the large colleges of liberal arts, where even fair-sized subdivisions of closely related departments could be established. Each group should elect its own dean for a limited term of years, subject to reelection. It seems to me that such a plan should find favor with the deans themselves. It is a thankless task to be a dean and well-nigh impossible to please all faculty members. Even exemplary deans are often severely criticized. The trouble is that the chronic fault-finders do the most talking, while the majority is satisfied and seldom heard from. The reelection of a good dean might stop all idle criticism. A board of deans, as proposed above, will be large enough to eliminate any danger of autocratic power on the part of any single individual, a danger which, in the case of a large college, may be as real as that of an autocratic president. I heartily
agree with you that nominations for professorships and promotions to such positions should be made by a committee of the faculty, the final decision resting with the senate. The latter should consist of the deans and an additional member elected from each group. I feel very uncertain that the election of the president by the faculty would be practicable. This should be left to a smaller body, for example, the board of deans. I should be strongly opposed to a short term of office for the president as well as for the deans. If they are elected in the manner proposed, they will be our leaders. They will have definite policies which they wish to carry through. A university is a conservative institution and any reform will require some time to be carried through and a change of leadership may prove disastrous. In Germany, so frequently quoted, the highest educational authority is a "Ministerium" in which no annual changes take place, as in the rectorat of the university. It has always seemed to me that the positions of president or dean in an American university are by no means ones to be coveted. They will become still less so if their present power be taken from them. What would remain? Principally such disagreeable duties as to listen to complaints of various factions of the faculty or to smooth over personal controversies, etc. I do not see that you have left to these positions much more than to serve as buffers for clashing opinions. Even the pleasure of serving as the representative of the university at public ceremonies may not outweigh the objectionable features of the positions. You must show that there is enough left to make them attractive to our best men. It seems to me unjust that a president should receive a salary not larger than that of a professor. His expenses must necessarily be greater, especially if he is expected to represent the university on public occasions. There are one or two more points which should be considered very carefully. In your scheme the student has not once been mentioned. A great deal of the time of a president and dean is taken up with matters of a disciplinary nature. Who is going to take up this disagreeable task? If the college of liberal arts should be divided into separate groups, which dean should be entrusted with such an office? Do you wish a special "dean" to be elected, with similar functions as the dean of women, now so
familiar to all co-educational institutions? Should these deans have the same authority as the "academic" deans? If the faculty is progressive it will elect its most eminent scholars to the most honored positions—and these should be those of president and dean. They are our natural leaders. But from my experience with our best men I know that they are in general not interested in matters of discipline or the management of the student body. I see a great danger in your plan, namely, that of creating a university for the professors—not for the students. A university founded on your scheme will be a very attractive place for a professor. He seems to have all the rights he wishes and apparently no duties. We are all human and I wonder if some of us who love research work and are sure of a life-long appointment might not be tempted to forget that we should also use our best endeavors to transmit the little we know to our students. Certainly a university, especially a state university, which would neglect its students would in a very short time be called to account by the people of the state. Any plan of university control should indeed look towards an alleviation of the real causes for complaint by the professors, but as much towards the solution of the problem, how to get the best results from our students for whose sake the universities have been founded. This latter question seems to have received too little attention. I know that the professors have real grievances. But I do not believe that we shall accomplish much at the present time by a utopian plan. We must propose something that can be put into practise in the near future. The whole question is one of evolution, not revolution. By not asking too much at present we may accomplish a great deal in the future.

My judgment causes me to approve in general of the preliminary paragraph; the paragraph number (1) seems to me not suited to state universities; paragraph number (2) is not approved; (3) and (4) are approved; (5) is approved in general, but that relative powers would need careful elaboration. As to the plan in paragraph (2), it would seem to me that in the ever-intense interchange between university and public in America a presiding officer is necessary with greater powers, greater con-
continuity of policy, and different qualities from those of the average professor.

I think I should hardly favor such a plan in all its details.

It seems to me that one of the most important things in university control is the selection and appointment of the presidents and the professors. In my opinion, the president of a university should be selected and nominated by the university senate, consisting of the full professors from the different departments. Upon his nomination by this body, the board of control, or regents, as we call them, should make the appointment. I think that it is bad policy to have the president of a university selected wholly by the board of control. He should be selected and nominated by representatives from the different departments or schools. In the second place, all new professors should be selected and nominated by the faculty of the school to which they are called, the appointment of course to be made by the board of control, or regents. In the third place, the dean of each department should be selected and nominated by the full professors of his department, and his appointment will have to be made by the board of control. In the fourth place, all promotions should be made on the recommendation of the faculty, to which the one recommended for promotion belongs. I am not so sure about the salary of the president. I think it might be somewhat larger than that of a professor, but I do not believe that it should be in great excess of the professorial salary. I am quite sure that it is a serious mistake to pay excessive salaries to presidents and deans. The dean of a department should have no bigger salary than that of the best professors in his department. In my opinion, more good men have left this university, not on account of the inadequacy of their salary, but because they have seen men, acknowledged to be wholly inferior to themselves, greatly increased in salary, through the influence of the dean or by direct influence upon the board of regents.

I find myself in entire sympathy with your plan broadly considered; for I feel that at present we are generally drifting without a chart and as chance propels us. I should like further
to see a sharp line of cleavage between the junior and the senior college, which separation would be reflected in the rank and pay of professors as well as in the organization of the university. The work of the last two years in the undergraduate courses is less differentiated from the graduate school than it is from the freshman and sophomore years. Elementary mathematics, English, modern languages in the earlier stages, logic and philosophy and like subjects will always make a demand for a large number of teachers who should be good drill masters, but whose horizon need not be that of the professor who regularly instructs upper classmen and graduates. I am a little in doubt concerning the quality of president that will be evolved under your system, but since he must be elected by the professors, it may be that that point is sufficiently guarded.

There can be no doubt that at the present the administrative phases of the universities are altogether over-developed, and too much importance is placed upon them. For the most part the control of all universities is in the hands of trustees who have first-hand knowledge only of finances and the physical side of the university equipment, buildings, grounds, etc., and tend to be interested in athletics alone of all the university activities. Usually they are wise enough to leave the details of administration to others, but nothing prevents them from interfering at any point, and cases are constantly coming up where they are helping a friend on the faculty or blocking promotions of people whom for any reason they may dislike, and interfering with educational policies. The faculty, as you point out, is altogether at the mercy of all the powers above. While faculty sentiment in the long run plays an enormous part in the determination of all university affairs, it is altogether indirect in its expression, there is no recognized medium of communication with governing bodies, to say nothing of any direct control. Under the present condition all depends upon the president. The trustees turn most matters over to him for administration, he it is that represents faculty sentiment before the board. Where the president is at once politic and strong and wise in all matters of university policy, all goes well. Where he is weak, the trustees run matters
on a political basis; when strong and unwise, he dominates board and faculty to the injury of all. Under your plan, as I understand it, the faculty would have power and direct representation as well as the privilege of making the university and governing it by opinion. It might be objected that the faculties are on the whole not suited to take part in government. It is true that much acquaintance with faculty administration makes for pessimism. Legislation often results from log-rolling for students rather than from any far-sighted policy. Those who carry most weight are frequently not the men of recognized ability as scholars, but administrators or pseudo-administrators whose chief claim to prominence is political skill. But this again is probably largely an outgrowth of the methods of choosing professors and the forces that make for advancement. At present in many universities advancement depends upon four factors which are, in order of importance, activity in administration (often doing the work of a ten-dollar-a-week clerk), number of students, real teaching ability, and scholarship and productivity. The president and deans can know personally only the men who serve on routine committees, and are in a position to judge them only on their efficiency in that work, which usually demands rather a low order of intelligence. The teaching ability they must judge from the size of the classes and chance remarks of students. They have time for no more than an occasional visit to classrooms, which, if made, would be often misleading. Of scholarly work and character they have no opportunity to know, and necessarily would, for the most part, be incapable of judging if they did take pains to examine it. In consequence, members of the faculties busy themselves with the externals and unessentials. They look for opportunities to sit upon committees, they work for legislation that will give them more students, or under the elective system they make their courses attractive to students, even if they must sacrifice something of real value or make the courses easy in the attempt. Scholarship and the essentials take a second place in the mind of the professor as in the mind of governing bodies. Men are held to their real work by the approbation of workers in the same field without the university, not by any recognition or reward at home. Were the selection of
professors made to depend upon scholarship, teaching and administrative ability in due proportion, and only the best be selected, many of the unworthy features of faculty politics would disappear of themselves. This can only be brought about by having the selections by a committee with knowledge on all points, as you suggest. One feature that you overlook in the high salaries paid to administrative officers is their value in offering a few prizes in the academic work. This is itself is desirable. The objection is that it again puts the emphasis upon administrative ability rather than upon scholarship. Advancement to these positions is through subordinate offices, committee chairmanships and the like, that require no particular scholarly ability and are likely to detract from real scholarly work. In every university men who might accomplish something are wasting all their spare time from the class room doing purely clerical work. Through it some few advance to deanships, but a large number merely wreck their scholarly careers. If the prizes could be made rewards for scholarly accomplishments, and the clerical work be done by clerks, there would be a double saving. On the whole, I think your suggestions would be practical, provided they could be adopted in their entirety. I see no way at present for their introduction except by the voluntary action of trustees and regents. Legal traditions seem to require some such body as the responsible financial authorities, and simplicity is furthered by giving them final authority in all matters. But boards seem to be more and more impressed by their inability to manage details and by their general ignorance of educational policy. It seems reasonable to hope that they will soon look for a fundamental solution of the problems rather than a temporary relief from shifting them to the most convenient shoulders.

(1) Either the state (eliminated in the case of privately endowed institutions) or the corporation (constituted as suggested, and desirable even in case of state universities to promote more intimate relations between the university and the people) should elect trustees, regents and treasurer—chancellor no function. (2) Professors elect president. Should be a great honor and the salary enough to tempt scholars for limited term. President's
work should be so lightened by clerks that he can devote as much
time to productive scholarship after election to office as before.
Does not need to make so many speeches. (3) Unit of organiza-
tion—group. (4) Agree completely, except in matter of salaries.
These should be as flexible as possible, and, within the economic
limits set for universities, as nearly as possible the numerical
expressions of (a) success in productive scholarship, (b) suc-
cess in teaching, and (c) skill in administration. The idea of
trust funds is very important. At present money is wasted in
great quantities at the end of each year in order to insure an
equally large appropriation for the next, and to prove that “the
department is growing”! (5) Agree theoretically. Practically
am very doubtful, for at present owing to inter-departmental
rivalry for students, not in scholarship, and innumerable petty
jealousies due to the immorality of the academic type, it would
be difficult to find representatives who would do more than repre-
sent themselves. In this respect we are face to face with the
same problems presented by state legislatures and congress.

Your plan of university control meets my approval in its
essential features. Since you have asked it, I will list the special
things that appeal to me, or alterations, as follows, using the
same heads employed by you: (1) Corporation. Endowment univ-
ersity. Faculty; members of alumni association; friends. State
university; all voters of state. Trustees, twelve in number,
elected by members of the corporation. (2) President or chancel-
lor. To act as chairman of board of trustees. A man of
prominence—giving his whole time to university and paid some-
what more than the professor. His duty would be to supervise
both the administrative and educational policies of the univer-
sity. He would be elected by the faculty through its senate,
subject to veto of trustees. Treasurer, secretary and other ad-
ministrative officers to be appointed by trustees to work in co-
operation with the president. (3) Same as stated by you. (4)
Would omit the sentence regarding the “board of advisers” for
the nomination of professors. I believe it would be unwieldy
under some circumstances. Otherwise I concur in this whole
paragraph. (5) There should be a university senate consisting
of the deans, executive committees of the several faculties, with the president of the university as chairman, for consideration of questions affecting the university as a whole. Communications could be made to the trustees either from the faculty as a whole, through its senate, or from the individual units of the faculty through their dean.

I am in hearty sympathy with the spirit of your proposals, but I should hardly feel competent to judge of the advisability of the details. I am sure most of us who have taught many years will agree with you that it is high time to give the faculty a larger share in the real management of the university.

I approve heartily of the whole of your plan, but I should proceed very slowly in carrying into effect the first provision. Such a corporation as is proposed should include a majority of persons of university ideals (as distinguished from college ideals). In my experience such men are rare in university governing boards; they are not in the majority among executive officers; the faculties themselves contain many who hold that our so-called universities are teaching institutions only. I know of one head of a large department who "instructs" or advises his "subordinates" to restrict their activities to teaching. Among those interested in the university in the general population are exceedingly few who have any notion of real university aims. Under these conditions corporation control seems to me very hazardous. I fear that a corporation with merely advisory powers would be troublesome. This of course refers to our western universities. I hope to see the time when some such plan as yours is put into operation. When that should happen in any institution ought to depend on the extent to which university ideals have become current. Where a majority of the faculties lacks them, an autocratic president and deans may accomplish more than a democratic organization. In the organization of a graduate school, I do not see how the wisdom of your plan can be questioned, except as to the first provision.
I do not agree with the policies advocated in your pamphlet entitled "University Control." I regard the existing system of American university administration not only as a development resting on historical conditions, but as generally satisfactory. I believe that ultimate responsibility should rest, not with interested employees, but with disinterested trustees in the literal sense of that term. The success of any institution, of course, rests as much with its employees, who do the actual work, as with the trustees, who determine its policy. The two bodies therefore need a connecting means and, at the same time, a buffer. This difficult and delicate position is filled by the American university president, who is in touch with both bodies. If the actual powers of the president are great, it is normally only because he is able. I do not believe that university freedom is often invaded either by president or trustees. As professors have not been able to unite for defense in those cases where their privileges and liberty are said to have been infringed, I think it is clear that they would not be able to cooperate harmoniously and efficiently in the transaction of every-day business. I believe that a system of complete faculty control would lead to the demoralization of our universities.

(1) The corporation mentioned I should consider as too large and too heterogeneous to be of much value in managing the affairs of a university. (2) The choice of president by the faculty I should consider a very unwise move and not at all free from the evils of the present system. Members of faculties are not free from bias, for very selfish reasons. No president worthy of the name would undertake the duties at a salary no better than that of a member of the staff. A president with no power is no president at all in my judgment. (3), (4) The subdivision into autonomous parts I consider the worst defect of
the scheme. It would increase the jealousy naturally existing now in the various parts of large institutions, would lead to lack of coordination in the work of the whole institution, and would be a case of the survival of the shrewdest. The selection of members of a faculty by the faculty, I do not consider at all an improvement over the present methods. With the exception of men who are prominent already in their respective lines, I do not think the average faculty has any better knowledge of their fitness than has a good college president. The president is usually free from internal jealousy in at least departments other than his own. The under men in a department would also have a tendency to shut out men likely to be promoted over them. In brief I do not like the anarchy you propose. As a member of a university faculty I should much prefer to be under even the absolute domination of one man, the president, than under the chaotic rule that I think would result from the plan you propose. I firmly believe that any organization must have a single dominating head big enough to really control it. My observation of faculty meetings and such service as I have had on college committees do not incline me to the belief that for administration and college policy the faculty, as a whole, is as competent as a few or one selected individual.

In my judgment there is a place and a need for the modern university president, although the right man for the place may sometimes be hard to find. I do not approve of the plan of having two heads to the university, as you suggest—namely, a chancellor and also a president. I doubt if the power of nominating the president should be placed in the hands of the professors, for, after all, university professors are usually specialists with a narrower view of what a public-service institution should be than is possessed by many leaders in business and state affairs. If the trustees are well educated, patriotic men, fairly representing the territory to be served by the university, then I think they are more capable of selecting a president than are the professors. Such a body consisting of twelve or fifteen members, elected by the people of the state or by the alumni of the institution, with freedom to counsel with the leading officers and professors of the
university, probably constitutes the best board of control. I
do not believe that the school or college is as capable of selecting
its dean or director as is the president and board of trustees.
Any self-controlled and self-perpetuating body, supported at
public expense, is too likely to become a mutual-admiration
society, which may forget or fail to discover its duties to the
public. I do not think that professors should be appointed for
life, but rather for efficient service; and I think a professor's
employment should terminate whenever another man can be
found who can fill the place with distinctly greater efficiency.
I think, however, that the university should pay reasonably and
in full for the service rendered, so that the professor can not
feel when his successor is appointed that the institution still owes
him employment and remuneration to the end of life. The
system adopted ought not to be one that will tend to load the
university with dead timber. The university professor, the same
as other people, should learn to live within his income and to lay
by for future needs. If he can not do this he ought not to
complain about it, but rather to seek employment in other lines,
for the university is not an institution for private charity, but
for public service.

I believe there is need in the large institutions, as well as in
the smaller ones, of some individual whose duty it shall be to
study carefully all the relations of university life and form the
central point around which the administrative work of the uni-
versity is grouped. The position is of such extreme importance
that it demands the very best ability that can be secured, and
demands also that the person who holds this position shall give
to it his entire attention without any distraction in the direction
of the care of a department or in class-room work. Under these
conditions it seems to me that our American system of a presi-
dent for a university is better than a system of frequent change
in this office, and because of the large interests involved and the
necessity of securing the very highest ability available a larger
salary than is paid to professors must be paid to secure the
right man, though it is of course a question as to whether the
difference has not become too great in many of our American
universities. Next to the president there should be a compact group of perhaps half a dozen advisers, whom it should be the duty of the president to consult in regard to matters of large university policy, which can not well be submitted to a larger group, including all professors in the university. In the case of such a university as ours the group consisting of the deans of the several colleges would seem to be appropriate for this function. Below this group and within each college there should, I think, be a similar small group who would consult with the dean of the particular college as to matters immediately pertaining to that college. Again within each department the head of the department or the chairman, according to whatever system of organization is adopted, should consult with the members of the department in regard to matters of importance. For some purposes all members of the staff in a given department should be brought together, but questions with regard to salaries and promotions should be always considered first in a group sufficiently small, so that personal considerations, which are so important, may be discussed freely. Such a discussion is, of course, impossible in a meeting of many individuals together. The above is only a very rough sketch of organization, and requires very much filling in of details, but two things, I think, must be secured in any effective organization of a university. (1) The individual professor must be relieved as far as possible from attendance upon faculty meetings, which are time-consuming and frequently ineffective. (2) There must be small, compact groups of individuals upon whom is placed the responsibility of organization and conduct of the affairs of the university; and these men must be so chosen that they will give the necessary time for careful consideration of the important, general problems committed to their care.

In general, I should characterize the plan as containing valuable suggestion rather than one which might be considered the ideal for any one institution. The problem of the state university seems sufficiently different from that of the endowed university to make some radical differences necessary. The plan should be extended, I think, to include some indication as to the
administration of funds, particularly as to their apportionment among the various departments. I believe quite thoroughly in the faculty control of all matters of purely educational nature. But the powers given by your plan to faculties or sub-groups of faculties seem to me in some cases too great. For instance, anything like the elective selection of professors might be dangerous. I should fear too much tendency on the part of men ambitious for professorships to ingratiate themselves with the nominating or electing bodies, or rather with the individuals of those bodies, so that professorships would be sought by activities political in nature rather than by the endeavor to prove oneself qualified as a teacher or investigator for the position. I think that a larger responsibility of deans and other administrators to faculties desirable, but I seriously question whether this can be most wisely attained by electing these officers. Nor do I feel that election furnishes the best method of choosing committees. The reason is simple. A responsible dean or head is free to consult with individuals as to his appointments, and can take into account all sorts of matters connected with qualifications connected with the office or committee membership to which appointment is to be made. An electing body can not, as a matter of experience, so freely discuss suggested appointees. To reinforce my opinion, I may call attention to a situation which has existed in nearly every body of which I have been a member, and a situation which I imagine to be general. It is, that in nearly every case in which a motion is made involving a committee it is of the form: "I move that a committee be appointed," or "I move that the chair appoint a committee." Only infrequently is the individual membership determined by election. And this in spite of the fact that in the majority of cases the motions might have been framed to make the committees elective.

Regarding (1) I would call attention to the fact that in a number of states the form of the governing body and its method of selection is prescribed by the constitution of the state. Since amendment to the constitution is becoming increasingly difficult or impossible—as it appears to be in this state—this recommendation would apply, if at all, only as an academic ideal. (2) I
can not see that a man with the specified qualifications would be likely to accept the type of position described. (3), (4) There can be no doubt that membership in a small faculty carries with it a sense of responsibility. Whether such groups could be formed in which the work could be understood reasonably by all members, I do not know. Doubtless many instances would arise in which groups of the size indicated would be possible only at the sacrifice of the sort of understanding implied—in which, for example, the election of minor teachers by the whole group could not be performed intelligently. Doubtless the provision that the same salaries be paid for the same office will appeal strongly to those who have suffered under the other system. The "same salary" system has, however, defects of its own, which are most painfully clear to those who have lived under it. The main defect is that it seems impossible to recognize eminent service or remarkable attainment by any plan other than the imposition of new duties. (5) The main insistence should, in my opinion, be upon the footnote No. 9. The tendency to create more and more administrative machinery seems to be quite general and it is most deplorable.

I am glad to express my approval, in the main, of your proposed system of university control. It seems to me, however, that, during the evolution period at any rate, if not permanently, it would be advisable to retain some of the advantages of the autocratic system, by introducing the veto principle into the system of government. University faculties, like other bodies, are not infrequently prone to act upon questions hastily or without having given the matter sufficient thought. The veto power in the hands of the administrative officer, or body, would act as a check upon evils of this nature, for a faculty would be slow to override (say by a two-thirds vote) the veto of an administrative officer who possessed its respect and confidence and such an action would come only after careful consideration and a conviction that its own judgment was the better.

I am heartily in sympathy with this plan in its broader outlines. I feel very certain that it is in the right direction, that is,
in the direction of the kind of a change which is sorely needed in
the administrative organization of our universities. There are
two or three items which I either have doubts about or do not
agree with, for example, in paragraph (2), your suggestion is, that
the president, to be elected by the professors or officers or their
representatives, should have a salary not larger than the salary
of the professor. I should need convincing argument to subscribe
to this. I do not think his salary should be out of all proportion,
as is now sometimes the case, but it seems to me that there are
certain responsibilities and burdens which make a larger demand
upon the energies and that would more continuously occupy the
thoughts of such a president, to the exclusion of other matters to
which he might prefer to give his attention, and that there ought
to be some additional compensation on this account. He should
receive more than a professor for similar reasons (in part) that
a professor should receive more than an instructor, or an in-
structor more than a laboratory assistant. This would not apply
to the kind of president that we have now, that is, men presum-
ably choosing a presidency as a profession by willingly laying
down other work, such as teaching or investigation, because
executive work makes a stronger appeal. In paragraph (4) your
proposition is, that "the same salary should be paid for the same
office and the same amount of work." I am not in a position to
agree that this is desirable. Taking the statement at its face
value, it puts remuneration on a quantitative rather than a qualifi-
tative basis. Two "head professors" in a given university might
put in the same number of hours of work and might publish the
same number of papers, or number of pages of contributions, or
other writings during the year, and yet the work of one be much
inferior in its value to the university and to the advancement of
knowledge in general. In such a circumstance, it seems to me
that one professor is really worth more to the university than the
other and should accordingly be paid more. Of course, I do not
mean to imply by this that I think any two men could ever be
appraised at precisely equivalent value, or that identical salaries
would imply this. You are of course familiar with all the argu-
ments that have recently been published with reference to a
similar proposition of "equal pay for equal work" in the school
situation in New York. I feel that your suggestion in paragraph 
(4) relating to experts outside the university is especially good. 
In fact, I have felt that it would be desirable for universities to 
have something like a board of educational directors, made up of 
members of the faculty, of the alumni, of local business men not 
connected with the university in any way, and two or three 
members of other universities, which should have the considera-
tion, and possibly the final decision, in questions of educational 
policy. Perhaps the senate which you suggest in paragraph (5) 
could to advantage have some such composition as this.

On the whole, I am very much in sympathy with your ideas as 
expressed in the article "University Control" but realize per-
haps more keenly than you do that to reach such an ideal, which 
is a combination of the German and British systems, there must 
be many intermediate steps, depending, as stated above, upon 
environment and personnel. An organization or method which 
would be useful to one set of conditions and individuals might 
be absolutely impossible in another institution, even though both 
were aiming at your ultimate ideal, which has for its object 
provision for the greatest freedom in the development of the indi-
vidual as well as departmental and university efficiency. In any 
ultimate analysis, departmental and university efficiency will 
quarrel with personal freedom. You have summed up the whole 
matter in your pamphlet in the last sentence of footnote 5, page 
3, where you say: "Security, permanence, honor, the slow growth 
of traditions, are essential to a true university." This means 
that there is a final substitution of organic law, rules and regu-
lations, traditions and precedents for the autocracy of presidents, 
deans and departmental heads. I believe that this transition will 
ultimately occur, but feel sure it is better to have an autocratic 
American system of presidents and deans in the earlier develop-
ment of our universities, than to attempt to protect individual 
freedom of action of autocratic and frequently erratic and 
visionary professors, where our institutions have not the elements 
of cohesion supplied by traditions, precedents, laws, etc., which 
safeguard the older institutions and at the same time interfere 
with easy adaptation to new social, economic or educational de-
mands. A suggestion in regard to your university corporation consisting of alumni, which is the Cambridge, England, plan, may be worth while. Would it not perhaps be wise to limit the university corporation, consisting of alumni, to second-degree men, such as M.A., M.D., etc.? I see that you have provided for their payment of fees. The system of compounding annual fees is arranged at Cambridge, England. This is based upon life expectancy, I think. It should be remembered that in state universities, such as Minnesota, alumni do band themselves together, taking life membership in the alumni association and through its officers, committees, etc., make themselves responsible for securing desirable legislation along general lines, such as increased appropriations, etc. Our alumni association is represented on our university council, on the athletic board of control, and certain alumni were appointed as such on the board of regents by the governor of the state.

This is a subject in which I am particularly interested, as we have the question of better university organization under consideration at the present time. Our new president, George E. Vincent, is a man of very democratic tendencies and believes in team work to the fullest extent. Our university council, which is now a representative council, is planned to be reorganized on the basis of including all the deans and professors in the various departments, organized as a university senate, the president of the university being the president of the senate and the deans of the colleges a sort of executive council. The matter is not yet fully worked out, but something along this line must certainly come in university administration. The day of one-man control of institutions of learning, or of scientific institutions or bureaus, is past, never to return. The exact form in which this more democratic organization should be undertaken is of course a question which will depend somewhat upon local conditions.

There are many excellent features in your plan of university control. The central idea, representative basis, is correct. Special features should be added to your plan to meet the normal conditions existing in some state universities so as to completely
eliminate politics. A large portion of the time and energy of the presidents of some state universities is necessarily spent in catering to popular "calls" so as to aid in securing appropriations. Presidents are even "rated" on their ability "to get" funds from legislatures. For a young institution this is in part excusable, but the habit once formed seems to cling long after the necessity ceases. This spirit extends to the professors and they often feel that they must offer so-called "popular courses" so as to aid in securing funds. This in turn leads to tin-horn work, and when the funds are secured often the modest, scholarly, deserving professor receives a mere pittance for his department, and the professor doing "showy work" gets the lion's share. College extension work is commendable, but it should be kept distinct from serious college instruction. This catering to the public and "popularizing" universities is in danger of being overdone and affecting the moral aspect of the work. Students, quick of perception, readily imitate "show work," and formulate wrong moral standards. The welfare of a university is the safest in the hands of a carefully selected and reasonably well paid faculty. The faculty and president should establish the educational standard of the university. Some colleges have too many professors and not enough assistant professors and instructors. Faculties should be carefully selected with the view of getting men who will work in harmony and men broad enough to forget individualism and to work for the common good of the institution. As to the president, he should be ripe in scholarship or at least capable of appreciating ripe scholarship. He should not be hampered by a dictatorial governing board, neither should he be autocratic in his relations to professors. The professor in an institution should stand in the same relationship as a director in a large business organization—not performing the functions of a manager or president, but assisting him to promote the welfare of the institution. The trusteeship of the college should concern itself largely with the financial management and affairs of the institution, and not attempt to perform the functions of president or faculty. And finally there should be some way of securing men for trusteeship so as to eliminate politics as largely as possible. That such conditions do exist is suggestive of a recent
grand-jury report of Hennepin County, Minneapolis, where the University of Minnesota is situated, when a shortage in accounts was investigated. "Your committee farther recommends that all moneys derived from any source whatever be deposited with the state treasurer; also that all appointments to the board of regents be made on the basis of personal fitness rather than on the basis of interchange of political courtesies." Without commenting upon the merits or demerits of this report, it is simply suggestive of the necessity for better forms of government and control of universities, and without criticism I am bringing this to your attention for consideration in connection with your plan for university control. Let your plan include the state universities as well as those privately endowed. Good will come, I believe, from a frank discussion of the question.

I am strongly in sympathy with your efforts to secure self-government in American universities. While the chief claim for the present hierarchy of officials—regents, president, deans, heads of departments—is that this form of organization makes for efficiency, in actual operation it leads to misdirection of effort, to non-representation or misrepresentation, to the elevation of personal interests above the good of all, and to unnecessary friction and strife, all of which spell waste and not efficiency. The specific ills in the state universities, at least, which appeal most to me are the following: (1) Lack of means of expression for all members of the staff of instruction. The men who have new ideas that are worth trying out are the young men who have no means of being heard. (2) The organization of the university by colleges instead of by faculties or by student groups. This leads to the erection of high walls around each college, the building up of vested rights in each faculty which becomes a close corporation for the defense of those rights. It leads to overlapping and duplication of work, to friction and waste of resources. Worse than these, it leads to disregard of the needs of the students and the public and contributes to crystallization along lines of personal interests, local tradition or ancient customs. This is one source of the provincialism of the state universities. (3) The control of departments by "responsible
heads." This is largely responsible for the stifling of individual initiative, for much friction and neglect of proper university functions, for misdirection and waste of energies in furthering the personal views or interests of the head and for much if not most of the evils of playing politics. For example, I know one head of a department who has done practically no teaching or research for five years or more, none whatever in the last two years; who spends his time in playing politics for the purpose of making a large outward show for his department, securing buildings and apparatus in profusion, holding many offices and committee appointments, and leaving the internal affairs of his department in almost complete chaos. He never calls a conference of his staff, but takes care to consult them individually and alone if at all. His policies are not approved by a single member of his staff. Several of them are called upon repeatedly to do the teaching for which he gives himself credit in the official announcements. There is no way under present conditions even to attempt the remedy of these things. (4) The mania for administration. The universities have gone administration-mad. Besides the deans of colleges who are not expected to do much teaching, a large number of men are spending more than half their time in administrative duties and most members of the faculties are asked to do so much committee work as to seriously interfere with their teaching and make research almost out of the question. Soon there will be so much administration that there will be nothing to administer. (5) The failure of most faculties to grasp the educational situation and work out any comprehensive policy fitted to the needs of the present students and the present-day community. The elective system, which was designed as a means of enabling the serious student to do a higher order of work, has degenerated into a means of enabling students to secure the bachelor's degree for four years of elementary work. As to the remedy for these evils, I can not agree with your proposed weakening of the presidency. In my own university it has been chiefly the weakness of the president which has allowed these evils to grow to such proportions as they have attained. I should rather say that the desirable thing is the strongest possible man as elected president in a democratic or
cooperative university society. I should like to see all but the most general powers taken away from the governing board (regents or trustees). Certain broad financial matters, the representation of the state university before the legislature and the fostering of favorable public sentiment, these functions may well reside in a board of regents. All else should be determined by some representative body of instructors. To such a body the president himself should owe his election in the first instance and possibly he should be subject to some form of "vote of want of confidence," or recall. For business and financial management there should be associated with the president a university commiss-roller with large powers. Educational policies should be in the hands of a university senate consisting of all men of the rank of professor. I would add to this senate a certain number of elected representatives of the younger men including instructors. These younger representatives might serve upon committees and take part in debate, and might or might not have votes. Among the plenums mentioned in your section (5) would be plenums of all instructors giving courses credited toward a given degree. These would serve all the proper purposes now served by colleges. For the more or less autocratic head of a department I would substitute a staff-conference which should elect its chairman for one or more years. This chairman would perform the duties of the present head of a department, except that he would be a representative of his staff. It might be desirable in laboratory subjects for the staff to elect a second representative in matters of building, equipment and supplies. The appointment of new members to the staff should be a subject of staff conference and election. Similarly the promotion of members to the rank of professor should be the result of election in which the staffs of closely allied departments should take part. Under such conditions the abuses of powers and of privileges by the heads of departments would scarcely be possible. Nevertheless, a further safeguard against the indolent politician should be provided in the form of a recommendation to reduce the rank of a member of staff or to dismiss him for continued neglect of duty or misconduct. Such a recommendation should be subject to approval by the senate. I can not share the confidence expressed by you in
the lifelong tenure of the professorship, after the abuses which I have seen. Some of these would be favored by this very security of position, and the greatest care in the selection of professors would not ensure against occasional unfortunate elections. "Eine verdorbene Apfel verdirbt viele andre." The evil effects of an occasional loafer in the high office of professor can scarcely be estimated. The possibility of recall by one's fellow workers would in no way or degree militate against good work or peace of mind on the part of a serious and honest man. It might prevent degeneration in the case of a weaker character. It is scarcely conceivable that the recall would be exercised except in cases of flagrant abuses. I think, after all, that my view does not differ essentially from yours. I agree that "the election should be for life, except in case of impeachment after trial."

It is quite obvious that we are floundering in the management of universities, and you are crusading in a good cause when you attempt to bring about conditions under which scholarship, expressed in instruction and production or research, may have a fuller or more normal development. The problems to be solved are complex and no simple solution of all is possible. Some of your proposals, however, seem to me to point the way for some evolution in the right direction. Among these the following seem the most important: (1) The best traditions and most effective management would be conserved when the supreme control of the institution is invested in a corporation, which might be variously constituted according to the nature of the foundation. The trustees should perform the proper functions of such officers, of which the business management, care and increase of the endowment would be the most important. (2) The designation of an electorate for the presidency, or chief educational officer, is not easy to make. The faculty should have a dominant voice in naming a president, but it would be well to have electors representing the corporation at large, as well as the trustee element. This might serve to avoid factional divisions which might easily arise when one or two of the faculty were candidates for the presidency. The president should be selected without reference to his membership in the faculty, but should
become a member by such election. Such security of tenure should be attached to the place as to attract men of ability, and the presidency should be referable to the electorate at all times, with proper protection of the personal interests of the incumbent. (3) The men representing interests so near together as to be readily grouped should form the unit of organization. These groups should be represented in a legislative body of the whole university. This smaller body or senate should serve as a council with the president on all matters pertaining to educational policy and also harmonize the activities of the groups or departments. The electorate for the faculty might well be constructed as you suggest—the interested group to have a dominant voice with other elements represented. It seems to me that the above ideas have been proved successful so far as they have been tried in various institutions, although of course not more than a few are practised in any form in one place.

I agree entirely with your objections to the present system which puts so much power in the hands of one individual. I believe that a system of government such as you propose could be adopted now with advantage by universities in which the faculties are of a high type, and whose alumni take an active and intelligent interest. However, I do not think it could be adopted at present in institutions such as Missouri, Kansas and Minnesota, for the following reasons: (1) The alumni take little interest in university affairs—at least only a few of them do. Again they are apt to favor popular professors rather than men of a real university type. They do not recognize the value of the research man at all. (2) I doubt the ability of our faculties to govern themselves. This has practically been the state of affairs during the past eight or ten years of President Northrop’s administration at Minnesota, and it has been a deplorable failure. The heads of the departments are in many instances men of inferior type. They would never remove one another to put in good men. The only salvation is a strong-armed executive, such as I believe we have in President Vincent. (3) Again, I do not believe that the state would delegate its powers to an organization of this kind. In Missouri and Kansas it is very difficult to
get adequate financial support from the legislatures. All support might be withdrawn if the enemies of the university could show that the professors had the power of fixing their own salaries. But, on the other hand, the scheme of control you have outlined is much more desirable than present conditions. I am in favor of working toward it even in the state universities. It may be practical in time in these also.

In the main, I feel that the representative basis is the ideal toward which we must strive. It is trite to say that just how much of this is practicable at any given time and place is of course where opinions will vary. There are some qualifications of your ideas which I should favor, but in general I approve of your plan, as is shown by the following: (1) The corporation should consist of professors and other officers. The alumni should not be allowed a dominant influence, on account of their conservative tendency. A student (undergraduate) knows and sees about as much of university control as a passenger on a railway is able to learn of railroading. The corporation should elect trustees. Or, where trustees are elected by the people, I do not see how to separate the business administration from the educational, as such trustees have full control. In practise this is a democratic basis, but at present the top of this system is or may be autocratic. These trustees should delegate democratic powers to the faculty. (2) The president should be elected by a representative body, and probably for a limited term, but his term of years might be rather prolonged. I doubt the practicability of giving the president no more salary than a professor, particularly here where the tenure is so limited, and an able man knows the risks. At present some of our state universities need some of the elements of the "old" college president to manage the legislature. (3) Each unit of organization should be democratic, as the school or department. This should include financial autonomy. (4) Each school should elect its dean and executive committee, and they should be responsible to the bodies electing them. The nomination of professors might well be done as you suggest. I doubt if it is practicable to pay the same salaries to all professors, at least under present social conditions,
and especially in the case of lines with a practical bearing. The
election of professors (full) is simpler in some respects than
those of lower rank. And just as young men are jealous of pos-
sible competitors and slow to recognize or grant ability in rivals,
on the other hand, heads or professors are similarly solicitous of
younger rivals, and may be intolerant of divergent opinions and
originality. With a change of conditions it might be possible
to combine in our faculties both scholarship and executive ability.
At present the preponderance of autocracy favors executive
ability in all positions and often gives secondary consideration
to scholarship.

It seems to me that there are three classes of problems con-
ected with this question, concerning finances, public represen-
tation, and educational administration. The third class should
be subdivided, for the subject of educational administration may
be either the student or the teacher. In American universities
the financial responsibility rests either on the trustees alone or
on the trustees and the president. Public representation is one
of the duties of the president. The educational administration
of the teaching force is also the president's business. The edu-
cational administration of the student body is largely left to the
faculty, but is shared more or less by the president and the
trustees. I understand that you are working toward an in-
creased power of the faculty as compared with that of the presi-
dent and the trustees. The present, relatively small, responsi-
bility of the faculty, if defended at all, is usually defended on
the ground of conditions peculiar to America. American uni-
versities had to be created out of nothing and had to serve the
peculiar needs of a new nation. As our national life becomes
more stable we may adopt a more democratic method of control,
like that of the German universities. So it is argued. But I
fear that those who argue thus misunderstand the administra-
tion of the German universities. I do not believe that imitating
the German universities will do us any good. The same evils
which we find here exist there, only worse. The faculty is sup-
posed to control the instruction of the students and the appoint-
ment of the instructors. As a matter of fact, the faculty has no
such powers. The American regards the doctor’s degree as the normal end of a university course. That is the point where the misunderstanding enters. In Germany, not the doctor’s degree (a mere decoration), but the state examination is the normal end of the university course. All the conditions for the state examination, as far back as the requirements for entrance to the university course, are fixed by the state department of education. The university faculty is completely left out, except in so far as some professors may also happen to hold positions in the state government. Compare the enormous influence of the faculty of an American university upon the course of instruction! The advantage is not on the German side. The German faculty is supposed to appoint, practically, the instructors. As a matter of fact, the only position filled by the faculty’s own power is the unsalaried one of “Privatdozent,” which does not even give the appointee a seat in the faculty, but only the permission to use a lecture room in the building. The misapprehension of the power of the faculty results chiefly from the fact that the faculty customarily makes recommendations as to the filling of a vacancy. But the man who actually fills the vacancy is the “Ministerialdirektor,” just as in America it is the president; and the Ministerialdirektor may, and not infrequently does, throw the recommendation of the faculty into the waste-paper basket. You say that the power of the president places the American professor in a humiliating position. But the German professor is in an equally humiliating position. For positive proof, read the proceedings of the last meeting of German university professors in Hamburg, as published in the daily press a few months ago. No denunciations of any American university president by a humiliated professor can be worse than the similar denunciations publicly pronounced there on the late Ministerialdirektor Althoff, who for a generation ruled the Prussian universities with an iron hand. Most American writers do not seem to know the very existence of the office of the Ministerialdirektor, who is the German counterpart of the tyrant ruling over an American university. They fail to notice him because he does not rule over any one university, but over all the universities of the state; and because he never represents any university before the
public, this being the rector's duty. It is interesting that the
very men who at that meeting complained of the despotic powers
of the Ministerialdirektor had only praise for the general effi-
ciency of university administration. We are accustomed to
similar combinations of praise and blame in America. Don't let
us look, then, to the German universities for remedies for our
troubles; we do not easily find any there. Now let me turn to
your propositions. I have no objection to the first. It places a
part, but not a burdensome part, of the financial responsibility
on the faculty. The faculty should have little of this responsi-
bility; but at present the faculty has too little of it. Your second
proposition as to the office of president I endorse with certain
restrictions. I should endorse it without restriction if the repre-
sentation of the university at public functions were not the presi-
dent's but a different man's duty. If it is the president's duty,
then he should receive a higher salary during his term of office
(so does the German rector), quite aside from having his inci-
dental expenses paid by the institution. However, I should
regret to see a university represented at a public function by
any man, whatsoever his prominence, other than one of its pro-
fessors. In this point, I believe, the Germans should be our
models. And then, too, it should be a different professor every
year who, like the ever-changing German rector, represents the
university before the public. Thus only can the public get the
proper idea of what a university is, that is, the body of its pro-
fessors. Therefore I conclude that the president should be elected
annually from the professors by the professors, that during his
term of office he should receive a fixed addition to his salary, and
that there should be as much rotation in this office as possible.
This rotation of office which I favor leads me to another point.
The lack of knowledge among faculty members of the actual
methods of administration and of the statutes by which it is gov-
erned in their own institution has become more striking to me from
year to year. But its cause too has become clearer from year to
year. It takes time to familiarize oneself with the administra-
tive system. At present there is no inducement to give (or
waste) this time except the advantage of being able to vote more
intelligently at faculty meetings, where, however, a single vote
does not count for much. Let the faculty member feel that once he will have to administer these statutes himself for a year before the public eye, and the inducement to know them is there. And after retiring from his term of office, what a different man he will be in faculty meetings. Thus only, it seems to me, can a faculty and the faculty meeting be made what it ought to be, instead of being, more or less justly, a target of jokes. I have hardly any criticism to make on your propositions concerning the organization of the schools, divisions or departments. I believe that the office of dean should rotate like the office of president, and I agree with you that in general there should be as much anarchy as is consistent with unity and order. I especially endorse that in the appointment of a professor some well-defined influence be given to experts in the subject outside the university.

On the whole I can heartily endorse your proposal for university reorganization as something toward which we should be working. You are quite right in emphasizing the fact that no reorganization like this should be undertaken in a revolutionary fashion and any one can see how some of the provisions would have difficulties in particular institutions. Your plan seems an excellent starting point for an agitation looking toward fundamental changes, which is about all one can say of so revolutionary a program when first proposed. I like particularly your comments upon the provincialism of many boards of trustees and the absence of any personal understanding between trustees and faculty, also the benefit which institutions might derive by seeking more outside aid and criticism. Although I am now in an institution in which the defects of the present system are less in evidence than in most places, and although I have a real personal attachment to the president and great confidence in his integrity and ability, I am convinced that the system is wrong. There is, as I see it, a very fundamental difference in the scholastic and the administrative point of view, and a man who goes into the presidential office, even though he may have had some experience as a teacher and investigator, usually finds no time to continue this work and he gradually comes to a place where he has the administrative in place of the scholastic point of view.
I believe in administration by specialists, but I think every one should understand that the administration is not the main thing. The essential defect in the existing system lies in the magnification of the administrative function.

Your plan for university control in its main outlines meets with my hearty approval. We live at present in an educational autocracy which is essentially undemocratic in principle and in spirit and disintegrating in its effect upon the independence and cooperation of our faculties. They have no ultimate control, and are all too prone to lose what little remains. In this university in the past ten years there have been a number of instances of the passage of important functions from the faculties into the hands of the executive. This situation is fundamentally subversive of the best interests of our democratic institutions; it tends to weaken initiative and subtly undermines effective constructive teaching and research. As to the details of your scheme permit me to criticize it—largely from the standpoint of the state university. (1) An extra-mural chancellor is a useless appendage, without adequate basis for "representing" the university to the community. Such a man should be chosen from the faculty and should combine educational experience, long knowledge of the state and community as well as the university, in order to interpret each to the other. (2) It would seem that the position of president as here defined is robbed alike of all honor and emolument and no one would care to assume its empty honors. I think you have gone too far in stripping the office of its dignity. This man should have more recognition and more power. As defined by you, he is below our deans in all respects. The university must have a leader, responsible to it, but he must have power for leadership and some financial recognition. (3) and (4) The departmental-division-school system is certainly the most effective for the unit itself. I have serious doubts as to the workability of complete educational autonomy of subdivisions. Even a small degree of this is leading in some of our universities to waste of effort, duplication of courses and equipment, and to rivalry resulting in lowered standards. (5) These recommendations are good as far as they go, but leave the "university as a
whole" too much the prey of factional interests. These interests are more sharply divided and unevenly balanced in state universities where economic pressure is affiliated with schools of agriculture, engineering, etc., than in endowed institutions not responsible directly to legislatures for their support. A loose system, containing "much of anarchy" would inevitably be disastrous to fields of learning where economic backing is feeble. Witness the recurring contests between state universities and agricultural and engineering colleges in states where the two are independent institutions, and the low standards of scholarship and research persisting in so many state universities in the agricultural departments, even under present autocratic control.

On one point I believe there can be no doubt—as you suggest the university must be reorganized on a representative basis, so that the faculty may take some actual part in shaping the larger policies of the university, as well as minor matters, connected with the curriculum, which latter responsibility is about the only one they usually have at present. With regard to the first suggestion, I am inclined to think that for state universities at least the present plan of direct appointment of the regents by the governor is better than election by the people at large. I should like, however, to see some of the regents elected by the faculty and the alumni. I agree with the suggestion that the president should be elected by the faculty and be subject to recall by them, but I am somewhat in sympathy with the spirit of the times which inclines toward giving rather large powers to executive officers. A president should be more than a mere figurehead; but his activities should be rather in the direction of harmonizing and coordinating the departments from within, not in tyrannizing over them from without, often with no clear notion of their real needs. Certainly there should be no powers conferred on him by the trustees which could give him the impression that the members of the faculty are his hired men. It might be well to give him a somewhat larger salary than that of a professor, because the position probably entails larger expenses, but no great discrepancies ought to exist. With suggestions Nos. (3), (4) and (5) I fully agree. Appointments and dismissals (for cause only)
should be made by the faculty—no one man should exercise such a responsibility. Each department should have all the freedom consistent with the proportional welfare of all the departments. I am afraid that much of our present trouble arises from the prevailing indifference of faculty members to other departments than their own, and a failure to recognize their responsibilities to the university as a whole. How many times have I seen important business deferred because a quorum could not be obtained in faculty or committee meetings—and not always because the absent ones were engrossed in professional work, but sometimes because they found it hard to tear themselves away from the billiard table or golf links. Perhaps the suggestion that appeals to me most is that contained in footnote No. 9. But it is not merely or mainly legitimate administrative work that uses up the time and energy of our teachers. It is the absolutely useless and fruitless work of ascertaining whether students are or are not fit to receive their degrees. Of all medieval educational fetiches I think this is the worst—that students go to school and to college simply to be sorted and labeled. Let us confine our energies to trying to teach them—our labels are meaningless and will not stick—they will soon enough get labeled properly when their actual life work has fairly begun.

Your proposed plan of university control is ideal; though in actual practise it would doubtless have to be greatly modified to meet varying conditions. In some respects the prevailing plan of university organization is probably advantageous during the present transition period of rapid growth and expansion. But as conditions become more stable, and as our institutions become real universities, in substance as well as in form, it seems to me that more democratic methods of administration become not only desirable but inevitable.

The more I have considered it the more I am inclined to believe that some such plan could be adopted with advantageous results by our universities. The examples in Europe teach us that a powerful head is not essential for a university, and there are some obvious advantages in a purely democratic form of government.
I find nothing in your proposals to dissent from, and almost nothing with which I am not in complete agreement. Indeed, the only point that I feel any doubt about is the last sentence, and this is perhaps more a matter of terms than of anything else. I have seen such lack of correlation and coordination in universities, so much intellectual anarchy, that I am at a loss to know which is worst, a dead level of unity and order or a chaos of anarchy. Perhaps, after all, the worst situation is where one condition prevails in certain colleges, and the other in related colleges. At any rate, it seems perfectly clear that the universities can never be efficient self-regulating organisms unless they are democratic in the best sense of the word.

I feel more and more confident that the administrative side of our American universities has a bad influence especially on the younger members of the instructional force. I do not feel that I have given your article entitled "University Control" sufficient thought to express an opinion on all the points involved, but I heartily agree with the method suggested for the election of professors. I also agree with you as regards the salary of the president. I believe that a very large part of the committee work in this institution, for instance, owes its existence to the interest in such work on the part of members of the instructional force, and to the foresight of shrewd deans interested in emphasizing their importance in the work of the university. As long as the largest salaries go to administrative officers, we can scarcely hope for better conditions. It is bad if the president receives more salary than the most noted professor, but when each of half a dozen deans is also paid more than any one who devotes his time and energy to teaching and the advancement of knowledge, things are doubly bad. I hope very much that such a scheme as you suggest will be given a trial in one of our largest institutions, by gradually adopting its various features. I should begin with the method of appointing professors.

It seems to me that we must come to some other plan than the existing one, and a representative plan such as you outline must be the inevitable outcome if our faculties are to enjoy that free-
dom and feel the accompanying responsibility that characterize our German colleagues in their organization. I think that your plan is admirable, and I have no specific suggestions that seem to me to be a real improvement. It seems to me that at our university we are slowly moving toward a democracy. However, the feeling still prevails quite strongly that the positions of dean, head professor, and president, of course, are more dignified, and these offices set the standard of the professor's value in the university activities. It has always seemed somewhat anomalous to me that the salary of dean should be so much higher than that of the professor when his work is largely administrative and clerical. I venture to say that the increase in vigor, virility and strength that would develop in a faculty during five years of life under a representative plan would really be a matter of surprise to skeptics.

I am very favorably impressed with the scheme, which is certainly a much-needed one. Almost anything would be better than the absolute monarchies that by some strange freak of development have grown up in our republic in precisely the institutions that should stand for democracy. Naturally, as an enthusiastic believer in democracy, and as a Californian of the most insurgent sort I should insist on the initiative, the referendum and the recall as an indispensable part of your scheme. Nothing else will ever continue to be satisfactory.

I find myself clearest in regard to your section (2), the electing of the president by professors or officers; and the relation of his pay to theirs. With this I am in entire agreement. That phase of your program dealing with the choice of professors seems to me excellent—that the nomination for professorships should be approved by a board of advisers constituted as you say in section (4), especially the introduction of experts outside the university as a check upon mere personal considerations. The final election by the senate, and a veto-power vested in trustees, seem to me sound and proper features. The main thing is that the ultimate power shown should be in the hands of the "corporation" essentially as you plan it in the first sentence of section
(1) but as to the details of organization of that body, and as to
the inner organization of the faculty itself, I have no fixed con-
victions. It seems to me that (as you yourself would probably
hold) these things will need experiment and will differ in differ-
ent places, without affecting the heart of the matter. What we
need to express—and your plan would express it—is that ad-
ministration is not the highest and most precious thing in the
university; and the symbols of its elevation at present (external
honors and high salary) express a perverted idea of its place in
the university.

(1) The board of trustees should function in the production
and care of the university's income. The board should not dic-
tate the spending of the income, certainly not in detail as be-
tween departments or needs of the university. (2) There should
be a council or senate of professors, which should determine not
only the educational matters, but the financial expenditures. The
president should receive no greater salary than the highest rank
of professor. He would not be able in such case to surround
himself with a political coterie through his present power of
appointment of professors or to use money for similar purpose
by salary promotions. (3) I see no objection to this section.
(4) Selection of professors and promotion in rank or salary should
be made by the senate of professors [see (2)], not by the small
division or department. A man who is a candidate for a pro-
fessor’s chair should look big or promising to a considerable num-
ber of experienced men. Moreover, a good man should not be
subject to the jealousy of his associates in a small department.
The charge of jealousy is, to be sure, too often a cheap way of
making complaints, but, after all, jealousy itself is one of the
commonest of human failings and manifests itself in most ugly
ways. (5) The senate of professors should have real power and
immediate control. I have no objection to a veto power by the
trustees; it would be a wise check. But the professors should be
able without useless conditions or handicaps to use the resources
of the university. For example: all secretaries, clerks, stenog-
raphers, bookkeepers, curators and librarians should be at the
service of the intellectual body in the university, to do what the
professors desire done for the advancement of the university and the cause of letters and science. As things are now in the University of California the "clerk gang" calls itself "administrative," runs the university; is incredibly ignorant and narrow and puts on most despotic and lofty airs. The salaries of clerks average much higher than the salaries of professors. This is ludicrous enough or would be if it were not so real. A number of professors have turned their positions into "administrative" offices. These professors without exception have no interest in their subjects and in a real reform would be properly labeled as clerks and made to work as such. No plan of whatever scope can, it seems to me, be successful which does not actually and genuinely provide for the encouragement of men who have a real interest in their subjects and are actually working and accomplishing things, that is, have real achievements in teaching or in research, or both, to their credit. At the same time, there should be discouragement, at least passive, of those men who do no work and more especially of those who sit around and do nothing but talk indefinitely, but volubly, of "research" and "scholarship."

On one point in connection with this whole question I am quite clear: Until the universities of the country are put on a far more democratic basis as to organization, administration and general outlook than they are now on, they can not reach the high place in the nation's life they ought to hold; and much of what they do must continue to be positive disservice. It is inconceivable that a country committed to democracy in its entire governmental system could be very successful politically so long as the institutions of first importance to its intellectual life should be the very antithesis of democratic. The theory that the citizenry of the nation as a whole is capable of self-government, while the citizenry of the universities of the nation are not capable of self-government, is monstrous, and how we came to be trying to run things on this theory would be, I should think, a highly interesting subject of inquiry for a socialist. Whether the plan of control outlined by you would be best in all respects, I would not venture to say without more study than I have been able to give
the problem in detail. Several of the suggestions strike me very favorably. On a few of them I am in considerable doubt. The methods of handling funds and making appointments would have to be determined with particular care and in the light of the widest experience. I am not sure from your letter that you would care for a general suggestion from me. Nevertheless I am going to venture one. It is that instead of breaking ground, so to say, on this hard practical question by trying to get the views of university men on so large a part of the whole of it at one time, it might be better to begin with the single question: Ought the universities to be made more democratic through and through? I may be wrong, but suspect there would be far from uniformity of reply. I believe there is a good deal of inadequate observation and rather hazy thinking on the subject. The state universities are furnishing some eye-opening object lessons in this direction. When one of these can travel over its state in an agricultural demonstration train to help the farmers on the spot with their sick chickens, their alkali lands, and their grasshopper troubles, at one extreme of its activities; and at the other live in isolation on a mountain top, occupied with the highest, most difficult of problems in “pure astronomy,” and do it all on money raised by general taxation, there is surely some evidence against the view that a genuine democracy must of necessity be genuinely mediocre in all that appertains to the higher life. I notice by several remarks in your printed article that you fully realize the necessity of going slowly in this radical reformation. My suggestion is in that behalf. It seems to me that a thorough study first hand by some competent, unbiased person like yourself, of just what the state universities particularly (though by no means exclusively) are doing, would be a very good first step.

I fully agree with your ideas concerning the reform of university control, but am inclined to believe that the cause of the present situation is not sufficiently appreciated. Nobody will deny that the shortcomings of the present system of university administration are, as you state, the product of two factors, the absolute power of the administrative body and its often high degree of incompetence. The former does more harm than the latter. The
unwillingness of trustees and president to abandon their power is part of the general system of class rule. The trustees represent the ruling class of their state or community. They are more than anxious that their institution should not turn out men who might endanger their class privileges or prejudices. In regard to prejudices it is only necessary to mention the fact that until a few decades ago the trustees were trying to guard against the teaching of evolutionary doctrines. Since the theologians have convinced themselves that the teaching of evolution is not likely to disturb the order of things the dogmatic supervision of universities has somewhat relaxed. As far as class privileges are concerned, several facts may be mentioned. In state universities where the trustees owe their appointment directly or indirectly to the political machine, they naturally do not wish to see their institution turn out graduates who might become leaders against the forces to which the trustees owe their power and often their financial standing. In the big industrial centers the real class struggle is on and will not down. The millionaire trustees of the big universities can not be expected to encourage the development of leaders of democracy in this struggle. To accomplish their end they need absolute power for themselves and their executive, the president, and are bound to stand for it. As long as those who wish to reform the present system of university administration fail to realize that this system is part of modern class rule and that their efforts to change this system are part of the class struggle, the chances of their success remain doubtful.
XVI. LETTERS FROM STATE INSTITUTIONS IN THE CENTRAL AND WESTERN STATES

Having risen from the ranks, so to speak (having been a professor in this university until three years ago), I appreciate all the difficulties of the situation. Since taking up the work of my present office, my relations with the members of the faculty have been unusually pleasant. I have been often surprised that there would seem to be a spirit abroad that members of the faculty were indicating a greater willingness to trust me than to trust their colleagues. I note what you say in footnote 3, of page 2, beginning with "There are often several trustees," etc. The desire of certain members of the faculty to secure an unfair advantage over their colleagues by securing the active interest of certain regents, an attitude unfair because these regents do not listen to more than a favored few, presents, in my judgment, the most serious problem of the college president at the present time. I note what you say about the permanency of professors' positions. As a matter of fact in our university there has not been a single instance of any one losing his position through any act or recommendation of mine. This includes all positions from deans to graduate assistants. The only removals of sufficient importance to make an impression upon my mind during my administration were as follows: One professor who had received a year's notice of his discharge, the notice being given nine months before my taking office. One fireman discharged by the superintendent of grounds and buildings for cause. One superintendent of farmers' institutes discharged directly through the board of regents against my recommendation, but not over my protest. The history of this institution shows that the tenure of office of a professor is very much better than that of the chancellor. I accepted my present office with full knowledge of these conditions. Though receiving now two and one fifth times my salary as professor of chemistry, I am actually saving less money. This comes about as follows: The position requires a house that
would have a rental value of a thousand dollars a year, while one
worth $300 per year sufficed for me in my professorial chair.
The sentiment in the state demands that I work in the way of
lectures, etc., gratuitously for the public. As professor of chem-
istry I had permission from the university authorities to con-
duct a private practise worth about a thousand dollars a year.
Expenses other than rent make the difference. Furthermore,
I was building up a name for myself among chemists. Under
present conditions a chancellor "out of a job" in the west has no
standing with any one. I would call your attention to the fact
that since I have been in office nearly twenty per cent. of the
presidents of tax-supported institutions have resigned or been
removed. I have sometimes thought that if the president could
be placed somewhat like the British premier—have his professor-
ship secure to go back to when some one else could better com-
mand the confidence of the regents, the faculty, the alumni and
the public—the situation would be better for all concerned. The
difficulties of the president's situation have been greatly increased
by agitation just such as you are now conducting. It is not
necessarily to be condemned on this account. It matters little
what happens to an individual president, or to an individual pro-
fessor, provided that we evolve a satisfactory system for the
future. It matters, in fact, very little whether the institutions
live or not, except in so far as they are necessary to the well-
being of the state and humanity at large. It seems to me, how-
ever, that at the present time the president's position is an im-
possible one. The members of the faculty, the alumni and the
public are demanding that in building up the institution he be
more than a god, while in the control of the internal affairs of the
institution and the direction of those forces which are necessary
to build it up, he is to be somewhat less than a man.

Probably there is no state university in the country which is
more a state institution than the University of Nebraska. We
are regarded as a part of the "state government," and in making
provision for the work of the state the legislature considers the
state university as much a part of the state government as the
governor's office, the office of the secretary of state, the state
treasurer, etc. By turning to the state constitution you will find a section which says:

The general government of the University of Nebraska is under the direction of the Legislature vested in a Board of six regents to be styled the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, who shall be elected by the electors of the state at large and their term of office shall be six years. Their duties and powers shall be prescribed by law.

So you see that the control of the university is fixed by the state constitution and can not be changed. In fact, we should not like to have it changed, as it gives us a board of control which is free from the dangers incident to an appointive board. Allow me to quote a few paragraphs from the law controlling the state university. Thus:

The Board of Regents shall have full power to appoint their own presiding officer and Secretary and they shall constitute a body corporate to be known as the Regents of the University of Nebraska, etc., etc.

The Regents shall have power and it is hereby made their duty to enact laws for the government of the University, to elect a Chancellor who shall be the chief educator of the institution, and the prescribed number of professors and tutors, and a steward, to prescribe the duties of all the professors and officers, and to fix their compensation. They shall have power to remove any professor or officer but only upon the proof of written charges, and after affording to the person complained against an opportunity for defense.

The University may embrace the following departments: (1) a graduate college; (2) a college of arts and sciences; (3) a college of agriculture; (4) a college of engineering; (5) a teachers college; (6) a college of law; (7) a college of medicine.

The regents shall be empowered to establish in these several colleges such chairs of instruction as may be proper, and so many of them as the funds of the University may allow, etc.

The immediate government of each college shall be by its own faculty, which shall consist of the professors therein, but no course of study shall be adopted or series of text books used without the approval of the Board of Regents.

From the quotations I have made you will see that a number of the things to which you refer are taken care of in the organic law which controls the university. Now I may make the following comments on your paper, referring to your numbered paragraphs: (1) In this university the "corporation" is in fact the people of the state represented by the board of regents on the one hand, and the legislature on the other. (2) I can not agree
with you in recommending that the "professors or officers or their representatives" should elect a president of the institution. Many years ago I maintained this view myself and advocated such a practise. However, after having had experience as acting-president (or chancellor) I have found that there are insuperable difficulties in carrying out such a plan. Our institutions are as yet too young and too much in need of guidance to permit us to adopt such a plan. During the periods when I was acting-president or acting-chancellor, it was my practise to keep in very close touch with the faculty, and I am told by those who have watched the development of this institution that during those periods the university made a most promising growth (I do not refer to numbers, but to procedure) and that many things which we now have, found their origin in such periods. This fact suggests to me that the executive of the institution must keep in close touch with his faculty, but my observation has been that in institutions, as they now are, with professors who are so largely interested in but one line of work, it is necessary that there should be one man in the institution who can think out consecutively the intricacies of the developmental problems that present themselves to every growing institution. For this reason, I feel that it is necessary that there must be one guiding mind. You may say that the election of a president by the professors would provide that, but we all know that in large faculties the election of a president if left to the professors would not be likely to result in the selection of the best executive. I wish it were not so, but unfortunately it is true that in any such selection not the good of the university as a whole would dominate, but the result would be determined by votes which had quite too much of personal and selfish considerations back of them. (3) Your statement in paragraph three is one that I fully concur in. It has been the practise of the University of Nebraska to give complete autonomy to each department. In fact that is one of the peculiarities of this institution. The head of the department is the one in full control, and his decisions stand. Where he is wise he counsels with his helpers (associate professors, assistant professors, instructors and even assistants) and the success of departments is largely measured by such willingness to counsel with those who are
helping to do the work. However, I feel that here, as with the institution as a whole, there must be one person whose final decision is really final. (4) As to the autonomy of each "school, division or department," that I have referred to above. The faculty which controls each college in this institution elects its minor officers, members of committees, etc., but it does not elect its professors, and it does not select them as a formal faculty. Nominations to professorships in this institution are by committees appointed by the chancellor from related departments. Commonly the dean of the college is a member of such special committee, and then the heads of related departments are added. They confer with one another and finally make their report to the chancellor, who then lays it before the board of regents, who by law are empowered to make the formal election. In this institution election to a full professorship is always for life, and as a matter of fact an election to associate professorships or assistant professorships is usually for life. Formerly we had a limited election for all but those who hold the title "professor" (including "head professor"), but the practise has largely come to be what I have indicated above. It should be said here further that many of our professors have become so by slow promotion from instructors. Such promotions have been both in title and in salary, but in no case do we have any "automatic" promotion or advance in salary. (5) The device of a "university senate" to legislate for the university as a whole has worked very well here. Now and then there has been danger of the encroachment of the senate upon the jurisdiction of some faculty, but there always have been enough alert men to stand up for the rights of the faculty and no difficulties have arisen. In so far as the inside control of the university is concerned, this university senate is coordinate with the regents, and neither body encroaches on the ground of the other. Yet it is recognized that in the end the regents constitute a higher body than the senate. I like the general idea in your footnote 9, where you say that "professors and other officers should not be distracted from their work of teaching and research by administrative politics." This has brought, with us, the practise of having much faculty administrative work done by standing committees appointed once a
year. I quite agree with you that no college or university can be "a simple democracy." That is unworkable, largely because the professors are appointed for a different purpose, and each man if he is doing what he should is giving his time and strength and thought to his teaching and his investigation. We have reached quite a satisfactory condition here in which the judicial work of each college is left to the dean and to a committee which assists him.

I think I agree with proposition (1) in its essential idea, though, so far as state institutions are concerned, I believe the people should elect all the trustees. If the institution has not influence enough to result in control by its friends in this manner, it is hardly probable that the institution will have much merit, or in any large way touch the interest of the people. In a republican form of government I believe that all its educational influences should be directly amenable to public opinion, and in any discussion of the propositions which you raise, my statements are influenced largely by this thought. It would, I think, be a very great misfortune to separate our educational institutions from our public official life. They must become closer in a government which depends upon education for its basis. I have no sympathy with any philosophy which would tend to set our teachers aside, making them amenable only to their own thoughts and ambitions. I would not have our universities become cloisters. There must be action and reaction between the educational institutions and the people, and we may as well understand that, one time as another. If our universities are alive, this influence will be for the good. If they are dead and only running for the purpose of placing learning into archives as a treasure trove for the learned, there is now no good cause for their existence. (2) might, I think, be a possible condition, though I can see no certain gain. Your statement that the president's salary should not be larger, his business more dignified, nor his powers greater than those of the professor, is not tenable in our form of government. If such is to be the case there is no object in having the position. It may be that there are institutions in which the president is not worthy of the institution, but it is a
strange mind that believes that there may not be some man more capable than others, and more worthy to be looked up to as a leader. I should have little use for our government if, in our desire to teach equality, we should gradually tend to the stagnant calm of uniformity. (3) is perhaps axiomatic, except the last sentence, which, of course, is only a guess, inasmuch as the size of the group will depend wholly upon the nature of the investigation and instruction which must be undertaken. With (4) I can not agree. Such a plan could only be effective at a time when our schools reach a condition in which there are offices of uniform graduation, out of which grades it is possible to rise only through death. In other words, our universities fall into a civil-service condition. A university should be a larger thing than that. If all the officers, major and minor, in a department were expected to remain constant in their positions, your proposition would be rather tenable, but it would be a very unfortunate condition when our colleges and universities reach such a status that a man once elected becomes a fixture in his little notch, with neither hopes or fears. Your statement that the "same salary should be paid for the same office and the same amount of work" sounds good, but at present it is un-American and I hope always will be, because there is no such thing as the same office or the same amount of work. A biologist can not think of one animal, or even a man, doing exactly the same amount of work as another, or as accomplishing as much, or even having the desire to do so. Our universities should not join the union. The present great incentive to American students is to gain the approbation of their fellow men, and this applies as well to a college professor or an instructor as in the business world. All the conditions which you desire in this paragraph can be reached under a management of the university which is amenable to a direct vote of the people. As to (5), I believe these features are all reasonably well attained under the present organization of our state colleges and universities, and each institution should be amenable to the direct vote of the people interested in that particular institution. If we are not already on that basis, our form of national government indicates that we must eventually come to it. The initiative and referendum will, in my opinion, be active here as else-
where. It will be all right for our educational institutions to initiate reforms in themselves, but it should be up to the people to decide whether such reforms are good or not. Being a biologist in training and thought, I have no desire to see our educational institutions adopt any plan to live to. These institutions must of necessity be a matter of evolution, and any plan which is adopted now will, in large part, be a dead one in the future, and in the meantime cause much unnecessary trouble in getting it out of the way. There was a time when our educational institutions had so many rules that a professor or a student could hardly live in the institution. We have now reached a time when our rules of life represent daily conduct amenable to public opinion. I should not care to help foist any sort of a scheme on the educational institutions of our country, which, if adopted by many people, would tend to put educational institutions into a strait-jacket again.

Propositions (1), (3), (4) and (5) are good and doubtless necessary for every large institution of higher learning. Details of make-up and of application will necessarily vary in different universities, especially in tax-sustained as compared with privately endowed institutions, and where the university is the culmination of the entire system of public education supported by taxation. With proposition (2), however, I do not quite agree. My opinion is based, of course, upon experience in, and a somewhat intimate knowledge of, conditions in only one institution. The president of the university should be elected by the trustees after securing the opinion or opinions of the professors upon available candidates. Professors might nominate a candidate or candidates. The president's powers from the standpoint of the whole institution should be greater than those of professor; his duties are more varied, and his responsibilities cover a broader range. His salary should also be larger, but not twice or thrice that of a professor, probably not more than twenty-five per cent. larger than the salary of professor. His position should certainly not be more dignified than that of the professor. One of the chief objections to the American university president is the fact that he has been in some cases, and may be still, an autocrat, an abso-
lute monarch, but with propositions (3), (4) and (5) well put into practise, he could establish a very limited monarchy only. The application of (3), (4) and (5) will constitute a rather broad constitution whose limits he can not well exceed. Moreover in the conduct of the affairs of his department of knowledge, the professor, or many of them, would rather be responsible to a president than to a committee of his colleagues. In the management of departmental affairs by a committee of professors, the practise of pitting one interest against another, or log-rolling, is a positive evil. In short there creeps in too much "politics," and the temptations to develop "political" methods become too strong. Or perhaps it is more like this in many cases: one of the children of a family resents being subject to official control or discipline by his brothers and sisters, but is much more amenable to outside authority. In short, I believe at present (though open to conviction) that an American university should have a strong president, i.e., strong in his knowledge of educational questions and a master of details on the business side of university administration. If it is not possible to combine the two in one man, there should be associated with the president a man who is master of business details and whose presence and activity are constantly conspicuous within the limits of the campus. The kind of university president most bitterly complained of, and justly too, is the narrow autocrat who refuses to consult or even to hear the opinions of his professors, save a selected few who become for personal reasons his henchmen. With your propositions (1), (3), (4) and (5) carefully worked out and put into practise, such a president as the foregoing can not be possible. As to salary let me say that men should never aspire to this profession because of the large compensation offered, if such were ever the case, but love of knowledge and love of the work should be our slogan, not love of the things the large salary could buy. True, salaries are distressingly small at present in our universities. Probably they should be equal to those of judges of the higher courts and of the higher officers of army and navy.

There are in every faculty a few well-balanced men of ordinary judgment with whom, if there were a sufficient number, a work-
ing democracy might be formed, but such a group in a university is very limited. The remainder or majority of the ordinary faculty I should class under three groups. (1) A few men, essentially selfish, who want everything available for themselves, or the interests they immediately represent. They will resort to intrigue and Italian diplomacy to attain their ends irrespective of the rights and welfare of others. Their code of ethics is similar to that of a pirate. (2) Men who are active until their own personal desires are satisfied and are then indifferent to the welfare of others or the general welfare unless their own comfort is jeopardized. (3) Men who wish to be always on the side that will win, not from principle of right, but in the hope that some advantage will accrue to them. With a combination of this kind a strong executive with more or less autocratic power seems necessary. I do not regard the autocracy of the president or overlord as so much to be deplored as the petty tyranny possible in the hands of a head of a department. The reason for this lies in the fact that an abuse of power in petty matters is much harder to bear than greater things which are shared by a larger group. In my opinion, the place where a test of democracy should be made is in the smaller unit. It must be admitted, I think, that a large share of the teaching and no small amount of productive scholarship falls upon those occupying subordinate positions in any department. The greatest element of protection afforded such men is that above their autocrat there is another autocrat who is jealous of his delegated power and will resent such abuses. Any gross abuses will or should be corrected instanter by the overlord, but an effort to correct petty abuses is more difficult. Any subordinate desiring to force the correction of a series of petty abuses risks his position and may be his educational prospects by attempting in the most open and legitimate way to have the ruling of the head of his department reversed.

(1) Looking at the matter from the point of view of the state university I should think that the nearest approach possible to your "corporation" would be to have a large part, say one half, of the trustees elected by the alumni. (2) I should replace the second statement by—his position should be at least as dignified
and his salary at least as great as that attainable by any professor in his faculty. His powers should be clearly defined and limited, as should those of all the officers of the university. (This would of course give greater power than at present in some ways, less in other ways.) I consider it bad that in many institutions the only hope of promotion and the only manner of promotion, after one reaches the professorship, lies in devotion to executive work. (3) One can hardly make the organization quite so simple in a large university. There must be something corresponding to colleges and departments and schools within those colleges. It may happen that the same department or school would come into more than one college. (4) I am inclined to the belief that this plan may be needlessly centrifugal. The appointment by the president, subject to the approval of the college, would seem to give sufficient democracy. In the smaller units the matter is not of vital consequence. In the manner of electing to the professorships I would grant the president at least a nominating power, or else a veto power, with restrictions, as in our national and state governments, upon both nomination and veto. This same feature might play a part in other matters of government. I do not see why all professors should be paid alike. Length of tenure and reputation should be taken into account. Financial autonomy is probably desirable for the colleges; will be a necessity in the near future. (5) This division does not seem to recognize sufficiently the difference in the character of the work of trustees and professors. Educational planning is the function of faculties under competent leadership. The carrying out of these plans and particularly the providing means for that carrying out is a matter that naturally falls to the trustees. Consultation between trustees and representative faculty committees is undoubtedly desirable, if only for the sake of a better understanding all around. There should be as complete unity and order as is consistent with flexibility and growth.

I fear I am not very expert on the question of university control. I find it hard to judge how far the good and bad results I see are due to the system or the men in each case. I don't care for the chancellor idea, and I think that a good president is a
great asset. The president should be a man rather well advanced in years, with a reputation as a scholar and man of affairs. He should represent, so far as one man may, the ideals and purposes of the university and should have such a character as to command respect. Such a president may be, I think, a great unifying force, and if he is wisely chosen there is no doubt, I believe, that his moral standards will be higher than the composite of a miscellaneous faculty. On the other hand, I most heartily agree that professors should be chosen only after they have proved their ability as scholars and teachers, and that once chosen they should have a free hand within all reasonable limits. I believe in the practical autonomy of the departments, and I think that when a new man is to be chosen, those most nearly concerned should have their say. Care should, however, be taken to avoid the possibility of departmental cliques refusing to let in new men just because they are new, and would bring new ideals, or possibly differ in opinion from some of the old guard. Given the autonomy of the departments, and a strong university senate, we have perhaps a sufficiently democratic system. If the president does not know the proper field for his activities, but tries to do work which should be done by others, it is difficult to control him; it is also difficult to control faculty members who err in the same way. It may be worth while at times to put up with some things for the sake of harmony: in fact, we all have to do this in our dealing with one another. Perhaps, after all, the root of most of the existing trouble is in our public and its ideals. We do not always know how to choose good men for presidents, or to keep them when we have got them. Faculties want more power because in various cases they feel that they are superior in knowledge and ideals to those who actually have charge. It would seem, however, that with power to choose the best men, this feeling would largely disappear. I think there is a natural desire (I am sure I have it) to look up to some one, but just because of that, it is irksome to look where that some one should be, and not find him. In our university here the president, whatever else may be said of him, has kept things straight and honest for twenty years, when it was extremely difficult to do so. It would be difficult to overestimate
the value of this service, and it seems to me quite impossible to imagine any such result with a system of changing faculty control, or even with a president not possessing large powers.

(1) While I think your plan would apply to an endowed university, it would be difficult to apply it to a state university. (2) Same as (1). I think the salary of the president should be larger but never more than twice as large as that of a regular professor. (3) Yes. Very good plan. (4) Our plan is to have the executive committee elective, but the dean is appointed, and in a state university I am inclined to think that this is a good plan because that gives a fair representation of both governing body and faculty. (5) Yes. Good.

He who believes in democratic control yet realizes the difficulty of attaining efficient and economical operation—economical in reference to the faculty member's time and energy—should find little in the proposed plan to question, and many suggestions to commend. The method of selecting trustees and the special committee for nominating professors are most admirable suggestions for any form of control. On the other hand, the important question as to who shall control the apportionment of funds which are not automatically distributed is not discussed. Personally, I am still more fearful of the results of a pure democracy than of a temperate monarchy. With the democracy I imagine that I can foresee two main parties within the campus gates—progressives and conservatives—alternately in control, tempted to strengthen their forces by electing to professorships men of like views. Likewise the deans and the presidents would be subject to the criticism of giving preference to members of their faction. I am inclined to believe that scholarship is most likely to grow under those conditions which require the least active interest in university policies.

Your first suggestion concerns the general organization of the governing body of the university, and, as I take it, involves the principle that this body should consist of people whom the institution serves and of those who serve the institution, and that this body should delegate its administrative force to a board of trus-
tees. As you suggest in your footnote, the application of this principle to state universities would be difficult to make. In a measure, however, the conditions surrounding a state university meet the requirements of your principle, and to that extent I should say that the principle is sound. I do not know how practical it would be in the case of privately endowed universities to institute such a scheme of control as you suggest. I imagine that it would vary largely with the institutions. My general opinion with regard to this matter is that the governing body of the institution should, as nearly as possible, represent the ideals and purposes of the community which it serves, and that any available means which would insure this representation might be used. For instance, in the case of Columbia, situated, as it is, in a very large city, I should deem it quite possible to carry out such a plan as you suggest with regard to the formation of the corporation governing the institution. On the other hand, the institutions situated in small communities would probably find it considerably more difficult to effect this type of organization. I hardly know what to say about the question of having a chancellor of the type that you suggest. Having grown up under a system of university control which places such a large emphasis upon the head of the institution, I find it difficult to conceive of conditions in which a centralized control might not exist. So far American universities have found it almost necessary to have some one who is able to represent the institution to the outside world and secure from it the necessary funds for maintenance. This is true even of state universities, where the head is obliged in most cases to go to the legislature and from it secure the necessary money for the running of the university. If it should come to pass that the states would provide an automatic maintenance from taxation for the support of their institutions, this need would not exist so strongly for them, and a chancellor of the type suggested in your first paragraph would not then be so necessary. If I analyze your second suggestion correctly, it involves the principle that the governing officer, the president, should be directly responsible to the faculty and should be its representative. Concerning this point I find myself in entire agreement with you. I also think that you are correct in your
analysis of the conditions which have led up to the present state of affairs, wherein the president of the institution exists as a force largely outside of the control of the faculty of the institution. This would seem to be fundamentally wrong. The really essential part of any educational institution must be the faculty. No other body within the institution, it would seem, is nearly so competent to judge of the needs of the institution as the teaching force. The final result of the present conditions must of necessity, it appears to me, be the production of a faculty body largely without initiative or power and the end result to the educational institution, inevitably a condition wherein it would exist without much influence upon the community. If we are to have strong and forceful faculties, they must be placed in such a position as to have responsibilities and be obliged to meet them, not only towards the students who come to them, but towards the communities which their institutions serve. It would seem no longer possible for an educational institution to withdraw itself from the life of its community, and only those will be successful which articulate themselves vitally with the people who support them and whom they serve. The intimate connection of the faculty with the administrative control of the institution, however, brings up one very practical difficulty, that is, that in taking faculty members away from the special work for which they prepared themselves it is necessary to ask for a division of their energies, and that, of course, must result to some degree in a lack of effectiveness. To avoid this, I am of the opinion that it will be necessary for institutions to train up men whose interests largely lie in educational administration. These men could be familiar with the aims and purposes of university work, and yet not be obliged to engage in teaching. They could constitute the educational machinery of the university to be under the direct control of the faculty, and in this way relieve the faculty members of a large amount of the details of administrative work. I should think, however, it would always be necessary for the faculty to retain control of the administration and to delegate only the details to the administrative machinery thus constituted. At the same time there should be provided, to as large a degree as possible, assistance of a clerical and technical sort, which
would relieve faculty members from the necessity of attending
to details of work which could be performed as well, or better,
by those who are not especially trained for teaching. In this way
I believe it would be possible for teachers to train themselves
intensively in their particular line of work and yet be in a posi-
tion to concern themselves with the general welfare of the insti-
tution and to contribute towards its administration. Your third
and fourth suggestions concern, as I take it, the details of organi-
zation within the institution. Here I find it more difficult than
in the other instances to answer specifically your questions con-
cerning the organization, for the reason that to a considerable
extent this must depend upon the nature of the institution itself.
It seems to me that you are correct in calling for the existence of
compact bodies of men all interested in a somewhat limited field
of work, with opportunities to meet and talk over the whole field
in which they are mutually concerned. Here I have repeatedly
urged the formation of sub-faculties constituted of the members
of the teaching force concerned with a particular branch of work.
For instance, I have suggested that all of those concerned in
biological instruction in the university should be constituted the
biological group of the general faculty, to be endowed with the
powers of an advisory body in relation to the whole faculty and
with administrative powers in regard to the biological work of
the school. Just how far this might be carried in the existence
of our present system of school faculties, I am not sure. It seems
to me that the present organization of the educational institu-
tions into schools and departments has to a large extent justified
itself and that by modifications of this it will be possible to do
away with such difficulties as are now inherent in this form of
organization. I am not sure, in the scheme which you suggest,
just where the unit of organization which you propose would
come in relation to present systems of organization. Is it to be
superimposed upon these, or is it to entirely take the place of
school and departmental organization? I am of the opinion that
the suggestion which you make with regard to the establishment
of these units of organization contemplates the formation of
largely independent bodies with limited interests and slight cor-
relation with similar units within the institution. Undoubtedly
great freedom of operation should be allowed, not only for the individual within the institution, but also the groups of individuals constituting a department or school. Whether it would be possible to endow these with such autonomy as you propose, extending even to financial control, is much of a question in my mind. I have been impressed with the need for better correlation between the parts of the university, rather than with the increased independence of them. This may possibly be due to the different nature of the institutions with which I am connected, but it has always seemed to me that there is a great need for more definite correlation between the different classes of subjects within the institution, and for that reason, in the scheme of organization which I proposed, I suggested the extension of the organization downward from the university council into the schools and departments by a system of representation which would carry the same individual from the council into the school and into the department as a member of various committees. Such a correlation as this I presume you intended to provide in your fifth suggestion, and it might be that what you proposed would be sufficient, but I am rather of the opinion that there is need for a machinery which will bring together more intimately the different interests of the school. There are so many things that could be said on this subject that I hardly know whether I have said too little or too much—certainly we are all vitally interested in the question, and much good must come from the agitation which now exists.

To me the presidency of an American university seems both an anomaly and a contradiction. All the presidents, I believe, have first been professors. Had they been successful professors, they would have remained professors, for a professor may be rated successful only so long as he is a professor. The fact that a professor is willing to renounce the calling to which he has devoted say the first forty-five years of his life together with all his energies, argues eo ipso in my opinion that he is not satisfied with himself. Gildersleeve, of the Johns Hopkins University, is my idea of a professor, antipodal to him is ——. As a professor he was not a success—as a university president he may have to fill
from twenty to fifty professorships, such as are held by Gilder-
sleeve. In these selections will he strengthen his own hand, or
will he be as sincere and virtuous as college presidents in their
orations would have other people be? On the other hand, the
fact that university mismanagement is so obvious to all and that
we continue to suffer therefrom, proves too well that professors
are incompetent in practical affairs; the meagerness of their
salaries is a mute witness of this; and as faculties they certainly
can not direct to the best advantage the business transactions
pertaining to large institutions. There is need of a business
manager. This work must be directed in part by a competent
head. If you call him president, insist that he be a man of
worth, sincerity and intellect. He should be able to obtain
endowments, and his home should be one of the social centers of
the community; his salary should be say five thirds that of a pro-
fessor. To offset the too great power he now enjoys and from
which the professors suffer, it might be well to have the deans
elected yearly by vote of their respective faculties; abolish the
senate which is a "go-between" between the president and board
of trustees, on the one hand, and the faculties, on the other;
have a board of trustees, consisting, say, of the president, the
deans, five members appointed by the alumni body and five
other members.

I agree most heartily with essentially everything you say in
the proposed plan. Good luck to you in forcing it through dim
eyes and muffled ears! Something like what you have outlined
has got to come to pass unless the clear-headed who can see the
present situation lose heart. Whatever salvation comes lies in
that direction. The only thing that can defeat it, besides the
blind plodding of those who have not thought through the situa-
tion, is the love of power of boards and president, who are now
in a position of authority and who, like the captains of industry,
are reluctant to relinquish anything. There are two points that
would seem to me to be overlooked in your plan. The first is,
that deanships will probably be a necessary part of the university
régime, even under ideal conditions. Greater differentiation and
consequently more autonomy of departments and schools, as the
university grows, are not inconsistent with the unification of related departments and faculties, each with its own executive officer. The university must progressively become a larger organism. The units of interrelation of parts will have to be individuals. Hence, deanships, rather than committees and councils. The deans should be elected by the faculties concerned. The second point has reference to student cooperation in university matters. Our biggest problem, at least so far as I can see, is to have students to feel that they are responsible parts of the great organism. For their sakes and for the health of the university as a whole they should have committees elected by themselves and have representation in the university senate with at least advisory power. I suspect that the reason they have not such representation now is the result of a false analogy drawn from the state, which prevents minors from active participation in affairs of adults. Another reason why students are excluded from representation in university questions is that colleges and universities have carried unto themselves customs which were developed for grammar and high school students. I hope that you will somehow get your plan so thoroughly before the university men of the country that it will produce conviction.

On the whole I agree with you completely. I believe in autonomy of the university and of each of its departments or divisions. What I have to say, however, has reference to state universities only, for I have no experience in others. In our particular case, I think a chairman of a board of trustees should be chancellor. His duties are largely perfunctory anyway. He shall preside at various functions when degrees are conferred; he shall represent the institution when necessary at the functions of other institutions of similar character; he shall be consulted in the election of members of the faculty and in the policy of the institution. But I agree with your second paragraph exactly. I am fully committed to the German method and think that the president should be chosen for a year only. I think, however, that his salary, on account of the increased expense to which he will be placed in the matter of entertainment and the like, should be at least one thousand dollars greater during his term of office. I
believe that the board of trustees should be paid. If chosen for political reasons and compliment they would certainly be less expert, and likely to leave the management of the institution to two or three; who, again, will leave it to the president and so establish an autocracy, which we so much depreciate. I agree with (3) and the first and second sentences in (4). I should hesitate to leave the election of any professor to the university senate after approval by the department concerned and the committee specified. The University of Iowa for twelve years has been following more or less closely the University of Chicago in its administration. The relation of the latter to the Rockefeller fortune caused Dr. Harper to organize the whole institution on the department-store system. He had head professors and all that. I understand that the new administration is getting rid of this artificiality and restoring autonomy as rapidly as possible. I agree with (5) in the thought that the senate shall not be in any sense a plenum, but shall be a joint committee of the whole. Generally speaking, I agree with your article throughout.

I have known of the election of a president of a college by trustees most or all of whom possessed little "schooling," such trustees relying on their own impressions and popular recommendation instead of the counsel of educated men of experience. Some of these elections proved most unfortunate, leading to forced resignation. The plan of selecting professors by a president or by trustees without consulting some or all of the faculty is most unfortunate and humiliating to those who have had experience in the institution. It serves as a wet blanket on the cordial cooperation which ought to prevail. The plan you propose could not fail to be an improvement on the plan now usually in vogue.

The fundamental principle of your plan, as I see it, viz., that the ultimate control of university matters should be in the hands of the faculty, has my hearty approval. I am rather inclined to think, though, that the greatest efficiency demands the delegation to the president of greater powers than I think you have in mind. I am a strong believer in centralized authority and responsibility
in government—in which I see no danger if the man having such authority is directly answerable to the people (or faculty).

I believe your suggestions are in the main eminently sound and workable. Many of our institutions are certainly in need of a change from the present chaotic conditions resulting from the ill-defined functions of the different bodies. At the same time, as you say, the boss system is utterly out of place in the university.

I am entirely in sympathy with the point of view of your article in Science, and with some of the proposed remedies for the evils that have arisen under the present autocratic system. In many places, the faculties have lost all interest in the direction of the institution because they have lost all power. This is the case in many places. As to our western state universities, it does not seem wise to lodge the election of the trustees in the hands of the people. As long as our college presidents can find nothing better to do than devise schemes for attracting larger freshmen classes that they may get more money, and more money that they may get more freshmen, there is little to be hoped from them.

When your article on university control appeared a few years ago I was much pleased with it. And I take great pleasure in saying that your ideas still have my hearty approval. I appreciate them now, perhaps, more highly than ever, because of my six years' experience at ——, whose administration for most of that time has been, in my opinion, inefficient and corrupt beyond the conception of any one who has not lived through it. And I have seen many things in university administration elsewhere which were outrageous in their nature and could never have occurred under the form of government which you espouse. Affairs at —— became so disgraceful and so trying to decent men, and therefore so detrimental to the prosecution of scholarly work, etc., that I concluded last summer not to endure the institution any longer. So I resigned my position and accepted a subordinate position here, in an institution and department managed by gentlemen. And I continue exceedingly glad of having made the change.
I believe the scheme you have outlined would not only give a
democratic government to our universities, but would greatly
advance the cause of higher education in America. It has seemed
to me that the Swiss and German universities which have no
president whatever run much more smoothly and are far more
conducive to scholarship than our own. At present we have at
our university a system that I believe is especially unfortunate.
You probably know what the system is. I might simply say that
I believe it is a clog to the advancement of those departments
which desire to advance beyond the ordinary gymnasium or high-
school ideal. I believe your third proposition is admirable and
might well represent a unit in the general organization in choosing
representatives for administrative purposes. I am in hearty
accord with your entire proposal and would be pleased to see
some practical results follow its publication.

I heartily approve of the general scheme proposed.

I have long been in favor of such a plan as you propose. I
have some question as to the dominance of departments as such.
The absolutism there is often as bad as any other. A group of
cognate departments as a large unit—instead of a single depart-
ment—would serve better, in my judgment, even though the num-
er of individuals included might be large. The "delayed
democracy" in university government can be defended only on
the grounds of immediate gain in efficiency. Its influence on
faculties has cost the country and the universities some important
leadership.

It seems that it would be reasonable to grant much larger
powers to the faculty. It is found here that the president can be
away from the university for weeks at a time without in any
manner affecting the work of the institution. In his absence the
secretary of the board of regents acts as the financial officer—
and does the work in a most efficient and agreeable fashion. As
the president in large universities never visits classes nor knows
anything personally about the individual instructors and pro-
fessors, it is difficult to see that he has any real educational
function. With his financial and educational work gone, there
would be very little for him to do. All committees here are appointed by the president and virtually have to report to him before each faculty meeting, thus making them largely his instruments rather than the instruments of the faculty. It occurs to me that you have not, in your paper, suggested a plan for the division or apportionment of funds to the various departments of instruction. Here is the place where the president has his most difficult work. Whether a president appointed by the faculty could carry out the wishes of a majority without most seriously offending some of the departments is a little doubtful in my own mind. Might it not come to this: that the heads of all departments would appear before the regents and the man who was the best talker get the largest appropriations for books, apparatus, etc.? I believe that one of the most important things to urge at the present time is the organization in each university (where this has not already been done) of a university senate which shall represent each and every teaching department, both of the liberal arts and the professional schools. The powers of this body should be gradually strengthened until all educational policies should be in their hands, and also as you suggest this body should elect representatives to meet with the regents. Another important move, it seems to me, would be an organization of university faculties for the entire United States. This organization should hold annual meetings to which each university would send delegates to represent the faculties, not the regents nor the presidents. It is well known that the "Association of American Universities" is merely an association of university presidents. This organization very carefully avoids the discussion of some of the most vital things in education and educational policy. University presidents are far more interested in securing large numbers of students than are the faculties. Hence they are unwilling and afraid to handle the question of inter-collegiate athletics. They are not generally anxious to fill their faculties with men who will outshine the presidents themselves, hence they are often content to appoint mediocre men when a better salary schedule would secure far better material. It seems to me that an "Association of American College Faculties" would do much for the advancement of higher education in
America. This organization need not have any power at all. But the power would come in time. If such an organization should recommend to boards of regents and trustees various reforms, I believe that some of them would be carried out very soon and that much good would be done. As the organization became older its recommendations would have greater weight.

I trust that your timely formulation will hasten the day when the autocracy of the president shall largely give way, in our smaller colleges as well as in the universities, to the more democratic control you propose. I heartily agree with Dr. Paton and President Van Hise that the principal function of our colleges and particularly our universities should be to foster the spirit of scientific research. This being true, the main thing to be accomplished by a change from our present system is the establishment of a better atmosphere for research and for productive scholarship. The present grind of teaching, lack of adequate equipment and lack of sympathy on the part of some executives do not furnish as yet the idealistic research environment which the great Strasburger anticipates that our wealth and youthful vigor and unparalleled resources will ultimately bring us; when that time comes, he predicts that American science will "Schlag ganz Europa tod." A most admirable part of your plan, it seems to me, is the making of the department, or small division, the more or less autonomous unit of organization. But this departmental unit might, under a more democratic organization, prove to be, just as it is sometimes now, a veritable graveyard for research aspirations, with a fossil at its head. So that, as you intimate, the idealistic university is, after all, mainly a matter of men; brainy, inspiring men to head the departments. It is perhaps due, more than to any other one cause, to the fundamentally trained, sympathetic, productive scholar at the head of a department to create about him the proper atmosphere for research. Such a man can inspire in plastic youth the ambitious desire to sail on unknown scientific seas, even under the most trying circumstances of lack of sympathy and appreciation from the autocracy. There need be in such departments no lament that our youth are becoming so commercialized that they no longer are
attracted by the scholar's life. The high-salaried research professorships you mention will furnish to such departmental heads a goal worthy of their most conscientious effort. Hence the great wisdom of your suggestions as to care necessary in the selection of professors and heads. Only the productive scholars of well-rounded training and proved worth ought to be elevated to such high responsibility, to endure as you suggest for life; or at least until retirement at sixty-five. It does seem to me, however, that nomination of professors by the department, subject to approval by its board of advisers, and to final election by the university senate, is safeguard enough, without having to risk a veto by that body of often unsympathetic business men, the trustees. The latter, as I take it from your plan, are created primarily to care for the property and finances of the university; while matters of administration and educational policy ought to be, it seems to me, in the hands of the faculty, who are undoubtedly the most vitally interested and in closest touch with university conditions. One step in the appointment of professors according to the plan proposed, if strictly adhered to, may possibly result disastrously. Jealousies and lack of breadth of view natural under the circumstances would often prevent the elevation of members of a department to professorships in their own department. In such cases, where a head professor had died, for example, and the department thus lacked a strong guiding hand, would it not be better to have nominations come, not from within the department itself, but say from the board department advisers? I am wondering also how the very important matter of distribution of annual departmental budgets would be handled under the democratic system of university control. The senate as a whole would probably be too unwieldy for this matter; the executive committee of the senate perhaps insufficiently informed on money matters. It may be that the joint executive committees of the senate and trustees, though undoubtedly liable to clash at times, could best handle such an obviously difficult and delicate matter. It seems to me, further, that in two matters—the legitimate enlargement of departments and the creation of new departments—the democratic control might work less efficiently and less expeditiously than the present autocracy. If,
however, the democratic body would early agree to a wise limitation of teaching hours for professors and instructors, then enlargement of departments would doubtless logically follow an increase in the number of courses and students. Perhaps the creation of new departments would depend largely on increased income; but the faculty as a whole would doubtless prefer to direct this extra income toward increase in salaries or toward the ever-insufficient departmental allotments. The chancellor's office would undoubtedly be especially useful in the solicitation of endowments; while the short-lived president-rector, the presiding officer of the senate, would probably still find himself possessing considerable power and influence, with much educational and administrative work to supervise. The present danger to educational freedom of our highly centralized administration is great; and your solution of the problem by the injection of more democracy into the government of our universities, in spite of the acknowledged "anarchistic" and "nihilistic" tendencies of our faculties, undoubtedly offers the true method.
XVII. LETTERS FROM PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS IN THE CENTRAL AND WESTERN STATES

I can see some excellent advantages in the system which you advocate, and it seems to me it has some fatal defects. In thinking the matter over, I have tried to recall my own experience as a professor and the criticisms which I made in regard to presidential and trustee control. I can remember that I desired above all things to be given a free hand in my own department; that I wanted to be able to plan out my work according to my own views of what ought to be done, and then to be able to carry out these plans unhampered. I wanted also a staff under me that would help me to do this, and it seemed to me that I could not succeed in any other way. Of course, this is pure autocratic control in a department and I have never been able to see how a department can be successfully managed without this autocratic control. If there are a good many professors and instructors in a department, and the department meets as a body to legislate on the work which is to be done, a plan of action can be arrived at which will meet with the approval of the majority, at least, but after this plan is settled it must be executed and it seems to me that one man must execute the wishes of the department and must have absolute power to do so. I have found in my experience with college professors, both as a professor and as a president, that it is exceedingly difficult to get them to agree upon any proposition and I am sure that they would disagree in regard to executive control in a department, although they might be able to come together in a legislative way. Here, in this small engineering college, we try to give absolute freedom to each head of department so far as that freedom can be given and not interfere with the work of other departments. It seems to work admirably, and yet I am conscious of the fact that our departments are very small and that we might meet with an entirely different set of propositions if we had six or eight full professors in one department. I have been brought in quite close contact with
business men during the past few years—with men who have large personal interests and with men who control corporations—and I find that in all of these efficiency is obtained only through an executive who is practically in supreme control, although amenable, of course, to the decision of the board of trustees which meets occasionally. You do not need to say to me that efficiency in a business organization is entirely different from efficiency in a college. I realize that every day, but I do think that there are problems of administration in every educational institution which a representative form of government, with no executive except a temporary one, would have great difficulty in meeting. I believe that the faculty should be freely consulted in regard to executive and administrative problems and that their knowledge and wisdom should aid the president at times; but my experience has been that after all there should be some one person who would finally decide and who could be held responsible by the governing body, and it does seem to me that that governing body should elect the executive.

I quite agree with you that university control can not be a simple democracy, and that it should not be a despotism. You note that I put the other end of the idea in front. The German idea that the faculty should have full charge is not workable for long or for large. That our present system tempts a man to select men lacking in character, individuality and genius is true only to the extent that a president has to be a balance wheel for the institution, and eccentric people disarrange all the machinery, and a large part of his time is frittered away in his effort to keep things running smoothly. Of course, I am going on the theory that he is a man with proper ideals. Every president who rises above mediocrity owes his reputation and the reputation of the institution over which he presides to the men of character, individuality and genius in his faculty. Without such men a genuine university is simply out of the question. I venture this suggestion also in regard to any plan for running a university by a corporation or a committee chosen by the alumni, by the faculty, or by the community: the moment this organization fails to agree you have pandemonium; and fail it surely must, for the
simple reason that it is not selected with any view of its working harmoniously. In regard to a president with the same salary and no greater powers than those of other members of the faculty, I can speak with some feeling and from a good many years of experience. In the first place a live, productive member of a faculty who must drop the work in which he is especially interested in order to look after administrative duties is entitled to some sort of compensation. Though I have looked after such matters for years, my salary has not been increased and my scientific work has not only suffered, but for long periods it has had to be practically abandoned, to my great chagrin and to the loss of my department. Furthermore the assumption of the presidential functions imposes certain social duties that cost a lot of money and can not be avoided. It would clear up this part of the problem if you could know how much social functions cost our university presidents. It is claimed, on the other hand, that there are plenty of members of the faculty who would be glad to take over these duties without extra compensation. I readily admit that such is the case. Indeed we could get a whole train load of them on a day's notice. But a university that would be satisfied with most of these men must be beyond hope. With the idea that men and women should not be subject to the whims of an individual, I am in perfect accord. But I also think that the converse is equally true—that a president should not be subject to the whims of a faculty. That many faculty members are whimsical calls for no demonstration. Neither should this whimsicality be accounted as anything against the faculty as such. A president who has the necessary balance and breadth of mind and bigness of heart will be very patient of the eccentricities of his individual faculty members, but he should not be governed by the eccentricities. I have in mind the case of a remarkably able and productive scholar who was engaged by a certain institution to prepare a scholarly work that he alone was capable of producing. But, being a very whimsical man, he was soon in the meshes of machinery and red tape, and was promptly dropped by the institution. The president of the university, recognizing the ability of the man, makes all sorts of allowances for him and lets him do his work in his own way, and the results are splendid. But that
same president would find it quite impossible to be guided by a
number of men of this type. One other point: your last sentence
says "there should be as much flexibility and as complete anarchy
throughout the university as is consistent with unity and order." I
believe the idea to be excellent, but unfortunately there is a
large number of our professors who would have it read so:
"There should be complete anarchy throughout the university."
If a well-balanced, broad-minded man of high ideals and with the
necessary patience is put in charge of these anarchists he can get
good results, but my experience of mankind is that the man in
charge is quite as essential to the good results as any other ele-
ment of the problem.

(1) It does not look to me practicable to elect trustees by so
loose an organization as the one you suggest. It would prove too
great a temptation to academic or trustee politicians to run the
politics of the organization. A better notion, to my idea, would
be the election of representative committees by the alumni, by
the faculty, by the trustees, etc., these committees then to meet
and elect the trustees or submit candidates for ratification by
their respective bodies. (2) I do not quite understand what
division of functions you would make between the proposed
chancellor and the proposed president, functions at present
united generally under those of the president. Assuming, how-
ever, that the usual functions were united in one person—the
president—it seems to me necessary that a person of more than
ordinary judgment, general understanding of administrative
duties, and executive capacity should hold that position and
should receive commensurate remuneration. Professors should
not be called upon to give their attention to the vast amount of
business and executive detail, nor can I conceive that they would
be willing to assume its burden even temporarily for short terms
without extra remuneration—provided they were capable of such
administration, which the average professor holding the place
ex officio, or in rotation, would not always be. Automatic in-
creases in salary are not always desirable, automatic promotions
would be still less so, even if the finances of the university should
permit, which in most cases at present is not the case. (3) I
approve of the separate department organizations, whether the number of members be three or twenty. Such a system has been practised here for several years. (4) I prefer the appointment of the heads of departments by the president, as equally efficient and as obviating occasions of partisanship growing up in small groups of teachers who should be able to retain harmonious relations. Adequate limitations of the autocratic powers of the head of a department by the organization of the department faculty sufficiently safeguards this from abuse, while the appointment by the president ensures better cooperation of all departments with the president, an extremely desirable object. (5) Representative government of committees by election by faculty is desirable. The details of organization of such committees, executive committees, senates, etc., would vary much with different organizations and my own ideas are better expressed by the organization existing in this university. I do not understand, however, what is meant by the senate being a body coordinate with the trustees—for, after all, the trustees in control of the funds are in that domain supreme, and the other functions of the bodies could not be the same. Their responsibilities would be different and coordination could not be effective, unless you could give the senate the power to dismiss a trustee for cause, as the trustees can dismiss a professor for cause. As for the desirability of "as complete anarchy . . . as is consistent with unity and order," I think most of our universities have about as much of anarchy as average academic human nature is prepared for.

It would seem that the main question concerns the executive conduct of the details within an institution, and the simpler plan for the best efficiency and the least friction. I assume that now no one can escape the conviction that the present commercial conditions have so far penetrated the atmosphere of every educational institution that in their greater expansion it is inevitable that commercial methods be adopted in the executive government and that the affairs within the institution be reduced to a routine business system. While in every institution there are some capable business men on the faculty, it is a well-known fact that the great body of teachers have little liking for business affairs—no
great business capacity. It is no reflection; it follows in con-
sequence of their occupation and their attitude of mind. It is also
well recognized as the guiding principle of modern business that
in only one way can its affairs be satisfactorily and economically
administered, and that is by a capable head with adequate
authority. In great business systems it follows from necessity
that the various lines centering in the head are best managed
each by a competent head. I therefore can not escape the convic-
tion that the vast amount of business in modern educational
institutions can be satisfactorily handled only by the machine
method of the great business corporation. The function of the
teacher must be to teach. Heads of departments must find time
for the routine business under their control and do what teaching
they can. I can not see that it makes any difference who selects
the president so long as it is the best man, but the presidential
office must from the situation be in close touch with the board of
trustees, wherein lodges the final authority. I think the presi-
dent should be also president of the board of trustees or at least
a member of that board. Referring to the article in Science,
from what is said above, it appears that I do not look on the plan
therein set forth in (2) as desirable. In (3), each sub-unit
should be the department, wherein are managed the details of
its inner organization. The unit should be the faculty and its
committees, before which should be brought matters concerning
the departments in general, properly digested for concise delib-
eration. While it would seem that there is a greater difference
than seems desirable between the salaries paid professors and
that paid the president, in many instances, I think that of the
president ought to be somewhat larger; for example, $5,000 for a
president and $3,500 for a full professor. As I understand the
gist of the Science article, its principal contention is a limitation
of the powers of the president; as a matter of fact in all bodies
of men working in a common field there is bound to be a leader;
if the powers of the president are limited, some other individual
will come forward who will in some way or another exert the
controlling influence with danger of undesirable results.
I am not in favor of the plan proposed as a whole. It seems to me to have some excellent features. On the other hand, it is my opinion that some of the principal proposed features are essentially a mistake. To make my opinion clear to a reader together with the basis of the opinion would require a much longer and more carefully prepared letter than I now have time to write. I believe that executive duties must always be performed by one man, or a very small group with very definite divisions of responsibility, if such duties are to be performed efficiently. In this belief, apparently, I am decidedly different from you and our differences in opinion in regard to the best plan of university control apparently arise largely from this one fundamental difference in our ideas.

I should not like to see instituted the greater number of your suggestions with regard to the university. While I do not belong to the administrative branch of the university I am a believer in the centralization of authority in the board of trustees, the president and the deans of the various colleges. These officers should be men of affairs and particularly good administrators. They should relieve the professors of all such duties outside of their own special department. The professors should be specialists, and their time and energy should be given to teaching and research. While they may become narrow and incompetent, as suggested by you, it does not seem wise to sacrifice their other work for the purpose of making them broader in their interests and especially at the sacrifice of good administration. I heartily agree with the suggestion of your first item—that is, the election of trustees should be in the hands of a corporation consisting of all persons particularly interested in the welfare of the university. All the educational work of the university should be directed by the president, while all the business interests should be under the control of the treasurer or business manager. For the purpose of expressing the opinions of the educational staff upon all matters connected with the university and for the purpose of drawing the various schools together, there should be a university senate consisting of members elected by the faculties of the various schools, who should give their
advice to the president and the board of trustees upon all ques-
tions presented to them and upon all questions which in their opinion need to be taken up. Such an organization can be made to work with little friction and continuously toward a common purpose, whereas I believe that division of authority and the setting up of almost independent schools would breed internal dissensions and interfere with the progress which the university would otherwise make.

Your ideas about university control are not mine. I am one of those hopelessly antiquated or reactionary few who believe in the beneficent autocrat theory. That is, as a theory. As a matter of fact I like to have, as a professor, a good deal to say about what this autocrat shall do in relation to the affairs of my own department and interests. At those occasional times when I do not believe in the beneficent autocrat theory I am an extreme democrat. I believe then in the annual or perhaps biennial selection of one of the professors to be president. As we should expect this president to do some special entertaining of visiting guns, I think that his salary should be a little larger than ours; that is, it should be as much larger than ours as the necessities of entertaining entail. Your suggestions as to division of the university into fairly independent schools, or departments, each with its own dean or chairman, appeals to me as wise. I do not believe that the "same salaries should be paid for the same office and the same amount of work." I know what horrible difficulties discrimination in salaries works; but I believe in it just the same. The election of the professors should of course be for life.

I am in sympathy with the general purpose of your plan, that is, of bringing the faculty into responsibility for all the important acts of the university. Some of the details will hardly work out as universities are. Most universities are at present in a state of formation, in constant struggle for more means and better opportunity. This struggle is ineffective unless there is some recognized leader who has initiative in all forward movements and who can see that the plans for financial expenditure
are properly and carefully made. This institution, for example, would have died many times if there had not been somebody responsible day and night, standing between the faculty and litigation intended to take away the university's endowment. As institutions grow older and become less and less of the nature of a "going concern," the need of the president becomes correspondingly less important, although the presidency at its worst seems to me preferable to direction from a political bureau such as exists in Germany. As matters are it would be impossible to pay the president the sum that other professors receive, because his ordinary expenses are twice as great, and the business involves all kinds of worry and risk beyond that of an ordinary professor's chair. I have favored all movements toward having the faculty share the responsibility for policies and for dealing with individual men. We have developed at Stanford an institution which I think is very good, that of an advisory board of nine full professors, chosen by the academic council without nomination, or suggestion from the president, each one serving for three years, one each from five faculty groups and four chosen at large. Before any appointment, large or small, promotion, removal, or any other matter affecting the policy of the institution, is brought before the board of trustees, the whole matter is laid before this committee for its report and approval. While it does not possess veto power, it is my custom to withdraw all matters to which any considerable objection is made, and it is not hard to find out whether objection will be made beforehand. This brings the faculty of the university into harmony with whatever may be done and it insures that no academic matters will be taken up by the board of trustees as its own initiative, and that the president and board will not spring any surprises on the faculty.

The years I have spent at one of the smaller universities have not made me feel the need of any radically different organization, for this university at least, so much as the necessity of two things under the present organization: namely, leadership by the president, and contact between the members of the board of trustees and the members of the faculty. The president should be more
than the efficient agent of trustees and faculties; he should guide
the councils of both, informing and advising and inspiring both,
so that the opportunities and obligations of the university may
be realized and improved. He should never be allowed to be-
come the despot. I believe few presidents wish to become despots,
but in their peculiar positions, between a body of academically
uninformed men on the one hand and practically uninformed
men on the other, they may be forced to become so or to neglect
the opportunities of usefulness of the university. This danger
of presidential despotism would be lessened if there were added
to the present usual organization of American universities
another official means of contact between trustees and faculty.
No one man can so represent the diversified interests and ideas of
two such different masses as trustees and faculties usually are
that there will be complete understanding and sympathy, with-
out which the best can not be attained either by or for the uni-
versity. Being "a country mouse", I find the ways, and the
proposed ways, of a city rather terrifying. I judge everything
by the smaller standard. So judged, your plan seems to me
cumbersome; but the department of which I am a member does
not number ten, your minimum, and I can not see that efficiency
or, as I prefer to speak of it, usefulness, would be increased by
combining into a division a lot of men whose interests are not
very similar.

(1) My personal opinion is that the university will do best
with a self-perpetuating board of trustees composed either en-
tirely of laymen or very largely so, who confine their energies
as much as possible to business matters. The terms of office
should not be too long to allow of a fairly rapid elimination of
inactive or otherwise undesirable members. (2) The president
should certainly be appointed by the board of trustees, but per-
haps on recommendation by the academic council. The academic
council might propose three candidates for the choice of the
trustees. The president most assuredly should have a larger
salary and a more dignified position than the professor. This is
purely a matter of supply and demand. Individuals capable of
shaping the destinies of a university are few and far between.
(3) No objection. (4) Each school, division or department should have as complete autonomy as is consistent with the welfare of the university as a whole. It should make nominations for professors (say two or three for each place) to be appointed by the president in consultation with an advisory committee, representatives to which should be elected by the various groups. The salaries must naturally vary according to what is necessary to attract the best men in the various fields. If any group has funds of its own, it naturally should control the expenditure of the same, subject, however, to a certain degree of supervision from the board of trustees. (5) I do not like the idea of a senate, at least not at the present stage of development of American universities.

The questions proposed in your paper on university control are some of the most difficult that arise in university administration, which just now is in a condition pretty sure to be changed in the near future. In the main, I think your proposals are based on sound principles, but the scheme is a bit complex, and I have some hesitation to see the principle of popular election brought into college administration at all points. There are elements in it which I fear would militate against the highest success in scholarly matters. In the administration of an American university, especially one on private foundation, there are two fields almost, if not quite, independent: one, the management of the financial and material interests of the university; the other, the development and adjustment of the scholarly interests. The financial and material interests of the university are best administered by a board composed in the main of men who have large commercial interests and at the same time have intelligent knowledge of educational matters. The members of such a board should hold office for long terms and should be chosen perhaps by another body representing the educational interests, the choice to be confirmed by the board itself. In purely educational matters I believe in democracy, perhaps in individualism, but in educational administration democracy can not be carried so far as to put aside experience and personal fitness. It must be conceded that some of the rarest scholars have no practical sense in
educational administration. The president of a university of necessity has a multitude of duties. He is the medium of communication between the body controlling the educational interests and the body controlling the financial and material interests. I do not believe it possible to substitute for him any other officer, such as the chancellor proposed in your article. Your chancellor would represent only the material side of the university, and the president representing the educational side would be subordinate. I believe the best president to be one who has come up through the educational work, who has held a preeminent place in educational or scientific circles, and has shown practical skill and balance in the adjustment of educational matters. He must be able to appreciate scholarship, though he may not himself be a great scholar. He must be able to present educational matters in such a way as to convince a board whose chief concern is financial and material. I believe that the best president will be secured from the educational ranks of the institution which he is to administer. You will note from these statements that I am not out of sorts with existing conditions. The plan of administration in an American university is in my judgment not subject to severe criticism. The defects are in the men who are selected as university administrators. Perhaps this implies a defect in the plan of selection, but I do not believe that it necessitates a complete readjustment. If, for instance, some method could be devised for the nomination of presidential possibilities by the educational body, may be when there is no presidential vacancy, and the board of trustees could then make a selection from these nominations, many existing difficulties would be gotten out of the way. Assuming that deans and presidents have no legislative functions, but purely administrative, I am not sure that they should be subject solely to selection by the educational body. Personal qualifications count for so much in these administrative offices that election by an outside body on the nomination of the educational body gives, I think, the best results. Surely administrative officers must be given some added compensation for increased expense of living and for sacrifice in scientific preferment. A very great deal could be gained by giving the various schools of the university greater autonomy. Each school knows
its own problems, and the men in these schools are chosen with special reference to the work of that school. Within the school everything should be as democratic as possible. The department head should be largely done away with, especially in departments of five men or more. There should be frequent meetings of the members of a department, and most matters should be decided by vote, recognizing, of course, that senior members there as everywhere will have a preponderating influence. Your proposed method of promotion and of the election of professors is, I think, admirable. If a professorship in a given department becomes vacant I am inclined to think that there should be associated with the president and dean of the school for the selection of a successor at least three professors in departments not too closely allied. The choice of instructors in a given department may well be left to the senior members of the department, subject to confirmation by the dean or president. In university administration two things must be guarded against: autocracy, on the one hand, and the control of educational matters by boards or by individuals who are not thoroughly conversant with them from practical experience; and, on the other hand, government by prejudice and preferment, rather than by reason and adaptability.

I am sure that reforms are needed, but they must come gradually. If you or I had the organization of a brand-new ten-million-dollar university, we might get forward a little. But would you or I not want to be sometimes a little autocratic?

The evolution of future schemes of administration should approximate some organization like the one you outline. In taking away the autocratic power of a president, there is danger of going too far and of reducing the office to one which no man of force and ability would care to assume. In that case the institution would suffer for lack of efficient leadership.

In common with most university professors, I believe that modifications of existing conditions are desirable; at the same time my ideas of specific measures are not stable. I am favorable to the formation of a corporation as suggested in section (1) of your paper—also I find the considerations in footnotes (7),
(8) and (9) especially commendable. I think I see advantages in maintaining the office of president in university organization on the present plane, but a new method of selecting the executive and the evolution of a new type of university president seems to me of importance. The nomination of president should come from the professors, as suggested in your section (2), since these men have better knowledge of the generic qualities required and have sources of information regarding candidates for the position not often made use of by boards of trustees. The coordination of the general interests of various departments of the university, and the devising of measures for general development, need the unremitting attention of one man. The president should have a cabinet of advisers composed of representatives of the various departments of the university, and his recommendations to the trustees should have the approval of this cabinet. The thing that I fear most in a very general participation by the professors in questions of development is excess of machinery and the distracting of some capable men from lines of productive scholarship. I believe that higher value should be attached by president and trustees to the products of ripe scholarship, and that they should undertake to determine the conditions under which contributions to knowledge can be made, and to provide the essentials for this form of university activity. In the universities with which I am best acquainted there is a constant warring of interests. The men who show initiative and trained powers of analysis are drafted for onerous committee work and for administrative positions to the detriment of their productive scholarship. A more altruistic executive, who places higher value on the results of scholarship and is disposed to conserve the powers of members of his faculty by providing opportunities, is much needed in our universities.

I believe we can get farthest if we hold fast to one elemental principle, namely, that the faculty are the essential part of the university. (The students may be left out of consideration here, since they take no part in the management.) All other elements are extraneous. They are useful only in so far as they aid the faculty; and they become detrimental when they in any way
hinder the faculty. If this principle is taken as the guide, one can never go far wrong. The details of administration must vary according to circumstances and no single plan will in its details meet all the different conditions which arise in times of progress—but the principle of faculty control can be made to hold throughout. In regard to this, we are in complete agreement. The details, as I said, can not be generalized to meet all conditions, but the following are the fruit of my personal experience and observation. (1) I do not believe in giving any authority to the alumni—though they should be encouraged to give advice. My experience is that the alumni, after they leave the university, do not keep sufficiently in touch with the university problems to make it safe to entrust any power to them. In short, I see no need for the "corporation"—and what is not needed is apt to be harmful. (2) The president should be nominated by the faculties or their representatives. It should be his duty to carry through the policies of the university (i.e., of the faculties); and his main responsibility should be to them, rather than to the trustees. This power would naturally be greater than that of any individual professor, but less than that of the professorial majority. Salary is a question of demand and supply of that particular type of talent. An executive officer of this type is needed to give effective execution to faculty counsels. If this is understood to be his function, autocracy would be a breach of trust, unfitting the man for the office. Tenure of office, otherwise, depends upon circumstances. In the present progressive era permanent tenure is almost necessary. (3), (4) No criticism, except as to salaries. A salary schedule uniform, for a given grade, is not feasible at present. Nor do I consider it desirable. There should be an established scale of "normal" salaries, but exceptions should be permissible. (5) Trustees: These should fulfill two functions: (1) financial agents; (2) balance wheel; in this latter function they should have a veto power on all nominations and on all important matters of policy; but they should not have the power of initiative in either direction.

I have long felt that college education can better be secured through rather small colleges than through institutions whose
students number thousands. I recognize that greater expense is involved, but I feel very sure that the better result is worth the added cost. Your very interesting article on "University Control" seems to me strongly to suggest that university education can, on the whole, better be provided through institutions smaller than the largest of our present universities. The difficulties of administration which your article emphasizes are not inherent in the university, but in large size and complexity. The Johns Hopkins University is able to have, as Oberlin College has, faculty government in all matters of internal administration, and each member of the faculty is able fairly well to grasp the problems of the whole university. This produces a harmony of feeling and administration, and an intelligent cooperation, such as could not be secured, I think, by your plan. I have little criticism to offer of your plan as applied to institutions of very large size. My criticism is rather more fundamental. I do not believe that it is possible to secure the very finest results in university education in institutions so large that they will need to adopt the plan which you advocate. Semi-autonomy of the different departments of the institution, with intelligent cooperation of all officers and instructors in the common work of the whole institution, will, I believe, work out better than more complete autonomy and representative government. May I ask how the corporation would be chosen? I doubt the value in America of a chancellor. I do not feel much sympathy with the tendency of American schools to emphasize pageantry in connection with their public functions, and I see little use for a chancellor in any other connection. I believe a president chosen by the trustees upon nomination of the faculty to be a valuable factor in the American college or university. He has great expense in entertaining and in many ways, as the official representative of the institution, and he should, I think, on this account more than on any other, have a salary much larger than that of the professors. It does not reach the needs of the case for him to have a fund upon which he can draw for entertainment and other such expenses, for this would interfere with the personal character of these courtesies which he may extend, and would make them official. President —— has done a great deal to serve the institution by personally
entertaining at his home the officers of college classes and student organizations. He has positively refused to allow the college to bear any share of the expense involved, lest it make these relations official rather than personal. I believe his judgment is good. You advocate a university of the German type with the several institutes completely autonomous. I like somewhat better a larger cooperation between departments than the German university presents. I believe that the election of the department head and executive committee by the department faculty would work advantageously, such election to be confirmed by a university council to consist of all the full professors. I cordially approve the method of nomination and election of professors which you suggest. It is that in vogue in the Hopkins University and in Oberlin. On electing to professorships men who have not already been tried in a similar capacity in the institution in which they are to serve, I believe in general that the election should be first for a definite term of years (not too long), the election to be made permanent by regular vote at the completion of this term, if all is mutually satisfactory. Of course, in calling a man of highly approved ability, this may often not be necessary. But I believe in the wisdom of choosing often younger men of great promise, and advancing them as they prove their complete fitness. Doubtless you do not intend to advocate financial autonomy except in the expenditure of income; its investment should be in the hands of the trustees. I believe more cordially in general university endowments whose income shall be distributed to the several departments as the university senate shall advise, rather than in an elaborate series of endowments for separate departments. The greatest flexibility in this regard will enable the institution to accommodate itself from generation to generation to the changing needs of the community which it serves. I do not, therefore, approve your suggestion in the last sentence of paragraph (4). Finally, let me suggest that there should be such organization and also such atmosphere in the whole institution as will tend to encourage initiative in each member of the institution, initiative not only in the matters committed particularly to him, or to the department to which he belongs, or to the committee of which he is a member, but every-
thing should tend to provoke suggestions in regard to all university problems from each member of the university community. Your proposed semi-disintegration of the universities into autonomous departments would, I think, seriously interfere with this incentive to initiative. This is one of several reasons why a smaller institution with the New England town-meeting plan of government will achieve results not obtainable by the very large institution which, because of its very size, must have representative government.

Considered as an ideal scheme I find myself in general agreement with your plan of university control. The fundamental feature of the whole plan is the proposition to make the university corporation the final source of power, the trustees, as well as faculty members, to be elected from and by the corporation. To most of us, at first sight, such a plan appears revolutionary in the extreme, but it is not absolutely new. I know of several schools in the United States where the plan has been tried, and in which the college, as the corporation was called, was constituted of professors, alumni and other individuals in sympathy with the work of the institutions. In one case, at least, this form of corporate management has been successful, but in another case it failed miserably after some twenty-five years of trial, and the cause of failure was found in the growth of the corporation through the addition of alumni to the point where the whole body broke up into factions on questions of policy. All this trouble, however, might have been easily avoided by a slight change in the form of incorporation. I am thoroughly in sympathy with the idea of making the president a faculty selection, and of divorcing his office from the work of securing funds for the support of the university. What a sorry figure some of our state university presidents present when they descend each year to the business of lobbying with the state legislature! As the president should be selected by the faculty, or rather by the senate of the faculties, so the head of each department should be the choice of the departmental faculty. But the executive committee of this faculty should be partly elective and partly appointive. I believe, for certain practical reasons, the president of the univer-
sity should have the appointment of half the members on this
governing committee. Having this right of appointment, the
president is better able to keep in touch with the work of each
faculty. While each college or department of a university should
have a large measure of autonomy, this departmental independ-
ence should, in a degree, be limited by the control of a univer-
sity senate, made up of members elected from each faculty. I
am of the opinion that to the senate might be left certain func-
tions which you suggest should be lodged with the trustees—for
example, the filling of the higher grades of professorships. The
advice of the president, as the educational head of the univer-
sity, should naturally carry great weight here, but should not,
necessarily, be final. On the senate should devolve the work of
bringing all the departments of the university up to the same
grade or level of efficiency. A good law school, for illustration,
should have some way of insisting that the weaker medical or
engineering department of the university should be strengthened,
and the senate would probably be the best agency to accomplish
the end desired. All standards of expenditure in universities
are undergoing such rapid changes that the financial side of uni-
versity management overshadows all others. Chairs must be
established to keep pace with the developments in new fields and
often there is the keenest kind of competition to secure men to
fill certain special positions. The marked raising of salaries in
some directions is a consequence, and much worry and jealousy
result because all salaries for equal work can not be brought up
at the same time. The principle is just but the practise is hard
to reach, and until we can find a better system of managing the
financial affairs of our universities it seems too much to hope for
a more rational scheme of general control and a democratic ad-
justment of salaries and conditions of work.

(1). I am not quite sure of the effective interest of such a cor-
poration. I am a trustee of a large boys' school, managed in just
this way, by a large corporation who elect the board of trustees.
The corporation as individuals have a strong interest in the
school, but in my twenty years of connection with it I do not
remember any policy initiated by its members, except so far as
they took care to elect an effective board of trustees. (2) I am not sure that a man who has expert knowledge of education and of university administration would be willing to take a presidency under the conditions suggested. Administration implies power. The chief difficulty, however, is the financial one. In most institutions in this country the president raises the funds for all improvements or advancement. This is largely true, even in the state universities. If the financial condition were as it is in Germany, the faculty-elected president would surely be the desirable one. All that you say in footnote 3 of the difficulties of the present system is true, and so far as I can see they are likely to become yet more troublesome before they are abated. (3) I heartily agree to all this, but think that department faculty meetings of considerably more than twenty members may be made efficient if most of the material for deliberation is prepared by committees. (4) I think the method described is a good method, which might, however, be indefinitely varied in its details. (5) I think of this as of (4).

Your general plan to put university control in the hands of men who are especially qualified by education, experience and interest to exercise such control—or in the hands of persons elected by such men—meets with my hearty approval. Any reasonable plan which will take from presidents of autocratic nature and from trustees, who are not educational experts, the decision in matters educational will make for good. To my mind the greatest present danger to individual universities, and to higher education in general, comes from such presidents and trustees. With some of the details of the proposed plan I do not always find myself in accord. (1) This article with the exception of the chancellor meets with my approval. I should be inclined to omit this office or combine it with that of president. (2) The first sentence is to my mind excellent, but with the second I do not agree. All groups of men, to be fully efficient, must have leaders and each group a leader. Such a leader in an educational institution should be the president, and a good president must be a large man—a man who is a real leader. Such a man deserves a large salary, a more dignified position and larger
powers than a professor, but he should not have powers, as is now often the case, larger than all the professors. University professors need some leadership, even in an educational democracy, and in order to have an efficient leader I see no way but to make his office better paid, of more dignity and of more power than that of the professor. (3) With this item I agree provided the unit does not become too limited, i. e., the school of medicine should be a unit and not the department of chemistry in the school of medicine, even if that department should in size be larger than "is prescribed by a psychological constant." (4) This article is good, with the exception of the part relating to financial autonomy. I do not regard financial autonomy as necessary or even essential to the different schools or departments of a great university; in fact I doubt if these departments should have complete financial autonomy. The final word concerning finances should rest in a higher body—such as the senate or the trustees, or better in both,—rather than in a division of the university. (5) This article meets with my approval. I trust that this discussion you are undertaking may be productive of much good and that its results may soon be felt in the evolution of the ideal method of university control.

I heartily agree with the general features of your plan. Personally I have not suffered from any autocratic supervision. The university authorities have allowed me to go my own way. I think this was perhaps because from the first I insisted upon it that I should be permitted to do about as I thought best in the planning of my own work. At one time I offered to compromise matters by writing my resignation. The fact is, however, that university management is too autocratic. The strong men are avoiding such work. I do think, however, that when a strong man who is capable of doing the work of a scholar is asked to give his life to executive drudgery, he is being asked to make a great sacrifice. He finally sinks into the unknown with nothing left behind him to represent a lifetime of work. He may hold his head above that of the ordinary professor, as the man of business does. That is, however, only while he holds his position, or while he is alive. If he is great only because he has been
appointed to a position with a larger salary, he makes a pitiful showing. It counts for nothing when he is gone. If a university could have a business manager, and the faculty could have an executive who is one of them, and who might serve them temporarily, to be replaced by another by vote of the faculty, it would be an ideal arrangement. At the same time I must say that I should not like to be asked to sacrifice my time in that way. The trouble with our present plan is that there are few men, very few men, who are fitted for such a position. It is too lofty. If the position were made less autocratic and more nearly on a level with that of the average professor, we might find men who could fill the place without finding it necessary to swell out their lungs and to bend their vertebral columns backwards.

I heartily endorse your proposed plan for university control in principle. There are one or two matters, in connection with the administration of schools or divisions, which I think might be improved. I do not believe that there should be an executive committee for each school or division, but in place of it there should be a faculty composed of about twenty members and officered by a dean or secretary. The officers should be subject to annual reappointment. With a permanent dean and an executive committee the rearrangement of the school is very apt to become one-sided. The faculty should be composed of representatives from every department in the school, in proportion to the relative size and importance of the department, and it should elect temporary committees as required for every question that can not be properly debated and adjudicated by the faculty without further investigation. Such committees would report back to the faculty for action. The president of the university should be ex officio chairman of the faculties. Instead of nominations for professorships coming from the faculty, they should, I think, come in the first place from a board of advisers. After the nominations have been made, others from the faculty might be added. The faculty choice should be subject to veto of trustees, etc., only where any good cause for such veto is shown to exist.
CENTRAL AND WESTERN STATES

I fully and thoroughly agree with the spirit of the proposed reform. If our universities are to exercise the function for which they have been created, if we do not wish to see them stifle thought, freedom and all the elements which made them the leaders in the moral and intellectual life of nations, then some such reform as that suggested in the proposed plan seems an absolute necessity.

The plan of organization of our universities meets with my most hearty approval. I have considered the matter seriously and it appears to be the most feasible one I have known to be advocated.

I am heartily in sympathy with the general position taken by you consistently with regard to the problem of university administration. Even the small college feels the tendency to depart from democratic methods in the handling of college affairs. I find nothing in the suggestions made by you that I should criticize adversely. I hope that you will keep up the fight for the greater responsibility and dignity of the professorial office. Those of my colleagues with whom I have discussed the matter heartily approve your plan to reorganize university control on a representative basis.

The autocracy of the president here being absolute, you can guess how incompetent the faculty. How gladly would the poor humiliated wretches welcome your sections (1) and (2). There is of course nothing like permanence of tenure. There is no elective participation in anything. I have always recognized, and now more forcibly than ever, the necessity of something corresponding to your sections (4) and (5). "No president is desirable other than an annually elected rector."

I presume your letter sent me has reference only to the larger educational institutions of the country—the real universities—rather than the small colleges (some of them calling themselves universities) of which there are but too many. The average salary, training, specialized efficiency and broadness of view of the members of the faculties of these smaller schools especially
is of so low a grade that I think "a one-man court" of final appeal is absolutely necessary, namely, a president, selected because of his broader grasp of educational problems, general fitness as a leader, and advisably with previous training as a teacher, whose salary should be deservedly somewhat larger, whose position should be more dignified, and whose powers should be greater than those of a professor. His entire faculty is often not much larger than that of a department in one of the larger institutions and thus he can easily confer with its ranking members in the consideration of problems of policy. I think to avoid the evil and confusion of mixed policies there should be some one man in the small school whose word is final. In all purely school matters his word should be practically final to even his board of trustees by whom he is appointed. The trustees of such a school should be chosen, probably best self-perpetuating, chiefly from among its alumni, and should comprise the most successful business men of that body with a few of its most efficient lawyers and certainly some intelligent physicians. Their distinctive duties should be to solicit, collect, guard and administer the resources of the school, always advising with the president as to the allotment of its income. For the larger schools, the actual universities, say those with a total faculty of more than 75, with more than 15 necessarily separate departments and with a graduate department meriting the name, I agree with your proposals, including the footnotes, with the following suggestions: (1) If a president be chosen for the larger institution, he usually does little or no teaching and of course should be fitted and logically expected to perform the duties assigned to a chancellor. (2) A most excellent method for the selection of a president. However, I think there should be an especially chosen small committee of the trustees, interested outsiders, which should especially aid in the investigation of the general fitness of the candidates and that the members of this committee should have equal voting powers with the "professors or officers" mentioned. Often the faculty member is wofully ignorant of or lax in investigating the private character and practical fitness of a candidate, especially one in a distant institution or state. How would it do to let the "professors or officers" here constitute the "senate"
of paragraph (5)† Further, just as the deans of divisions are given an additional dignity (expressed in additional salary) for performing the duties of dean, so, I think, the office of president will carry additional dignity always. He must at least perform the duties of head dean, he must or should be considered chairman of all the general committees of the faculty, of the general plenums and of the senate, and should thus have the deciding vote in cases of tie-votes. To this extent his powers are greater than those of the professor. (4) This I think a most admirable and safe plan. To be more specific, I think the sentence beginning in line 11 of the paragraph should be changed to read, "The election of professors and heads of departments in a division, if such heads be recognized, should be for life, etc." (5) It is suggested that the "senate" here consist of the "professors" of (2), and that the senate be assigned the additional duty of choosing the president, voting coordinately with a special committee of the trustees, always much smaller than the senate.

The present condition of affairs in our leading universities is well-nigh intolerable, and little calculated to attract men of the highest ability to a university career. The plan you propose sounds as though it would work well. In some of its aspects I have seen it in very successful operation at the St. Louis University. In that institution (as I believe is customary in Roman Catholic universities) the president is known as "rector" and the office is but little elevated above that of professor. The medical department (of which I speak particularly, as I was formerly on its teaching staff and had a good opportunity to study its methods) has complete autonomy in everything except its finances. The medical faculty, being composed of physicians in practise who give clinical instruction only, was found to be too large and unwieldy a body to handle the many difficult and complicated questions that inevitably arise in the instruction and discipline of a large body of students. Hence there was organized the junior council, composed of the men of professorial rank in the fundamental branches of medicine and presided over by the rector, or in his absence by the dean of the school. These men, being all professional teachers and giving their entire time
to teaching, were naturally best fitted to handle all matters pertaining to their own and closely related departments, and this fact was given full recognition. In no instance were the recommendations of this body slighted or ignored. Few, if any, departments or schools of a university have such need of a governing body of this sort as a medical school. Usually all the professors of the department can be brought together at frequent intervals for full, free and candid discussion of all measures which concern the department, but this is not possible for a medical school. To use a homely simile, the junior council is the tail that wags the dog. However it is to be accomplished, let us get away from the autocratic type of university government! It is a blot on American education which can not too soon be removed. Perhaps, as you suggest, it can not be done suddenly. I presume a gradual curtailment of the power of the president, with corresponding increase of the power of the faculty, and more careful selection of trustees, is what you have in mind. I agree heartily with your scheme of representative government in universities and wonder why it has not been adopted long since.

I do not agree wholly with everything said, but I believe the plan of control proposed would work many improvements and also that your scheme offers a number of useful points for discussion. I fear your picture of the faculty meetings in the old days is too good to be true, or, if such a happy time existed, it was due more to indolence and lack of interest than to a spirit of cooperation and loyalty. In other words, I do not believe that faculties at present are any worse than of old, but that the greater complexity of administration and the greater activity of discussion regarding methods, are chiefly responsible for the present condition. (1) The proposed corporation would be useful just to the extent in which the members took a genuine interest in the institution. Your footnote (3) shows some of the weak points that exist now. Would they be eliminated by changing the scheme, or is not a deeper change necessary? (2) I think the plan is a good one, but the question may be raised whether men could be obtained to fill the position at present, under conditions named: The proposal, at any rate, is more likely to be practicable in the
future than it is at present. The footnote showing the possibility of an annually elected rector is interesting in this connection. When our schools have all their details as thoroughly worked out as they are in Germany the duties of the president will be much less onerous than they are now and the plan would have many advantages. (3) The suggestions here are very good, particularly those in regard to frequent meetings and daily intercourse. The essential thing is to have groups having common objects and interests, to understand the whole and feel responsible for it. Your plan for electing professors does not seem to ensure the broad sympathy for other departments, the minimum of selfishness that works night and day to enhance its own department regardless of others or of the institution, and the widespread indifference to responsibility that is so conspicuous all through our social and political life. (4) This also is very good, although it hardly seems necessary to have the final vote for professorships by the university senate. You say the same salary should be paid for the same office and the same amount of work. This does not seem to mean so much when we consider its application. The same office does not and can not call for the same amount of work, besides the kind of work varies so that the individual factor will always exist when salaries are under discussion. (5) Very good and should be easy to bring about, but in practice at present fails on account of some of the causes mentioned under (3).

We have reached a stage of experience where it is possible, as well as necessary, so to adjust duties and officers as to secure a democratic, scientific mechanism, which will do the work and upbuild it. There would then be some chance for a healthy growth, a natural development of departments and their mutual cooperation for the welfare and influence of the institution. Individualism would love to work through a sane mechanism. But I realize the force of your footnote (1), "no sensible person would attempt to reform suddenly by a paper constitution a system which has developed in response to its environment." This characterizes the problem of the medical school, which is remodeling. As you say "The boss, the university president, etc., have
conduced to a certain kind of efficiency and to an enlargement more rapid than would otherwise have been possible." In case of a medical school brought under the university by a sudden coup—"what the community (faculty) does is dependent upon the men who compose it," etc.—certainly, but as many of them are inexperienced as educators, an autocratic leader may be needed to get them started and bring in outside men to make the metamorphosis real. The time soon comes, however, when this spells non-progression and the organization must be made democratic. Then you find that the ideal plan must be yet postponed for a while. When a faculty is accustomed to vote individually on everything it is difficult for an advocate of your plan to get them to vote through representatives. They insist on open, general faculty discussion and voting on all points. Your scheme means departmental organization, and requires the faculty to think in groups for the whole. It fixes more responsibilities on the groups and decentralizes in that sense; yet it requires a centripetal cooperativeness, as it were, which means more work and thought for each. Undoubtedly it would greatly develop the faculty and raise the standard. It would broaden and strengthen the individuals of the group; but it is difficult for them to give up easier and more direct functions for the more scientific and effective method. I have recently seen certain parts of your plan brought up for adoption in a faculty and rejected for these reasons. It was claimed that professors must not be even nominated by the faculty because of dangers of political intrigues—your wider nominating committee, however, would have met this objection. The same objection was offered to faculty election of dean. This was a confession of weakness by the faculty. Departments were not trusted to elect representatives for committees for common faculty action, because the faculty at large was regarded as far better fitted to select from the members of a department the best man for a committee. Of course the objectors were individualists of such an extreme type, produced in the general faculty meetings, that they could not see the necessity of even a limited subordination of the individual for cooperative action. The professor is so impressed with the personal privilege, etc., of autocracy that he imitates the president in miniature. If
the professors of our larger departments would place their subordinates more on a par with themselves, would organize so as to divide responsibilities and privileges with the staff, much greater efficiency would appear in departments (the various members of the staff should be encouraged to offer views, take responsibilities), and the method would be found to apply well to cooperation between departments.
XVIII. ANONYMOS LETTERS

The test of any plan of organization is its efficiency in securing the best qualified man (i.e., the expert) to perform each function. In the college or university there are three main groups of functions: First: To use your words, "The representation of the common sense . . . of the community in university policy." Second: Administration. Third: Teaching and research. In seeking to determine the best methods of organization for the performance of these functions it should be borne in mind, as pointed out by President David Starr Jordan that, for a true university, doing only graduate work, a much simpler organization and looser administration may suffice than is necessary in a college dealing with undergraduate students and in which the work of the departments and schools must be definitely coordinated. Much confusion of thought has arisen from failure to define the term university. For the average American "university," a considerable degree of centralization is necessary. From this point of view I offer the following comments: First: The university, whether state or endowed, exists for the benefit of the whole people, and they and not any selected body should constitute the corporation and select the trustees. The present boards of the state universities seem to me on the whole fairly well adapted to perform their function, and even the boards of endowed institutions are to a considerable degree responsive to public opinion. Second: Expert administration is of equally vital concern to the trustees and to the faculty (the full professors, elected for life). Both should therefore participate in the selection of major administrative officers upon some plan which distinctly recognizes their mutual interest. Probably a scheme based on nomination by the faculty of the university or of the school (either acting directly or through an academic senate or an executive committee) and election by the trustees would be the most feasible. These officers should appoint their own subordinates in administration and be responsible for them. There
should not be a separate executive or chancellor of the board of trustees. The university is one and should be represented in all its relations by a single executive head. The major administrative positions should be equal in dignity to professorships and election should, therefore, be for the same term. The salaries paid must of necessity recognize the comparative rarity of first-rate administrative ability. There should be a large measure of autonomy on the part of schools, divisions, etc., and much liberty as to details of organization and procedure. Third: The establishment of chairs and the selection of professors are questions which concern both the faculty and the administrative officers and both should participate in their decision, subject to the veto of the trustees. Some such scheme of nomination as you suggest seems both feasible and desirable, but the approval of the nominations by the dean or the president, or both, should be required. In practise, I think the initiative is likely to fall naturally into the hands of the administrative officers.

I can only speak from the acquaintance I have had with state educational institutions. Taking up the matter according to your subdivisions: (1) I agree fully with you, certainly the alumni should be sufficiently interested to join the corporation in order to have voting power. It would hardly do in a state institution for the alumni to be the leading factors in the control of the institution. It is a wise policy, it seems to me, to have the trustees appointed by the governor or elected by the people: If it would seem best to have the people elect them, this election should be removed as far as possible from general elections. Politics should be completely divorced from educational matters. I like the plan for the appointment by the governor and then this appointment should be confirmed by the senate. Your suggestion as to the chancellor and treasurer is a good one. (2) I agree fully as to the election of a president by the faculty, but there might be serious difficulty under present conditions. A man of strong personality would be elected whether he was a desirable man or not. (3) I think this would be an admirable plan and give unity of thought and action and tend to promote the effectiveness of university or college organization. (4) I am in hearty
sympathy with this. In recent years questions of policy have been delegated to the deans. I hardly think this a very effective way of improving a university or college. (5) I like the university senate idea. The senate to be elected by representatives of the department. I am fully convinced we are becoming autocratic instead of democratic. The action of the senate should not be final, but a report be made to the members of the faculty, who should in turn make a report to the board. This will give the largest amount of freedom and insure a wise action. I have many times observed that good ideas come from the younger men of the faculty.

I approve most heartily the general tenor of the plan of university control proposed for discussion in your letter of December first, and I endorse unreservedly the closing sentences of the first paragraph, "Under these conditions . . . whom they serve," which I regard as formulating the essential characteristics of the proposed line of action. I have myself thought quite a little on this question (who that has long witnessed the friction, humiliations and injustices of the present system has not?), and I mention a few changes that have been in my mind as improvements on existent conditions. I need not say that these do not constitute a well thought out plan like yours, but they may serve as discussions of the corresponding portions of the latter. (1) The internal affairs of each school or college to be entirely governed by its own faculty. (2) The faculty to consist of all permanently appointed instructors. (3) Instructors to be permanently appointed by the faculty upon nomination by the department in which they are to serve; only men may be nominated who have taught five years in one or more institutions of collegiate rank, and of these years at least the last three must have been in the recommending department. Appointments prior to permanent appointment to be annual, and to be made in the same way as the latter. When the conditions for permanent appointment have been met, the candidate shall either be so appointed or not reappointed at all. (4) The "Department of . . .," to consist of all members of the faculty whose chief work lies in the field named. A department shall not be established or continued with fewer than
five members; fields of work that would have a departmental faculty of fewer than five members shall be amalgamated with cognate fields. (5) Salary advances to be automatic. (6) Promotion in rank (assistant professor, professor) to be made (after at least five years of service in the present rank) by the faculty upon nomination of the department. Promotion to confer no increase of salary, but to give increased voting power in the faculties, general and departmental (assistant professor two votes, professor three votes). (7) Men who have served in other first-class institutions shall upon permanent appointment be given the place in the salary scale which they would have attained if the time had been spent in this institution; they may be given any rank not higher than that which they could have attained in this institution in the same time. \( \text{Note.} \) The condition of No. 3 above, requiring three successive annual appointments prior to permanent appointment, shall in no case be waived.\( \) (8) Appointments and promotions to be made on the basis of scholastic attainments and promise only, particularly in the lines of research, teaching or both; administrative services shall not be taken into account. The specific qualifications upon which any permanent appointment or promotion is to be based shall be stated by the department in writing and at the time of making its nomination. This formulation shall be published with the official announcement of the appointment or promotion. (9) The president shall be elected by the faculty or faculties of the institution from among their own membership. Voting by mail shall be allowed, and a majority of the total number of votes in all the faculties shall be requisite for election. The term of office of the president shall be fixed by the faculty prior to the election. The duties and powers of the president shall provisionally remain as heretofore except as otherwise provided. (10) The head or chairman of a department to be chosen annually by the department, reelection permitted and desirable. His duties to be those of a chairman together with such others as may be assigned to him by the department. He shall receive additional remuneration proportionate to the additional work done by him as head or chairman. (11) The faculties shall have the right, jointly and severally, to constitute other bodies, temporary or permanent
(senate, committees, etc.), and to delegate to these any or all of their own powers, for a definite time, or indefinitely subject to revocation. I could continue and make provision for other essential phases of university control (many of which you have admirably covered in your own draft), but I have said enough to block out my line of thought. Of all that I have said, I regard the following as by far the most important: (I.) Salary increases to be automatic; (II.) Appointments and promotions to be made by the faculty upon nomination of the department. When these two regulations are once established, the others will gradually work themselves out. And it seems to me that it would not be too brusque a change to put these two regulations into operation at once. The question is how to persuade those in power in any given institution to do so. I do not doubt that the present plan of benevolent despotism is thoroughly unsatisfactory to the rank and file of the faculties of our universities. But how can it be altered? The individual is powerless; papers appear from time to time in journals discussing various phases of the situation—for example, your own article in _Science_ in 1906, and that heartrending picture of the "Pressure upon the Professor," in the _Saturday Evening Post_ of June 11, 1910, but they seem to produce no tangible effects; no organization exists that can and will champion the cause. Accordingly I give your labors a most heartfelt welcome, and trust that you will be able so to focus the thought of the country as to make it effectively felt. Three possibilities (alas! all remote, I fear) come to mind; one is that philanthropists may be moved to condition sufficiently large and attractive gifts to universities upon the establishment of the two regulations mentioned; another is that the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching may be induced to use its powers in the interests of bringing about such regulations; and third, that separate boards of trustees may be led to establish these regulations for their own institutions. In the last case, the great obstacle will be found in the fact that the existent ideal is largely what you so aptly call that of the "department-store system." Commercial men dominate many boards of trustees, and they do not seem to realize that because success is attained by placing a department of a railroad, a factory or a store under
the absolute control of one man and holding him responsible for results (results that can readily be measured and that must in the nature of things be brought about by a distinctly inferior personnel acting in a strictly subordinate manner), it does not follow that the same policy will be equally successful in a department of a university, where the head is at most primus inter pares. I trust that you will give the results of your investigation wide publicity and that you will bring them effectively to the attention of every individual or organization that may be able in any way to contribute to the amelioration of the situation. You are at liberty to quote anonymously any portion of what I have said, and it is not the least significant part of my reply that I make it actually anonymous. I do not in the slightest degree question your own personal secrecy, but in view of the extreme delicacy of the subject and in view of the possible vicissitudes of anything that is once committed to writing, I prefer that these sheets should not bear my name.
PART III.

ARTICLES ON UNIVERSITY CONTROL
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PERIL IN EDUCATION

BY JOSEPH JASTROW,
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Published in The Popular Science Monthly, November, 1912

Privileges must be justified by occasion. The close of an academic service of twenty-five years is the justification; the privilege assumed is an indulgence in the use of the imperious pronoun, first person singular—a considerable liberty of expression, as it substitutes conviction for argument. In extenuation I plead that I am not speaking for myself, but, under the warrant of sympathy, for an unorganized, probably unorganizable, group, scattered geographically, exposed to varied intellectual climates, united by a community of interests, reacting similarly to common factors in experience. The only singularity is a persistent concern for my professional class—a profitless solicitude for their welfare.

Looking backward I distinguish overlapping periods of development in the higher education, of divergent tend-

1 The data and argument of this presentation in part overlap the scope of two addresses to educational assemblies. The first was delivered at the Trustees' Conference held in connection with the inauguration of President James at the University of Illinois (October, 1905), and was published in the proceedings reporting the exercises of that occasion, and also in Science, April 13, 1906. The second was delivered at the Collegiate Conference in commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of Oberlin College, June 24, 1908, and was published in the Popular Science Monthly, October, 1908. The earlier presentations were adapted to the character of the occasion and the audience. The time seems appropriate for a more general survey in which the perspective of importance of the several issues may appear in their true values, admittedly as interpreted by my own color-scheme. To correct the individual prepossession I have rendered the argument largely in the words of others.
ency; nor is this a gray-haired retrospect. Things move quickly in a country where each generation undertakes to make precedents, and an imitative subserviency follows the flag of heralded success. I began my career under the impulse of a quickened interest in intellectual callings, for which at the time the Johns Hopkins University was the progressive sponsor. The spirit of the movement was the emphasis upon the personality and training of those who were and were to be intellectual leaders. I found myself in an intensely alert democracy of learning. The feeling was in the air that notable men were there doing notable work; prophets were honored in their own land, the honor often echoed from abroad. My most salient impression of President Gilman was and remains that of a man with keen joy and pride in the discovery of unusual men, in facilitating their emergence, in proclaiming their achievements. Rank counted for little and quality for much.

The ambitious colleges were changing to universities, sometimes prematurely with flourishes on paper unsupported by performance; generally with a sincerity of spirit and policy. Men of my academic generation felt themselves part of this progressive movement. They gained a foothold, and, as a rule, rapid advancement. They were called upon to occupy responsible if elastic chairs, the bright prospects offsetting the shortcomings of the moment. The Ph.D.'s of the 80's and early 90's felt themselves a welcome part of the university with whose fortunes they linked their own, were themselves contributors to its growth with a reasonable singleness of purpose and sensible community of endeavor. Quite naturally their engrossment in establishing their positions kept them away from intimate concern with general policies and problems of management. Faculties were small and informal; the calls of committees not oppres-
sive; problems of adjustment relatively simple; rival interests were not yet disturbing. It was not a golden age; nor is its color-scheme in memory due to the mellowing of years. There was an abundance of homelier metal; and the process of refinement was uncertain and tedious. Yet there was an orchestral harmony—a sense of being considered and of playing a part—that can not be referred to an insensibility to discord, or to a blissful ignorance of standards and possibilities.

The period of transition came with a rush and was hurried to its consummation. Everything grew, enlarged, expanded—grounds, buildings, plans, facilities, positions, students and duties—most of all students and duties, least of all salaries. Some of the maturer members of the guild felt the change as delayed growing pains. The adjustment involved difficulties and a stern disregard for hesitation, a brusque treatment of opposition. Size was truly a complication that must be fairly met. Competition without and rivalry within became conspicuous; the perspective of things changed notably. Administration became imperative. Correlation was urgently demanded and unflinchingly enforced. Standards and ideals were changing; whether for good or ill was far more uncertain. The success of measures became more momentous than the manner of securing them. Interests of an academic type were confronted with interests of a measurably different temper, and with the assertion of authority. Pressure from the outside, from legislatures in state universities, from alumni and the public in all, became differently insistent; dissensions complicated issues. The administration which under older conditions had stood between the board and the professor’s security, came to carry the external pressure to the academic career. The professor was diverted by manifold cares beyond the class-room or laboratory or
study; and found that his availability for the purpose of organization directly affected his influence, his value, his preferment, his status. Academic peace became as obsolete as the cloister; privileges of one order were sacrificed for advantages of another that quite too commonly failed to appear.

And now I may find relief in the use of the present tense. It is of the actual situation and of the recent past that I speak, and that without reticence. This is not a testamentary nor yet an elegiac occasion, and by the same token not an apologetic one. I have indicated the conditions under which certain convictions have matured, slowly and confidently—convictions that carry a vital message of caution, of distrust. The one paramount danger, the most comprehensively unfavorable factor affecting ominously the prospects of the higher education—and the lower not less so,—though differently—is the undue dominance of administration: in policy, in measures, in personal relations, in all the distinctive interests of education, and the welfare of ideas and ideals. What is imperiled most directly is the academic career: its worth, its service, its security, its satisfactions, its attractiveness to the higher types of men.

The professorial career is in its requirements distinctive, though not unique; it is by nature institutionalized. The professor can not very well be unattached or

---

1. The danger of externalism—the theme of the present discourse—to the public school system is looked upon by Mr. J. P. Munroe ("New Demands in Education, 1912") as a potent factor in the comprehensively unsatisfactory character of our educational system, methods and product. He regards the limitation of authority of school boards and the establishment of school faculties with authority over educational matters as essential steps to permanent improvement. The present system wastes the intellectual force and enthusiasm of good teachers; it deadens initiative and cultivates prudent acquiescence. In its place a true professionalism would advance the status of teaching and teachers more effectively than any other single measure, and would bring with it the benefits now sought for in vain by petition and complaint.
very much of a free lance; yet his creative energies
demand a sympathetic, unhampered environment. He
can not sell his birthright and remain a freeman; the
institution can not place a mortgage upon his output
without injury to its value. The university can best
provide the collective facilities, the communal stimulus,
the larger environment, in which intellectual products
flourish. Institutionalism carries a menace to person-
ality, at the worst reducing those enlisted in its service
to a set of cogs in a wheel; yet the intimate association
with a corporate body offers a worthy communion if
worthily administered by those free to follow the wisdom
that in them lies. The corporate university can be no
more and should be no less than the reflex of its spirit;
to express the quality we borrow the term esprit de corps
—the indigenous sentiment holding that corporations
have no souls. Under present conditions it is a need-
lessly difficult task to make the inevitable institutional
quality of the professorial service a source of strength;
to reduce its disabilities is the first step. American pro-
fessors are not disposed to call one another “Herr
College”; what he professes shapes the manner of the
man above the bare fact of his profession; and thus the
professor loses the solidarity of interest more readily
attained in other callings. His professional sense needs
stimulation. The requisites of a true profession are that
its members shall authoritatively represent, advance and
control its interests, as well as the qualifications for
membership; each member thereof shall be subject
definitively to the judgment of his peers. The pro-
fession forms a peerage in the best sense. Thus weighed,
the professoriate is found sadly wanting; and until this
privilege is restored or acquired for the American pro-
fessor, the career must continue to suffer a serious, almost
a fatal handicap. Present tendencies are aggravating
this unfortunate influence; the current is set strongly in the opposite direction; its drift is felt by those in the stream and by the onlooker alike, as the sweeping dominance of administration. That temper controls the professorial career, thwarts its development as an independent life-service. The formula of the investiture of the scholar, "with all the dignities and privileges thereunto appertaining," has come to carry a cynical flavor—the privileges often enjoyed as one is said to enjoy bad health.

The prevalent system of university control has been called "externalism." Authority rests ultimately and, so far as they choose to exert it, constantly with the governing boards of trustees or regents; it rests dominantly, and by delegation from the former, with the president, intermediately at the latter's discretion with the deans. Let it be conceded that a system often yields to, but yet more constantly determines, or reflects, the spirit of its administration. But as to the nature and effect of the system, I propose to cite others; it would indeed be strange if my conviction of so public a situation should not be shared by kindred observers. To reflect the distrustful and anxious attitude of thoughtful critics, I shall present a considerable series of views touching upon all sides of the situation. I must rely upon the earnestness of expression and the cumulative appeal to carry the full force of the protest, which is necessarily weakened by detachment from the supporting context.

The contrast of the prevailing "American" system with the practise and spirit of other countries is striking. In our allegedly democratic land "university government has assumed a form that we might have expected to see in a land accustomed to kings. European universities have a constitution that might have come from some American political theorist; American universities are as
though founded and fostered in the bourne of aristocracy. ... The polity that we might call monarchical is thus not only frequent in the new-world colleges, but it is stripping away the few lorn shreds of popular control which still remain among them" (G. M. Stratton). "Elsewhere throughout the world the university is a republic of scholars, administered by them. Here it is a business corporation" (Popular Science Monthly: editorial). It is indeed a "departure from our usual American ideas as well as from the scholarly custom elsewhere, that we should have called into existence in affairs of learning a regnant body the life activities of whose members lie outside the realm they rule" (G. M. Stratton). "The American university has become an autocracy, wholly foreign in spirit and plan to our political ideals and little short of amazing to those marvels of thoroughgoing democracy, the German universities" (J. P. Munroe). "The main ends of the university are the same in all lands, but our American presidents and boards of trustees are an indigenous product which can scarcely be regarded as essential" (J. McK. Cattell). In brief it seems that in our superficial democratic zeal we react aggressively to the show of authority and the symbol of distinction, while quite insensitive to the inner thralldom covered by specious profession. Our English exemplars accept the former naturally, gauging it at its true worth, and keenly resent any invasion of the spirit of liberty; there "the university is unconstrained in presence of its visible lord, bringing, as he does, no thought of imposition, but standing forth rather as the representative and spokesman by free choice of those who are the learned guild" (G. M. Stratton). In other relations, also (witness: politics), our citizen plainness may harbor the vested interests of autocracy.

We may not be deeply concerned as to the source of this
American brand of externalism, though such knowledge may temper without removing our conviction of its present unsuitableness. It has been suggested that it is a sympathetic survival of a colonial, absentee form of government—"a government that was well enough for a boy's academy in colonial times" (G. M. Stratton); also, that "the present relationship between the faculty, trustees, and president may be regarded as a haphazard growth, the result of a laissez-faire policy, affording an example of the same sufficient-to-the-day spirit and smug satisfaction" (Stewart Paton) that obtains in municipal management, in which in turn we acknowledge old-world superiority. The unsuitability of the system to needs and conditions, and the menace it harbors to interests of vital import, remain the same, whatever the historical justification, or lack of it. Freely and fully admitting its points of merit, the most charitable verdict may still recognize it as an example of the partially good forming a serious obstacle to the better or the best. "The administration imposed on universities, colleges, and school systems is not needed by them, but simply represents an inconsiderate carrying over of methods current in commerce and politics" (J. McK. Cattell). "The development of our American universities is seriously handicapped by the present system of administration" (Stewart Paton). "No single thing has done more harm in higher education in America during the past quarter-century than the steady aggrandizement of the presidential office and the modeling of university administration upon the methods and ideals of the factory and the department store" (Springfield Republican: editorial). "The very idea of a university as the home of independent scholars has been obscured by the present system" (J. E. Creighton). "All experience of democracy with itself justifies the plea for more democracy in American educational administra-
tion" (Boston Herald: editorial). The disastrous effect of the system in blighting the academic career is set forth in no uncertain terms. "It is one of the most productive of the several causes which are working together to bring about 'the degradation of the professorial office'" (G. T. Ladd). "If the proper status of the faculties is to be restored, and if the proper standard of educational efficiency is to be regained, there must be a radical change in the relations of the teaching and corporate boards" (J. J. Stevenson). "Unless American college teachers can be assured that they are no longer to be looked upon as mere employees paid to do the bidding of men who, however courteous or however eminent, have not the faculty's professional knowledge of the complicated problems of education, our universities will suffer increasingly from a dearth of strong men, and teaching will remain outside the pale of the really learned professions. The problem is not one of wages; for no university can become rich enough to buy the independence of any man who is really worth purchasing" (J. P. Munroe). The prevailing system "does not attract strong men to the profession of teaching, nor does it foster a vigorous intellectual life in the universities. And occasionally a gross and tyrannical abuse of authority reminds the world how far America is behind Germany in the freedom of its university life" (Springfield Republican: editorial).

It is quite proper that the professor should be called to account for his meek submission to the situation that is oppressively thrust upon him. "Now the idea of professionalism lies at the very core of educational endeavor, and whoever engages in intellectual work fails of his purpose in just so far as he fails to assert the inherent prerogatives of his calling. He becomes a hireling in fact, if not in name, when he suffers, unprotesting, the deprivation of all initiative, and contentedly plays the
part of a cog in a mechanism whose motions are all controlled from without” (Dial: editorial). “Young men of power and ambition scorn what should be reckoned the noblest of professions, not because that profession condemns them to poverty, but because it dooms them to a sort of servitude” (J. P. Munroe). “But there is real danger that the existing system may prove repulsive to men of the highest intelligence and character and that mediocrity and time-serving may be developed when we need the most vigorous ability and independence” (Popular Science Monthly: editorial). “The degrading tenure” of the professor is spoken of as forming a “nursery of abject cowardice” (W. C. Lawton). How oppositely the protest of the professor is met when the academician summons courage enough to protest, appears in these two comments: “Truly the academic animal is a queer beast. If he can not have something at which he can growl and snarl, he will growl and snarl at nothing at all” (Educational Review: editorial). “At any rate American professors have come to feel that their independence is imperiled and their proper influence in the university organization seriously impaired by the activities of deans, presidents, and trustees.” “Whatever organization may be necessary in a modern American university, the institution will not permanently succeed unless the faculty as a group of independent personalities practically control its operation” (J. G. Schurman). And here the call to arms! “The professor must teach the nation to respect learning; he must make the nation understand the functions and the rights of the learned classes. He must do this through a willingness to speak and fight for himself” (J. J. Chapman).

The system is concentrated in the president. So often uncritically the recipient of praise as the visible embodiment of the source from whom all blessings flow, he is
as naturally chosen as the one on whom all curses fall. Critically temperate statements admit the enormous powers he wields to mitigate or to aggravate the evils of the system; yet we are asked to consider that "the benevolent and efficient despot is the worst kind; the cruel and incompetent despot soon disappears" (J. McK. Cattell). The educational situation is naturally subject to the unfortunate influences of the social climate. "The individual has once more been subordinated, cruelly commercial standards prevail, and control has been seized by the strong and the unscrupulous" (J. McK. Cattell). The relation between the president and the professor, though not untouched by the quality of mercy, is indeed strained, quite too commonly to the breaking-point. Its vital wrong is this: it sets forth that "we exalt administrative ability above scientific insight." Universities "should be the last to typify in their own structure the thought that discovering truth and imparting the vital principle whereby others may discover it are of a dignity less than that of organizing and management" (G. M. Stratton). This is the charge; that the president "is in large measure thought of, and thinks of himself, as the master, or the foreman, or the captain, of a body of men working under his direction; and this fact has a potent influence on the whole character and spirit of academic life in America" (New York Evening Post: editorial). Presidential inaugural addresses show the drift of the current: "And there is the style of ill-concealed arrogance, expressing the personality of the man who frankly thinks of his colleagues as subordinates, and who will ride rough-shod over their rights as men and their freedom as educators whenever his masterful instincts prompt him so to do" (Dial: editorial). The president is appointed "not to elevate the institution as an educational power, but to make of it 'a big thing.' . . . The executive duties
of his office render the president less and less fitted as the years go by to represent the purely educational side of the institution, yet every year strengthens his control of all the interests. This condition is not in accord with business common-sense’’ (J. J. Stevenson). The universities seem to drift towards or to desire ‘‘high-priced imperious management’’ and ‘‘low-priced docile labor’’ (Dial: editorial)—truly a dismal combination. The censure is at times diverted to the governing board. ‘‘Our colleges have been handled by men whose ideals were as remote from scholarship as the ideals of the New York theater managers are remote from poetry. In the meanwhile the scholars have been dumb and reticent’’ (J. J. Chapman). And this in extenuation: ‘‘The financial gentlemen are applying in naive good faith, to a mechanism which they utterly fail to understand, the rules for efficiency in a bank or a department store’’ (W. C. Lawton). They seem to be as unfortunate in delegating as in exercising their powers. ‘‘The present autocratic position of university executives was created for them by the acts of trustees in shifting responsibility for the performance of certain duties from their own shoulders to that of the president and deans’’ (Stewart Paton). The ‘‘quickest and least troublesome way to solve administrative problems is to give as free a hand as possible’’ to some capable man (J. P. Munroe). The ready vindication of such authority lies in that much-abused term, ‘‘efficiency.’’ ‘‘When the wisdom of letting a man lord it over an aggregate of employees instead of conferring with a company of scholars is questioned, the answer is the efficiency with which the autocrat can get things done’’ (J. McK. Cattell). Efficiency undefined and unattached is either the most meaningless or the most

*It is worth footnoting that the Carnegie Foundation which is ostensibly devoted ‘‘to the Advancement of Teaching’’ (yet is governed by a board of college presidents with no representative of the teaching profes-
dangerous of terms; there are efficient fools and knaves and meddlers and weather-vanes and apologists and dissemblers, and most hopelessly the class whose costly efficiency is an eruption of their callous insensibility. Even so directly a utilitarian thing as a signpost is efficient only when you know where you want to go and where not; the term should never be permitted to appear in educational discussions without a chaperone.

The relation of professor to president can not be dismissed at this point. On the one side is the irritating accountability or subserviency or worse. "To hold a Damascus blade over other men's lives, careers, reputations, may still be the fashion in Damascus. The Anglo-Saxon has had the right for uncounted centuries to a full hearing and decision by an open council of his peers" (W. C. Lawton). Given the right type of man, and it may be easy to avoid overbearing in manner or spirit; yet it seems fated to persist in the formal relations of the professor to the administration from which (for one thing) the professor is estranged by a foolish etiquette requiring him, lest he offend by lèse majesté, to accept the president as his representative. The president is thus strongly tempted to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. With the right of promotion and dismissal sponsored a report on efficiency in academic affairs, which brought forth the following comment from a journal technically expert to judge the article: "Its whole tenor was to lay emphasis upon the destruction of the academic freedom and initiative that is necessary to the advancement of human intelligence, and to promote that kind of organization which under the guise of uniformity and system effectively suppresses progress" (Electrical World and Engineer). And this from a worldly source: "What efficiency experts sometimes forget is that there is a type of ability that can be found and retained better by the offer of a secure and dignified post than by the flourishing of money" (Springfield Republican: editorial). An efficiency primer might well set forth as its first axiom, that it consists in adapting means to ends; its second, that different ends require different means; its third, that expertness in means grows out of loyalty to ends. Beyond this, matters are too complex for those who use primers—even for the intelligent and benevolent laity of mature years.
comes the right of life and death; to exercise it is to incur the presumption of ἱστήρα— to the unspoiled Hellenic conscience the sin beyond pardon. The practical result is too familiar. "The president may assume superhuman responsibility, but he is after all human in his limitations. He may regard common-sense as agreement with him, common loyalty as subservience to him, respect for the opinion of mankind as deference to that small portion of mankind which has money to give" (The Popular Science Monthly: editorial). Transferred from the personal to the corporate relation, the breach in educational policy is coming to be more and more between the professors fundamentally interested in the ends of education and the president and deans dominated in their educational interests by an administrative temper or habit of mind. "The millionaire and the college president are simply middle men who transmit the pressure from the average citizen to the learned classes."

"The educated man has been the grain of sand in the college machine. He has a horizon of what 'ought to be,' and he could not help putting in a word and an idea in the wrong place; and so he was thrown out of education in America as he was thrown out of politics in America" (J. J. Chapman). There is at once a conflict of aims and of ideals, thus inviting, according to the type of provocation, a guerilla warfare or a civil war. The system provokes unrest, uncertainty, distrust; it removes harmony, corporate pride, professional independence. So much is clearly to be read in and between the cited lines.

Before resuming speech in the first person, it will be well to consider the rejoinder—the alleged incompetence of the faculties to play the part to which some of them aspire. "It has been said that university faculties are poor legislative bodies; if true, this would not be sur-
prising, so long as their deliberations are confined to discussing questions such as whether they shall wear gowns at commencement, the decision being with the trustees” (J. McK. Cattell). “We appear at present to be between the Scylla of presidential autocracy and the Charybdis of faculty and trustee incompetence. The more incompetent the faculties become, the greater is the need of executive autocracy, and the greater the autocracy of the president, the more incompetent do the faculties become” (J. McK. Cattell). “But was there ever a more vicious circle of argument than that which defends the persistence in a system productive of such unfortunate results by urging that the personnel of the profession has now been brought so low that the restoration of its inherent rights would entail disastrous consequences?” (Dial: editorial). From this “lack of opportunity to discuss the larger problems of the university” with authority and responsibility, from this “living in cramped intellectual quarters” (Stewart Paton) there results the helpless “looking outward for (their) succor” (W. C. Lawton) that makes for resignation not born of strength, and docility not the issue of sacrificing loyalty. No one knows better than the regular attendants at faculty meetings the hesitant, dispirited, nibbling, myopic, lame and wearisome discussions that are a trial to spirit and flesh; but the reasons therefor lie in the “vicious circle” from which they can be released by converting the prisoners into the guardians of a fortress. For any believer in that oldest and perennial source of salvation, the liberation of spirit that makes freemen of slaves, knows what marvels may be accomplished by removing barriers of intellectual restraint, whether shackles, blinders or ghettos. The redemption is through the enthusiasm born of self-assertion, with responsibility as its poise. All bodies long deprived of their constitutional rights tend
to become incompetent or nihilistic or restless according to temperament. If disposed to act under a sense of personal injury, they become militant; if organized and with the prospect of control, they become insurgent; if academic, they apparently become dormant. The academic situation suffers from restriction in means and neglect of ends in a confusion of peremptory demands. Reform must be directed to the illumination of ends and means, and primarily to a fitter sense of their kinship. "Administration plays a part in most of our colleges and universities altogether disproportionate to its value. Nor is the objection to this state of things merely negative. There is positive harm of the most serious kind in that submergence of self-assertive personality on the part of the professors which inevitably goes with it" (New York Evening Post: editorial). Here lies another vicious circle: we have so much governing to do because we rely so much on governmental machinery and so little on self-government. Yet externalism, however unsuitable and disturbing in itself, is yet more disastrous by reason of its by-products—the distortion of purpose, the suppression of initiative, the false competitive standards that insinuate themselves in underhand and unforeseen ways, and so little of which is enough to contaminate the whole academic life. It is the common disaster that ensues when those who should lead are subservient to their following, either by force of circumstance or feebleness of principle. In the university above all should the ideals of a sturdy and righteous government be visibly expressed. Its spirit should be progressive. "It appears that the general course of social evolution is not towards competition. In the university it would probably be adverse to the finer traits of scholarship and character, most of all when, as under our present system, the competition would be for the favor of presidents and
trustees” (J. McK. Cattell). Faculty incompetence and the restrictedness of academicism—much of which is superficial rather than deep-seated—is not the excuse for but largely the result of externalism and of living in the depressed atmosphere which it breeds.

Yet the charge of presumption recurs. Surely the cumulative wisdom that has gone into the guidance of universities would have recognized these untoward influences, would have referred them to their source, and disposed of them, if they were so real and so ominous as this arraignment sets forth. 4 Such a view rests upon a naïve faith in the insight and consistency and vertebrate intellectual integrity of able and intelligent men exposed to complex social pressure, which I can not share, and for which history furnishes uncertain warrant. The best intentioned and discriminating men are prone to worship idols or to yield to those who do; the status quo of the standpatter easily becomes an obstacle, if not an obsession. Reforms have ever been necessary and will ever be so, so long as new as well as ancient evils yield to an increasing insight or a more sensitive conscience. Favorable or tolerable situations may degenerate as they persist and grow out of helpful relation with the advancing forces that shape our ends. It is not vice alone but many another if lesser untoward influence that first endured or resisted is by familiarity cherished, through vested interests embraced. The personal equation enters; we

4 The appeal to experience is curiously partial. If the larger experience of the old world be considered, the burden of proof falls the other way. Externalism does not obtain there in the same manner or temper; presidential autocracy has not been found necessary or desirable; faculty control exists in variable yet always satisfactory measure; and the evils that flourish in American institutions are minimized. It has not been shown that our educational requirements are so wholly peculiar as to demand opposite provisions; it is fairly established that the democratic traditions of the old world are responsible for some of the mitigations and concessions which have prevented the system of imposed authority from developing its direst possibilities.
defend what we have acquired, established, contributed; not "a poor thing, but mine own" but "a good thing because my own" is the attitude assumed toward one's house, or town, or club, or college, or automobile. All this weakens the test of fact—the vapid argument that whatever is, is best—and divests radical scepticism of the charge of presumption. Experience requires critical interpretation before it yields its true meaning. It is a common enough situation to find that men progress in their endeavors despite the handicap of the means on which they depend. The successes achieved under the present system are in my judgment partly due to the compensations that lie in every system however unsuitable, yet more largely to the mitigations exercised under considerations foreign to its temper, more plainly to violations of its provisions—to concessions and forbearance. These the reforms advocated would establish as constitutional rights, as constructive principles fertile in promise, inviting embodiment in practical measures. The gains, the trophies, the tributes are naturally in evidence and properly so; but what of the losses, the ships that have gone down at sea! Moreover bookkeeping in terms of intellectual and spiritual incomes is so difficult; values of ideals are so subject to difference of appraisal by shifting standards, that university authorities are sorely tempted to abandon the attempt, and put their investments in real estate—in buildings, plants, and inventories of trade catalogues—to be pointed at with pride so long as one is blessed with an easy conscience. Yet such abandonment means the loss of the soul—an ancient but not negligible hazard. Commencement addresses may be confidently counted upon to pay adequate tribute to the gains and glories of a triumphant education, with an indulgence in fustian in inverse relation to insight. It is plain and crass folly to disregard the losses
and possibilities, which however intangible are by no means unreal. The wisest men have always been influenced in their judgment by what might have been; just as the future is shaped by those capable of conceiving what may be.

Reforms return to first principles to get a fair start, and are as often called upon to retrace false steps as to project the course for the future. A university is first and foremost an educational institution ministered to by a company of scholars; it engages many and diverse activities, all contributory to its welfare. Yet no other test of value is relevant than the educational one; no sacrifice in any measure of educational to other interests can be justified; no domination or intrusion of any foreign spirit can be tolerated. These premises lead with the directness of sound logic, with the constant reward that awaits singleness of purpose, to the conclusion that the university interests must be entrusted authoritatively to those expertly conversant with their nature. The professorship must be made a position of honor and authority. The evils that now cause anxiety but corroborate the vital import of academic home-rule; they do not establish its validity; it inheres in the nature of the influence which civilization has shaped to guard the intellectual interests of the race.

It is, however, important to view the situation in the concrete. By way of illustration I shall survey a few significant consequences of the system, which in turn are of a nature all compact. The directive forces that determine the movement and activities of the academic life do not validly or adequately express the real intentions, demands and ideals thereof; this is the comprehensive and the woeful wrong. The rest is but a bill of particulars, the recurring item in which is that through such suppression, a usurping, distorting predominance is given
to a different and an unsuitable range of influences. First is the lack of initiative—a disqualification the more serious in a career that professes to train for leadership; along with it is the absence of an authoritative referendum. The democratic implication of the terms need not be repudiated, if safeguarded by proper qualifications. The level at which a reference to a composite expression of will is demanded in order to secure the best result—and is not this in reality the aristocratic ideal of government by the most competent?—is reached whenever the qualifications of the referees are adjusted to the issues at stake. Such aristocracy—or to avoid prejudice, let us say isocracy—obtains among the judges of a bench, each presumably qualified to serve, each with like status with the others, yet exercising to the full the qualities of his personality. It is about as appropriate to subject the decisions of a faculty to review by an external board, as it is apt to be constituted, as it would be to have the decisions of the bench reviewed (or influenced, as a suspicious journalism implies is the case) by non-commissioned captains of industry. If the members of the faculty are not qualified to decide educational measures, and to do so broadly, not with a narrow professionalism but with due regard to diversified, at times conflicting, public interests, then there is something seriously wrong about their training or in the manner of their election or in the influences to which their judgments are exposed. If such incapacity is inherent in the academic character, the appointment of a board of guardians is defensible. Yet initiative is paramount. The more expert judgment is always needed to see what is wanted, to frame policies, to make platforms, to raise issues; to decide whether this or that is wanted may often be referred with advantage to a wider constituency. To secure a double or a multiple basis of judgment on many-sided issues is a proper func-
tion of boards of trustees, corporations and alumni. The usual statement that educational questions are decided by the faculty and financial ones by the board is absolutely specious and is not borne out by practise. There is a group of plainly financial and a group of plainly educational questions; but most questions partake of both aspects. Instead of "hedging," the fact should be frankly met. Old-world precedents—and in favored cases our own usage—abundantly show that and how this may be done. Under the prevailing system the professors neither individually nor collectively settle the important directions in which matters are to move. They await the pleasure or fear the displeasure of the president and deans; and if they move, it is too apt to be with an eye to the man higher up, just as the president is tempted to urge not what his untrammeled judgment approves, but what he considers will be approved by the

*I give as an instance an issue which, if not of acute importance is so rated in many a quarter, and which is sufficiently generic that it might have occurred in any one of a dozen institutions. The decision to build a large stadium for athletic contests was reached without consulting the faculty, who, it was assumed, if indeed they were considered at all, would delightedly approve of this expenditure of funds even though other cherished purposes would thereby be deferred,—a common occurrence. The vital decision in this expenditure is an academic one. Whether such a structure is needed depends upon the place to be assigned to athletics in the educational scheme. If you have the stadium you must have the crowds to fill it, and provide the occasions by exhibiting the brawn of studious manhood in the arena. To vote for the stadium is to decide an educational issue, and to commit the faculty to a policy for the complications of which they will in the future be held to account. It seems so elementary a fact that the spending of money for educational purposes is an educational matter, that only the narrowly practical man of business (and presidents with interested motives) would undertake to put asunder what the nature of the interests to be protected has joined together. I am tempted to add the comment of a man of business associated with the financial side of a large university to the effect that the trustees of private institutions had considerable business in investing funds and getting them, and thus were profitably occupied; but that there was so little of this to be done by the regents of state institutions that about all the latter could do was to direct affairs largely out of their province.
board. The professor does not stand face to face with determinative issues; there is not a considerable body of men thinking of the university as a whole, not a sufficiently corporate sense of their being a whole; the system does not encourage it, distinctly discourages it. The referendum is there but is not unrestricted; it is beset with implications of accountability to another, rather with an independent responsibility. The scope of questions and policies included in the referendum is curtailed. The faculty is at times entrusted with the details of a plan on the general desirability of which it has not been consulted; it receives commissions, conducts a second-table order of deliberation, which makes a sorry feast. All of which is bad for the faculty, as duly set forth; and bad for the university, as is also coming to be realized.

The crux of the matter is here reached. Is there or is there not a clash of interests? Do academic needs demand distinctive provisions, distinctive in end and distinctive in means? Are there or are there not economic, political, administrative, individual interests, external sources of pressure, irrelevant or undiscriminating judgments or motives, that conflict with academic purposes? Does the current system of university government impose such restraints and force the organism to an unwholesome existence, weakening the vitality of its expressions, distorting the ends of its being? Here the case, which I have made my case, stands or falls. The statement must be limited to conviction not unsupported by argument. If I am wrong in my primary contention, my plea is vain.

In further illustration of the view that such divergence is real and disastrous, I approach the disagreeable but unavoidable part of my task. I wish it were possible always to speak of the presidency and the professorship
and forget the president and the professor; for these objective fictions are really the subjects of discussion. It is also true that in large measure the office shapes the man; yet personality persists despite the difficulty of recognizing in the glorified presidential butterfly the humble professorial worm. The unwise authority and false responsibility of the presidential office invites the incumbent to attempt impossible tasks; invites him to adopt irrelevant standards; to obscure issues by looking many ways and seeing none clearly; to lose the clear-cut distinctions that regulate well-adjusted views and wholesome leadership. A despondent colleague insists that the only type of man safely to be entrusted with the prerogatives of the presidency is one whose principles would require him to decline the office. The dismal problem of salary shows the situation at its worst. (Let me assure the reader that I shall not expose the futility of the professor’s financial manipulations to the kindly scorn of an affluent public; it is so magnanimously conceded that the professor is grievously underpaid, that there is still hope that the grief may assume a pragmatic form.) It is the chaotic adjustment, the introduction of the methods of the auction-room and the stock-market, that have totally obscured the fact that there are principles at stake. What is wrong to the core is the attempt to translate academic service into dollars by an esoteric procedure which only presidents understand and will not reveal. It is possible to recognize the sublimity of Don Quixote’s courage in his grotesque ventures, or of Chanticleer’s confidence in his relation to the solar system, though disturbed by a humiliating mischance; but the administrative alchemy seems only ridiculous, while the waving of the magic wand of “merit” is irritating because so specious and so futile.

Principles are as clear as practise is muddy. More
significant for wise adjustment is what a man is paid for, than what he is paid. Salary represents an adjustment of resources to needs, to the composite factors of the situation viewed academically, not commercially. The folly of trying to serve two masters is as patent here as elsewhere. Those who are worried lest men of unequal merit receive like salaries reveal the commercial bent of their minds; the academic concern is rather that men of like merit may receive unequal salaries. But salaries can not be regulated on the principle that it is pleasant to receive them. Rewards of merit and Christmas stockings doubtless have their place, but in the light of the lamp of learning they seem a bit tawdry; nor does it seem helpful to punish service that does not fulfill promise by imposing complications in settling butchers' and grocers' bills. If professors are going to scramble for incomes, they lose all claim to the partial release from the economic pressure which their prerogative claims. The whole wretched business is mismanaged and causes more needless misery than it is proper to disclose. The security of the professorship is involved; the integrity of great academic traditions is involved; the soundness and poise of the intellectual life is involved. Indeed so much is involved that the enumeration might suggest to the uncharitable that the academic nervous system finds its solar plexus in the purse. The commanding consideration is that such is not the case; and the public should be prevented from so regarding it. Salvation lies in holding fast to the plain truth that this, like all other questions, must be considered and settled as an academic one. Any system will be good—though some will be better than others—that is framed on that principle and on no other; that holds to it steadily, come what may; that solves salary questions by preventing nine tenths of them from arising; that does not invidiously discriminate between
men on a money basis; that gives a man an independent seat in an academic council and relegates the pay day to its proper place in the calendar. "A single university which acts in this way [i.e., makes tenure and preferment dependent on the president's ukase] will in the end obtain a faculty consisting of a few adventurers, a few sycophants and a crowd of mediocrities"; if all universities do so, able men will not embark "on such ill-starred ships" (J. McK. Cattell). But the world is slow to banish the money-changers from the temple of learning; and, sad to confess, the custodians of the shrine have invited the disturbance of their offices by considerations of the market. They have indeed been hard pressed; whether this condones the offence let each judge. It is the familiar case of advancing a good end by bad means, thus sacrificing a larger benefit for an immediate gain; yet in so doing—and that is the sacrilege of it—the integrity of the end is compromised, the worship of false gods sanctioned.

The largest field of conflict between the standards and

*It is clear that I am not reviewing the salary question, but am touching only on one phase of the principles affecting its solution. The question was discussed five years ago by an association, composed of the presidents and deans of a score of the foremost universities, which is sufficiently naïve or presuming to call itself "The Association of American Universities." Only one protagonist stood out against his associates for an uncompromisingly academic adjustment. Let me record my optimism in my belief that he would not stand alone to-day. I am not in the least unaware of the many difficulties that beset the practical adjustment of salaries to condition; nor do I forget that at some stage a modus vivendi between academic and economic demands must be arranged. This does not in the least excuse the reply of a president to a plea for the academic adjustment: "I have never been able to manage a university" (note the language) on that plan. That statement is a confession of unfitness. It would be invidious to point out how this or that institution has admirably solved one or another phase of the problem. There is sufficient proof that a reasonable solution can be reached even under present conditions. I also offer the two-edged philosophic consolation that since salary can not possibly reflect merit, it does a man no good and no harm to receive more or less of it than do his colleagues. Perhaps this truth should be kept for home consumption; to offer it to the public may lead to complications.
consequent views and favored policies of the academic interests and those associated with administrative measures is that of educational provisions. It is true that the divergence is more commonly partial than total; yet cumulatively it is momentous—a chronic if not acute ailment. It is not easy to illustrate it without becoming tedious. I shall choose a phase in which the public is interested. How does it affect the student, the manner of life which he is invited to lead; the influences to which he is exposed; the curriculum to which in theory he is subjected and in practise too commonly orders by devising a mingled à la carte and table d'hôte menu not contemplated in any well-designed European or American plan of education. His very presence in college or in a particular college may be a result in which the administrative emphasis has been a cause; for there are so many of him (or her) that are in college without due warrant of present fitness and future benefit. The bidding for numbers is part of the system that operates to the disadvantage of standards; for the size (not the quality) of the share of the annual freshman crop, when reported, affects the rating in the educational Bradstreet. Prosperity is statistically measured; hence the desire for more buildings and costly ones; for more instructors, many of them occupied in work that the college should require and not provide; and more and more students who must be attracted towards the local Athenopolis and away from the rival one. Accordingly the hills are all reduced to easy grades and new democratic (not royal) roads to learning are laid out for those who do not like the old ones. Requirements are set not to what collegians should learn but to what they will; as at the circus the strip of bunting is held ostentatiously high until the horse with its fair burden is about to jump, when it is inconspicuously accommodated to the possible performance.
Still more fatal is the continuance of a like spirit within the college; competition is encouraged for large classes and big departments; each professor bids for students, and students have the air of patronage when they choose the wares on his counter. It is difficult to have one eye on popularity and the other on scholarship and retain a concentrated attention. A confessional questionnaire upon the motives operative in electing studies would reveal family secrets, difficult to reconcile with the lofty provisions and disinterested opportunities of the catalogue.

Involved in this rivalry, friendly in appearance, deadly in effect, is the intrusion of over-practical, quasi-professional interests, to the disparagement of discipline and cultural ideals. It is as though the course of the ship of education were to be determined by consulting the passengers. Advertising looms large, and boosts the bigness that brings revenues and responds to administrative ambitions. The general consequence, I contend, is that the policies pursued, the measures adopted, that determine what students do at college and how they do it, and what they fail to do, neither truly nor adequately reflect the intent, the wisdom, the influence of those to whom they rightly look for guidance. Let me concede at once that some of the above trends are within limits legitimate and helpful, and again that in considerable measure they are not wholly or predominantly due to the administrative influence. None the less the administrative emphasis must be charged with a large responsibility for the excess to which the natural divagations of youth have been permitted to expand.7 The administrators

7 Since writing these words Mr. Owen Johnston has set forth in no uncertain temper the "Shame of the Colleges" in terms of undergraduate dissipation, not as ominous in its physical extravagance as in its intellectual waste. It is the undergraduate distortion of perspective that is the source of despair, and for which the academic authorities must accept a considerable responsibility.
have held the balance of power; they have ruled by overruling; or by yielding where resistance was demanded. If theirs is the pride, theirs is also the shame.

There can be no doubt that college life is generally and severely criticized. The perspective of student activities seems to the casual as to the close observer sadly out of joint; and this extends to more than the fact that for news of the colleges one must turn to the prismatic sporting pages of enterprising dailies. The query whether the collegiate side-shows have not eclipsed the business carried on in the main tent, if carried further, may lead to similar revelations as to the altered spirit of the performance in the academic arena. The arraignment is long and severe: students have no intellectual interests, no application, no knowledge of essentials, no ability to apply what they assimilate; they are flabby, they dawdle, they fritter and frivol, they contemn the grind, they miseducate the studious, they seek proficiency in stunts, they drift to the soft and circumvent the hard; undertrained and overtaught, they are coddled and spoon-fed and served where they should be serving; and they get their degree for a quality of work which in an office would cost them their jobs. You may read it seriously and impressively set down in Mr. Flexner's "The American College"; you may read it no less forcibly if more indulgently recorded in Mr. Gayley's "Idols"; you may find it undisguised in Mr. Dooley's satire, and dramatically staged in "Stover at Yale." Parents are uneasy about the value of it all when their sons are in college (parenthetically with some one's else daughters); their worldly employers question it more pragmatically when college days are over. Alumni are divided between an indulgent retrospective loyalty and the enlightenment of maturer wisdom. All this smokes points to a constantly smouldering dissatisfaction, bursting occasionally into a flame of
protest. Doubtless the causes of the situation so variously complained of, like the causes of the high rate of living, are both deep and wide. Yet it seems clear that things would not have drifted so rapidly nor so far if the machinery of the university had been made more directly responsive to the educational sentiment. It is not so much a question of conservative or liberal, of standpatter or progressive. It is a question of a proper perspective and of the power to enforce it—of foreground and background, of what shall be put first and what second and what last.

Further illustration would encroach upon complex scholastic matters. One group of issues centers about the manner in which the university ideal is to be maintained while meeting and yet resisting the public pressure, or directing it to fruitful channels; for the university should be at once responsive and responsible. The several legitimate influences bearing upon educational provisions, whether publicly or privately supported, should have avenues of expression and of enforcement. Their adjustment is a delicate matter in which the representation of opinion and the disposition of authority will be both just and wise if the several factors are given due order of precedence. It is a question requiring argument, but must here be dismissed with the conviction that the academic representation is far too slight and unauthoritative, that the evils developed and others in the making are largely due to the overshadowing of academic by administrative interests. All this is but natural. Let any one of a group of interacting factors gain a headway, and the acquired momentum accumulates about it further aggrandizement unless opposed by rival forces. This type of greatness comes both by birthright and office, is achieved by set purpose, and is thrust upon the conspicuous recipient. Add to this the natural heedlessness
exemplified in a prosperous and expanding environment—so pointedly shown in the exploitation of natural resources, now checked by the movement for conservation—and it becomes clear how sound policy has been sacrificed to temporary expediency, to the desire to get things done, to the neglect of the criterion of quality that in the end makes or mars. Think of the superfluous ease with which colleges and universities have been sprinkled over the land, and the misguided zeal of local ambition, and the passion for quick returns; and how inevitably must academic interests suffer under such pressure, how natural that administrators should seize and hold the reins of government to the retirement of the calmer, sober claims of sound education! So far as youth and the frontier is the excuse, it no longer obtains. We are of age; nor is it so much a matter of age as of tradition. It is the survival of an unwholesome tradition into a state of affairs in which it becomes a hindrance and not a help, that constitutes the administrative peril.

A retrospect suggests the prospect and foreshadows it. I find some difficulty in attaining the degree of despondency which the outlook demands. There are many signs of a reaction against the system; while, as I have repeatedly noted, the spirit of the academic relations has steadily improved, and will, I am confident, lead in the directions of the reforms so urgently desired. The ability, earnestness and eagerness to cooperate, on the part of governing boards, is itself a sufficient assurance. They are becoming sensitive to their externalism, and recognize the unwisdom of snapshot judgments of momentous issues, concerning the pros and cons of which they are increasingly reluctant to accept the president's view as representative. The retrospective contrast is indeed amazing. It falls just beyond my experience to have members of the faculty addressed by a member of
the board as "You men whom we hire." It is within my experience to have professors summoned inquisitorially before a committee of the board to give an account of themselves, the interview conducted by the chairman with his feet on the table, and displaying a salivary agility that needs no further description. Such reminiscences carry no sting; they are merely amusing because now so impossible. They are instructive as showing how quickly the products of a world-culture follow upon the receding frontier. It lies in the power of governing boards to restore the academic prerogative. A movement in this direction would be in accord with the tendency in public affairs to correct national weaknesses and to revise cruder codes of procedure.

Returning some years ago from a prolonged sojourn abroad, I was on the watch for the first convincing incident that would reflect the American trait. Emerging from the attentions of the customs officials, who lost no time in showing me my place in their scheme of existence, I was accosted at the gates of liberty by a foreign urchin with the breezy offer: "Carry your bags, Boss!"—in his own land it would have been "Signor." I recognized the title as the proper address for the returning American citizen. But now the boss, political, industrial or educational, is no longer in such high repute as to make the term an unquestioned compliment. Methods are coming to be scrutinized, policies challenged, rights and wrongs as well as successes considered, and ethical and social as well as economical balance-sheets demanded. All this makes for a refinement in the adjustment of means to ends, which is sympathetic with my plea. It is natural that the men of affairs chosen for posts of honor, so many of them of the high-principled classes responsive to the higher standards, should become sensitive to the autocracy in educational administration and look upon
it with distrust. They understand, if they do not embrace, the cause of academic insurgency. They may be few in number, even exceptional; they are growing in influence. But the professor must not look passively for relief from without; he must find it within his guild. The clouds of promise though small are visible above the horizon. Protests are growing and are no longer received as dangerous or pardonable idiosyncrasies. The class of men from which presidents are recruited shows a considerable group alert to the evils of the system which they are called upon to administer. Programs of reform have been proposed: advisory bodies to offset presidential autocracy and make the position representative; the election of the president by the faculty together with the determination by the faculty of the powers which he is to exercise; the abolition of the office altogether. Speaking some years ago in a conciliatory mood, I favored the gradual elimination by reformatory measures of the most serious administrative evils, and trusted to the spirit thus awakened to carry the movement to a fitting consummation. I confess that the logic of the abolitionist position is growing upon me. It seems in so many ways disturbing to have a commanding figure in the academic horizon; the foolish and increasing pomp and circumstance of each presidential inaugural deepens the impression. Yet I still believe that the presidential office, shorn of its unwise and unsafe authority, of its aloofness in salary and lime-light conspicuousness, of the prerogatives which it has assumed because unclaimed (or, in the vernacular, because not securely nailed down), could be adjusted to accomplish all the essential desiderata. I believe this mainly because I believe that the position thus reconstructed would attract a different type of man—one who would desire to be no more and no less than an academic leader serving by the warrant of elec-
tion and of constitutional support by the body which he serves. Clashes of policy must be avoided by the fusion of interests, not by the imposition of an external authority.

The rectification of the greatest loss constitutes the restoration of the greatest gain. The independence of the academic career as embodied in the status of the professor remains the noead vital of the educational system. Untoward conditions affect the intellectual economy unfavorably from its lowest to its highest ramifications. The blight of the blossoms is often caused by the impoverished soil at the roots. It is at the upper levels of fruition where growth is most sensitive to climatic influences that the hazard is greatest. In acknowledging the honorary degree which Harvard University conferred upon William James to make him yet more distinctively her own, he offered in return the concentrated expression of his academic experience. "The university most worthy of rational admiration is that one in which your lonely thinker can feel himself least lonely, most positively furthered, and most richly fed." In reminding the alumni of Harvard that "our undisciplinables are our proudest product" he gave expression to a memorable reflection. The administrative temper breeds an atmosphere peculiarly noxious to the finer, freer issues of learning. The inner quality so precious to the function of leadership in intellectual callings, dependent as they are on the delicate nurture of the creative gift, is precisely that which recedes at the first harsh touch of imposed restraint. There is a temperamental disposition involved, fraught with difficulty of adjustment under the most favorable circumstances, beset with hazard throughout its uncertain maturing at all levels. Unless the academic life is made helpful to its purpose, the course of which it must so largely be free to set for itself, the ships
that bear our most valued cargoes will be storm-tossed and needlessly discouraged in their efforts to reach their sighted harbors; and some of them will mutely and ingloriously go down at sea. It is because the prevalent administrative system is so deadly to "our proudest product," that it appears to me, through the vista of a quarter century, as the supreme peril of the educational seas.  

*Since this article was written, Professor Cattell has made known the results of his inquiry in regard to the opinions of professors upon the desirability and acceptability of the present system of academic control. (See Science, May 24 and 31, 1912.) Speaking generally, the inquiry, which was conducted upon a wide basis and presumably a frank one, reveals the astonishing conclusion that 85 per cent. of the replies are unfavorable to the system in vogue—the system here criticized. It is even more significant that a large majority advocate a very decided and radical reconstruction to bring about an urgently needed reform. The variety of points of view from which the dominant system is attacked is also suggestive. Knowing as I did, from the many letters of endorsement of my own utterances, that there was a wide-spread sympathy with this position, I was yet entirely unprepared to find such general an expression of dissatisfaction. It would appear that the professors constitute a fairly unanimous army of insurgents, with a peculiar reticence in announcing their cause, and a reluctance to enlist in any active operations. None the less the statistical result is a cause for congratulation; and the academic world owes a debt to Professor Cattell the nature of which the future will more clearly reveal. Of the several constructive suggestions those advanced by Professor Cattell must now be accorded the preferred position, since it is with reference to them that a representative referendum of the academic profession has been taken. When it is realised that a considerable majority favors an extensive reconstruction of the system as established, and that the professors as a body find themselves dispirited and not inspired by the provisions supposed to ensure their efficiency, it is hardly probable that boards of management will fail to respond to this convincing and notable evidence that there is something out of joint in the academic situation. In my opinion Professor Cattell has indicated a workable, flexible program. As a platform its stability will depend not so directly upon this or that plank which is inserted or omitted or trimmed to local requirements, as upon its finding a solid support in the sentiments and judgments of those whose business and privilege it will be to direct its construction as at once a visible and a spiritual reality.
II. THE NEED OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES IN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

BY GEORGE T. LADD,
YALE UNIVERSITY

Published in The Popular Science Monthly, April, 1912

In the first of a series of articles on the higher education in this country, which were published in The Forum during the years 1902 and 1903, I designated the true functions of a great university as "chiefly these three: (1) The highest mental and moral culture of its own students; (2) the advancement, by research and discovery, of science, scholarship and philosophy; (3) the diffusion, as from a center of light and influence, of the benefits of a liberal, genial and elevating culture over the whole nation, and even over all mankind." On raising the question whether the universities of the United States had up to that time discharged these functions in a manner commensurate with their opportunity and with the demands made upon them by the size of their faculties and the wealth of their endowments, it seemed evident to me that we were forced to the confession, "They have not." And while no small part of the causes for this confessed failure must be charged to the general public, with its ignorant or mistaken views in respect to the interests, values and ideals of the higher education, no small part of the blame attaches itself to the internal management of these same institutions and involves their presidents, faculties and trustees.

Within the past ten years there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the character and the workings of the system of administration still prevailing in our larger
and wealthier collegiate and university institutions. It has been pointed out that, while this system was admirable in its adaptation and praiseworthy in its results as applied a half-century ago to the small denominational college, it is ill-adapted and far from praiseworthy in many of its results, as applied to the indefinitely more complex and almost totally different conditions of the modern university. Particularly inept in its character and disastrous in its results—so it is claimed—is the relation which the president sustains to the different faculties of a great university, and to its trustees or corporation or other governing board. In too many instances, it is claimed, this relation interferes with the perfect understanding and cordial, intelligent cooperation, which should always be maintained between the faculties and the governing board. There can be no doubt that, among the men who know most about the secret working of the present system of university administration in this country, and who are best competent to pass judgment upon it, the need of some change is keenly felt; and if there is as yet too little unanimity of opinion as to what that change should be, there is a fairly uniform agreement that the time for a franker and fuller discussion of the difficult subject has fully come.

Before saying anything in consideration of the problem itself, I wish to define it—at least so far as this attempt is concerned—somewhat more carefully. In the first place it is evident that the scores of small denominational colleges are not to be reckoned in the same class with the larger private and state institutions which have some valid claim to the title "university." A constitution which worked on the whole so well for them in the older days may continue to work almost equally well under more modern conditions. In their case, the fundamental necessities are such that they can not become any-
thing at all—not to say, anything great—without being for a considerable time under the almost unlimited control of one man, with a corps of a half dozen sympathetic colleagues who are subordinates. It must also be borne in mind, when urging the need of greatly modifying if not totally abolishing the office of president in the larger institutions, that the very importance of the personal element in the successful discharge of this office can be converted into an argument which counts heavily in opposite directions. Certainly, the office of president in any one of these institutions, under the present system of administration, is no sinecure. He who accepts or holds it may not improperly claim sympathetic pity from his friends, and plead with them, if not with the public, to help him answer the question: "Who is sufficient for these things?" The answer would have to be: Few indeed are, by natural gifts or by training; and fewer—far fewer—of those who succeed by the current political methods in getting chosen to the position. And as in so many instances the final event makes evident, it would seem more fitting to regard the music and the ribbons, the pomp and the paraphernalia, of the inauguration ceremonies as consecrating a victim for a free-will sacrifice than as raising a deified monarch to a sort of imperial throne. It is neither becoming nor necessary to the argument to follow the example of a series of articles published not long ago by one of our most influential newspapers and denounce the great majority of college and university presidents as habitually guilty of falsehood and selfish intrigue. Indeed, such a charge is to be convicted of the untruth of exaggeration. It is quite enough to point out that the accusation itself, accompanied by the fact that it could find admission to a respectable weekly paper and be so largely credited as it undoubtedly was, offers strong reasons for devising some system of govern-
ing our universities which shall help to remove the temptation on the part of any of its officers to resort to such means of carrying their measures; and so make the charge intrinsically impossible and absurd. We desire, then, to keep in the background all suspicion of indulging in personalities, favorable or unfavorable to particular persons, while treating freely of the person of the president, its power and relations to the true functions of the university, in the prevailing system of university government.

And now let us consider what are some of the more important objections to the workings of the form of administration almost universally in vogue. These may be all summed up in saying that, in many, if not in the majority of cases, it hinders rather than helps the smoothest working and most valuable results of a university education. At once we must plant ourselves squarely and immovably upon the proposition that all the legitimate work of the true university culminates in its teaching. From this it follows that all the acquisitions of the university are subordinate to the quality and force of its faculties. Such an "institution of learning" may offer fine and even luxurious dormitories, and a cheap and well-served dining-hall for its students; it may give them agreeable and even refining opportunities for social life; it may have expensive appliances and large and splendid fields for athletic sports and culture; but if it has not the sufficient number and right sort of men in its faculties, it fails just where success is most imperatively demanded of it. All these other advantages, so far as the work of the university is concerned, are entirely subordinate. All the other officers are the servants of the teachers. Good health is indeed of vital importance; but in securing it, to refrain from dissipation and to take an abundance of open air in unexhausting exercise, is vastly more profit-
THE NEED OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES

able than the existing extravagances and absurdities of college athletics. Social life is indispensable for the best development of the human individual; but it is not best obtained in the saloons, or clubs, or even in most of the sodalities popular with university students. I repeat: Everything else must be kept subordinate to the efficiency of the teaching, if the university is to discharge satisfactorily its chief functions. But that I am pleading for no narrow conception of these functions, let me refer to the sentences quoted above. It then appears that, not the students alone who are gathered under her walls are the pupils of the great and good university; her pupils are also the nation and the world.

What now are the principal obstacles which have stood, and are still standing, in the way of the most efficient discharge of their obligations to their pupils, to the nation and to mankind, by the institutions of the higher and professional education in the United States? If we confine our attention—as indeed our theme demands—to those obstacles which arise more strictly within the university circles themselves, we may say: On the part of the students, the chief are the vices of extravagance, lawlessness, superficiality and idleness. All these are, to an extent difficult to determine, connected with the grosser vices of certain forms of dissipation. The obstacles arising from the existing form of administration, on the part of the trustees, are chiefly due to ignorance, indifference and a species of cowardice which too often takes the fashion of reluctance to oppose the president or the majority of their colleagues on the governing board, or even to inquire too curiously into the motives or the significance of the measures brought before them by their presiding officer. And, finally, the smooth and efficient discharge of the functions of the university are hindered by insufficient education, lack of didactic skill, tactlessness,
indifference or low moral tone, in any or all of its several faculties.

It would by no means be fair to charge the deficiencies and vices of the student body to the administration of the university, whatever the exact form of that administration might happen to be. The particular list of vices mentioned above are the national vices. And no amount of painstaking or system of discipline can keep life in the university free from infection by its public environment. It is not at all clear for what proportion of the extravagance, lawlessness, superficiality and indolence of the students the university may justly be held responsible. And, of course, previous to prolonged experience it is difficult to prove that these vices would be minimized or better held in check by a somewhat radically different form of university administration.

Of late years, the presidents who have been wise at the beginning, or who have become wise through experience in the early period of their career, have been more and more inclined to leave most of the discipline of the students in the hands of the faculties, or of the appointees of the faculties, to which the various classes of the students belong. In a large institution, the less there is of the one-man-power discipline, on the whole the better. Especially is the president tempted by favoritism, prejudice, various kinds of fears and by personal or family or friendly sympathies, to act unwisely if any power of punishing or pardoning is left in his hands alone. It is a misfortune for him and for the institution even to seem to have any such power. Too often has the professor, on bringing forward the name of some member of his classes who had failed in his studies or cheated in an examination, been made by the presiding officer, through the latter's anxiety to save some notable athlete or the scion of some family of wealth or high social standing,
himself to appear the delinquent, either in the artifice of
detecting cheats or in the art of teaching those that will
not to learn if they can possibly help it. Even stronger
than any of these other motives may be the desire of the
individual officer, if he is the nominal head of the entire
show, to be popular with the "boys" and with their
parents, the alumni and other constituency of the institu-
tion. And so long as such a large proportion of these
"friends" (?) look leniently upon, if they do not largely
indulge themselves in, the practise of these same vices,
how can any one lonely man stand against the multitude
for firmness and due severity in discipline? But a body
of men like the faculties, or their selected committees, in
a great institution, is much more likely than any one man
can be, to administer even-handed justice, tempered with
reasonable mercy. While, then, I am by no means pre-
pared to quote with unlimited assent the following
declaration taken from a pamphlet, entitled "The De-
moralization of College Life," "College presidents are
not willing to enforce the law or even to allow it to be
enforced when it will cause them to lose students, espe-
cially rich and influential ones," I am fairly confident
in the belief that the total elimination of even the appear-
ance of one-man power or influence would greatly im-
prove the morale of the student body. And this morale,
whatever is to be said about it as compared with other
countries and earlier days in this country, is certainly
quite too low at the present time. It can be raised, and
that without any very severe difficulties; and it would,
in no very long time, be raised, if the men in the uni-
versity faculties who sincerely want to see it raised were
given a free hand. Perhaps they might not have the
"nerve" at once so to check the extravagance of college
athletics as to make it no longer possible to spend a half-
million dollars on a single game of football; or difficult for
the sons of impecunious teachers or country parsons to embarrass their parents by calling for a goodly slice out of their salaries, in order to attend in proper style a dance that rivals in magnificence a state-ball at Government-House in Calcutta.

But is not the present prevailing form of university administration the only one under which the trustees, corporation or otherwise named governing board, can successfully discharge their part of the administrative functions? In these days, universities can not grow in other respects unless they grow in their finances. And there is something appalling, even to the multimillionaire, in the remorseless appetite of the American university for an ever larger expenditure of money. The trustees by advising and assisting the president, and by answering generously to a certain obligation put upon, or gently hinted to them, when they are chosen to the position of trustees, are supposed to be under obligation to oversee the getting and the expenditure of the required money. But the obstacles which they may, for the most part unwittingly, throw in the way of the efficient work of the faculties of the university are chiefly due to their ignorance of the principles and right methods of education, or to their indifference toward the supreme ends of education, or to their reluctance to criticize—much more oppose—the will of the president or the majority of their own body. Indeed, their position and their action quite too often corresponds to that of the trustees of some bank or other large corporation, who altogether too late wake up to find themselves convicted of conniving at some imprudent or illegal transaction on the part of the official whom they have trusted incontinently.

The vice of extravagance in administration is being distinctly fostered by the system at present prevailing in our larger and wealthier universities. Money is much
too largely given to bricks rather than brains, to mortar rather than men. In other words, too large a proportion of gifts and of income is being spent on needlessly expensive buildings; too small a proportion on teachers and explorers of first-rate ability in the several faculties. It is only a partial, but by no means a sufficient, excuse for this vice (1) of extravagance to say that we are now in the brick (stone) and mortar stage of our educational development, and that, when we have provided a splendid and complete equipment of the material sort, then we shall be ready to turn our full attention to raising the intellectual and spiritual equipment. For the drift of our experience and the point of the argument for a change lies in the fact that the present system is working toward the degradation of the professorial office and the depreciation of the functions and the personnel of the faculties. The fallacy of the other chief argument for this sort of extravagance is less obvious. It is said—and truly—that it is easier to get large sums of money for fine buildings than for great teachers or for stimulating scientific research. In reply, it is not necessary to credit the cynical saying of Europe—although there is much evidence in its favor—that the real scientific work done in the scientific laboratories of the United States is in inverse proportion to their magnificence. Nor could any real friend of the American universities feel otherwise than pleased and grateful to see them equipping themselves with buildings sufficiently commodious for calculable future needs, of good academic architecture, but above all, of the highest serviceableness. But such a friend can not in the same way approve the building of luxurious dormitories, where only the wealthy can really afford to live with any show of an honest independence. The simplicity and severity of the student life, in this and other similar regards, in the public schools and the col-
leges of the great universities of England are in refreshing and suggestive contrast to the extravagances and class distinctions of republican America. And when, contrary to the good judgment of the teaching force, scores and hundreds of thousands of dollars are unnecessarily spent merely or largely to glorify the administration as a notable "building era" in the life of the university, it would seem that the foundations of an argument were laid for giving the men who have the work of teaching and research in charge a much larger share in determining such matters.

These things, however, are of minor importance compared with the way in which the present system works out, too often, in practice, as affecting the very delicate and important but now remote relations between the faculties and their governing board. So long as these relations are chiefly—not to say wholly—through any one man, there are almost sure to be misunderstandings, heartburnings over real or fancied wrongs, jealousies and suspicion of favoritism and of intrigues, even if this one man is equipped with an inconceivable breadth of culture and of variegated scholastic interests, mingled in due proportions with the wisdom of a Solomon, the self-sacrifice of an apostle, and the temper of an angel. A few university presidents have had naturally, or have acquired, enough of this adorable mixture to pass courageously and patiently through years in so trying a position, and at the last to emerge with a large measure of respect and some measure of affection from their colleagues in the different faculties. But there are not a few other cases where great and irreparable injustice has been done to individuals and no small mischief to the university through lack of an appointed means of securing trustworthy communication between the governing board and the faculties under their control, irrespective of the
representations and the control of the president. If the inside history of the mistakes made and the wrongs committed in this way were fully written—and it is probably not desirable that it should be and quite certain that it never will be written—it would be spotted with scandals of the most astonishing character. For example, several years ago a distinguished professor in one of our larger universities, who had given the greater part of his life to its devoted and efficient service, was as a part of the business of a single meeting of the trustees dismissed without further trial from his place; and after the action was taken and inquiry was made as to its grounds, not one of the trustees could be found who was willing to assume any responsibility or to state the grounds on which the action had been taken; or indeed, whether the letter written by the president to the professor fairly and truthfully represented the intention of the trustees. Subsequently, a number explicitly, and all implicitly, admitted that they had been deceived by the president.

From the point of view which regards its morally deteriorating influence on the faculties, the present arrangement is equally unsatisfactory. The men of standing in the world of science and scholarship, and of a high sense of honor, will not willingly resort to the trustees, either as individuals or as a body, unless they are officially authorized or requested to do so. Of all men, too, they are least likely to run to the president with either complaints or defences, or to take any measures to "make themselves solid" with him. If they are being undermined or traduced by any one, whether on the outside or among their younger and more ambitious and place-seeking colleagues, they are even unlikely to know anything about it, so busy are they in their own work; or if they do know about it, they are not unlikely to scorn to pay any attention to it. But if no action touching the profes-
sional standing of any member of the faculties could be taken on the initiative or recommendation of the president alone, there is little doubt that this kind of maladministration would occur much more infrequently.

Indeed, it would seem as though this one contention did not require prolonged or subtle argumentation. Granted even that "the cotton-mill policy" is suitable for the administration of a great university: yet the head of this form of industrial enterprise ought to be, as a "boss," no less strictly limited than the bosses in other no more important or intricate industrial enterprises. This is the one thing that the labor unions are most vigorously and most righteously insisting upon—namely, that there shall be some adequate and trustworthy means of employers and employees coming near, in a frank and friendly way, to each other.

But of all the objections to the continuance without change of the present system of administration in the great universities, the most weighty and imperative is this: it is one of the most productive of the several causes which are working together to bring about "the degradation of the professorial office." That this process of degradation is really going on, I ventured to assert in one of the series of articles to which reference has just been made. The response which the assertion called forth at the time went a long way toward confirming the opinion. Careful inquiry into the history of the last decade of collegiate and university movements would, I am sure, show that the process has in the meantime not been checked. It is the rather to be feared that it has gone forward with a quickened pace. The causes of this process do indeed chiefly lie beyond and below the power of any form of management largely to control.

Let us briefly consider the case of the young man who decides to devote his life to a university career. The
more intelligent and deliberate the decision is, the later it is likely to have come in the course of his secondary education. But under the working of the system of almost unlimited electives which has prevailed in our higher institutions of learning during the past half-generation or more, the candidate for a future professorship is almost certain to discover that he has neglected to lay the foundations of any particular subject solidly and thoroughly well. He knows no elements, as the elements of every species of science and scholarship must be known, in order to proceed safely and with joy in hard work to its ever higher stages of study, research and discovery. But our intending professor can not go back into the fitting-school or into freshman year and begin over again. He enters the graduate department. Here he has, with few exceptions, as colleagues in study, men who, like himself, are not well grounded and who are unable or unwilling to submit to the prolonged and severe discipline which is necessary for the training of the intellectual athlete. He is prematurely set at "a problem" and works with an aspiring eye on the degree of Ph.D. That this description is not true alone of the few advanced students trained by the secondary educational system of this country, who are without serious purpose, I may cite the unanimous testimony of the professors and other officers at Oxford respecting the Rhodes scholars in general, as it was given to me on occasion of a recent visit there. They are, for the most part, fine, manly fellows, earnest in work and anxious to pick up whatever might seem fit for their advantage, but superficial in their attainments, eager to specialize minutely while as yet they know little or nothing thoroughly as to elementary matters in their chosen specialty, and restive under all manner of control, whether as touching manners, petty morals, the prompt keeping of appointments, or conformity to university regulations.
Now that our candidate is ready for his professorial career, how shall he get into a place which will at least give him a foothold for beginning a life-long race? He must be, as a rule, recommended by somebody (often some president) to some president, who will, if he thinks best, recommend him to the appointing board. This latter recommendation is usually equivalent to an appointment, although of late the same custom of consulting some members of the faculty into which the candidate is to be introduced has begun to prevail. In popular parlance, he must push and be pushed. But every one who has had the long experience of the writer in such matters knows perfectly well that the willingness and skill to push one's self, and the vigor and success with which one is pushed by others, are quite as often in inverse as in direct proportion to the merits of one's case.

When all the preliminary stages are passed through, and the candidate has really the right to call himself professor—although the young ladies whom he used to meet at the summer resorts were wont to call him "professor" when he was in fact only a tutor or an instructor—unless he has a most self-sacrificing intellectual interest in his calling and a thoroughly ethical love for the work of the teacher, he finds that his position and its rewards are not at all what he fondly imagined they would be. His classmates who have gone into business or into the professions of law or medicine are in receipt of incomes two-fold or four-fold his own. They have a higher social standing; and those they have served with no higher degree of talents or of success are seemingly more grateful and ready in some form or other to show appreciation of the services rendered in their behalf. But let him never mind. Perhaps, if he is a true man he does really not much mind. But what he can scarcely help minding is this: His whole career, and the reputation and influence
which he has won by a life of self-sacrificing labor, may at any moment be in peril through the caprice, or cowardice, or ill-will of a single man, or of a little group of men who have influence with that single man. Then he will have the choice between a silent submission or an ignoble contest with a probably inglorious—albeit triumphant—ending.

This last and worst of all the many influences tending toward the degradation of the professorial office is definitely connected with the present system of university administration. One can not wonder, and one can scarcely blame, the younger generation if they neither have nor profess the same unstinted devotion for an institution as that which sustained their forebears during lives of self-denial, hard work and low living. They are in it for what they can get out of it, much more than their old-time predecessors were. They need not be at all so careful as their elders were about any shadow being cast upon their reputation for the most upright and austere morality; but they are almost sure to be more careful about standing in with the power that has most to do with appointments and promotions. For the question may at any time be thrust upon them: Which shall I sacrifice, my hard-won position or my highly prized spirit of manly independence?

Immediately following the consideration of the evils of the present system of university administration in this country comes the question: Can these evils be abolished or lessened by any feasible changes in this system? And on the heels of this question follows another: If changes are to be made, what shall those changes be? In treating these questions it scarcely needs to be said that, as a matter of course, no system of administration, to whatever purpose that system may be applied, can avoid encountering and in all probability collecting about itself a
host of embarrassments and of obstacles to its perfect working. Institutions that have developed as large and old universities have, even in this comparatively new country, in fact developed, can not be subjected to radical changes, suddenly, and on grounds of theoretical significance alone. But as I have already said, so obvious and important in their power to defeat the smooth and successful working of the highest functions of a great and good university have some of these evils grown to be, that the time has fully arrived for a frank and thorough discussion of the topics suggested by them. And this discussion may be entered upon with the conviction that some of these evils, and those not the least of them, are so largely due to the nature of a worn-out system, that by changing the system we shall lessen if we do not wholly extirpate them.

In order to point the direction in which changes are both needed and promising, as respects the present system of university administration in this country, it seems to me that some fixed places of standing may be established. In closing this article I will mention the following as among the most important, and perhaps they may be summed up in a tentative way in this sentence: The administration of a large university requires for its most effective conduct two boards or bodies of men, which have largely different functions and for the most part a different personnel, but which are bound to cooperation for the welfare of the university by regularly appointed and trustworthy means of understanding each other’s views, necessities and measures enacted, and by a system of checks that shall operate in guarded ways to make each responsible for its initiative to the other.

Of these two boards which are necessary for the efficient administration of a large university, one should be chiefly responsible for its material affairs. For this
reason it should be largely composed of men of sound business principles and experience; but also, as far as possible, of men possessed of a worthy knowledge of the needs and methods of a modern university education and with devotion to high educational ideals. There would seem to be no valid objection to, but much valid reason in favor of, having a small minority of this board chosen from the different faculties of the university. Why should not a professor of business law, a professor of economics, and a professor of architecture or engineering, be useful members of such an administrative body? Even a professor of ethics, if one could be found who combined a firm grasp on moral ideals with a fair amount of practical wisdom, might sometimes serve as a valuable control in the performance of the legitimate functions of the trustees of an institution of the higher education.

It is unnecessary to emphasize the fact that the business administration of a large educational corporation requires the same trained staff of competent and responsible assistants—treasurer, cashier, clerks, etc.—which are required by any other business corporation of equal magnitude; and these paid assistants should be held to as strict account in every respect as that which prevails in the best organized business corporations. If, besides the gifts which are solicited or directed to the endowment or income of a well-organized and well-administered university through the free-will devotion of its trustees, faculties, alumni and other friends, there is pressing need for yet more, it would always be within the province of this board to call to its help especially selected agents for meeting such need. But however the details of collecting and distributing the material resources of the university are managed, and whatever the success which attends their management, it should never be lost out of mind that all their value consists in the effi-
ciency with which they minister to the real ends and promote the realization of the true ideals of a great and good university. These are not in any way necessarily connected with the glorification of any one man or of any single administration as a money-getter or a builder of magnificent buildings.

The other arm of administration, which ought to be equally strong and self-respecting and independent within its own appropriate sphere, must be wielded by the faculties. But not by them as acting all together, or as all acting equally in any one faculty, or as acting in an unorganized and unrestricted way. The same process which has tended toward the degradation of the professorial office has increased the danger of something resembling mob rule, if every teacher stands on equal terms with every other, in a great university. Yet, in general, the educational policy, matters touching the curriculum, and all the discipline of the student body, as almost a matter of divine right, whether or not by custom or by statute, belong to the men whose craft and experience is in lines of education. And while they should always be thoughtfully considerate of the judgment of their employers, and are quite of necessity dependent upon them in the matter of their salaries and of the equipment allowed for the prosecution of the work of their departments, they should be so related to these employers as to be delivered from all feelings of fear, or wish or chance to curry favor, in the discharge of their functions as teachers and explorers of truth.

In saying this I am far indeed from advocating an unrestricted license for the individual teacher, or even for the whole of the teaching force. The management of the more strictly educational affairs of each one of the separate faculties would, in general, best be left to each one of these faculties. And, indeed, so far as the professional
schools of law and medicine are concerned, this course is customarily adopted. In the faculties of these schools there is customarily a moiety of strong and independent men, who can readily take care of themselves if obliged to leave their positions; and while ready to hear and heed advice (or, at least, they ought to be so), they are not ready to take orders unquestioningly from the president or from the corporation. But the same thing ought to be true of all the faculties. When, however, these faculties are large and largely composed of young and inexperienced men, as is sure to be the case with the faculties of the undergraduate schools of a great university, their internal control can not be safely committed to the entire body—share and share alike, as it were. It can not be democratic; it must be aristocratic. And this aristocracy would have—so it would seem—to be selected by joint action of the full professors and the trustees. The method of its fixing might be adapted to the circumstances and the needs of the particular institution. Once fixed, the advice and cooperation of the entire body of officers, of every sort and grade, might be invited or commanded, but the final control of educational matters would rest in the authority of this aristocracy, with the aid of those to whom they might see fit to delegate any portion of it. And, finally, for matters affecting immediately the scholastic interests of the whole university, and for adjusting differences and conflicts touching educational interests between the different departments, a university council is a most feasible expedient. Only be it understood that such a council should be no sinecure, or body designed to assume a show of responsibility while actually having little power to check intrigues, to judge intelligently and righteously, and to act with something more than a mere shadow of influence or authority.

Most important of all the improvements for which we
might have a fair measure of hope, if something like the suggested changes could be inaugurated and fairly and thoroughly tested in the administration of our greater and older universities, would be the improvement in a good understanding and in reciprocal confidence and in effective cooperation, between the board of teachers and the board of business management, between the professors and the trustees. In the lack of knowledge, of confidence and of cooperation, most of the embarrassments, difficulties, failures and scandals connected with the present system of university administration in this country undoubtedly arise. And perhaps in the majority of these cases they arise from or center about the action of the president. It will be noticed that the scheme tentatively proposed in this article does not necessarily call for any president. And, indeed, we may boldly ask ourselves, Why should there be any president, if by this title we mean to cover the office of any one man combining within himself, even apparently, all the functions belonging to this name in the days—and, if you please, even now—of the small denominational college? A figure-head to represent the university at home or abroad on occasions of peculiar import and corresponding grandeur can easily be appointed, either with a three years’ tenure or for each special occasion.

Doubtless many difficult problems will arise and await a speedy or more remote solution, in the way of any institution which attempts to inaugurate the needed changes. Doubtless, too, the particular character of the changes enacted would wisely vary in different cases. In the cases of universities under state control, everything could scarcely be arranged in the same way as in the cases of the private institutions. Doubtless, again, the effect of change upon the alumni and the public at large would have to be seriously taken into the account. But neither
the public, nor the alumni, nor the trustees, and perhaps not even the presidents of these institutions, realize how deep is the dissatisfaction with the existing system, how urgent, if not loud, is the call for a somewhat radical change. At any rate, it is high time that the problems afforded by this system should be frankly and boldly faced; high time that the disadvantages should be announced, if not at once corrected.
III. THE STATUS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE PROFESSOR

By JOHN J. STEVENSON,
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Published in The Popular Science Monthly, December, 1904, and December, 1905

Three months ago, the colleges and universities opened for the new year. In most instances, telegrams from the institutions were jubilant, announcing that the entering class is the largest in the history of the college, but some were apologetic, as one or another department showed decrease. Editors rejoiced in the "era of education," pointing with pride to the four hundred and fifty colleges, more or less, with about 15,000 instructors and about ten times as many students and a total income for all purposes approaching $25,000,000. Unquestionably, there is much in this of which to be proud, but the broad statement, as given in the journals, fails to emphasize the fact that this great fabric of higher education owes its existence, in great measure, to the willingness of college professors to bear a great part of the cost. It is true that college professors have never received salaries such as to arouse envy in men of other professions, but at one time the calling offered great attractions to those who cared more for study than for money. Appointments were made for life or good behavior, the calling was honorable above all others, as in Germany of to-day, and there was that "literary leisure" which could be devoted to investigation. Many imagine that there has been no change in these conditions; this error should be corrected.

370
The scope of instruction, especially on the scientific side, but measurably on all sides, has been widened and the hours have been scattered so as practically to cover the available day. The kind of knowledge required is very different from that of even thirty years ago, when students had hardly any source of information outside of the text-book and classroom and the courses were truly elementary. Immediate preparation required little time and the professor's close study was within a chosen field of investigation; but now he must read carefully the literature in all portions of the field covered by his chair merely to meet the exigencies of the classroom, for the elementary courses of little more than thirty years ago belong to the common stock of knowledge; popular magazines deal with discoveries in science and archeology, as though they belong to familiar discourse, and daily papers indulge in editorial discussions of subjects which, twenty-five years ago, were in the province of specialists alone. There remains for the college professor hardly a trace of "literary leisure," and even the university professor is apt to find the stress of outside duties connected with his work so exhausting that, during term time, any prolonged study beyond that which is necessary becomes irksome.

Two generations ago, college trustees kept themselves more or less in touch with the professors and made diligent effort to become familiar with details of the work. With vast expansion in resources and equal expansion in the curriculum, personal relations between professors and trustees practically ceased and the latter have no longer time, opportunity, or, in too many cases, inclination, to acquaint themselves with the nature or extent of the work done by individual professors. University faculties have rarely any direct representation in the board of trustees or before it, the common mouthpiece
being the president, who, no matter how earnest and faithful he may be, is not, in the very nature of things, competent to understand all matters or to present them properly. In too many cases, the professors are not consulted even in the matter of appointments and the trustees place the responsibility for these upon the president, as though the institution were a country academy. Naturally enough, trustees have come to regard themselves as the institution and the professors as merely their employees, as, indeed, has been asserted. This has gone so far that in one institution, at least until a very recent period, all appointments were for the period of one year—a plan admirably adapted to secure adherence to the powers in control. For trustees having this conception of their powers and duties, the usefulness or worth of an instructor is not measured by his ability as teacher or investigator.

Certainly the attractions making the profession so inviting in former days no longer exist in such form as to be magnetic to ambitious young men.

It might be supposed that, on the whole, salaries have been increased so as to compensate in some degree for the losses; and the relation of income to number of instructors, as given in the opening paragraph, appears at first glance to confirm the supposition. But not so. Salaries, always small, have not been increased to keep pace with cost of living or even with other demands unknown two generations ago. On the contrary, taken as a whole, the salaries have decreased. The writer recognizes that salaried men are at a disadvantage in comparison with ordinary wage-earners, the advance of salaries being slow and the periods of rest usually long; but college men are at especial disadvantage owing to peculiar conditions, which have been intensified during recent years.
College income must come mainly from endowments or their equivalent. Students' fees, though not unimportant, pay but a small part of the cost. Little more than two generations ago, when college faculties were small, the course compulsory and free tuition almost unknown, fees were the chief source of income. With increase in number of students, old buildings became insufficient and new buildings were secured by sale of long-time scholarships at low rates, the future being heavily mortgaged for the present. After the civil war, a vast army of students entered our colleges; the fees were increased somewhat in many cases, but not in proportion to the cost, and the system of free scholarships became an important feature almost everywhere. More buildings, more and attractive grounds, were acquired and in time a large share of the income went toward mere maintenance of the property. To make matters worse, the colleges soon suffered an actual loss of income, for owing to the decreasing rates of interest, the endowments, such as they were, became less and less productive, while, in addition, the broadening of the curriculum compelled greatly increased expenditure. Fifty years ago there were institutions doing excellent work for the times with only six or seven salaried men in the faculty, averaging one instructor in some cases to forty students, whereas to-day the multiplicity of courses requires an instructor to every ten or even less students.

Increasing outgo without corresponding income must be at somebody's expense, and, in this case, that somebody is the college instructor. Not that in every case the salary of a professor has been reduced in order to pay the cost of dividing his chair, so that the college may receive twice as much work for the same money—though this is not unknown—but that a newly appointed man in many cases receives less salary than his predecessor. It
is by no means rare for a college, on the retirement of a professor, to divide the chair, employing young men at salaries which, combined, amount to little more than the single salary fixed many years before. Even so, not a few of our colleges have alarming deficits at the end of each year.

No doubt this arouses astonishment and some may be disposed to ask, in view of the immense gifts for educational work made during the last twenty-five years, if such a condition of things does not prove incompetence in the business management of colleges. Not at all; the error is not in that. The financial management, in most instances, is beyond criticism, more, it deserves the highest praise, and in many institutions the trustees are not merely competent, they are devoted and conscientious, dealing with college business as with their own. As the most caustic reflections upon college management usually come from alumni, the writer may be pardoned for a slight digression.

Alumni who contribute a few dollars a year toward the support of alma mater's glee or athletic clubs are apt to take their display of affection altogether too seriously. They seem to feel convinced that by attending the college and by securing a degree, whether deserved or not, they have placed their college under such material obligation that they should have a large voice in its control. This notion, which would be grotesque were its effects not so serious, is due perhaps to the constant hunt for students and to the prevalent opinion that the success of a college is measured by the number in attendance. But the college is under no obligation whatever to the alumnus; its obligations were all discharged when he graduated; on the other hand, the student's pecuniary obligation increases each year, reaching its maximum at his graduation. This matter can not be presented too frequently or too emphatically.
An excellent man of large means once informed the writer that he would never send his grandson to a college in which tuition is free, as he always paid for what he received. He was taken aback when told that, although paying a large sum for his grandson’s tuition, he was still an object of charity to the extent of several hundred dollars a year, the cost per student at that institution being, as the writer knew, four times the fee. It is probable that in no college to-day is the cost less than three times the fee, and in those with small fees the cost is proportionately very much greater. Before giving voice to a demand for a share in control of college affairs, the alumnus will do well to discharge the debt of $1,000 to $1,500 which he owes to “dear old alma mater.” Were alumni to do this, the pangs of poverty would be less severe in many of our colleges.

Returning from this digression. It is very true that immense sums have been given to colleges and universities during the last thirty years and that such giving is likely to continue. Much of the money thus contributed was for the founding of new institutions, too often with inadequate equipment, thus making the condition worse by adding to the number of struggling colleges; much was given for the erection of buildings, most of them needed, but not in all cases useful in proportion to the cost and, until recently, not always endowed; much has been bestowed upon the endowment of scholarships; not a little has gone toward the founding of fellowships for the encouragement of graduate study; some large sums have been given for the advancement of outdoor athletics and intercollegiate contests; and in many cases funds have been provided for the employment of instructors in new branches. But unconditional gifts of money have made up only a small part of the whole, and even where these have been given, those in charge of affairs have rarely
seen fit to strengthen the institution by increasing salaries, preferring rather to "expand" by creating new chairs to be filled by young men at, to speak within limits, modest salaries. In all probability, there are institutions with a net endowment not so great as it was thirty years ago, though showing a great increase in number of students and instructors as well as in property. The average salary is much less and the president's energies are devoted to raising money to meet the annual deficit. So it has come about that the college president of our day has duties very different from those of thirty years ago. The loss of the old-time president has been a disaster and the good of our colleges requires that he be brought back. There should be an officer at the head of the business affairs and another at the head of the educational affairs. Our universities will not do their work as it should be done so long as the two offices are held by one man.

Some excellent people who have no money, and others who have money but do not give, are quick to censure those who donate buildings instead of funds. College men, being especially affected, are apt to repine much after the fashion of a good professor who, in speaking of a generous benefactor, said, "We asked him for bread and he gave us a stone." But the criticism is unjust. Donors are said to be selfish, seeking only to perpetuate their names. Even so, they have done only what every man ought to do and they have chosen a praiseworthy method; they will be remembered as doers of good. It must not be forgotten that the steady stream of buildings had its origin in the most pressing need of our colleges. At the close of the civil war, colleges had their faculties and the professors were receiving fairly good salaries; but there were not buildings in which to accommodate the rapidly increasing number of students and every effort
was devoted to supplying this crippling deficiency. When, later on, it became necessary to add to the staff of instructors, the older professors gladly consented to the lessening salaries, expecting soon to have the conditions restored, but never suspecting that by enduring hardness for the sake of their institutions they were making a standard for the future.

But now, in most of our colleges, additional buildings are not the urgent need; the time has come to impress upon the community the necessity for endowments, that qualified instructors may be obtained so as to utilize properly the buildings and equipment already provided so generously. Buildings are necessary, but they do not make the college, no matter how complete their equipment may be. The college is not here to cultivate public taste in architecture or even to restore the Grecian games; primarily, its purpose is to train men for life's struggle; secondarily, to advance the world's welfare by investigation. Without a thoroughly efficient staff of instructors, the college is a farce, no matter how magnificent its plant may be, how numerous the students or the victories in athletic contests. The prolonged effort to obtain buildings has obscured this fact, and now, with increased cost of maintaining grounds and buildings, with increased and increasing number of instructors to satisfy incessant demands for new courses—which those in authority have not the moral courage to deny—with constantly increasing numbers of students and with practically no compensating increase of income from endowments, the ability of colleges to pay salaries deserving of the name has disappeared. Nowhere in the United States are there salaries which mean more than a very modest living. It is true that a few salaries in the larger cities are such as to appear enormous to those living in small villages; but even those are larger only arith-
metically, not in purchasing power; while they are far more than counterbalanced by the great number of small salaries in the same institutions. These "large salaries" in themselves are not such as to be inviting to strong men; they are inviting, however, because with them there is offered also some of that "literary leisure" which is so much desired by the student.

As the result, college chairs are filled in great part by men who, at the most, are but partially dependent on their salaries. In a sense, this was always true. When the hours of teaching were less scattered and the requirements less severe, college men in cities often supplemented their salaries through congenial work outside; while in country colleges, where an almost prerequisite qualification for several of the chairs was ordination to the Christian ministry, professors added to their income by preaching. But those conditions no longer obtain, and in some institutions a professor, even if he have the opportunity, may not undertake any outside work without special permission—a perfectly proper regulation. In any event, except in rare instances, no opportunity remains for a professor to engage in outside work during the college year unless he devote only a part of the time to college work, for, as already said, practically the whole business day is demanded. To live in comfort, to retain the respect of the community, one must depend largely on means already acquired.

That this condition, or, rather, combination of conditions, will have a prejudicial effect on the personnel of the profession is not open to doubt; and additional danger lurks in the system of fellowships, which is nothing other than that of hiring young men to pursue graduate studies. Even now, though the system is, so to speak, in its infancy, graduates judge of universities not so much by the standing of the professors or by the grade of instruc-
tion offered, as by the value of the fellowships. Students about to graduate have been known to ask their professors what inducement the college offers them to remain—more than that, have been candidates for appointment at more than one institution. Evidently the time approaches when prospective candidates for the doctorate will scan university catalogues as prospective students of theology are said to scan seminary catalogues, to discover which has the longest list of highly productive scholarships.

Formerly a graduate desiring to become a professor usually received appointment at once as a tutor and eventually worked up into some professorship. That was when the courses were all somewhat elementary in character; but now special preparation for a particular chair is demanded. The graduate spends at least three years in study as a specialist, very frequently including a year or more at some European university. On the scientific side, at least, this work is severe, leaving no time for other occupation except at the cost of a dangerous expenditure of energy. Preparation for college teaching is more exacting than that for any other profession, medicine not excepted.

The prospect of spending seven years in preparation, of working afterwards as an assistant for several years at a salary of $700 or $800, for several years more at a small advance, and of attaining by middle age a salary not much greater than the wages of a switchman in an eastern railway yard, with at the end little hope of a pension, is by no means alluring to a man unwilling to remain celibate throughout life. Thoughtful young men in the higher classes of our colleges recognize this condition and recognize also that the compensating privileges of social standing and leisure for research have been reduced to the minimum. This feeling respecting the status
of American professors is so wide-spread that, unless the conditions are modified quickly, the next generation will see a notable change in type of professors; some will be teachers because unwilling to be anything else; some will be men of independent means desiring a not too burdensome occupation; but a large proportion will consist of men carried along on scholarships and fellowships into a profession for which they have neither fitness nor inclination—perfunctory teachers, lamenting their fate in being compelled to "waste themselves on a parcel of boys."

To prescribe a remedy is not difficult; to bring the patient into receptive mood is apt to be difficult. The writer suggests a remedy; the administrating must be left to others.

The first step should be elimination of mimic universities and restoration of the college with a fixed curriculum, intended to develop the man and to lay foundation for a broad education. By thus removing odds and ends of elective courses and attempts at types of work belonging altogether to graduate study, relief will be given from much which is of doubtful utility to the undergraduate, and the professors will regain that leisure, which for so many years was utilized to the advantage of the whole community.

The second step should be complete readjustment of the relation between the corporate and educational boards. Times have changed and with them the conditions also, but the powers and duties of the corporate board have remained unchanged. Trustees are chosen in view of their fitness to manage the financial affairs, very rarely with reference to their familiarity with educational matters; yet their board has, as of old, the power to appoint professors and even to create new chairs, thus controlling not only the selection of the faculty but also the curriculum, matters with which, in the very nature of
the case, they cannot deal intelligently—as a board. The teaching board should have the sole right to name candidates for appointment, to determine all matters concerning the curriculum, and the corporate board should be called upon to confirm the action, pro forma, whenever a business contract is involved. Details respecting methods of procedure do not concern us here; what is contended for is a proper assignment of powers and duties to accord with the conditions of to-day as contrasted with those of two generations ago, when most of the great institutions of to-day were little better than are the eastern High Schools. This adjustment would give to the teaching staff its proper standing and the trustees would be guardians of the material interests.

Perhaps this second step should be regarded as the first. It certainly would change in some respects the estimate which some boards entertain regarding the relative importance of trustees and professors. In many colleges, professors have given their services at small salaries, far less than they could have obtained in other directions, have refused calls at higher salaries to other colleges, in not a few instances have reduced their salaries voluntarily and served the college for a pittance, simply to preserve it from destruction. All this they did deliberately, hoping that in the end their college would be placed upon a sound basis and depending upon the good sense of the trustees for proper recognition in due season. Such contributions should be accepted as so much money given annually to preserve the college and the contributors should receive at least as much credit as do such trustees as pay something in actual cash. That this is not the case is well known. When money is received by a college, the trustees should not hasten simply to relieve themselves from their subscriptions, they should share the relief with the professors; and if, at
length, sufficient money should come to relieve the actual pecuniary stress and to leave a surplus, common honesty requires that that surplus be devoted toward finally relieving the professors. That done, the time will have come to consider the question of expanding the curriculum and of appointing new instructors. That this is not the view held by trustees of our day is a familiar fact. And yet the condition does not justify any reflection upon the honor of the trustees; it is due solely to the fact that they know little about the professors as men or as workers—to the constantly widening gulf separating the corporate and educational boards.

In any event, this second step, if taken, would go far toward restoring the profession to its former honorable standing and would go far also toward making possible the third step, which is consolidation.

There are too many academies calling themselves "college" or even "university," with high-grade curriculum and low-grade requirements, with long lists of pupils in preparatory classes of one sort or another and very short lists of students in so-called college classes.

Many of these have no apology for existence aside from the fact that otherwise the religious denomination, which they represent, would have no educational institution in the region. There are in proximity too many feeble colleges, with few college students, with insufficient equipment, with practically no endowment and with makeshift instructors. If a judicious consolidation could be brought about, if the academy portions could be gathered into a strong academy and the college portions into a strong college, with the academy as its feeder, if higher institutions under similar relations of space could be brought together so as to make a thoroughly equipped college and a thoroughly equipped university, the vast sums now expanded on mere maintenance of property
could be applied directly to educational work and a long advance would be made toward paying salaries which, with the regained leisure and the regained honor, would make college teaching once more attractive to men of the highest type.

The writer has been told that these propositions are fair and reasonable, that they are merely what common sense demands, but that they are chimerical. One correspondent asserts that they are good, but that the world can not go backward. This last is very true, but the truism has no bearing upon the question. If one have strayed from the road in blind trails, he can hardly be reproached for retracing his steps to the parting of the ways, that, taught wisdom by his error, he may advance anew and along the right path.

That the suggestions are chimerical, the writer can not concede; that they involve serious difficulties, he not only concedes, but also asserts. The obstacles to be overcome before the second can be realized are comparatively insignificant. If it be a common-sense proposition, it will need only proper presentation to secure its acceptance by the business men on the corporate boards and, as far as they are concerned, the adjustment could be effected very rapidly. But obstacles of no mean sort will be encountered in an effort to realize the first and third, most serious of which are those arising from denominational prejudice or jealousy. Almost as serious are those due to individual prejudice or obstinacy. Trustees and teachers are unwilling to acknowledge that their college has no good reason for separate existence, though they know and the community knows that they know the fact. Alumni, whose only manifestation of interest in the college has been an occasional visit to a summer reunion, are apt to display a sudden and emphatic love for Alma Mater when consolidation is suggested, putting forth
energy enough against consolidation to place the college on a good footing, if properly directed. The writer recognizes all of these difficulties, but is convinced that they will be overcome if only full discussion of the matter can be had, so as to bring it fairly to the attention of those on whose gifts the American college depends for development.

About a year ago the writer discussed some matters bearing upon the condition of college instructors in America. A restatement of some parts of that discussion is necessary, as events occurring during the interval have tended to divert attention from the more important issues.

An impression seems to prevail that the Carnegie Foundation has rendered unnecessary further discussion of the salary question. But the provisions of that trust, perhaps intentionally, are such as to provoke further discussion, for the salary accorded to emeritus professors is to be in direct relation to that received prior to retirement. As the payments will be only to men of sixty-five years and upward, they will affect at best only a few years at the close of a long period of service, and in all probability they will be of personal interest to a very small proportion of the whole number of college instructors.

The writer has been criticized for laying stress on the matter of salary and for thus introducing a mercenary feature which is degrading to the profession. But education is no longer in charge of ecclesiastics pledged to life-long celibacy, and theoretically, at least, to life-long poverty. The notion that teachers should be indifferent to pecuniary matters is a survival, which still holds in the minds of some youthful students and occasionally gains control of a college trustee, but it has never found favor
among tradesmen. While it is true that no man should
become a college instructor merely to gain a livelihood, it
is equally true that the matter of income should not be
ignored, for in our day one is hardly to be commended
for choosing a profession in which poverty or the observ-
ance of the strictest economy must be his lot through
life—provided always that he is fit for anything else.
And this is what makes the question of salary so im-
portant from the standpoint of the college. Statistics
show that in the leading eastern institutions and in the
leading state universities the average salary of pro-
fessors is about 2,000 dollars; but this is the salary of a
full professor and is the maximum which most men may
hope to receive after years of service. Such being the
case one must recognize the danger to which colleges are
exposed, especially on the side of pure science, which for
educational purposes is the more important.

To the greater number of those who have become
teachers of science in our colleges, the chief attraction has
been the promise of leisure for study. But in the greater
number of our institutions that leisure has practically
disappeared and young men recognize the fact. On the
other hand, the applications of pure science have been
multiplied; the chemist, physicist, geologist and biologist
have become, each of them, the mainstay of industries
not only requiring many millions of capital, but also con-
tributing in equal proportion to the welfare of mankind.
In each of these industries competition is so earnest that
incessant investigation along lines of pure science is
essential. There is here promised a greater reward of
fame than the college instructor can hope for, while in
addition there is a prospect of pecuniary reward for the
wise and industrious man, compared with which the
maximum college salary is a pittance. It is quite in
accord with human nature that young men after com-
pleting graduate study, costly both in time and money, should think applied science, which promises both fame and money, preferable to college teaching, which promises in our day not very much of either.

It has been said that a change has passed over the minds of American college professors, that, whereas formerly they regarded investigation as the all-important and teaching as the unimportant part of their duties, they now regard themselves as chosen especially to teach. This is a somewhat belated discovery, for the American college professor has always been preeminently a teacher, to whom investigation has always been, as it were, a side issue. But for a generation, owing to rapid expansion of curricula without corresponding increase in number of teachers, there has been an increasing neglect of investigation. For the most part, small colleges to-day are as well off for men and equipment as not a few of our larger institutions were fifty years ago, but their contributions to the sum of human knowledge, at least on the scientific side, are in no sense comparable with those made by college men of the earlier period. This reacts on the college, for men who are not investigators by nature and to some extent, at least, in practise can never be genuine teachers. They may be good disciplinarians, masters in the art of hearing recitations, adepts in compelling students to learn lessons, but as retailers of merely second-hand information they never can be makers of men.

Beyond all doubt there will always be an ample supply of candidates, whatever the salary may be, but ambitious young men will not take up a profession which threatens to dwarf them intellectually and socially; rather will they turn aside to business or to other professions in which great prizes await diligence and common sense. The sentimental grounds on which many chose college
work no longer exist, since opportunities for service to others abound everywhere even for the busiest of men. Such opportunities were rare formerly and, for their sake, college work was chosen by many to whom pecuniary reward was, in comparison, a secondary matter. And this led in no small degree to the high esteem in which college professors were held, for the corporate boards were composed chiefly of professional men, who believed that they had chosen their work for similar reasons. But the boards of to-day are made up largely of men of affairs, strong men of the business world, who are apt to regard indifference to material success as evidence of native weakness.

While the matter of salary is important in its bearing on the future of American colleges, it is of less immediate importance than that of relations between the teaching and the corporate board. This is the vital matter.

Theoretically, the corporate board of to-day and the college president of to-day are the same as they were one hundred years ago; but in fact they are essentially different. The boards and presidents of the former days were so familiar with the conditions of their little schools and of the narrow curriculum that they were competent to take charge of them. To-day the curriculum is so broad that neither board nor president can be familiar with the needs of the several chairs even in institutions of moderate size, while in universities it is barely possible for them to have any personal knowledge whatever. Yet the teaching board is wholly subordinate to the corporate board. Such complete legal subordination was well enough as long as the chief purpose of colleges was to prepare men for the ministry and subordination may be well enough still in purely denominational colleges, whence it is fit and wise to eject summarily those "courageous, independent thinkers" who
would hold to their salaries while rejecting denomina-
tional tenets; but the university has outgrown the swad-
dling clothes of the semi-theological college and the
method of control should be adapted to the new con-
ditions.

It is well understood that the corporate board as a
rule is not composed of men familiar with educational
matters. The rapidly increasing financial interests of
colleges and universities necessitate the selection of men
possessing thorough business ability. Examination of
college catalogues shows that the boards are made up
chiefly of men beyond middle age, eminent lawyers,
prominent business men, with some clergymen and physi-
cians, all of highest standing; all of these are busy men,
whose prominence proves that for many years they have
been engrossed in the work of their several callings so
intensely as to be disqualified for some of the duties
devolving upon college trustees; most of them are far
removed in thought and occupation from educational
work and few of them are in any degree familiar with
the changes in scope and methods of college teaching.
Nor, as has been said elsewhere, have they opportunity
to acquire the necessary familiarity after assuming office,
for business matters occupy most of the time at board
meetings and matters affecting work by the teaching
board are largely incidental. It would be strange if the
trustee did not regard his board's responsibility as the
more important.

The change for the worse in relations of the boards is
due in no small degree to a change in character of the
president's duties. That officer is no longer primarily a
teacher; in many of the larger universities he does no
teaching, is simply the executive officer; while in many
of the smaller institutions he does little teaching because
efforts to raise money occupy most of his attention. The
chronic impecuniosity of most colleges prevents trustees, when seeking a president, from inquiring closely respecting a candidate's fitness to represent the educational side of the institution; money and more students are the crying needs. The appointee is usually a man of great expectations—on the board's part; he will find money, gather students, advertise the institution, awaken interest everywhere and convert indifferent alumni into hustling canvassers. But once appointed he is left practically to his own resources, to be praised by the board if he succeed, to be blamed if he fail—a rather uninviting post, whose holder deserves more sympathy than is contained in the libel that he has every grace except that of resignation. He has been appointed not to elevate the institution as an educational power, but to make of it a "big thing." One may not censure him severely for emphasizing what may be termed the non-educational side or for resorting at times to odd expedients for increasing the total of students and instructors; but the results have been disastrous, for thus it has come about that the vast majority of people and the vast majority of prospective students measure an institution not by the character of its instruction or by the fitness of its instructors, but by the mass of its buildings, by the number of students and by its prominence in the semi-professional athletics which so disgrace American colleges.

The president is practically the only source whence the trustees may obtain information respecting internal affairs of the institution, as, with rare exceptions, the faculties have no representatives on or before the corporate board. He is the responsible head, the only element known to the trustees; in the nature of the case, heformulates the business to be presented, so that, if he possess a fair degree of tact, the board merely carries out his wishes. If successful in securing money and
students, he is liable to be human enough to forget that he has done this work as the professor has done his and to think of himself as creator with consequent right to control policy and to direct expenditure. Business presented to the trustees is not likely to be such as to encourage great inquisitiveness respecting details of internal affairs. And all this is thoroughly compatible with a strict sense of honor and with conscientious devotion to what he believes to be the best interests of the institution. But the result is unfortunate. The executive duties of his office render the president less and less fitted as the years go by to represent the purely educational side of the institution, yet every year strengthens his control of all the interests. This condition is not in accord with business common sense.

If the proper status of the faculties is to be restored, and if the proper standard of educational efficiency is to be regained, there must be a radical change in relations of the teaching and corporate boards. In church organizations, the religious interests are ordinarily in care of one board and the secular interests in care of another; but the former, being charged with the interests for which the church was organized, is superior to the latter, although this represents the corporate body before the law. A similar grouping and relation should exist in educational organizations. The trustees should not control in any degree the internal affairs of the college or university, their duty being to relieve the teaching board from the burden of caring for business matters and to represent the institution before the state. They should fill vacancies in their number, subject to veto by, say, two thirds vote of the full professors; but the faculties should have complete control of all matters relating to the actual work of the institution and they should make all appointments to the teaching staff, subject to merely
pro forma confirmation by the trustees, as representing the corporate body, or to veto by them in case there are not funds to warrant the expenditure. The office of college president, as it now exists, should be abolished; each faculty in a university or the single faculty in a college should choose its own executive head, who should be simply primus inter pares and should be the mouthpiece of his faculty in conference with other faculties or with the trustees. In a university, the several executives would be a council to determine matters affecting the policy of the institution as a whole.

Some appear to dread such reconstruction as liable to bar all progress, for it has been said that, somewhere, the most important advances have been made in face of earnest opposition by professors. Possibly. But it may be that some steps, advances in the opinion of a president, might be retrogression in the opinion of an educator. The dread, however, is unnecessary in view of the fact that the remarkable elevation of standard in legal and medical education within the last twenty years is due wholly to the professors themselves and largely, in most cases, at their expense. This statement is equally true of schools of applied science, and it is well understood that in colleges the professors constantly struggle for maintenance of high standards. More than this. Professors have been known to show themselves capable of attending to the business affairs of their institution; have been known indeed to take up the burden of business, after it had been abandoned by the corporate board, and so to care for teaching and business that in time both were returned in excellent condition to the control of the trustees.

No doubt it is true that in some cases the faculty gathered under the present system may not be fully competent to undertake management such as has been suggested;
but that is no reason for continuance of a system which can bring about such a condition. Serious errors are less likely to be made by those who know something about the requirements than by those who know very little or practically nothing about them. A not very skillful carpenter is a far better judge of carpentry than the ablest statesman can be. A faculty of not very high grade can judge better respecting the all-around fitness of a candidate than can a board composed of eminently successful bankers, lawyers and clergymen—better even than can a college president, who at one time was a typically good professor, but who by force of circumstances has been diverted from educational work to become a strong man of business.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES

By J. E. Creighton
Cornell University

Published in Science, August 12, 1910

There are perhaps some advantages in discussing the question of university government during the summer vacation, when partial detachment from professional duties makes possible a clearer perspective than when one is in the thick of the work. The problem is both difficult and urgent, and in approaching it one can not do better than remind oneself of the need of patience and good feeling in its consideration. Above all, it should be emphasized, as has already been done by Professor Jastrow in a recent number of Science, that the attack is not directed against individuals, but against a system. That system may be described as one of personal government, as opposed to government by consent or the self-government of a freely acting community. The objections against this system are directed not merely against the exercise of irresponsible power by college presidents, but against all claims on the part of any member of the university body to subject another to his personal will.

The urgent character of the problem, and the consequent significance attaching to the present agitation for reform in university government, is due to the fact that the very idea of a university as the home of independent scholars has been obscured by the present system. If it were true that only a few supersensitive individuals among university teachers were affected in their personal feeling by the power now exercised by presidents and
other university administrative officers, the question would have little significance. But it seems clear that there exists a large class of university teachers to whom it is every year becoming clearer that they have neither part nor lot in the larger interests of the institution to which they are attached. The effect of this condition is different in the case of different individuals. Some pessimistically give their assent to the theory that a university teacher is simply an employee of the trustees, who is paid a fixed salary for teaching certain classes. Others, having a truer sense of the importance and dignity of their profession, yet recognizing that the logic of actual events confirms the theory which they deny, grow restive and generally find the cause of their discontent in the tyranny of some individual whom they believe to be depriving them of their just rights. In both cases alike the result is unfortunate, and one that loudly calls for remedy. A man who regards himself as merely an employee is not likely to give to the university more than his theory demands, while a man who lives with a constant sense of grievance, knowing that there is no court before which he can claim redress, can not reasonably be expected to be greatly in love with his profession.

It is clear that the problem can not be solved by giving to each individual exactly the same weight in the government of the university. Organization and efficiency demand that some individuals shall have more responsibility and some less. But it is essential that each university teacher shall be conscious that he is a member of a community with which his own interests are organically bound up. This is only possible when the individual is made to feel that he is governed by principles to which his own reason consents. It seems unnecessary to argue that where this feeling is absent some change is imperatively demanded. As Mr. Balfour is reported to have said in a
recent speech in parliament: "Whenever you get to the point that a class feels itself excluded, and outraged by being excluded, then those who believe that democracy, properly understood, is the only possible government for any nation at the stage of political evolution which we have reached, must consider whether it is not their business to try to see that the government which is by hypoth-
thesis not a government by consent, can be turned into gov-
ernment by consent." The truth seems to be that in the era of expansion through which we have been passing we have been concerned with problems of material and organization, and have had no time to develop that inter-
nal spirit of loyalty and community without which bricks 
and mortar, overflowing class rooms, and even learned 
teachers and investigators can not make a real univer-
sity. In the universities as elsewhere, the era of expan-
sion has been attended by a certain loss of the ancient freedom. The demand has been for men "who could do 
things," and the tendency has been to measure efficiency 
in terms of immediate and striking results. Now, how-
ever, there seems to have come a period of reflection, and 
we realize that the spirit of a university can only spring 
from a free soil, and flourish in an atmosphere of 
fraternity.

The working theory as to the division of authority be-
tween the faculty and trustees has been that to the former belongs jurisdiction over all educational matters, while the latter have the right of control over all questions involving expenditure of money. Now, this enunciation of the respective powers of the two bodies has proved the bulwark of our liberties, and has served to prevent the direct interference of the trustees with the work of teach-
ing. The talk of applying "business methods" to the 
administration of the university is still occasionally heard in certain quarters, but the right of the faculty to control
the educational policies is now generally conceded by the trustees of all the more important universities. And it would not be fair to forget the important work that the presidents have done to secure this result, in upholding the rights of the faculties against boards of trustees, and in preventing these bodies from meddling in educational matters.

Nevertheless, it seems evident that university faculties have not yet fully realized all that their responsibility for educational work implies. In the first place, it is clear that this power can only extend a little way, unless it includes a voice in determining how the funds of the university are to be applied. Educational questions, and questions regarding the proper expenditure of money, can not be dissociated, and, as a matter of fact, the apportionment of funds among the different colleges and departments of a university is not now controlled by the trustees, but is, largely at least, determined by the president. The same is true of appointments to membership in the faculty and of promotions. It can not be denied, I think, that control on the part of the faculty of educational interests involves and requires a voice in determining the character of its own membership and in electing its own officers, including its president. This is the right and privilege of every self-governing body, and it is only under these conditions that a faculty can develop that sense of unity and esprit de corps which is essential for the most effective discharge of its functions. At present, however, this power which is nominally in the hands of the trustees is usually exercised by the president. The truth, then, seems to be that at least two important matters, which are vitally connected with the educational work of the university, are in many of the universities assumed by the president, and exercised by him without any official recognition of the faculty. In practise it is
doubtless true that the president is influenced, both in his recommendations as to the expenditure of money, and in his nominations for positions in the faculty, by the opinions and advice of certain members of the faculty, particularly of deans and directors and heads of departments. But neither the faculty as a whole, nor any individual member, can claim an official right to be heard or to have a vote in such matters. The result is unquestionably unfortunate, for both the president and the faculty. On the one hand, as the president has assumed sole responsibility, and as there is no body before which he comes to explain the grounds for his decisions, he becomes the target for criticism which, unfortunately, often fails to understand the real conditions of the case. He thus suffers the loss of that sympathy and support which rightly belong to him in the discharge of his difficult duties. This, as wise presidents know, is a great source of weakness. "Bare is the back," says the Gaelic proverb, "without brother behind it."

There is also another side to the matter which can not be ignored: a system that does not leave room for freedom affects injuriously the ruler as well as the ruled. The psychological effects of irresponsible power upon the mind and character of those who exercise it has always been a favorite theme in literature. I have no wish to dwell on this side of the subject, but it can not be forgotten that a rational and moral life is only possible where there is a reciprocal "give and take" process with one's fellows. The man who isolates himself, thinking that he has the source of authority within himself, pays the penalty, as necessarily and inevitably as if he had cut himself off from the sustaining life of the physical atmosphere.

The unfortunate effect of the present system upon university teachers has been already referred to, yet this
point is so important as to demand frank discussion from many sides. I hope that the question will be taken up by others, and that we may be able to look the present situation squarely in the face. It seems fair to ask whether the present system of government, whose boast is in its efficiency, has tended to dignify the professorial office by giving to the men who hold it the strength and stimulus that comes from a consciousness of membership in a community devoted to the highest ends. Is it likely to attract into the profession men of independent spirit and to call out the best that is in them? The actual state of affairs, it seems to me, compels us to answer questions of this kind in the negative.

In spite of the fact that the office of university president has been filled during this generation with gentlemen who have as a class attempted to discharge its duties, not only with fairness and integrity, but in a spirit of patience and consideration for the rights of others, no one can doubt that the system has had its day, and that a change is at hand. It is an anachronism in this modern age, and an anomaly in a democratic country. The arbitrary power of the president has always been a subject of wonder to European scholars. Professor Alois Brandl, of the University of Berlin, gives the following picture of the American university president: 1 which is fairly typical of the impressions our visitors carry away regarding that office:

Er muss ein "starker Mann" sein, a strong man, der das Blühen und Wachsen der Anstalt in jeder Hinsicht betreibt. Verantwortlich ist er nur den Vertrauensmännern. Wird er bei diesen verklagt, so müssen diese sagen können: "Was wollt ihr? Er ist ein starker Mann, wir bekommen keinen bessern, wir halten zu ihm." Hat er diese Rückendeckung, so ist er fast unbeschränkter Herr über den Lehrkörper und kann Absetzungen wie Anstellungen mit einer Freiheit vornehmen, wie sie bei uns kein Minister geniesst, kein Monarch gebraucht. Durch solche Einrichtung von Diktatoren liebt es bekanntlich der

1 Deutsche Rundschau, April, 1907.
Amerikaner, gegen die Ungebundenheit seiner Verfassung ein Gegengewicht zu schaffen, um eine wirksame Verwaltung zu ermöglichen. . . . Dagegen findet die Macht des Präsidenten ihre Grenze an der Bodenschicht der Universität, an den Studierenden. Gegen diese übt er in der Regel das freundlichste Entgegenkommen; denn eine starke Auswanderung der Hörer, selbst ein häufiges Durchfallen bei den Prüfungen würde auf das Gedeihen der Anstalt einen Schatten werfen und wird daher nach Kräften vermieden. Durch den Präsidenten hat der Studierende in Amerika eine Hand auf den Dozenten, wie bei uns durch das Kollegiengeld: so greifen dort die innersten Räder ineinander. Der Kurator an einer preußischen Provinzuniversität, den man am ehesten mit dem "president" in Parallele stellen möchte, hat ein wesentlich verschiedenes Amt; er hat weniger zu sagen, aber auch weniger zu sorgen; er ist ungleich abhängiger nach oben und unabhängig nach unten; er ist nur ein respektirter Vermittler und nicht ein autoritativ Führer.

I have said that the present relation between the university presidents and the faculties must undergo a change in the interests of both parties. I can not, however, think that it would be a step in the right direction for the faculties to appeal, as Professor Jastrow suggests, to the lay members of boards of trustees against the presidents. For, after all, it must not be forgotten that the presidents belong to the faculty side of the family. As President Butler has said: "The heads of the great universities were every one of them not long ago humble and poorly compensated teachers." If a breach exists between president and faculty, it should rather be closed than widened. In other words, what requires to be emphasized is, not the rights of the professors as over against these of the president, but the duties and responsibilities that belong to all in virtue of their membership in the common corporate life of the university. As has been frequently remarked, "liberty" and "equality" are one-sided and inadequate ideas until they are completed by the conception of "fraternity." And within this idea of fraternity the president, as well

*The American as He Is, p. 38.*
as all other members, should be included. He is not to be regarded as an *Uebermensch*, standing in special relations to the Absolute, or, on the other hand, as lacking in the virtues and loyal feelings of his colleagues. He is a man and a brother on whom great responsibilities rest. But he has received no new baptism which should set him apart from his fellows. The burdens and responsibilities he carries are shared by his colleagues, who gladly yield to him the honorable position of *Primus inter pares*, because he is, to a greater extent than any other member of the faculty, the servant of all, and because they recognize also that in him is embodied and personified the corporate authority and dignity of the university more fully than in the person of any other member. When these relations are realized the strength of the president’s position is greatly enhanced and dignified, because it is *inclusive* and represents the authority of a self-governing faculty. In universities, as in all social organizations, absolute power is the weakest form of authority, because it is exclusive and disintegrating. In denying the rights of others, it establishes a system of potential war, where there is no law but the will of the strongest. On the other hand, real authority only exists in so far as it is shared by others. Its impregnable rock of support is found in the fact that it expresses the will and consent of the governed.

These principles are, of course, very old, but they never become trite. They seem to furnish the only practical solution of the problem of university government. For they make clear the hopeful line of advance. Faculties must rise to a realization of what is involved in their responsibility for educational affairs. “It devolves upon the faculties,” says President Eliot in his book on “University Administration,” “... to discern, recommend, and carry out the educational policies of the institution.”
Let us take our stand upon this, and proceed to act without stopping to debate constitutional questions. *Hic Rhodus, hic salta.* By accepting their responsibilities, the faculties will regain their rightful authority. "The way to resume is to resume." It is not by any great external revolution in the form of university organization that the system is to be changed, but by gradual evolution from within through a movement from which we may hope that "freedom will slowly broaden down from precedent to precedent."

If objection be brought to this program on the ground that it is impractical—an objection that is often mistaken for the voice of an oracle—I would reply that it is only necessary to lift up one's eyes to see that the program is already in course of fulfilment. The very fact that the subject is being discussed shows that a change has come: ten years ago the importance of the problem was realized by scarcely any one. Studies like that of Professor Marx, on "The Problem of the Assistant Professor," have emphasized the need of more freedom and democracy in the organization of faculties. President Hill, of the University of Missouri, in reply to one of Professor Marx's questions, writes: "A more democratic organization of department faculties seems to me one of the most important and pressing reforms demanded in educational institutions." President Hill was thinking only of democracy within a department; but it is obvious that there is a demand for a wider application of the principle. At Yale, and also at some of the smaller universities, the faculty has an official voice in determining the character of its own membership. At Cornell University the faculty of the college of arts and sciences have more than once in recent years made recommendations which were accepted by the trustees regarding the establishment of new chairs in that college. And during the last year the faculty of
the graduate school at Cornell adopted an important series of resolutions which formulated, among other things, certain principles to be observed in making appointments to the faculty and in promotions, as well as in the apportionment of funds to the purposes of elementary and advanced teaching. There was no thought of raising any question as to the constitutional force of these resolutions; but I feel sure that I can say that they were adopted with the president's hearty concurrence and approval and are accepted by him as the voice of the faculty.

I mention these things because they seem to point in a significant and encouraging way to the happy solution of our problems. The growing sense of the duties and responsibilities that are laid upon members of faculties by their commission to "discern, recommend, and carry out the educational policies of the institution" will give rise to a new feeling of loyalty and esprit de corps that will lead to something better than a "class" feeling on the part of university teachers—a consciousness of the dignity and value of their own profession which will make them more useful members of society. No one can doubt that the university president who works quietly and patiently towards this result will have a far more enduring title to fame than if he had covered the campus with marble buildings or had been the inventor of a much-heralded "elective" or "preceptorial" system.

That university presidents and other administrative officers have felt and will continue to feel the new drift of things there is no serious reason to doubt. It would not be fair to assume that they are unwilling to cooperate in a democratic movement as soon as faculties show a disposition to assume their proper responsibilities and rise to "the point of view of the whole." Indeed, the strength of the president's position has consisted in the fact that he has attempted to represent, however inadequately, the
interests of the university as a whole, while members of faculties have often failed to see beyond their own departments. The objection, therefore, that a democratic movement can look for nothing but obstruction from administrative officers seems unduly pessimistic. There may indeed be such cases, but patience and good feeling will do much to dispose of them. And, after all, no man or set of men can long obstruct this movement. Stephenson’s reply to the objection regarding the danger of the cow getting on the railway track seems to fit the case—“it wad be verra bad for the coo.”

No changes in external organization can compare in importance with the birth of the new spirit that I have ventured to predict, or be properly regarded as a substitute for it. Nevertheless, it seems likely that this new spirit will demand, as time goes on, new and more adequate forms for its expression. The multitude of distracting duties that the presidents of the larger universities are called upon to perform prevent them from keeping in touch as closely as is desirable with the educational work of the faculties. It is also unfortunate that university presidents are no longer teachers, and that no leisure is afforded them for productive work. An interesting suggestion in this connection has been made by Professor Cattell. In a letter to the New York Evening Post he proposed that there should be a division of the office by the appointment of both a president and a chancellor. The general idea underlying the proposal is that the president should be the leader of the faculty in educational affairs and that the chancellor should represent the university locally and before the world. It is to be hoped that questions of this nature will continue to be discussed freely and frankly both by university presidents and pro-

* October 5, 1901.
fessors. The subject might perhaps be discussed profitably by the Association of American Universities. That body should, however, realize, as a preliminary to any discussion, that there can be no real association of American universities in which the faculties of the universities are not represented.
V. CONCERNING THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

By J. McKEEN CATTELL,
Columbia University

An address read before the members of Phi Beta Kappa of the Johns Hopkins University, May 2, 1902. Published in The Popular Science Monthly, June, 1902.

Political, social and educational institutions rise and decline, as species and genera have come and gone in the history of organic life. Evolution has been on the whole progressive, leading to greater differentiation and more complex interdependence. But there have been strange creatures—suited perhaps to their environment, but monsters from our point of view—brutes encased in impenetrable armor and dragons undecided as to whether they should crawl or fly. Our universities have developed in the main by the crude and wasteful methods of natural selection; but a new factor in evolution has in these latter days become possible and perhaps even potent. The struggle for existence, prodigal of time and careless of the individual, resulted in the production of animals that could learn by experience, and finally in such as can consciously look before and after and plan for what is not. Hitherto human foresight and reason have had but little to do in the selection and direction of educational methods, but the time has come when we can at least form opinions and judgments. We realize that certain surviving dinosaurs should be exterminated, that certain fads spread like weeds, that the “fittest” is not always the best. Our reason is as yet only a toy in the hands of a child, but as the child grows the toy may become an engine competent
to direct our civilization. We have not at present a
science of education or an art of education based on
science, but we are beginning to have ideas. However
vague and immature these may be, it is well that they
begin to exist, for, thanks to the contagion and possible
immortality of ideas, natural selection can here work
more rapidly than in the case of organisms. It may take
a million years to mold a new whorl on a shell, whereas
the entire system of higher education in America has
developed since the Johns Hopkins University opened its
doors twenty-five years ago.

The outline history of the American university is a
familiar story. We had the English college, beginning
with Harvard in 1636, for the training of the clergy and
as a denominational school. With many sects colleges
multiplied like churches in a village, supported, so far as
they were supported, by religious zeal. Free education
has been fostered by our states as never before, and
where the field was clear, beginning with Michigan in
1837, state universities became the head of the public
school system. Technological schools and departments
—beginning with the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in
1824—were founded in answer to the needs of a country
requiring material development. Independent or quasi-
independent schools of divinity, medicine and law gave
the inadequate preparation that the pressing demand for
clergymen, physicians and lawyers allowed. University
work did not exist, and our B.A.'s swarmed to Germany,
where ideals of research and creative scholarship had
arisen, which took kindly to transplantation and an unex-
hausted soil. Certain native agencies, the Smithsonian
Institution, the scientific academies, the geological sur-
veys and the like, modestly furthered research and con-
tributed to the university ideal.

In a general way the old Cambridge college, adjusting
itself to the practical needs of a democratic and industrial country, adding the German faculty of philosophy, and gathering in the professional schools, has given us our American university. These three elements, represented by the bachelor's degree, the doctorate of philosophy and the professional degrees, are variously combined and developed in our different institutions; and this certainly gives great flexibility and possibilities to university development. The foundation of new universities—Cornell, Johns Hopkins, Stanford and Chicago—and the enlargement of the resources of private and state institutions have greatly favored progress and differentiation. We have no one kind of university, but many types, each seeking to work out its own salvation. Here surely is ground for hoping that we shall soon set educational models.

But twenty-five years is a short period, and it would be no cause for surprise if it has given us more problems than solutions. The college, originally for secondary education, but with higher education attached, is in a state of unstable equilibrium. The distinction between courses for culture, courses for higher specialized liberal training and courses fitting for the professions appears to have a historical explanation rather than a logical justification. Every student during all his course of education—namely, from the time he is born to the time he dies—should do the three things that are artificially separated in our universities. He must learn to do his share of the useful routine work of the world, he should aim to improve the methods of doing this work, and he should have some acquaintance with the work of others.

The prolongation of infancy marks off the higher animals from the lower, and men from all others. If the sensori-motor arcs are closed at birth or soon thereafter, the creature can learn but little. So long as the brain is
kept plastic, permitting the formation of new associations, there is room for intellectual progress. We have thus a psychological justification for the artificial extension of babyhood, but possibly the college senior at the age of twenty-three has been kept too long in this condition. Certain sensori-motor arcs should be early closed and certain associations definitely formed, or we shall never have the expert; but certain other paths must be kept open or the result will be a machine.

We begin as a matter of fact by teaching the child, supposing it to have escaped the snares of the kindergarten, certain strictly utilitarian studies—the three R's. Under a poorly paid and partially educated woman, we place a flock of children. They sit silent and cramped when movement is essential, not only for bodily health, but also for the formation of ideas; they are crowded into an unhealthful room when all out-of-doors surrounds it; the individual child is as far as possible reduced to the average child; in six or eight hours a day for six or eight years the child laboriously acquires certain technical knowledge, the surviving part of which could probably be got in two hours a day during two years. Then in the high school, the youth perhaps takes up Latin, Greek, French and German, while decent English remains a foreign language; text-books in mathematics are arranged for the suppression of thought, and if science is taught it is made as remote as possible from human experience. At the age of eighteen or nineteen the boy has put on the quantity of cerebral fat which, when duly measured by the college entrance examination board for the Middle States and Maryland or some other automatic weighing machine, admits him to college. Here his physical and social environment is suddenly changed, but he finds himself pursuing the secondary studies of the preparatory school—more Latin, Greek, elementary mathematics and
English composition—usually under immature tutors. Later in his course, he is allowed to elect miscellaneously, and his daily program may have some resemblance to that of a vaudeville performance. Then finally at the age of twenty-two or three those who stick to the educational system enter the professional schools and go to work in earnest, with no time for culture or research; while a few students prepare to be teachers and are encouraged to undertake independent investigation under the faculty of philosophy.

Mere criticism is nihilistic, and no sensible person would wish to alter suddenly an educational system that has slowly grown. The fact of its existence is evidence that it is the best we can do, but by no means proof that it is the best we shall do. I have no idea what a century will bring, but it is reasonable to assume that there are certain things that it will take. Ten years of age is early enough to begin to read, write and calculate; primary education should be chiefly for the formation of motor habits; a child's head will not hold more miscellaneous facts than can be injected in a year or two; he can learn nearly as much of his present scholastic studies in two hours a day as in eight. If the required school attendance for each child were reduced to one half or one third, then without additional expense the fewer buildings and smaller equipment might be doubled or tripled in value, and the salaries of teachers might be doubled or tripled. The best trained teachers, more men than women, should be in charge of the younger children. If society must develop a class similar to the neuter insects, it should not have charge of the education of children. The boy should stay in the high school until he is eighteen and then go to the university, or he should enter the college at sixteen and pass forward to the university in two years. The man should begin to take part in the real work of the
world at twenty-one, but he should never regard his education as complete, and should for many years, if not always, continue to spend some time in work at the university.

I believe in the prentice system from start to finish. Let the child learn the best that the home can teach, let the younger child learn from the older, let the novice learn by helping the master. Each child should have as wide interests and as generous sympathies as may be; he should learn to do some useful work; he should strive to become an originator and a leader. Never in our educational system should these three chief ends of education be separated, least of all in the university.

The word "culture" has for me acquired an objectionable connotation—it calls up a picture of manure applied to turnips or of microbes growing fat by feeding on gelatine. Boys of twenty-one, chiefly interested in quasi-professional athletic competitions and social organizations, incidentally nibbling at the academic flowers and fruits from which the fences have been removed, supported by their parents at the cost of $1,000 a head, are a variety of prize animal that can not become universal. The elective system, in so far as it means that a Procrustean course of study shall not be imposed mechanically on all students, but that his work shall be selected by the boy with the advice of judicious councilors, is one of our great educational advances. But the boy should have some definite aim from the outset; he should usually prepare himself to follow the trade or profession of his father, always aiming to reach a higher plane, while at the same time he and his teachers should always be on the watch for any special aptitude or sign of genius. The boy's studies should be related to his life's work, and the relation should be evident to him. Then apart from his main interest, he should have one or two recreations or avoca-
tions, as a sport or game, some branch of science or one of the fine arts. Here too he should be an expert, only an amateur in so far as he is led by love. The group system of the Johns Hopkins University seems to be the best plan hitherto devised for securing the advantages and avoiding the dangers of the elective system.

Even an undiscriminating use of the elective system appears to me better than the obsolescent required course in Latin, Greek and elementary mathematics. Latin was once as much of a professional study as electrical engineering is to-day. By a natural evolution it became part of the insignia of a leisured aristocracy, educated with priests and by them. The use of quotations in which the quantities were given in accord with the peculiar accent of the English universities was a mark of birth and breeding, as are to-day the scars on the face of a German student. Literature and art based themselves on the classical tradition; the intrinsic beauty of the Greek civilization and the part played by Rome in history added to its strength. Even the most iconoclastic must regret the bankruptcy of classical culture, but at the same time the most conservative must acknowledge that the idol is broken. We certainly still feel entitled to sneer at the millionaire who orders a painting of Jupiter and Io and complains that only one of the 10 is supplied, and she without her clothes; whereas it is not regarded as a lack of culture when an eminent historian regards the Fissure of Rolando as a chasm in the Pyrenees. But Latin versification is becoming as obsolete and as little used to mark the fine gentleman as the carrying of a rapier. A classical education is essential for certain lines of research, and will always attract its full share of the keenest intellects; but it is no longer wise or possible for a boy to devote eight years of his life to the dead languages in order that he may be admitted to an artificial aristocracy.
Latin will survive for a long time in the secondary school on the ground that its illogical constructions supply an intellectual gymnastic, or because its roots are useful in learning French, understanding law terms and naming new species; but its part in education is no longer leading or dignified. In the twilight of the classical tradition it is the once radiant elder sister that I regret:

Müsizig kehrten zu dem Dichterlande
Heim die Götter, unnütz einer Welt,
Die, entwachsen ihrem Gängelbande
Sich durch eignes Schweben hält.

There should surely be in our system liberal education, as well as opportunity to learn a trade. I can not, however, believe that superficial knowledge of many subjects is culture, while a thorough knowledge of a few is not; that studies are liberal in direct proportion to their uselessness; or that certain studies are humanistic and others inhuman. Greek literature may be a "Brodstudien" and dentistry may be followed as a liberal art. That education is liberal which enlarges the sympathies and emphasizes our common interests, not that which forms an exclusive clique. On the whole the sciences in their application to human life seem more likely to form an adequate basis for a common culture than the dead languages. But intellectual training demands specialization, whereas the emotions are more nearly shared in equal measure by all. Civic life or art, if we but had a native art, seems to be a better basis for common culture than any special sort of knowledge.

In my opinion the university is or should be a group of professional schools, giving the best available preparation for each trade and profession. It is more feasible to give such training than to teach culture or research. These, like the building of character, are not the result of any particular kind of curriculum. Culture comes from
daily and immediate association with the best that the
world has; and this should be found at the university.
The leader is born a leader; what the university can do is
to give him an opportunity. The kind of research that
may be taught to the second-rate man is not the highest
ideal of the university. The presumption is that the new
facts recorded by the student are unimportant; just be-
cause they are new and discovered by the student. But if
by research we mean the discovery of new truth and the
creation of new lines of activity, then research is indeed
the highest function of the university. When we find the
man who can advance knowledge and the applications of
knowledge to human welfare, he is student or professor,
him we should all serve and reverence. But we do a
grievous wrong if we assume that this man is found, and
should be found, only in the faculty of philosophy. I am
glad that our great leader, President Eliot, in his address
at the inauguration of President Remsen, emphasized
particularly the forward movement made by the estab-
lishment of the Johns Hopkins Medical School. Not
because it requires for entrance the equivalent of the
bachelor's degree, but because we have there the best
specialized training, united with the highest culture and
the freest research, it will become and has become the
model for our medical schools, and for our schools of law,
thology and technology. So long as we must have de-
grees, let the A.B., the A.M., the M.D. or other profes-
sional degrees, and the Ph.D., each mean, according to its
measure, culture, expert training and independent re-
search.

The general public doubtless regards the university as
simply a place for the teaching of students, and there may
be some justification for this opinion in the actual state
of affairs. But over the doorway of the building in which
is my laboratory of psychology we have inscribed the words "For the advancement of natural science." Historically the university has been far more than a school for boys. In medieval Italy, France and Germany, men of maturity, usually attracted by a great personality, came together for mutual stimulus. The colleges of Oxford and Cambridge were monasteries for learned men before they became boarding schools. It may be our part here in America to develop the true university: A place where each would gladly learn and gladly teach; open summer and winter, night and day; a center in each community for the conservation of the best traditions and for the origination of the newest ideas; closely in touch with every forward movement of civic and national life; a home from which will go out, and to which will return, our leaders in every department of human activity.

Twenty-five years ago perhaps only an Eliot or a Gilman could have realized the future of the American university, but to-day even the man in the street must have some vague notion of its possibilities. Our college presidents and professors are called upon for the most important and difficult public functions. When New York City needs its leading citizen it finds him in the presidential chair of Columbia University. When Mr. Cleveland retires from public life, he allies himself with a university. There is no other office so fit for a past president of the United States as the presidency of a university.

The university is those who teach and those who learn and the work they do. The progress of the university depends on bringing to it the best men and leading them to do the best work. Our president, Mr. Remsen, in his admirable inaugural address, told us that the chief function of the university president is to find the right man, and his chief difficulty the lack of enough such men to go round. He considered the question of how far an in-
increased salary would add to the supply of good men. I quite agree with Mr. Remsen that a professor will do about the same kind of work whether his salary is $4,000 or $10,000. If anywhere, in the university it should be to each according to his needs, from each according to his ability. The professor who must live in a city or who has children to educate should be given the necessary income. He should have an adequate pension in old age or in case of disablement; the university should insure his life in a sufficient sum to provide an income for his wife and minor children. The professorial chair can be made attractive by freedom, responsibility and dignity, rather than by a large salary. Still it must be remembered that we live in a commercial age, and men are esteemed in accordance with their incomes. While it may not, or at all events should not, matter greatly to the professor, it may be well for the community that those who do the most for it should be paid on the same scale as those of equal ability in other professions. It may not be necessary to double the salaries of all university men, but it would probably be desirable to have certain prizes that would represent to the crude imagination of the public the dignity of the office and would perhaps attract young men of ability. The average salaries of teachers are about the same as in the other professions, but there are no prizes corresponding to those in the other professions. A clergyman may become a bishop, a lawyer may become a judge, a physician may acquire a consulting practise; and they may earn incomes of from $10,000 to $100,000. A professor can only earn a larger salary and an apparent promotion by becoming president of his university; and this I regard as unfortunate. As Mr. Remsen told us that the professor would be pleased, but not particularly improved, by an increase in salary, I may perhaps be permitted to suggest that a president might be
pained, but would not be seriously in
of his salary to that of the professor
this matter would be for the profes-
salary—perhaps $3,000 to $6,000, acc-
of living in the neighborhood, with
for each of his children between the
Advances in salary dependent on the
ities appear to be undesirable. If
from $3,000 to $5,000, a man should
salary as may be necessary, but should
automatic increases, say of $500 after
service. Then there should be a few
each university, promotion to which
 distinction, and occupancy of which
all routine work and carry a salary
presidency.

The man of parts is born, but he
given an opportunity. Lincoln, Go-
forth in history, owing to the even-
they had not been born others would.
The chief difficulty in securing the
sity chairs is the small field from
drawn. When we have a hundred un-
versity training teaching in the school
deserving promotion. When we have
research work at the universitites, the
of genius for the higher offices. The
stitute for Medical Research, and espe-
Institution, by encouraging men to
the universities, will perform in more
service of immense value. We should
duce the Privatdocent system of Ger-
not exclude a man from the universi-
vacant position, but should welcome
one who will add to its strength.
tract. In making such an appointment, the university should accept the responsibility, fully realizing that a man, however carefully observed, is subject to a large probable error. Even on the commercial side it pays to take the risks, for with permanent tenure, men will accept smaller salaries; but the chief gain is the moral advantage of securing the complete loyalty of the professor and setting him free to do his work. Less competent men should not, of course, be permitted to teach required courses, and the departments to which they belong should be strengthened. Permanent tenure of office carries with it as a corollary a pension system. Some men are old at sixty and others are young at seventy, but as it is difficult and rather invidious for any authority to decide to which class a man belongs, it is perhaps desirable to pension all professors at a fixed age, permitting them thereafter to offer elective courses or not as they prefer.

Academic freedom is a subject that has not lacked discussion during the past year. So long as universities are dependent for support on gifts from rich men or on appropriations made by a legislature, there is real danger that the teaching of economics, sociology and some departments of history and philosophy may suffer improper limitations. But so far as I am aware this is a danger rather than a fact. It should also be remembered that the university professor has responsibilities as well as rights. He should realize that views radically opposed to the sentiment of the community are not proper subjects for undergraduate teaching or for exploitation in the newspapers. On the other hand, there should be of course no inquisition in regard to a professor’s private beliefs; there should be as little interference as possible with his graduate teaching and none with the presentation of his work or theories to experts in his own field.
The university is its men and their work. But certain externals are necessary or at least usual—buildings and equipment, a president and trustees. One of the notable services of the Johns Hopkins was to show that a great university can be lodged in humble quarters. I almost regret the erection of more expensive buildings and the present removal and rebuilding of the university. Yet it is certainly for the interests of the community as a whole that the exterior presence of the university should represent its dignity and influence. As the loving devotion and art of the community were once lavished on its cathedral, so they should now go toward making the university stately and beautiful. The university, with its affiliated libraries, museums, hospitals, art galleries, theaters and parks, should be the chief pride of the community; and the money that is needed should come freely. We do not, however, want imitation parthenons and pantheons; architects should be found who can plan the buildings that are best adapted to their uses.

The best scientific work has usually been done with modest equipment and inexpensive apparatus—it depends chiefly on the man. But as science becomes more exact and complex, there is undoubtedly increasing need of large expenditures. A million dollars or ten million dollars should not be grudged, if this sum is needed for an astronomical observatory or for an experimental farm. The investment is sure on the average, and likely in each individual instance to pay large interest to the public by actual decrease in the cost of production or distribution. But in any case the community can afford to contribute for ideal ends an amount that is insignificant when compared with its total expenditures. Books required by the worker should always be at hand, but it does not seem necessary for each university to maintain a museum of a million volumes. We should have two or three such col-
lections in the country, but it is more economical to move books or even men, than to store and care for books that are used but once in a century. Museums and art galleries can also be limited in size without serious loss. Each should maintain certain typical exhibits and have in addition some well developed special departments. In general it would be in the interest of economy and efficiency if there were more division of labor and cooperation among our universities than has hitherto obtained. It is not necessary for every university to have a complete equipment in every department.

The main ends of the university are the same in all lands, but our American presidents and boards of trustees are indigenous products which can scarcely be regarded as essential. They are the natural outcome of the denominational college, and have developed in line with methods of business organization that have proved themselves highly efficient. Given a small and compact group of men who represent a certain policy, but whose chief duty it is to elect an absolute dictator, who in turn appoints minor dictators, and the result is an economical and powerful machine. In politics, in business and in education, this form of despotism has prevailed, and has on the whole justified itself by the results. But it appears to be only a passing phase in educational development.

The college president has enjoyed a rapid evolution in the course of a single generation. Thirty or forty years ago he was a clergyman, as a matter of course; later he was likely to be selected for business qualifications; now he is a member of the faculty who unites executive ability with high scholarship. We seem to have made a further advance at Columbia by the election of a president who is at the outset an educational expert. He alone does not begin as an amateur and can devote himself to his work while cultivating his scholarship. But the demands now
made on the university president are so diverse and exorbitant that even when he gives up both teaching and research they can scarcely be met. He can not be in loco parentis for 5,000 students; select and control 400 officers; coordinate the conflicting demands of incommensurable schools and departments; arrange diverse curricula in accordance with changing needs; superintend buildings and grounds; manage an estate of $10,000,000 and secure the additional funds always needed; be a public orator and monthly contributor to magazines; attend bicentennials, sesquicentennials and semi-sesquicentennials; occupy positions of honor and trust whenever called upon by the community or nation, and all the rest. It has become necessary to delegate part of these duties to deans and other officers, and it seems probable that the office of president should be divided and filled by two men of different type: one an educational expert, in charge of the internal administration; the other a man of prominence and weight in the community, in charge of external affairs.

The president and trustees as they now exist have their chief justification in financial conditions. We know that the lack of money is the root of all evil. Our private educational corporations, dependent on the generosity of millionaires, are in a remarkable and almost anomalous position. Yet it is evident that this unique phase of development has not only kept the university in advance of popular appreciation, but has also tended to maintain the stability of society. At a time when large fortunes and monopolistic corporations are needed for the material development of the country, the generous gifts of a few men of great wealth have done much to allay popular clamor. It seems likely, however, that in the end the people will control monopolies and the universities supported by the profits of monopolies. There is no more reason for depending on the generosity or caprice of mil-
lionaires for our universities than for our ships of war. It has always seemed to me a curious perversion that elementary education, chiefly useful to the individual, should be free and supported by the state, whereas higher education, chiefly for the benefit of the state, should be a charge to the student and depend on private charity. I believe that the state universities are more nearly in the line of evolution than the private corporations, but there is every reason to hope that the latter will remain sufficiently plastic to adapt themselves to conditions that are likely to prevail. Even at present I think it would be desirable for our boards of trustees to be gradually increased in size, until they become large corporations, consisting of those who are most actively interested in the work of the university.

However it may be to-day, it does not seem likely that the money question will be the most troublesome one of the future. The people of this country spend $200,000,000 annually for sugar. The same quantity of sugar a hundred years ago would have cost five times as much, $1,000,000; the reduction in cost has been due to the applications of science in chemistry, agriculture and transportation. The saving on the cost of sugar for a single country in a year or two would pay for all the higher education and scientific investigation from the establishment of the University of Salerno to the present day. This is a statement easily understood by every voter and legislator; when it is once grasped the question for our universities will not be how to get money, but how to spend it judiciously. I also believe that the people of this country are not only good business men, but are idealists beyond others, and that patriotism and civic pride will lead them to increase the wealth of their universities as rapidly as it can be wisely used.

With the passing of the money question, I look forward
to the passing of the president and the board of trustees. Our absentee and quasi-hereditary boards of trustees, and our presidents, ranging from King Log to King Stork, have on the whole administered their trusts in accordance with common sense and the opinion of the well-informed. In so far as they have done so, their dictatorial power has been both harmless and useless. The professor is, as a rule, a free man, even though he may be looked upon as a fetus shut up in an incubator. The type of professor, who is exclusively concerned with settling "the doctrine of the enclitic De," or with distinguishing one beetle from another, survives on the stage and in novels, rather than at the university. In the scientific departments, at least, executive ability of a high order is needed for the conduct of a laboratory or the prosecution of research; and the demand is fully met. The university could not continually supply presidents and administrators of all kinds were there not a large supply of material. It has been said that university faculties are poor legislative bodies; if true, this would not be surprising, so long as their deliberations are confined to discussing questions such as whether they shall wear gowns at commencement, the decision being with the trustees. I believe that the university community is competent to direct the policy and administration of the university and will soon do so.

In these remarks I have used the freedom of speech that a teacher may claim; but it has certainly not been my intention to run amuck through our educational system. The man of science is by profession an optimist. None can write the equation giving the world's trajectory, but I believe that we are moving along an ascending curve. Never before has the average intelligence been so high, never before has a civilization been so securely established. Nor, I trust, are great men lacking. They say
that we are failing in art and in literature; but those who are at the foot of a rainbow can see only the fog. In science and in other great departments of human activity progress is at a geometrical ratio. I also believe in the present and in the future of this democracy. Not only is the average well-being of the individual higher than elsewhere or hitherto, but we are contributing and shall increasingly contribute to political, business and educational organization; we are contributing and shall increasingly contribute to science, to scholarship and to art. The knowledge and the culture of the world have been freely given to us; it is our part to return them the usury. While in the energy of our pride we lord it over land and sea, we shall discover the truth, the beauty and the righteousness that lie hidden everywhere:

In this broad earth of ours,
Amid the measureless grossness and the slag,
Enclosed and safe within its central heart,
Nestles the seed perfection.
VI. EXTERNALISM IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES

BY GEORGE M. STRATTON,
THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Published in *The Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1907

At almost every great European seat of learning the observer feels that all its present sponsors are faithful children of the past. The softened forms of ancient buildings, the survival of use and ceremonial from an age long ago—these and a multitude of other witnesses seem to tell of a mysterious spirit there awaiting and subduing all who come. A suppression and blending of private wills in fealty to a higher power seems but a fair copy of those outer patterns with which the universities of Europe have long stood face to face—with captured soldiery, with the sway of pontiffs in the church, with kings and emperors.

Yet the European higher schools, in their own rule, are strangely free. The masters, the professors, have the chief voice in choosing those who are to join their body; and though it often reserves the right to intervene, the state regards with favor the autonomy of this band of men. And while there is no lack of rank and dignity—of heads of colleges, rectors, chancellors—the university is unconstrained in the presence of its visible lord, bringing, as he does, no thought of imposition, but standing forth rather as the representative and spokesman by free choice of those who are the learned guild. In many a European university the headship is conferred by the faculties, often for a single year upon one of their own professors, who returns, at the close of his brief term, to
his old estate, and some colleague takes his place. Often, as in some of the great British universities, the election to the most exalted station brings a splendid honor whose real power, however, has wholly passed away. Everywhere in the old world, titles and robes and golden symbols, beautiful to the imagination as the illumined initials on some vellum page, meet one at the opening of the seals of knowledge. But the real dominion over the mind is recognized as coming no more from those initials than from the characters, untinctured, which form the body of the work.

In the new world all is changed. A citizen-like plainness has long marked the buildings, the dress, the customs, and is only now departing here and there. The surroundings would make one expectant that with us least of all would learning be overgoverned—here in the land of loose bonds, of individual excess. For in no part of the world is there among the people as a whole more concern to avoid the danger of domination; the federal power is narrowed in by the reserved power of the states; few men are permitted to remain long in public office, lest they should learn too well to govern; the legal safeguards about the person charged with guilt are so absurdly effective that almost the only assurance one can have of life and liberty is to commit some fearful crime. Yet among a people so jealous of private rights, so patient of the inconveniences of weak and scattered powers and changing persons in political government, lest the individual should be oppressed—among such a people university government has assumed a form that we might have expected to see in a land accustomed to kings. European universities have a constitution that might have come from some American political theorist; American universities are as though founded and fostered in the bourne of aristocracy.
The government of American universities is essentially from without. A board of governors known by many names—"trustees," as at Johns Hopkins, "regents" at the University of California, "the corporation" at Harvard, "fellows" at Yale,—belongs neither to those who study nor to those who teach, and is in consequence disjoined from the real life of the institution. Often their high character, their training, their devotion to the work, greatly reduces the disjunction, yet is the separation real. Even when some of their number are graduates of the university they govern, they are sons who have left the family hearth, and too often they are unequally yoked with unbelievers. For some of their fellow members of the board may be there merely by reason of election to a remote political office, or by virtue, or vice, of great possessions, and neither of these successes, we have learned, does always insure the presence of wisdom for academic guidance. Yet even in those frequent cases where there is sympathy and understanding for the work, it remains a curious departure from our usual American ideas, as well as from the scholarly custom elsewhere, that we should have called into existence in affairs of learning a regnant body the life activities of whose members lie outside the realm they rule. And these men, besides administering the funds, choose the man who is the power of all powers in our academic world, the university president.

The American university president holds a place unique in the history of higher education. He is a ruler responsible to no one whom he governs, and he holds for an indefinite term the powers of academic life and death. Subject to the formal approval of the trustees, he selects new members of the faculty, promotes, dismisses them. To the faculty, it is true, there seems to be left the important power to define the requirements for admission
to the university and to its degrees, and yet these activities are in a fundamental way directed by the president, since by his word comes growth to this department and atrophy to that. And while his sway is subject to a constitution, and he can not quite justly be called an autocrat, nevertheless the charter brings to him perhaps less serious restrictions than those which often in the larger world bind men who bear the name of emperor.

There is thus a marvelous disparity between the rule of states and of their own academies, both here and elsewhere; nor is it easy to see why Europe and America should each be harboring what would seem properly to be sacred only to the other. Still it is possible, would one but look far enough—to the colonial times of America, to the medieval times of Europe—to catch some glimpse of the causes which have brought about this strange condition.

The early American college had but few students and few instructors, a body compact and not unlike a family. Its students were younger than our undergraduates to-day, and the care of youth so tender in their years may easily have suggested patriarchal forms—forms that, we know, rise readily to monarchical. Moreover there was no growth side by side, as at Oxford and Cambridge, of several relatively independent colleges to check each other and to keep, as always in a federation, a certain jealous guard and division of their strength. But with us a single college, modeled in many ways after the single English college, rather than after the university, expanded in its isolation until, with all its paternal spirit still unchanged, its size seemed to become a warrant for a more impressive name. It seems probable, moreover, that a strong influence to fix the early form came from the imitation of a type of government common in the colonies, where a small corporation, or "company," often resident
in distant England, controlled its colony through a single local governor. For it can hardly be by chance that the old collegiate constitution under which we still live repeats so exactly the political model of the time—the academic trustees, or corporation, corresponding to the "company," while the president, appointed from without, would answer to the governor administering the colony in the company's name. And long after the political forms became by hard struggle more democratic, and the small external corporation ceased to rule the colony (the governor being now chosen by the colonists themselves), the seats of learning, that cling so long to ancient ways, still kept in thoughtless piety the older rule.

Even where there has been some attempt to follow the European course and live as befits believers in democracy, the opposing current has proved too strong for the sturdiest hearts. Several of our universities began their life without long tenure and high power in the office of their president, but one by one their courage fails and they follow the custom of the land. The most notable of these conformists is the honored University of Virginia, that after nearly a century of loyalty to Jefferson's democratic ideal has finally in these last days inaugurated its first president according to the usage of America. The polity that we might call monarchic is thus not only frequent in the new-world colleges, but it is stripping away the few lorn shreds of popular control which still remain among them. Chiefly at Yale of all the leading universities is there some vestige of real power remaining to the faculty. Yet, as by historic humor, she celebrated nearly two centuries ago the prime importance of the president, even in the official style of her corporation, "The President and Fellows of Yale College," and in these later times has set forth anew his primacy in a golden glory of mace and massive chain.
As the American university has preserved almost unchanged the constitution of its younger days, so the European university has continued the form of government with which its life began. And there the controlling type of association was the medieval guild. The universities at the beginning were but loose associations similar in many ways to modern trade-unions,—now a guild of masters or professors, and again a company of students. At Bologna, where was the best instance of a student corporation, the strange spectacle is presented of a great university governed by those receiving instruction—students electing their own rectors, engaging their own teachers. At Paris, where the contrasting type of organization came to power, the university was ruled, not by its students but by its professors, and such was their strength and corporate spirit that they could, battling, win their freedom from the domination of the bishop's chancellor. These two early and wonderful instances of academic order, the University of Paris and the University of Bologna, have shaped the polity of the universities of Europe, so impressing their own features upon their descendants that these are, even to this day, essentially what universities were in the Middle Ages—free guilds of men professionally interested in the higher learning, with power to determine their own membership, elect their own officers, administer their own property.

But after history comes judgment and prophecy. And having tried to see the distant influences which have made the university government in America stand out so sharp against her political usage and opinion, what should be said as to the wisdom of such a contrast? Were it not better if we instituted here the form of government under which have prospered the greatest universities of the world—a form of government which might well with us have hope of fortune, familiar as we are with the mechan-
ism of self-control? There are many who would welcome such a change; many who feel that the presidency in our universities is like that oak in the Finnish tale, which sprang up late, and yet in the end shut out the light of day and must be felled, lest all other life should fail. And not alone the overshadowing presidency is regarded with distrust; many are doubtful also of the whole system of direction by an alien body of trustees.

It is not entirely clear that a change of these externals would of itself ennoble the spirit of our academies; and the spirit is the chief care, and can live true in bodies diverse in form. When Matthew Arnold named the English as having undue faith in machinery, he no less noted a trait of the American, who is so often confident of the efficacy of outward means. And our university reformers are possibly not untouched by this idea. Yet the truth is, that the body exhibits the mind even more than it controls it, and therefore there are changes on the face of our universities that would be grateful, not so much as sources from which would come some inner transformation, but rather as the legible record of such a hidden change already far advanced. In its turn the outward sign would minister inwardly, as a banner helps an army.

The changes that seem seriously worth attempting—not suddenly, but after the manner of Fabians, glad to bide their time—would bring us to a middle way between the present course of America and that of Europe. The board of trustees one need not wish utterly to abolish, although here and there the manner of their selection might be improved. For, all in all, the American is perhaps right in placing the care for the general plan of income and expense in the hands of an external body of men trained in the management of funds. But the action of the trustees might well stop at narrower limits than those to which at present they often go. In appointing
new members of the faculty, they should perhaps best confine themselves to granting a stated annuity for a particular academic office. The man to fill this office should properly be selected by the faculty itself. And the faculty alone should normally have the power to dismiss its own members. But still more important and beneficial for our present needs would it be to have the professors rather than the trustees elect the university president and determine the powers which he should wield. The office of president would thus remain, but he who occupied it would be the representative directly of the faculty, and he could be efficient only so long as he retained their confidence. In such a plan the president need be no puppet of the professors, any more than at present he is a puppet of the trustees. He would best be a wise leader, yet driving all the while only where he could lead and not compel—lead not a majority merely, but the body as a whole. One can readily imagine the delays and even abuses to which such a system might give rise, especially during the years required for the self-training of the faculty to its new responsibilities. But such evils would hardly exceed the worst that comes from the present system, and in the end the movements of the university would tend more and more to spring from inner harmony and conviction; a university that would stand at the front, not in numbers but in worth, would have to bring itself to harmony, would have to become convinced. In a few of our best American universities the president even now is in a hidden way the representative of the faculty: they believe in him; he feels it necessary to have the support of those who are so vital to the institution, those who devote their lives to teaching and research. It would do no harm in these universities—where such a spirit now is wanting, it would doubtless be of infinite good—if provision were made in the very constitution that the president regard the faculty
as men from whom must come real guidance; as men who must if necessary be forced, even against their present will, to be more and more answerable for the ideas that dominate their seat.

While a change of government might thus assist us, it is not our chief necessity. We need what is of greater value and far more difficult to obtain. There is called for, both in the public mind and in the universities themselves, a refinement of the measure of academic progress. An evil spirit afflicts us, whose spell might be broken if, following the custom of primitive men, we turned stoutly upon it and called aloud its secret name. For to externalism, in the end, we must attribute the prominence of the president, the dependence of our universities upon him. This condition of ours comes not so much from a want of democratic spirit, if by this we mean an easy intercourse, a bonhomie, of college men, a hatred of snobs and vanity, a desire for public service. It comes rather from a passion in our people for visible accomplishment, a love of dimensions, an admiration for alert administration, for forceful public utterance.

In politics we have in some measure been influenced by the thought that weakness in government is not wholly unjustified if thereby the individual is encouraged to be strong. Although our public affairs indicate a certain loss of enthusiasm for individual initiative and freedom, nevertheless our thought of government has long been molded by an educational ideal. Our universities, strange to say, have been swayed more by political motives—by the feeling which works for compactness, for energy at a focal point. Rather than render some slight sacrifice for the sake of spontaneity and inner strength, our universities feel that they must first of all have the power of rapid adjustment to a changing situation, the power to strike while the iron is hot, the power to go forth, also, in
a direct and personal way to get help as well as give it. And all this means administration centered in a man free to act. In the ship of state we have been willing to consult the passengers and crew at each change of the vessel's course; in trying to make the port of knowledge, however, we are strong for authority and discipline. Yet we may well doubt whether our university methods have been quite as manly, quite as far-sighted, as our statecraft. Our colleges could now afford to be less worldly-wise, to be less ready to move toward small ends and more steadily attentive to the great aims of education, to be less fascinated by quantity, to have less eye and more vision.

The American university is wonderfully enheartened by outward prosperity and outward growth. In a recent letter of resignation of the aged president of one of our more conservative colleges—a college so conservative that it has never assumed the title "university"—there is a tone of satisfaction almost exultant, because the freshman class had increased during his administration ten-fold in number, and the college buildings had enlarged by equal bounds. If success is to be measured merely, or even mainly, by changes of this kind, there is need of strong officering. The strong officering, the emphasis on officering, brings in its turn an undue attention to things that can be expressed in statistics and to the eye.

There can be little question but that the president's prominence and the general system of external government add one more to the many motives toward academic inflation. I would say nothing that even seems to be unappreciative of the character of our presidents, many of whom are among the truly honorable men of the nation. Yet in any group so large there are characters that are not quite crag-like, and to these comes at times the temptation to justify their prominence by results that can be
shown. A reputation for resourcefulness must be made or maintained, bringing an inner prompting to hurry and harry the college with "original" ideas. On view by day and by night in the public place, and having attributed to him many of the natural ups and downs for which he is nowise answerable, any man whose foundations do not go down to rock is liable to be shaken. He becomes restless and moves by popular favor, or opposition, so that steadiness and sound growth in the university are in great peril.

A university works best when its work is quiet and deep; and all its forms and organization should express and strengthen this idea. Its first duty is to offer men knowledge and the power of judgment. And yet so closely are the springs of life united that knowledge and judgment are always found close to the love of moderation and order. The line between science and art can be seen only when one does not look directly at it, disappearing before our closer gaze. For science is but the art of seeing the world as it is—temperate, law-bound. The university, therefore, hinders the cause of intelligence unless in its own conduct it is patient and steadfast; unless it shows itself the one institution above all others that can train itself and train its sons to be serene and moderate, out of very loyalty to the changeless good. The true university is, in its action, neither feverish nor slothful. Having in its keeping the great ideas that guide all progress, it is at its best neither in shifty efforts at advance nor in listless contemplation of the good; so that the strongest universities have ever been ready to give their own kind of support to living ideas, while disinclined to rush forth at every cry of "Lo, here!" or "Lo, there!" Certainly no place where intelligence really exists will lose its excuse for being if it fails to increase in size. The American reverence for quantity is a great hindrance to our universities in pursuing their proper end. We need a prophet
crying, "Woe unto all things that are big!" We need this cry for our universities no less than for our insurance, our railways, and our sale of oil.

Moreover, the externalism in the universities, whereof the elevation of the presidency is but one sign, takes responsibility from its rightful place. We make central the administrative office, as in some great commercial undertaking, instead of the office of teacher and truth-seeker, the office of student. Yet here is the locus of success and failure. No one would claim that the professors are a worthier group of men than our college presidents; it is not a question of personal rights or jealousy of honors. It is a question of right or wrong to the cause; and the universities themselves, knowing what is in their charge, should be the last to typify in their own structure the thought that discovering truth and imparting the vital principle whereby others may discover it are of a dignity less than that of organizing and management. And yet, much more than in the great universities of Europe, we exalt administrative ability above scientific insight. We bestow the praise for success, the blame for failure, more upon the administration and less upon our professors and our students, who are rightly answerable for the university's achievement. Our undergraduates are a painfully dependent class, overtaught and undertrained, accustomed to incessant drill and supervision, themselves the victims and encouragers of this policy. The professors likewise are not without fault. They look wistfully at the activities of other callings, and show in this that they have no full sense of the dignity of facing square toward truth and belonging to its council. Only a short time ago a college teacher spoke seriously in public of the banker, the lawyer, and even of the burglar, as being in touch with life in a truer sense than is the university professor. And the professors' frequent reference to the
poor rewards and all the outward hardships of their work indicates some little envy of the goods of life which come to the merchant, the lawyer and the physician. Yet there is no lot on earth that offers greater rewards and greater opportunities. And when an individual has grievances, the blame is often placed primarily on the president, since the form of organization encourages the professors to place the responsibility anywhere but on themselves. It would be more fitting if their constitution gave no excuse, but constantly invited each to perceive that with himself it rested whether he would succeed or fail. Externalism is thus no purely Philistine failing, nor a failing only of the president and trustees. Students and professors are alike infected with it; they too are looking outward for their succor.

It is but natural, where organization is so important and the office of administration is magnified, that the presidency should fast lose its connection with active and advancing scholarship. There is so much governing to be done—because in our universities we trust so much to government—that in but few places can a president continue a scholar’s life. So the old type of leader, learned and temperate, fast yields to the new type—self-confident, incisive, Rooseveltian. And with the coming of the new type there seems to be an increasing stress upon rapid accomplishment, upon "doing things," with grave risk that our places of learning will preserve a less clear vision of what is catholic and enduring.

The constitution of our universities is an appearance of their indwelling mind, and therefore is of moment for their future. It is difficult to foretell whether the American will continue forever the government that was well enough for a boys’ academy in colonial times. The desire is unquestionably awakened in us to have universities that can stand with the greatest of the world; and the
desire will in the end, I believe, lead us more and more to
distrust external rule. Our present forms have served
our nonage; the days of our ignorance have been winked
at, but now we are commanded everywhere to repent.
We shall hardly reproduce in haste the European models,
with all their clear advertisement that they are scholars'
commonwealths, are municipalities of science; and yet it
can not be thought that we shall continue forever and
without regret upon our present course. We shall in the
end place less reliance upon commercial methods in dis-
covering and bringing into harmony the choicest minds;
the university will perceive that it must become for them
a hospitable place, showing in its very laws and customs
that it is a union of gifted persons sanely working
together to increase the store of intelligence among men.
It will feel that it must bestow on all who come within its
walls the keys and freedom of a great city.
VII. UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION AND UNIVERSITY IDEALS

BY STEWART PATON,
PRINCETON, N. J.

Published in Science, November 24, 1911

The development of our American universities is seriously handicapped by the present system of administration. A spirit of chauvinism intolerant or adverse criticism from outsiders, even when directed against obvious defects, is often a prominent factor in determining as well as in limiting the functions of the entire educational system now operative in colleges and universities which remain private corporations. This particular defect is more apparent in our older universities, where the bonds of union between alma mater and alumni, which during the early period of development were essential to the life of our colleges, now threaten, unless modified and readjusted, to impair the growth and vitality of these institutions. Wherever the spirit of progress is felt, the problem of the proper readjustment of the administrative forces of our universities so as to make the most effective use of available resources is, for the moment, a more important question than providing for an increase of revenue. It is not difficult to point out more than one concrete example of the confusion that exists in regard to the relationships of the various departments of administration and the unfortunate state of anarchy sure to arise when a board of trustees whose members are uninformed as to the general progress made in the development of universities suddenly reassumes the powers which through their inertia had temporarily been
relegated to president and deans. The results of this unfortunate state of affairs have been that fruitless efforts are made to solve problems requiring the training and special knowledge possessed only by experts in university affairs.

The administration of our universities is vested in a board of trustees, a corporation, or overseers, president and faculty. The manner in which the members of these boards are selected and the relation they bear to each other is not the result of a carefully thought-out plan, but represents a scheme in development in which opportunism has played the chief part. A serious result of a policy of administration that takes no thought for the morrow is seen in the persistence of a form of government sufficiently elastic not to interfere with the growth of the college, but painfully restrictive when applied to the conduct of affairs in the higher institutions of learning. The form of organization, with but very slight modifications, that was originally adopted in the early history of our colleges, when these institutions were about on the level with our present high schools, is practically in use now and is relatively as effective as would be the wood-burning locomotive in pulling the modern express train. The present relationship between the faculty, trustees and president may be regarded as a haphazard growth, the result of a laissez-faire policy, affording an example of the same sufficient-to-the-day spirit and smug satisfaction with existing conditions that is so common in our institutions, and is well illustrated in the administration of municipal affairs where the immediate exigencies of a given situation are met without any provision for eventualities.

The chief duty of the trustees during the early history of the American colleges was to assist the president in collecting the necessary revenues, while turning to him
for instruction in regard to the educational policy of the college. He became not alone their representative and spokesman, but also that of the faculty. The present autocratic position of university executives was created for them by the acts of the trustees in shifting responsibility for the performance of certain duties from their own shoulders to that of the president and deans.

The faculty, to an almost equal degree, is to blame for the undue centralization of power in the executive offices. As a rule, faculties (in common with other legislative bodies long deprived of constitutional rights) as a body are nihilistic and show little evidence of any capacity for constructive criticism and administration. During the period when the autocracy of the president's and dean's office was rapidly rising, it became a form of lèse-majesté, as it is now, for members of the faculty to communicate their views upon university questions to individual members of the board of trustees. As all direct channels of communication between trustees and faculty are officially closed, the temptation to resort to indirect methods of expression and interchange of ideas is frequently present.

The ease with which the members of the board of trustees transferred their power as well as sense of obligation in the performance of duties to the president plainly showed they did not wish to be troubled unnecessarily by the discussion of educational problems. The lack of sympathetic interest shown by the trustees in the problems of most vital importance in the university life has had two serious consequences. In more than one instance a feeling of distrust and suspicion has arisen between the faculty and trustees, more serious and aggravated in the case of the former body, as they as individuals were directly interested in the progress of events. In the second place the absence of any safety
valve or of a channel of direct communication between the two governing boards has given rise within the faculty to a *psychasthenia universitatis*. This psychosis has been produced by the lack of opportunity to discuss the larger problems of the university, and, as always happens to those suffering from forms of mental repressions, or of living in cramped intellectual quarters, the tendency to indulge in petty recriminations and to be resentful of criticism has occasionally assumed alarming proportions with some of the characteristics of an epidemic. If it were possible to adopt the treatment generally indicated in psychoses of this nature, a cure could readily be effected by getting rid of the relatives and asking for advice from disinterested outsiders competent to express an opinion on university problems. Unfortunately, complications are apt to arise. Trustees, unaccustomed to the discussion of academic problems, will, when confronted by a crisis, feel the importance of immediate action. The faculty naturally resents what it considers to be an encroachment upon its prerogatives, and well-grounded serious misgivings as to the results that will probably follow the interference of laymen in the struggle for the establishment and maintenance of university ideals are sure to arise.

At present, trustees see things through a glass very darkly, as they themselves are generally strong partisans of institutions and lack not only a special knowledge of university problems, but are often deficient in a true sense of perspective. The choice of trustees in our eastern universities in a large number of instances is not determined by the individual's personal qualifications for the position, nor by his special knowledge of university problems. The selection depends frequently upon the partisanship of the candidate reflected in the uncritical attitude of devotion to his alma mater and a certain lack
of discrimination, often a product of the hysterical domination of a phase of the college spirit which produces a hyposensitiveness in detecting the defects of his own and a corresponding degree of hypersensitiveness for picking out those of other institutions. This is one of the reasons why the information acquired by trustees from their friends in the faculty in regard to the relative value of work done in the different departments of the university often has about the same intrinsic worth when introduced as evidence as a Teutonic valuation of French scholarship, or a standpatter's attitude towards the subject of tariff reform.

The trustees' lack of a clear understanding of the nature of university problems and their failure to cooperate with the faculty in the formulation of a definite policy for the development of the institution, is a very serious tactical error. The public, partly through ignorance, and partly through an instinctive feeling of distrust, caused by the silence of the administration as to the existence of any general plan for the development of the university, does not have any great degree of confidence that funds contributed are always expended to the best advantage.

A public statement of policy would avert another danger always imminent in the administration of university affairs. The acceptance of benefactions with attending conditions may be a curse and not a blessing. The American university has reached a stage in its development when it is no longer to be considered as a debtor to any public-minded, generous citizen who contributes to its financial support. The attitude passively assumed by trustees, that the policy determining the growth of the institution depends upon the sums of money contributed for maintenance, is not only undignified, but it is in danger of becoming a thorn in the flesh.
This cringing form of mendicancy, always on the defensive, would cease to exist, if a carefully prepared plan for the future development of the institution was presented to the public. There is no reason why a great university should be apologetic in asking for financial support.

The sense of official obligation which often impels trustees to beg in a perfunctory manner for funds, making it possible to carry some plan or scheme into effect, the details of which are either unknown or are not carefully prepared for general scrutiny, does not generate sufficient strength of conviction among the representatives of the university to arouse by their appeals the interest of intelligent persons to the point when a favorable response may be expected.

Those institutions of learning which take the public into their confidence, at the same time pledging themselves to the maintenance of the highest academic ideals, will without doubt receive the necessary financial support. The resentful attitude sometimes adopted by an administration in the face of the well-directed criticisms from without, is often replaced by a singular indifference or apathy in formulating a working plan embodying any features suggested by those who are not intimately associated with the institution.

Several instances of this tendency to drift have recently occurred and may be taken as quite typical of what is unfortunately a frequent occurrence. One of the most distinguished scientists in the country offered in writing some suggestions for the development of departments along lines which, if they had been followed, would have brought signal distinction and honor to a university with which he was not officially connected. The plan has never been discussed by either trustees or faculty, and it is only reasonable to suppose that the genuine interest
in the affairs of this particular institution shown by an outsider, whose opinion is highly valued in university circles, has not increased if it has not altogether disappeared.

Very often prominent men are asked to state the conditions upon which they would go to certain universities. Their replies are sometimes given at length and are devoted to indicating the lines along which the work in certain departments should be directed. These replies, containing the valuable advice of experts, are seldom discussed by the faculty or trustees, and the possibility of making a successful public appeal for the carrying on of important work is not entertained. The effect of this lack of sympathetic, intelligent interest of the trustees in the actual progress of the university has become a serious drawback, and is quite as disastrous for the maintenance of high ideals as is the notion that it is possible to estimate the progress of an institution by the increase in the enrollments of students or by an enumeration of the list of new buildings.

The discussions that have occurred in academic circles during the past decade have served the double purpose of exposing defects inherent in the administration of most of our universities and have also been the means of suggesting the remedies. (1) There is a pretty general agreement that the autocratic powers of presidents and of all executive officers should be limited. In order to do this successfully, the conditions responsible for the present state of affairs should be modified. This would lead to setting reforms in motion, resulting eventually in an intelligent and active cooperation of the executives, trustees and faculty. An excellent plan has been suggested of limiting the tenure of office of president and deans to a single period of four or five years. The salaries paid to executives should not greatly exceed that of
the professors, nor should more elaborate provision be
made for the residences of president and deans than for
those of the faculty.

(2) Synchronous with the limitations imposed upon
the authority of executives there should be correspond-
ing and equally important changes in the board of
trustees. A joint committee, as already suggested, con-
sisting of three or five members from each board, viz.,
trustees and faculty, should act as the medium for keep-
ing the former in touch and sympathy with the in-
tellectual progress of the university. The presiding
officer of this joint committee should be chosen by vote
from either board and it would be well to limit his tenure
of office to correspond with that of the president and
deans. The reports of this committee would be quite
free from the personal coloring given to the suggestions
made by single executives. The establishment of a more
intimate relationship would be reciprocally beneficial and
would serve to give the faculty a greater sense of re-
ponsibility by introducing the discussion of questions
of broader academic interest, and would lessen the tend-
cy of individual members of the faculty to indulge in
the petty recriminations and personalities which are the
result of conditions arising from having lived too long
in one place, and a limited intellectual horizon. A
change of equally great importance would be the crea-
tion of an advisory board to trustees and faculty, com-
posed of the members of the joint executive committee,
to which should be added several representatives, pref-
erably from the faculties of other universities. This
enlarged committee should hold one or two meetings a
year and from its foreign members a perspective view of
the university could readily be obtained. The Prince-
tonian should know how his alma mater appears when
viewed from Cambridge, and the Harvard professor or
overseer could sometimes correct a tendency to spiritual myopia by adopting suggestions coming from a source as distant from the Back Bay as is New Jersey. The tyrannical domination of certain forms of college spirit has become an obstacle to progress in the life of the older universities. Impatient of criticism and often expressing itself in the form of a flabby optimism, it insists that the administration of the university should be directed solely by those alumni who possess "the requisite degree of knowledge of local conditions." The annual report of "outsiders" letting in fresh air from without the walls would in time lead the trustees to take a more intelligent appreciation of the intellectual life of the university.

The rate of development of our higher institutions of learning will be directly proportional to the rapidity with which trustees or regents familiarize themselves with the actual progress made in the university world. The majority of trustees on account of lack of knowledge have the tendency to look at university problems from the high-school or collegiate point of view. Their failure, in common with many other persons, to apprehend or appreciate the essential factors in the life of a great university at their proper valuation was referred to by the late President Gilman when he more than once affirmed that "the true university does not depend upon 'cloistered aisles' or a beautiful campus." He knew how often brains are sacrificed for buildings, and that institutions, like individuals, often built themselves wonderful tombs. If we except what has been accomplished in a few notable instances, there has been a general failure in our eastern universities to comprehend the vital importance of encouraging productive scholarship. Business men as a rule have only a vague idea of the reasons for promoting and encouraging research, and university trustees greatly need enlightenment on this subject. The
mention of the word "investigation" suggests "mysteries," while research is looked upon in the light of a luxury carried on by professors as a pleasant relaxation from the ordinary drudgery of routine duties. This misconception of the spirit that dominates the investigator is a transmitted product of the times when the general public was satisfied to accept the first half of the definition of "university" given in the dictionary; namely, "an institution devoted to teaching."

Recently the reading public has reopened the dictionary and has found there is a second hitherto forgotten clause, "and to the higher branches of learning." Learning and teaching, if either one is to be successful, can not be disassociated. The investigator is a "learner" and teaching, if it is not to degenerate into dogmatism, a mere cramming of the memory with information, must be thoroughly inoculated with the spirit of youth. The instructor, who, in the ordinary sense of the word, is a teacher, an imparter of information, and one never having actually engaged in research, loses his mental plasticity at a much earlier age than the investigator. The spirit of eternal youth is the impetus and moving force of the great investigator. He is neither satisfied nor quiesced by the mere commands of authority. The apple falls from the tree, the pendulum swings in the cathedral, the blood leaves the heart, circulates through the body and returns to this organ, and his eyes are first to see these phenomena. He needs no "letter from the blind to those who can not see" to arouse his perceptive faculties. His sympathies are with the healthy child, whose interest in the universe has not been impaired by teachers competent only to impart information and constantly irritated by the "why" of irrepressible and impressionable youth. He does not discourage any attempt to look at the universe from the
Aristotelian or Platonic point of view, but admonishes the student to be himself rather than a mere pocket edition of the classics.

The basic principle underlying culture, expressed in the affirmation "no one is altogether right and no one altogether wrong," is the working creed of the investigator. His attitude of mind makes him instinctively reject as spurious the cultural specifics hawked in the market-place as cures for all the ills to which human flesh is heir. The invidious distinctions occasionally drawn by teachers, between those subjects which have a supposedly higher cultural value and those of more strictly utilitarian merit, do not exist. The mental mechanism determining the individual possession of culture is merely an index of the functional capacity of the brain and nervous system. The factors upon which this mechanism depends are largely the product of racial and ancestral traits. Too much attention is frequently given to the infinitesimal influence of education in the supposed dissemination of these particular mental traits, while some educators are actually in danger of reducing the pursuit of culture to a fad. By proclaiming too vociferously the specific virtue of certain remedies, they not only expose the fallacies in the argument, but like the parvenu who continually harps upon the advantage of aristocracy, they make public confession of the absence in their own cases of the hereditary factors essential in the acquisition of culture. These same persons, say President R. S. Woodward, "having drunk deeply at certain fountains of learning appear to be sure that there are no others."

The spirit of investigation is a tonic, restoring vigor, self-reliance, and individuality to the members of the army of imitators that yearly receive degrees from our colleges and universities. It rebukes the artist whose chief ambition in life is to copy French models, ridicules the
classicist who is only at his best when working in the Oxford atmosphere, or the scientist whose spectacles are made in Germany, and says to each of them, "Eyes have you and can not see, ears and hear not," and with the Persian poet is ready to exclaim, "I myself am Heaven and Hell." Instead of offering to the student an "à la carte" diet of selected facts and theories, it would teach him how to search intelligently for facts while cautioning him, as did Bishop Berkeley, to "consider the pains that have been taken to perplex the plainest things, that distrust of the senses, those doubts and scruples, those obstructions and refinements that occur in the very entrance of the sciences." If he remembers this admonition, then "it will not seem strange that men of leisure and curiosity should lay themselves out in fruitless disquisitions without descending to the particular parts of life, or informing themselves in the more necessary and important parts of knowledge."

The university in which the spirit of research does not pervade the atmosphere bears a relation to the students similar to that of the nursery maids to the children playing on the beach, always within call of guardians, ever ready to emphasize the danger of young people venturing beyond their depth. The desire to enter deep water is more quickly aroused by watching expert swimmers than by reading dissertations on the art of swimming. Youth rebels at the needless restraints imposed by authority, and as an education is generally only the summons bidding it listen with becoming humility to the commands of the fathers, those in authority should recognize that the assumed indifference of undergraduates to the claims of the intellectual world is often merely a protective form of reaction. Instead of repressing healthy instincts, why should not students be encouraged to believe that it is possible for them to advance the bounds of
our present store of knowledge? The consciousness of leading in the procession always awakens stronger impulses and deeper interests than can be expected to develop in students who in all their mental excursions have been trained like the participants in the parade of a young ladies' boarding-school, to submissively follow the teacher.

The healthy, inspiring and contagious spirit of independence of the modern investigator, recalling that of the old Vikings with their uncontrollable desire to sail over unknown seas, should be fostered by our universities. The presence in these institutions of a large corps of investigators, each led by a dominating interest in his special problems, is the sanest and safest method by which to combat "commercialism," create idealism and give undergraduates an intelligent appreciation of the pleasures of student life. "Words are feminine, deeds masculine," says the old Italian proverb. The patience of youth has been severely overtaxed by the length and number of the sermons to which it has been forced to listen. To-day the American university has a wonderful opportunity to teach by example. By making the encouragement of productive scholarship a primary and not a secondary duty students may be led to realize that an intelligent, normal interest in any subject is inseparably connected with the desire for progress.

The index of the healthy physical and mental life of a great university is measured by the number and activities of its teachers and students who are actually engaged in productive scholarship.

During the period when trustees and regents have been more keenly interested than ever before in discussing the question as to whether the ideals of the high school and college should or should not dominate the policy of the university, two great foundations, the Carnegie and
Rockefeller Institutions, have been dedicated to the advancement of learning. Gradually the real significance of their independent existences is becoming more and more apparent to those persons who are competent to form an opinion upon the nature and scope of university problems. The American university to-day is an institution devoted primarily to teaching, while its assumed right to the title of a seat of learning is still open to question. Will the old bottles hold the new wine? If they do not, then the intelligent interest of a rapidly increasing number of American citizens, competent to distinguish the essential differences between collegiate and university ideals, will within a few years provide the means for the establishment of "higher institutions of learning."
VIII. PROFESSORIAL ETHICS

By John Jay Chapman,
New York

Published in Science, July 1, 1910

When I was at a university as an undergraduate—I will not say how many years ago—I received one morning a visit from a friend who was an upper classman; for, as I remember it, I was a freshman at the time. My friend brought a petition and wished to interest me in the case of a tutor or assistant professor, a great favorite with the college boys, who was about to be summarily dismissed. There were, to be sure, vague charges against him of incompetence and insubordination; but of the basis of these charges his partisans knew little. They only felt that one of the bright spots in undergraduate life surrounded this same tutor; they liked him and they valued his teaching. I remember no more about this episode, nor do I even remember whether I signed the petition or not. The only thing I very clearly recall is the outcome: the tutor was dismissed.

Twice or thrice again during my undergraduate life did the same thing happen—a flurry among the students, a remonstrance much too late, against a deed of apparent injustice, a cry in the night, and then silence. Now had I known more about the world I should have understood that these nocturnal disturbances were signs of the times, that what we had heard in all these cases was the operation of the guillotine which exists in every American institution of learning, and runs fast or slow according to the progress of the times. The thing that a little astonished the undergraduate at the time was that in
almost every case of summary decapitation the victim was an educated gentleman. And this was not because no other kind of man could be found in the faculty. It seemed as if some whimsical fatality hung over the professorial career of any ingenuous gentleman who was by nature a scholar of the charming old-fashioned kind.

Youth grieves not long over mysterious injustice, and it never occurred to me till many years afterwards that there was any logical connection between one and another of all these judicial murders which used to claim a passing tear from the undergraduates when I was in college. It is only since giving some thought to recent educational conditions in America that I have understood what was then happening, and why it was that a scholar could hardly live in an American university.

In America, society has been reorganized since 1870; old universities have been totally changed and many new ones founded. The money to do this has come from the business world. The men chosen to do the work have been chosen by the business world. Of a truth, it must needs be that offenses come; but woe be unto him through whom the offense cometh. As the boss has been the tool of business men in politics, so the college president has been his agent in education. The colleges during this epoch have each had a "policy" and a directorate. They have been manned and commissioned for a certain kind of service as you might man a fishing-smack to catch herring. There has been so much necessary business—the business of expanding and planning, of adopting and remodeling—that there has been no time for education. Some big deal has always been pending in each college—some consolidation of departments, some annexation of a new world—something so momentous as to make private opinion a nuisance. In this regard the colleges resembled everything else in America. The colleges have simply
not been different from the rest of American life. Let a man express an opinion at a party caucus, or at a railroad directors’ meeting, or at a college faculty meeting, and he will find that he is speaking against a predetermined force. What shall we do with such a fellow? Well, if he is old and distinguished, you may suffer him to have his say and then over-ride him. But if he is young, energetic and likely to give more trouble, you must eject him with as little fuss as the circumstances will permit.

The educated man has been the grain of sand in the college machine. He has a horizon of what “ought to be,” and he could not help putting in a word and an idea in the wrong place; and so he was thrown out of education in America exactly as he was thrown out of politics in America. I am here speaking about the great general trend of influences since 1870, influences which have been checked in recent years, checked in politics, checked in education, but which it is necessary to understand if we would understand present conditions in education. The men who, during this era, have been chosen to become college presidents have, as a rule, begun life with the ambition of scholars; but their talents for affairs have been developed at the expense of their taste for learning, and they have become hard men. As toward their faculties they have been autocrats, because the age has demanded autocracy here; as toward the millionaire they have been sycophants, because the age has demanded sycophancy here. Meanwhile these same college presidents represent learning to the imagination of the millionaire and to the imagination of the great public. The ignorant millionaire must trust somebody; and whom he trusts he rules. Now if we go one step further in the reasoning and discover that the millionaire himself has a somewhat exaggerated reverence for the opinions of the
great public, we shall see that this whole matter is a
coil of influence emanating from the great public and
winding up—and generally winding up very tight—about
the necks of our college faculties and of our professional
scholars. The millionaire and the college president are
simply middle men, who transmit the pressure from the
average citizen to the learned classes. What the average
citizen desires to have done in education gets itself ac-
complished, though the process should involve the ex-
tinction of the race of educated gentlemen. The prob-
lem before us in America is the unwinding of this "knot
intrinsicate" into which our education has become tied,
the unwinding of this boa-constrictor of ignorant public
opinion which has been strangling and, to some extent,
is still strangling our scholars.

I have no categorical solution of the problem, nor do
I, to tell the truth, put an absolute faith in any analysis
of social forces, even of my own. If I point out one of
the strands in the knot as the best strand to begin work
on, it is with the consciousness that there are no doubt
other effectual ways of working, and other ways of feel-
ing about the matter that are more profound.

The natural custodians of education in any age are the
learned men of the land, including the professors and
schoolmasters. Now these men have, at the present time,
in America no conception of their responsibility. They
are docile under the rule of the promoting college presi-
dent, and they have a theory of their own function which
debars them from militant activity. The average pro-
fessor in an American college will look on at an act of
injustice done to a brother professor by their college
president with the same unconcern as the rabbit who is
not attacked watches the ferret pursue his brother up
and down through the warren to predestinate and hor-
rible death. We know, of course, that it would cost the
non-attacked rabbit his place to express sympathy for the martyr; and the non-attacked is poor, and has offspring, and hopes of advancement. The non-attacked rabbit would, of course, become a suspect, and a marked man the moment he lifted up his voice in defense of rabbit-rights. Such personal sacrifice seems to be the price paid in this world for doing good of any kind. I am not, however, here raising the question of general ethics; I refer to the philosophical belief, to the special theory of professorial ethics which forbids a professor to protect his colleague. I invite controversy on this subject; for I should like to know what the professors of the country have to say on it. It seems to me that there exists a special prohibitory code, which prevents the college professor from using his reason and his pen as actively as he ought in protecting himself, in pushing his interests and in enlightening the community about our educational abuses. The professor in America seems to think that self-respect requires silence and discretion on his part. He thinks that by nursing this gigantic reverence for the idea of professordom, such reverence will, somehow, be extended all over society, till the professor becomes a creature of power, of public notoriety, of independent reputation as he is in Germany. In the meantime, the professor is trampled upon, his interests are ignored, he is overworked and underpaid, he is of small social consequence, he is kept at menial employments and the leisure to do good work is denied him. A change is certainly needed in all of these aspects of the American professors' life. My own opinion is that this change can only come about through the enlightenment of the great public. The public must be appealed to by the professor himself in all ways and upon all occasions. The professor must teach the nation to respect learning; he must make the nation understand the function and the
rights of the learned classes. He must do this through a willingness to speak and to fight for himself. In Germany there is a great public of highly educated, nay of deeply and variously learned people whose very existence secures pay, protection and reverence for the scholar. The same is true in France, England and Italy.

It is the public that protects the professor in Europe. The public alone can protect the professor in America. The proof of this is that any individual learned man in America who becomes known to the public through his books or his discoveries, or through his activity in any field of learning or research, is comparatively safe from the guillotine. His position has at least some security, his word some authority. This man has educated the public that trusts him, and he can now protect his more defenseless brethren if he will. I have often wondered, when listening to the sickening tale of some brutality done by a practical college president to a young instructor, how it had been possible for the eminent men upon the faculty to sit through the operation without a protest. A word from any one of them would have stopped the sacrifice and protected learning from the oppressor. But no, these eminent men harbored ethical conceptions which kept them from interfering with the practical running of the college. Merciful heavens! who is to run a college if not learned men? Our colleges have been handled by men whose ideals were as remote from scholarship as the ideals of the New York theatrical managers are remote from poetry. In the meanwhile, the scholars have been dumb and reticent.

At the back of all these phenomena we have, as I have said, the general atmospheric ignorance of the great public in America. We are so used to this public, so immersed in it, so much a part of it ourselves, that we are hardly able to gain any conception of what that
atmospheric ignorance is like. I will give an illustration which would perhaps never have occurred to my mind except through the accident of actual experience. If you desire a clue to the American character in the matter of the higher education, you may find one in becoming a school trustee in any country district where the children taught are the children of farmers. The contract with any country school-teacher provides that he shall teach for so many weeks upon such and such conditions. Now let us suppose a teacher of genius to obtain the post. He not only teaches admirably, but he institutes school gardens for the children; he takes long walks with the boys and gives them the rudiments of geology. He is in himself an uplifting moral influence and introduces the children into a whole new world of idea and of feeling. The parents are pleased. I will not say that they are grateful; but they are not ungrateful. It is true that they secretly believe all this botany and moral influence to be rubbish; but they tolerate it. Now, let us suppose that before the year is out the teacher falls sick and loses two weeks of school time through absence. You will find that the trustees insist upon his making up this lost time: the contract calls for it. This seems like a mean and petty exaction for these parents to impose upon a saint who has blessed their children unto the third and fourth generation by his presence among them. But let us not judge hastily. This strange exaction does not result so much from the meanness of the parents as from their intellectual limitations. To these parents the hours passed in school are schooling; the rest does not count. The rest may be pleasant and valuable, but it is not education.

In the same way, the professional and business classes in America do not see any point in paying salaries to professors who are to make researches or write books,
or think beautiful thoughts. The influence which an eminent man sheds about him by his very existence, the change in tone that comes over a rude person through his once seeing the face of a scholar, the illumination of a young character through contact with its own ideals—such things are beyond the ken of the average American citizen to-day. To him they are fables, to him they are foolishness. The parent of our college lad is a farmer compared with the parent of the European lad.

The parent regards himself as an enlightened being—yet he has not, in these matters, an inkling of what enlightenment is. Now, the intelligence of that parent must be reached; and the learned classes must do the work of reaching it. The fathers of the christian church made war with book and speech on paganism. The leaders of the reformation went out among the people and made converts. The patriots of the American revolution—nay, the fathers of modern science, Tyndall, Huxley, Louis Agassiz, Helmholtz—wrote popular books and sought to interest and educate the public by direct contact. Then let the later-coming followers in learning imitate this popular activity of the old leaders; we need a host of battlers for the cause.

For whom do these universities exist, after all? Is it not for the people at large? Are not the people the ultimate beneficiaries? Then why should the people not be immediately instructed in such manner as will lead to their supporting true universities? It is hard to say why our professors are so timid. Perhaps too great a specialization in their own education has left them helpless as all-around fighters. But the deeper reason seems to be a moral one; they think such activity is beneath them. It is not beneath them. Whatever be a man’s calling, it is not beneath him to make a fight for the truth. As for a professor’s belonging to a mystic guild,
no man's spiritual force is either increased or diminished by the name he calls his profession. Learning is their cause, and every honest means to promote learning should be within their duty. Nor does duty alone make this call to publicity. Ambition joins in it—the legitimate personal ambition of making one's mind and character felt in the world. This blow once struck means honor, and security of tenure in office, and public power.

In fine, the scholars should take the public into their confidence and dominate the business men on our college boards. This will be found more easy than at first appears, because the money element, the millionaire element, is very sensitive to public feeling, and once the millionaire succumbs, the college president will succumb also. The step beyond this would consist in the scholars taking charge of the college themselves, merely making use of certain business men on their boards for purposes of financial administration.
IX. CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN TRUSTEES AND FACULTY

BY JAMES P. MUNROE,
BOSTON, MASS.

Address to the Conference of Trustees of American Colleges and Universities, at the University of Illinois, October 17, 1905. Published in Science, December 29, 1905

I venture to speak upon the topic: "Closer Relations between Trustees and Faculty" because I am in this respect hermaphroditic. I have seen service upon both college bodies and, moreover, have studied certain problems of public school administration which present many points of analogy. I speak, however, with only that half-knowledge which we of the east, unfamiliar with state-supported universities, bring to the important questions of this conference.

It is a common cry that teachers—whether in colleges or in schools—are underpaid; and the complaint (especially if one has been a school official) seems amply justified. The imperative need of our American college faculties, however, is not higher salaries; it is larger professional authority and more genuine freedom. Those attained, the wage question will take care of itself. It is true that teaching offers no such money prizes as does law or medicine; nevertheless, the average professor or schoolmaster is in many ways better situated than the average lawyer or physician. Despite this patent fact, the number of youth who deliberately prepare themselves to be teachers, by years of serious study, is comparatively small. Young men of power and ambition scorn what should be reckoned the noblest of professions, not because that profession condemns them to poverty, but because
it dooms them to a sort of servitude. The American lawyer or physician is subject only to the judgment of his peers—that is, to the well-established code of his profession. The American teacher, on the contrary, especially in the public schools, is not only subject to—he is often wholly at the mercy of—unsympathetic laymen.

This condition is inherent in the American system of education, and neither can nor should be wholly abrogated. The teacher serves the public (for even an endowed college is a public institution) and must rest, therefore, under some of a servant's disabilities. Yet, without impairing the proper powers of school or college trustees, it is possible, I believe, to give teachers—or rather to restore to them—so much of authority, dignity and independence as shall raise teaching to the professional status of the law—to a position, that is, where it will commend itself to the most ambitious and the best-trained youth.

The medieval universities, as you know, were preeminently nurseries and citadels of intellectual freedom and political democracy. They were "essentially federated republics, the government of which pertained either to the whole body of the masters . . . or to the whole body of the students." Moreover, "what slight subordination did exist was, in the beginning, to the ecclesiastical and, later, to the civil power." The American universities, also, from the frontier college of Harvard, in 1636, to the latest frontier (if there now is any such place) college of the plains—have been strongholds of intellectual freedom; but in their administration they have been profoundly subordinate, in the early days to the ecclesiastical, and later—directly or indirectly—to the civil power.

This subordination, under the stress of circumstances, has progressed until, as President Pritchett points out in
a recent admirable address, the American university has become an autocracy, wholly foreign in spirit and plan to our political ideals and little short of amazing to those models of thoroughgoing democracy, the German universities. And this absolutism of the American university is not, as in the days of the scholastics, an autocracy of teachers and scholars; it is an autocracy of ecclesiastical or lay trustees. Whence has arisen this astonishing inversion? Why does the very fountain of our higher life present this paradox? Mainly, I think, because the European universities grew from within, while those of this country have been established from without. The old theocracy of New England, the younger democracies of her splendid daughters, created colleges to fit youth for service in church or commonwealth, and they placed over them men of notable authority. In the east, the hands of both church and state have been largely withdrawn; but in their place have appeared the dead or living hands of donors demanding that their gifts be safeguarded by stable and substantially irremovable trustees. College and public school funds are no less sacred than they are colossal; and those who administer them assume high legal as well as moral responsibility. But this large liability has been more than balanced by the gift of almost absolute powers—powers surpassing, perhaps, those of any other bodies. I do not know how it is here; but in Massachusetts the school boards are virtually despotic, far transcending in authority those sturdy democrats, their parent town meetings.

Excepting those strictly denominational, the balance of the extraordinary legal powers given to college trustees has gradually passed from the hands of the clergy into those of laymen chosen, as a rule, for their standing as financiers rather than as educators. From many aspects
this has been a salutary change; but there has followed from it one signal disadvantage—that of putting the trustees more and more out of touch with the faculties whose members they appoint. Although the reverend gentlemen of those antique college boards could scarcely have distinguished a government bond from a wildcat stock, they were usually scholars by inclination and teachers by profession, and their relations with their faculties were close and sympathetic; while the modern financier who, by skillful investing, secures every possible penny of income for his college, generally finds its educational problems quite outside his range, and sees, therefore, less and less occasion for meeting, or even knowing, that faculty over which, legally, his power is of life and death.

This change in personnel, however, is not alone responsible for the progressive alienation between trustees and faculty. That estrangement has come about no less, through the rapid growth of college curriculums and in college attendance. When educational institutions were small and their courses of study undifferentiated, it was possible for trustees, even though not trained as teachers, to acquire an admirable education (so far as concerned their own college) through intimate relations with the faculty and personal supervision of their work. But with the enormous development in numbers and complexity, this old-fashioned contact between trustees and teachers has become impossible, and, at best, a trustee can now make himself familiar with only that department of the university which it is his duty (more honored in the breach than in the observance) to inspect. Therefore, the modern trustee has gradually withdrawn from the teaching side of the college to fix his attention upon those questions of revenue, housing and legislation which have multiplied even faster than the undergraduates.
But here again the size and complexity of the problem are appalling to men already over-weighted with other responsibilities. These material questions, however, must be met and settled just as those on the educational side must be faced and solved. And both business and political experience have taught men of the world that the quickest and least troublesome way to solve administrative problems is to give as free a hand as possible to some man with brains, with tact, with power of initiative, of leadership and of persuasion—with, in short, those peculiar abilities which distinguish the generals of our intricate twentieth-century enterprises.

Hence has arisen the modern college president—a being as different from the awe-inspiring clergymen of the eighteenth century or from such men as Josiah Quincy (who was given the presidency of Harvard as a sort of haven for his declining years) as it is possible to imagine. The modern executives have had thrust upon them powers which give to their decrees the finality of an imperial ukase. They have assumed such sway, not from love of dominion, but because their task is so enormous that nothing short of practically plenary powers would permit of its being done at all. And it should be said to their honor that they have met the demands upon them as organizers and administrators so ably that, to-day, the leaders of the country are not, as formerly, the great statesmen and clergymen; they are these modern Cæsars—the heads of our principal colleges and universities.

These modern presidents have their cabinets in the board of trustees (if that board be small) or in an executive committee selected from it if the board be large; they have their staff in the several administrative officers, such as deans and registrars; they have their field officers in the heads of departments or courses; and the work of the great machine, through committees, subcommittees,
labor-saving devices and automatic methods of reporting, is as smooth-running (and sometimes, I fear, almost as impersonal) as a well-developed mercantile establishment. We have here a conspicuous example of the current tendency towards one-man power, towards that concentration of authority which makes, of course, for ease, rapidity and sureness of administration; but which, in politics, undermines manhood; in industrialism, destroys initiative; and in education tends to defeat the very object of teaching, which should be to develop and make the most of every man's individuality. If the goal of a college were the giving of mere instruction, nothing could be better than the present system of administration; but colleges should be fountains of true education, and the best part of education comes through the personal influence of the older governors and teachers upon adolescent, and therefore highly impressionable, youth.

Most modern colleges have expensive and excellent material plants utilized substantially to their full capacity. They possess, also, admirable executives who, as I have said, are used away beyond their limits of endurance. But those colleges have also other educational forces which are not availed of, in my opinion, to anything like their normal maximum. Those less-used forces are: (1) The personal influence, as teachers and men (not as mere administrators) of the leaders of the faculty—an influence which should be exerted upon both students and trustees; (2) the personal influence, as men of power and broad human experience (not as mere money-holders) of the trustees—an influence which should extend to students as well as faculty; and (3) the perennial and unselfish loyalty of the alumni, together with the unique experience given to those graduates in gauging their collegiate training by the tests of life. The third force is beyond the scope of the present paper; but let it not be
inferred, therefore, that I regard it as any less potent than the other two. Indeed, in the last analysis, the moral as well as the financial strength of a college must come from its own sons.

As has already been suggested, the complexity and autocracy of the American university have converted the strongest men of the faculty—the men, therefore, whose personal influence upon the students would be of the highest value—into subordinate administrators harassed with details of department maintenance and committee attendance. As a necessary result, the teaching is put largely into the hands of recently graduated youth, zealous but not always wise, untrained in the science and art of teaching, and quite incapable, of course, of giving to their classes the inspiration which comes from contact with men of wide experience. This throws the severest strain of the college upon the weakest part, and from it arises much of our educational ineffectiveness. Mere information, lesson-hearing, examinations, become paramount; scholarship and character are well-nigh forgotten, being impossible to register by even the most elaborate machinery.

The trustees, on the other hand—excepting those who constitute the president’s cabinet—find less and less opportunity for usefulness in a machine so elaborate that any incursion into it, by those unfamiliar, may do infinite harm. Therefore most of them drift into the belief that their trust is discharged by attendance upon stated meetings and by, perhaps, an annual visit to that department which, nominally, is their especial care. Yet the personal influence upon the students of men like college trustees would be second only, in educational value, to that of the leading members of the faculty. I am not prepared to suggest any plan by which the trustees can be brought into direct personal relations with the students; but I
firmly believe that such a plan could be devised; and I know that nothing so vivifies a man of middle life and of large responsibilities, nothing so clears his brain and rejuvenates his heart, as comradeship with bubbling and eager undergraduates.

Whether or not trustees can broaden their powers and sweeten their responsibilities by thus meeting their students directly, it is clear that they can influence them indirectly by establishing closer relations with those young men's teachers. For their pupils' sakes and for their own advantage, the professors need the stimulus and the breadth of view which they would get from looking at the world through the eyes of such a man of affairs as the usual trustee; those trustees, on the other hand, need the insight into true education and into the difficulties of training youth which they would secure from intimate contact with the members of their faculty. The money conservatism of the trustee, hesitating to grant funds for new enterprises, needs to be enlightened by the vision which the teacher has of the demands and possibilities of higher education. Per contra, the academic conservatism of the scholar needs to be quickened by the hard world-experience of a man of more varied responsibilities. That purblind vision of the "practical" man which exaggerates material success requires enlightenment through the opposite, but no less purblind, vision of the scholar which magnifies intellectual achievement. Each point of view is essential to the ends of true education, and unless each in authority can see and understand the other's outlook, the university will suffer and its youth will be defrauded of some of the best things in college.

At present—except for certain perfunctory visiting—almost the sole point of contact between trustees and faculty is their common sovereign, the president, who, as
I have tried to show, has administrative duties and responsibilities beyond normal powers. Moreover, however conscientious he may be, his personal equation cannot but enter into his interpretations—so to speak—between two bodies of which he alone is a common factor. It is essential to his leadership that he should have large powers over the teaching staff, but the opinions of the most perfect of administrators as to the individuals under his benevolent despotism should have the salutary check of others' close and unbiased observations.

In order, therefore, that there may be many instead of only one channel of understanding between trustees and faculty (as well as for the more subtle reasons suggested earlier), I would advocate most earnestly the creation in every board of trustees of a new standing committee. This committee should be most carefully chosen, and its duty should be to confer, at stated and frequent intervals, with a like standing committee of the faculty, selected freely by that body itself. And I would advise, further, that this conference committee be distinct, if possible, from that executive committee which I have called the president's cabinet, and that no legislation of any consequence should be passed by the executive committee or by the trustees as a whole without the concurrence of this joint committee. And—at least so far as relates to questions having any educational bearing—I would have it understood that the joint committee should not concur until the proposed action had been submitted to the faculty as a whole, had been debated, if so desired, before the standing committee and the executive committee sitting in joint session, and had been approved by at least a majority of the teaching staff.

Such a general plan as this (the details of which, needless to say, would differ with each college) could not fail, it seems to me, to increase the educational efficiency of a
college to an extraordinary degree, by coordinating the views of those without and those within the daily routine of teaching; by establishing a clear understanding, in each body, of the other's problems; by relieving the executive of a substantial portion of his crushing load, through increasing the legislative and administrative responsibility of the faculty; and, not least, by making that faculty—without adding to its legal powers—a body coordinate with, instead of subordinate to, the board of trustees. Unless American college teachers can be assured by some such change as this that they are no longer to be looked upon as mere employees paid to do the bidding of men who, however courteous or however eminent, have not the faculty's professional knowledge of the complicated problems of education, our universities will suffer increasingly from a dearth of strong men and teaching will remain outside the pale of the really learned professions. As I said in the beginning, the problem is not one of wages; for no university can ever become rich enough to buy the independence of any man who is really worth the purchasing.

This plan of cooperation would not, however, except to a limited degree, bring the trustees as men into close contact with the faculty as men. And the plan which I offer towards that second aim is put forward with much greater diffidence. The scheme of a joint standing committee would be productive, I feel certain, of the most happy results; but of my minor proposition I am not so sure. This second plan is to make every member of the board of trustees an administrative officer in that branch of the college work (so far as possible) which is most congenial to him, giving him no special individual powers over his assigned department, but increasing his responsibilities by making him—together with one or more of his colleagues—the direct and responsible channel of
information between that department and the whole board of trustees. It is already customary in most colleges to create visiting committees with the duty of presenting annual reports; my suggestion would make substance out of what is now little more than shadow, by having it formally understood that in all matters relating to his department the trustee would be looked to for reliable information and responsible advice.

Difficulties, of course, stand thick in the way of such a project. Among them are the unwillingness of already busy trustees to accept further responsibilities, the danger of personal friction between the trustee and the department head, and the natural fear on the part of the teacher that "administration" might spell itself to the trustee as mere officiousness. It seems to me, however, that a short acquaintance with the minutiae of a college department would show the trustee that the professor's as well as his own time is far too valuable to be given to details of administration, and that college funds could in no way be made more productive than by giving the heads of departments such clerks and underlings as would release them from much killing drudgery. There is no greater extravagance than to permit an expensively trained man to do ten-dollar-a-week work. And that same short acquaintance would, I believe, so interest the trustee and so increase his respect for what is being done and what is still to do, that officiousness or meddling would become impossible.

These two plans, if found practicable and if developed in a spirit of enthusiasm, would lead to many other points of helpful contact between trustees and faculty and would discover, I think, unsuspected avenues of mutual help. And by these or some like methods trustees and faculties must be brought more closely together unless we wish to see the growing alienation of the administrative and
teaching staffs develop into a real and fatal breach. Separation involves mutual misunderstanding and that, even among educated men, leads, as in industrial enterprises, to arrogance on the part of the employer, to suspicion and dislike on the side of the employed. If cooperation seems imperative—as I think it does—to the solution of the problems of industrialism, how much more necessary is it if we are to solve the educational riddle. Cooperation would teach the trustees the antipodal difference between the problems of a university and those of a business corporation, and, at the same time, would show the faculty the importance of business methods and thorough organization. Cooperation would get things done without compelling our universities to take refuge in an autocracy which, harmful in itself, is breeding a race of youth who scorn the slow methods of democracy. It would develop trustees who actually, instead of fictitiously, comprehend and apprehend their trust; it would unite faculties which, under the strain of departmental complexity, are fast disintegrating; it would double the educational efficiency of our colleges; and, most important of all, it would make our universities, as they ought to be, supreme preservers, instead of conspicuous destroyers, of that genuine spirit of democracy which, more than schools, more than churches, more than any other human agency, has uplifted mankind and built civilization.
X. FACULTY PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSITY GOVERNMENT

BY JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN,
CORNELL UNIVERSITY

From the Annual Report for 1912 of the President to the Trustees of Cornell University. Published in Science, November 22, 1912

The present government of American universities and colleges is altogether anomalous. The president and trustees hold the reins of power and exercise supreme control, while the professors are legally in the position of employees of the corporation. In the best institutions, however, it should be explicitly recognized that the status of the professors is in practice a good deal better than could be claimed as a matter of mere legal right. In the first place, the professors hold office for life or during good behavior or till the arrival of the age for superannuation with a reasonable pension. And in the second place, in the best American universities all educational matters have been either formally or by tacit consent delegated by the trustees to the faculties for authorization and final disposition. The place of the faculty as the sole educational authority of the university may be considered established, even though in some reputable universities the board of trustees reserves the right of veto or revision. Certainly in Cornell University the supremacy of the faculty in all educational matters has been maintained for a score of years, and professorial tenure of office is permanent and secure. Furthermore, the right to absolute freedom of thought and speech for all members of the faculty has been vigorously asserted and constantly enjoyed.
It should, therefore, at the outset be candidly acknowledged that a professor who enjoys a life-tenure of office, who is absolutely free to think and speak and write what he believes to be the truth, and who is a member of a body which controls the educational administration of the university, is already in possession and enjoyment of the highest, best and most vital things which inhere in his calling and function. Yet while all this is true the professor may be dissatisfied with the other conditions under which he is compelled to do his work. And that is undoubtedly the case in America.

Compare the American professor with the scholars and scientists of Oxford and Cambridge. They are their own boards of trustees. The legal corporation of an Oxford or Cambridge college is composed of the head (president, master, or whatever other name may be given to him) and the fellows, who are the teachers of the institution; and this body fills all vacancies by cooptation. Again in the two universities with which these self-governing colleges are connected there is a similar exercise of authority by the professors, and if it is not so complete that is only because it is shared by the non-resident Masters of Arts.

Look again at a German university. The state furnishes the funds for its maintenance and development, but, subject to the very light touch of a minister of education, the government of the university is in the hands of the faculty.

What the American professor wants is the same status, the same authority, the same participation in the government of his university as his colleague in England, in Germany and in other European countries already enjoys. He chafes at being under a board of trustees which in his most critical moods he feels to be alien to the Republic of Science and Letters. Even in his kindliest moods he can
not think that board representative of the university. For the university is an intellectual organization, composed essentially of devotees of knowledge—some investigating, some communicating, some acquiring—but all dedicated to the intellectual life. To this essential fact the American professor wants the government of his university to conform. And he criticizes presidents and boards of trustees because under the existing plan of government they obstruct the realization of this ideal—nay, worse, actually set up and maintain an alien ideal, the ideal of a business corporation engaging professors as employees and controlling them by means of authority which is exercised either directly by "busybody trustees" or indirectly through delegation or usurpation by a "presidential boss."

What is needed in American universities to-day is a new application of the principle of representative government. The faculty is essentially the university; yet in the governing boards of American universities the faculty is without representation. The only ultimately satisfactory solution of the problem of the government of American universities is the concession to the professoriate of representation in the board of trustees or regents and these representatives of the intellectual, which is the real life of the university, must not be mere ornamental figures; they should be granted an active share in the routine administration of the institution.

How could such a reform be carried out in Cornell University? The board of trustees of Cornell University is a genuinely representative body. That is, it represents everybody but the faculty. The state of New York is represented by the governor and other ex-officio trustees and also (since the recent amendment of the charter) by trustees appointed by the governor with the advice and con-
sent of the senate. The alumni are represented by trustees whom they themselves elect, and in June last a woman was, happily, once more elected as one of the alumni trustees. And, apart from alumni and state, the general public is represented by the trustees—half of the entire body if the ex-officio trustees be not counted—whom the board itself elects presumably from citizens who are especially concerned for the promotion of higher education or who are particularly interested in Cornell University. The trustees thus elected by cooptation number three annually; and it is the custom to reelect these trustees when their terms expire.

Now in case of the death or resignation of one of these cooptatively elected trustees, the board might, without any change in the charter, ask the professoriate to select a candidate for the vacant position and then formally elect the candidate thus recommended. This process might be repeated till the professors had designated one third of the trustees now elected by the board, and thereafter professorial representation might remain in that ratio.

For the purpose of such representation it would probably be wise and expedient to divide the professorial electorate into groups each of which should elect one trustee. Only full professors would have the suffrage as only full professors hold permanent appointments. The full professors in the graduate school might constitute one electoral group, to fill (say) the first trusteeship assigned to the professoriate. The second electoral group might be composed of the full professors of arts and of law, and the third of the full professors of science and of medicine (in Ithaca). The full professors in the two engineering colleges and in architecture would naturally form a fourth electoral group, and those in the two state colleges—agriculture and veterinary medicine—a fifth. The med-
ical college in New York City would furnish the sixth electoral group, but the number of professors entitled to vote should perhaps be limited to those who give their entire time to the work of the institution or those who are heads of the more important departments.

This plan would give the professors a share in the government of the university through the voice and vote of their own elected representatives, who (unless an unalterable state law forbids) should preferably be members of the faculty. But this injection of professorial trustees into the board would be a somewhat slow process, if, as is here recommended, it took effect only when vacancies occurred by death or resignation in trusteeships now filled by cooption of the board. There is, however, another measure of relief which could and should be forthwith adopted, and which should continue in operation whether the privilege of representation in the board of trustees be conceded or denied to the professoriate.

While the faculties of the university control educational affairs they have, under the statutes, nothing to do with the appointment of teachers, the appropriation of funds, or other business vitally connected with the life and work of the institution or the standing and efficiency of the several departments. Here, again, it is true that practise is more considerate than theory or ordinance. For in case of appointments the president makes no nominations to the board without previous conference and practical agreement with the professors in the department or allied departments concerned. The time, however, has now arrived to codify this practise and establish it as a matter of professorial right. And at the same time the right of the professors to share in other ways in the government and administration of the faculties or colleges to which they belong, and so far as practicable of the entire university itself, needs to be specifically recognized and formally confirmed.
Towards this goal the university has been gradually tending for some years past. There may not have been a distinct consciousness of it in the general mind of the academic community, but there has been a vague yearning against a background of dissatisfaction and a foreground of hope. The situation will be brought to the consciousness of itself and crystallized in and through the idea and program of professorial participation in the management and control of the university.

The plan to be proposed has the fundamental merit of every salutary reform: it is the modification and extension of an idea and organization already in successful operation. Professors sit, deliberate and vote with the trustees in the administrative boards and councils (as they are called) which manage the affairs of the university library and of the medical college in New York. The professors are elected by their colleagues for a term of two or three years, and the trustees are similarly chosen by the board of trustees. Under the statute creating these councils they are merely advisory bodies whose resolutions come as recommendations to the board of trustees or to the executive committee, but in practise these recommendations of the men selected by the board and by the faculty to keep in intimate touch with the affairs of those great departments of the university and to dispose of them in the combined light of business and educational experience, are regarded by the board as expressions of the highest wisdom available under the circumstances and are regularly approved or, if not approved at once, merely referred back in special cases for further consideration in view of some new contingency or some unforeseen bearing upon the general policy of the university.

The council of the medical college in New York City consists of the president of the university, who is ex-officio
chairman, three trustees elected by the board for a term of three years, and the dean of the medical faculty and two professors elected by that faculty, for a term of two years.

The president recommends that a council of substantially this type be as soon as possible established for every college in Cornell University (except the state colleges for which councils composed exclusively of trustees have already been organized): Whether the professorial members of the council outnumber, or are outnumbered by, the trustee members is not a matter of any consequence if only it be understood that this is a scheme devolving genuine responsibility upon the professors for the administration and government of their collegiate unit of the university. If these councils are in practice to be as independent of the executive committee, and even of the full board, as the medical college council in New York City, it will probably be found necessary to allocate annually fixed portions of the income of the university to the different colleges. And with the existing distribution of funds as basis this assignment should not be an impossible task.

This is a plan of partnership between trustees and professors for the government and administration of the university. It is not the German system, which has no board of trustees, nor the English system, in which the professors are the corporation, but it is a modification of the American system in which the trustees voluntarily invest the professors with a share of their own powers and functions (devolving on them corresponding responsibilities), and guarantee them the maximum of authority, independence and institutional control which seems compatible with the American idea of university organization and government.

To these councils would be assigned the duty of dealing
with all business of every kind affecting the several colleges. Whatever business now comes before the executive committee or the board of trustees affecting Sibley College or the College of Arts and Sciences or any other college of the university would be taken up by the appropriate council and settled in the form of resolutions which would be sent to the trustees for final approval and ratification. In time the councils would undoubtedly be empowered by the board of trustees to dispose definitely of routine business and minor affairs, reporting only their action to the trustees. But at the outset it seems wise to follow in this respect the example already established by the council of the medical college.

There are, however, two deviations which should be made from that model, if it is to be used in Ithaca, and which indeed experience shows may in time be advantageously adopted in New York. In the first place not only should the term of office of professorial members of the council be limited, but professors should be ineligible for more than one reelection. The object of this restriction is to keep the faculty in general in close touch with the council. And, in the second place, the president should be required (as he is not in the case of the medical college council) to submit all nominations for appointments to the council in order that they may be voted on and the record of the vote sent to the board of trustees. For the reform here discussed involves the surrender of power not only by the trustees but also by the president, the supreme object being to secure (by means of the representative system applied to faculties) effective professorial participation in the administration and government of the university.

The president recommends that the foregoing scheme for taking the professoriate into partnership with the trustees in the government and administration of the uni-
versity by means of college councils composed of representatives of both be adopted by the board of trustees at the earliest practicable date. Some features of the scheme may need modification, but it will be easy to determine what changes are advisable after trustees and professors have got together in councils for the trans- action of the business of the different collegiate units of the university.

A further step in the same direction should also be taken at the present time. Under the existing statutes the deans of the faculties of arts and sciences and of the graduate school are appointed by the board of trustees on the nomination of the president. The faculty has indeed some voice in the matter, for it votes on the nomination of the president and sends the record of its vote to the board of trustees. But the time has arrived when the right of the faculty to select its own chief officer should be recognized and confirmed. The president recommends that the statute be amended so as to invest the faculty with exclusive power in this regard. The faculty would of course report its action to the trustees.
INDEX

Administration, University, and University Ideals, Stewart Paton, 439; Referendum on, 17
Administrative, Peril in Education, Joseph Jastrow, 315; Changes, Need of, in American Universities, George T. Ladd, 349
American, Universities, The Need of Administrative Changes in, George T. Ladd, 349; College Professor, The Status of, John J. Stevenson, 370; Universities, The Government of, J. E. Creighton, 393; University, Concerning the, J. McKeen Cattell, 405; Universities, Externalism in, George M. Stratton, 425
Anonymous Letters, 306
California, Minnesota, Illinois and Missouri, Letters from, 222
Cattell, J. McKeen, University Control, 3; Concerning the American University, 405
Central and Western States, State Institutions in, Letters from, 251; From Private Institutions in, 277
Chapman, John Jay, Professorial Ethics, 453
Chicago, University of, Letters from, 116
Columbia University, Letters from, 92
Cornell University, Letters from, 130
Corporation and the President, 26
Creighton, J. E., The Government of American Universities, 393
Education, Administrative Peril in, Joseph Jastrow, 315
Ethics, Professorial, John Jay Chapman, 453
Externalism in American Universities, George M. Stratton, 425
Faculty, Trustees and, Closer Relations between, James P. Munroe, 462; Participation in University Government, Jacob Gould Schurman, 474
Government, of American Universities, J. E. Creighton, 393; University, Faculty Participation in, Jacob Gould Schurman, 474
Harvard University, Letters from, 65
Historical Retrospect, 3
Ideals, University, and University Administration, Stewart Paton, 439
Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri and California, Letters from, 222
Jastrow, Joseph, The Administrative Peril in Education, 315
Johns Hopkins University, Letters from, 107
Ladd, George T., The Need of Administrative Changes in American Universities, 349
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Letters from, 138
Michigan, University of, Letters from, 213
Middle States, Institutions in the, Letters from, 165
Minnesota, Illinois, Missouri and California, Letters from, 222
Missouri, Minnesota, Illinois and California, Letters from, 222
Munroe, James P., Closer Relations between Trustees and Faculty, 462
New England, Institutions in, Letters from, 146
Paton, Stewart, University Administration and University Ideals, 439

483
INDEX

Pennsylvania, University of, Letters from, 99
President and Corporation, 26
Private Institutions in Central and Western States, Letters from, 251
Professor, Position of, 36; Duties of, 49; The American College, Status
   of, John J. Stevenson, 370
Professorial Ethics, John Jay Chapman, 453
Referendum on Administration, 17
Retrospect, Historical, 3
Schurman, Jacob Gould, Faculty Participation in University Government,
   474
Southern Institutions, Letters from, 188
State Institutions in Central and Western States, Letters from, 251
Stratton, George M., Externalism in American Universities, 425
Stevenson, John J., The Status of the American College Professor, 370
Trustees and Faculty, Closer Relations between, James P. Munroe, 463
University Control, J. McKeen Cattell, 3; Letters on, 85; Articles on, 315
Western and Central States, State Institutions in, Letters from, 251; From
   Private Institutions in, 277
Wisconsin, University of, Letters from, 202
Women, Colleges for, Letters from, 185
Yale University, Letters from, 85

UNIV. OF MICHIGAN,

MAY 6 1913