ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS

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**Politics**

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In offering this translation to the public, I wish to say a few words as to the object with which it was written. When I took private pupils at Oxford, I found that Passmen who read Aristotle’s ‘Politics’ laboured under great disadvantages in comparison with those who read the ‘Ethics.’ The latter possessed an excellent translation in that of Mr. Williams, and a complete edition, with good notes for their purpose, in Mr. Moore’s book. The Passman-student of the ‘Politics’ generally used Mr. Congreve’s edition, in which the most useful notes were not of the kind he needed, and the translation in Mr. Bohn’s series. To help pupils who aimed at taking a Pass degree, I tried to translate for them the work they had to do in a manner at once literal, and not unintelligible when read apart from the Greek context. I soon found that I could not keep pace with my pupils’ work; and as I hoped that others might find useful what was helpful to them, I have, after many interruptions,
completed the books which Passmen take up in their final schools. To obtain success in my object, of combining a literal translation of Aristotle with English that can be read easily as English, soon appeared impossible. I have endeavoured, however, to give the Passmen the best aid in my power, and I hope that even this amount of assistance will induce more men to take up so interesting and profitable a subject as the ‘Politics’ of Aristotle.

In rendering the more difficult passages, I have endeavoured to make out the meaning, if possible, from Aristotle himself, and have not always followed the beaten track. I have found great help in St. Hilaire’s French translation, and many of Congreve’s English notes, besides other works in different languages. In the matter of text, I have found Susemihl’s edition most useful, though the text printed is almost entirely that of Bekker’s second edition, now used in the schools at Oxford.

I must take this opportunity of thanking many friends for kind suggestions and help, especially the Rev. T. L. Papillon, Fellow and Tutor of New College, for his kindness and care in looking over the proofs.

In conclusion, I would only say that no one can
judge of the difficulty of translating Aristotle till he has himself tried to do so. The greatest encouragement that I have found was in the words of a writer in the 'Saturday Review':—

'No one who has not tried such work can know the labour and the thought which often go to the decision of this or that shade of expression: the shade chosen at last is a compromise. A slap-dash reader thinks it clumsy or tame, and would at once put in some more telling phrase, for he has not gone through the difficult and delicate poising of the scales; he does not see that, of many conditions which the translator must regard, the greatest number is satisfied by just this particular word or turn, and could be satisfied by no other, though the general sense might be far more brilliantly expressed.'

W. E. B.

To try to give a brief account of the evolution of Greek Political conditions, and of Aristotle's attitude and method as a student of the philosophy of society, is to labour _νεισὶ ἐν τριτόλῳ_. I have, therefore, sought to introduce some novelty by bringing in a few illustrations from the life of backward races.
I have to thank Mr. Ernest Myers, Fellow of Wadham College, for his kindness in looking through the proof-sheets of my notes.

The quotations from Mr. McLennan's 'Primitive Marriage' are from the first edition, not the new and enlarged 'Studies in Ancient History.'

A. L.
INTRODUCTORY NOTES.

I.

THE 'POLITICS' OF ARISTOTLE.

The Politics of Aristotle have a double value: they contain the first really scientific discussion of the origin, the elements, the constitution, and the conditions of human society, and they are a storehouse of information as to the facts of the history of Greece. It is true that conscious reflection on the different shapes and possible perfect form of the State, on its relations to the Individual, and on its international rights and duties, had been awake in Greece long before the age of Aristotle. The great questions had been propounded and discussed, the terminology had been almost fixed. In the first place had arisen the early Lawgivers, Solon, Charondas, Zaleucus, Philolaus—whom we may call the Judges—and the early mystics, Pythagoras, Apollo's son, Epimenides, the healer of souls, and Empedocles, who were in a sense the Prophets of Hellas. The latter possessed a secret of life, a certain method of conduct, which they inculcated to disciples, who then formed small communities within the cities of Sicily and Italy.
From these mystics Aristotle received, through tradition, many ideas, and, above all, the notion of the power which the lawgiver has to direct the conduct of men to a moral end. From the example of the great Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus, whom the Delphian Pythoness knew not whether to address as God or as mortal, and from the enduring influence which his system of almost monastic discipline exercised on Sparta, Aristotle, like other Greek writers on politics, drew the conclusion that one man of impressive character, backed by the influence of religion, might mould the characters of men to a uniform type. Hence the recurrent idea of the Lawgiver (νομοθέτης) who, with the help of the Delphian oracle, is to fashion the spiritual lives of the citizens towards a given end. Again, the Lawgivers who appear on the horizon of really historical times, such as Solon, had codified and committed to writing the unwritten customs and dooms of early Greece; and the ideas fixed in these customs and dooms, ideas dating from the time when the Chieftain-Priest was a living oracle of law, greatly coloured the political speculations of Aristotle.

After the actual legislators came the amateur theorists, like Phaleas and Hippodamus, who seem to have tried, in a fashion, to buttress the old traditional notions of Greece, with the help of the new rational doctrines, which we connect with the names of the earlier sophists.

Still later appeared the wandering rhetoricians, disturbing the repose of political custom, with arguments drawn from abstract notions about Right, Virtue, Nature, Law, and so forth. These arguments were
popularised by dramatists like Euripides, who made his characters speculate on duty and morality on the stage, and who did for the new democracies what Pindar and Theognis had done for the ancestral aristocracies—gave them poetic texts in support of their ideas. Next Plato, in a variety of dialogues, had sought after some permanent basis for morality, had constructed an ideal state, had discussed almost every difficulty which Aristotle handles, and one may almost say had left, in beautiful scattered fragments, the notions which Aristotle tries to arrange into a scientific body of doctrine. Plato had amplified the teaching of Socrates, and had helped out reason by imagination, by rhetoric, and by the invention of myths, which like the gods in the plays appear whenever there is a *nodus vindice dignus*. Xenophon had discussed the constitution of Sparta with partisan admiration, and had treated of the commercial democracy of Athens, and pointed out the way to make her more wealthy and indolent than ever, with the irony of a man of high birth and education, a soldier and a sportsman. Acquainted, as we may believe, with all or most of these writings, and with the political thought of Thucydides, and not uninfluenced by any of them, Aristotle went to work to build up a philosophy of human society, which should neither depend wholly on old traditional wisdom, nor be a series of empirical maxims, a *moyen de parvenir* in politics, nor rest upon poetic imagination; but should be founded on a collection of facts, and on the teaching of historical experience. Quite
unlike Plato, he determined to discard no institution—as the Family, and Property—which immemorial use approved. He would introduce nothing new, nothing which had to be based on a myth, for he probably perceived that myths had been invented to account for institutions already sacred, and that no new custom could be made sacred by being grounded on an equally new myth. Thus he neither rejects anything dear to men (άγαπητόν) from of old, nor brings in a new áγαπητόν, like the Enthusiasm of Humanity.

II.

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

Before entering on the study of Aristotle's scientific philosophy of the State, it may be well to ask what he meant by his science; and further, whether he was mistaken in thinking that a science of Politics is possible at all. Now if by political science be understood a knowledge of the general laws of human nature, acting in political associations, and of the effects of variable causes, such as the influence of great men, sufficient to enable the philosopher to predict, and if he chooses to alter the development of history, we may say that Aristotle did not consider this science possible, and did not attempt to construct it. If he had made any such pretensions his own failure would be obvious. He lived in an age of slavery, and far from foretelling a day when slavery
should fall into discredit and disuse, he gave it a place among the ‘natural’ institutions of society, such as property and the family, and left it there. He lived in a country of small city states, and in a time when the spirit of these states had departed, when their liberty had well-nigh perished, and he proposed no scheme of union, and looked forward to no such fresh order of things as the Roman Empire, or the national system of modern Europe, or even to such a federation as the Achæan League. Such a new and striking factor in politics as the beginning of the Macedonian Empire seems to attract his attention indeed, but gets no notice in detail. Again, although the military age of Greece was practically past, he did his best to discourage industrial development, and left a stigma on commerce and on credit which still clings to them.

What, then, did Aristotle mean by ἡ πολιτική—political science? What was his idea of its scope, its aim, and its method? In the first place, he gives this science the loftiest rank in the hierarchy of sciences; it is ἡ κυριωτάτη καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονική.¹

Political science takes this lofty place, because the matter which it deals with is the noblest. That matter is the nature of Man, and of Man too in his highest relations, in the conditions within which alone he attains his most perfect, his almost divine development, namely, as the free citizen of a free state. The end of this science is like that of all sciences—the attainment of good, but of good in its brightest form, the form of Justice.²

¹ Ethics, i. 2, 5. ² Pol. iii. 12, 1.
common weal; or, in other words, the end of political science is to discover the conditions under which every citizen will be able to secure the most free and perfect development of himself, consistent with the good of the State, without impediment in harmonious circumstances. But as this ideal harmony of circumstances is not always to be found, it is the practical duty of political science to study the almost infinite diversity of existing circumstances, 'for there is not one sort of democracy or one sort of oligarchy only,' and to suggest the adaptation of institutions to facts which have come into existence through different laws of historical necessity. Laws must be made for states, not states for laws. Therefore untiring study and collection of facts are necessary. The nature of political science, and its scope, as conceived of by Aristotle, are now apparent. It is the science which observes man in the sum of his relations, as historically exhibited in his institutions. It is a science based on the collection of facts, and on the discrimination of countless shades and gradations in the evolution of the various forms of government. And it is the science which, having thus obtained a clear and critical conception of man's needs and powers, applies that conception to his institutions, and attempts to bring them into harmony with circumstances. Again, it is the science which constructs, as a type and example, a model of the ideal state in which men might reach perfection, if perfection could ever be reached by more than an isolated person, here and there in the world. Sometimes the brightness of this ideal conception blinds

3 Pol. iv. 1, 11.
Aristotle to the value of the ordinary civic life of Greece, and draws him away from realities. But Aristotle always has history and historical development present to his mind; he has a fact for every assertion; he is keenly alive to the immense variety, the many differences in institutions which come under the same general name, such as Democracy, Liberty, Tyranny, and so on. It is in his continual reference to history and to fact that he is most instructive. His collection of the constitutions of one hundred and fifty-eight Greek states, and his researches into the customs of barbarous tribes, with his habit of making these customs throw light on the earlier institutions of Greece, give him a place among students of what we now call Comparative Politics. Aristotle is not satisfied with saying, like one of the characters in Plato's 'Republic,' that 'there are reported to be many and absurd forms of government among barbarians.' He notes the constitutional kingship of the Molossi; he remarks on an early Greek custom like compurgation; on the fact that the Greeks used to buy their wives from each other; and he mentions some curious traits of savage manners. Thus Aristotle studied political life in the spirit of modern criticism, and he treated many modern problems in a scientific fashion. But his science has many preconceptions and prejudices, his method many peculiarities, his field of observation many necessary limits; and all these combine to make him seem remote, out of date, and difficult of comprehension to modern readers. It is therefore needful first to give an account of

4 Rep. 544; Pol. v. 10, 8; vii. 2, 11; ii. 8, 20.
Aristotle’s Method, and of his preconceptions, and then to trace in history the development of the Greek City-state to which his speculation is confined.

III.

ON SOME LEADING CONCEPTIONS OF ARISTOTLE.

In reading the ‘Politics’ of Aristotle we meet with many arguments which appear either to want force altogether, or to depend for their force on some conception not stated, or on some premise taken for granted as if it were generally known and admitted by everyone. There seems to be a store of ideas in the background, which no one is expected to dispute, and which Aristotle appeals to with confidence. When he has brought a theory within the reach of one of these conceptions, such as Nature, Measure, the End, Order, he is satisfied that he has made his point. Some of these conceptions are tolerably familiar to us, others less familiar, or even strange; some of them are parts of Aristotle’s general system, for it must never be forgotten that his ‘Politics’ is only one stone, a corner-stone, in a whole theory of knowledge; some, again, may be called Greek common-places, notions that were parcels of the mind of Greece; and some are part of Aristotle’s inheritance from the older philosophers, such as Pythagoras and Anaxagoras. Then there are processes of argument which do not seem always convincing to us, especially the argument from the analogy of the arts, with conclusions in the
sphere of politics. Again, there is a strong belief in the power of the Legislators, to whom the Greeks were wont to attribute such arrangements as the συσ-σίτια,—the early distributions of land, and so on arrangements which we believe to have been produced by circumstances, before the age of law, out of the remains of tribal customs. Further, there is the tendency in Aristotle which we may almost call mystic—the tendency to look now to an ideal life of political virtue, now to an ideal life of philosophic contemplation, or to a blending of both, as the best for individuals and for the State. Besides all this, there is the obscurity arising from a method of arguing in which ἀπορία, or difficulties, are put forward, while the question is not definitely settled, but is relegated to some later portion of the 'Politics.'

On the whole, the method of Aristotle may be called analytical, with a view to a later synthesis. He will examine the ultimate units, the elements of every compound existence, before pronouncing on the nature of the whole which the elements make up. In the 'Organon' and in the 'Ethics' he has analysed the psychological and moral elements in the nature of the Individual; and in the 'Politics' he begins by examining the component elements and the conditions of the State, as husband and wife, father and children, master and slave, owner and property, citizens of this rank and citizens of that lower grade, as differentiated by such natural causes as birth, wealth, occupation. But all the time that he is analysing, Aristotle has present to his mind some very dis-

5 Pol. i. 2, 1.
tinct ideas as to the nature of the whole, as to the natural, unspoiled form of the State. These ideas are the result of all sorts of factors, of aristocratic prejudice, of traditional morality, and of a philosophic theory about Nature, which it is necessary to understand.

Aristotle mentions among the devices of Sophists the trick of ringing changes on the terms Nature, and Law, or Conventional Institutions. The dialecticians of Greece had discovered that 'the estimates of things just and honourable, with which Political Science is concerned, shift and vary so much, as to seem the result of capricious enactment, rather than of Nature.' In fact the revolutionary thinkers of Greece laid much the same stress on Nature (meaning thereby the presumed primitive freedom from all authority of law, reason, and custom) as Rousseau did in his 'Discourses on the Origin of Inequality among Men.' This is a common sort of reaction against a complicated civilisation, founded on religious and traditional beliefs which men have ceased to believe in. Now the purpose of Aristotle was conservative, and thus it became his object to prove that the institutions he wished to preserve were not the result of capricious enactment, but were founded on Nature. But Aristotle's way of understanding Nature is just the reverse of Rousseau's way, except when it suits his purpose to shift his ground, as in the disquisition on money and trade. Nature is identical with the fulfilment, and final cause of all progress to an end (ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα). Nature is matter fully fashioned and elaborated rather than matter in the rough (μᾶλλον αὐτῇ φύσις τῆς ὕλης).

6 Ethics, i. 3, 2. 7 Nat. Auscult. ii. 1, 10.
Man in a state of Nature is Man as Nature would have him to be, that is, as Aristotle would have him to be, a free warrior, statesman, and politician, at leisure, not a savage, feeding on acorns. 'Nature seeks not only right activity, but the power of living in noble leisure.' Contrast this with Rousseau's State of Nature: 'L'exemple des sauvages qu'on a presque tous trouvés à ce point, semble confirmer que le genre humain était fait pour y rester toujours ... et que tous les progrès ultérieurs ont été en apparence autant de pas vers la perfection de l'individu, et en effet, vers la décrépitude de l'espèce.' The contrast is particularly marked where Rousseau denounces the man who invented property, which Aristotle declares to be an institution suggested by Nature and 'unspeakably sweet.'

In Aristotle's eyes, then, Nature is almost the unconscious action of the will of the world, bringing all things into uniformity with limit and with right reason. The right reason of course is Aristotle's notion of what is best. Mr. Grote's way of stating the doctrine of Nature makes the matter very clear, if we apply to politics what is said of physics and metaphysics. 'There are in the sublunary bodies' (in which form is implicated with matter) 'both constant tendencies and variable tendencies. The constant Aristotle calls "Nature," which always aspire to Good, or to the renovation of Forms as perfect as may be, though impeded in this work by adverse influences, and therefore never producing anything but individuals comparatively

8 Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes.
9 Pol. ii. 5, 8.
defective, and sure to perish. The *variable* tendencies he calls Spontaneity and Chance, always modifying, distorting, frustrating the full purposes of Nature.  

If we apply this doctrine to politics, we find that the *matter* is human character, and human circumstance, which *Nature* fashions into the forms of the family and the state. The *constant* tendencies in human character and circumstance make for good and for order. Such a tendency is that which keeps all things in due subordination of ruler and subject, which sets father over child, master over slave, old over young, reason over passion, which makes the city *wish* to consist of equals, which when one man or one family is undeniably better than the rest, as gods are better than men, puts kingly or aristocratic rule into their hands. Thus the results of Nature's unchecked workings are the *Family*, with due subordination of woman, child, and slave; the *Monarchy*, with due obedience to the one Godlike man, who alone contributes more to the stock of excellence than all the others; the *Aristocracy*, where a few are equally pre-eminent; and the *Polity*, where there is a natural equality among the citizens. In all these natural forms of rule government is exercised in the interest of the natural *whole*, the State and citizens. On the other side are *variable* tendencies, contrary to Nature, which ruin the subordination of families, which induce men to take money, a mere *instrument*, for the *end* of their life, which work for the overthrow of *natural* slavery, which drive the one best man or the one best family out of the cities, which prevent the

10 Grote, Aristotle, i. 165.
State from consisting of equals, which, in short, produce these abnormal and unnatural distortions called *tyrannies, democracies, and oligarchies*, which govern in the interest of an overgrown member of the whole. Thus Nature is always being frustrated and defeated, and from this point of view Aristotle’s doctrine of the decline of states is not so very far removed from the scheme of Plato, with its fatal cycles of better and worse.

Analogous to the idea of Nature in Aristotle is the idea of the limit, *τὸ πέρας*, and of *τὸ πεπερασμένον*, the finite. Both these notions seem to be derived from the Pythagorean catalogue of limit and limitless, odd and even, one and many, good and bad, male and female, and the rest, which became a sort of accepted canon with Greek thinkers.

Limit and the infinite are the elements out of which the orderly and knowable world is made. The infinite is all disorder, confusion, a blur of undistinguishable sensations, and in morals of masterless passions, till, by the introduction of the limit, chaos is slowly made orderly, and passions are formed into character. Applying, for instance, this conception to the question, is commerce a legitimate occupation? Aristotle answers no, because *οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως*, there is no necessary limit to the acquisition of wealth.\(^{11}\) Now wealth is defined to be abundance of the instruments necessary towards the independent life. These used to be obtained by barter, and a man was satisfied when he had enough of them, that sufficiency was the

\(^{11}\) Pol. i. 9, 1.
πέρας. But when money was invented, and it was commonly held that wealth meant abundance of money, there was no natural πέρας to the acquisition of coin, ἀπειρός δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος. But there is a deeper reason than this for the fact that the endless acquisition of wealth is unnatural. Desire of riches springs from that character which thirsts insatiably for life, not for the noble life, which seeks satisfaction in the chaotic and infinite field of pleasure, without definite end, not in striving after the limit and end of existence.\(^\text{12}\) Here the limit (πέρας), from another point of view becomes identical with the end and aim of life (the τέλος). This τέλος is the same for the State and for the individual, namely, happiness. No conception is more constantly in Aristotle's mind than this of the End. From all past experience and history he has arrived at a fixed and luminous idea of what Nature would have, what all her workings tend to. This is not the life of men wandering in nomadic hordes, nor of men living as husbandmen in scattered villages, nor of great servile nations. The free wild tribes of the North have no central engrossing interest and bond of life; the peoples of Asia are gifted with intellect and art, but they are slavish. Hellas alone occupies the happy mean, alone offers to men in the city-state an object for noble action that must fill all their lives, and an environment of free relationships in which to exercise virtue. The State is the limit, beyond which Nature does not wish to pass in the formation of political organisms. The State in its perfection and the citizen in perfection are

\(^{12}\) Pol. i. 9, 17; Plato, Laws, 714.
the end of her travail. Now that perfection is happiness. But is the happiness to be that of practical activity and the exercise of moral virtue, or that of philosophical contemplation?

The consideration of the τέλος thus brings us to what is a standing difficulty in reading Aristotle. He seems to hesitate whether to recommend a possible life of civic virtue and activity, or an ideal life of contemplation to men and states. The latter life answers to the saintly life, the entrance into 'religion'; the former corresponds to the knightly life of the Middle Ages. As we have within us, he seems to say, the power of raising some divine element to a momentary delight in the divine reason, a momentary recognition of our connection with divinity, ought we not to make this our τέλος? Can this contemplative existence be combined with the political existence? This is the question which is treated in the book on the Ideal State. It is here, then, that the mystic element appears amid the common sense and historical activity of Aristotle. Indeed, when we come to analyse his method, we find three incongruous elements, really scientific enquiry, aristocratic prejudice, and the dreams of a metaphysic which literally sublimi ferit sidera vertice, and listens for the eternal harmonies of Nature.
IV.

THE GREEK CITY-STATE.

The political speculations of Aristotle are bounded by the limits of the πόλις, or City-state, which he looks on as the ultimate and perfect form of society. It does not seem to have occurred to him, who, in his literary criticism, was ready to admit that the Drama might advance in changed circumstances to new forms, that human society also might come to be fixed on a wider basis than the city—on the basis, namely, of the nation. The political unit with which he concerned himself, the town of perhaps ten or fifteen thousand free citizens, supported by slave-labour, enjoying a life of leisure and culture, self-ruled, and exercising all the rights of a sovereign state, was the form of society through which Greece attained her eminence in war, and in the arts. It was therefore his business to understand all the conditions which contributed to make up the City-state, to point out the causes which in the past had frustrated its development, and had sometimes perverted it from being the home of noble life into the seat of Tyranny, of Oligarchy, of Sedition, of the later Democracy, ignoble in the eyes of Aristotle. The ideal aim of the State was to give room and opportunity for the full and free development of the best powers of all its citizens; that aim, as conceived of by the philosophers, had never been actually reached. Here, of

13 Pol. i. 2, 8.
course, we touch the point where Aristotle's political speculation diverges from that of later times. Modern thought is concerned with nations, that is with what were originally ἕθνη, aggregates of tribes with no political unity in the Greek sense. Various causes have united the descendants of these tribes into the large associations which we call nations. The common possession of conquered lands by a tribe of kin; the defeat of one tribe by another, with the retention of its freedom under the new over-lord; the unity imposed by the Church; the dislike of city life; the growth of kingly power, which could not well grow in a city; all these, with other causes, have brought about a wider and looser organisation than that of the city. But all Aristotle's thought is conditioned by the existence of the city, which had so powerful an attraction for the Greeks, and which, within its narrow bounds, could actually school them in morality, and in the spiritual life. To do this is, of course, beyond the power of a national government, and thus Aristotle's ideas are in a different plane from that occupied by modern speculation.

To understand the conditions under which the City-state grew up, out of general laws which were everywhere the same, and everywhere checked and diverted by varying causes, it is necessary to look back to the dawn of Greek history. The State, as Aristotle knew it, was 'the inevitable consequence of its antecedents in the past,' and Aristotle himself enables us to trace a sketch of these antecedents. The State (Πόλις) is ἡ τοῦ εἵν Κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους, 'an association of families and clans in a higher life for
the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing existence.' 14
It is thus that Aristotle adds to the bare facts, the union of villages, a moral interpretation. This union was not without the will of Nature, which was leading men towards the perfect life. His aim is to be a fellow-worker with Nature, by pointing out the faults of human character which retard the advance to perfection in Nature's political school, the City.

When the tribes, which came in time to develop Hellenic civilisation, were first settling in Hellas, when they were invading the country from the North, or landing in her ports from the East, they were not yet, it may be said with some certainty, what Aristotle would have considered actually political beings. They lived in scattered villages κατὰ κώμας, and it may be presumed that their society was based, not on the πόλισ of course, but on the group, γένος, and on the family, οἰκία. Their lands were probably held on a communal system—that is to say, if we may judge by analogy and by traces of institutions, they were not the property of individuals, but of village groups of men (γένη), united by the belief in descent from a common ancestor, and by the practice of certain religious sacrifices in common. This is a primitive stage of society which is found to have existed in most parts of the world—a stage in society which takes no notice of the individual as such, but merely of the group, or γένος. It is the γένος which is wronged if one of the group be slain or injured; it is the γένος which inherits property, and is responsible for the actions of each of the individuals within its circle.

14 Pol. iii. 9, 12.
This formed a stage in the development of the English race too, but the difference began when the Greeks had once tasted of city life, which satisfied them so thoroughly that they never sought a wider unity. On the other hand, the wider national unity was imposed on the English before they came to care for city life. To take another instance. It was the misfortune of the Irish Celts that they lived under the clan system, with only abortive attempts at a wider unity, till conquerors came among them to whom the clan system seemed an abomination. But this primitive condition of things had ceased to exist in most of the states that made up Hellas before regular history begins: it had ceased to exist, in all its simplicity and vigour, as soon as several ἁένη deserted their villages, or at least removed the shrine of their religions, and their place of meeting, to some central spot, where their nobler families began to dwell within the walls of a city, and on the crest of some commanding hill. This process of clustering together, and of combining several clans, with their religions, was called συνοίκισις, and was generally attributed to the initiative of some primitive king, or hero, or demigod. With the συνοίκισις of villages, the Greek city was born, and only Attica was fortunate enough to be the scene of the perfect συνοίκισις of many cities, into the great city of Athens. By the process a new sort of life, a higher life, τὸ ἐὖ ζήν, began for the clansmen. Their tribal hero, father and lord long dead, or their tribal fetish, was no longer their highest conception in religion. Their sacred clan-festivals still existed, but in subordination to the loftier
and purer creed which became common to them all. The members of the various clans, sons of Æacus or of Eu-
molpus, recognised each other as kindred by an older descent; they were all γεννηται Ἀπόλλωνος πατριδόυ, brothers together in Apollo, and Zeus of the household
 guarded each man’s home and enclosure. Thus the
 newer faith succeeded the old without a break in con-
 tinuity; it was still ancestor-worship, only of a father
 more remote and powerful. With his cultus comes a
 wider morality than that of the tribe. If a man is slain,
 the slayer falls under the wrath of Apollo, and of the
 State as well as of the clan. He cannot escape by paying
 a blood-fine (ποινή, wer-gild, eric) to the clan or kindred
 of his victim, or braving their vendetta. The Greeks
 found, as the Basutos in Africa find to-day, that, ‘if they
 avenged themselves, the town would soon be dispersed.’

 Thus a nobler religion, a wider and purer morality,
 a more settled body of customary law, laid down by the
 Chieftains of the old clans, τὸ εὖ ξῆν in fact, began with
 the allegiance to the city. But it did not follow that,
 because the State had become the ruling idea, and the
 State-god the main religious conception, and because
 the life of individuals was partly emancipated from the
 solidarité of the clan, it did not follow that the clan
 became extinct. It survived in a modified shape, and
 was one of the most powerful factors in building the new
 constitution, and the State as known to Aristotle. The
 history of a Greek city is to a very great extent the history

 15 Plato, Luthydemus, 302. Harpokration. Ἀπόλλων πατριδὸς ὁ
 Πόθιος. τὸν δὲ Ἀπόλλωνα κοινὸς πατρίδον τιμῶσιν Ἀθηναίοι ἀπὸ Ἰανός,
 τούτου γὰρ οἰκίσαντος τὴν Ἀττικήν, ἀς Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους
 Ἰανός κληθήναι, καὶ Ἀπόλλων πατρίδον αὐτοί διομοιασθήναι.

 1 E. B. Tylor, Contemporary Review, June 1873.
of the struggle waged by the chief and most wealthy families within the clans, the dwellers in the city, in whose veins the clan's blood ran purest, against the body of the rustic clansmen, and probably against the later immigrants, the broken men from other tribes, who were attracted by every growing centre of settled life. The chiefs (βασιλικὸν γένος) claimed from old time that power 'to make foul weather or fair,' which the Brehon laws attributed to Irish chieftains. They had exclusive privileges, knew the law, or were inspired to deliver it, and they alone could keep up that unbroken practice of religious rites on which all the luck of the community was believed to turn. The common clansmen and the settlers were probably oppressed by food-rents which they could scarcely pay, and were threatened with loss of land. Naturally they longed for some body of written law, for freedom and equality, and they were usually aided in the struggle by discontented members of the chief houses.

The order of these conflicts, out of which the State was built up in its ultimate form, must have varied in different places, but on the whole tended to some such course as this. The earliest form of fixed government which Greek history shows us, the form which we find in Homer, is that of heroic monarchy. This monarchy is described by Aristotle as being hereditary and constitutional. No problem in early history is so difficult to solve as that of the origin of kingship. Among

18 Senchus Mor, iii. p. xxvi. Odyssey, xix. 109, 115, results of εὐγεσία.
most early peoples we find a certain stock or stocks, which are held almost divine. They differ so much from the common, that sometimes they are believed to have immortal souls, while their subjects lack them, or to transmigrate into nobler creatures after death. At the least they descend from Gods, as the English stock from Woden, or as Agamemnon from Zeus. Aristotle conjectures that the founders of the monarchies had been ‘the first benefactors of the people in the arts of peace or war, or had first collected them into a society, or given them a territory to live in.’ We only know that the kings of Homer’s time are represented as possessing some strain of nobler blood than their free subjects, the chief of whom attend them in the council, and whom they consult in the greater assembly of the host. The kings are of the kin of Gods, διόγενες βασιλῆς, while most men are only δῶς, or noble. It is not easy to understand the sort of nobility which was so general in the Homeric world. We are reminded of early Iceland, when ‘nowhere was the common man so uncommon,’ and of the fleet with which Cnut invaded England (1015), at least two hundred ships, and every man in every crew a noble-man. Both kings and nobles were severed by an uncrossed line from ‘churls rock-born or oak-born,’ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἄπο πέτρης, but either king or noble, if taken in war, might become a thrall.

Freeman’s Comparative Politics, Lecture IV. For the peculiarity of royal souls, Callaway’s Religion of the Amazulu, ii. 197: ‘Chiefs turn into the black and green Imamba, common people into the Umthlocozi.’

20 Freeman’s Norman Conquest, i. 373.

21 Odyss. xix. 162; Preller, Ausgewählte Aufsätze, p. 179.
The heroic kingships, however they first arose, whether out of leadership in war or not, were usually hereditary, and hereditary rights were exercised over willing subjects, in accordance with traditional custom. The coronation oath was simply the laying hand on sceptre. The privileges of the king were a témevos far larger than the common lot, leadership in war, and probably many of the profits arising from fines, as well as the gifts which Hesiod says the kings used to devour, rewards for decisions in suits, and the chief seats at feasts, and the best mess at sacrifices. The heroic monarchy left to later Greece the institution of the General Assembly, and the germs of a council of elders, which might become probouleutic and administrative in an Oligarchy, or might be cut down to a mere committee, with the task of preparing matter for the consideration of the full Assembly, in a Democracy. (Pol. iv. 14, 14; vi. 8, 24. Gladstone, Homer, &c., iii. 58.)

‘Kingship in a single city is not an institution which is likely to last;’ for, as Aristotle says, many men would be found to be ‘peers in valour and virtue,’ and there is no mystery in a small community to protect the king. The members of the noble families would aim at equality, and some such anarchy would result as that which made confusion in the little isle of Ithaca before the return of Odysseus. Power would fall into the hands of all the noble houses in the clans, or into those of some one house, like the Penthelidæ in Mitylene, or the Bacchiadæ of Corinth, or the Protiadæ in Massilia, or the Basilidæ in Erythrae, who would cut down the royal functions, and hand over the real sway in
commission to their own kindred. The kingly title might be left, but the man who bore it would only keep up the continuity of religious tradition, by performing certain rites and sacrifices. An instance of such a process has been noted among primitive peoples, our own contemporaries. Among the natives of Tonga the real ruling monarch yields precedence to a functionary whose duties are purely priestly, though his title means *King of Tonga,* and whose position answers to that of Archon Basileus at Athens.

The new form of government by a clan, or by members of noble houses, when corrupted, is called a δυναστεία by Aristotle. It corresponds to the worst sort of tyranny, or to the latest and most corrupt democracy, in the fact that old customary law was distorted to serve the selfish interests and passions of the rulers. Yet the δυναστεία claimed the noble name of 'Aristocracy,' the rule of the Best. The ruling class called themselves 'the good and fair,' 'the famous,' 'the illustrious.' They relied on long possession, on illustrious descent, on knowledge of the law, which was hidden from the *sheepskin wearers,* dusty feet, *club-carriers* of the country, and, above all, on possession of cavalry, which enabled them to ride down the dusty-feet as easily as the chivalry of feudalism used to crush the villeins. Many causes contributed to the overthrow of the δυναστεία, or early oligarchy of ancient Greece. Trade increased, the seafaring popu-

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23 Pol. v. 3, 3; Pol. iv. 5, 1.
24 Müller, *Dorians.* Nicknames of Serfs, ii. 57.
lation grew strong and rich, the strength of light infantry began to be understood, the poorer landholders were oppressed with taxes and usury beyond endurance, the Oligarchy conferred honours and power within ever narrower limits, and the general discontent took the form of a demand for a written code of laws. 'When laws are written down, the rich man and the weakling find equal justice,' says Euripides. This was ordinarily secured after a struggle in which some neglected member of the higher class was frequently the leader. The lower classes, 'who have neither law nor equity,' as a poet of the aristocratic class wrote, succeeded in making their leader Æsymnete, as Pittacus was in Mitylene, and looked to him as an irresponsible magistrate to settle their differences with the nobles, in a strife which went on till it was settled by the giving of a code of laws, or, more frequently, silenced by the rise of a tyrant.

V.

TYRANNIES IN GREECE.

These tyrannies, whether in Athens, under the Pisis-tratidæ, in Megara, in Corinth, or elsewhere, helped to consolidate and shape into their ultimate form the city-states of Greece. All classes, noble or non-noble, were crushed under the same weight of reckless power. All were offended by the license, so distasteful to Greek ideas, which was permitted to women and to slaves; and the pride of the nobles was sometimes humbled by
such insults as Clisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, heaped on
the tribes, calling them 'Ass-tribe,' 'Pig-clan,' and so
forth. The tyranny may best be considered as the direct
contradiction of all Greek ideas of life and government,
as the negation both of the old notion of aristocracy
founded on birth, and of the new notions of the equal
claim of all freeborn citizens. The tyrant rules over
men who are his equals and betters, purely in his own
selfish interest, and not in that of the governed. Just
as a true commonwealth, or Politeia, contained all the
elements of the State mingled in due subordination, so
tyrranny mingled the worst qualities of the worst forms
of government, selfishness beyond that of the narrowest
oligarchy, license beyond that of the loosest democracy.
The tyrant in early Greece was generally either a
demagogue, or partisan of the people, who led them
against the nobles, and seized the fruits of victory, or
one of the surviving heroic kings, who strained his
hereditary and constitutional powers, or a magistrate
who abused the sway he held for a long term of office,
or an oligarch set in high place by his faction. His
power was never stable till he secured a bodyguard,
especially a bodyguard of strangers. Once supported
by this Oriental institution, he showed all the distrust
of an oligarchy, all their greed, and like an oligarchy
stripped the democracy of their arms, while in the
spirit of democracy he put down the nobles, and drove
them into exile less honourable than that of ostracism.
Such crimes were the natural consequence of absolute
power, though we should be wrong in supposing that

Pittacus of Mitylene, or Phidon of Argos, or Pisis-tratus even at Athens, were essentially criminals of this class. They had the excuse of Cæsarism, and were not wanting in the redeeming features which the believers in despotism are wont to flatter. But the tendency of tyranny was to develop a character of lawless lust and cruelty, a character to which recondite evil became good, a fantasy which found pleasure only in arbitrary violence against nature and law, in exquisite varieties of sin and inflicted pain. This is the type of man which we find in the medieval cities of Italy, and the Baglioni may mate with the Penthelidæ, Ezzelin with Periander. But there were also commonplace practices of tyranny, the mere natural result of greed and selfishness of a low sort, which have had their likeness in our own time. When we read how the tyrant is a stirrer up of war, how he fosters distrust between citizens, how he puts down all public gatherings, how he has his police everywhere, how he encourages the extravagance of women, how he impoverishes the State with public works, how he associates with the worst of men, how he sets class against class, how he corrupts all classes, we think of the author of the Crimean and the Mexican expeditions, and of the coup d'état, the cause of great men's exile and of low men's promotion, the patron of Hausmann, the tyrant who 'did so much for France.'

When the tyrants had been expelled, for the most part, by the action of individual revenge for insult, or of combined rebellion, or by help of the conservative power of Sparta, the Greek states emerged from the struggle, each a tolerably compact body of citizens,
united by the wrongs which all had suffered, and by glory in the tyrannicide which had benefited all. If the tyrant had not always succeeded in 'lopping off the taller ears of corn,' at least he had levelled nobles and churls, gentiles and non-gentiles, by a common oppression of disgrace. The emancipated citizens were now heirs to the splendid public buildings, the roads, and aqueducts, on which the tyrannic policy had expended public money. In the common feeling of relief the class privileges, which had been in abeyance, fell often into disuse. In Athens, where the development of democracy was, so to speak, normal, the laws of Solon had, even before the tyrant's time, made property, not birth, the qualification for rule, and even the poorest freemen had received just so much power as would suffice to satisfy them. How much that may have been it is not easy to ascertain. In one passage Aristotle represents some disputants as holding that he 'gave all a right to sit on the juries, wherefore some blame him, as if he had rather undone than established the State.' The opinion that he did establish the juries, which in time made the Demos all powerful, as well as the blame, was probably expressed by the censurers of Solon, for (in Pol. book iii. 11, 8), as well as in the passage already quoted (ii. 12, 3), Aristotle himself declares that Solon only gave the people the right to elect magistrates, and to bring them to trial after their term of office. Whatever may have been the exact amount of liberty and power conceded, it is tolerably certain that the power could not have been actually wielded by poor and industrious men before

27 Pol. v. 11, 8.
Pericles began the custom of paying the jurors. The laws of Solon, which were to the Demos what the laws of Edward were to the English after the Norman Conquest—another name for justice and freedom, had the good fortune to please both the people and the later philosophers. Plato looked back to them lovingly, as to the institutions of a time when our 'Lady Reverence was with us;' and perhaps it was not till the Solonian constitution was restored in all its exclusiveness by Antipater and by a foreign force (322 B.C.), that the Athenians discovered how their later democracy had outgrown its early limits.

Solon had anchored the State, with the fixed power of the Areopagus, which exercised a censorial sway, based on old religious privilege. It was the business of Clisthenes, coming after the interval of tyranny, to complete the equalisation of ranks which the Pisistratidæ had begun. For this purpose he introduced into the tribes many stranger-residents, and even slaves, made new tribes altogether, and separated the citizens into the local divisions of demes for political purposes, while the clans tended to become a mere religious survival, and mode of registering the legitimacy of citizens. What with new guilds, new tribes, and the bringing together of the many separate family-worships into few and common shrines, everything was contrived so as to

28 Grote, iii, 170.
29 Plato, Laws, 698, 744. θεσποτις ἐν ἡν τις αἰδώς. Grote, iv, 139.
30 Pol. vi. 4, 18; where Aristotle says that the same sort of reform was carried out in Cyrene. Herodotus, v. 69, says he made ten tribes instead of four, but supposes him to have done so out of contempt for the sons of Ion.
blend the State into a new συνοίκισις. Changes almost as important followed the victory of the 'mob of seamen' at Salamis. The Archonship became open to all free citizens by Lot, the sacred power of the Areopagus was checked by Pericles and Ephialtes, the jurors were paid for attendance in the courts, the tables of the law were brought down from the Acropolis to the Agora, and step by step the demagogues reduced the democracy to that last estate which Plato calls a critical theatrocracy, and Aristotle despises as perverted and unnatural. But if Athens incurred the censure of Aristotle because, through the influence of trade, her population grew heterogeneous, because by aid of success in war she became a tyrant city, ruling other states against their will; if her citizens pursued commerce till they came to make money even out of their intellectual powers; if there was no drill, no surveillance of private life; on the other hand, Athens may be looked on almost as an Ideal State at the time when she placed full power in the hands of him who 'excelled all the state in virtue,' who was 'as a God among Men,' Pericles the Olympian. 31

In Athens the development of the State was most natural and normal, but of course there were many varieties of growth, and many cases of arrested development in Hellas. 1 In mountainous districts of Arcadia the people in Aristotle's time lived as an ἐθνός, or tribe, in separate homesteads. Sparta, again, knew no age of tyrants, and suffered from στάσις, or civil strife,

31 Pol. iii. 13, 13; Grote, iv. 215. ὁ σχινοκέφαλος Ζεὺς Περικλῆς, so called by Cratinus.
only in very remote times. She preserved the semblance of kingly power, in the two kings, with their sacred and military functions.\(^{32}\) In many states, as in Thebes and Corinth, Oligarchy was as successful almost as Democracy was in Athens, and, in spite of insurrections, gave the stamp to the character of the city. Other states, again, lived without fixed character, either Oligarchic or Democratic, and changed with each revolution that brought back one party of exiles, and drove the Government to wander in search of foreign aid, or gave dominion to a tyrant. When Sparta and Athens had fairly consolidated their powers, and had consciously recognised their state-character as Liberal or Obstructive, they were always interfering with the politics of the smaller towns, and so preventing a normal development.\(^{33}\) Still on the whole there did exist a normal and natural law of revolution which, subject to occasional variations, governed the internal affairs of the Greek States. Having sketched their historical career to the period of full growth, it becomes necessary to examine the many causes that inclined the balance in every direction, from the loosest democracy to the sternest oligarchy.

\(^{32}\) Herod. vi. 56. \(^{33}\) Pol. iv. 11, 17; v. 7, 14.
VI.

INTERNAL CAUSES OF VARIOUS FORMS OF THE STATE.

Aristotle has left us an elaborate theory of the causes which produced not only Oligarchies, Democracies, and Tyrannies, but also the various degrees and shades of difference that distinguished one from another Oligarchy or Democracy. All three forms of constitution are in the first place to be considered as παρεκβόσεις, as institutions which have missed the rational order, founded on the very nature of things, which governs the real Monarchy, the true Aristocracy, the genuine Commonwealth. To fall short of this perfection, then, was the common feature of all existing non-ideal governments; but they fell short of it in various manners and degrees. They varied in their character—that is in their organic arrangements as to the distribution of power, as to the sovereign, or strongest portion of the state in the last resort. The sovereign (κύριον) is 'that which decides in questions of war and peace, and of making or dissolving alliances, and about laws, and capital punishment, and exile, and fines, and audits of accounts, and examinations of administrators after their term of office.' \(^{34}\) Clearly the character of the πολιτεύμα or constitution may vary almost infinitely—(and to observe the variety of shades was Aristotle's main pre-occupation)—in proportion as few citizens or many belong to the sovereign body, and in proportion to the

\(^{34}\) Pol. iv. 14, 3.
degrees in which they share, and the manner in which they exercise sovereign functions, and the amount of discretion and power they allow to the elected magistrate. Judicial, administrative, elective, legislative functions may be arranged, in states so small as the Greek cities, in hundreds of artificial ways, so as to preserve a balance of power for a year or two.

States were thus differentiated as regarded the form of their constitution, and again they were differentiated by their moral object, by the kind of life at which they aimed. This aim, whether in Tyranny, Oligarchy, or Democracy, was a selfish one, namely the interest of one lawless ruler, of the few who were in power, or of the poorer freemen. All oligarchies, however, were not equally selfish and equally narrow, nor all democracies on one level of indolence, useless meddlesomeness, and greed. None of the perverted constitutions were natural, but none, not even Tyranny, might not be rendered more serviceable than total anarchy or constant change, by the moderate exercise of power which preserves the duration of governments, while duration might make even an oligarchy lose its virulence, as diseases grow milder when they have long prevailed in a country. This is the tolerant way in which Aristotle regarded all existing polities, however distasteful they might be to his own sense of right.

The constitution and character of a state depended on, and was in fact identical with, the distribution of power, and power was distributed in accordance with the proportionate differences in the social elements. There were rich men, poor men, men of middle fortune,
men who could afford heavy armour, others who went light-armed to battle, and the bulk of the people derived its livelihood from trade, agriculture, or fishing and maritime enterprise. All these classes of the population, which might be reckoned in six sets, as husbandmen, handicraftsmen, warriors, men of property, priests, judges, had their various tasks, and claims to power and recompense from the state, and the character of the state was determined by the proportions in which each class got its claims recognised. When men of wealth and birth were powerful, they would exclude husbandmen, handicraftsmen, and tradesmen from rule—if possible even from the general assembly—on the pretext that persons engaged in business had neither the leisure necessary for the discharge of civil duties, nor strength and skill in war. Where, on the other hand, circumstances such as the victory of the seafaring population of Athens at Salamis, or a defeat in war which weakened the aristocracy, threw power into the hands of the multitude, they would establish Democracy, glory in that as the only really free constitution, and reply with the watchwords of 'equality,' 'rule and be ruled in turn,' 'trust the sacred lot,' 'collective wisdom,' to the Oligarch's pretension of wealth, education, and high birth.\(^{35}\) The constitution now established might vary, Aristotle thought, in four degrees, resulting from the nature and occupation of the ruling people. In a Democracy, where the majority of the citizens were husbandmen, and had little leisure to spend in the market place, or where the holders of magistracies

\(^{35}\) As to the Lot, Plato, Laws, 690 C.
were selected out of the possessors of a slight census, or even where all citizens were eligible for office, but the mass, being poor, had to attend to their own affairs, Law was likely to reign, and not popular self-will. But when there was a large population, paid out of the state resources, out of tributes, fines, and so on, for attendance at the Assembly, Law Courts, and Theatres, the last and worst form of Democracy arose. All the social evils of tyranny were felt; the people had its flatterers, as tyrants had theirs; justice was perverted by greed of fines. In such a state popular will ruled through decrees, instead of the passionless Νόμος, and the regulative powers of the upper house or πρόβουλοι were disregarded by the brawling Assembly.

When, on the other hand, birth, wealth, and education managed to make good their claims, when an Oligarchy was established, that too might be more or less intense in its action. A tolerably large class in easy circumstances might be the actual sovereign, or again, a very large property census might be demanded as qualification, or power might fall into the hands of one family or kinship, and, worst of all, the self-will of hereditary rulers might override Law. In contradistinction to these degrees of injustice, the Πολιτεία, or Commonwealth, was a form of well-tempered state, which united the virtues and satisfied the claims of freedom, wealth, birth, and native genius or virtue. Any form of Oligarchy or Democracy, or the juster Commonwealth, might be gradually brought about by slow transfer of the balance of power, by raising or lowering the franchise, electing to magistracies by vote,
an oligarchic arrangement, by lot, as Democracy preferred, or by combining both systems. In the Law Courts there might be many degrees of property qualification, conferring the right to sit on trials, and many shades of power might be entrusted to the Senate, to the Nomothetae, and to the Assembly. In oligarchies and democracies all these matters were in a state of delicate equipoise, which might be upset at any moment, with consequences affecting the whole state. 'The smallest thing may be the occasion of a revolution really involving the most important results,' says Aristotle, whose theory of revolutions is an expansion of this text.

VII.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONS.

Revolutions, and civil strife, were the permanent dangers of the Greek City-state, and the great bar to its usefulness as an instrument of education, and as an environment of the perfect life. As the character of the citizen shifted with that of the city, and as that was always changing, there could be no stable character at all. Therefore what the Greek political theorist wished to secure, before all else, was a permanent constitution. As a rule he made the error of thinking that this could only be found in a stationary condition of society, which he found more nearly attained by Sparta than by any other State. A theory of Revolutions was therefore a necessary part of political philosophy, and
in Aristotle's theory the difference between the methods of himself and of Plato is very clearly displayed. Plato's views are made difficult to us by the fact that he starts from an astrological scheme of numbers which rule the existence of his ideal city. During a certain necessary cycle of time there will be certain births of inferior citizens among the Guardians; hence a selfish love of wealth, and of individual distinction arises, and the ideal polity is corrupted into a likeness of the warlike Spartan commonwealth. In the decline to Oligarchy, to Democracy, and to Tyranny, it is always the passion of greed that is the corrupting power. Oligarchic magistrates engage in commerce—a practice, as Aristotle says, forbidden in most real oligarchies—they impoverish young men of birth, and thus a class arises like the Mirabeaus and Catilines of French and Roman history. The step to Democracy is easy, as the poor despise the bloated oligarchs, and at last attack them, while the extreme license of Democracy tends to the opposite evil of Tyranny. To all this theory Aristotle opposes facts. A State does not usually change into the form next it, but into its opposite. Oligarchy, more often than Tyranny, succeeds Democracy. Plato has given no account of the end of Tyranny itself. Injustice, and offence to heaven, more frequently than greed, produce revolutions. Lastly, the Platonic theory neglects the very many shades of difference which in real life separate democracy from democracy, and oligarchy from oligarchy. In the 'Laws,' however (709), Plato hints at a wider theory, and a more historical one.

In his own theory Aristotle is guided by history. The
‘fountain’ of Revolution was that jealous love of equality which marked the Greek character. ‘Men turn to civil strife when they think that they have not got their dues in proportion to their estimate of themselves,’ Aristotle observes. The civil strife might take the form of a desire to overthrow the existing constitution, or to seize its rewards and offices, or to modify the intensity of its character as oligarchic or democratic, or to change some special detail in its working. On the whole a Democracy was less subject to στάσις than an Oligarchy, because there was room for the jealousy of ‘an oligarchy within an oligarchy,’ and so for a tripartite division of envyings and heartburnings. The universal and prevailing cause of Revolution was jealousy, but jealousy had many objects, and took many shapes, and found great variety of occasions. The distribution of wealth and civic honours and office was of course the main ground of quarrel, but habits of insolence, moments of terror, the pride and negligence of overweening power, the strength of some magistracy or class which had outgrown its proper status (αὐξησις παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον), the factionlessness of party, the undue depression of any set of citizens, were all predisposing causes of Revolution. Again, a State might contain citizens of alien races, as Achæans and Træzenians were mingled at Sybaris, or as the Gephyræans were blended with an Ionic population at Athens, and race hatreds might break out into civil war. Even differences of local situation afforded very pretty quarrels, and the dwellers on the height might hate the dwellers in the plain;
the people of the harbour might be more democratic than the people of the city.\textsuperscript{37} In short, the acquisition of power, whether by private citizens, or magistracies, or tribes, or by any single portion, small or great, of the State, was a cause of sedition; for either the persons who envied these began the strife, or the men, or party which had gained the strength, were no longer content to live on a footing of equality with their fellow-citizens.

Such were the general conditions of civil discord in Greece, but there were evils and dangers peculiar to Democracies, and others which beset Oligarchies. In a Democracy there was the terror felt by the rich, and their reactionary revolution against the peril of confiscation. The greed of demagogues would drive forth large troops of hostile émigrés, who waited their chance to destroy the Democracy. Then there was the risk, greater in warlike than in later times, of a demagogic dictator setting up a Tyranny. Any powerful magistracy might be made a stepping-stone to a despotism by an unscrupulous demagogue. Again, the proverbial haste of democracy which gave the force of law to suddenly carried decrees, might destroy some old legal safeguard of the constitution. In Oligarchies the besetting sin was insolence and injustice towards the mass of the citizens. Through this fault most of the old dynasties fell, under the assault of some popular leader, whether sprung from the oligarchic families, or of the oppressed classes. Allied to these dangers was the risk of narrowing the Oligarchy, and of constructing an

\textsuperscript{37} Pol. v. 3, 15.
imperium in imperio. The insolence of wealth, and the demands of luxury threw men of the type of Catiline or of Mirabeau, youths of ruined fortunes, on projects of sedition. Distrust of the people in war made mercenaries a necessity, and a general of mercenaries might anticipate the conduct of Italians like Francesco Sforza and Castruccio Castrucani, and enslave the state he had served. Either in an Oligarchy or a Democracy a change in the value of money might widen or narrow the census, and a crowd of new citizens might be admitted to power, or, again, office might thus be limited to the few, and in either case a revolution was imminent. As might be expected, revolutions broke out on slight occasions, though really the matters in dispute were of high importance. A love quarrel, a lawsuit, a marriage difficulty, might divide a city into parties, as in medieval Italy. The words of Hallam apply almost without change to the earlier civilisation of Greece: 'In every city the quarrels of private families became the foundation of general schism, sedition, and proscription.' In short, the condition of Greek cities went to prove that 'the pathological state is more frequent and more dangerous in proportion to the complicated character of the organism.'

In all these combinations of power, the form of the constitution was the prize of party victory. This state of things was positively ruinous to the philosophic conception of the State. There could be no fixed moral habit of character among men whose polity was always shifting its Ἴδος. To bring out the darkness of
the political picture, Aristotle sketches a brighter design of the best possible State. He will not speak of the ideal Aristocracy, where a few men, of preeminent merit, rule the State for the advantage of the governed, nor of the ideal Monarchy, where one divinely gifted man reigns in the same fashion. Aristocracies demand somewhat beyond the real condition of States, or they approach the form of government called Politeia. This is almost a confession that the true Aristocracy, based on willing concessions to half-divine superiority, is usually a mere dream. A set of men, or one man, might flatter themselves, or their friends might flatter them, into the belief that they were the founders of a true Aristocracy, or of a true Monarchy. But in the eyes of Greece the self-styled Aristocrats were really Oligarchs, and Aristotle himself did not escape the charge of being the trencherman and boon companion of that slave-eunuch turned tyrant, Hermeias. The philosophers might expect much from an 'orderly tyrant,' 'young, temperate, quick at learning, having a good memory, of a noble nature, and the friend and contemporary of a great legislator.' But the constitution of things was against this favourable conjuncture of absolute power, virtue, and knowledge. Monarchy of the true sort, Aristocracy of the true sort, were but visions. 'There are no kingships now,' says Aristotle. There remains the other natural and unperverted ideal government, the Politeia, Polity, or Constitutional Commonwealth.

What was the Politeia? We have seen that Oligarchies and Democracies derived their names from the

abnormal disproportionate growth of a part of their organisation, from the monstrous development of the power of poor or of rich. The more excessive the deformity, the easier it was to give its name to the deformed organisation, whether Oligarchy or Democracy. Now the Politeia has no distinctive name; it is simply a constitution *par excellence.* This fact in style points to the distinctive merit of the Politeia in nature. It had *no* overgrown part, all were mingled in due proportion. The life of the Politeia, and of the citizen in the Politeia, is established on the basis of the *μέσον,* the golden mean. Property is equalised as far as possible, extreme wealth and extreme poverty are unknown. τῶν εὐτυχημάτων ἢ κτῆσις ἢ μέση βελτίστη πάντων. Children are not brought up in the insolence of luxury which 'breeds the Tyrant;' there is no *hiérarchie des méprises,* as a modern philosopher has nicknamed modern society. The natural tendency of the City-state, the impulse of its being is allowed free scope, for 'the city would fain consist of equals.' There is a preponderant middle class, and rich and poor but little exceed or fall short of the ordinary standard of wealth. The full-armed citizens hold the sovereign power.

40 Compare Plato, Laws, 712. The fragments of Hippodamus, if they are genuine, prove that these ideas of the value of mixed Governments were 'in the air.' εἰ καὶ σύνθετος ἡ πολιτεία ἡ καὶ συντεταγμένη ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἄλλων, λέγω δὲ οὐ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, ἄλλα κατὰ φύσιν· τυραννίδος γὰρ οὐδεμία χρεία ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ μήτω καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπὶ βραχύ. δει τοὺς βασιλείαν πράταν ἐντετάχθαι καὶ δεύτερον ἀριστοκρατίαν. βασιλεία μὲν γὰρ θεεμίατος πράγμα, καὶ δυσφύλακτον ὑπὸ ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχᾶς· παχέως γὰρ ὑπὸ τρυφᾶς καὶ ὑβρίσει ἀλλάσσεται. He goes on to speak of the jealousies within oligarchies, and of the right the free citizen has to γέρας from his State. Archytas is represented as saying, δεὶ τὰν πόλιν ἐκ πασῶν σύνθετον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν. Fuhr's Dicsearchus, pp. 37, 38.
This State is clearly the best of possible constitutions, because it has the note of excellence, it is alone unshaken and unchanged by civil brawls. This is a picture of happy political life, as the philosophers hoped that it might be constituted. But when we ask where an example of the πολιτεία, of the 'well-mingled State,' is to be found, the answer is but doubtful. Sparta, perhaps, came near it, for the Spartan constitution held democratic, monarchic, and oligarchic elements in steady equilibrium. But Aristotle confesses—ἡ μηδέποτε τήν μέσην γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν, ἢ ὀλιγάκις καὶ παρ' ὀλίγοις. Thus he is at one with Tacitus, where he says—'dēlecta ex his et consociata Reipublicæ forma laudari facilius quam evenire,' though he would deny that, when the mixed State was once formed, 'haud diuturna esse potest.'

We have sketched Aristotle's analysis of the factors, historical, political, and social, that made up the Greek States, and the causes that disturbed them. The international relations of the States to each other must now be considered.

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VIII.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE GREEK CITIES.

The very essence of the Greek City-state was isolated, self-governed freedom. For a city to be subject to the

41 Pol. iv. 11, 19. Solon also had the praise of 'mixing the State well,' as the Areopagus represented oligarchy; the elective nature of the governors, aristocracy; and the juries, democracy. (Pol. ii. 9.)
commands of another state in the regulation of her foreign affairs, was almost to cease to be a city at all, and to become a nondescript community, as much wanting in definite position as the once free citizen who has become the subject of a tyrant. Autonomy was as much the note of the free State, as a share in deliberative and judicial functions was the note of the full citizen. Many reasons might be given to help to explain this peculiarly Greek demand of autonomous independence for each state, which caused at once the variety, the many-sided development, and the weakness and disunion of the race. The physical structure of Hellas, with its various climates, its deeply indented coasts, its walls of mountains, its different classes of productive soil, tending to sever city from city, and the mode of life in one state from the mode of life in another. To these natural causes must be added the force of religion, which combined the associations of ancestral kindred with those of locality. When once the religions of the gentes had been united under the sanction of a higher and more comprehensive worship, when once the city had been placed under the protection of an Olympic God, as Apollo, Athene, Hera, the limits of early Greek religion had been reached. The citizen, whose patron was Athenë, could not allow his state to be swayed by the citizens who worshipped Hera in chief place. 'The Gods are hard to reconcile,' and all the instincts of the Greeks prevented them from making the effort. True, it was religion that tried to unite city with city, just as religion had united γένος with γένος. The Amphic-

42 Pol. iv. 4, 11. αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἡ πόλις, τὸ δὲ δούλου οὐκ αὐτάρκης.
tyonies of Calauria, of Delphi and Pylæ, the gatherings at Delos and at Olympia, were all the result of a feeling that tribes of Hellenes were one in blood and faith. It might have been expected that, just as the old hospitalities, in which one village received deputies from another village to its sacred feast, had promoted the combination of villages into the city, so the meetings of Ionians, Doriens, Dolopes, Perrhæbians, and so on, at Delphi and Pylæ, would help to amalgamate cities into a nation, or at least into a confederacy. But the greater Amphictyony was after all a survival from the tribal times, from ages earlier, perhaps, than the foundation of the City-states, which, when once founded, exercised so absorbing an influence over their citizens, that Greek states never could coalesce into a Greek nation. Confederacies there were in plenty, such as the Theban confederacy, the Athenian alliance. But just as few Greeks, with all their hatred of tyranny, could resist the temptation of an opportunity to become tyrants, so neither Thebes nor Athens could bear to be only first among equals. The confederacies of the flourishing age of Greece were always weakened by ambition on the one side and jealous watchfulness on the other. There were, however, two causes which tended to promote a national feeling in Greece, and to give a more than parochial breadth to Greek politics, but these causes had ceased to act in the age when Aristotle surveyed the constitutions of Hellas. Resistance to the barbarous power of Persia in the struggle that saved civilisation went near to combine all Hellenes, though, even in the face of the Persian invasion, Thebes and Thessaly stood aloof,
Argos was doubtful, or took the side of barbarism. Again, after Persia ceased to be formidable, the strife for supremacy between Athens and Sparta divided Greece into two camps—the camp, in a sense, of Democracy, and the camp of Oligarchy, and it might have been hoped that the complete victory of either side would result in some sort of steadfast unity. But, unhappily, the pretext of liberty, whether urged by Athens or Sparta, only covered the ambition to erect a Tyrant State on the ruins of free Commonwealths, and the ultimate exhaustion of both powers left Greece, free indeed, but without a policy or an aim, save the sentimental policy of Isocrates, without even a wholesome dissension. When Thebes had grown to an equality with the two 'primary States'—Thebes, which in the struggle for the very existence of Greece had sided with the powers of darkness—a sound national feeling had ceased to be possible, and Greek politics became a chaos of petty and hostile ambitions. The new Athenian naval confederacy broke up disastrously; the backward States, Phocis and Arcadia, arose in sudden strength that had none of the polish of the old leading cities. The ambition of Phocis ended in the sack of Delphi, and in the consequent destruction of the associations that made the religious unity of Greece. Meanwhile the power of Macedon was growing up in the background, as surely and stealthily as the power of Brandenburg in modern Europe. The character of the individual Greek citizen had also been changing, his ideas becoming blurred and confused, through circumstances which need to be glanced at.
IX.

CAUSES AFFECTING THE PERSONAL CHARACTER OF THE CITIZENS.

The sources of dissension within the cities, and the causes of revolution which we have been considering, were all, it may be said, of a necessary character. It was necessary, if the States were ever to exist at all, that interests should clash, that there should be a struggle for power between sacred privilege and numbers, between wealth and birth, and the force of the majority and the might of individual ambition and genius. But when the struggle had been decided in one way or another, when the balance had been struck, which might unfortunately be so easily disarranged by a slight access of strength to the Demos, or to the Oligarchs, the cities had acquired each an individual ethos, or character. One was adventurous, industrious, full of variety of mood, yet constantly set on maintaining democratic freedom, like Athens; one was steadily devoted to military glory, and submitted to military drill, like Sparta; another was commercial, like Corinth; another reposed indolently on the labour of an enslaved agricultural class, like Thebes. Whatever the ethos of the State, it was most important, for the avoidance of revolution, that the ethos should be impressed on all the citizens, and that the social tone should not be offended by individual vagaries, by 'a want of conformity to the standard of opinion in daily life,' like that which was censured in
Alcibiades. Besides the ethos of each state, there was what may be called the Hellenic ethos, the conformity to Greek ideas, to vary from which was to cease to be a good Greek, as to vary from the character of the State was to cease to be a good citizen. Now the character which the opinion of Hellas demanded from every true citizen might be summed in one word—Patriotism. Patriotism set the claims of the city above all other claims, urged the Greek to spend and be spent ‘as if his body were not his own but another’s,’ in the interests of the State. The patriotism might be narrow, but it was genuine, and after the Persian war it was sapped by many causes. First came acquaintance with foreign lands, alien religions, non-Hellenic customs in daily life. Persian luxury and despotism, Oriental mysticism, and the wild rites of orgiastic religions, probably shocked the Greek at first; then they appealed to his love of power and his sensuality, then they set him to ask why the free institutions and temperate life of his country should be the best life. They were handed down to him by his ancestors, it is true, but wherefore should his ancestors be held wise with more than the wisdom of the Egyptians? These ideas led to speculation on the origin of society, on its religious basis, on the sanction of social rules, and in this era of enlightenment speculators were found, like the Thrasymachus of Plato, to denounce the life of the free State, to demand a return to Nature, and to defend tyranny. Political speculation was now set free, and metaphysical philosophy became more and more popular. Was it not a better and nobler thing, the Greek
had to ask himself, to strain all the mental faculties to the apprehension of truth, and in the search after God, than to haunt the Assembly, and mix in 'the Babel of sterile politics?' Thus philosophy began to draw the best minds away from the service of the State, into an exclusive sect, while the ambitious were tempted, by the sight of foreign luxury, to reject the old Greek temperance, to desire unlimited wealth, splendour, and power. Clubs and Symmories began to claim the attachment once felt for the γέως and for the city. Upon luxury and culture followed indolence, and life became too sweet to be wasted in the service of the State. Thus mercenary forces began to be employed, and if any Greek felt the old warlike impulse, he preferred to take arms as a condottiere in Oriental or other service, where booty was plentiful, rather than to stay at home and defend the frontiers of his city. Thus the younger and poorer men were withdrawn from their states, and this, with the increased luxury of the rich, and with the fact that the old lots of land which supported a yeoman's family, were united in the hands of a few great proprietors, along with the system of marrying 'in and in,' brought about that ὄνταγανθρώπια, decline of population, which was the bane of Sparta. On the other hand, there arose just the opposite evil, as Aristotle thought it, for the commercial activity of the maritime cities increased their population out of measure; the spirit of colonising was spent; citizenship was too easily conferred, or might be claimed.

43 Plato, Laws, 701 C. On the 'Titanic' character of the later Greeks.
with less chance of detection. Thus the crowd of paid jurors, a pauperised aristocracy of thousands, was tempted to raise the never gratified cry of \( \gamma\gamma\sigma \ \alpha\nu\varphi\varepsilon \delta\varepsilon\alpha\sigma\mu\omega\), to demand the meting out afresh of the lands of the rich, and did, if Aristotle is to be believed, inflict heavy and unjust fines, which went into the common fund for pleasures. But the philosophers probably exaggerated the real proportions of the Red Terror in Greek democracies.

X.

PRACTICAL AIMS OF ARISTOTLE.

The picture of the political state of Greece in the time of Aristotle, which has been sketched, is, perhaps, too darkly coloured. There was plenty of life left in Hellas, and she had not even yet 'completed her practical tasks in the domain of Politics.' But, on the whole, the spirit of her people was, for the future, to 'continue its activity in freedom from local boundaries,' was to flood the world with the light of civilisation, not to kindle a bright and solitary fire before the shrines of Apollo and Athene. To us, in the perspective of time, the unbroken continuity of Greek life is apparent, but to the contemporaries of Aristotle the new years seemed so different.

44 Confiscations by Demagogues, Pol. v. 5, 5. While the old Greek ideas prevailed, there would seem no injustice to the heirs in confiscation. The whole house had sinned with the sinner. Cf. Boeckh. Public Economy of Athens, Engl. Transl. 393. Does Diexarchus say it was a favourite practice with the Athenians 'to entrap the resident aliens,' or is he speaking of the baser sort whom he calls the Attici, p. 141?
from the old, that they may well have thought the continuity stopped, the existence of Hellas ended. Greece was not dead, but changed—so changed that those who looked back to the years in which she best fulfilled her own ideas, the years of Salamis and Himera, when she withstood in one day the whole force of two alien barbarisms—or to the age of Pericles—might well have thought her dead. Yet we find Aristotle studying her political conditions, as if she were still the Hellas of times past, and we may well ask what was the nature of his practical hopes and aims.

In the first place Aristotle had to recognise the fact that, what with the weakening of Sparta and Athens, the rise of Macedon, the failing strength of the old natural enemy, Persia, what with the new cosmopolitan philosophies and the spread of enlightenment, national feeling, attachment to the city, exclusive pride in Hellenism, were waning forces. It has been suggested that he wished to revive the national sentiment, in the spirited words which contrast Greeks with the warlike and unsettled tribes of the North, and with the tame, though crafty Asiatics. 'Greece might rule the world, if she came under one single government,' he says, and the hint may imply a whole theory of an united Greece, combined with and absorbing the military order and drill of Macedon.45 There is no word, however, to tell how Aristotle would have produced the union; whether it would have been a παμβασιλεία, a monarchy of the

45 Pol. vii. 7. This is the view of Oncken, 'Die Staatslehre des Aristot.' ii. 272, 274: 'Und bleibt als Panhellenisches Ideal des Aristoteles nur übrig, der Bund der Hellenischen Freistaaten unter der Schirmherrschaft des Makedonischen Königthums, &c.'

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one best man, or a federation. But Greece would have thought such a federation, under the leadership of Macedon, as low as the subjection of Thessaly seemed to Demosthenes, \( \mu\eta\ \mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \pi\omicron\omicron\epsilon\omicron\omicron\ \alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \xi\theta\nu\eta\ \delta\omicron\omicron\lambda\epsilon\omicron\epsilon\omicron\). So slight is Aristotle's allusion, that we are compelled to guess that he only glanced at the idea, and put it away as one too happy ever to be realised. If he did not hope then for an united Hellas, what manner of political life did he still think possible for Greeks, under the old political forms of the City-state? To answer this we must remind ourselves of the extent to which politics and morals blended and merged in the minds of Greeks. The State was, as has often been said, like an University, or, again, like a Religious Order; its drill, the devotion it claimed, were like the enthusiasm demanded from his followers by the founder of the Company of Jesus. Now if Greeks could either forget that the sceptre of the world had passed from Hellas, or could accept the old city life on a lower level of dignity in face of the rest of the world, the old city form might still suffice for the politico-moral training of men. Aristotle, therefore, seriously studied all the conditions of past Greek political experience, and, if he could not cure the evils which vitiated the life of the State, could at least put his finger on them, and say, 'Thou ailest here, and here.'

This kind of pathological examination of the states and their disorders is, in short, Aristotle's \textit{practical} contribution to Greek State-lore. His minute diagnosis of the diseases of the polities had never been so well attempted before, and, as he himself said, if we know
the causes of the ruin of states, we know the remedies. In the first place even the most minute violations of Law were to be scrupulously guarded against, for the accumulative force of many small changes destroys the strength of Law, which lies in Custom. Here Aristotle is far enough removed from our conception of Law as a living thing, that develops with the changes of society, and he rather holds to the ancient theory which wished to stereotype and fix society in a stationary condition. Again, the party of the State which possessed power should never use it to harm 'those within or those outside of the constitution.' Thus he recommends short terms of rule, as short as six months, to avoid all appearance of injustice in a State where many share the highest franchise. Short terms of office, also, are unfavourable to the growth of tyranny. Again, in oligarchies and polities, where there is a money qualification for the highest franchise, there must be a yearly census to prevent a depreciation, or a rise in the value of money, from disturbing the balance of the State. And this is only one practical way of guarding against the disproportionate growths of power, which destroy the artistic symmetry and pervert the very life of cities. A censorship should watch over private morals in the same interest, and rich and poor should be made to feel that they are not hostile camps, but have the same real interests in political permanency. This will follow from a system of unpaid magistracies, which the poor will desire less, and whose holders they will not envy.

In Democracies, not only should all clamours for division of property be repressed, but not even the
incomes of the rich should be subject to disproportionate charges. Aristotle disapproves of the large and unnecessary expenses incurred by volunteers at Athens, to provide spectacles, banquets, and music for the enjoyment of the Demos, though one might suppose that, where there was no wasteful extravagance, such liberality was a happy mode of keeping up φιλία between rich and poor. To be brief, Aristotle advises all governments, of whatever shade, to avoid being too emphatically themselves. The less democratic a demos is, the less oligarchic an oligarchy, the less tyrannous a tyrant, the more each of these forms of rule approaches the natural ‘mean,’ and the more likely is it to last undisturbed.

Practically, then, Aristotle recognises the State, even in its erring forms, as a most valuable educational organism, whose value improves with its permanency. It might, even in his late time, remain the best environment of the noble life. And thus Aristotle did not think it below him to frame laws for his native city of Stagira, where, even in the fourteenth century of our era, he was revered ‘as thoughe he were a seynte,’ and where men hoped ‘that through inspiracioun of God and of hym, they schulde have the better Conseile.’

46 Mandeville, Voyage and Travaile, p. 16.
XI.

SLAVERY, COMMERCE, AND THE LATER DEMOCRACIES.

The mind of Aristotle, like the Greek State system itself, was influenced by traditional ideas older than the development of the State, and he attempted to apply these ideas at a period of history when the State was being sapped and weakened by many novel forces. The confused result is very plain in Aristotle's discussion of the questions of Slavery, of Commerce, and of ultimate Democracy. In the first place he was anxious to support the Conservative view of the institution of Slavery. This view was threatened on many sides. In the sphere of politics, both Tyranny and Democracy tended to relax the restraints imposed on slaves, and we learn from Xenophon, as well as guess from Aristotle, that the slaves in Athens were well-to-do, richer than many citizens, free and easy, not distinguishable in their attire by the one-sleeved tunic, not to be struck by men who were not their masters. Again, the new theories were all against slavery. Speculators called it a violation of Nature, just as Rousseau did so many centuries later.\(^{47}\) The Flesh and Blood argument of Mr. Gladstone was applied to slavery. 'God made all free, Nature has made no man a slave,' said Alcidamas. 'No one is worse when he becomes a slave, who was

\(^{47}\) Rousseau, *Discours*, p. 65:—'Se trouve-t-il un homme d'une force assez supérieure à la mienne, et de plus assez dépravé, assez paresseux, et assez féroce, pour me contraindre à pourvoir à sa subsistance pendant qu'il demeure oisif; il faut qu'il se résolve à ne me pas perdre de vue un seul instant.'
good when a freeman,' said Euripides, contradicting the Homeric saw,

\[ \text{\textit{εὖ\: σα\: τή\: αμα\: α\: αν\: τ\: τή\: Ζε\: ν\: κα\: τά\: δούλο\: ν\: ἡ\: μα\: ρ\: ἐ\: λή\: σι\: ν.} \]

Again, 'if one be a slave, he hath the same flesh as the free, for no man ever was born a slave by Nature, but evil fortune has enslaved his body.'

In opposition to this sentiment, and in accordance with his firm belief in old Greek ideas, Aristotle goes to work to prove that slavery is natural. One argument comes easily to hand; all Nature is arranged as a hierarchy of rulers and ruled, and it is necessary to the safety of society that the element of society which has full reason should direct the element that has mere bodily strength. The poets had said as much: 'It is right that Hellenes should rule barbarians.' (Eurip. \textit{Iph. Aul.} 1400.) This text proves that the idea is an orthodox one; besides, everything Nature makes has some purpose, nay, has one purpose, and to what purpose were barbarians created except to be slaves, and wild beasts except to be hunted? Again, a household is a natural community, and to suffice the wants of this community there must be instruments. Now instruments will not work at the word of command, so there is absolute need of living instruments. The poor man has only his ox, but \textit{Nature} (improving on this early state of the slaveless Phocians) has provided slaves, that is, men who are naturally not their own property.\(^{49}\) Slaves differ as

\(^{48}\) Cf. Oncken, 'Staatslehre des Aristoteles.' Vol. ii. p. 34.

\(^{49}\) Atheneus, 6. 86, 88: 'Phocians had no slaves at one time. Slaves may be divided into the classes of slaves bought, slaves bred in the
much from other men as body differs from soul, and beast from man. The best thing they have to contribute to the community is simply their bodily strength.

Here we meet the difficulty that Nature has separated body and soul, man and beast, by obvious unmistakable differences. Now why has she not separated citizens and slaves as widely? To answer this Aristotle looks about for visible differences. First, slaves are barbarians; again, slaves have not the erect port which the freeman gained from the gymnasia and arms, forbidden to the unfree. Aristotle was unfortunate in the fact that the slaves of the Greeks were not negroes, for then he might have said in earnest, what Montesquieu said in irony, about the impossibility of supposing that God had meant to give freedom to beings with such ill-formed noses.

Aristotle's search for an universally acknowledged difference between the shape and semblance of slaves and freemen being half a failure, he has to declare that Nature 'wishes to make their bodies different.' But Nature, as we have seen, does not always get her own way. It is for the philosophers to detect her intentions, and explain them, and therefore Aristotle proclaims that Nature has made the two classes of free and slave, though she has only occasionally succeeded in making the difference visible. (Ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις, οὐ μὲντοι δύναται.) A later chapter sets out that the slave is indeed a man, but that his virtues family, and slaves taken in war. The Chians were the first buyers of slaves. There were slaves attached to sacred territory, and unfree land-serfs. Cf. Hermann's 'Lehrbuch der Griechischen Antiquitäten,' iii. 79-90.
only correspond to those of the part of the soul which is obedient to reason. To soften the severity of the argument, Aristotle alleges that the relation is for the good of the slave (accidentally), as well as (essentially) for the good of the master. Moreover, there is an affection of a sort between master and slave, and through his relations to the master the slave is 'a partaker in common life,' as indeed he is accepted into the religious services of the household to which he belongs. He may also, if he be a free-born Greek taken in war, console himself by reflecting that he is not naturally, but only casually, a slave.

In this argument Aristotle uses Nature in his favourite sense of the perfected development of institutions. The State is such an institution.\(^{50}\) The State consists of freemen at leisure, and only through slave-labour is that leisure to be obtained. The philosopher has passed beyond even the old aristocratic sentiment of Homer's time. Odysseus was a practised ship-builder and husbandman, but Aristotle'sburghers would disdain to hew wood, and to dig they would be ashamed. Thus slavery is necessary, and, like Plato in the Laws (777 D), Aristotle would prefer to have barbarous slaves of various speech, rather than to employ an earlier subject population of Greeks, as did the Thessalians and Spartans. The theory seems odious to us, because we have been used to see the old institution, which in ancient society had a meaning and a purpose, namely the attainment of the perfect life, existing in a society with a changed conscience, and a changed purpose—money-making.

\(^{50}\) Pol, i. 1.
To understand and to forgive Aristotle’s opinions on slavery, let us remember what Christian philosophy of the best period had to say on this matter. Ægidius Romanus, a pupil of S. Thomas Aquinas, reasons thus: Man has fallen from the liberty he had in Paradise, has lost the right to belong to himself, and is thus naturally liable to be made a slave. Again, he is legally liable to become a slave, if he is taken captive in war. The author of the ‘Summa Theologîæ’ also avers that slavery though unnatural before the Fall, is now rather an addition to, than a departure from, the Law of Nature.

When theology aids political speculation in this happy way, there is clearly a deep and powerful conviction of human nature at the bottom of the theory that slavery is natural. The cause of this conviction is long custom. Captives taken in war pay with their liberty the ransom of their lives. Again, children are naturally the property of their parents, who, in Greece, might sell them till they reached the age of seven. Again, certain disgraceful actions have in most ages been punished with loss of liberty, and in early times men gambled away their bodies and their freedom, or bowed their necks for bread in time of famine, or lost their liberty through debt. Thus all nations have been familiar with the fact of slavery, and with the theory of naturally distinct classes of men. When philosophers, as culture advanced, have tried to discover the ideal, and the aim of life, they have looked on it as the aim of the best class, and have found a fitting function for

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52 Kemble, ‘Saxons in England.’ The Unfree.
the other classes in mere service. All this is shocking to us, who neither believe in natural distinctions of classes, nor in any universal aim of life, except that of 'getting on in the world.' We therefore leave all nominally free to strive towards this noble goal, which we well know that only the few can reach. The ancients, and the Christian doctors we have alluded to, were equally well aware that but few could attain to their very different goal—Perfection. The former accepted slavery as a means towards that end, the latter knew that no earthly condition made its attainment impossible.

Finally, we must remember that no one would have been more bitter than Aristotle against the negro-slavery on plantations of modern days. To turn the servants of the noble life into tools of limitless money-making, would have been, in his view, unnatural. We must remember also, that he would have held up the promise and reward of freedom, to stimulate his serfs to virtuous lives, and, with freedom in prospect, and friendship in the meantime, with every lovely rite of divine service performed for their sake, there may have been worse lives than those of the Greek slaves.\(^53\) The heroic fathers of their masters had often borne the yoke, when captured in battle, and the father of the Ionian race, Apollo, the mediator between men and Zeus, had come down to earth upon a time, and had been the slave of the king Admetus. Thus, while we may wish to see

\(^53\) *Econ.* I. vi. :—Δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἔλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἄθλον· καὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις μᾶλλον τῶν δουλῶν ἔνεκα ποι- εῖσθαι, ἣ τών ἔλευθέρων, πλείονα γὰρ ἔχουσιν οὗτοι οὕτε περ ἔνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνομίσθη.
a state of things in which life shall have a noble aim, towards which all shall be equally free to strive, we cannot agree with writers who allege that 'Plato and Aristotle, with almost cynical heedlessness, sacrificed the toiling multitude to a select moral oligarchy, who appropriated the virtues by a kind of natural selection.' If the domestic slave, the bright side of whose lot we have sketched, and if the husbandman slave in his subject commune, and his life under a Grecian sky, were 'cynically sacrificed,' what shall we say of our own miners, and of our own starved and ignorant peasantry?

Aristotle found that Nature was in conformity with Greek practice in the matter of Slavery. But Nature was out of conformity with Greek practice in the matter of Commerce. Aristotle proves this by using 'Nature' in the reverse of his usual way. Slavery was natural, because it was a finished result of the working of circumstance and reason in human life. Money is unnatural, because money is not a primitive institution, but the result of a covenant, that is, the result of the working of circumstance and reason in human life.

Acquisition of all things absolutely needful, beginning with food, which Nature provides for the chicken in the egg, is necessary, and thus barter is natural, as it provides things necessary, and no more. But money is neither a natural product, nor a thing of any intrinsic usefulness, nor a thing to the desire and collection of which there is any fixed limit, and, though dead matter, it manages in some unholy fashion to breed its like, in the shape of interest. Commerce employs this unnatural substance, and commerce makes gain from the
other party to the bargain, while usury is a sort of crime, like 'sweating' the coin. In this tirade against money Aristotle is really taking up a position like that of Rousseau. He wants to go back to a state of nature in which barter supplied all natural wants, and forgets that, without money, no civilisation like that which he delighted in, and no intercourse between polished nations, would have been practicable. He forgets, too, that, even before money was invented, people might find no limit to wealth-seeking. The \( \xi\omega\eta\ \alpha\sigma\pi\epsilon\tau\omicron\sigma\) of Odysseus (Od. xiv. 96) went beyond limit of his consumption, and its aim was, not nurture, but power, as he could make grants to his comitatus out of his herds and flocks. In fact Aristotle is carried away by the old aristocratic hatred of trade, as marked in Greece as ever it was in feudal Europe. He has the Socratic contempt for any man who 'prostitutes' his courage for gain, as a soldier, or his eloquence for gain, as an orator, or his wisdom, as a teacher. All such conduct makes that an instrument which should be an end. The love of money has brought strangers into all cities, and spoiled the \( \epsilon\theta\omicron\omicron\omicron\) and confused the customs. Money has put power in the hands of men of no birth, and has enabled the Demos to leave his handicrafts or field-labour, and attend to politics, and pay himself by confiscations. For it is difficult for the poor to meet in unpaid Assemblies, and, where there are no revenues, this paying of Assemblies is hostile to the few, for the money must come from taxes, and fines, and unjust courts of Jurors. (Pol. vi. 5, 5.)

If commerce had not been unduly developed, if
Athens had not been the mart of all the world, her revenue from dues and customs would have been much smaller; there would have been no great fortunes, and liberal rich men; nothing, in fact, to tempt the people to desert the country for the town. She would have continued to be the early democracy, or polity, of husbandmen, not the last democracy of craftsmen and hirelings. Without spectacles, gratuitous distributions of food, without the feasts and ceremonies, 'such as no other city in Greece rejoiced in,' the poor would not have crowded into Athens, would not have been half supported by the State, and enabled to make their decrees law. Without the intercourse of trade, they would not have spoken in an accent, and worn garments, and practised customs, 'mixed up out of all that Greeks and Barbarians use separately.'

Commerce, in short, made the laxest democracy possible, and the laxest democracy was as fond of fining the rich, as fond of pleasure, as given up to flatterers, as the tyrant. It is easy to oppose facts to these charges of Aristotle, as far as they are urged against Athens; easy to allege that the heliastic oath ensured the State against any selfish injustice of the people, to show that the steady undebased standard of coinage proves a rare political honesty; that the Nomothetae, and the trials for illegal proposals, must have checked the popular will as expressed in decrees; and it may even be asserted that the Theoric fund answers to our Church endowments, instead of to the civil list of a Tyrant. On the other hand, many of the

religious feasts were ἐπιθέτοι ἐορταῖ, innovations on the old religion, and were pampered while the ancient rites were stinted. The evidence of Isocrates, Xenophon, and the Comedians is on the side of the philosophical foes of ultimate democracy. The philosophers preferred to look at the dark, the modern historians enjoy the bright, side of the character of the great city, whose very degeneracy was a not unlovely scene of common enjoyment, of noble pleasures, and artistic luxury. The enjoyment was too incessant, the art too luxurious, the life too bright and variously blended to last. 'The constitution of things proved somehow to be against it;' but this was only half the reason of the censure freely spoken by Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon. They echoed, in a stately way, the grumbling of rich men, who, on the whole, were probably not ill-satisfied with their native city, which declined because 'everything which has a beginning has also an end,' and because even the city that was 'the Rose of Greece' had its term like other flowers. (Lysippus ap. Dicæarch. p. 141.)

XII.

ARISTOTLE'S IDEAL STATE.

There is nothing more characteristic in Greek political feeling than the almost religious attachment to the State. The Athenians of Pericles' time considered their very lives not their own, but the possession of the City,
through which alone their lives were, in their eyes, free and worth keeping.\textsuperscript{55} We have already pointed out the many causes that broke up this feeling of devotion, and proofs of the change in sentiment may be found in Aristotle's conception of the ideal State. It is true that no one speaks out more clearly than he as to the supreme position of the city, which is, as he puts it, prior \textit{in idea} to the family and the citizen. The family and the individual only exist, he almost seems to hold, as factors which are at last to compose that ultimate and perfect whole, the State. Yet when we come to examine his ideal State (\textit{kat' e\i}"\textit{\i}\textit{hyn}), we cannot but detect traces of a wish to make the State an organism to subserve the happiness of the individual.\textsuperscript{56} It is true that, in affording an environment, and all outward appliances of perfect happiness, as well as in supplying all the human relations within which perfect virtue may be exercised, the State also attains to what Aristotle thinks its own proper perfection. But it cannot be concealed that Aristotle's conception of perfect happiness is somewhat self-regarding. His citizens, no less than the citizens of Plato, are all to be philosophers, and their bliss is a philosophic satisfaction. Now a State which made this philosophic, nay almost mystic, ecstasy possible for all its citizens, would, in practice, have been likely to slip out of the active inter-political life of Hellas, and would have been prosperous only if it were possible that a state should be planted somewhere in

\textsuperscript{55} Pol. viii. 1, 4. The same view expressed by Aristotle.

\textsuperscript{56} Curtius' History of Greece, v. 205 (Engl. Transl.). 'The spiritual life of the Individual became the standard whereby to judge of the Commonwealth.'
isolation.' Thus, with all his caution, Aristotle, like Plato, cannot reconcile himself to the natural and spontaneous ideas of Hellas.

There are one or two expressions in the 'Republic' of Plato which strike a kind of key-note, prolonged with variations, in the 'Ideal State' of Aristotle. Plato writes: 'If Philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she herself is, then it will be seen that she is in truth divine;' and again: 'The question is how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as to be consistent with the preservation of the State.' Now Aristotle, too, conceives 'an End (τέλος) which shall be the same for the perfect man and the perfect State,' a standard of virtue which shall be the same for the individual and the State. This end is attained, and this standard reached, by those only who possess 'the good things of the spirit that are the more precious even as they are the more exceeding abundant,' in contrast with outward wealth, which has a natural limit. Such men, and a state composed of such men, are alone to be called happy, nay blessed with a bliss beyond all the mere good repute and praise that is given to justice. 'No man eulogises happiness as men praise justice, but he calls it "blessed," as something better and more divine.' Again, in the same passage of 'The Ethics,' he says: 'We hold the Gods to be blessed and happy, and even so we call the most divine of men blessed.' Compare the words in 'The Ethics,' where the Deity is adduced as an example of the blessed estate resulting from the full possession of virtue and wisdom, and an existence in harmony with

57 Rep. 497 C. 58 Pol. vii. 15. 59 Eth. i. 12, 4.
these. From these texts it follows that the ideal State of Aristotle, with its citizens who are called 'blessed' (μακάριοι), does not rest on mere political and moral virtue. Moral virtue is a thing not beyond the reach of praise, not too rare and holy for comparison with other conditions, and for encomium. The τέλος, the ultimate end of the happy life, is, by its very essence, unattainable in the merely righteous existence of the law-respecting citizen. It is like the happiness of the Gods (Ethics, x. 8, 7), who 'alone are all blessed, yet not through a life of moral practice. For what actions of morality can we assign to them—acts of justice? There is something ludicrous in the conception of their keeping covenants, and making exchanges—. . . . acts of generosity—to whom will they make gifts?'—and so on. Yet there is an activity of self-conscious life in the blessed beings, who do not sleep like Endymion, which can be nothing else than the ecstatic contemplation called θεωρία. Now (Eth. x. 8, 8) the life of mortals is only happy so far as it has a kind of likeness to this divine activity. ὥστ' εἴη ἄν εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τίς.

From this conception of Happiness, apart from action, which is to be the portion of the perfect man in the perfect State, it follows that Aristotle, like Plato, wants to devise a State which may be preserved in full civic life, while at the same time it affords a milieu for the mystic life. In this polity the philosopher will not be a forlorn stranger, but will find the satisfaction of the civic and political sentiment of Greece, and also the enjoyable and satisfying activity of the divine part of
his nature; will, in fact, live the best life of practice, and the blessed life too, in the society of his peers (όμοιοι). In such a city his happiness will not be subject to the reproach of do-nothingness, with which the philosophers in the ordinary States of Greece were justly assailed. How then are these peers in philosophy, this company for the leading of the best life, to be fitted with the χορηγία or necessary outward appliances and goods of a free, temperate, generous existence? How is their city to be ordered and governed?

These are the questions discussed in the 7th and 8th books of the ‘Politics’ of Aristotle. Keeping his aim always before us, it is easy to understand the limitations of his ideal State. It is neither to be a state organised merely with a view to the fostering of martial valour—an encampment, as it were, like Sparta—nor a commercial city, eager for wealth, and making itself all men’s mart, like Athens. From the example of the Spartan discipline Aristotle borrows the idea that it is possible to keep a city constant to an aim, possible to enforce simplicity of life, and uniformity of drill and of education. From Plato he continues the idea of a city of philosophers, but, unlike Plato, he attempts to bring in no innovation, to establish no institution, such as community in wives, children, and property, which experience shows to be contrary to the universal instincts of humanity. Thus we may conceive of the ideal State of Aristotle as almost Platonic in its aim, almost Spartan in the strictness of its discipline, but always limited by

60 Pol. vii. 2, 1; Pol. vii. 2, 5. καθ' ἡν τὰξιν καὶν ὁσισοῦν ἀριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῇν μακαρίως.
the thought of conditions which history proves to be necessary, and widened by the desire of liberal enjoyment.

In the first place, then, the founder of a city of men who are to be peers in their capacity for leading the highest life, must be allowed to choose citizens of a noble nature, men of spirit and intelligence. Again, they must not be too numerous, as a large state is not easily kept to its discipline, nor do the citizens find it possible to gain the requisite knowledge of each other’s capacity for rule, while strangers slip unnoticed into the roll of citizens.\(^61\) States, too, have their natural and necessary limit, like all other things, in art and nature. The natural limit of a state is found in the number of citizens necessary to provide the political conditions of sufficiency (\(\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\rho\kappa\epsilon\iota\alpha\)) in every respect. The extent of land must be just so great as to support this number of citizens and their families in a life of freedom, leisure, and temperance; to feed their agricultural labourers, who are to be unfree; and to supply provisions for the priesthoods and sacrifices of the Gods. Thus the \(\delta\mu\omega\iota\omicron\) are all landholders, and so are nobles. As nobles at leisure, they will be enabled to live the higher life of excellence, on which their happiness depends. Any form of labour, or of commerce, would absorb the leisure absolutely necessary for the happy and completely virtuous life. ‘The citizens must not live the life of traders, nor of artisans, for that existence is ignoble, and opposed to virtue, nor must our citizens be husbandmen, for there is absolute need of entire

\(^{61}\) Scrutiny at Athens generally detected crowds of aliens.
leisure for the development of virtue and for the conduct of political affairs.'

Men who provide, either as artisans, tradesfolk, or husbandmen, for the wants of the citizens, are, as being incapable, ex hypothesi, of the precise life, no element in the State (μόριον), but only conditions out of which the material structure of the State is built. The full citizens are, so far, in the position of the full citizens of Sparta, but their leisure is not given up to warlike training alone, but to culture. Their agricultural labourers are to be unlike the Helots, for they are to be, as far as possible, men who do not share the same blood and speech, nor are they to have the warlike valour of the Helots. The land is to be so divided that each citizen shall have two lots, one near the border of the State, like the properties called ἐσχατιαί in Attica, the other near the city. Thus the citizens will all be equal in their interests as well as in their training, and none of the demes will oppose a war because it ravages their estates, and leaves unharmed the lands of demes nearer the town. On private lands the slaves are to be private property; on the folk-lands and temple-lands, public property. The many dangers which arise from inequality of property, from a χορηγία which is not σύμμετρος, are thus in part provided against. Landed property is equalised, and only from his land can the citizen who is true to the theory of natural wealth derive riches. Again, no citizen is exposed to the risk of losing his franchise through inability to provide for his own meal at the common tables. The subscription to these, by an improvement on the Spartan practice, is defrayed out of the produce of the folk-land.
Thus leisure is secured to all the citizens. There remains, however, a danger to equality of wealth, in the chances of making large fortunes by commerce. Thus the question is raised, shall the ideal State be near the sea?

Without sharing Plato’s horror of the ‘bitter, brackish element, filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and begetting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways,’ Aristotle yet keeps in mind his own doctrine that ‘a naval power is ever democratic.’ He is anxious to keep out strangers nurtured in alien laws, to check the overflowing population of a seaport, and yet to have the means of importing the necessaries of civilisation. His State is to be a mart for her own good, not for others’ profit, and thus requires a harbour near the city, yet not too near. Again, he will have a navy, if his State is to be a leading State in Greece, but the ναυτικὸς ὄχλος shall no more share in the State than the husbandmen. The officers and fighting men on board ship alone are to be freemen, and of the ruling class. Aristotle can allow himself this license of fancy in a State κατ’ εὐχήν, and he finds an instance of the possibility of an unfree naval force in the case of Heraclea, in Pontus, where the Perioeci manned the navy. Indeed, the oarsmen, even in Athens, must as a rule have been slaves: those who rowed at Arginusae were rewarded with their freedom. The demand for slave seamen shows that Aristotle’s ideal State is based, as much as Plato’s, on the existence of supposed natural distinctions among classes of men. Plato frankly proposes to get these distinctions generally admitted, by telling the ‘noble lie’ that there are gold, silver, and iron species
of men. Aristotle backs his conception of exclusive divisions, proposed in Book I., by the historical instance of Castes in Egypt.\textsuperscript{62} 'Apparently it is not to-day, nor even lately, that the discovery has been made by theorists on constitutional government, that the State should be marked out into castes (hereditary classes), and that the element which fights should be separate from that which tills the soil. For this is the case even now in Egypt, and also in Crete; Sesostris, it is said, having legislated to this effect for Egypt, and Minos for Crete.' In the same way Plato, in the 'Timæus,' makes the Egyptian priest say to Solon, 'If you compare our laws with your own, you will find that many of ours are the counterpart of yours as they were in the olden time. In the first place, there is the caste of priests, which is separated from all the others; next there are the artificers, who exercise their several trades by themselves, and without admixture of any other; and also there is the class of shepherds, and that of hunters, as well as that of husbandmen; and you will observe, too, that the warriors in Egypt are separated from all the other classes, and are commanded by the law only to engage in war.'\textsuperscript{63} There seems very little reason to believe that a rigid caste system ever existed in Greece, though we hear of families among which certain crafts, and music, and the performance of sacred rites were hereditary. But the idea of natural distinctions among men, distinctions which Nature did not quite succeed in marking by physical differences, was congenial and useful

\textsuperscript{62} Pol. vii. 10, 1–6; Herodot. ii. 164–167.

\textsuperscript{63} Plato, Timæus, 24 A.
to both Aristotle and Plato, who, believing that events return in cycles, might easily look forward to a revival of a system of castes.

Aristotle has thus provided against most of the untoward wants that caused jealousies in Greek cities, and disturbed the happy life with politics that threatened to subvert the city. He has, as far as possible, equalised possessions, taken care that there shall be no extremes of riches and poverty, has secured leisure for all true citizens, excluded evil foreign influences, and now he comes to the question of the sovereignty. Who is to hold power? Clearly only the host, the men at arms. 'Those who have weapons in their hands have also in their hands the permanence or non-permanence of the Constitution.' This cannot include the democratic light-armed troops (ψιλή δύναμις). Within the host he draws a natural distinction, and assigns the deliberative functions to the old, who have practical wisdom. The claim 'to rule and be ruled in turn' is thus satisfied in a way; the young warriors will mature into counsellors. The old Greek idea of οἱ γέρῳντες (the elder men)—the idea of authority going with age, which is also said to be implied in the words 'eorl' (elder) and 'ceorl' (younger man), is thus maintained by Aristotle.

The city in which Aristotle's burghers are to live is to be fortunate in respect of situation. All the land must be easily surveyed from its burg, and the territory must lie fairly towards the sea, and be hard of access to foes. The town itself should face the east and 'take the morning' and the morning air. There should be springs of well water, and the houses should be built
on several places of strength. The old arrangement of narrow labyrinthine streets was safer in war, but the new regular fashion of laying out a town which Hippodamus applied to the Piræus, leaving old Athens κακῶς ἐρρυμοτομημένη διὰ τὴν ἀρχαιότητα, is fairer and more commodious.\(^{64}\) The two plans may be combined. Walls there must surely be, and means of encountering the new artillery and machines of war, while guard-towers on the walls will be occupied by members of the various messes. On a farseen height will be placed the common halls of the magistrates and priesthood, and close under their eyes the meetingplace of the free-men, not to be profaned by buying and selling. Near by will be the gymnasia of the elders, but at a distance the market-place and seats of the money-changers, and close to the mart the messroom of the magistrates who see to police and decide in suits about contracts.

Now the citizens who are to dwell in this ideal city, and be like the inhabitants of the Isles of the Blessed, will above all men need to practise philosophy, temperance, justice. Other States either do not school their people in these qualities or only in the two last, so far as they go to make up martial virtue. Thus the Spartans have rusted in disuse, in spite of their attention to training, and have even been defeated in war, and lost the empire for which they toiled. Aristotle has chosen citizens of a noble nature, and now wishes Reason to mould that nature, through education and habit, into a fitness for the virtuous leisure which is the crown of

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\(^{64}\) Dicæarch. Fragm. 140.
EDUCATION.

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life. Arguing from his own psychology he proposes to educate the body first, then the passions, then the intellect, as each severally develops. Then follow a variety of minute precepts concerned with the breeding of children, the age of marriage, and restraints on population. These are almost as strange to modern usage and sentiment as the precepts of Plato were to Aristotle and the contemporaries of Aristotle. We are scarcely concerned with the sensible rule that babies should be allowed to cry as much as they like, and unhappily we have only a fragment of the Aristotelian theory of education, after the boy, at the age of seven, is removed from the care of women. The early education is mainly corrective; the child is to see and hear nothing slavish or impure, to listen to none of the foul tales, and behold none of the fouler orgies, of heathenism. From the age of seven to fourteen, and from fourteen to twenty-one, the youthful citizens are to be subjected to a public and uniform system of schooling, of which Sparta alone gave an example. As the End of the city is one, so shall its training be one in gymnastics, music, letters, and design. No study is to be specialised; gymnastic shall not make the lads brutal, as in Sparta, nor music make them professionals. Like Plato, and like the Pythagoreans, Aristotle recognises that music has a moral quality and influence on character. He denounces the new music, with its 'wonderful feats,' and praises the educational music, of which Plutarch says that the Greeks had lost the secret. We find this theory hard to understand, even if we remember that the harmonies revealed in music appeared to the Pythagoreans the mystic echo of
the correspondences of Nature. Again, both Aristotle and Iamblichus in his Life of Pythagoras speak of the healing power (iatrēla) of music in a way which may be derived partly from old ideas about magical chants, partly from the study of instances like that of Saul. Thirdly, in early Greece, words, dance, and music went together, and could not be divided, so that to introduce new music meant the introduction of new words in place of sacred hymns, new dances, and perhaps new gods to be worshipped in the new fashion. We know that Aristotle would have retained some music for its moral effect, and more varied strains for mere delight in leisure. For the rest, his ideal State is left incomplete, because the portion of his work is lost in which he describes the education which should 'constrain and direct youth towards the right reason which the law affirms.'

XIII.

LAND-TENURE IN GREECE.

In writing of the State of Greece before the συνοίκισις, or establishment of the city, it has been said that when the Greeks still lived in villages, their land-tenure was probably like that of other early village communities. Reasoning merely from analogy, we should expect to find that the village life in Greece, like the village life in India, in Russia, in early England, in Java, among the Arabs, and so on, implied, at first, the communal

65 Laws, 659, 660.
partition of land. Each house-father would have his own enclosure round his homestead, the beginning of several property in land. This spot would be his very own, and within the sacred ἐρκος the will of the father would be law. Each householder would share with his kinsmen of the village, in the right to till his equal portion of the arable land of the village, to cut wood in the forest, and to feed his cattle on the common pasture. In very distant times it is probable that the lots of arable land were shifted at stated or uncertain periods, as population varied, and as one part of the territory was left fallow, and others taken in due rotation into culture. On this system there would be no several property except the enclosure, the tūn or ἐρκος. It is probable, however, that, as certain husbandmen acquired greater skill than their fellows in agriculture, they would object to the constant repartition of the soil; to them, as to the Russian peasants now, the partition would seem le partage noir. They would urge that they had improved their plot, and that the system of repartition was unjust to their skill, and expenditure of time, manure, and labour. As this view would probably be pressed by the more powerful men of the village, it would result in a permanent partition of the arable land. This partition would be in intention equal, but it is likely that some families of distinction would absorb more than their equal share. At all events, supposing such a division to have been made, it is pretty clear that land and freedom would go together.

66 Stubbs, Constitutional History of England, i. 52; Laveleye, De La Propriété, p. 13.
The *etiol* means both the plot of land and the freedom, and in contrast with the state of landless men, the nobility, of the landowner. This process of development of land-tenure, or something like this, is so general a fact in history that we should be tempted, *à priori*, to conclude that it occurred among the Greeks, even if we found no surviving traces of it in the early laws of Greece.

If it is possible to hold this view of the early state of land-tenure in Greece, many questions which are now obscure may be answered with some plausibility, and the answer, even if vague, will be at least intelligible. The traditions of a golden age, when there was not

*fixus in agris*

*Qui regeret certis finibus arva, lapis,*

will seem to be more than a dream of poets. We shall partly understand the origin of the tradition of the Lycurgean repartition of the soil of Sparta; we shall have some notion of the real condition of the Athenian husbandmen whom Solon relieved from debt; and we shall see that the early lawgivers, who decreed that the lot of land should never be sold, and that Aristotle and Plato, in making full citizenship depend on possession of the soil, had facts of early history to support their laws and back their theories.

Before going on to such conclusions we must notice some valuable opinions on the other side of the question. M. Fustel de Coulanges, in his work on *'La Cité Antique,'* writes that 'the populations of Greece and Rome from the earliest periods always recognised
private property in land. There never was a time when the soil was in common use, and we find no trace of the German system of annual partition.' Again, Mr. Cox, in his 'History of Greece,' brings his acquaintance with Aryan customs to bear on the question: 'All the conditions of primitive Aryan society were, as we have seen, unfavourable to, if not altogether inconsistent with, the equal subdivision of real property.'

A different view is that of Sir Henry Maine: 'There appears to be no country inhabited by an Aryan race in which traces do not remain of the ancient periodical redistribution; and 'the original distribution of arable land was always into exactly equal portions corresponding to the number of free families in the township,' and 'the periodical redistribution ended in perpetuity.' It is our object to show that the early lawgivers of Greece either lived in a time when the almost sacred tenure of the family lot, now held in perpetuity, was being broken up, or that they looked back to the tradition of such a time, and tried to restore it.

The traces of any preceding epoch of periodical redistribution are extremely faint. It existed among some of the islands, where it might be explained away as a vestige of Pelasgian practice. It is hinted at by Aristotle as having survived at Tarentum, but the reference is very doubtful. Some authors see in the very ancient common meals, or συνσίτια, the record of a time when land was cultivated in severalty, and the produce divided; as Aristotle says, 'certain of the

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67 La Cité Antique, p. 62.  
68 History of Greece, i. 80.  
69 Maine's Village Communities, pp. 31, 82.  
70 Pol. vi. 5, 10.
barbarians use.' Again, there is the fact that, when a piece of land was sold at Thurii each of the neighbours who was a witness was paid a small piece of money, as if the community had once possessed a right in the land, for which they now received a nominal satisfaction. This would be the survival from a time when, as in Hindostan, the village community had a veto on the sale of property. These are but slight hints of communal property, and we would not press the re-equalisation (ἀνομάλωσις) of Phaleas; but the traces of an early and equal division in perpetuity are more convincing.

Much the most famous instance of an early equal division of soil is the redistribution attributed by Plutarch to Lycurgus. Mr. Grote has shown how many difficulties are involved in this story as it has reached us. Whenever we have an authentic record of Sparta at all, we find the complaint that 'wealth makes the man,' and that there are extremes of riches and poverty. It need not follow, to be sure, that wealth is equal where arable land is equally divided; but Mr. Grote shows how very vague and untrustworthy is the tradition even of a redistribution.

M. Laveleye, on the other side, appears to think that though this re-distribution cannot be properly attributed to Lycurgus, yet there remained a tradition

71 Laveleye, op. cit. 164, 165; Stubbs, Constit. Hist. i. 85; Senchus Mor. iii. 53.
of an original equal distribution which was attached to the name of the great lawgiver. In support of the existence of such a tradition he quotes Plato ('Laws,' 684). M. Laveleye's words are: 'We may pretty confidently discern the part of tradition and legend. There was an almost equal distribution of land (ἰσότητα τινά) in the Dorian invasion—that is, the part of history. (See Plato, 'Laws,' 684.) But the reparation of territory attributed to Lycurgus is the part of legend.' It may be doubted, however, whether the words ἰσότητα τινά refer to the Dorian conquerors, though Hermann also relies on this text. Again, Plato need not be quoting a tradition, he may be framing a hypothesis. So far we are entirely in the dark as to what really happened. A legend of a re-distribution made by Lycurgus, a legend not noticed by our earlier authorities, does not so much as prove that there existed a tradition of an equal distribution made at the time of the Dorian Conquest.

It is therefore curious to find Müller saying in his history of the Dorians, that 'the united testimony of all authors proves that the property of the Spartans was set out in equal lots,' and that this division was in strictness only a lower grade of community of property.

In the midst of this confusion there is one certain and important fact. The number of full citizens of Sparta had once been eight or nine thousand, and in the time of Aristotle it had dwindled to one

73 Laveleye, op. cit. 161, 162, cf. note.
74 Müller, Dorians, ii. 200.
thousand. Coincident with this decline of the numbers of full citizens was the concentration of real property in few hands. There had been an age when eight or nine thousand Spartans had land enough to provide for their subscriptions to the common meals, which subscription was the ὁρὸς τῆς πολιτείας. If we allow then eight or nine thousand lots for these eight or nine thousand men, and allow for the pasture land, forests, and wastes, as well as for the property of the Periœci, it is probable that very little arable ground was left over in Laconia to form estates going much beyond the limit of equality. There need not have been absolute equality of extent or value. The royal demesne may have been large, but there must have been a nearer approach to equality than Mr. Grote would allow at the time when Sparta was rich in full citizens.\textsuperscript{75} Mr. Grote has observed that, in very early times, we hear of rich men and poor men in Sparta, but it by no means follows that the rich had much larger lots than the poor. Their greater wealth, if we judge by the analogy of Celtic Ireland, may have lain in cattle, pastured on the common pasture ground, which is not said to have been meted out at all, and which certainly was not meted out among the Germans.\textsuperscript{76}

Again, Aristotle says that Plato would need a limit-

\textsuperscript{75} Grote, ii. 557. Compare Müller, ii. 33, where the lots are certainly large enough.

\textsuperscript{76} For Spartans rich in cattle, compare Athenæus, iv. 141, and for wealth in heroic times, Odyssey, xiv. 96, 104. The lot offered as a rich reward to Meleager was a τέμενος of fifty acres, in the plain of Calydon. Iliad, ix. 579.
less territory, 'Babylonian Lands,' to support his 5,000 idle citizens. But the soil of Sparta supported, at one time, more than 5,000, and there must have been only a small margin of land left for the larger estates which the noblest families and the king might manage to secure. Thus, on the whole, we find more than what Mr. Grote calls 'possible exaggeration of a small fact' in the late traditions of early equality of landed estates in Sparta. We have both the fact that many thousands of citizens had a sufficiency of land, and again, we have the analogy of other equal divisions of land by most early conquering peoples. It is therefore possible that the confused traditions of equality may have been a refraction from the past, as M. Laveleye suggests, perverted into an account of a Lycurgean redistribution, rather than, as Mr. Grote holds, a myth suggested by the desires of the disenfranchised citizens at the time of Agis. At the least, we may say, that if the original Dorian allotments were not equal, or nearly equal, the Dorian Conquest was an exception to what Sir Henry Maine calls a very general law.

We must remember, too, that land might in later times be concentrated in few hands without having been sold. The decay of Sparta showed itself in the disproportionate number of daughters born, and the kinsmen who married these daughters would fall heirs to the lots of the family whose males were extinct, and three generations of this sort of thing would make an immense difference in landed property.
EARLY LAND-TENURE IN ATTICA.

The condition of land-tenure in early Attica is even more difficult to understand than in the case of Sparta. In Sparta, and in Dorian communities generally, we have the traces of an undoubted conquest; the land naturally falls into the hands of the conquerors, and they, in their contempt for husbandry, live on the rents paid by the vanquished peoples, who are reduced to various stages of servitude. But in Attica the people were proud of their immemorial freedom from invasion. It is only through the mists of mythology that we guess at a conquest in which the Ionians played the part of Dorians. When we come to times on the threshold of history, to the age of Solon, the land question is one of the chief social difficulties. We find an impoverished class of husbandmen, who seem to have been owners of the land, because we hear much of the mortgages on their estates; and, again, we read of ἐκτημόριοι, apparently tenant farmers, who paid either a sixth as rent, or who only kept a sixth of the produce of their farm for themselves. Now the Helots paid a fifth of the produce to their Spartan lords, and there seems nothing so very crushing in the contribution of a sixth, as to account for the distress of Athenian farmers, while it is impossible to suppose that the cultivators could afford to retain only one-sixth, and to take all the expenses of husbandry. Who then, in the first place, were the landlords of the ἐκτημόριοι? Boeckh says the Hopletes possessed all the land, in which case
the mortgages prove that many of the Hoplite class were indebted to others in the same rank. There must apparently have been both small and large holders, and it is usual to suppose that the Eupatridæ were the large holders. Now some writers, as Dr. Curtius, make the Eupatridæ include all the 360 clans divisible into 10,800 houses. As this number of full citizens is at least as great as the highest number ever attributed to Sparta, we return to the old difficulty: there could scarcely have been any land left for large estates, owned by the oligarchy. This view also seems to imply that clansmen and Eupatridæ are interchangeable terms, an idea disclaimed by Dr. Curtius in his appendix. We hear in point of fact of clans of no consideration. Again, we find a doubt whether the Eupatridæ were autochthous, or, on the other hand, foreign houses of distinction. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the whole position is to remember that the ἑυπάτριδες of Athens was a gathering together of several towns, not of villages. Each town must have had its own clans, and it is consistent with analogy to suppose that one of the clans in each town was that in which the blood of the race was supposed to run purest—was the royal clan from which rulers were chosen. When Theseus united all the towns, Plutarch says that he chose out and set apart the kingly clans of each from the yeomen and the labourers. To such Eupatridæ, as to Laertes in

79 Suidas in verb.
80 Maine, History of Early Institutions, p. 132.
81 Plutarch, Theseus, 25. πρῶτος ἀποκρίνας χωρὶς εὐπατρίδας καὶ γεωμόρους καὶ δημιουργοὺς.
Homer, it would be a discreditable thing to live in the country. But these noble houses would not include more than a small proportion of the members of γέμη, who would still, very likely, stick by their original lots in the country. Everything would tend, however, to raise the town dwellers in wealth and culture; indeed, the very fact of chiefship implies wealth; and if we may look on Solon's law prohibiting the acquisition of landed property beyond a certain extent, as a trace of an old inalienability of lots, we may guess that the town nobles had begun to covet more than their mere lot of land. Now let us suppose that though the nobles' lots were originally little larger than those of other members of clans, yet that the nobles were wealthier in cattle; let us consider the absolute necessity of a large stock of cattle for rude agriculture; and we can understand that the Eupatridæ might allot some of their superfluous stock, on onerous conditions of rent, to free but poor landholders of the clans.\(^2\) We find this kind of tenure, where land was easily obtained, but the means of tillage was hard to get, producing various grades of debt and of clientship in early Ireland.\(^3\) 'In very early times land was a drug, while capital was extremely perishable, added to with the greatest difficulty and lodged in very few hands.' Thus, while the land was the tenant's, he was obliged to take capital (cattle) from the chief, and if he took much was a daer, or scarcely free man, paying heavy rent, if he took little, a saer tenant, paying less rent, for stock, not for land.

\(^2\) 'Need of many oxen.' Nasse, Land Community, p. 43.
\(^3\) Maine's Hist. of Early Institutions, passim.
For chiefs read Eupatridae; for saer and daer men of their clans read free γεωμόροι; and we have an intelligible account of how the poverty, debt, and servile condition of men who were still landowners arose in Attica. It might be in such an age of the extreme importance of cattle that the primeval Athenian law against killing oxen was made. I should be inclined, however, to refer this law, both in Attica and India, to another cause. Be this as it may, the introduction of money, not long before Solon’s time, must have complicated matters, and the mortgage pillars may be conceived of either as records of an early attempt on the part of Eupatridae to seize the clansmen’s lots, or as records of the amount of the mortgage, or of dues of food rent, on the land, or on the produce. Meantime hirelings (θητές), and broken men from other tribes, would have their own grievances. There would be plenty of distress, but by the removal of the ὁροι by Solon, and the consequent decline of what we may almost call the seignorial rights of the Eupatridae over the lots of the freeholders, the land would be left in the small holdings of the democratic age, when Alcibiades had but sixty acres, and when only 5,000 citizens were not landowners.

We have tried to account for the curious fact that freeholders were crushed with rent, and yeomen with debt due to nobles, on the principle of Sir Henry Maine, that wealth was part of the essence of nobility, as, indeed, early warfare tends to enrich the chief. We have adopted his suggestion of a way in which the

81 Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, p. 486.
debt would be incurred—namely, by a Greek form of the custom of taking stock (French *chapitel de fer*, Scotch *steel-bow*), crossed by the conditions of urban life, and by the introduction of money. And we have seen that, unfortunate as they were, the debtors might yet be landholders, and so their lands might be covered with *ôrōi*, *i.e.* pillars registering rent on the land, or recording mortgage, if we suppose that land was becoming alienable at least to the chiefs. This theory supposes that *ôrōi* was as much the legal name for mortgage pillars in Solon’s time as in later Athens. Mr. Cox has recently tried to show that the pillars were sacred land-marks which ‘it was sacrilege to touch.’ As he also holds that the land *belonged* to the Eupatridae, it is not easy to understand why Solon removed the pillars, and how he dared to do so. If he ‘freed the land’ in the sense that he gave it away, to the previously non-holding cultivators, this was an *ànadaσμός*. Now we hear that the poor were annoyed because he made *no ànadaσμός*. If, on the other hand, he only removed restrictions on the sale of land, how did that benefit the ‘impoverished cultivators’? It was rich men, friends of Solon, who borrowed money and bought up land, if we are to believe Plutarch. The money they repaid after the depreciation of the currency; the land which, when they bought it, had rent or mortgage on it, became after the seisachtheia, *áστικτος*, free from *ôrōi*, or record-pillars. But the whole business is unintelligible if we suppose Solon to have sacrilegiously removed

85 Harpocratin, *s. v.*; Cox, *History of Greece*, i. 201; Plutarch, Solon, 16.
ancient and sacred land-marks. Things scarcely grow clearer when the historian says that the peasant, in the circumstances he has described, must either have become a free owner of the soil or have fallen back into his original subjection; and in the next sentence represents his peasant, presumably now a free owner, as still paying a rent. To whom this rent was paid, if the ownership of the Eupatridæ disappeared with their pillars—and if it did not disappear, why were the pillars removed—it is hard to say. Did the State resume all landed property?

In support of the theory that in early times the Greek freemen held almost equal lots of land, a number of facts in early legislation may be quoted from the 'Politics' of Aristotle. 'Men of old time,' he says, 'seem to have recognised the advantage of equality of property.' Thus, Solôn laid down a law, which was common in other states, that there should be a maximum and limit to the acquisition of landed property.\textsuperscript{86} Again, there was the injunction, as far as possible, τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασώξειν. Philolaus gave the same law, described as peculiar to his legislation, to the Thebans.\textsuperscript{87} In Thurii the nobles (γνώριμοι) broke the law of the state by acquiring all the land. In the ancient states 'the first lots' could not be sold. All the Aphytæans were landholders. Oxylus forbade lending on landed security. All these attempts to restrict the sale of land, and to keep it parcelled

\textsuperscript{86} Pol. ii. 7, 6.

\textsuperscript{87} Thurii; cf. Pol. v. 7, 9; Philolaus, Pol. ii. 12. Oxylus could not have forbidden the lending of money, which came in after his time.
out in small lots, may be taken, without much imprudence, as survivals of early custom. Plato, in the regulations as to land-tenure in the 'Laws,' would have returned to the old usage, by way of rendering his community prosperous, free, and stationary.\(^8\) In short, the views of property of the theorists in late Greece, like the economical views of some modern writers, were an attempt to restore an institution of which the religious and family sanction had long been obsolete.

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XIV.

THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY.

'The hole of the pit whence we were digged.'

In dealing with the problems presented by the earliest associations of men, Aristotle had two great advantages. In the first place, Greek religious tradition on the matter of the origin of society, and of the family, was various and shifting, and bound the enquirer to no particular orthodoxy. In the second place, Aristotle had never heard of the Aryan race, and was not tempted to imagine that one branch of the human stock enjoyed some peculiar privileges, or grew up in a different way from that by which the other families of man have been

\(^8\) Plato, Laws, 740, 638, 684.
led towards civilisation. In spite of this absence of misleading notions, and in spite of his acquaintance with the rude forms of kinship through women, or of mere gregarious herding together, which observers like Herodotus had noted among the Massagetæ and Agathyrsi, 'the most delicate of mortals,' Aristotle conceives of the family as the original unit of society. Many ages of this sacred institution have made the conception of the family so familiar that it is certainly difficult to believe that there was a time our ancestors were unacquainted with it, in its present form. That such a state of society may exist, however, experience suggests. The more minutely we examine the society of savages, the more clearly do we detect a very gradual progress from kindred through females only, to the patriarchal stage of family life, and so to the family as we understand it. Now if the nameless ancestors of the ancient Greeks ever passed through the savage state, the inference would plainly be that they too had gone through several stages

89 Maine, Early History of Institutions, p. 96. 'It is to be hoped that contemporary thought will before long make an effort to emancipate itself from those habits of levity in adopting theories of race.'

90 Herodot. iv. 104–172; Libyans, Pol. ii. 1, 13. The Family, Pol. i. 1, 5.

91 McLennan, Primitive Marriage, p. 176.

92 Morgan, Systems of Consanguinity and of Affinity, p. 469. 'The evidence from the classificatory system tends to prove that marriage between single persons was unknown to the primitive ages of mankind.' Mr. Morgan's theory differs somewhat from that of Mr. McLennan. But the connection between the higher and lower forms of kinship may be traced by so many survivals, especially by the ceremony of capture, and by nobility going on the female side, that I cannot share the doubts of Sir Henry Maine (Early History of Institutions, pp. 66, 67). See also Giraud Teulon, 'Origines de la Famille.'
of kinship before they reached the perfect family life which we find them enjoying as soon as we make their acquaintance in Homer. Now as far as the traditions of Hellas, and the common opinion of the Hellenes went, they had evolved their civilisation out of a condition of savagery. Both Aristotle and Plato, to go no further, speak of the earliest men as 'earth-born,' or as being the remnant of another race left after some deluge, 'small sparks of humanity preserved on the tops of mountains.' 'Of cities, or governments, or legislation,' they could have no idea at all.\(^9\) Neither Plato nor Aristotle, however, lays much stress on the nature of their family arrangements; the latter says that 'the Greeks of old used to buy their wives from each other;' the former quotes the well-known passage from the Odyssey about the Cyclopes 'giving laws each to his own wife and children.' Thus the two philosophers may be said to consider Greek life to have begun in the patriarchal stage, where the father and house-master has despotic power \((\textit{patria potestas})\) over the members of his household. In fact, Aristotle accounts for the rise of kingly government in cities and tribes, by saying that these associations were made up of men who had previously been accustomed to the kingly sway of the paternal authority. Nor can there be much doubt that the first Greeks who gathered into cities had long been in the patriarchal stage, that each father had been a king within his own επικός, or house-enclosure, while he was but a peer in the assembly of his village.

\(^9\) Plato (Laws, 677-80; Pol. ii. 8, 21; Laws, 782) speaks of human sacrifice, and of abstention from the flesh of the cow.
Without disputing this, we wish to ask if there was not an age beyond the dawn of history, perhaps beyond the dateless time when the common Indo-European terms for father were coined, when the ancestors of the Greeks knew no ties of blood at all, or knew them only through females? Now, as we have said, the Greeks themselves believed that such primitive simplicity had once been their own condition. As a proof that they accepted this view without the reluctance now so general, one might quote the words of Moschion, a late writer of the school of Euripides:—

\[ \eta \nu \gamma \rho \rho \tau \omicron \ὀ\nu\nu \varepsilon \nu \gamma\nu, \eta \nu, \delta \nu\nu\nu\nu\kappa \kappa\nu \theta\varphi\rho\sigma\nu\nu \delta\nu\nu\tau\nu\varepsilon \xi\chi\nu \varepsilon \mu\acute{\nu}\varepsilon\nu\epsilon\iota\varsigma \beta\rho\omicron\tau\omicron\iota\iota. \]

This may be called a mere sophistic paradox; but the author of the Homeric hymn to Hephaestus was no sophist, and he speaks of men—

\[ \omicron \iota \tau\omicron \pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\omicron\varsigma \pi\varepsilon \omicron \\alpha\nu\nu\tau\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\kappa\omicron \nu \omicron \nu\upsilon\zeta\omicron\nu \omicron \nu\upsilon \omicron \iota\tau\omicron \varepsilon\omicron \nu \omicron \iota\nu\tau\omicron \varepsilon\omicron \nu. \]

It is only natural to attribute to cave-men the morality of cave-bears, and we shall see that Greek tradition did not scruple to do so. Cecrops, the Serpent king of Athens, was credited with the invention of marriage, as the Australian blackfellows of to-day assign the innovation to the Lizard. Another legend

94 I am indebted to Preller, Ausgewählte Aufsätze, p. 287.
95 The words of Suidas are plain enough, p. 3102. \[ 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ran to the effect that, before Cecrops, children in Athens went by the mother’s name, just as nobility went by the mother’s side among the Lycians and Etruscans, just as ‘the Picts chose their royal race ever on the mother’s side,’ just as nobility in heroic Greece came through the mother, and the Divine father who saw the daughters of men that they were fair.96

We thus find that neither tradition nor opinion in Greece ran absolutely counter to the view that Greeks had once been like barbarians, while barbarians had been like savages. It would not be hard to go further, and show that many traces in the symbolism of Greek marriage customs, that certain strange and revolting provisions of Greek law, are derived from an antiquity when the family was a very different thing from what it became in historic times. The mere persistence of a pretence of capture in the Spartan marriage ceremony points to a time when women had to be, as in so many Greek myths they were, stolen from a hostile tribe. And the fact that women had to be stolen points to the prohibition to marry within a man’s own group, which again was deduced from a scarcity of women within the group, which must have made polyandry a necessity. To take another instance, the law which allowed an Athenian to marry his sister-german clearly looked on the relative by the father’s side as no relative at all, while relationship on the mother’s side was a sacred tie.97 It is unnecessary to dilate on this subject.

96 The English Chronicle, p. 1.
97 Plutarch, Solon.
more fully here, because Mr. McLennan has collected enough of the evidence that makes for the ancient existence of kinship through women in Greece. What we are now about to attempt is a mere application of views which Mr. McLennan has originated and set forth with an admirable combination of clearness, originality, and learning.

There would perhaps be little reason to examine the origin of the family in Greece if there were not grounds for supposing that the process which ultimately developed the family produced also the germ of an association which lasted, as a political body, long after the family had acquired its civilised form. This association was the ρένος; and the object of this essay is to contrast the two views of the origin of that important political factor, the views of Mr. McLennan and of Sir Henry Maine. To state the matter shortly, we may say that the former writer believes the ρένος, or at least the germ of the ρένος, to have existed prior to the evolution of the patriarchal family; while the latter, like Aristotle, Mr. Freeman, Mr. Cox, Mr. Grote, and Mr. Kemble, holds, or did hold, that the ρένος was probably composed by aggregation of families. By the first theory, the ρένος was the earlier unit, and the families grew up and separated each from each within the bosom of the group. By the latter theory, the ordinary family existed first in time, and the ρένος was formed later by the extension of the single family, and by the adoption of other families into the first.93

93 Early History of Institutions, p. 66; Freeman's Comparative Politics, p. 104. Dicæarchus held the same view, if we suppose πάτρα
We have already seen the great political importance of the γένος in Greece. This association answered to the gens at Rome, and to the sibsceaf, or kinship, which, when settled within its own mark of land, is known in early Teutonic history as the Markgenossenschaft. Whether in Greece, Rome, or England, not to mention other countries, the members of each of these kinships all bore the same patronymic name, were all held together by the two most sacred bonds—of belief that they shared the same blood, and of participation in the same religious rites and worship of a heroic ancestor. Whether in Greece, England, or Rome, the chief families in these kinships, subordinated to the wider tribal arrangement, formed the earliest aristocracies. Outside the gentes there was neither tribal right, nor civic right, nor land, save at exorbitant rack-rent, for the stranger who settled in their neighbourhood. Even in the later times of Greece, full citizenship generally implied admission within the sacred circle of gentile feasts and sacrifices. The question which we have now to ask is, did the members of each γένος really partake in any degree of common blood; were they really kindred, or was the idea of kinship little more than a legal fiction? That any traceable blood connection had disappeared in the time of Pericles, or of Gracchus, may be admitted at once. Indeed, there was a definition which recognised the γεννηται as connected by to have the same meaning as γένος. ἕρατρία, with him, is the union on festal occasions (ἱερῶν κοινωνικῆς σύνωδος) of brothers and sisters, who have married into different πατραί. φυλή, or tribe, is a still later and larger division after the σύνωδος εἰς τὰς πόλεις.—Dioσearch. Fragm. 139.
customary law (νόμῳ), as having been ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὰ καλούμενα γένη κατανεμήθεντες.

In several places the γεννηταί are defined as οὐχ οἶ ἐκ γένους καὶ ἀφ' αἴματος προσήκοντες. Gentile relations, then, were not necessarily, or at least in later times could not make out that they were, blood relations. The ancient tie of kindred had come to be thought part of some consciously invented division of the citizens, but it cannot be doubted that long before the beginning of political legislation the γένη had grown up out of some real ties of blood. The right to share in the property of a deceased fellow gentile, the duty of taking up the blood feud for him if he were slain, the common burying-place, sufficiently prove that kinship was at the bottom of the gentile division.

How, then, did the γένος come into existence? Now, if we allege, with Sir Henry Maine, 'that it is difficult to say of what races of men it is not allowable to lay down that the society in which they are united was originally organised on the patriarchal model,' we must accept the usual theory of the origin of the γένος. We must say, with Mr. Freeman, that 'the family grew into the clan, and the clan grew into the tribe.' We must say, with Mr. Cox, that though the father of the

99 See a number of extracts in Meier, De Gent. Att., showing that the lexicographers supposed the gentile relationship to have been produced by enactment, νόμῳ τινί ἔχοντες κοινωνίαν. The synonyms for near kin, such as ὁμογάλακτες (collactanei), ὁμοσίπαι, ὁμοκάπνοι, quoted by Aristotle from early authorities, like Charondas and Epimenides, correspond to 'Gaelic teadhloch and coedhich, meaning, the first, having a common residence, the second, those who eat together.' (M'Lennan, Primitive Marriage, p. 154.) They certainly seem to base kinship rather on milk ties and residence than on blood affinity.

100 Ancient Law, p. 132.
primitive household 'knew nothing of ritual common to other families,' and though the 'primitive Aryan' lived 'in utter isolation,' yet that 'the original families might combine for the purpose of extending their power and increasing it.' It is very hard to see how this union of hostile families into tribes was brought about. Mr. Cox is led to suppose that the primitive Aryan lived 'in lawful wedlock,' in a den 'which, save his mate and offspring, no other living thing might enter, except at the risk of life.' We must presume that after his death the primitive Aryan became 'the god' of his children, that his younger sons became the heads of new families, which were kept in strict subordination to the chief who, in the direct line, represented the original progenitor, and who thus became the king of a number of houses, that is, of a tribe. This view, which is shared by M. Fustel de Coulanges, is a perfectly simple, clear, and natural one; but how far is it based on history, how far is it based on the facts of primitive life? No real explanation seems to be given of the fact that families, said to be exclusive both by brute instinct and by selfish religion, combined with other families equally exclusive. Yet there is no doubt at all that distinct families were combined in the local tribes. The original exclusiveness could scarcely have been overcome, as Mr. Cox suggests, by any far-sighted policy of 'extending and increasing the power' of families that, ex hypothesi, detested each other. Again, if we suppose the original family to have merely increased and multiplied into a

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101 Cox's History of Greece, vol. i. pp. 15, 16.
homogeneous tribe, why were the local tribes not homogeneous? why were they local aggregates of clans of different patronymics and different religions? There is still another difficulty. How is it that, among nations still in the clan stage of society, we find the same family names prevailing in different and distant local tribes? Take the case of Australia, one finds the same family names, scattered through the different local tribes all over the continent. Take the case of early England, one finds the traces of the clan of Billingas in Northampton, Lancashire, Durham, Lincoln, Yorkshire, Sussex, Salop, and other widely separated districts. Here, then, are three difficulties—first, that of accounting for the non-homogeneous character of local tribes if they sprang from one kinship; secondly, the difficulty of accounting for the union of elements confessedly so exclusive as the different families; thirdly, of understanding how the same family names were scattered through many local tribes. The last question scarcely meets the student of Greek and Roman history, but it at once encounters the reader of early English history, and the observer of existing societies still in the tribal and clan stage of civilisation.

Sir Henry Maine solves the first problem, that of the non-homogeneous character of local tribes, by supposing that one family admitted others within its circle by the legal fiction of adoption. 'The expedient was that the incoming peoples should feign themselves to

be descended from the same stock as the people on whom they were ingrafted.' Mr. M'Lennan asks, 'where is the evidence that the fiction of adoption was ever employed on so large a scale as to account for the heterogeneity of such groups as the tribes of Rome, Greece, or India?' One might point, in reply, to the very modern instance of the Kaffirs. Within the memory of men a certain Englishman has become the nominal father of a tribe of more than three thousand Kaffirs. This came about through a curious kind of savage 'commendation.' The English settler, who was rich in cattle, bought wives for a number of Kaffir vassals; these vassals took his family name as a tribal name; they increased and multiplied, holding their wives of the Englishman on condition of military service, and our countryman, a Mr. Finn, is thus the nominal father of the whole tribe of Ama-Finns. There must meanwhile be numerous older family names within the tribe of Ama-Finns. Here is a bizarre instance of the extension, by adoption and legal fiction, of the Finn family. Curious as this case of adoption seems, it is not an example of the process by which family names got scattered through the local tribes over the continents of Australia and North America, and, as it seems, over North Germany in the ages before the English invasion of Britain.

There is good reason to believe that the γένη of Greece, the Roman gentes, the sibseceaits of the early English, were not developed out of the family as we understand it, by natural increase and by adoption.

103 Ancient Law, pp. 130, 131.
They were very probably survivals from an earlier stage of kinship than that of the ordinary family. It was not the processes of natural increase of one family, and of adoption into it, that developed the clans of Australia and of North America. The members of these clans bear each the clan patronymic, perform the same superstitious rites, and are bound to mutual defence. So far they resemble the Greek γένη. Again, they are scattered through all the local tribes, so that, in Australia, a man of the Kangaroo family may belong to the Waddaroke local tribe, or to the Ballarat local tribe, and so on, just as in England a man of the Billinga clan, or of the Arlinga clan, might be a Somersaeta, or a Huicca, or a Lindisfara by local tribe. This curious scattering of the family names through the local settlements in England has puzzled Mr. Kemble, who accounts for it by the confusion of the English invasion, and by later wanderings and colonisations. But if the Arlingas, Billings, and so forth, were once scattered over North Germany, as the men of the Snake, Sun, or Tortoise clans are scattered all over America and Australia, it would necessarily happen that when a Jutland tribe invaded the south of England, it would leave families settled there of the same names as a Schleswig tribe would leave in the north or west of England.  

Now, it can be absolutely proved that the clans of America and Australia were developed not out of aggregations of ordinary families, but through counting kindred by the female side, and through a strange custom which prohibits a man from marrying a woman

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of his own patronymic. 'The children take after the clan of the mother, and no man can marry a woman of the same clan, though the parties be in no way related according to our ideas.'\(^{105}\) We have seen that the members of the \(γένος\) were 'in no way related according to our ideas,' \(οὐ κατὰ γένος ἀλλήλους προσήκοντες οὔδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἵματος\), according to their later notions of relationship.

If we trace the results of the savage rule of marriage, we see that a man of the Ballarat tribe, and of the Swan family, may not marry a Swan woman. If he marries a woman of the Wandyalloch tribe, and of the Kangaroo family, his children, taking her name, become Kangaroos within the Ballarat local tribe and almost within the Swan \(γένος\). Yet they are bound to fight, in case of blood feud, for the Kangaroo family in whatever local tribe it may be situated. Thus, by a process not that of adoption, one family, however naturally hostile to all other families, is brought within their circle. It is scarcely necessary to trace the causes of the two primitive marriage rules, the one prohibiting marriage with a woman of one's own family name, the other making children take the mother's family name, as tradition says that they did in early Athens. It is enough that these rules account for the heterogeneity of local tribes, for the existence of \(γένη\) which have a tradition of kinship, though no real kinship is traceable, and for the dispersion of these all through distant localities. As to the causes of these marriage

\(^{105}\) The Aboriginals of Australia, G. Scott Lang, p. 10; Primitive Marriage, p. 113; Morgan, Systems of Affinity, p. 149.
rules, they hold of conduct which Sir Henry Maine contemplates when he speaks of practices which 'it would be unjust and incorrect to call immoral, because . . . they are older than morality.' These causes produced the savage groups of America and Australia—the question is whether the ἁρματική of Athens, the gentes of Rome, and the English sibsceafht are but traces of practices 'older than morality' in the Aryan race.

Against this view it may be urged that the Australians and American Indians are even now in the habit of deriving family names through female kinship, which the ἁρματική of historical Greece did not do. But this makes no difference to the argument. It is easy to imagine the Australians beginning—the Indians have already begun—to derive names through the father, and to permit marriage between men and women bearing the same name. When they do so—if the Aryan settlers let them live till they do so—they will not alter the fact that gentile families are scattered all over Australia. The names and a tradition of kinship will survive, just as the names with tradition of kinship survived in various degrees in Greece, and Rome, and England. The family grew up within the group by a process of appropriation and of the development of individual claims. When it was fullgrown it seemed prior in time to the group, whereas it was only prior in idea, as the state, according to Aristotle, is earlier than the family in idea.

Another very obvious objection to the theory that the ἁρματική is earlier than the family is perhaps of little weight. The savage κοινωνίαι we have spoken of are
named after what are called Totems, by the names of plants and animals, or of the sun, or water, or earth. They reverence the vegetable, or beast, or natural force from which they think they spring, and will rarely pluck the plant or slay the beast. Now the English, Greek, and Roman kinships deduced their stock from some eponymous hero, not from a totem, and this difference in practice may seem to imply a difference in the kind of association. But it may be conjectured that a time must have come to Greeks and Teutons, when tribes that had once believed in some tradition of descent from beast, or bird, or fish found the notion incredible. We know that the Zulus have reached this stage of scepticism.\textsuperscript{106} Such people would either look on the old story as an allegory, and consider the Snake, or the Sun, of their ancestors as a mere name for some real man, or they would transfer their adoration from the Totem to some distinguished chief of their stock, whom they would 'seek to lord and to Father.' His name would be the name of his clan, which would thenceforth only bear the effigy of the bestial or animal ancestor as a crest or banner in war. If we look at Greek and Northern traditions with this in mind, we may guess why the χένος of the Ioxidae reverenced asparagus, why many Attic demes were called after the names of plants, why the Bear appears as an ancestor in Scandinavian pedigrees, why the boar was the amulet of the Scyldings, why there was a hero of the form of a wolf at Athens.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{106} Callaway's Religion of the Amazulu.
\textsuperscript{107} Plutarch, Theseus, for the Ioxidae. For the Bear, see Freeman,
The origin of the family is a question that has its disagreeable side. The painfulness of the study may be compensated if it teaches us to throw away the absurd pride of race, which furnishes so-called Aryans with a semi-scientific excuse for despising the 'lower races,' on account of practices that have left their mark in Aryan institutions.

Norman Conquest, i. 420; for the Boar, see Kemble's Beowulf and notes; for the Wolf-shaped hero, see Harpocratus under ḏekáζειν. Something in this direction might be made out from a philological analysis of the patronymics given in Mr. Kemble's Saxons in England. Compare Grote, iii. 85, 'A great many of the demes seem to have derived their names from the shrubs and plants which grew in their neighbourhood,' with Sir G. Grey, ii. 228, 'One origin of family names frequently ascribed by the natives is, that they were derived from some vegetable or animal being common in the district which the family inhabited.'
Επειδή πᾶσαν πόλιν ὅρωμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἄγαθον τινὸς ἐνεκεν συνεστηκυίαν (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἄγαθον χάριν πάντα πρᾶττον τοι πάντες), δῆλον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἄγαθοί τινος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ, καὶ τὸν κυριωτάτου πάντων, ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πᾶσαι περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας: αὕτη δ' ἐστιν ἡ καλομένη πόλις καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική. 1 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἶονται 2 πολιτικοὶ καὶ βασιλικοὶ καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ δεσποτικοὶ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν. πλῆθει γὰρ καὶ ὑπόγοτη νομίζουσι διαφέρειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶδει τούτων ἕκαστον.

Since we see that every state is an association of some sort, and that every association is formed for the attainment of some good (for it is to obtain what appears to themselves to be good that men always act), it is clear, that while all associations aim at some good, that one which is the highest of all, and includes all, will aim at the highest good in the highest degree; and this is that which is called the State and the State-Association. Now those who think that men in the positions of Magistrate in a free state, of King, of Householder, or of Slave-owner, are really one and the same, are not right. For they hold that all of these differ from one another only in degree (in the matter of large or small numbers), and not in kind; for instance,

2 πολιτικοὶ. There are two different uses of this word in Aristotle: (1) a man holding magisterial authority in a free state in turn with others, in contrast to the king, whose rule is continual; and (2) a man who devotes himself to political science, a politician or statesman, almost equivalent to the νομοθέτης, as in Book iii. 1.
if a man is in authority over a few, they call him a Slave-master,
if over a greater number a Householder, if over a still greater
a Magistrate or Monarch, implying that there is no difference
between a large household and a small state, and the only dif-
ference (they say) between a magistrate and a monarch is that,
when one individual is personally supreme over the rest by him-
self, he is a Monarch; but if in the terms of a science of this kind
he is in turn ruler and subject, he is a Magistrate. But this is not
the truth; and what we say will be clear if we examine the subject
in accordance with our normal method. For just as in the other
departments of science it is necessary to analyse what is compound
till we reach atoms that are in composite (for these are the smallest
elements of the whole), so also it is by examining the component
elements of a state that we shall both have a clearer view of the
differences between these elements, and also see if it is possible to
arrive at any scientific result in each of the subjects that we have
mentioned.

It is by examining things in their growth from the very begin-
ning that we shall in this, as in other matters, obtain the clearest
view. Now, it is necessary, in the first place, to group in couples
thesis. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνέν ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἴον θῇλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἐνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὠσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίέσθαι, οἴον αὐτὸ, τοιῶτων καταλυτεῖν ἑτερων), ἁρχῶν δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον, διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἁρχῶν φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἁρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον. διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλω ταύτῳ συμφέρει. φύσει μὲν 3

those elements that cannot exist without each other, such as the female and male united for the sake of reproduction of species (and this union does not come from the deliberate action of the will, but in them, as in the other animals and plants, the desire to leave behind such another as themselves is implanted by nature), and also that which naturally rules, and that which naturally is ruled, connected for the sake of security. [For that which has the capacity, in virtue of its intelligence, of looking forward is by nature the ruling and master element, while that which has the capacity, in virtue of its body, of carrying out this will of the superior is the subject and slave by nature. ] And for this reason the interests of the master and the slave are identical. Now it is by nature that the woman and the slave have been marked as separate, for nature produces nothing in a niggard fashion, as smiths make the 'Delphian' knife, but she makes each individual thing for one end; for it is only thus that each instrument will receive its most perfect development,

1 τὴν Δελφικήν μάχαιραν—probably a knife that could be used for various purposes besides cutting, and called the 'Delphian,' because originally made to serve in different parts of the sacrifice at Delphi. Macarius mentions the greed of the Delphians, who 'took somewhat from the offerings and made something out of the hire of the knife.'—Oncken, Staatslehre, ii. 126.
4 δουλευον.  ἐν δὲ τοις βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ δούλου τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν.  αὐτίνω δὲ ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἀρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου. διὸ φασιν ἡ ποιηταὶ βαρβάρων δ' Ἔλληνας ἀρχεῖν εἰκός,
5 ὡς ταῦτῃ φύσει βαρβαρον καὶ δούλου ἤν. ἦκ μὲν οὖν τουτοῦ τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὁρθῶς ὁ Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας 'οἰκον μὲν πρωτιστα γυναῖκα τε βοῦν τ' ἀρωτήρα.' ὡ γὰρ βοῦς ἄντι οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἐστὶν. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκνια κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν οἰκίος ἐστιν, οὕς Χαρώνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσειτύνως, Ἐπιμενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρῆς ὁ μοικάπους. ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειώνων οἰκιῶν κοι-6 νονία πρώτη θρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κόμη. μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἐοικεν ἡ κόμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι. οὕς κα-

namely, by subserving not many functions, but one. But among the barbarians the female and slave have the same position as the man; and the reason is that these nations do not possess the naturally ruling element, but, instead, their association becomes that of slave-woman and slave-man: and on this account the poets say, "It is proper that Greeks should rule over barbarians," implying that the ideas of barbarian and slave are by nature the same. So from these two forms of association comes the Family in its original form; and Hesiod was quite right when he wrote, 'First the House, the wife, and the ox which ploughs the land,' for the ox stands in the place of a domestic to the poor. Thus the association formed to supply the wants of each day in the course of nature is the House, and the members of it Charondas calls the ' sharers of the mealbin,' and Epimenides the Cretan, the ' sharers of the table.' Then the association formed of several households originally for the supply of necessities not limited to those of the day was the Village. And entirely in accordance with nature does

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4 δμοκάπους. δμοκάπους is the reading of the Vet. Trans., and adopted by Susemihl and others. It would mean ' sharers of the fireplace.' See above, p. 97.
The Village seem to be an offshoot or colony of the Family, consisting of 'those who,' in the language of some, 'are suckled by the same milk, children and children's children.' For this reason also our States were originally governed by Kings, as also are barbarian tribes to this day; for they were an aggregate of units governed by Kings. For every household is governed by its oldest member as by a king, and thus the offshoots were similarly governed through the sympathy of kinship. And this is what Homer means. 'Each man is the oracle of law to his children and his wives.' For then families were scattered, and this was the way in which they lived in olden times. This is the reason also why all men say that the gods are governed by a king, for men themselves are either still subject to a king, or were so in ancient times. And just as men represent the appearance of the gods as similar to their own, so also do they imagine that the lives of the gods are all like their own.

The association formed of several villages is the complete State, which attains the limit of full satisfaction in itself of all its wants, if I may so speak, being formed originally for the object of living, but going on for the object of living well, and therefore

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πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστὶν, εὗτερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι· τέλος γὰρ αὐτὴ ἑκεῖνων, ἢ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστὶν· οἷον γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν
9 φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὡσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἔπποι ὀικίας. ἔτι
tὸ οὖ ἑνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον· ἢ δ' αὐτάρκεια τέλος
καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσεων ἡ
πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι ἀνθρωπός φύσει πολιτικὸν ξῦνον, καὶ ὁ
ἀπολιπαὶ διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἢτοι φαύλος ἐστὶ
κρείττων ἢ ἀνθρωπός, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ 6 ύφ᾽ Ὄμηρου λοιδορη-
θεῖς ἁφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος: ἀμα γὰρ φύσει
tοιοῦτοι καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητῆς, ἀτε περ 7 ἄζυξ ὅν ὡσπερ
ev πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἀνθρωπός ξῦον πάσης
μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ξὺον μᾶλλον, δηλοῦν. οὐθὲν
gὰρ, ὥσ φαμὲν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ, λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄν-
every state is a natural production, since the original associations
were so. For the State is their end, and the natural development
of anything is properly its end. For that which is the character
of each thing when its growth is fully completed, that we say is
its true nature, as in the case of a man, a horse, or a house. Again,
the object aimed at and the end is the best possible, and the power
of supplying all wants from within is an end and the best possible.
From these considerations, therefore, it is clear that the State is one
of Nature's productions, and that man is by nature a social ani-
mal, and that the man who is without a country through natural
taste and not by misfortune is certainly utterly degraded (or else a
being superior to man), like that man reviled by Homer as clanless,
lawless, homeless. For he is naturally of this character and desirou-
of war, since he has no ties, like an exposed piece in the game of
backgammon. And that man is a social animal in a fuller sense than
any bee or gregarious animal is evident; for nature, we say, makes

6 ύφ᾽ Ὄμηρου. II. ix. 63.
7 ἄζυξ ὄν ὡσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς. An epigram of Agathias (Anthol. Pal.
ix. 482) throws light on the game of πεσσοῖ, which appears to have been
very like our backgammon. The ἄζυξ there occurs as a 'blot.' See
'Proceedings of Cambridge Philological Society,' Feb. 1876, where it was
suggested that perhaps the ἄζυξ could move only to take, which would
suit πολέμου ἐπιθυμητῆς very well.
nothing without an object, and man is the only animal that possesses rational speech. Now the utterance of a cry is a sign of pleasure and pain, and is therefore found to belong to other animals; for to this point has their nature reached, namely, to the perception of pleasure and pain, and to the power of manifesting this to one another. But rational speech is intended to explain what is useful and what is harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For this gift is the distinguishing property of man as compared with other animals; namely, that he is the only one which has perception of Good and Bad, Just and Unjust, and the like. And it is the association of creatures who have this power that produces a House and a State. The State also in its real nature comes before the House and our individual selves; for the whole must necessarily come before the part. For, if the whole be removed, there will be no foot or hand except in the equivocal sense in which we speak of a hand of stone; for the natural hand, when its powers have been destroyed, will be a hand only in that equivocal sense. Everything is defined by its Function and Capability, so that when its character is no longer the same, it must not be called by the same name except in a metaphorical sense. Now
that the State is a natural production, and also before the individual, is clear; for unless the individual can supply all his wants in himself when he is separated from others, he will bear a similar relation to the whole to that which the other parts bear. But the man who has not the capability of association, or requires nothing from outside through his own complete resources, is no part of a state; so that he must be either a brute (below the level of man), or a God (above it). It is true that the impulse in all men is directed by nature towards association of this sort; but still the first organiser was the author of the greatest blessings, for man is an animal which, just as it is when fully perfected the best of all, so when separated from law and justice, is the worst of all. For injustice is most difficult to cope with when armed. Man is born into the world in the possession of arms, in the shape of practical wisdom and moral excellence, which he can use to the fullest degree for exactly contrary objects; and therefore, when destitute of virtue, he is an animal most unholy and most savage, and most viciously disposed towards sensuality and gluttony. Justice is a virtue of society, for the administration of justice is an arrangement of the association of the state; this administration being the determination of what is just between man and man.
Now that it is clear what the elements are of which the state is composed, we must speak, in the first place, of the Household; for every state is composed of Households, and the parts of the Household are those elements of which the household in its turn consists. Now the Household, when complete, consists of slaves and free persons. But since each individual thing ought first to be examined in its smallest elements, and since the first and smallest elements of the household are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children, we must first inquire into these three relations, and see what each is, and what its character ought to be. These relations are that of the master, that of marriage (for this relation of husband and wife has no name in Greek), and in the third place that of the generation of children (this also having no proper name). Let us then consider these that we have mentioned to be the three parts of the family. There is indeed another subdivision, which is thought by some to be actually equivalent to Household Management, and by others to be a very large part of it, the truth of which statement we must examine into.

1. *dokei.* As a general rule, in translating Aristotle, it may be noticed that he never uses the words *dokei* ὤδα to signify his own opinion. These words express the common or general view, often not shared in by Aristotle. *φαύεται,* on the other hand, expresses his own view.
I allude to that which is generally called the art of making money. Let us speak first about the master and the slave, that we may see both the general facts which concern the wants of ordinary life, and also whether we can, with a view to a scientific knowledge of the question, arrive at any conclusion more satisfactory than the present opinions upon it. For while some men hold both that mastership over slaves is really a science, and that there is no difference between the management of a household or of slaves and that of a free state or of a monarchy (as we said at the beginning of the book); others, again, consider that any mastership over slaves is a violation of nature (it is only by convention, they say, that one man is a slave and another free, by nature there is no difference between them), and therefore not just, for it rests upon violence.

Since then Property is an integral part of the Household, the art of acquiring Property is also an integral part of the management of the Household; for without the absolute necessaries of life it is impossible to live and live happily. And just as in the definite arts it will be necessary to have the proper instruments ready to hand if the work required is to be brought to completion, so also will it be necessary to have the instruments proper for
the management of a Household. Of instruments, some are animate, some inanimate; for example, to the Pilot the rudder is an inanimate, the look-out in the bows an animate, instrument; for the assistant stands to the arts in the specific relation of an instrument. Similarly also an article of property is an instrument for living, and property generally is a multiplicity of instruments, and the slave is an animate article of property, and every assistant is as it were a single instrument in the place of many. For if each instrument could at the word of command and by its own foresight perform its proper function—just as the figures of Daedalus or the tripods of Hephaestos, which the poet says moved into the assembly of the Gods of their own accord—if thus of themselves the combs made the web close, and the keys struck the harp, neither would masterscraftsmen need assistants nor masters need slaves. Now the instruments which we usually speak of are instruments of production, but property is an instrument for action. For while from the use of the comb there comes into

1 ὁ θείης. Homer, Il. xviii. 376.
existence a something new, and distinct from itself, from our clothing, on the other hand, or our bed we have the use alone. Again, since there is a difference in kind between production and action, and each requires instruments, it is absolutely necessary that these (respective instruments) also should show the same difference in kind. Now life is action, not production, and for this reason also the slave is an assistant in matters that concern action. An article of property is spoken of in the same way that a portion of a whole is, for the part is not only a part of something else, but entirely belongs to it; so is it with the thing possessed. And while the master is only master of the slave, but does not belong to him, the slave is not only the slave of the master, but does entirely belong to him. From this we clearly see what is the nature of the slave, and what his capacity for being such. For he who does not in his nature belong to himself, but to some other man, being himself a man, is indeed by nature born a slave; and he belongs to someone else who, though a man, is but an article of property. Such an article is an instrument adapted for active use, and that can be set by itself.

Whether or not there exists a man thus formed by nature, and if so whether or not it is a better thing and a just for him to be a slave to
someone, or if rather slavery of every sort is a violation of nature,
of inquiry. Now in the first place a living creature is a combination of soul and body, of which the first is by nature the ruler, the latter the ruled; and in things that follow natural laws we ought rather to examine a case in its natural state than take distorted forms. For this reason we ought to take for consideration a man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, and in his case what we have said is clear. For in the case of the wicked or the wickedly disposed, the body will often appear to rule the soul, in consequence of his evil and unnatural condition. We can then, we say, see first in any living being rule like that both of a master and of a governor; for the soul rules the body with the rule of a master over his slaves, and the intellect rules the appetite with the rule of a constitutional governor and of a monarch. And in these cases it is obvious that it is natural and advantageous both for the body to be ruled by the soul, and the appetitive part by the intellect and the rational part; but that these should be on an equality, or that the superiority should be reversed, is in all cases injurious. Again, in the case of man and the other animals there
is a similar relation. For tame animals are in their nature better than wild, and for all these it is best to be under the rule of man, for by this means they obtain security. Again, the relation of male to female is naturally that of superior and inferior, ruling and ruled, and the same kind of relation must necessarily exist in the case of all men generally. So in men, where there is as much difference as between soul and body, man and beast (and of this sort is the case of those whose function consists in the employment of their bodily powers, this being also the best that can be got from them)—men of this kind (I say) are slaves by nature, and it is best for them to be subject to this kind of rule, just as it was in the cases which we have mentioned. For he by nature is a slave who has the capacity of belonging to someone else (and on this account actually does belong to someone else), and whose share of reason only goes so far as to comprehend it in others, but who does not possess it himself. For the other animals do not comprehend reason, but are servants to their impulses. The use also of these differs little; for from both, that is slaves and tame animals, we receive
that those also who maintain the opposite view in a certain sense are right it is not hard to see. For the words slavery and
slave are used in a double sense. There is such a thing as a man who by law also (as well as by nature) is a slave and in a state of slavery: the law that I mean being a sort of agreement according to which men assert that what is conquered in war belongs to the conqueror. Now it is this form of 'justice' (or legality) which many jurists indict, as they would a public speaker, on the ground of illegality, maintaining that it is monstrous for the object of violence to be in a state of servitude and subjection to him who has the power of using violence, and who is superior in brute force. Some persons take this view, others the opposite, even among philosophers. The cause of this difference of opinion, and that which makes the reasoning ambiguous, is that in a certain sense Virtue (or excellence), if it finds adequate means, is well able even to use force, and success always exists in virtue of superiority in some good point. So that it is generally thought that Force cannot exist without excellence, but the difference of opinion arises on the question of what is just. For because of this, some hold that

1 γράφονται παρανόμων. That is: they lodge an objection against the new νόμος (here τὸ δίκαιον) as being a violation of an existing νόμος. Alluding to the process called γραφὴ παρανόμων at Athens.
Justice consists in kindness, others that this very rule of the superior is just; since different as these views are, there is no strong ground or power of convincing in the other alternative; namely, that it is not right for that which is superior in excellence to rule and be master. Still, on the whole, persons in their clinging, as they think, to something that is just (for law is a form of justice) make out the slavery which comes through war to be just, but at the same time they deny it to be so. For it is quite possible for the beginning of wars to be anything but just, and no one would say that the man who did not deserve to be a slave was really a slave. Otherwise it will happen that men held to be nobly born will be slaves and the children of slaves, if they chance to have been taken prisoners and sold. And for this reason men do not generally speak of themselves (i.e. their own countrymen) as slaves, but only of foreigners. And yet when they use this language they are really looking for the slave by nature; and this is just what we said at the beginning. For they must allow that there are persons who are slaves everywhere, others who are slaves nowhere. It is the same also with regard to noble birth. For men deem themselves to be
nobly born not only among their own people, but everywhere; foreigners, on the other hand, to be noble only at home, implying that there is a class of men which is essentially noble and free, and another which is essentially not so, just as Helen, in the play of Theodectes, says: 'Sprung as I am from two divine stems, who could deem it right to hail me servant?' When persons use such language, they make the distinction between slave and free, the nobly born and the low born, depend upon nothing else than virtue and vice. For they really maintain that as man is the offspring of man, and beast of beast, so also good is the offspring of good. But Nature, while having a tendency often to produce this result, has not the power to do so always. It is clear then that the objection raised has one ground of reason, and some are not slaves by nature and some are not free: it is also clear that in certain cases some such distinction has been marked, and that in these it is for the advantage of the one party to be slave, of the other to be master, and that it is also just, and that one class ought to be ruled and the other to rule 'with the rule for which they were intended by nature,
so that it should rule as of a master over slaves; but for the rule to be of a wrong character is against the interest of both classes. For the interests of the part and of the whole, of the body and of the soul, are the same, and the slave is really a part of the master, being a sort of animate but unattached part of his body. For this reason there is some advantage even in mutual friendship between master and slave, where they have been placed in their respective positions by nature; but where they have not been so placed, but are only there by law and force, the reverse is true.

It is clear also from what has been said that mastery over slaves and constitutional authority are not the same thing, and generally that all forms of government do not agree with each other in character, as some say they do, for the one is rule over men free by nature, the other over slaves. Also the government of a household is a monarchy (for every household is governed by one man), but constitutional government is rule over men free and equal. Now the slave-owner does not get this name from any scientific knowledge, but simply because he is such (i.e. a master), and the same may be said of the slave and freeman. But still there will be a science belonging to both masters and slaves, and of the science of
slaves we have an instance in what the man taught at Syracuse. There a certain person, on the receipt of a fee, used to teach servants their ordinary round of duties. But the power of learning such accomplishments will extend farther to such things as artistic cookery and other similar branches of service. For there is a distinct difference between the more valuable and the more necessary services, and in the words of the proverb, 'There are slaves and slaves, and there are masters and masters.' Now all such accomplishments are forms of the science of slaves, while the science of the master is how to use slaves, for the master is such in virtue not of possessing but of using slaves. Still this science implies nothing very great or elevated. For what the slave ought to know how to do, that the master ought to know how to order. For this reason, if men have the power of escaping the personal trouble, an overseer takes this charge, while they themselves engage in public life or study philosophy. But the art of acquiring slaves is distinct from both of these—the just form I
mean—being a part of the science of war or of hunting. On the questions, however, of slave and master, let us be satisfied with the decisions at which we have arrived.

But let us examine the whole question of property of all kinds, and the art of making money, following the method which has hitherto guided us, for even the slave was found to be a particular subdivision of property. Now in the first place one might raise a difficulty as to whether the art of making money is the same as that of ruling a household, or is a subdivision of it, or subservient to it; and if it is subservient, whether it is so in the manner in which the art of the shuttle maker aids the art of weaving, or in that in which the art of brass founding aids the art of making statues. For these (two arts) do not give their assistance in the same sense; on the contrary, the former supplies the instruments, the other the material. I mean by material the substance out of which any work is brought to perfection. For example, for the weaver, I mean fleeces; for the statuary, bronze. Now that the art of ruling a household is not the same as that of making money is evident: for it is the business of the one to procure, of the other to use. For what will the art be that will make use of household stores unless it be the art of household rule?
BOOK I. CAP. 8.

οἰκονομικῆν; πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τι ἢ ἐτερον ἐδος, ἐχει διαμφισβήτησιν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦ χρηματι-3

στικοῦ θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ κτήσις ἔσται, ἢ δὲ κτήσις πολλὰ περιεῖλθε μέρη καὶ δο πλοῦτος, ὡστε πρῶτον ἢ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἢ ἐτερον τι γένος, καὶ καθόλου ἢ περὶ τὴν τροφῆν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτή-

σις; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰδῆ γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ 4 και τῶν ᾠδῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶν. οὐ γὰρ οἰόν τε

ξῆν ἀνευ τροφῆς, ὡστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποίηκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ᾠδῶν, τῶν τε γὰρ ὅ

θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελαια τὰ δὲ σποραδικὰ ἐστὶν, ὅποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφῆν αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ἄρ-

φάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφόρα τὰ δὲ παμφόρα αὐτῶν εἶναι. ὡστε πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν τῆν τούτων ἢ

φύσις τοὺς βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ ταύτῳ

But whether the art of money-making is a particular part of household rule, or is distinct in kind, admits of some discussion. For if it is the business of the man concerned with money-making to find out the source from which money and property are to be got, still property includes many subdivisions, and so does wealth. So, in the first place, is the art of husbandry a subdivision of the art of money-making, or is it distinct in genus? And so, in general terms, what are we to say about the industry and acquisition that are concerned with food? Nay but further, there are certainly many forms of food, and for this reason there are many kinds of life, both among animals and men. For it is not possible to live without food, so that the differences of their food have made the modes of life of animals different. For of wild beasts some are gregarious, others solitary, according as it suits them in their pursuit of food, since some are flesh-eaters (carnivorous), others herb-eaters (herbivorous), others of them, again, eaters of anything (omnivorous). So that it is Nature who has determined their modes of life, with an eye to facilities and power of choice in getting their livelihood. But since the same thing is not naturally sweet to every individual, but some things
are sweet to some, others to others, so also among even carnivorous and herbivorous animals do the modes of life stand distinct one from another.

Similarly of men: their habits of life vary widely. Thus some, the most do-nothing, are wanderers, for their food, supplied by tame animals, comes to them without toil on their part, while they live at their ease; but since it is necessary for the cattle to change their quarters for the sake of pasturage, the masters are also compelled to go with them, just as if they tilled a field possessed of life and motion. Others exist by the chase, some by one, others by another form of it. For instance, some gain their livelihood by piracy, others by fishing—these are they who live near lakes, marshes, rivers, or the sea, where it is adapted for fishing; others, again, by fowling or hunting wild game. But the largest class of men gets its living from the earth and its cultivated fruits. Now such, more or less, are the different modes of life—those at least

1 ἄπο ληστείας. Cf. Thuc. i 5. οὐ γὰρ ἔλληνες τὸ πάλαι, καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων οὐ τε ἐν τῇ ἥπειρῳ παραβαλάσσεις καὶ ὅσοι νῆσους εἶχον, ἐτράποντο πρὸς ληστείαν.
which confine their daily work to personal exertion, and do not get their food by barter and trading—namely, pastoral, agricultural, the pirate’s, the fisherman’s, and the hunter’s. Other men, again, live enjoyably by mixing up some of these, thus filling up the most deficient part of their existence where it happens to fall short in attaining self-sufficingness. For instance, some combine the pastoral and the piratical modes of life, others that of the husbandman with that of the hunter. Similarly also with the rest, just as necessity combines their aims, so do they live.

Property then of this sort seems to be given by Nature herself to all creatures, as at the first moment of their birth, so also when they have come to full growth. For even looking at the moment of birth, some animals produce with their young just that quantity of food which will suffice till the new-born can provide for itself by itself, as for instance, animals that are verminparous or oviparous. But those which are viviparous have nourishment for their young within themselves for a certain time, namely, nature’s supply of what is called milk. So in like manner it is clear that at a later period of growth also we must conclude that plants exist for the sake of ani-
and the other animals for the sake of man—those domesticated for his use and his food, and of those wild (if not all), yet the greatest proportion, to supply him with food and other things, so that raiment and other serviceable things may be formed out of them. If then Nature makes nothing either imperfect or in vain, it must needs be that she has made all these things for the sake of man. Therefore also the art of war will naturally in a certain sense be an art of acquisition. For a branch of it is that art of the chase which must be used both against wild beasts and such men as being intended by nature to be ruled over, are unwilling to submit to this arrangement:—on the ground that this form of war is naturally just. One sort then of the art of acquisition is naturally a part of Household Rule. And this must either be found by it already in existence, or it must take measures to secure its existence, namely, the acquisition of things which are capable of being stored, neces-

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Footnote:
2 γενομένοις cannot, if it is the right word here, have its proper meaning of 'at the moment after birth.' It must have taken the place of some such word as τελειωθείσων, which indeed is adopted as the reading by Susemihl.
That there is then a form of the acquisition of property in accordance with nature to be practised by masters of households and statesmen, and why this is so, is clear.

But there is another class of the art of acquisition which above others men call, and rightly call, the art of making money, and it is by reason of this that there is thought to be no limit of riches and property; and this many men look upon as one and the same with that already described, because the two border closely on each other. But it is neither the same as that aforementioned, nor yet very widely removed from it. In reality one of them exists
by Nature, and the other does not, but rather comes through a certain experience and art. But let us take our start in considering it from the following considerations.

Of every article of property the mode of use is twofold: both modes treat the thing as what it is, but do not do so in the same sense: one is the proper, and the other the not-proper use of the article. Of a shoe, for instance, there is both its use to wear and its use as an object of barter; for both are modes of using a shoe. For he also who makes an exchange with the man that wants a shoe in return for coined money or for food, uses the shoe quæ shoe indeed, but not according to its primary and proper use, since it was not made for the object of barter. The same holds also with regard to the other articles of property, for the use by barter applies to all things, arising at first from the order of nature, by reason of men having more than enough of some things and less than enough of others.

And therefore also it is clear that trading is not a natural part of money-getting; for only so far as to satisfy their necessities was it absolutely necessary for men to employ barter. Now in the earliest
πρώτη κοινωνία (τούτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερῶν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἐν πλείονοις τῆς κοινωνίας οὕσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνουν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἐτέρων· ὅτι κατὰ τὰς διήθεσις ἀναγκαίων ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἐτί πολλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ἔθνων, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγήν. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ 6 καταλματοῦνται, ἐπὶ πλέον δ' οὐθέν, οἷν οἷνον πρὸς σῖτου διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἐκαστοῦ. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλητικὴ οὕτε πάρα φύσιν οὗτε χρηματιστικής ἐστὶν εἰδος οὐθέν· εἰς ἀναπληρώσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἤν. ἐκ 7 μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετ' ἐκεῖνη κατὰ λόγον. ἔνικωτέρας γὰρ γνωμένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὅν ἐνδείκνυται καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὃν ἐπελεύνας, ἔξω ἀνάγκης η̆ τοῦ νομίσματος

association (that is the family) it is clear that there is no part for it to play; but there is a part as soon as the association has become wider. For these (the members of the household) used to have all the same things in common use, but those (members of the wider community), having become separated, have in common many things as before, and also have a share of different things; and it is of these different things, according to their wants, that they must needs make their exchanges, as even now many of the barbaric tribes do in the form of barter, for they exchange things useful separately one against the other, but they never go farther. For instance, they give and take wine for grain, and so on with each other of the same class of things.

Now this kind of exchange is neither contrary to nature nor is it any form of the art of money-making, for it was adopted to fill up the measure of natural self-completeness. Still it is out of this form that the other rose, as might have been expected. For when the help that men found in importing what they wanted, and exporting what they had in over-abundance, came into use over greater distances, from sheer necessity the use of
money was devised. Because it is not every matter of natural and necessary use that is easily carried about; and so with a view to their barterings men covenanted to give and take in their intercourse with each other something of this nature, which, belonging itself to the class of useful articles, possessed a secondary use, easily adapted to the wants of life; silver, for instance, and gold, and anything else of that sort. And this was at first simply measured by size and weight, but at last its value was fixed by men further putting a stamp upon it to save the trouble of measuring, for the stamp was set to mark the value. But money having been now adopted in consequence of the necessary barter, another form of money-making arose, namely, trade, which at first perhaps appeared in the simplest forms, but afterwards grew from experience more scientific, as the trader calculated from what country and in what manner his exchange should be made, so as to produce the greatest gain. For this reason the art of wealth-getting is thought mainly to be concerned with money, and its function the being able to see from what source abundance of wealth is to come, as it is calculated to
produce wealth and possessions. Indeed, men often define wealth as an abundance of money, because the art of getting rich and trading are concerned with money. At another time, on the contrary, money is thought to be vanity, and quite as conventional as its name implies, but to be by nature nothing at all, because if those that use it change their standard it is worth nothing and profitless for obtaining anything necessary. And a man rolling in wealth will often be at a loss for his needful food. And yet it is ridiculous that that should be wealth which a man may have in abundance and yet perish of hunger, just as they tell in the fable that the famous Midas perished through the insatiate greed of his prayer, all that was set before him turning into gold. For this reason men seek for something else as the true wealth and the true art of seeking it, and they do well so to seek. For the art of getting wealth and wealth itself, when they follow nature, are quite distinct from this; and while this form (i.e. the κατὰ φύσιν) belongs to household rule, the trading type is merely productive of money—not by every means but only by exchanging it. This latter also is thought to be concerned with money. For money is the
BOOK I. CAP. 9.

13 χείων καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστίν. καὶ ἀπειροῦ δὴ οὕτως ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. ὃστερ γὰρ ἢ εἰσιντεκνὲς εἰς ἀπειρῶν ἐστι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειροῦ (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκείνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπειροῦ (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πᾶσας), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἐστὶ τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις. τῆς δὲ οἰκονομικῆς, οὐ χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶ πέρας: οὐ γὰρ τούτῳ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον. διὸ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλούτου πέρας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὀρόμεν συμβαίνου τούτων: πάντες γὰρ εἰς ἀπειροῦ αὐξοῦσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα. αὐτίον δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς beginning and the end of the exchange made, and this wealth now, namely, that which comes from this sort of money-making, is without limit. For just as the art of healing seeks no limit in producing health, and as each art seeks no limit in pursuing its end (for each desires to produce this end to the fullest degree possible, while in the means towards that end they do not thus reject a limit, for their end is the limit to all), so also this form of making money has no limit to the pursuit of its end, and that end is wealth of this (spurious) sort and the acquisition of possessions.

But there is a limit of the art of household rule, though not in the pursuit of riches; for this is not the function of the art of household rule. And therefore, although in one sense it is clearly necessary that there should be a limit of all kind of wealth, still in practice we see that the opposite is the case, since all who care for money-making seek to increase their money to an endless extent. The cause of this confusion is the close connection between the

1 ὃστερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.: the arts recognise no limit to their τέλος, they seek to do as much good as possible, but they do observe a limit in the means towards that τέλος, a limit fixed naturally by the τέλος itself. Similarly, those who make money-getting their τέλος allow no limit to it, those who make it only a means keep it within bounds.
two. For the using of the same means becomes ambiguous, since in either case the money-getting art comes into play. This is because the acquisition is either case of the same article of use, though it is not used in the same way, but the end of the one is something beyond, of the other the mere increase of money. And thus some think that this increase is the end of the art of household rule, and live on in the idea that it is their duty either to save or to increase their store of money to an unlimited extent. The cause of this state of mind is the eagerness for simply living instead of for living well. Therefore, since that desire has no limit, they also covet the means to satisfy it without limit. But those men also who eagerly desire to live well seek for what conduces to the pleasures of the body, so that since this also is clearly found in possession, all their effects are employed in money-getting, and thus the second form of the art of money-getting has arisen. For since their pleasure consists in excess, they seek for the art which will produce an excess of pleasure. And if they cannot obtain their end by means of the art of money-getting, they try for it by
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totus peirôntai, ἐκάστη χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνδρίας γὰρ οὗ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἔστιν ἄλλα θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς, ἄλλα τῆς μὲν 18 νίκης τῆς δ' ὑγίειαν. οἱ δὲ πάσαι ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ὡς τοῦτο τέλος ὅν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τέλος ἀπαντὰ δέων ἀπαντᾶν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τῆς, καὶ δὲ αἰτίαν τίνα ἐν χρείᾳ ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς, εἴρηται· καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἑτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ περὶ τὴν τροφῆν, οὐχ ὡσπερ αὐτὴ ἀπειρος ἀλλ' 10 ἔχουσα ὁρον. δὴ λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀποροῦμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἔστιν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ οὐ, ἄλλα δει τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν· ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτικὴ, ἄλλα λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται αὐτοῖς, οὔτω καὶ τροφῆν, τὴν φύσιν δὲ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι· ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς some other means, using each of their faculties in unnatural fashion. For it is not the part of courage to produce money, but daring; nor is it the part of the arts of war or medicine; but the former ought to produce victory, the latter health. Others make arts of all sorts instruments for getting money, under the idea that this is the great end, and that all things ought to unite to further this end. Thus now we have spoken on the subject of non-compulsory money-making, and stated what it is, and what the reason is why we use it; also on the subject of the compulsory form, that it is distinct from the other, and belongs naturally to the art of household rule, where it concerns food, not being, as the other form, without any limit, but having a fixed boundary.

Plain too is that which was the question at the beginning, namely, whether or not the art of getting money is the business of the master of a household and a statesman. If not, the existence of wealth (in the state or household) must be presupposed. For just as the science of Politics does not create men, but receives them from Nature, and then uses them, so also ought Nature to provide nourishment, whether she be in the shape of land or sea or any other element; but after-
wards, as it is right, so it is fitting that the master of the house-
hold should dispose of these resources. For it is not the part of
the weaver's art to produce fleeces but to use them, and to know
what sort is good and serviceable, what bad and unserviceable.
For otherwise a man might raise a difficulty why the art of wealth-
getting is a part of household rule, while the art of healing is not
a part; and yet the members of the household ought to enjoy health
as much as life or anything else that is needful. But since it is in
one sense the duty of the head of a household or state to consider also
the question of health, but in another sense it is not, but that of
the physician, so also is it in the matter of possessions; in one
sense it is the part of the head of the house to see after them, in
another sense it is not his, but that of the art of supply. But
above all, as we have said before, it is well that this (sufficient pos-
session) should be supplied by Nature. For it is the function of
Nature to supply food to all that is born: for that which is left
behind is nurture for each thing, in each case coming from that
from which it was born. Therefore to all men the form of making
gain from fruits and animals is natural. But since this making
gain is, as we have said, of two kinds, one belonging to trade, the other to household management, while the latter is necessary and praised, the other—that connected with barter—is rightly blamed (for it is not a making gain in a natural manner, but a robbing of man from man): and most reasonably of all is hated the trade of the usurer, because the gain comes from the money itself, and not from the use for which money was devised; for it came into existence for the help of exchange; but Interest (which means Breeding) increases it more and more, whence also Interest has got the name of breeding, for things born are in themselves similar to that from which they are bred, and Interest becomes money bred of money, so that of the means of making gain this is by far the most unnatural.

But as we have sufficiently determined the theoretical side of the question, we ought to consider in detail its practical side. All matters of this class are free in theory, but constrained in practice. Useful branches of the art of getting wealth are—to be experienced about stock—what class pays best, and where, and under what conditions; for example, to know what is the advantage of
breeding horses, or oxen, or sheep, and in the same manner of the other animals. For a man ought to know by experience which of these are the most paying in comparison with the others, and what breed do best in what localities, for some do well in one class of country, others in another. In the next place a man should know about husbandry, and that both as concerns tillage of the soil and the growth of plantations, and about the keeping of bees, and about the other living creatures that swim or fly, from which it is possible to derive profit. These then are elements, and primary elements, of the most proper form of wealth-getting; but of the form which deals in exchange the most important element is Traffic (and this has three parts, traffic by sea, traffic by land in caravans, and retail trade, and these differ from each other in that some are safer and others give the larger returns), the next is usury, and the third labour for hire. And of this, again, one sort is working at mechanical arts, and another at those which require no skill and are useful only in respect to the physical strength employed. But the third kind of wealth-getting lies between the last and the first mentioned. For it has some part both in the natural
μέρος καὶ τής μεταβλητικῆς, ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων, ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δὲ, οἶον ὼλοτομία ὅ τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτικὴ. αὐτὴ δὲ πολλὰ ἤδη περιελήφθη γένης πολλὰ γάρ εἴδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλλευμένων ἔστιν. περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτου καθόλου μὲν εἰρηταί καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβελογείνθαι χρήσιμον μὲν 6 πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. εἰς δὲ τεχνικῶταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὑπὸν ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης, βαναυσόταται δὲ ἐν αἷσ τὰ σώματα ὅμωστατα μᾶλλα, δουλικῶταται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος πλείστατα χρήσεις, ἀγενέσταται δὲ ὑπὸν ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἄρετής ἐτεῖ δὲ ἐστὶν εὐνῶς γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, οἶον Χάρτι δὴ τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ Ἀπολλοδόρῳ τῷ Δημηνίῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψυλής καὶ πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλωσ περὶ ἄλλων, ταῦτα μὲν ἐκ τούτων θεωρεῖτω ὅτῳ ἐπιμελεῖν· ἐτεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, σποράδην, δὲ ὑν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν

form (of money-getting) and in that which rests on exchange, namely, the profit made from the earth and from things produced by the earth, things without fruit but useful, wood-cutting and the art of mining of every sort; and this now embraces many kinds of metals obtained from the earth. Of each of these divisions we have now spoken, but while speaking accurately of them in detail is useful for the pursuits in question, to linger over them is tiresome.

The most scientific of men's pursuits are those where there is the least element of chance; the meanest are those in which men's bodies are most deformed; the most servile where there is most use of the body alone; the most ignoble where the least excellence is required. But since works have been written on these subjects by certain persons, such as by Chares of Paros, and Apollodorus of Lemnos, on husbandry in both its branches of tilling the soil and growing plantations, and similarly by others on other subjects, let whoever cares to do so study these matters in the writings of these authors. Also it is well to collect scattered stories of the means by which certain persons have made a lucky hit in their pursuit of
for all this is useful for those who set high store on the art of acquiring wealth. Take, for instance, the scheme of Thales of Miletus. This is a particular device for making money; but though men attach it to him on account of his wisdom, it is, as a matter of fact, of general application. They say that when his neighbours reproached him for his poverty, as proving that philosophy was of no profit, since he had found out by his astrological knowledge that there was going to be a great olive harvest, while it was still winter, having a little money, he laid it out as deposit for the hire of all the olive presses in Miletus and Chios, hiring them at a low rate, as none bid against him. So when the season came and there was a sudden rush of crowds seeking (for olive presses) all at the same time, he sublet the presses just as he liked, and having gained a large sum, proved that it is easy for philosophers to be rich if they like, but that this is not the object on which they set their hearts. Thus Thales is said to have given a proof of his wisdom in this fashion; but, as we have stated, this form of money-making is
ρωλίαν αὐτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἐναι
tοῦτον ποιοῦνται τὸν πόρον, ὅταν ἀπορῶσι χρημάτων·
μονοπωλίαν γὰρ τῶν ὄνιων ποιοῦσιν. ἐν Σικελίᾳ δὲ τις
tεθέντος παρ’ αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνεπρίατο πάντα τὸν
σίδηρον ἐκ τῶν σιδηρείων, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα ὦς ἀφίκοντο ἐκ
tῶν ἐμπορίων οἱ ἐμποροὶ, ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιή-
σας ὑπερβολὴν τῆς τιμῆς· ἀλλ' ὄμως ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα
11 ταλάντοις ἐπέλαβεν ἐκατόν. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν ὁ Διονύσιος
αἰσθόμενος τὰ μὲν χρήματα ἐκέλευσεν ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ
μέντοι γῇ ἐτί μένειν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὦς πόρους εὑρίσκοντα
τοῖς αὐτοῦ πράγμασιν ἀσυμφόρους. τὸ μέντοι ὤραμα Θά-
λεω καὶ τούτο ταύτων ἔστιν· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐαυτοῖς ἐτέ-
12 χνασαν γενέσθαι μονοπωλίαν. χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν
tαύτα καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς· πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρη-
ματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων πόρων, ὡσπερ οἶκια, μᾶλλον δὲ.
διόπερ τινὲς καὶ πολιτεύονται τῶν πολιτευομένων ταῦτα
μόνον.

of general application when a man can secure a monopoly for him-
self. Therefore also certain states adopt the method when they are
badly off for revenue, since they establish a monopoly of market
wares. In Sicily a certain person, having a sum of money deposited
with him, bought up all the iron from the smithies, and afterwards,
when dealers came from the marts, he was the only seller, though
he did not make much increase in the price. Still he gained 100
talents in addition to his original 50. When Dionysius heard of this,
he told him to carry off his gains, but not to stop any longer in Syra-
cuse, on the ground that he hit upon schemes which were not to
the profit of the Prince's own interest. The speculation, however,
of Thales and this scheme of the Sicilian are really the same, for
each contrived to secure a monopoly for himself. But it is useful
even for statesmen to know these ideas, for many states need a sup-
ply of money and means like this of getting it, just as a household
does, but to a greater degree. And so some of those in public life
make these matters alone the object of their public policy.
There have been seen to be three elements of household government, the first being the rule of the master over slaves, of which we have spoken before, the second that of the father over children, and the third that of the husband over the wife; for (it was also seen to be part of the householder's duty) to rule both his wife and his children as beings equally free, but not with the same character of rule. His rule over the wife is like that of a magistrate in a free state, over his children it is like that of a king. For both the male is naturally more qualified to lead than the female, unless where some unnatural case occurs, and also the older and more perfect than the younger and imperfect. Now in the government of free states in most cases the positions of ruler and ruled alternate, for there is a tendency that all should be naturally equal and differ in no respect; but, nevertheless, whenever one party rules and the other is ruled, there is a wish that there should be some difference made in garb, titles, honours, just as Amasis implied in what he said about the footbath. But the relation of the male to the female

1 ἐπεῖ. The apodosis to this is supposed by Thurot and Schneider to be found in the commencement of ch. xiii.: φανέρω τοῖνυν.

2 Ἄμασις. The story of Amasis and the footbath is given in Herod. ii. 172.
is always of this character and unchanged. But the rule over the children is the rule of a king, for the father is ruler both through affection and seniority, and this is the character of a king's rule; and for this reason Homer was right in addressing Zeus as 'Father of Gods and Men'—Zeus the king of all these. For a king should differ in nature from his subjects, but be still the same in kind; and this is the relation of the elder to the younger, the father to the child.

It is clear, therefore, that the earnest attention of household management is more concerned with living men than with the acquisition of inanimate objects—with the excellence of the former rather than with that of property, to which we give the name of wealth—with the excellence of freemen rather than with that of slaves. Now, in the first place, some one may raise a difficulty with regard to slaves: whether a slave has any excellence beyond that of an instrument and an agent; any other more valuable than these, such as Temperance, Courage, Justice, and any of the other dispositions of that sort; or whether he has none at all beyond bodily
services. There is a difficulty either way. For if slaves have such excellence, in what will they differ from freemen? and yet to say that they are not, if they are men with a share of reason, is absurd. The question is very nearly the same in the case of women and children, as to whether they too have excellences, and if a woman ought to be temperate and courageous and just, and if a child is utterly intemperate or wisely temperate or no. And to speak generally, we have now this consideration before us with regard to the natural subject and the natural ruler, have they the same excellence or a distinct kind? For if both ought to share in nobleness of character, why, once and for ever, should one be ruler and the other be subject? for it cannot be that they differ in the matter of greater or less (i.e. of degree), for to be ruled and to rule differ in kind, but the greater and the less do not. On the other hand, if one ought to possess this nobleness, while the other ought not, it is a strange state of things. For if, on the one hand, the ruler is not to be temperate and just, how is he to be a good ruler? if, on the other, the subject (is to lack these qualities), how is he
to be a good subject? For being, according to our supposition, utterly intemperate and cowardly, he will do none of those things that he should do. It is obvious, then, that while it is necessary for both parties to have their share of excellence, there must still be different kinds of excellence, just as there are also different kinds of those who are naturally subject to rule. And this has led us directly to the consideration of the Soul: for in the soul there is by nature an element that rules and also an element that is ruled; and in these we recognise distinction of excellence—the excellence, to wit, of that which possesses reason, and the excellence of that which lacks it. It is clear, then, that the same rule holds good in the other cases also, so that most things in the world are rulers or ruled by Nature's direction. For in different method does the free element rule the slave, the male the female, the man the child; and while in all of these are there present their separate shares of soul, these are present in each in a different manner. For the slave, speaking generally, has not the deliberative faculty, but the woman has it, though without power to be effective; the child has it, but in an imperfect degree. Similarly, then, must it necessarily be with regard to the moral virtues also. We must suppose that all ought to have
some share in them, though not in the same way, but only so far as each requires for the fulfilment of his own function. Therefore the ruler should have moral excellence in its perfect form (for his function is strictly that of the master builder, and reason is the master builder), and each of the rest (the subordinates) should have just as much as falls to him. And so it is clear that moral excellence belongs to all the classes we have mentioned; and yet the same kind of temperance does not belong to woman and man, nor the same courage and justice (as Socrates thought), but the one is the courage of the ruler, the other the courage of the subject. And similarly with the other virtues. This is clear also if we look more closely in detail: for men deceive themselves who use general statements, saying that ‘to keep the soul in sound condition’ is virtue, or that ‘right action,’ or anything of that sort, is virtue. For they who, like Gorgias, make an enumeration of the virtues, speak much more wisely than those who make such (general) definitions.

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2 ὁ ποιητής. Sophocles in the Ajax, 293.
Therefore we ought to think about all the virtues in the sense of what the poet said of woman:

Silence gives a crown of honour to woman.

But this does not extend to man. And since the child is imperfect, it is clear that his excellence also is not his own and in relation to himself, but is only in relation to the man who is perfect, and directs him. Similarly also, the excellence of the slave is with regard to his master. Now we settled that it was for the absolute necessities of life that the slave was useful; so that it is clear he also needs excellence to but a small extent, and only so much as not to fail in his work, through habits of intemperance or cowardice. But one might raise the question, supposing what we have now said to be true, 'will artisans then also need to have excellence?' for they often fail in their work from habits of intemperance; or is the difference here the widest possible? For while the slave is a partaker of life in its proper sense, the other (the artisan) is farther off, and there falls to his lot only such a share of excellence as there does of slavery: for the low artisan is in a sort of slavery, unattached to any master. The slave also is one of Nature's insti-
BOOK I. CAP. 13.

αλλα περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. 15
περὶ δὲ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τῆς
tε περὶ ἐκαστοῦ αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτῶν
όμιλίας, τῇ τὸ καλὸς καὶ μὴ καλὸς ἦστὶ, καὶ πῶς δεῖ
tὸ μὲν εὗ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακὸς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ
τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν
πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα δὲ οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους
πρὸς τὴν του ὅλου δεὶ βλέπειν ἀρετὴν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς
τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς παιδὰς
καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἰπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν
tuitions; but no shoemaker, nor any of the artisans, is such. It is
clear, then, that the master ought to be the source of such excellence
to the slave, but not by making his art of teaching duties a part of
his duty as master.

For this reason they say not well who would deprive slaves
of reason, and who assert that they but obey the word of com-
mand; for slaves require more persuasion than children. But on
these matters let our decision given in this form suffice: on the
questions of husband and wife, children and father, of both the
excellence (of these) in each particular relation, and the character
of their intercourse with each other, what is well and what is not
well, of the right method to pursue the good and avoid the evil,
(on these questions) it is necessary to go further in discussions
about the constitution of a state. For since every household is a
part of a state, and these questions belong to the household, and
the excellence of the part ought to keep in view the excellence of
the whole, it is necessary that we should have our eye on the con-
stitution in educating our children and wives; if so be that it is
of importance towards the State being good that both the children
should be good and the women good; and important it must necessarily be. For women are half the free population; and it is from children that grow the members of the constitution. And so since our decisions have been given on these points, and we must speak elsewhere of what remains, let us dismiss this present subject as being completed, and make a fresh beginning of our argument; and let us first examine the theories that have been set forth in the Ideally best constitution.
If we wish to examine State Government, and see to what class each particular case belongs, and what character it possesses, perhaps our first step should be to consider the State, and see what sort of thing, after all, the State is. For, at the present moment, different people take different views; some saying that it is 'the State' which has done such or such a thing, and others that it is not 'the State,' but the 'oligarchy,' or the 'despot.' Now the whole business of the statesman or legislator is, we see, concerned with a 'State,' and the government of it, or 'constitution,' is a particular organisation of the men who live in the State. And since the State belongs to the class of compound bodies, as much as anything else that is a whole itself, but yet is composed of many factors, it is clear that it is the citizen who must be first discovered. For the State is an aggregate of citizens, so that we must try and find out what man it is to whom we must give the name of citizen

1 Cf. Bk. I. ch. i. 3.
and who the real citizen is. For the word citizen also is often understood in different senses. All people do not agree in calling the same man a citizen, for it is possible to find a man who, although a citizen in a democracy, is very likely not a citizen in an oligarchy. We may, indeed, dismiss those who have, by some accidental means or other, gained this name, as, for instance, citizens by adoption. The citizen is not such in virtue of residence in a particular place, for aliens also, and slaves, share the qualification of residence. Nor, again, are those persons citizens who have the benefit of the law just so far as to be defendants or plaintiffs in a suit; for this right belongs also to those who are associated by commercial treaties, and these privileges also belong to aliens. In many cases, certainly, the aliens do not possess even these in a full sense, but must find a patron to appear for them; and so it is in an imperfect sense that they have a part in this form of association, just as in the case of children who have not yet been enrolled on the list of citizens on account of their youth, and old men who

2 ἐγγεγραμμένοι, i.e. in the register of the demus, τὸ λεξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον. Names were entered on this when the member reached the age of 18.
have earned exemption, we must call them citizens in a certain sense, not quite absolutely, but must add the qualification of ‘imperfect’ or ‘superannuated,’ or something similar (what it is makes no difference, for what is meant is quite clear): for we are looking for the citizen in the full sense of the word, open to no objection of this kind requiring a correction, since similar difficulties about persons who have lost their citizenship, or have been exiled, may be raised and explained. The citizen in the full sense is defined by nothing so well as ‘participation in the administration of justice and the offices of government.’ Offices are either definite in point of time, so that there are some which the same man may not hold twice under any circumstances, or only after the interval of a definite period, or indefinite, as that of the members of the judicial or legislative bodies. Perhaps it might be said that this latter class are not officials, and have no share of office in virtue of these privileges: and yet it is absurd to deprive those who are most powerful of the title of power. But let this make no difference,

3 tovs ἀφειμένους, i.e. past the age of 60.

4 ὁ ἄρριστος, a sudden change in the construction from the feminine abstract to the masculine concrete—a sort of attraction to the δικαστής καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής following.
for it is a question of a name. For the common element between the two—the member of the judicial and the member of the legislative bodies—has no name by the help of which we may find a common term for them both. So let it be, for distinction sake, ‘an indefinite office;’ and so we consider citizens those who are in this sense members of the association. Thus the meaning of ‘citizen,’ which would apply best to all who are now called citizens, may be said to be this, or something like this. But it must not escape us that in the case of general terms, when the meanings included are specifically different, one sense being the primary, another the secondary, and so on, there is either absolutely no common element in virtue of which they have this name, or only some petty resemblance. Now we see that constitutions are specifically different from each other, some being of a secondary and others of a primary nature; for those which have gone wrong and become perverted must necessarily be secondary in comparison with those which have not done so. What we mean by perverted constitution will appear later on. Therefore the citizen, under each

5 \( \delta \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \mu \eta \) κ.τ.λ. As an instance S. Hilaire gives the use of the word ‘dog’ for (1) the animal, (2) the fish, (3) the star of that name.

6 Cf. ch. vii. sub fin.
particular form of constitution, must also be distinct. Consequently the man with the qualification we named will be most truly a citizen in a democracy; under other forms he may be so, but it is not absolutely necessary. For some forms have no democratical element at all, nor have they a regular ecclesia or meeting of the people, but assemble them on special occasions, and they administer justice by special boards; for instance, at Lacedemon, the different ephors administer the different cases that arise under the law of contract, the senators take cases of homicide, and similarly particular officers other varieties of cases. The same method is adopted also at Carthage; for particular officers decide on cases of all sorts. But now our definition of the citizen admits of correction. For in the other forms of constitution (i.e. not democracy) it is not the 'indefinite officer' that is the member of the legislative and judicial bodies, but the particular person set apart for the particular office; for in these either all or some have the privilege of joining in the deliberations, and in the administra-

7 Cf. Bk. II. ch. xi. 7: καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων διὰζεσθαι πᾶσας, καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ’ ἄλλων καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι. The ἀρχεία = boards of magistrates, are here called ἀρχαὶ τινές.
BOOK III. CAP. 1, 2.

12 ἢ περὶ τινῶν. τὸς μὲν οὖν ἑστὶν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερῶν. φ ημὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἡδή λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἰκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρ-
2 κειαν ξωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπτεῖν. ὁ ἐφ' ἐπὶ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν, πολίτην τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν καὶ μὴ θατέρου μόνον, οἶον πατρὸς ἢ μητρὸς· οὗ δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πλέων ζητοῦσιν, οἶον ἐπὶ πάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλεῖους. οὐτώ δὴ ὁ ἐφ' ἐπὶ πάππους πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροῦσι τινὲς τὸν 2 τρίτον ἐκείνου ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολίτης. ¹Τοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντίνος, τὰ μὲν ἵνα ἀπορῶν τὰ δὲ εἰρωνεύ-
μενος, ἔφη, καθάπερ ἀλὸμος εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλμοτικῶν πεποιημένοις, οὕτω καὶ Ἀρισσαίοις τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ²δή-
μουργῶν πεποιημένους· εἶναι γὰρ τινας ³Λαρισσαίους

tion of justice, either in all cases or in some. It is now clear who
the citizen is; we can now say that that man who has a right to
take his part in the office of counsellor or judge is a citizen of the
State where he has that right, and that a number of such citizens
sufficient to provide for the wants of life by itself is, roughly
speaking, a State.

People do for practical purposes define a citizen as the child
of citizens on both sides, and not of one parent alone, whether
father or mother; others seek to go further still—as far, for
instance, as two, three, or more generations of ancestors. Taking
this practical and hasty definition, the difficulty arises in what way
is the third or fourth ancestor to be a citizen? Gorgias, of
Leontium, partly in a real, partly in a pretended difficulty, said
that just as kettles were those which had been made by the kettle-
makers, so those were Larissaeans who had been made so by their
magistrates, for some of these were larissa- (or kettle-) makers.

1 Torgias, the celebrated Sophist, the hero of the Platonic dialogue
of that name.
2 ἀρισσαίοις, an ambiguous word, implying artificers as well as ma-
gistrates.
3 Λαρισσαία, copper kettles made at Larissa, were apparently
called λαρισσαία or λαρισσαίοι.
Really the matter is simple; for if these ancestors were members of the constitution in the sense our definition requires, they were citizens. Indeed, it is not easy to apply the qualification of having citizen father or mother in the case of original settlers or the founders of a state. But perhaps another class involves a greater difficulty—namely, those who have become members in consequence of a change in the constitution, as Cleisthenes, for example, effected at Athens after the expulsion of the despots, for he included in the tribes many foreigners and slaves residing in the city. But the real question in regard to these persons is not which of them are really citizens, but are they such illegally or legally? And yet someone might here raise the further difficulty, ‘If a man is not legally a citizen, does it not follow that he really is not a citizen at all?’ on the ground that that which is illegal is equivalent to what is false. But since we sometimes find men even holding office and power

4 ἡσαν (SOEVER) πολίται, omitting the ἂν with Congreve.

5 Κλεισθένης, who raised the number of Athenian tribes from four to ten. B.C. 508.

6 δούλους μετοίκους. Cf. Grote, iv. 170, note 1, who considers that ξένοι μέτοικοι and δοῦλοι μέτοικοι are correlative terms, the latter expressing ‘intelligent slaves, living apart from their masters in a state between slavery and freedom, working partly on condition of a fixed payment to him, partly for themselves.’
ἀρχοντὰς τινας ἀδίκως, οὐς ἀρχεῖν μὲν φῆσομεν ἀλλὰ οὐ δικαίως, ο ὃ ὁ πολίτης ἀρχή τινι διωρισμένος ἐστίν (ὥ γαρ κοινωνόν τῆς τοιᾶσθε ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστίν, ὃς ἔφαμεν), 3 δὴ λον ὅτι πολίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον κοι 1τούτους, περὶ δὲ τὸν δικαίως ἡ μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην 2πρῶτερον ἀμφισβήτησιν. ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πόθ' ἡ πόλις ἐπραξεν καὶ πότε οὐχ ἡ πόλις, οἷον οταν ἐξ ἀληγρ-2 χίας ἡ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. τοτε γάρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλα τα ἐνοι βουλοῦνται διαλύειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος, οὔτ' ἀλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτείων τὸ κρατεῖν οὕσας, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. εἰπερ οὖν καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται τινες κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τούτον, ὁμοίως τῆς πόλεως φατέον

illegally, to whom we must give the title of holding office, but not of holding it legally, and since the citizen is marked out as such in virtue of a certain office (for he who is admitted to such or such an office is a citizen according to our definition), it clearly follows that we extend the term citizen also to the class which we are considering, while the question whether their admission was legal or illegal connects itself with the difficulty which we mentioned at the beginning of the book.

For some raise the question, when is it the state that has been the agent, and when is it not the state; as, for instance, on a democracy taking the place of an oligarchy or despotism. For in that case some persons refuse either to meet the contracts in hand on the ground that it was not the State, but the despot who entered upon them, or to perform any similar obligation, on the ground that some forms of constitution exist purely in virtue of superior strength, instead of for the common good. Further, since some democratical governments rest on the same ground, we must say that the acts of a constitution of that sort are the acts of the state

1 τούτους. Such as those introduced by Cleisthenes, ὃσοι μετέσχον μεταβολῆς γενομένης.
2 πρῶτερον in ch. i. 1.
in which it exists, just as much as the acts of an oligarchy or despotism are the acts of their respective states. Akin to this difficulty appears to be the question, ‘By what rule are we ever to call the state the same, or not the same, but different?’ The most superficial mode of treating this difficulty is to look at the place and the inhabitants. For the place and the inhabitants can be separated, and some of the latter live in one place, and others in another. In this form, the difficulty must be considered of a milder character; for if the name of the state or city be applied to many places, it is comparatively easy to treat the question under this aspect. Similarly, if the inhabitants do live in the same place, the question still is when ought we to call the state the same; not, I suppose, when it is enclosed by walls, for it would be possible to throw a single wall round the whole of the Peloponnesus, and as an instance of this sort, we may take Babylon, and every city whose circumference more suits a nation than a state. And when Babylon

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3 διαζευγθήματι, e.g. the Athenians at the time of the invasion of Xerxes, when some took refuge in Salamis, others elsewhere.
4 Βαβύλων. Cf. Herod. i. 178, who gives the circumference of the walls at 480 stadia, the shape being quadrangular, each face of 120 stadia.
was taken, they say part of the city was not aware of it for three days. But the inquiry into this difficulty is one adapted for another and fitting time. For what is the right size of a state, and whether it is best that it should consist of one tribe or more, are questions which ought not to escape the attention of the statesman. But assuming that the same men are living in the same place, ought we, as long as the race of the inhabitants continues the same, to call the state the same, though some individuals be continually dying, and others coming into the world (just as we commonly speak of rivers and fountains as the same, although one wave is continually coming on and another passing away), or should we say that it is the men only who are the same on these grounds, but that the state is different? For since the state is a certain association, and an association of citizens, when the relation of the citizens, i.e. the constitution, becomes specifically other than it was, and is thus changed, it would appear necessarily to follow that the state also is not the same, just

5 For the ignorance of one part of the city that the other had been taken, see Herod. i. 191.
6 eis ἄλλον καὶρὸν, see Bk. IV. iv. 3.
as we say that a chorus appearing on one occasion as comic, and on another as tragic, is not the same, though very likely the individual members of it are the same; and, similarly, we speak of every other association and composite body as differing, if the character of its composition differs, as we call the music of the same sounds different, if they are in one case arranged in the Dorian, in another in the Phrygian style. If this view be correct, it is clear that we should, with most accuracy, speak of the identity of a state by regarding its constitution. It is quite possible to give it the same or a different name when the same men dwell in it, and also when they are quite different. But whether it is right to discharge contracts, or to repudiate them, when the state assumes a different constitution, is quite another question.

Next to the subjects which we have just discussed comes the investigation, whether the same excellence should be held to mark the good man and the good citizen, or not the same. Certainly, if

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1 Ch. iv. See Eth. v. c. v. 11. οὐ γὰρ ἵσως ταύτῳ ἄνδρι τῷ ἄγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτη ταύτῃ.
we are to succeed in this examination, we must first in outline determine the excellence of the citizen. Just as the sailor is a single unit among those associated with him, so, do we say, is the citizen; and although sailors differ from each other in their particular abilities (one is rower, another pilot, another look-out man, another something else, with a similar special name), it is clear that while the most accurate description of each will be the one confined to his individual excellence, there will still be some common name which will equally well apply to all. For safety on their voyage is the object and function of all, since it is this that each individual sailor makes his aim. Similarly citizens, although individually dissimilar, have the safety of the association as their object and function, and it is the constitution which is their association; and therefore the excellence of the citizen should be in some relation to the constitution of which he is a member. Since, then, there are several forms of constitution, it is clearly impossible that there should be one complete excellence to mark the good citizen. But the good man, we say, is such in virtue of complete excellence. It is, therefore, now clear that it is quite possible that
a citizen, though good as such, should not possess the excellence which characterises the good man. Not but that we may in another manner discuss the best constitution, and arrive at the same result. For if it is impossible that a state should be composed of good men without exception, and yet each member ought to perform his own peculiar function well (which he must do in virtue of some excellence), and since it is impossible that all citizens should be exactly similar (or ‘peers’), we arrive at the conclusion that there will not be one and the same excellence to characterise the citizen and the good man. For the excellence of the good citizen must belong to all the individuals (for it is necessarily on this assumption that the state can be the best possible), but the excellence of the good man cannot possibly do so, unless all the citizens in a good state must necessarily be good men. Again, since the state is composed of dissimilar elements (just as a living being, to begin with, is composed of soul and body, and a soul again of reason and desire, and a household of husband and wife, and property of master and slave, and similarly a state of all these and other dissimilar kinds of elements as well), it necessarily follows that the excellence of all
toûtois êξ ἄλλων ἀνομοίων συνέστηκεν εἰδῶν, ἀνάγκη μή μίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἀρετήν, ὡσπερ οὔδε τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίον καὶ παραστάτου. διὸτι μὲν τοῖς ἀπλῶς οὐχ ἢ αὐτή, φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων ἄλλ' ἀρα ἔσται τινὸς ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετή πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἄνδρος σπουδαίου; φαμέν δὴ τὸν ἀρχοντα τὸν σπουδαίον ἄγαθον εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἄναγ-καίον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς ἐτέραν εἶναι λέγουσι τινες τοῦ ἀρχοντος, ὡσπερ καὶ φαίνουσι οἱ τῶν βασιλέων νιεῖς ἱππικήν καὶ τολμηκὴν παιδευ-μένοι, καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ 2' μή μοι τὰ κόμψη, ἄλλ' δὲν πόλει δεῖ, ὡς οὖσάν τινα ἀρχοντος παιδείαν. εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή ἀρχοντός τε ἄγαθον καὶ ἄνδρος ἄγαθον, πολίτης δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ ἀπλῶς ἄν

the citizens is not one and the same, any more than in a chorus the excellence of the leader is the same as that of the next in order. Therefore that, as a general rule, it (i.e. excellence in the citizen and the good man) is not the same is obvious from these considerations: but will there not be any particular case where we shall find, at the same time, the excellence both of the good citizen and the good man? Yes, we can speak of the good ruler as morally good and practically wise, and the statesman generally must necessarily be a man of practical wisdom. Also, some speak of the education of the ruler as distinct to start with, just as we see the sons of kings instructed in the art of riding and military service. Euripides, too, says, 'No ornamental arts I beg, but what the state wants,' implying that there is a special education for a ruler. Now, if the same excellence belongs both to the good ruler, and the good man, and yet he who is ruled is also a citizen, it follows that, as a general rule, the excellences of the citizen and the man will not coincide, but that in particular cases they will.

2 μή μοι, from the (Eolus, a lost play of Euripides.

μή μοι τὰ κόμψη ποικίλοι γενοιάτο ἄλλ' δὲν πόλει δεῖ μεγάλα βουλεύοντ' αἰε.
For the excellences of the ruler and the ruled are not the same; and it was for this reason, perhaps, that Jason said that 'he was always hungry when not a despot,' meaning that he did not know how to be a private citizen. Still, praise is given to the capacity for both ruling, and being ruled, and the excellence of a perfect citizen is thought to consist in the capacity for either ruling or being ruled equally well. If, then, we consider the excellence of the good man as one adapted for ruling, and that of the citizen as adapted for both ruling and being ruled, the two will not be equally objects of praise. Since then it appears that there are times when both (appear objects of praise), and that the ruler and the ruled ought not (as such) to be learning the same duties, while the general citizen should understand and have a part in both functions, what follows may be easily seen. For there is a form of rule which is that of a master over slaves, and this form, we say, is concerned with the necessaries of life, which it is not essential for the ruler to know how to produce, but only how to use (when produced);

3 'Iásow, tyrant of Phere in Thessaly. He was a bold and ambitious man, and meditated the interference in Greek matters which we find later in Philip of Macedon. His plans were frustrated by his assassination.
"ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἄνδρα ποδοδὲσες. "

12 λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακονίκις πράξεις. δοῦλον δὲ εἴδη πλεῖον λέγομεν· αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι πλείους. ἢν ὑπὸ μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερινίτες· οὕτως ὁ εἰσίν, ὡσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τούνου' αὑτούς, οἱ ἔσωστε ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βίων αὐτὴς τεχνίτης ἔστιν. διὸ παρ' ἐνίοτε οὐ μετείχον οἱ δημιουργοί τὸ παλαιὸν ἄρχον, πρὸν ἀρχαίν γενέσθαι τοῦ ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἀρχαίνων οὕτως, οὐ δεῖ τὸν ἁγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτὴν τὸν ἁγαθὸν μανθάνειν, εἰ μὴ ποτὲ χρείας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν· οὐ γὰρ ἐτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὸν μὲν δεσπότην τὸν δὲ δοῦλον. ἀλλ' ἐστι τὸς ἄρχην καθ' ἣν ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. τευτνὴν γὰρ λέγουμεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἢν δεὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα ὁμοίων, μαθεῖν, οἰον ἐπισταρχεῖν ἐπιπαρχηθέντα, στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ τάξιαρ-

14 the other kind of knowledge is the mark of the slave; and by the other kind, I mean the capacity for performing, and the performance of acts of service. Of slaves, again, we speak of several classes, for their tasks are several. One class are handicraftsmen, and these are, as the name also implies, those who live by the labour of their hands, in which class comes the low artisan. And for this reason, in some states, artificers were formerly not admitted to office until democracy had come in its most extreme form. Now the duties of those who are subject to rule in this sense need not be learnt by either the good man, or the statesman, or the good citizen, except in some cases for private use. For if they are, the result is that the distinction between master and slave ceases to exist. On the other hand, there is a form of rule, in virtue of which the ruler rules men similar in kind to himself and of free birth; for this is what we mean by constitutional rule or Government, and it is this sort which the ruler should learn by being first subject to it, just as a man must learn to command cavalry by first riding in the ranks, and to be a general in command by first obeying others, and holding the subordinate commands of brigadier
χήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα. διὸ καὶ λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλὸς, ὥς οὖν ἐστίν εὖ ἄρξαι μὴ ἄρχεσθαι. τούτων δὲ ἄρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα, δεὶ δὲ τὸν πολῖτην τὸν ἄγαθον ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, καὶ αὐτὴ ἄρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἄρχην ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἄνδρος δὴ ἄγαθον ἁμφω, καὶ εἰ ἔτερον εἰδὸς σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἄρχικής· καὶ γὰρ ἄρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μὴ ἄν εἰη τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ἄρετη, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ’ εἰδὴ ἔχουσα καὶ ἀρξεῖ καὶ ἄρξεται, ὅσπερ ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς ἑτέρα σω-φροσύνη καὶ ἄνδρα. δόξαι γὰρ ἂν εἴναι δεῖλος ἄνὴρ, εἰ οὐτως ἄνδρείος εἰη ὅσπερ γυνὴ ἄνδρεια, καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοιμία εἰη ὅσπερ ὁ ἄνηρ ὁ ἄγαθος, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικός· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτάσθαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν.  

and captain of a company. And for this reason there is truth in the saying that a man cannot be a good ruler unless he has been subject to rule. In the two positions excellence is not the same, but still the good citizen should understand and have the capacity for both being ruled and ruling; and in this consists the excellence of a citizen—namely, his understanding of both meanings of rule (or authority) when applied to free men. Both alike also characterise the good man, even if there is a distinct type of moderation and justice as found in a ruler; for even when a good man is subject to rule, but still a free man, it is clear that his excellence will not be only of one sort, as justice, but will have various parts, in virtue of which he will either rule or be ruled, just as self-restraint and courage vary in man and woman. For a man would appear to be a coward if he were only as brave as a brave woman, and a woman to be a chatter-box if she were only as reticent as the good man, since also the functions of men and women in the household are different; for it is the function of the man to get, of the woman to keep. Now practical wisdom is the peculiar virtue

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4 ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος. Cf. Eth. VI. x. 2. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ.
On the subject of the citizen there is one difficulty which still remains. Is it strictly true to say that he alone is a citizen who is qualified to take a part in the government, or must we admit artisans to be citizens? Certainly, if we do admit this class that can have no part in offices of government, it is not possible for every citizen to possess excellence of the kind that we described. For the artisan is in this case a citizen. If, on the other hand, no member of this class is a citizen, under what head are we to place such a person? for he is not a resident alien, nor is he a foreigner, but may we not say that this question at any rate does not involve any difficulty? For slaves also do not belong to any of the classes
mentioned, nor do freed men. For it is certainly true that we must not admit all persons as citizens whose presence is necessary for the existence of a state; since the children are not citizens in the same sense as the full-grown man, the latter being citizens in the full, the former in a qualified, sense of the word: for they are citizens, but imperfect citizens. Now in olden times in certain states the artisan population consisted of slaves or foreigners, and so the majority are of these classes even now. The best state will never make a citizen of the artisan; but supposing that he is a citizen, then we must not speak of the excellence of the citizen, as we described it, as applying to every individual, or even to those alone of free birth, but only to those who are not bound to work of a compulsory nature. Of those bound to such work—those who serve one man in this manner are slaves, those who serve the public are common artisans and hirelings. If we look a little farther, we shall see what their position is; for what we have said will, if explained, by itself make the matter clear. For since constitutions are of various kinds, the types of the citizen also must necessarily be various, more especially of the citizen as subject to rule; so that, while under one form of
constitution the artisan and the hired servant must necessarily be citizens, under other forms this is absolutely impossible; for instance, whenever there is what is called an aristocracy, and honours are given on the ground of excellence and personal worth; for it is impossible to cultivate a state of excellence while living the life of an artisan or hireling. Again, in oligarchies the hireling cannot be a citizen (for in them admission to office depends upon large income), but the artisan can, for most craftsmen grow wealthy. At Thebes there used to be a law that no one could be admitted to office unless he had retired from business in the Agora for twelve years. In many constitutions the law even draws some foreigners within the limit; for in certain democracies the son of a citizen mother is a citizen. The same is the case with the regulations respecting bastards in many states. It is true that, since it is from a lack of genuine citizens that they make citizens of persons of these classes (for scarcity of population induces them to legislate to this effect), when they have sufficient numbers, they little by
little strike off; first the offspring of a slave father or slave mother, and then those whose mothers only are citizens. Finally, they only allow children whose parents are both citizens to be themselves citizens. From this it is clear that there are various kinds of citizens, and that he has most properly the title of citizen who has a part in the honours of the state. So Homer sings, 'To treat me as a wanderer who has no honour,' as if he deemed an alien the man who could hold no honour. But wherever this exclusion is concealed, it is done to deceive those who come to reside in the state. The answer to the question whether the excellence that characterises the good man, and that which characterises the perfect citizen, are the same or different, is clear from what we have said, namely, that in some states they are the same, but in others different, and that in the former case the person in whom they meet is not any citizen, but the statesman who, either singly or with others, is, or can be, supreme in the general administration.

Now that these points have been settled, the next question to

1 ὡς εἰ τῷ' II. ix. 648.
be considered is whether we must assume one type of constitution or several; and if several, what these are, what is the number of them, and what the points of difference between them. Now a constitution is the arrangement in a state of all the offices of government, and more especially of that one which is sovereign over all. For the Government is everywhere sovereign over the state, and the constitution is really the Government. I mean, for instance, that in democratic states the People is sovereign, in oligarchies, on the other hand, the Few; and so we speak of the constitutions also of such states as are different from each other, and we shall use the same mode of speaking of the other forms also. But we must first premise the object for which a state is formed, and also how many forms there are of government, as it affects the individual and social living. Now it was said in our first book, where we discussed the government of a household, and the relation of master to slave, that by nature man is a social creature, and so even, where they have no need of assistance from their fellows, men do none the less desire to live with others. Still the advantage

1 εἶρηται δή. Bk. I. ii. 8—11.
μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ’ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν ὅν 4 τούτ’ ἐστὶ τέλος, καὶ κοινὴ πάσι καὶ χωρίς· συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζήν ἐνεκεν αὐτοῦ (ἰσως γὰρ ἐνεστὶ τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον), καὶ συνέχονσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζήν αὐτὸ μόνον, ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λίαν. δὴν δ’ ὡς καρτεροῦσι πολλὴν κακοτε, πάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γιλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν, ὡς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐμερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους βάδιον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτεροις λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἢ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία, καὶ περ ὅντος κατ’ ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε φύσει δούλω καὶ τῷ φύσει δεσπότῃ ταύτῳ συμφέροντος, ὃμως ἀρχεῖ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον οὐδὲν ἤττον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ δούλου κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου τοῦ δούλου σώ-

gained by union does also draw them together in proportion as each gains thereby a share in a higher life. Now this higher life is certainly an end both to society generally and to individuals; but still men do come together also for the sake of life by itself (and perhaps there is underlying some trace of a higher element), and do also preserve this social union purely with reference to life by itself, unless difficulties arise greater than this life can bear. We see, in fact, how most men are resolute to endure intense misery in their desire for life, as if they thought that there were some enjoyment and sweetness naturally inherent in it.

In the next place it is easy to distinguish the generally accepted forms of government, for we frequently have to distinguish them in more popular treatises also. The rule of a master over slaves, although in abstract truth the interests of the natural slave and natural master are identical, is practically none the less a rule that considers the interests of the master, and only those of the slave incidentally; for it is impossible, if the slave has perished, for the rule over the slave to continue. On the other hand, the authority (of
the head of a family) over his children, his wife, and all his household, which we call household government, is certainly for the interest of those under authority, if not for that of both parties—in the abstract it is for the good of those subject, as we see also in the case of the other arts, as medicine and gymnastics, but incidentally it may be for the benefit of the person in authority. For there is no reason why the trainer should not be sometimes himself one of those engaged in gymnastics, just as the pilot is always one of the crew. Now the trainer and the pilot aim at the good of those under their authority, but when either of them becomes one of the number of his subordinates, he incidentally shares in the benefits that they derive; the one becomes a sailor, the other one of those engaged in exercise, while he is still the trainer. And so, in the government of a state, when it is based on the principle of the equality and similarity of the citizens, all claim a right to be in authority in turn. At first, and naturally, each thinks it right to perform this duty in turn, and that another should afterwards consider his good, just as he himself, when in
authority, considered that person's good. But at the present day, owing to the advantage which arises from public authority and office, men want to be always in office, just as if persons in office found that they were always in health, though naturally sickly; for in such a case they would probably have coveted office as they do now. It is obvious then that all those constitutions which aim at the interests of the community are really pure on the principles of abstract justice, while those that aim at the interests of the rulers are all corrupt and deviations from the right forms of constitution; for they are of the nature of rule over slaves, while the state is an association of free men.

Now that we have marked these distinctions, the next point is to examine how many forms of constitutions there are, and what they are, taking, to begin with, the pure forms; for when these have been distinguished, the corrupt forms or deviations from them will be also easily seen. Since a 'constitution' and a 'government' have practically the same meaning, and the power that is sovereign over states is the government, and since the sovereign power must ne-
cessarily consist of either one individual or a few or the many, when either the individual or the few or the masses make the general welfare the object of their government, the constitutions thus formed must be necessarily pure; but those conducted for the private ends of either the individual, the few, or the mass, must be corrupt deviations, for we must either not give the name of citizens to all members of a community, or else these ought to have a part in the advantage obtained. We usually call that form of Monarchy that regards only the interests of the community a Kingship, and that form of the government of the few (but still more than one) which has the same object an Aristocracy, either because the best men are in authority, or because the aim is that which is best for the State and the members of it. Again, when the People govern with a view to the general good, this form is called by the term common to all constitutions—namely, a constitution proper, or Republic. And that this should be so is what we might expect; for while it is quite possible that a single individual, or a few, should be of conspicuous excellence, when we come to a majority it is difficult for it to have been brought to per-
ἐν πλήθει γίνεται. διότερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὁπλα. παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τυ-ραννίσ μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλυγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τυράννις ἔστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχούντος, ἢ δὲ ὀλυγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἢ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων: πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελουν οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

δὲ ὅμως διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τὸς ἐκάστης τού-των τῶν πολιτείων ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ 8 δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀπο-βλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδὲ τὶ καταλείπειν, ἄλλα δὴ λογοῦ τὴν περὶ ἐκαστον ἀλήθειαν. ἐστὶ δὲ τυράννις μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἰρηται, 2 δεσποτικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλυγαρχία δὲ ὅταν ὅσι

fection in excellence generally, but if in any, most probably in excel-

cence in warlike qualities, for this has its origin where numbers are

large. And thus, in a constitution of this sort, the fighting ele-

ment is sovereign, and the members of it are all that bear arms. Of

the deviations or corrupt forms of the aforesaid, a Tyranny is the

deviation from a Kingship, an Oligarchy from an Aristocracy, and

a Democracy from a Republic; for Tyranny is a government of

one man aiming at the good of that one man alone; an Oligarchy is

a form that aims at the good of the wealthy and well-to-do; and

a Democracy one that considers only that of the poorest and lowest

classes. But not one of these forms aims at advancing the interests

of the community.

But we must specify at rather a greater length what each of

these forms of constitution really is. For there are some difficul-

ties—and it is the peculiar duty of those who make a philosophical

enquiry in each department, and do not look only at practical

results, not to pass over or omit a single point, but to make the

truth clear in each case. A Tyranny is the government of one

man, as we have said, which has the form of slave mastery over
the political association; there is an Oligarchy when it is the possessors of property that hold the sovereign power in the constitution; a Democracy, on the other hand, when those who have not large property, but are poor, are in possession of power. The first difficulty is in relation to this definition. For supposing that the majority were rich and sovereign in the state (and it is a democracy when the many are sovereign), or similarly again, supposing that it should happen somewhere that the poor were fewer in number than the rich, but still, through superior strength, were masters of the constitution (and where a small number are the masters there is said to be an oligarchy), it would appear that our distinction between forms of constitution was not well made. Again, if we combined small numbers with wealth and large numbers with poverty, and from this point of view gave our names to constitutions, calling that an oligarchy where the chief power is held by the rich, if they are few in number, and that a democracy where it is held by the poor, if they are many in number, (this view), involves another difficulty. For what names are to be given to constitutions such as we have just spoken of, where the wealthy
form the majority, or where the poor are in a minority, and either of these are supreme in their respective states, supposing that there is no form of constitution besides those that we have stated? Certainly reason seems to make it clear that the case of the Few or the Many being in power is purely accidental, in the latter case in oligarchies, in the former in democracies, because the rich are few in number and the poor are numerous all the world over; and so it does not really happen that the alleged causes of difference ever exist, and the real points of difference between democracy and oligarchy are Poverty and Wealth; and while the necessary rule is that whenever men rule in virtue of wealth, this form should be an oligarchy, and where it is the poor who rule, it should be a democracy, still the actual case is, as we have said, that the former kind of rulers are few in number, and the latter many. For wealth is the possession of few, but freedom is shared by all; and it is on these respective grounds that either party prefers its claim over the constitution.

We must, in the first place, consider what are the boundaries
commonly assigned to oligarchy and democracy, and what is the idea of justice involved in oligarchies and in democracies. For all men attain some idea of justice, but they advance only to a certain distance, and do not state the principle of absolute justice in its entirety. For instance, justice is held to be equality, and so it is, but not universally, only among equals. Also inequality is thought to be just, as it is, not universally, but only for those who are unequal. But men leave out the question of the persons concerned, and so they form wrong conclusions. The reason is that they have to judge on their own cases, and, as a rule, most men are bad judges on matters that concern themselves. And so, whereas justice involves persons, and a just division concerns equally the thing divided and the recipients, as was said before in the Ethics, these men agree about equality in the object divided,

1 to ois—they leave out the idea of to whom, as, equal to the equal, unequal to the unequal.

2 en tois theikois. See Eth. v. ch. vi. on Distributive Justice, where it is shown that in distribution between two parties there are four points to be kept in view, the two parties and the two shares. άνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἑλάχιστοις εἶναι τέταρτον ois τε γάρ δίκαιον τυγκάνει ὅν δύο ἐστιν καὶ ἐν ois τὰ πράγματα δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτῆ ἐσται ισότης, ois καὶ ἐν ois. The result is that justice must be relative. As the relation of the parties varies, so must their respective shares vary. The ratio will be the same for persons and things.
but dispute about it in regard to the recipients; and they do so primarily for the reason just mentioned, that men are unfair judges of their own affairs, and secondly, because, as each side states one view of justice correctly up to a certain point, they both think that their own statement of it is complete. For while those who are unequal in some one point—wealth, for instance—consider that they are unequal altogether, others who are equal in one respect—freedom, for instance—believe that they are equal absolutely. But they both forget the most important point. For if it was for the sake of property that they formed their associations and united together, then their share in the state is exactly the same as their property; so that the argument of the oligarchical party would appear convincing, for, say they, it is not just that the contributor of one mina per cent. should have an equal share with the contributor of all the rest, either in the original deposit or in the subsequent profits. But [if] it was neither for the sake of life alone (that men united), but rather indeed for the sake of a higher life (for had it

3 ei δέ. There is no grammatical apodosis to this sentence, which becomes broken up as it proceeds. The argument is resumed in the next section: περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς.
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξύλων ἦν πόλις· νῦν δ' ο useHistory εστὶ διὰ το  
μή μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ξύλου κατὰ προαίρεσιν), 
μήτε συμμαχίας ἑνεκεν, ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδὲν ἀδικώνται, 
mήτε διὰ τὰς ἄλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρήσιν τῆν πρὸς ἄλληλους· 
kαὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οὐ̣ς  
ἐστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἄλληλους, ὡς μιᾶς ἄν πολέμως ̣  
ἡσαν. εἰσὶ γοὺς αὐτοὶς συνθῆκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγήματι  
καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μή ἀδικεῖν καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμ-
μαχίαις. ἀλλ' οὕτ' ἄρχαι πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις κοιναὶ  
καθεστάσεις, ἀλλ' ἐτεραὶ παρ' ἐκατέρως, οὕτε τοῦ ποιόνς 
τινὰς εἶναι δεὶ φροντίζουσιν ἀτεροὶ τοὺς ἐτέρους, οὔδ'  
ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδικοὶ ἐσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας μηδὲ 
μοχθηρίαν ἔξει μηδὲμα, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδικη-
8 σοσυσ ἄλληλους. περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς 
διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ἢ καὶ φανερὸν 
ὅτι δεὶ περὶ ἄρετῆς ἐπιμελέσ εἶναι τῇ γ' ὃς ἄληθῶς ὅνομα-
not been so a state could have been formed of slaves and other 
living creatures, whereas this is impossible, as these have no share 
in happiness or life according to a definite purpose), nor was it 
for the sake of alliance in war, to avoid suffering wrong from 
anyone, nor on the ground of commerce and mutual assistance 
(for in that case the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all those 
who have commercial treaties with each other could have been 
considered citizens of one state). They certainly have treaties re-
garding imports, and conventions to prevent wrong-doing, and 
enactments on the terms of alliance; but still they have not all 
joint officials appointed for this purpose, but different officials for 
each; nor do they, on either side, have any care as to what the 
moral character of the other should be, or how to prevent any in-
dividual member of those comprised in the treaty from being an 
unjust man, or guilty of any other vicious habit, but only how 
they are to avoid doing wrong to one another. But it is with 
virtue and vice in the state that those are concerned who make 
good legislation their care; and so it is clear that it is virtue which 
must be chiefly the concern of the state which deserves that title

in reality and not merely in name. For otherwise its association becomes an alliance different from other alliances with states at a distance only in point of locality; and law is but a treaty, just as Lycephron, the sophist, said, 'It is a pledge to men of mutual just dealing, but has no power to make citizens good and just.' But that this last is the true view is clear. For supposing that we could group several places and make them one, so as to connect the states of Megara and Corinth by walls, still the result would not be a single state, even if the inhabitants intermarried; and yet intermarriage is one of the peculiar bonds of union in states. Similarly, supposing that men lived apart indeed from each other (though not too far off to associate), but had laws which prevented them from doing wrong to one another in matters of commerce—for instance, if one were a carpenter, another a field labourer, another a worker in leather, another engaged in some similar employment, and in number they were as many as 10,000—still, if they had no other bond of union besides such as commerce

4 ἐπιγαμία. Cf. the importance of the legalisation of 'connubium' at Rome in arriving at unity in the state.
And why is this? for it is not owing to the want of neighbourhood in the association. It is because, even if men did meet in an association of this sort, and yet each individual considered his own house as his state, and all were assisting each other only against those who did them wrong, as if they had formed a defensive alliance, there would still, to the accurate enquirer, not seem to be a real state, since their relations are similar when they meet as when they were separate. It is clear, then, that the state is not only an association based on locality and formed to prevent men from wronging one another, and to assist commerce. These are necessary conditions for the existence of a state; but still, if they are all present, there is not yet on that account a state, but only where there is an association in a higher life for families and clans to obtain a life perfect and complete in itself. Still this cannot be attained unless the citizens live in one and the same place, and intermarry. And it is to secure this end that there arise in states family alliances, and phratries, and public sacrifices and
συζην. το δε τοιοτον φιλιας έργουν. η γαρ του συζην προαρεσις φιλια. τελος μεν ουν πολεως το εν ξην, ταυτα δε του τελους χαριν. πολις δε η γενων και κοιμων κοινωνια ξωης τελειας και αυταρκους. τουτο δε εστιν, ώσ φαμεν, το ξην ενδαιμονως και καλως. των καλων αρα πραξεων χαριν θετεον ειναι την πολιτικην κοινωνιαν, άλλων ου του συζην. διοτερ ουσι συμβαλλονται πλειστον εις την τουλαιτην κοινωνιαν, τουτοις της πολεως μετεστι πλειον ου τοις κατα μεν ελευθεριαν και γενός ισοις ει μελζοσι κατα δε την πολιτικην άρετην άνισοις, η τοις κατα πλοιουν υπερεχουσι κατα άρετην δε υπερεχουμενοι.

οτι μεν ουν παντες οι περι των πολιτειών άμφισβητουντες μέρος τι του δικαιου λέγουσι, φανερόν εκ των ειρημενων· έχει δε υπορίαν, τι δει το κύριον ειναι της πολεως. η γαρ τοι το πληθος, η τοις πλουσιοις, η τοις

fêtes to unite the citizens. This is the work of benevolence, for benevolence is a deliberate choice of social life. Now the end and object of a state is a higher life, and these means lead to that end. A state is the association of clans and villages producing a life perfect and self-satisfying; and this is what is meant, as we have said, by a happy and noble life. Therefore we must conclude that the political association has for its object the performance of noble actions, and not merely a living together. And so those who contribute most to the production of such an association have a larger share in the state than those who are equal or superior to them in point of freedom or birth, but who are not equal to them in point of political excellence, or than those who excel them in wealth but are excelled by them in merit. So it is clear, from what we have said, that all those who hold these different opinions about forms of constitutions give a partial, but only partial, account of justice.

There is difficulty in the question, 'What should be the sovereign power over a state?' This must be either the numerical majority, or the rich, or the best class, or the one best man, or a
ἐπιεικεῖσι, ἢ τὸν βέλτιστον ἓνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον. ἄλλα
tαῦτα πάντα ἐχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. τί γὰρ; ἃν οἱ
πένητες διὰ τὸ πλείους εἶναι διαισθομένοι τὰ τῶν πλουσίων,
tούτ᾽ οὐκ ἀδικον ἐστίν; ἔδοξε γὰρ νῦν Δία τοῦ κυρίω
2 δικαίως. τὴν οὖν ἄδικιάν τι χρὴ λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην;
pάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλατ-
tόνων ἂν διαισθομένοι, φανερὸν ὅτι φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν.
ἄλλα μὴν οὐχ ἢ γ᾽ ἄρετη φθείρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτήν, οὕτω τὸ
dικαίων πόλεως φθαρτικὸν· ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον
3 τούτων οὖν οίον τ᾽ ἐστιν δικαιοῦν. ἐτί καὶ τὰς πράξεις
ὀσσας ὁ τύραννος ἐπραξεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσας δικαιάς·
βιάζεται γὰρ ἑνὶ κρείττων, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τοὺς
πλουσίους. ἄλλ᾽ ἀρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δικαιοῦν ἄρχειν καὶ
tοὺς πλουσίους; ἃν οὖν κἀκεῖνοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι καὶ
διαρπάζωσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἀφαιρῶσι τοὺς πλῆθους,
4 τοῦτ᾽ ἐστι δικαιοῦν; καὶ θάτερον ἀρὰ. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν
ὅτι πάντα φαῦλα καὶ οὔ δίκαια, φανερὸν· ἄλλα τοὺς
despot. But all these alternatives obviously involve difficulty.
Consider, if the poor, in virtue of their numerical superiority,
divide amongst themselves the property of the rich, is not this
proceeding unjust? No! it was the will of the justly sovereign
body! Why then, what are we to call the worst form of in-
justice? If we take all together again, and the majority divide the
property of the minority, it is clear that they are destroying the
state. But surely it is not its excellence that destroys the thing
possessing it, nor is it that which is just that is likely to destroy a
state. And so it is evident that this principle also cannot possibly
be just. Again, all the actions of a despot must be necessarily
just. For he does violence in virtue of his superior power, just as
the majority did violence to the rich. But does it follow that it is
just for the minority, for the rich, to be in power? If they too
should act in the same manner, and pillage and rob the possessions
of the poor majority, would this be just? If so, the previous case
must be so also. So it is clear that these alternatives are all vicious
and not just. But is it right that the best class should hold au-
BOOK III. CAP. 10, 11.

ἐπειδεὶς ἄρχειν δεῖ καὶ κυρίους εἶναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τούς ἀλλούς ἀτύμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἄρχαίς· τιμᾶς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἄρχας, ἄρχόντων δὲ ἀνεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἀλλούς ἀτύμους. ἀλλ' ἐνα τὸν σπουδαίοτάτον ἄρχειν δὲ βέλτιον; ἀλλ' ἐτι τοῦτο ὅλιγαρχικῶτερον· οἱ γὰρ ἀτύμοι πλέον.

ἀλλ' ἵσωσ φαίη τις ἄν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἀνθρωποὶ εἶναι ἄλλα μὴ νόμον φαίλον, ἔχοντα γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἄν οὖν ἢ νόμος μὲν ὅλιγαρχικὸς δὲ ἡ δημοκρατικός, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν ἡπορημένων; συμβησεται γὰρ ὅμοιος τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον. περὶ μὲν 11 οὖν τῶν ἀλλων ἔστω τοῖς ἐτέροις λόγοις· οτι δὲ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἄριστους μὲν ὅλιγους δὲ, δοξεῖν ἄν ἕν τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ κἂν

thority, and be sovereign over all? If so, it is necessary that the rest should be all without honours, inasmuch as they are not honoured by the possession of political offices; for we call such offices 'honours,' and if the same persons are always holding office, the rest must necessarily remain without honours. But is it better that the single best man should govern? Why, this is carrying the oligarchical principle still farther, for the number of those who cannot possess honours is increased. But perhaps it may be said that the principle that the sovereign power should reside in man at all, and not in law, is bad, since man is liable to the passions incident to the human soul. Now, supposing that law is sovereign, but law with an oligarchic or democratic tendency, what difference will be made in our difficulties? For the results which we have mentioned will follow just the same.

On the other questions let us speak in another place. But the assertion that the numerical majority should have supreme power rather than the few best men would appear [to require a solution, and yet] to involve a difficulty, though possibly some truth also.

1 λύεσθαι καὶ. It seems impossible to translate these words as they stand. Thurot conjectures τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν τάχα δὲ κἀ (κἂν) λύεσθαι
For it is possible that the majority, of which each member is not a distinguished man, may still, by combination, be better than the few best men, not viewed as individuals but in the aggregate, just as banquets to which several contribute are better than those supplied at the expense of one man. For as the members are many in number, each may have some portion of excellence and practical wisdom, and when they are combined the many may become as one man, with many feet, many hands, and many senses. And the same may be said of their moral and intellectual qualities. For this reason also the many are the best judges of works of Music and Poetry. For some persons pass a judgment on one portion, others on another, but all together on the whole. Distinguished men are superior to each member of the mass, in the same manner as the beautiful, it is said, are superior to those who are not so, and the productions of art to real objects, namely, in the combination into one of what in other cases is scattered; since when the parts are taken se-

κατ' ἀλήθειαν, which appears to be the reading adopted by St. Hilaire: ‘pense sembler une solution equitable et vraie de la question quoiqu'elle ne tranche pas encore toutes les difficultés.’ Suseumih encloses ἀνεσθαι καὶ in brackets, as probably spurious.
...the eye of some one individual, some other part of another, may be more beautiful than in the picture. Whether in the case of every people and every mass of men this superiority of the many in comparison with the few can exist is not clear; indeed, it may be said that in some cases it is impossible, for the same argument would apply in the case of brutes; and yet we may say, in what points are some men superior to brutes? Still, in the case of some particular mass of people, there is no reason why what we have said should not be true. So, by these arguments, we may solve both the difficulty previously stated and that connected with it; namely, over what should free men and the mass of the citizens be sovereign? The mass of the citizens are those who neither are rich nor have any renown for excellence. That these persons should have a part in the highest offices of government is not safe (for through want of justice and thought they would in some cases be unjust, in others mistaken), while to give them no share is very dangerous. For when there are included in a state many without a right to office, and also poor, that state must
8 εἰναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην. λείπεται δὴ τοῦ βουλεύσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αυτοῖς. διότι καὶ Ἱολὼν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινές νομοθετῶν τάττουσιν ἐπὶ τε τὰς ἀρχαίρεσις καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἔσωσι. πάντες μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἱκανὴν αἰσθησιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίωσι τὰς πόλεις ὠφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφὴ μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλίγης.

10 χωρὶς δ᾿ ἔκαστος ἀτελῆς περι τὸ κρίνειν ἔστιν. ἔχει δ᾿ ἡ τάξεις αὐτὴ τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρώτην μὲν ὅτι δόξειν ἄν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρίναι τίς ὀρθῶς ἰάτρευκεν, οὕτπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι νῦν τοῦ κάμνοντα τῆς νόσου τῆς παρούσης. οὔτος δὲ ἔστιν ἰατρὸς. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. ὠσπερ οὖν ἰατρὸν δὲι διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἰατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ necessarily be full of enemies. It remains that they should have a share of deliberative and judicial power. For this reason Solon and certain other lawgivers appoint them to elect magistrates and to call them to account, but forbid them to hold office by themselves. For all, when combined, possess sufficient critical sense, and when joined with superior men they serve to profit the state, just as coarse food, when mixed with fine, makes the whole more nourishing than the smaller quantity. But taken apart, each individual is imperfect as a judge. Still this arrangement of the constitution involves a difficulty. In the first case it would appear to be the province of the same man to decide who has pursued the right method of treatment, and himself to treat and cure the sufferer under a particular disease. That person is the physician; and the same is the case in other matters of experience and art. Just, then, as a physician should have to give an account of his practice to physicians, so also should other men to those in their own position.

BOOK III. CAP. 11.

Now the term physician means both the man who practises at the direction of another, and a scientific physician of the highest class, and thirdly, one who has simply studied the science. For there are persons of the latter class, generally speaking, in every science. And we allow the power of judgment to those who have studied the science no less than to those who have complete knowledge of it (i.e. by practice also). In the next place, the question of election would seem to stand on the same ground. For to make a right choice belongs also to persons who have specific knowledge. For instance, the choice of a geometrician belongs to those who are acquainted with geometry, of a pilot to those who understand navigation. For even if there are some functions and arts of which certain unprofessional students have some knowledge, still they have not more than those professionally acquainted with them. And so, according to this train of reasoning, we ought not to give to the mass of the people supreme authority in electing magistrates or in calling them to account for their conduct. But, perhaps all that we have here said is not correct, partly by reason of what we said some time back, if the mass of people be not of too servile a
character; for though each individual of them will be a worse judge than those who have specific knowledge, all, when taken together, will be either better, or at least no worse; and also because there are some things of which the maker will be neither the only nor the best judge—that is, where the work done is understood also by those who have no knowledge of the art used. For instance, it does not only belong to the builder to know and judge of a house, but he who uses it (that is the householder) will pass a better judgment upon it. Also a pilot is a better judge of a rudder than the man who made it; and so is the guest of a banquet rather than the cook. This difficulty, then, we may be thought to have disposed of sufficiently. But there is another closely connected with it; for it seems absurd that those of indifferent character should have supreme authority in greater matters than those of the best class; but the right to call magistrates to account, and to elect them, is a matter of the greatest importance. And this power, as we have said, is given in some constitutions to the people: for the assembly of the people has supreme authority in all matters of this class. Yet men are admitted to the public assembly, and deliberate on public affairs, and try causes, though they have only small property, and may be of any age, while they can
only act as Public Treasurers and Generals, and hold the highest offices, if their property be large. Now this difficulty may also be met in a similar manner; for perhaps this arrangement, too, is right. For it is not the member of the judicial body, or of the council, or of the public assembly, that is in power, but the Court of Justice, and the Council, and the People; and each of the above-mentioned is but a part of these. I mean by a part the member of the council, of the public assembly, of the judicial body. And so it is just that the mass of the people should have authority in more important matters, for it is of a large number of persons that the People in assembly, the Council, and the Judicial Body are composed. And the property of all these together is greater than that of those who hold great offices, either alone or in small groups. Let these points, then, be dismissed as settled in this manner. But the difficulty which we first mentioned shows nothing so clearly as the necessity that it should be the 'Laws,' wisely framed, that should have supreme authority, and that the ruler or rulers should have absolute power in cases where the laws
cannot possibly speak accurately, as it is not easy for them, in
general terms, to be plain on all particular cases. Of what
character, however, these wisely framed laws should be is not yet
clear: that which was formerly suggested as a difficulty is still
unsolved. Only this is clear, that the laws should be framed with
reference to the constitution. But it is absolutely certain that,
just as constitutions vary, so the laws will be bad or good, just or
unjust. But if this be the case, it is evident that the laws in
accordance with the right forms of constitution must be just, while
those that are adapted to the perverted forms must be the
reverse.

In all sciences and arts the end is some good; but it is the
greatest and most truly good in the highest of them all—that is to
say, the art of Politics. But justice—that is to say, general
utility—is the good in political life; and all men think that justice

1 ἐτεί. The apodosis does not appear to begin before πολῶν δ’ ἴσως,
and for sake of clearness it seems best to omit the ἐτεί in translation.
2 τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασῶν. Cf. Eth. I. ii. 3–5. τινὸς τῶν ἐπιστήμων ἢ
dυνάμεων δόξει ἡ ἀν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη
δ’ ἡ πολιτικὴ φαινεται.
is equality of some sort, and to a certain point they agree with the philosophical arguments which we used in discussing Morals; for they say that justice concerns some thing and some persons, and that equal ought to go to equals; but what sort of things admit of equality and what of inequality is a question which ought not to be forgotten. For this involves difficulty, and requires the philosophy of a politician. For perhaps someone may say that offices ought to be distributed unequally, on the ground of excellence in any good quality whatever, if in every other respect there were no difference and all were alike, arguing that when men differ their rights and claims differ also. But, supposing this true, complexion, and height, and any other good thing, will give a larger share in political rights to those who possess them conspicuously. Does not the fallacy of this lie on the surface? It is transparent if we consider other arts and sciences. For where flute-players are alike in the art which they pursue, the advantage of better instruments is not to be given to those of noble birth—for that

3 περὶ τῶν ἥθικῶν. The reference is again to Eth. Bk. V. as in ch. 9.
qualification will not make them play upon the flute any better—but if one man excels others in the performance of his function, to him we ought to give the most excellent instrument. And if what we mean is not yet clear, it will become more so when we have gone further. Supposing that a man is superior in the art of playing the flute, but far inferior in respect of birth and beauty, even if each of those gifts (i.e. birth and beauty) are greater advantages than flute-playing, and supposing that others excel him in these points more in proportion than he excels them in playing the flute, still it is to him that the best flute should be given. For the excellence in point of wealth and birth ought to contribute something to the work to be done; but it contributes nothing. And further, if this argument were allowed, every good thing could be brought into comparison with every other good thing. For if the possessing a certain magnitude had more weight, then magnitude generally would come into competition with wealth and free-birth. So that if A excels B in size more than B excels A in virtue, and if, on the whole, size excels virtue more than virtue
εἰ ἡ ἄν συμβλητὰ πάντα. τοσόνδε γὰρ μέγεθος εἰ κρείττον τοσόνδε, τοσόνδε δήλον ὡς ἵσον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τούτ’ ἀδύνατον, 7 δήλον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνισότητ᾽ ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν. εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν βρα- 20 deis οὐ δὲ ταχείς, οὐδὲν διὰ τούτο δεὶ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖον τοὺς ὅ ἐλαττον ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγώνισιν ἡ 22 τούτων διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμὴν. ἀλλ’ ἐξ δὲν πόλις 8 24 συνέστηκεν, ἐν τούτωι ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμφι- 26 σβήτησιν. διότερ εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ 28 εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ πλούσιοι. δεὶ γὰρ ἐλευθέρους 29 τ’ εἶναι καὶ τίμημα φέροντας* οὐ γὰρ ἄν εἰς πόλις ἐξ 30 ἀπόρων πάντων, ὡσπερ οὐ δὲ δούλων. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ 31 δεὶ τούτων, δήλον ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πολεμικῆς ἁρετῆς* οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι πόλιν δυνατόν, 32 πλην ἄνευ μὲν τῶν προτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, ἄνευ 33 δὲ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι 13 34 excels size, all things could be brought into relation and comparison. For if a certain magnitude is greater than a certain amount of something else, then another magnitude is evidently equal to it. But since this is impossible, it is evident that on political questions also men have no good reason for claiming offices on the ground of any kind of inequality. For if some are swift and others slow, that is no reason that the one class should have more and the other less; it is in athletic contests that difference in these respects finds its value. But it is within the sphere of the elements which composed the State that the opposing claims must necessarily be made. And on this account persons of good birth, free, or rich, have good grounds for asserting their claims to honours. For there must be men both of free birth and possessing rateable property, since a state could never consist entirely of poor men, any more than of all slaves. But if such persons are necessary, it is evident that justice and bravery are also necessary; for without them a state cannot be maintained. The only difference is, that without the former a state cannot exist, without the latter it cannot flourish.

As contributing to the mere existence of a state, all, or some at
least, of these classes would seem fairly to lay claim to consideration, but as leading to a good life, education and virtue would with justice put in their claim, as has been also said previously. But since it is not in all things that either those who are equal in one point alone ought to have an equal share, or those unequal in one point an unequal share, it is necessary that all forms of constitution based on such principles must be corrupt forms. Now it has been said before that all put in their respective claims with justice to a certain degree, but none of them with absolute justice. The rich contend that they have a greater share in the land, and the land is a national interest. Also, in commercial transactions, they are, as a rule, more trustworthy. Freemen and men of high birth argue from a somewhat similar standpoint, for men of nobler birth are more truly citizens than the ignoble, and high birth is everywhere honoured in its own country; in the next place, because it is likely that the descendants of better men will be better men themselves, for high birth is excellence of race. Now, with equal justice, we shall say that personal virtue puts in a
claim, for we call justice a virtue of society which all others must necessarily follow. But again, the majority assert their claim against the minority, for they are stronger, richer, and better, when the majority is taken collectively and compared with the minority. Supposing now that there are in one state all classes—I mean good men, rich men, and noblemen, and besides these a certain mass of persons with political rights—will there be any dispute as to which class ought to be in authority, or will there not? Now, in each of the above-mentioned forms of constitution, the decision as to who ought to be in authority is not open to dispute. For it is in the classes that hold supreme power that they differ from one another. For instance, one form is marked by power belonging to rich men, another by its belonging to good men, and so with each of the others. We, nevertheless, will consider how, when all these elements co-exist at the same time, we ought to settle between them. If, now, the virtuous are very few in number, how are we to decide? Ought we to look at the fact of their being few in number in relation to the work to be done, i.e. whether they are
able to direct the state, or are they to be sufficiently numerous to form a state of themselves? But there is a difficulty which affects all the different claimants of political honours. For those who claim a right to rule on the ground of wealth (and similarly those who claim on the ground of birth) would seem to have no justice in their plea, for it is obvious that if there is one individual more wealthy than all the rest put together, it will, on the same principle of justice, be right that this single man should rule over all the rest; and similarly, one man particularly illustrious for his noble birth should rule over those who rest their claim on free birth alone. And perhaps the same embarrassment can arise in considering aristocracies on the question of virtue. For, supposing that there were one individual better than all the other good men in the state, he should have supreme power on the same principle. Further, if the many ought to have chief power because they are stronger than the few, supposing that one man, or more than one, but still a comparatively small number, should be stronger than the rest, it is these who ought to have power rather than the mass. All these
BOOK III. CAP. 13.

reflections seem to show that not one of these principles on which men claim themselves to rule and to have all others subject to their authority, is correct. For in answer to those who claim the chief power in the government on the ground of virtue, and to those who claim the same on the ground of wealth, the people would have a just argument to urge; for there is nothing to prevent the mass of the people from being at times better and richer than the few—not, I mean, as individuals, but in the aggregate. And therefore we may in this manner meet the difficulty which some persons feel and suggest. For some feel a doubt whether a lawgiver, if he wish to enact the soundest laws, should, when the case which we have mentioned occurs, legislate with a view to the advantage of the better class or to that of the many. But that which is right must be determined on the principle of equality; and that which is equally right is that which tends to the profit of the whole state, and to the common interest of its citizens. A citizen is, speaking generally, the man who takes a part in governing and being governed, but he varies under each
form of constitution: in relation to the best form, he is the man who has both the ability and the will to be ruler and subject, with the view of securing the life which is according to virtue.

But if there be one man (or more than one, but not enough to make up the complement of a state) so far conspicuous for his very great virtue that neither the moral virtue of all the rest, nor their political capacity, can be at all compared with theirs, if there are more than one, or his, if there is only one, then they (or he) must be no longer considered part of the state. For it will be doing them an injustice to rate them on a level with others, when they are so far superior in virtue and political ability. For a man of this sort is properly a god among men; so that it is clear that legislation also must only concern men who are equal in birth and natural powers. But to men such as we have mentioned no law applies, for they are themselves a law. And it would be ridiculous for anyone to endeavour to apply the law to them, for perhaps they

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1 "Αντισθένης, disciple of Socrates and founder of the Cynic school.
would say what Antisthenes tells us the lions said when the hares addressed them in council, and demanded that all should have equal share. And for this reason the states that are democratically governed establish ostracism; for such states are thought to pursue equality above everything, so that if any appear to be particularly powerful, through wealth or the number of their friends, or any political strength, they usually ostracise them, and compel them to leave the country for a specified time. It is told in the legend that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for a reason of this sort, for the Argo refused to take him with the other oarsmen because he was much bigger than they. And for this reason those who blame Despotism, and the advice of Periander to Thrasybulus, should not be thought to be entirely right in their censure. The story is that Periander did not speak a word to the messenger sent to obtain his advice, but struck off the ears of corn which were higher

The lions' answer to the hares' demand was the strong argumentum ad hominem, 'where are your claws?'

2 τὴν Περιάνδρου συμβουλίαν. This story is reproduced in the Latin legend of Tarquinius' advice to his son Sextus in regard to the men of Gabii. Ov. Fast. ii. 705 and foll.
than the rest, till he had reduced the whole crop to a level. And so, when the messenger, though he knew not the reason of what had been done, related what had happened, Thrasybulus understood that he must remove the men who stood too high. For this policy is not only advantageous to tyrants, nor is it pursued by tyrants alone; it is just as expedient in oligarchies and democracies. For ostracism has this same property in a way, by checking and exiling those who are too conspicuous. And the same thing is done by those who hold supreme power to states and nations also. For instance, the Athenians acted thus with the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians (for as soon as ever they had finally established their empire, they reduced those states to submission, in violation of the treaties made with them), and the King of Persia used often to reduce the Medes and Babylonians, and any other nations that had become proud from the fact of having once been powerful. The question concerns all forms of constitution generally—the good forms as well. For the corrupt forms act thus from regard to their
own interests alone, and yet the same is true of those forms which direct their attention only to the common good. This principle is evident also in the other arts and sciences. For the painter would not allow the animal (that was his subject) to have a foot too large for symmetry, even if its beauty were remarkable; nor would a shipbuilder make the prow or any other part of his ship out of proportion; nor would the master of a choir allow one who sang louder and more beautifully than all the rest to join in a chorus. So that, on this account, nothing prevents monarchs from being at one with free states, if they act thus where their personal rule is for the advantage of their states. And so, where conspicuous excellence is acknowledged, the argument in favour of ostracism possesses some ground of political justice. It is, indeed, better for the lawgiver originally to frame his constitution in such a manner that he will not require a remedy of this sort; but if, perhaps, that

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3 δεύτερος πλούς—a proverbial expression, meaning ‘what is second best;’ lit. another voyage after the first has failed. It occurs in Eth. ii. 9. 4; Plato, Phileb. 19; Phædo, 99 D.
cannot be done, he should endeavour to correct it by some such method. But this was not the course adopted in the states we know. They would not look to the advantage of their respective constitutions, but used ostracism as a weapon in party strife. It is clear that in corrupt forms of constitutions ostracism is something useful for their peculiar needs, and just; but it is also clear that it is not absolutely a just thing. But in the best constitutions it raises questions of great doubt, not indeed in the case of pre-eminence in other good things, such as strength, and wealth, and wide influence; but where one man is remarkable for his moral excellence, what ought to be done? It would never be said that we ought to exile and banish such a man. Nor, indeed, would it do to rule over such a man. It would be as absurd as to claim a right to rule over Zeus, taking power in turn with him. The only course left, which seems the natural one, is for all to submit willingly to such a man, so that men of this sort should be kings for their lifetime in their respective states.

But perhaps, after what has been said, it is well to pass on and
consider the subject of Monarchy; for we call that one of the right forms of government. We must enquire whether it is for the advantage of the state and country that is to be well governed to be under the rule of a monarch, or whether it is not advantageous, some other form being better, or whether in some cases it is so and in others not. In the first place we must decide whether monarchy is of a uniform character, or has different forms. Now it is easy to find out this, at any rate, that it embraces several forms, and that the system of its government is not the same in all cases. For the form existing in the constitution of Laconia is thought to represent monarchy in the truest sense of all the constitutional forms: it is not universally supreme, but when the king quits the territories of the state he is commander-in-chief in all that relates to the war. In the second place, whatever belongs to the worship of the gods is put in the hands of the kings. Now this form of monarchy is, as it were, a military command with absolute power, and lasting for life. For the king has not the power

\[1\text{ Another reading is } \text{αὐτοκράτωρων, 'belonging to, or vested in, men with absolute power;'} \text{ but the reading } \text{αὐτοκράτωρ, 'absolute,' referring to } \text{στρατηγία, is adopted by Susemihl, and is supported by the Vet. Trans., which has imperialis.} \]
of life and death, except in one portion of his office (i.e. as general), just as was the case with the ancients, on military expeditions, by martial law. Homer shows this, for Agamemnon, when insulted, restrained himself in council, but when out of it he had the power even of life and death. Thus he says: 'For that man whom I shall find far from the battle there shall be no hope to escape the dogs and birds of prey, for in my hands is death.'

This, then, is one form of monarchy—a supreme military command for life; and it is sometimes hereditary and sometimes elective. Besides this, there is another form of monarchy, such as those found among some of the barbaric nations; for all these are invested with power very like that of a Tyranny, but they are, nevertheless, sanctioned by law and the custom of the nation. For as barbarians are naturally of a more servile disposition than Greeks, the inhabitants of Asia than the inhabitants of Europe, they endure their despotic government without murmuring. These forms are, for some such cause, of the character of Tyrannies, but...
they are secure because they are founded on custom and law. The guard of the king is, for the same cause, one that belongs to a monarch and not to a tyrant, for the citizens protect their kings with their arms; but it is aliens who guard despots. For the former rule legally over willing subjects, the latter over unwilling; so that the former are guarded by their subjects, the latter against them. These are two forms of monarchy. Another is one that existed among the ancient Greeks, which is called a Dictatorship. This is, speaking generally, an elective Tyranny, differing from the barbaric type by being opposed, not to law, but to hereditary custom alone. Of this class, some held their authority for life, others for some specified time, or till some specified objects were accomplished. For instance, the people of Mitylene once elected Pittacus to oppose the exiles, who were led by Antimenides and Alcæus the poet. Alcæus proves that they elected Pittacus as a tyrant in one of his banquet songs, for he chides them ‘for setting up as a tyrant
Pittacus, the low-born, over their meek devoted state, praising him loudly and all together.'

Now these forms are and were despotical in character, owing to their resemblance to Tyrannies; but also monarchical, because they depend on the election and will of the people. The fourth form of kingly monarchy is that which existed in the Heroic ages, depending upon the will of the people and in accordance with custom and laws. For from the fact that the first individuals were benefactors of their people in the arts of peace or in war, or from having collected them into a society and given them a territory to live in, there arose kings over willing subjects, and their power was continued by custom to their successors. They had supreme authority as generals in war, and in the sacrifices to the gods, with the exception of those that required priests; and, in addition to this, they acted as judges. In performing this function they sometimes did not take an oath, sometimes they did, and the form of the oath was holding out the sceptre. These monarchs, in olden times,

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8 πάτριοι. The reading as it stands is difficult, though the meaning seems clear. The difficulty is how the kings could be said to be πάτριοι. Casaubon (nescio an recte. Susem.) conjectures βασιλείαι for βασιλείς above, which certainly clears the sentence.
always administered the affairs of the state, both in the city, in the
country, and abroad; but in later times the kings gave up some of
their functions, and others the people took from them, till in all
other states sacrifices were left to the 'kings' as their only func-
tion, except where it was still worth while to retain a monarchy in
name, and there the kings only held the office of commander-in-
chief in military operations beyond the borders.

These, then, are different forms of monarchy, four in number,
of which one existed in heroic times (this was a government over
willing subjects, with certain fixed prerogatives, for the King was
General and Judge, and High Priest); and the second is the
barbaric form (an hereditary despotic government in accordance
with law); the third is that to which the name of Dictatorship is
given (an elective tyranny); and the fourth is the form existing in
Laconia, which is, speaking generally, the highest military com-

4 θυσίαι κατελείψθησαν, e.g. at Athens and Rome, where the only
'kings' who survived the period of monarchy were the ἄρχων Βασίλεως
and the Rex sacrificulus, both purely priestly officials.
mand, hereditary and for life. In this manner do these forms differ from each other. But there is a fifth form of monarchy, where one individual is sovereign over all, in the same manner that nations and states are each of them sovereign over the public property, and it holds a position analogous to that of domestic government. For just as to be head of a family is to be king over a household, so to be king is to be the head of a state or a nation, whether one or more.

It may be almost said that there are really two forms of Monarchy that require our consideration, the one last mentioned and the Laconian; for most of the others lie between these two, for they have less power than absolute monarchy and more than the Laconian type. So that our subject is for the most part confined to two questions—the first whether it is or is not for the advantage of states to have a military commander for life, that office being either confined to a family, or open to all in turn; the other whether it is or is not good that one man should have sovereign

1 κατὰ μέρος. The MSS. are pretty equally divided between this reading and κατὰ αἵρεσιν, 'elective.' The Vet. Trans. supports μέρος.
Now, to examine details in reference to a military command such as I have mentioned has the appearance of being a legislative rather than a constitutional question, for this question may arise in all the forms of constitution; and so let it be dismissed just now. But the remaining type of monarchy is really a form of constitutional government, so that we must examine it carefully, and touch upon the difficulties which it involves. The first point in the enquiry is this: is it more advantageous to be under the rule of the best man or the best laws? Now it is the opinion of those who hold it advantageous to be governed by a monarch that the laws only speak in general language, and do not give instructions for particular cases, so that in any art whatever it is ridiculous to keep to written rules. In Egypt, also, the physicians are allowed, when four days have elapsed, to change the usual treatment, though if they do so before it is at their own peril. It is evident, therefore, for the same reason, that the best constitution is not that which is bound to written rules and laws. But then (we answer) those who rule must possess in themselves
that universal principle, and that which is entirely free from passion is better than that in which passion is innate. The law does not possess this element of passion, but human nature must necessarily have it universally. Perhaps it may be urged that, as a counterbalancing advantage to this, one man will deliberate better about particular cases. Then it is evident that he must have the legislative faculty in himself, and that he must have fixed laws, which are not inviolable where they fail to apply, whereas in other respects they ought to be so. But whenever the law is incompetent to decide fully or fairly, ought the one best man to have authority or all the citizens? For the present method is for men to meet together to act as judges and councillors, and make decisions, all these decisions being upon particular cases. Perhaps, then, one man, whoever he may be, is inferior when compared as an individual to many collectively (whereas a state consists of many persons), just as a banquet to which many contribute is better than one single table. For this reason also the multitude is a better judge of many matters than any one man whatever. In the next place, a large quantity is less liable to corruption; just as water is
less liable to corruption the more there is of it, so is a large number of persons than a small number. The judgment of a single individual must necessarily be corrupted when he is overcome by anger or any other such passion. But in a crowd it is difficult for all at once to lose their temper and to be misled. But let us suppose that the mass of our people are the free citizens, never acting contrary to the law except in cases where the law necessarily falls short. Or if this is not easy to find in a large number of persons, suppose there is a majority of good men and good citizens, will it be the one man who is less liable to corruption when placed in authority, or will it rather be the majority, numerous but good? Is it not clear that it is the greater number? But it may be said that there are dissensions among a number of persons, while one man is not capable of dissension. To this, perhaps, it must be answered that the larger number are personally as good as he, the one individual, is. If, now, we are to apply the term aristocracy to the government of several persons, all of whom are good men, and that of monarchy to the government of one man, an aristocracy will be a better form for states to adopt than a monarchy (whether
the government be or be not accompanied by physical power), supposing that it is possible to find several persons equally good. And perhaps this is the reason why government by kings was adopted in former times; namely, because it was a rare thing to find men very remarkable for virtue, more especially as the states they then inhabited were but small. Again, kings were appointed for the benefits which they had conferred, which is the work of good men. But when it came to pass that many persons equal in point of excellence existed at the same time, they no longer brooked superiority, but sought for something which all could share, and established a free Republic. But when they degenerated, and enriched themselves out of the public property, it was some such cause probably that gave rise to oligarchies, for men made wealth an object of honour. From oligarchies the first transition was to Tyrannies, the next from Tyrannies to a Democracy; for as the tyrants tended to diminish their number from selfish avarice, they increased the power of the people, so that the latter attacked them, and democracies arose. But now that it has happened that states have grown in size, perhaps it is not easy for any form of government to
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exist except democracy. But supposing it to be admitted that to be governed by a king is the best thing for states, what is to be done about his children? Ought his family also to reign? But, should his children be only of an average type, this would do harm. But, it is argued, the king, having supreme power, will not leave the succession to such children. Still it is no longer easy to give him this trust, for it is a difficult task, and requires greater virtue than belongs to human nature. There is also a difficulty about the material power of the intended king: ought he to have some force about him to enable him to compel those who refuse obedience, or how is he to support his authority? For, supposing that he rests his absolute power on the laws, and does nothing of his own will to oppose them, it is still necessary for him to have some means of power by which to guard the laws. Perhaps it is not difficult to decide this question in the case of a king in such a constitutional position; for he must have some force, and that must be sufficient to make him stronger than any one person or several together, but not so strong as the mass of the people, just as the ancients used
The discussion now naturally brings us, and our attention must be directed, to the king who always acts according to his own will. For he that is called a constitutional king is not a real type, as we said, of constitution; for in all constitutions, democratical and oligarchical, it is possible that there should be a military command for life; and many states entrust the entire executive to one man. Of this sort is the government at Epidamnus, and also that at Opus, but in a slightly inferior degree. With respect to Absolute Monarchy, that is when the king rules entirely according to his own will, it is thought by some persons to be a violation of natural law that one man should be sovereign over all the citizens where the state consists of similar individuals. For those who are similar by nature have, according to the law of nature, the same rights and the same claims; and so, since it is...
injurious to the body for those who are of different constitution to use the same diet or clothing, the same holds true with respect to the distribution of honours. Just in the same way is it injurious for those who are similar to have unequal shares. And where honours are held in turn the same principle holds good. But this now is law, for order is law. We should therefore choose that law should rule rather than one single citizen. According to this same train of reasoning, even if it is best that there should be some persons in authority, these persons ought to be constituted merely guardians and servants of the laws. For it is absolutely necessary, they say, that there should be supreme power somewhere, but it is not just that this one man should represent it, at any rate where all are equal. Again, it is urged, those details which the law is incompetent to fix definitely cannot either be grasped by a man. Still, the law specially trains its rulers, and then sets them to judge and act for the future to the best of their judgment. It further allows the power of making an amendment wherever it appears from experience superior to existing legislation. He, therefore,
tòv κειμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἀρχεῖν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἀρχεῖν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν ισόν μόνους, ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπος καὶ τοὺς κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον. ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτος, καὶ θυμὸς ἀρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἁριδον καὶ στοις ἄνδρας. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως οὐκ ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ τὸν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψείδος, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ γράμματα ἰατρεύεσθαι φαύλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱρετῶτερον χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οὐ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀρνυται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες. οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς πολλὰ πρὸς ἑπὶρσιαν καὶ χάριν εἰκοθασι πράττειν, ἐπεί καὶ τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πεισθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς διαφθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ζητήσειν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπεύαν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἄν μᾶλλον.  
8 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονται γ’ ἐφ’ ἕαυτοις οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμνοντες ἀλλοις ἰατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὅσον δὲνυάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθῆς διὰ τὸ who wishes Law to govern seems to wish for the rule of God and Intellect alone; he who wishes men to rule brings in the element of the animal. For appetites are of this lower nature, and anger distorts the judgment of rulers, even of the best. And so Law is Intellect without animal impulses. The analogy of the arts seems fallacious, that it is a mistake to seek a cure in books, and better to have recourse to those who are skilled in the art of medicine. For physicians never act upon feelings of friendship, and contrary to the dictates of reason, but it is for curing their patients that they receive their fee; but those who hold political power are wont to do many things to annoy others and win favour. Since, also, when men suspect that their physicians have been bribed by their enemies to destroy them, they in that case would rather turn to the treatment which they find in books. Moreover, physicians, when they are ill, of their own accord call in other physicians; and trainers, when they are going through a course, obey trainers, implying that they have not the power of judging rightly, as they have to decide on matters which affect themselves, and they are
liable to the influence of their feelings. And so it is clear that in
seeking what is just they seek that which is in the mean; for law
is the mean state. Again, customary laws have more authority and
that on more important matters than written laws; so that a man
is a safer ruler than written laws, but less safe than the laws of
custom. Further, it is not easy for one man to attend to many
things, and so he will require that there should be several rulers
subordinate to himself. So what difference is there between this
arrangement being made at first and it being made by one indi-
vidual? Again, as was also said before, if the one good man has
a right to rule because he is better than others, then two good men
are better than one. This is what is meant by ‘when two to-
gether go,’ and the wish of Agamemnon, ‘had I ten such coun-
sellers.’ Also at the present day there are offices, such as the
judicial body, that have supreme power in giving opinions on
matters which the law cannot definitely fix, for where the law can

1 σὺν τὲ δύ’. Il. x. 224. 2 τοιούτω δέκα. Il. ii. 372.
11 καὶ κρίνειεν. ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ δ’ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἢ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ξητεῖν πότερον τὸν ἁριστον νόμον ἁρχεῖν αἱρετῶτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἁριστον. περὶ δὲν γὰρ βουλεύονται νομοθετῆσαι τῶν ἀδύνατων ἐστὶν. οὐ τοῦν τοῦτ’ ἦ ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνθρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔνα μόνον
12 ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς. κρίνει γὰρ ἐκαστὸς ἁρχὸν πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλὸς, ἄτοπον δ’ ἱσωσ ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἤδοι τις δυνῶν ὑμμασι καὶ δυσὶν ἀκοαῖς κρίνουν, καὶ πρῶτων δυσὶ ποσι καὶ χερσὶν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολλοὶς, ἐπει καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μονάρχοι ποιοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ὡτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας. τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἁρχῇ καὶ
13 αὐτοῖς φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν οὐνόματε οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαιρεσιν’ εἰ δὲ

do so, no one doubts that it will be the best ruler and judge. But since there are some matters which can be embraced by the law, and others which cannot, it is these latter which raise the difficult question whether it is better that the best law or the best man should govern. For matters which require deliberation are of the class on which it is impossible to legislate definitely. Certainly no one denies that it must be a man that is to decide such questions, but some say it should not be one man, but many. For though each person when in authority judges rightly if he has been trained by the law, it would perhaps seem ridiculous that one man should see better with two eyes, hear better with two ears, and do things better with two hands and two feet, than many will with many eyes and ears; for, as it is, monarchs supply themselves with many eyes and ears and hands and feet, for they associate with themselves in the govern-
ment those who are friendly to their authority and to themselves. Now, if these are not friendly, they will not act according to the will of the monarch, and if they are friendly both to him and to

ὀφθαλμοὺς. Cf. Moses’s request to his father-in-law, ‘leave us not, forasmuch as thou mayest be to us instead of eyes.’ Numb. x. 31.
his authority, then the friend, it must be allowed, is an equal, and similar to his friend. So that if he thinks such persons ought to be in authority, he thinks that those who are equal and similar to himself ought to be in similar authority. These are more or less the objections which are brought against a kingly form of government.

But perhaps all this is true in some cases, but not in others. For nature has made one class of men who should be governed as slaves by a master, another of men who should be governed by a king, another of men who require a free constitution; and this is just and advantageous to each. But there are none whom nature has formed to be subjects of a tyrant or members of any of the other corrupt forms of constitution. For these are contrary to nature. Still, from what we have said, it is evident that where men are similar and equal, it is neither advantageous nor just that one man should be sovereign over all, either where no laws exist, he himself taking the place of law, or where they do exist, nor that a good man should be lord over good men, or a bad man over bad men, nor that he should be sovereign even if he be of very superior virtue, except in one particular case. What that case is must be told; it...
eirhetai de pwo xoi kal 1πρότερον. πρότον δε διωριστέων
ti to basileuton kai ti to áristokratikov kai ti to poli-
4 tikov. Basileuton mèn ouv to toioútov èsti plēbos ο
pèfuke fèrein xénos úperéchov kai' ãrætín pròs ãgæmo-
νiain politikèn, áristokratikov de [plēbos ο pèfuke
fèrein] plēbos ãrchèsthai dunámenon tòn tòn èleuðèro
ì ãrchiìn úpò tòn kai' ãrætín ãgæmonikòn pròs politikèn
ãrchiìn, politikòn de [plēbos èv φ pèfukev 2ègænèsthai]
plēbos polèmikòn, dunámenon ãrchèsthai kai ãrchia
vòmon tôn kai' ãxían diænêmonta tois èupòrois tàs ãrchiás.
5 òtan ouv h ãénav òloun h kai tòn álloan èna tina ñìmβή
diæféronta gænèsthai kai' ãrætìn tosoùtov øòò õ
úperéchein
tòn èkeínon tôs tôs álloù pàntow, tôte ðíkaion tô h xénos
eînai touto basileikòn kai kúriov pàntov kai basileá
çov

has been also alluded to before. But first of all we must dis-tin-
guish between the classes which should be subject to a king, those
which should be members of an aristocracy, and those which should
form a free state. Now, subject to a king should be that people
which naturally produces a family of superior personal excellence
for the supreme command over a state; under aristocratical govern-
ment should be a people which naturally produces men adapted to
be ruled in a manner suited to free men by those whose personal
excellence fits them for the highest place in the government of the
state; and that people should form a free state in which there is a
natural growth of warlike men, who are capable of being either
subjects or rulers, according to a law which, on the claims of
merit, assigns positions of authority to the well-to-do. When,
however, there happens to arise either a whole family, or some
individual from the rest of the nation, of such superior virtue that
its or his virtue exceeds that of all the rest of the citizens
together, then it is just that this family should hold kingly

1 πρότερον. cxiii. 13. 25.
2 [kal èv] is here inserted in brackets by Becker and Susemihl, but
it seems better to omit it with Congreve and others.
power and absolute authority, or, if one man, that he should be King. For, as was said before, this is not only in accordance with the principles of justice which are usually put forward by the founders of constitutions, be they aristocratic, oligarchic, or democratic (for all these would assign supreme power on the ground of excellence, but their conceptions of excellence are not the same), but it is also agreeable to what we have already said. For it would surely not be proper to put to death or banish or even ostracise a man of this sort, or to require him to be subject in his turn. For it is not the usual course of nature that the part should surpass the whole, whereas this happens when a man is very superior to the rest. And so nothing else is to be done but submit to such a man and let him have supreme power, not in turn with others, but absolutely. Let these be our conclusions on the subject of monarchy, its different forms, and the question whether it is advantageous to states or the reverse, in what cases and in what manner it is so.

But since we say that the right forms of constitution are three in number, and that of these that which is directed by the best
men must be the best (and such a one is found, where there is
one individual or a whole family or larger number of conspicuous
personal merit, some having the capacity for being subjects and
others for being rulers with a view to obtain the best kind of life),
and since it was proved earlier that the excellence of the best man
and of the citizen of the best state are the same:—it is evident that
the same methods and the same means which make a man good
will also enable anyone to construct a state under aristocratical or
kingly government; so that the education and manners which make
a good man will be almost the same as those which produce a man
fit to be a statesman in a free state, or a king. And now that we
have settled these points, we must endeavour to discuss the best
form of constitution, and see how it naturally arises and how it is
established.
Anyone wishing to give this subject the investigation it deserves must first settle definitely what kind of life is most desirable. For while this point remains undetermined, the best form of government must also be undetermined. For men who are under the best form of government would naturally, except in extraordinary circumstances, enjoy the best life that their means permitted. For this reason we must in the first place agree as to what sort of life is universally, if we may so speak, the most desirable, and in the second, whether it is the same or different for the community and the individual. We believe that we may be content with the many statements which we have made in our other treatises on the best sort of life, and may now use them: most certainly with regard to one division at least no one would deny that, as there are three sorts of goods, those external, those belonging to the body, and those belonging to
the mind, all should be found in the happy man. For no one would call that man happy who possessed no share at all of bravery, or self-restraint, or justice or practical wisdom, but was, on the contrary, afraid of the fly that passes him, or could not curb his appetites, however excessive, for meat or drink, or would for a quarter-obol ruin his dearest friend, or was in intellect as silly and ill-judging as a child or madman. To the truth of these general statements all men would agree, but they differ quite as much on the question of degree and on the relative excellence of these goods. For of virtue they think that any small amount that they have is sufficient, but of wealth and money, and power and glory, and the like they seek an excess that knows no limit. But we will tell them that it is easy to secure conviction on these points from facts themselves, if they observe that men do not acquire and preserve their virtues by means of external goods, but external goods by means of their virtues, and that the happy life (whether it consist for men
in simple enjoyment or in virtue, or in both together) belongs more truly to those who possess the highest adornments of character and intellect, while their wishes are moderate with regard to the outward possession of good things, than to those who possess the latter to a degree beyond utility but have too little share of virtue. Not but that, when we also consider the problem by the method of reason, it is easy to solve. For external goods have a limit as much as any instrument, and every useful instrument is one of those things of which an excess must necessarily be hurtful or at least useless to the possessor, but of goods of the soul each one is most useful in proportion to its abundance—if we must apply the term useful as well as honourable to such goods. Speaking generally, it is obvious that we shall say that the highest states of all things stand in the same relation to each other in their superlative degree as those same things originally do of which we call these the superlative states. So that since the soul is something more valuable than property and

1 ὀσπερ ὄργανον. Cf. Bk. i. 18: οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἀπειρον οὐδεμίας ἐστι τέχνης οὐτε πλήθει οὐτε ὀλιγότητι.
the body, both intrinsically and in its relation to ourselves, it necessarily follows that the same relation should hold between each of these in their highest states. Again, it is for the sake of the soul that these other goods are naturally to be desired, and all who think aright ought so to desire them, but not the soul for their sakes.

So let us consider it granted that every individual's share of happiness depends on its share of virtue and intelligence, and on its acting in obedience to these, taking as evidence the Deity Himself, who is certainly happy and blessed, not in dependence on any external good, but on Himself and the essence of His nature. Moreover, for the same reason good-luck is necessarily different from happiness, for the spontaneous results of chance can produce the goods external to the soul, but no man is just or temperate by the gift of fortune or on the ground of good fortune. Closely connected with this and depending on the same arguments is the conclusion that the happy and prosperous state is that which is the best. But it is impossible for those to be prosperous who do not act honourably, and there can be no honourable action on the part of either individual or state.
without virtue and practical wisdom. Courage, justice and practical wisdom in a state have that same inner force and outward form that give to an individual, in virtue of his participation in them, the name of just or wise or temperate.

Let us be content with closing our preface here, for while it was impossible not to touch on these subjects, it is not possible to pursue all the considerations proper to them, for they are a task for another leisure hour. As it is, let us consider it granted that that life is the best, both singly for the individual and generally for the state, which is accompanied by a virtue sufficiently helped from outside to take a share in virtuous action. In answer to those who raise difficulties, we must, dismissing them in our present treatise, examine the facts later, in case there be anyone unconvinced by what we have said.

It now remains for us to discuss whether the happiness of each individual and that of a state must be considered identical or not. Here too the answer is obvious, for all men would allow that it is
identical. Those who make wealth the ground of a happy life in the case of an individual also call a state happy as a whole if only it be rich; those who hold in highest estimation the life of a despot will also call the state with the widest empire the happiest; while he who allows the claim of the individual to happiness on the ground of virtue will also say that the better a state is the happier will it be. But here we now have two points which require investigation; —in the first place, which kind of life is preferable, that which results from union with the body politic and a share in the state, or that of a stranger and of one who is removed from all association in matters of state; secondly, what constitution and what system of a state must be laid down as best, that where it is desirable for all citizens without exception to have a share in the state, or that where it is desirable for the majority, though not for particular individuals. But since it is the latter question, and not what is desirable for each individual, that is the proper object of reflection and theorising on politics, and since this is the investigation that we have chosen in the present case, the former question
will be merely a bye-subject, the latter the proper work of this treatise.

Now it is perfectly clear that that form of constitution must necessarily be the best under which any individual can do best and enjoy a happy life; but there is a difficulty raised even by those who allow that the life accompanied by virtue is the most desirable, namely, whether the life of politics and action is desirable, or rather that which is free from all external interests—I mean a life of contemplation which alone some men hold to be a philosophic life. For generally speaking these are the two kinds of life which have been chosen by all persons who either in the past or our own days have been most keen in pursuit of virtue—I mean the life of politics and the life of philosophy. And it is a question of no mean importance on which side the truth lies. For the wise man must necessarily range himself on the side that has the best object, and as the individual so must the community as a whole. Now it is the opinion of some persons that rule over neighbours is, if it take the form of a despotism, inseparable from certain injustice of the grossest kind, while if it be of a constitutional character it is,
though involving no injustice, a hindrance to personal enjoyment. Others happen to regard the question quite from an opposite point of view, for they hold that the life of action and politics is the only one becoming to a man; arguing that, in the case of any excellence, an active use of it does not belong a whit more to those who keep apart than to those who join in public life and politics. So then, while some hold the one opinion, others say that an imperial and despotic form of government is the only happy one.

In fact, in some tribes this is the beginning and the end of their constitution and their laws—namely, how to gain empire over their neighbours. And for this reason, although most peoples have most of their institutions directed, I may say, to no definite object, still, if there is one point which their laws keep in view, it is an aim at conquest. For instance, at Lacedemon and in Crete it is almost entirely with an eye to war that their education and the greatest proportion of their laws are arranged. Again, in all tribes which

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1 τῶν νόμων. Before the word legum the Vet. Trans. has et, and Congreve inserts καὶ, approved by Susenmihl.
are in a position to gratify their ambition, honour has been paid to
this faculty of warlike valour, as in the case of the Scythians,
Persians, Thracians and Celts. Some even have laws to stir men
up to the exercise of this excellence. At Carthage, for instance,
they say a warrior wears as many rings as he has seen campaigns.
There was also at one time a law in Macedonia that a warrior who
had never killed a foe should wear a leathern mouthband; and in
Scythia it was forbidden for anyone who had never slain a foe to
taste the cup which was passed round at a particular festival.
Among the Iberians, a warlike tribe, as many pales are fixed round
the tomb of a warrior as he has slain enemies. Many similar
institutions are there among other tribes, differing in each, of which
some have been established by law, others are the result of custom.
And yet, if we are willing to think, it will appear very monstrous
that it should be the function of the statesman to be able to judge
how he may gain empire and rule as a master over his neighbours,
13 μένων. τῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰδ τοῦτο πολιτικῶν ἢ νομοθετικῶν, ὅ γε μηδὲ νόμιμων ἐστίν· οὐ νόμιμων δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄδίκως ἁρχεῖν, κρατεῖν ὃ ἐστὶ καὶ μὴ δικαίως. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαίς ἐπιστήμαις τοῦτο ὁρῶμεν· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνῆτος ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἢ πείσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τῶν θεραπευομένως τοῦ δὲ 14 τοὺς πλωτῆρας. ἀλλ’ ἐοίκασιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἴσθαι εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοὶ ἐκαστοὶ οὐ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐθὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἀλλούς ἀσκούντες’ αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρ’ αὐτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἁρχεῖν ἔργασθι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀλλούς οὐδὲν 15 μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἀτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσπότου εστὶ τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσπότων, ὡστε εἴπερ ἐχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὐ δὲ πάντων πειράσθαι δεσπότες, ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θολὴν ἢ θυσίαν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτὸν· ἐστὶ be they willing or not. For how can that be the aim of the statesman and the legislation which is not even in itself legitimate? For there is nothing legitimate in power which uses not only just but also unjust means, and it is possible to be the stronger without justice or one's side. Further, we do not find any support for this view in the other sciences. It is not the function of either the physician or the pilot to use persuasion or force to his patients in the one case, to the sailors in the other. Still, the many appear to think that despotic rule is an object for states, and that which they individually deny to be either just or advantageous for themselves they do not blush to practise in their conduct to others. For themselves at home they seek for just government, in their actions towards others they care no iota for it. (Despotism) is monstrous unless there be a natural distinction between that which is master and that which is not. And so, if this be a true view, men ought not to try to be masters over all things alike, but only over those made to be ruled, just as we should not hunt men for the purpose of sacrifice or the table, but that which is made to be hunted—that is to say, a wild animal good for food.
But again, a single city may be happy by itself, granting that it be well governed, since it is quite possible that a state may be situated somewhere standing alone and enjoying good laws, and that the system of its constitution be not directed towards war or the conquest of an enemy; for we do not suppose such a thing known there. Thus it is evident that all attention paid to war must be considered honourable, not as the highest end possible, but as means towards that end. It is for the good lawgiver to see how a state, tribe, or other community shall have its share of a good life and the happiness open to it; and indeed some of the institutions which they establish will vary in different cases. It is also the duty of the legislature to see, in case the state has neighbours, what conduct must be observed to each respectively, or what are the fitting duties to perform towards each.

This question will also later on receive the attention which it requires; namely, what is the end at which the best constitution ought to aim.
In addressing those who agree in admitting that the life of virtue is the most desirable, but differ as to the method of spending that life, we must say, and say alike to the holders of each view (for there are two opposite opinions—some condemning all political offices and thinking that the life of the free man is one distinct from that of the politician, and the most desirable; others holding that this political life is the best, arguing that it is impossible for the man who does nothing to do well, and that virtuous action and happiness are synonymous)—we must, I say, tell both sides that they are each partly right, and each partly wrong. One side says that the life of the free man is better than that of one who rules over slaves; and this is true, for there is nothing grand in employing a slave qua slave. The act of giving orders about the necessaries of life has nothing honourable about it;—but, on the other hand, it is wrong for them to think that all rule is one of slave-mastery, for there is as much difference between the rule over free men and the rule over slaves as there is between that which nature makes for freedom and

\[ \text{ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. Bk. L c. 4-7.} \]
to δὲ μᾶλλον ἔπαινειν τὸ ἀπράκτειν τοῦ πράττειν οὐκ ἂλθεῖσι· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξεις ἔστιν. ἐτὶ δὲ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. καίτοι τάχι ἃν ὑπολαβοῦ τις τούτων οὐτὸς διωρισμένων ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἄριστον· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἶναι πράξεων. ὡστε οὐ δεῖ τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παριέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παῖδων μήτε παῖδας πατρὸς μήθε' ὀλως φίλον φίλου μεθέναι ὑπολογεῖν μηδὲ πρὸς τούτο φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἱρέτωτατον, τὸ δ' εὖ πράττειν ἄριστον· τούτῳ μὲν οὖν ἄληθῶς ὑσσος λέγουσιν, εἰπερ ὑπάρξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἱρετῶτατον· ἀλλ' ὑσσος οὐχ οὗ τοῦ τούτῳ ψεύδοσ· οὐ γὰρ ἐτὶ καλὰς τὰς πράξεις εὑρέχεται εἶναι τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον

that which she makes for servitude. This distinction was sufficiently drawn in our earlier books.

On the other hand, to praise the life of inaction above the life of action is not a true view to take, for happiness is a state of activity; and further, the actions of honest and temperate men involve the accomplishment of many noble results. And yet some one may urge, if these principles are laid down definitely, that 'absolute power is the best thing possible, for by possession of it a man has the power of performing the greatest number of the noblest actions; for this reason no one who has the chance of enjoying power should give it up to his neighbour, but should rather seek to rob him of it; and there should be no account taken or thought bestowed in comparison with this object by father on children, or children on father, or friend on friend. That which is best is most to be desired, and the best thing is nothing but the performance of good action.' This may be all very true if the highest good can come to men who use spoliation and violence; but we may say that it never can do so. And here lies the fallacy of the argument, for it is no longer possible (according to them) for a man’s actions to be noble unless
he has as much superiority over others as a man has over a woman, a father over his children, or a master over his slaves. He then who deviates from the position prescribed by virtue will never subsequently meet with success to compensate for the deviation already made. If men are alike, right and justice belong to them alike in reciprocal share; for this it is that is meant by equality and likeness. Inequality between equals, an unlike sharing between like, is a violation of nature, and nothing that violates nature is good. Indeed, if there be some other person superior to us in virtue and the ability that leads to the best actions, it is good for us to follow this person, and it is just to obey him. (I add this ability), for there must be not only virtue in the man, but an ability that will enable him to perform virtuous actions. If this be true—and we must consider it settled that happiness consists in virtuous activity—the best life both for the state as a whole and the individual alone will be one of action. But this activity need not necessarily imply a relation in a man to other people, as some think, nor need those exertions of the intellect only be active which are made for the sake of what results from their action; but much
more should those contemplations and thoughts be held so which have their end in themselves and exist for their own sake. For a state of well-being is their end, and this state of well-being (as we see by the etymology) is an active state. We go so far as to say that these men are the most powerful agents even in external matters whose thoughts mould and master the world.

Nor, again, is it necessary to ascribe inactivity to states which are placed apart from others and choose a life of isolation: for activity can be found in the relation of its parts. For the different parts of the state have many points of communication with each other. In a similar manner, this same sort of activity may be found in any individual man. Else hardly could God and the Universe have a fair existence, for they have no actions to perform outside and beyond those of their own sphere. So then it is plain that the same sort of life is the best both for each individual alone and also generally for states and men universally.

Now that we have finished our introduction in what we have said on these subjects, and have examined the other forms of
constitution in a previous book, we must begin the rest of our subject by discussing, in the first place, what fundamental principles we must lay down for the state that is to be constructed as our ideal. It is impossible for the best form of constitution to exist without suitable conditions, and we must therefore presuppose many things as if we could get them for wishing, but not one of these must be an impossibility. I mean, for instance, the question of the number of the citizens and the extent of the territory. Just as other artists—the weaver, for instance, or the shipwright—must have their material supplied in a condition suited to their work (for the better prepared this material is, so much the fairer must the result produced by the art in question necessarily be)—so also must the statesman and the lawgiver be supplied with their peculiar materials in a condition suited to their work.

Now, the first element in a statesman’s material is the number

1 πρότερον. If this Book is considered to be the fourth in order and these words form part of the text, they must refer to Bk. II.; if this be the seventh, to Bk. IV.—VI. The words καὶ ... πρότερον are now generally considered to be of doubtful authority.
BOOK IV. (VII.) CAP. 4.

To the pratical question, "How many men in the state, involving the quantity and natural quality of which they ought to be; and also the territory, involving its size and quality. Most persons think that the happy state should properly be a great one; but granting the truth of this, they ignore what conditions make a state great and what make it small; for they judge a state to be great by the number of men that live within it. Rather should we look not at actual number but at capacity. For a state too has a function of its own to perform, so that it is the state which has the capacity of fulfilling this function to the fullest extent that ought to be considered the greatest. Similarly, we should say of Hippocrates, not as a man but as a physician, that he was greater than some one else who was larger in bodily size.

Not but that if we must look at the question of number, we ought not to do so only in reference to its accidental extent (for it is perhaps necessary that there should be in all states a number formed of a large quantity of slaves, resident aliens, and foreigners), but by the consideration of those who form an actual part of the state and of the particular members that make up a state. It is the large
μορίων. ἢ γὰρ τούτων ὑπεροχῆς τοῦ πλῆθος μεγάλης πολέως σημείου, εὖ ἦς δὲ βάναυσοι μὲν ἕξερχονται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὁπλίται δὲ ὀλιγοί, ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην. οὐ γὰρ ταύτων μεγάλη τε πόλεις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο γε ἐκ τῶν ἐργῶν φαινοῦν ὅτι χαλεπῶν, ἵσως δὲ ἀδύνατον, εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον. τῶν γοῦν δοκούσων πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς οὐδεμίαν ὁμομοῦν οὐσαν ἀνεμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος. τούτῳ δὲ δῆλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. οὐ το γὰρ νόμος τάξις τίς ἔστι, καὶ τῆς εὐνομίας ἀναγκαῖον εὐταξίαν εἶναι, ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβουλλομένος ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξιν· θεῖας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἐργῶν, ἢτις καὶ τὸ ὑπερβαίνει 2 τὸ πᾶν, ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἰναὐσί 3 γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλιν ἢς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς ὄρος ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἂναγκαῖον. ἀλλ' ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεις μεγέθους μέτρον, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων number of these latter that show the greatness of a state. But the state which produces artisans in profusion, and warriors in small numbers, can never possibly be a great one. For a great state and a populous state are not the same thing. Indeed, this fact at least is proved by experience, that it is difficult if not impossible for an over-populous state to be well organised. Of those states commonly believed to be well governed we do not find one without any regulation as to population. This fact is also made clear by the conviction that reason gives. Law is an arrangement, and good laws must necessarily be good arrangements; but an excessive number of units cannot admit of arrangement. In this case it can only be produced by Divine power which holds this universe in harmony, since beauty always implies certain quantity and certain size. It follows then that that state where the limit mentioned is found together with a certain size must necessarily be the most beautiful. But states have a proper limit to their size as well as every other

2 Congreve alters the punctuation and reads τὸ πᾶν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ καλὸν... γίνεσθαι, καὶ πόλιν.
object, be it animal, plant, or inanimate instrument. For each of these will not, if unduly small or excessively large, possess its proper powers: in the first case it will be deprived of the full development of its natural qualities; in the second they will be spoilt. For instance, a ship a foot long will not be a ship in the proper sense of the word, nor yet will a ship of two stades. But there is a degree of size to which it can come in either direction, where in the one case its smallness, in the other its excessive size, will spoil its powers of sailing.

Similarly, the state, if it is composed of too few units, is not able to supply all its own wants (and our state is essentially a self-supporting thing); and if it be composed of too many, though self-sufficing in mere necessaries, it is a sort of nation, not a true state, for it cannot easily have a state constitution. What general will be found for the overwhelming multitude of men? What herald, unless he be a Stentor? It follows then necessarily that that first will be a state which has reached the first point in number that can become self-supplying in all that conduces to a good state of life in political association. It is quite possible that a state
exceeding this limit in point of number may be a greater state, but there is not, as we said before, no limit at all. And what the limit is, where excess begins, it is easy to see from experience. For the action of the state is divided into that of the governors and that of the governed, and the function of the governors is executive and judicial. To exercise these judicial functions on questions of right and for the proper distribution of office, it is necessary for all the citizens to have some knowledge of each other's qualities; since where from any circumstances this is not the case, there must necessarily be mistakes made on questions of election to office and judicial decisions. On either point it is not right to act blindly—a fault which evidently must exist where the population is too great. Again, in such a case it is easy for foreigners and resident aliens to usurp a share of state rights; for it is not difficult to escape detection on account of the great crowd. It is clear then that here we have the best limit to a state; namely, the largest number of persons that can be self-supporting and easily kept under the eye.
Let this then be our conclusion on the question of the size of a state.

The same considerations hold good with respect to the territory. For as to the question of its quality everyone would evidently recommend that which is most self-supporting (and such would necessarily be one that bore all kinds of produce: for to have everything ready to hand, to want nothing, is what we mean by self-support). Again, in extent and size it must be large enough to enable the inhabitants to enjoy a leisurely and temperate life. Whether or not we are right in fixing this limit, we must consider afterwards more carefully when the time comes to take into consideration the questions of property and ease of livelihood, and how and in what manner these should be employed. For there are many vexed points in this question, owing to those who entice to either extreme in the conduct of life—in the one direction to sordid avarice, in the other to absolute luxury. The form of the country is not hard to describe; we must on some points listen to
experienced soldiers, (who tell us) that it must be difficult for an enemy to enter, and easy for the native troops to leave. And further, just as we said of the number of the citizens that it should be such as can be easily kept under the eye, so must we say the same of the territory; and that a country can be kept under the eye means that it can be easily defended.

If we are to fix the situation of the state according to our wishes, it should lie equally favourably toward the sea and toward the land. One necessary point has been already settled, that it must be equally convenient for all parts to render mutual assistance. The other is, that it must be convenient for the transport of the produce of the country, of timber or any other material which it may happen to possess.

On the question of communication with the sea, whether it is advantageous for the good administration of states or the reverse, many persons hold different opinions. For some say that it is prejudicial to good order to have resident in the state men who have
been brought up under other laws, and too large a population, and that this latter results from the use of the sea, as such states send out and admit a whole crowd of traders, and that this is by no means conducive to good government. Still, it is not hard to see that, if these disadvantages do not arise, it is better both for security and a plentiful supply of necessaries that both the state-city and its territory should have some communication with the sea. For, to resist better a hostile attack, it is necessary that those who wish to be saved should be easily succoured on both sides, that is, both by land and sea; and to inflict injury on the attacking party, supposing it impossible on both elements, there is more chance of success on one or the other for men who have some command of both. Any necessaries of life which such men happen to want they can import, and their surplus produce they can export; for a state should be of commercial value to itself and not to other people. Men who offer themselves a sort of market to the world, do so for the sake of revenue; but the state which ought to know
πρώτον τις· ἢν δὲ μὴ δὲν πόλιν τοιαύτης μετέχειν
5 πλεονεξίας, οὐδὲ ἐμπόριον δει κεκτήσθαι τοιοῦτον. ἐπεὶ
dὲ καὶ νῦν ὀρθῶς πολλαῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ χώραις καὶ
tόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν
tόλιν, ὡστε μήτε 1 τὸ αὐτὸ νέως ἀστυ μήτε πόρρω λιαν,
ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τεῖχεσί καὶ τοιούτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι,
φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τί συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς
κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τούτῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ
τι βλαβερὸν, φυλάξασθαι ράδιον τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας
καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δὲ καὶ τίνας ἑπιμίσθησθαι δει
6 πρὸς ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι
μὲν βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τῶν πλῆθος, ὡς ἀδηλον
οὐ γάρ μόνον αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίων τισὶ δὲ καὶ
φοβεροὺς εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, ὡσπερ κατὰ γῆν,
7 καὶ κατὰ θάλαταν. περὶ δὲ πλῆθος ἢδη καὶ μεγέθους
tῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίου ἀποσκευπτέον τῆς
πόλεως· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολεμικὸν ζηστεῖ
nothing of such a desire for gain ought not to possess a commercial
centre of this kind. But, as it is, we see many countries and states
with dockyards and harbours situated advantageously as regards the
state-city; so that, while the men in them do not actually inhabit
the same city, they are still not very far off, and are secured by
walls and other defences; and hence it is clear, that if there is any
good to be gained by communication with them, such a state will
possess this good, while if there is any harm resulting, it will be
easier for the citizens to avoid it by stating and definitely defining
who are to have intercourse with each other, and who are not. On
the question of naval forces, it is clear that these must exist to a
certain point; for it is not only with regard to themselves alone,
but to certain of their neighbours also, that men should be able
to strike awe or give assistance, as easily by sea as by land. But
when we come to the number and size of this arm of the service,
we must consider what style of life is aimed at by the state. For

1 τὸ αὐτῷ. Better with Susemihl—αὐτῷ τὸ. The city proper itself.
βίον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον. τὴν δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν
γνωμένην περὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ὥχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρ-
χειν ταῖς πόλεσιν. οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δὲὶ τῆς
πόλεως. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶβατικὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζεύ-
8 ὀντων ἔστιν, δὲ κύριον ἔστι καὶ κράτει τῆς ναυτιλίας. πλή-
θους δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιοίκων καὶ τῶν τῆς χώραν γεωρ-
γοῦντων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ναυτῶν. ὁρὸμεν
dὲ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισὶν, οἷον τῇ πόλει τῶν
Ἡρακλεωτῶν. πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι τριήρεις κεκτη-
μένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἐτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ λιμένων [καὶ πόλεως] καὶ 9
θαλάττης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἐστῶ διωρι-
σμένον τῶν τρόπων τοῦτων. περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους,
tῶν μὲν ὅρον ὑπάρχειν χρή, ἡ πρώτην εὑπομεν, πολίους δὲ
tινας τῆν φύσιν εἶναι δεὶ, νῦν λέγωμεν. σχεδὸν δὴ κατα-7

if it is a life of empire and warfare that it will lead, it must neces-
sarily have this arm developed to a degree commensurate with
such enterprises. But the large number of men which is in-
volved in a large naval force need not be found in the states
themselves; for they ought not to be any actual part of the state.
For while the marines can be free men and drawn from the military
ranks—I mean those who command and control the navigation—
still, wherever there are large numbers of country folk and agricul-
tural labourers, there can be no want of seamen. This arrangement
also we find even now existing in some states—as, for instance, at
Heraclea; for the men of Heraclea turn out a large number of
triremes, although the state which they own is much smaller than
others. So much for our conclusions on the question of territory,
harbours, cities, sea communication and the naval force required.
In considering the number of the citizens, we have already stated
where the limit should lie; let us now discuss what their moral
character should be.

We might almost form a definite judgment on this subject

2 πρῶτην in c. 4.
by casting our eyes on the most famous Greek states and the world generally with its divisions into different tribes. For the tribes that live in cold countries and scattered about Europe are full of courage, but inferior in intellect and craft; and so, while they preserve their freedom, they are incapable of social organisation, and unable to gain empire over their neighbours. On the other hand, the tribes scattered over Asia, though intellectual and crafty, want spirit, and so live in a state of perpetual subjection and slavery. But the Greek race, just as it holds a middle position topographically, has its share of both qualities, for it possesses both spirit and intellect; hence it both preserves its freedom and the best forms of constitution, and the capacity to rule the world if it came under one single government. But the tribes of Greece have the same differences among themselves; for some have a one-sided nature, while others are a happy compound in respect to both these capabilities. Now it is obvious that those men must be capable of
both spirit and intellect who are to be easily led by the statesman toward virtue; and as the qualification that some philosophers say must be found in the guardians is that they must be affectionate towards those they know and savage towards strangers, it is spirit that produces this affectionate nature. For this is the faculty of the soul in virtue of which we feel love, and here is a proof:—Against our intimates and friends our spirit rises more than against strangers when it thinks itself slighted; and on this ground Archilochos, in blaming friends, aptly argues with his own spirit thus—‘Surely thou dost not hang thyself for the sake of friends.’ Also, all men get the idea of power and freedom from this faculty: for the spirit loves to rule and hates to be conquered. But it is not well to bid men be rough to strangers, for to none should one be rough. Nor are highminded men savage in nature except to the evildoers; and this anger men feel even in a greater degree towards

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1 τίνες. Plato, Rep. ii. 375.
perὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευμένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν
dei καὶ ποίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἐτὶ δὲ τὴν χῶραν τῶν
τέ τινα καὶ πολλὰ τινά, διώρισται σχεδὸν· οὐ γὰρ τὴν
ἀυτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διὰ τὰ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν
γνωσμένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἔπει δ᾽ ὦσπερ τῶν ἄλλων
tῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταῦτα ἐστὶ μόρια τῆς ὅλης
συστάσεως δὲν ἀνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἄν εἶπ, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ
πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὀσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν,

their associates, as was said before, if they imagine themselves
wronged. And this is as might be expected. For where men imagine
that a kind act should be owing to them, in addition to actual
injury received, they imagine themselves robbed of this kindness
due; whence it has been said, 'Rough are the quarrels between
brothers,' and 'They who have loved beyond measure, hate also
beyond measure.' Now, on the subject of the members of the
state, their proper number and natural character, and also on the
size and character of the country, we have said almost enough;
for we must not seek the same accuracy in detail through theo-
retical considerations as by the aid of results obtained by the
senses.

But as in other naturally compound bodies the actual parts of
the whole composition are not those things which are the necessary
conditions for the existence of the whole, so it is clear that we
must not consider parts of a state the conditions that are necessary
for states, nor do so of any other association which produces one

ou'd ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἔξ ἢς ἐν τι τὸ γένος. ἐν γὰρ τι καὶ κοινὸν εἶναι δεὶ καὶ ταύτῳ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, ἀν τε ἵσον ἃν τε ἀνυσον μεταλαμβάνωσιν, οἴον εἶτε τροφῇ τοῦτῷ ἐστὶν εἰτε χώρας πλήθος εἶτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶν. ὅταν δ' ἡ τὸ μὲν τοῦτον ἔνεκεν τὸ δ' οὔ ἔνεκεν, οὐδὲν ἐν γε τοῦτοις κοινὸν ἄλλ' ἤ τῷ μὲν ποιήσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν. λέγω δ' οἴον ὀργάνῳ τε παρέτερο τὸ γενόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς· οἰκία γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐθέν ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται κοινὸν, ἄλλ' ἐστὶ τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἢ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέκυν. διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἢ κτήσεις μέρος τῆς πόλεως. πολλὰ δ' ἐμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεως ἐστίν. ἢ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῆς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἔνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ευδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστοῦ, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τῆς τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὡστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδεχομένους homogeneous whole. For there must be some one thing common and the same for all members of the association, whether their share in it be equal or unequal: this may be, for instance, means of sustenance, or possession of the soil, or anything of the same character. But when one class of things are means to an end, and another an end itself, there is between these, at all events, no common link, except that the one produces and the other accepts the result. I am speaking, to take an instance, of the different relations of any instrument and of the workman to the work in hand. For in the relation of a house to the housebuilder there is no common element, and yet it is for the sake of making a house that the art of the housebuilder exists. Therefore, although property is absolutely necessary in a state, it is yet no part of the state, though there are many animate subdivisions of property. A state is a particular association of similar beings, and that with the object of enjoying the best life within their power; and since happiness is the best thing possible, and happiness is an active state of excellence and a fully developed practice of the same, and since, in the natural course of things, some men have it in their power to obtain this, while others can have only a small share or none at
It is clear that in this lies the reason for the rise of different forms of states and varieties of constitutions. For as different men pursue this end in different methods and with different means, they produce for themselves variety both in their modes of life and in their constitutions. We must also observe how many of these conditions there are which are indispensable to a state; for in them must necessarily be found what we call the true parts of a state. We must, then, make an enumeration of these (conditions), for they will show us what we want. In the first place, we must suppose the existence of means of sustenance; secondly, of arts (for there are many instruments which life requires); thirdly, of arms (for it is necessary for men in association to have arms within their reach, both for internal administration to check the disobedient, and to repel external foes if they attempted aggression); in the next place, of a good revenue to meet the calls which arise at home and during war; in the fifth place, but really primarily, of attention to things divine, which is called religion; sixthly in order, but most necessary of all, of means
of decision on the interests of the state and cases of justice between man and man. These are the conditions which every state, so to speak, demands. For the state is an aggregate body, one not determined by chance, but, we repeat, self-supplying in the wants of life; and if any one of these conditions be lacking, it is impossible that the association in which that is the case should be completely self-supplying. It is a necessity therefore that a state should be formed in accordance with these requirements. So, then, there must be a number of agricultural labourers who provide food, artisans, material for war and finances, priests and judges to watch over the state's needs and interests.

Now that we have divided these functions, it remains for us to consider whether all the citizens must have a part in all of them (for it is possible for the same men, i.e. all of them, to be both labourers in the fields and artisans, and also to belong to the bodies of counsellors and judges), or whether we must assign different men to the performance of each of the functions that we have specified, or whether some of these are necessarily separate and others necessarily common to all. This question is not open in
every form of constitution; for, as we have said, it is quite possible that all should have a part in all these functions and also that they should not, but particular classes in particular functions: for this it is that also produces varieties of constitutions. For in democracies all men have some part in all of them, but in oligarchies the opposite is true. But since we are now investigating about the ideally best form of constitution—and that is the one which will make the state most happy; and since it has been already stated that happiness cannot be present without virtue, it is clear from these premises that in the state which possesses the best form of constitution, and whose citizens are just absolutely and not with reference to the particular idea of the state, the citizens must not live the life of either artisans or men of the market-place; for a life of that sort is low and adverse to virtue. Nor must those who are to be citizens be agricultural labourers; for leisure is required both for the growth of virtue and for political action. But, since both the element that is concerned with war and that

1 καθάπερ εἶπομεν. Κτ. Βκ. ΙΙ. c. ι.
which is concerned with deliberation on the interests of the state and deciding on questions of justice are found among the conditions of a state, and are obviously parts of the state in the fullest sense, must we separate these functions also or assign them both to the same individuals? The answer to this also is clear, that we must in a certain sense assign them to the same, in another sense to different men. For, from the point of view that each function belongs to the time of life when different qualities are in their prime, the one requiring practical wisdom and the other bodily vigour, we must assign them to different persons; but, from the other point of view, that it is an impossibility for those who have the power to exercise coercion and restraint to live all their lives under authority, in this sense I say we must assign them to the same. For those who have the arms in their hands have also in their hands the continuance or discontinuance of the constitution. It remains then to give to the same men (i.e. both classes) these functions of government, but not at the same time, but as bodily vigour naturally resides in the younger, and practical wisdom in the elder, it is surely on this principle that it is both convenient and right to assign these func-
Again, the element of property ought to be connected with these classes. For it is necessary that our citizens should have sufficient wealth, and these classes are citizens. For the artisan element has no real part in the state, nor has any other class which is not a producer of virtue. And this is clear from our assumption. For happiness must necessarily exist only when accompanied with virtue, and when we call a state happy, we must not look at some parts of it, but at all the citizens together; and it is evident that property must belong to the classes above mentioned, since the tillers of the soil must be either slaves or foreigners or serfs. Of the classes specified we have now left that of the priests. Their position too is easily seen. For neither agricultural labourer nor artisan must be made a priest; for it is by true citizens that it is becoming that the gods should be honoured. And since the state-body has been divided into two sections—that is to say, those who bear arms and those who deliberate—and since it is fitting that those who
through age have given up public action should render service to the gods and have a rest for themselves, this is the class which we should set apart for the priesthood. Thus we have spoken of the elements without which a state cannot be formed and of the real parts of a state. For while agricultural labourers and artisans and the lower orders generally are elements which must of necessity exist in states, it is the classes of warriors and counsellors who are the real parts of the state; and, as we see, each of these divisions is clearly marked, the one by a perpetual, the other by a partial separation.

Apparently it is neither in the present day nor even recently that the discovery has been made by theorists on constitutional government that the state should be distinctly marked out in hereditary classes, and that the element which fights should be quite separate from that which tills the soil. For both in Egypt is this the case even still, and also in Crete; Sesostris, as it is said, having legislated to this effect for Egypt, and Minos for Crete. Very old too appears to be the institution of public messes, those in Crete having been instituted in the reign of Minos, while those in
Italia are much older still. For the antiquarians among the inhabitants of those parts say that a certain Italus was king of Ænotria, and that from him the Italians took their name in exchange for that of Ænotrians, and also that that spur of Europe which lay between the Scyilletic and Lametic gulfs (these being half a day’s journey distant from each other) got the name of Italia. This Italus, they say, turned the Ænotrians, who were purely pastoral, into agriculturists, and, besides giving them other laws, was the first to establish public messes. And so even still some of his descendants use public messes and some of his laws. Now, the land lying on the Tyrrenian sea was occupied by the Opici, who were formerly and are still called by the additional name of Ausones; while that which lay towards Iapygia and the Ionian sea (and is called Siritis) was occupied by the Chaonians. The Chaonians too were Ænotrians

1 τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν. For the legends about Minos and the historical element in them see Grote’s ‘Greece,’ Part I. c. 12.
2 περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, i.e. in Magna Græcia.
Thus the institution of public messes first rose there; while the class or caste division of the political body came from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris is of much more ancient date than that of Minos. We must consider that almost all the other discoveries that have been made have been repeated, in the long course of time, a great or rather an infinite number of times. Those absolutely necessary are naturally taught by the wants of daily life alone, and when these have been obtained, those which lead to refinement and abundance as naturally increase; and so we must suppose that political discoveries proceed in the same fashion. That all institutions are old is proved by Egyptian history; for while the Egyptians are held to be the most ancient people in the world, they still have had enjoyment of laws and political organisation. Therefore, while we must make sufficient use of discoveries already made, we must endeavour to solve the problems that have been omitted. It has been already said that the land ought to belong to those who possess arms and have political rights, and that the tillers of the
soil should be distinct from the owners, and also what the size and character of the country should be. We must now speak first of the allotment of the land, and about the labourers, their proper number and character; for while we do not say, as some have done, that the land should be absolutely common to all, but rather that it should become virtually so by the friendly use of it, we still say that none of the citizens should be absolutely without means of support. On the question of public messes all agree that they are an useful institution in well-regulated states, and why we also agree with this we will state later. All the citizens ought to participate in these; but it is not easy for the poor to contribute their share from their private stock and at the same time supply their other household wants. Again, the expenses incurred in the worship of the gods are common to the whole state. So then it is necessary that the territory should be divided into two parts, one to be held in common and the other as private property, and that each of these again

3 φαμεν. Cf. Bk. II. v. 5, sqq.  4 τινές, alluding to Plato.
should be subdivided, one portion of the common land being appropriated to the services of the gods, and the other to the expenses of the public messes; and of the private land, one portion lying on the borders and the other near the city; so that, by giving two allotments to each individual, all would have an interest in both parts of the country. For thus we get both equality and a just share, and a greater tendency to unanimity in the presence of wars with neighbours. For wherever this method is not adopted, the citizens at a distance care little for hostilities with neighbouring states, while those near care too much and more than honour admits. For this reason in some states there is a law that those living near the border enemy should take no part in deliberation on wars with those enemies, on the assumption that personal motives would prevent them from giving good advice. As far then as the land is concerned, it must necessarily be allotted in this manner for the reasons that have been stated, but for those who are to till it, they must if possible, and if we are to have what we wish, be slaves, consisting of men who are not all of the same nationality nor of spirited disposition (for it is
only on these conditions that they will be useful for their work and safe from revolutionary ideas); but if they cannot be slaves they must be barbarian serfs, similar in disposition to the slaves we spoke of. Of these one class should be private property employed on the private estates of those who hold land, the others employed on the public land should be public property. As to the method which should be employed in the treatment of slaves and the advantage of enfranchisement being held out to all slaves as a reward, we will speak later on.

It has been already said that the state-city should have communication both with the land and the sea, and as far as possible with all parts of its territory equally. Now, for its position solely with regard to itself we must pray that it may be fortunate in four respects; and in the first place, as is absolutely necessary, with a view to healthiness. Those cities which slope towards the east and face the breezes that blow from that quarter are healthier than others, and next to that those protected against the north wind, for they have milder winters. For the other points we must have an
eye to a favourable position both for domestic and strategic action. For the latter, the place must be easy for the defenders to leave, and yet difficult for the foe to approach and surround. Of water supply and springs there should, if possible, be a large quantity within the town itself: if this cannot be, the solution to this difficulty at any rate has been found in preparing reservoirs for rain water, many in number and large in size, so that a supply may never fail the citizens if blockaded in war. And seeing that we must consider the health of the inhabitants, and that this depends on the place being in suitable soil and towards a suitable quarter, and secondly, on the use of wholesome water, this latter point must also be attended to, and that not as one of subordinate importance. Whatever things we apply most, and most frequently, to our bodies contribute most towards their state of health. Now the influences of water and air have such a character. Therefore in wise states, if all springs be not equally good, or if there be a scarcity of good springs, a distinction should be made between the water to be used for drinking and that to be used for other purposes. With regard
to positions of defence, the same rule of expediency does not apply to all states alike. For instance, a citadel suits an oligarchy or monarchy, and a plain country a democracy; whereas neither of these suits an aristocracy, but rather a number of strong positions. The arrangement of the private houses is thought to be pleasanter to the eye and more useful generally if it be regular in its lines, according to the newer system and that adopted by Hippodamus, but still for security in war the opposite principle is best which used formerly to be employed; for that older system makes it difficult for the foreign foe to escape, and difficult for an attacking force to find their way. And so we should combine both systems (and this is possible if we build on the plan used in husbandry, which some call the ‘vineyard pattern’), and not make the whole city regularly-cut, but only parts of it and some quarters; for this method will be found well adapted for both security and beauty. With regard to the question of walls, those who say that
states which lay claim to valour should not possess any, have very antequated ideas, especially as they may see how states which have prided themselves on that ground are brought to shame when actually tested. It is possibly, when we are opposed to a foe of similar strength and one not far superior in point of numbers, not honourable to seek to protect ourselves by the defences of our walls; but since it sometimes happens (and is always possible) that the superiority of the attacking force is too great to be resisted by any human valour that can be found in the small numbers (of the defenders), if we wish to be secure and safe from injury and insult, we must conclude that the greatest strength of walls is the most advantageous for war; more especially as everything connected with artillery and siege materiel has been elaborated to perfection. For it is just as bad to call upon states not to surround themselves with walls, as to ask them to let their territory be open to invasion and to level the strong positions that their hills give them. We might just as well tell people not to build walls to their private
houses on the ground that those who live in them will be cowardly. There is one point at any rate which must not escape us; those who have walls round their cities may treat those cities in both ways, either as walled or not walled; those, on the other hand, who have them not, cannot do so. If now this be the case, we must not merely build walls round the city, but must pay great attention to them that they may be of advantage to it both in embellishing it and also in resisting the dangers of war, especially those of recent invention. For just as the attacking force concern themselves with the means of aggression, so also must the defenders, besides using discoveries already made, seek, and that in a scientific spirit, others also; for, as a general rule, men do not even attack those who are well prepared to receive them.

Since the whole number of citizens should be portioned out into messes, and at the same time the walls of the city be intersected by guard-towers and forts at suitable spots, it is clear that these facts

2 ξητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν. Cf. the defence of Syracuse by Archimedes and of Jotapata by Josephus.
of themselves invite us to fix some of our messes in these guard-towers. And while so far we might make our arrangements on this plan, it is fitting that the buildings set apart for the gods and the more important messes of the magistracy should occupy a suitable position and be together, except in respect to those sacred rites which the law or some distinct oracle from Delphi enjoins should be kept apart. Such a position will be one that stands conspicuously in a manner worthy of the excellence that will have its seat there, and is of considerable strength as regards the neighbouring parts of the city. It is well that immediately below this spot should be placed an ‘Agora,’ or public place of that sort which is generally used in Thessaly, and is called the ‘Free Agora.’ It is this Agora which must be unpolluted by any sort of buying and selling, and which no artisan or agricultural labourer, or any of such position, must enter unless summoned by the magistrates. The place will have a cheerful appearance if the gymnastic exercises of the elder men be also held there. For it is better that in that branch of cultivation also distinction should be made according to
differences of age; and that while a few of the magistrates pass their time with the younger people, the elders should be with the magistrates generally: for the fact of being under the eye of the magistrates produces more than anything else genuine dread of disgrace and such fear as freemen feel. The Agora for buying and selling must be both distinct from the Free Agora and in a different part of the town, occupying a position where both imported merchandise and goods from the country generally can be easily brought together. Now, since the whole number (of the elders) in our city has been divided into priests and magistrates, it is well that the messes of the priests should be situated near the sacred buildings. Those boards of magistrates which are employed on questions of contract, on trials of lawsuits, on summons, and similar duties, as well as those concerned with the police of the city and what is called the conservancy of the Agora, should have their mess rooms close to the Agora and to some common place of meeting; and such a spot will be found close to the ‘Agora for Necessaries.’ For the superior
Agora we keep for a place of leisure, and the other for the necessary dealings of life. We ought also to imitate the above-mentioned system in arranging country institutions. For in the country also the magistrates, who are called by some ‘Foresters,’ by others ‘Conservators of the Fields,’ must have their guard-houses and messes when on garrison duty; also religious institutions must be distributed throughout the country—some in honour of gods, and others of heroes. But to spend our time now on accuracy of detail and the discussion of such questions is unprofitable; for the difficulty does not lie in forming plans on such matters, but rather in carrying them out. To say what we want is a matter of wishing, to succeed of good fortune. And so for the present let us dismiss further consideration of such questions.

But on the subject of the constitution itself we must now say what must be the number and what the nature of the elements which combine to form the state which is to be blessed and to be well governed. Now, for all men the sources of success are two: one of them is that the object and end of their actions be correctly
fixed; the other is the discovery of the course of action that leads to that end. For it is possible that these two should be at variance and also possible that they should harmonise. Sometimes while the object has been rightly chosen, it is in their action in pursuit of it that the failure of men to attain it lies; sometimes they succeed in all the means that lead to their end, but the end they chose was a bad one. Sometimes again, they err in both; for instance, take medical science. Occasionally people neither form a right opinion on the character of a healthy body, nor yet hit upon the means likely to produce the end they have chosen. In the arts and sciences both points must be mastered, the end and the course of action that will lead to that end. Now that living well and happiness generally is the object of all is perfectly plain. But while some men have the opportunity for attaining their objects, others have not, owing to some accident or natural cause. For a perfect life requires, in addition to other things, some external help to a less degree for men of a better disposition, to a greater for those of
Some there are who from the very beginning do not seek happiness in the right way, although they have the opportunity. But since our object is to find out the best constitution, and that is the one in accordance with which the state will receive its best development as a state, and since it will receive this in accordance with the constitution which gives it the greatest possibility of happiness,—it is clear that the real nature of happiness must not escape us. We say in our Ethics, if any help is to be obtained from them, that it is an active development of powers and a final and complete use of virtue, and that not relatively but absolutely. By relative I mean what is forced on us by necessity, by absolute what is intrinsically excellent. For instance, in the case of just actions, just punishments and chastisements, though having their origin in virtue, are forced on us by necessity and have their excellence only in a forced sense (for it is better that neither individual nor state should require anything of the sort), but actions which lead to honour and well-being are absolutely the most excellent. The first case is a choice of one evil in preference to a

1 ἐν τοῖς ἡθικῶι. Eth. i. 6.
worse, the second class of actions are quite the reverse, for they are the fabric and origin of good things. The good man may indeed meet even penury and disease and other evil fortune in a noble and excellent manner, but still blessedness lies in the opposites to these. For this conclusion also has been reached in the Ethics, that the good man is he to whom by reason of his virtue those things are good which are good absolutely. And it is clear that his use (of external goods) must be good and noble in an absolute sense. And it is for this reason that men imagine that external goods are the sources of their happiness, as blindly as if one were to hold the instrument and not the skill used responsible for a brilliant and excellent performance on the lyre. So from what we have said it must necessarily follow that some elements of the constitution must be assumed, and others provided by the legislator. And so in the building up of our state we must hope for the best on those points where Fortune is supreme, for that she is supreme we assume. But when we come to the goodness of the state, it is no longer a

2 κατὰ τοὺς ἡθικοὺς. Eth. iii. 6.
question of fortune but of scientific and deliberate choice of measures. Now a state is good in virtue of the citizens who share its constitution being good, and in our view all the citizens have a share in the constitution. This point then must be examined, 'How does a man become good?' For even supposing it possible that all should be good as one whole, and not by each citizen individually being so, this would still be the best method; for upon the goodness of the individual follows that of the mass. Now there are three means by which men become excellent and good. These three are Nature, Habit, and Reason. For nature must give to man, in the first place, his form as a man and not as any other animal; and, secondly, a certain character of mind and body; but there is no advantage in some things that nature gives, for habit makes them change. For some feelings are by nature undetermined, but turned by habit to evil or to good. Now, while other animals live chiefly by natural instinct, and some few by habit also, man alone lives.
by reason as well, for he is the only animal that possesses reason. Therefore these three should be in harmony with each other. For men do many things contrary to their habits and their nature on account of reason, if they are convinced that another course is best. The natural character of those who are to be easily managed by the legislator we have already defined; the question now left us is that of education; for men learn some things by practice—others by precept.

Since every political community is compounded of those who rule and those who are ruled, the point now to be considered is, should the rulers and the ruled be different persons, or the same for life; for it is clear that their education also must depend upon the distinction made. Supposing now that there were some men as superior to their fellows as we imagine the gods and heroes to be superior to men; of great pre-eminence, to begin with, in bodily stature, and secondly in mental strength, so that the superiority of

5 πρῶτον, in ch. vii.
the rulers should be unquestioned and evident to the ruled, it is clear that it is better that the same persons should be set to rule, and the same to be ruled once and for all. But since this is not easy to have, and it is not possible to have kings, as Scylax says is the case in India, so far superior to their subjects, it is obvious that for many reasons all should, on equal terms, have their share of ruling and being ruled in their turn. For equality means the same thing for similar persons, and it is difficult for that state to hold its own which is formed contrary to the principles of justice. For there are always ready to join the subject class in revolutionary projects all who reside only in the country, and that those engaged in the government should be numerous enough to be stronger than all these together is an impossibility. On the other hand, that there should be a distinction between the rulers and the ruled is a truth that admits of no discussion. The legislator must then consider how this is to be managed, and how all shall have their share.

1 πρῶτερον, ch. ix.
We have already spoken on this subject. Nature has supplied the distinction by making that which is the same in kind at one time younger, at another older, and it is well that the former should be subject and the latter rule. No one grumbles at being in subjection on the ground of age, or thinks that he is superior, more especially when he is going to have this privilege in his turn when he has reached the proper age. The truth is, we must say, that in one sense the same, in another different, persons are rulers and subjects; so that their education also must necessarily be in one sense the same—in the other different. For men say that the man who is to be a good ruler must first have been a subject. Authority exists, as we said in earlier books, in one form for the benefit of the ruler—in another for that of the subject. The first we call despotic, the second that of a free people. Some commands are distinguished not so much by the act to be done as by the motive for doing it. And so there are many duties which are considered menial that it is honourable for young men even of free birth.
to perform. For actions do not, in their relation to what is honourable or the reverse, differ so much in themselves as in the object and motive for which they are done. But since we assert that the virtue of the citizen when a ruler is identical with that of the best man, and also that the same person must be subject first and ruler afterwards, the anxious care of the legislator must be how men are to be made good, what pursuits are to be used as means, and what is the highest end of the best life. Now we have noticed a distinction has been made between two parts of the soul: one possesses reason in itself; the other does not possess it in itself, but is able to listen to the voice of reason. And we say that it is in reference to the virtues of these parts that goodness is predicated of a man to a particular extent. To the question in which of these the highest end is most likely to be found, those who make the analysis in the way we have stated, have no difficulty in seeing what answer must be given. That which is inferior always exists for the sake of that which is superior, and this is evident alike in the products of art and those of nature; and the part possessing reason is the superior. Now reason is divided into two heads,
following the division that we have been accustomed to use: one sort is practical, the other speculative. In a similar manner it is clear that this part (which possesses reason) must necessarily be divided, and we may say that the actions of each division bear a corresponding relation to each other, and the actions of the naturally superior part ought to be most desired by all who have the power to attain to those of all the parts or those of two out of the three; for that is always the most to be desired by every individual which is the highest point to which he can attain. The whole of life also is divided into toil and rest, war and peace, and all action into the necessary and useful on the one hand, and the honourable on the other. On these points the same preference must be shown as in the parts of the soul and their actions (i.e. for that which is superior); and so war should be for the sake of peace, toil for the sake of rest,—things necessary and useful for the sake of things honourable. So to all these points must the statesman look in framing his laws, considering both the parts of the soul and their action, or better still, what is really superior, and the highest ends. Similarly must he regard the modes of life of the citizens, and the
diasiries*... deis men gar asekolein dynasthai kai polemein, 
muallon de eirinyn engein kai skolazevn kai tagnykaia 
kaia ta xrosisma de prateu, ta de kaldei muallon. 6ste 
pros toutous tous skopous kai paiades eti duntas paiade-
ten kai tas alles hlikias, osai deixontai paiideias. oi dei 
nun arista dokounites politeuesbai ton Ellinon, kai 
tou nómogeton oi tautas katashtsantes tas politeias, 
oute prosto to beleion telen fainontai sunitzantes ta peri 
tas politeias outhe prosto pasas tas aretais touvs nymous 
kaia tin paiideian, alla 3 fortikos atopelwvan pros tas 
chrisimous einai dokousas kai pleionektikosteras. para-
plhsws de toutois kai tovous vsteron tines grafiantes 
apheiranto tin autiin doxan. epainoioutes gar tin 
Lakedaimonion politeian agontai touv nómogetov ton 
skopon, outhe panta pros to kratein kai pros polemon 
differences between the things they do. For they should be able 
to toil and to fight; but for preference should enjoy peace and 
quiet, and while they do things which are necessary and useful, they 
should prefer those which are honourable. Therefore it is to these 
aims that we must train men even during childhood, and also 
during those other periods of their life which require training. But those Greek states which at present seem the best governed, 
and those legislators who framed those constitutions, appear to 
me not to have kept in view either the highest end in the com-
position of their constitutions, or all the virtues in the ar-
rangement of their laws and education; but they in a lower 
spirit inclined to those virtues which are considered useful and 
the most paying. Like them some recent writers also have 
betrayed the same views; for by their praise of the Lacedemo-
nian constitution they show their admiration for the aim of its 
lawgiver, in making all his legislation point to conquest and war.

3 fortikos implies a want of culture or of higher ideas, such as is 
implied by the modern phrase 'in a spirit of Philistinism.'
Yet this policy is easily proved fallacious by argument, and has already been fully shown to be so by history; for just as most men seek to be masters over many on account of the large supply of the goods of fortune that thence accrues, so do Thimbron and the other writers on the Lacedemonian constitution evidently admire that state's lawgiver, on the ground that the Lacedemonians by being previously inured to danger gained a wide empire. And yet it is obvious that, since empire can no longer be predicated of Lacedemon, they were not a happy people, nor was their lawgiver an excellent one. It is absurd to call him so, since, though they remained true to his laws, and though there was nothing to hinder the use of them, they have yet lost their life of glory. Nor do men form a right conception of the kind of authority which a legislator clearly ought to revere; for authority over free subjects is more noble and more connected with virtue than one that is despotic. Again, it is not a correct reason for terming a state happy and praising its lawgiver, that he has trained it to endurance with a
view to obtaining empire over its neighbours; for this involves much harm. For it clearly follows that each citizen also who can must make it his object to find means to rule his own state; and this is the very charge that the Lacedemonians make against their king Pausanias in spite of the high position which he held. No argument or law of such a character is consistent with the idea of a state, or useful or correct; for the sentiments which are equally the best for individuals and for the community are those which the legislator should instil into men’s minds. The proper motive for attending to the practice of military duties is not to enslave those who ought not to be slaves, but, in the first place, to escape falling into slavery to others; in the second, to seek supremacy for the interests of the governed, and not absolute and universal mastery; in the third, to reduce to subjection those who are naturally intended for slaves. In proving that the legislator should be particularly anxious to direct his legislation on military matters to the attainment of quiet and peace, we have the evidence of experience in favour of our argument; for most military states
while still engaged in war are safe, but the moment they have established an empire fall to pieces, for, like a sword, they lose their temper by being unemployed; and the blame must fall on the law-giver, since he never trained them to a capacity of living a life of rest.

Now since there must clearly be the same end for our citizens, whether we consider them collectively or individually, and there must necessarily be the same standard for the best individual and the best constitution, it obviously follows that the virtues requisite for leisure must be found in the State; for, as we have often repeated, peace is the end and object of war—leisure of toil. Now the virtues that are useful for purposes of leisure and recreation are not only those which are employed during leisure, but also those which are required in active life; for there are many requisites which must be secured in order to have the power of enjoying leisure. And so the State ought to be temperate and brave and patient, for, as the proverb runs, 'There is no leisure for slaves;’ and those who cannot bravely face danger are the slaves of the aggressor. Thus, bravery and endurance are required for the hard
work of life—intellectual cultivation for its leisure hours—temperance and justice for both; but to the greatest degree when we are enjoying peace and leisure. For war forces justice and temperance upon men, and it is the enjoyment of good fortune and undisturbed peace which have a tendency to make them overbearing. Much justice then and much temperance are required by men who are thought to be best off and in the enjoyment of all that is considered enviable, like the dwellers of whom the poets speak in the Islands of the Blest; for it is these men who will have the greatest need of philosophy, temperance, and justice in proportion to the leisure which they enjoy in the midst of an unbounded supply of similar blessings. So it is clear that the State which is to be happy and good must, to some extent, possess these virtues; for if it is a disgrace to be unable to make good use of the blessings of life at any time, far more is it to be unable to use them in time of leisure, and, while appearing good in time of toil and war, to sink to the level of a slave in the hour of peace.

1 οἱ ποιηταὶ, e.g. Hesiod, Op. 169, and Pindar, Ol. ii. 128.
θούς, εἰρήνην δ’ άγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδώδεις.
6 διὸ δεῖ μὴ καθάπερ ἢ Δακεδαμονίων πόλεως τήν ἁρετήν ἀσκεῖν. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταῦτα διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν ταύτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἁγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γίνεσθαι ταύτα μᾶλλον διὰ τινος ἁρετῆς. ἔπει δὲ μείξω τε ἁγαθὰ ταύτα, καὶ τήν ἀπόλαυσιν τήν τοῦτων ἢ τήν τῶν ἁρετῶν, καὶ ὅτι δὲ αὐτήν, φανερὸν ἢ τοῦτον, 7 πώς τῇ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον. τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηγημένου πρότερον ὁτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τοῦτων δὲ ποιούς μὲν τινας εἶναι χρή τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πῶς πρὸτερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δεί πρὸς ἀλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τήν ἁρίστην ἐνδεχεται γὰρ διημαρτησαί καὶ τῶν λόγων τῆς βελτιστης ύποθέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔθων ὁμοίως ἡχθαί. φανερὸν δὴ τοῦτό
and leisure. Therefore we must not cultivate virtue in the way that the Lacedemonians do. It is not in a different conception of the highest blessings that they differ from other people, but in their idea that those blessings are obtained by means of one special virtue.

But since it is clear from this that those blessings are superior (to special virtues), and that the enjoyment of them is superior to the enjoyment of those virtues considered purely on its own account, we must now consider the manner and the means of obtaining them. On a previous occasion we divided the necessary means into Nature, Habit, and Reason. With regard to these we also decided what character Nature should give to men, and so it now remains to consider whether their education should proceed first by the help of reason or by that of habits (i.e. discipline). These two ought to be in the most perfect harmony, for it is possible that even reason should have mistaken the best end, and also that men should be led quite as far astray by the influence of habits. This much, at any rate, is clear. First, the actual birth of man, as

2 πρότερον, ch. vii.
in everything else, depends upon something previous, and the object and end of that birth depend upon something which is the original source of a different end. Now reason and intellect are that end of our nature, and so we must regard as subservient to them both our birth and our moral disciplines. Secondly, as soul and body are two and distinct, so also do we find in the soul two parts—one devoid of reason, the other possessed of it; and that their corresponding states are two in number—namely, desire and intelligence. Just as the body comes into existence before the soul, so does the irrational part of the soul before the rational. And this is obvious, for temper and wish, and desire also, are found in children immediately after birth, but calculation and intelligence are implanted by Nature as they advance in years. And so we must, in the first place, attend to the body before the soul, and in the second, to the desire before the intellect, though the training of the desire is for the good of the intellect, and that of the body for the good of the soul.

Seeing then that it is from the earliest period that the legis-
lato must consider how the bodies of those to be reared as citizens may be of the best quality, he must, in the first place, attend to the union of the parents, and decide at what time and under what personal conditions they must enter into the state of marriage. In legislating upon this union he must particularly regard both the individuals themselves and their age, so that the powers of both may decline with their years till they reach the same period together, and not be out of harmony, as would be the case if the man could still beget but the woman could not conceive, or if she had the power while he had not. It is differences like these that produce mutual quarrels and disagreements. In the next place the legislator must consider the succession of the children. Children should be neither too far removed from their fathers in point of years (for the pleasure given by children is thrown away upon men too old, and the help given by fathers is lost to the children); neither should they be too near to them, for that produces much disagreeable feeling. Respect is felt by children in a less degree to parents of this character who are, as it were, their equals in age, and in the management of a household generally nearness of age is
likely to give rise to wrangling. Again, to return to the point from which we made this digression, care must be taken that the persons of the parents be in a state suited to the wishes of the legislator. Now we might almost say that all these points can be secured by one form of supervision; for since the limit for having children has been fixed, generally speaking, at seventy years as the outside age for men, and fifty for women, it is right that the beginning of the connection should be in correspondence with these dates. Connection between two young people is not good for the production of children; for in all animals the produce of young parents are below the average quality, and generally female and small in size, so that the same must be the case also with human beings. And there is evidence for this: in those states where the marriage of young people is the prevailing custom, the children are below the average, and small in size. Again, young wives suffer more in childbirth, and more frequently die in it. And so some

1 τὸν χρησμὸν. The oracle was μὴ τέμε νέαν ἄλοκα.
Bia Toh, a great Trphs yap viae yap 9.

9.79, yap 9. yap vL9,

9. say that it was for a reason of this sort that the well-known oracle was given to the Trozenians, as there had been great loss through the marriage of women too young, and not in reference to the harvest. Again, it is more conducive to continence that elder women should be given in marriage, for the younger are thought to be less continent after they have lived with a husband. Also men’s bodies seem to receive some injury to their growth if while they are still growing they form connection with women; for the body also has a definite time after which it does not continue to grow. And so it is best to unite women of about eighteen years of age and men of thirty-seven or less; for by such an arrangement the union will be during their greatest physical perfection, and will, as the years pass, reach the limit of child-begetting at the right time. Again, the succession of children will be secured, as the younger generation will be having children at the beginning of their prime, supposing some to be born at once, as we may expect, and as the right age has passed away from the older generation as they approach the limit of seventy years. We have thus spoken about the right time
to form the union: the period of the year most people choose rightly even now, in fixing on the winter season as the right time to commence cohabitation. The parents also must pay attention in relation to child-bearing to what physicians and natural philosophers say; for the physicians give plenty of instructions on the best state of the body, and scientific men on the winds, saying that the northerly winds are better than the southerly. On the state of body of the parents, which will most benefit the children, we must speak with more minuteness when we discuss the superintendence of education: for the present it is sufficient to speak in outline. The condition of an athlete is not conducive either to the state of body which an ordinary citizen requires, or to good health and the begetting of children; nor again is that of an invalid and one always ailing, but the mean condition between the two extremes. Thus parents should be in a condition obtained by exercise, but that exercise should not be violent or taken only in one line, as the condition of an athlete, but in all the usual pursuits of a freeman. And this must apply equally to the husband and wife. Also a
woman when pregnant must pay attention to her body, and not be idle or take unnourishing food. This is easy for the legislator to secure by ordering them every day to take some walk to perform a service to the gods, whose office it is to preside over birth. On the other hand, it is best to give the mind more rest than the body, for the offspring appears to be affected by the mother before birth, quite as much as plants by the earth. On the question of exposing or rearing the children we would have a law against the rearing of any deformed child, but forbidding to expose any child only on account of the number of the children, supposing that social arrangements fix a limit; for we have fixed a limit to the production of children. But if any have children in consequence of union in violation of regulations, abortion must be procured before sensation of life come, for that which is inviolable will be distinguished by sense and life from that which is not. But since the earliest time of perfection for man and wife has been determined, let us also determine at what period they should commence their union, and for how long they should properly do their duty in the procreation of children;
for the children of parents too old, just as those of parents too young, are below the average both in mind and body, and those of really old persons are actually weak. And so let us decide upon the period of their intellectual prime. This is in most cases the age which the poets take in their measurement of years by sevens—namely, that nearest the age of fifty years. And so when a man has passed this age by four or five years, he ought to give up avowed begetting of children. After that time it ought to be clearly for the sake of health, or some such cause, that men have intercourse with women. On the question of adultery for men or women, let it be definitely laid down to be disgraceful to be detected with a woman under any circumstances at all while her husband is living, and acknowledged as such; and if during the fixed time for child-bearing anyone be found guilty of this crime, let him be punished with loss of civil rights in proportion to his offence.

When the children have been born, we must consider that the
character of their diet makes a great deal of difference in the strength of their bodies. Now it is clear, if we examine the question by observation of other animals and of those nations that make it a great object to produce a warlike habit of body, that an abundant milk diet is the one most naturally suited to the body; and there should be as little wine as possible to prevent disease. Again, it is best to give children, while still at this early age, as much exercise as possible, and to avoid any straining of the joints, in consequence of the delicacy of children. Some nations even now use certain mechanical contrivances which keep the bodies of young children from being strained. It is also a good thing to habituate them from infancy to bear cold, for this is the most useful aid both to health and military duties. And so it is a custom with many barbarous tribes to dip babies in a river when quite cold, and with others, as the Celts, to give them very little shelter. It is best to teach everything that can be taught by habituation at the youngest age possible, and to teach by gradual advances. Now
the condition of children is naturally adapted, by reason of their warm blood, for training to endurance of cold; so, during the earliest period, it is best to attend to this point and others like it. During the next period—i.e. till the age of five years—during which it is not yet the right time to advance them either to any form of instruction or to compulsory toil, for fear of stopping their growth, they must take exercise of a character to drive away the natural slothfulness of the body; and this we must supply by general pursuits, and especially games. But their games must not be of a low character, or fatiguing, or uncontrolled. Also we would have those officials who are called Superintendents of Education pay attention to the character of the stories and legends which children of this age should hear; for all these things must prepare the way for the occupations of later life, and so their games as a rule should take the form of playing at what they will afterwards have to do in earnest. Those who seek to check screaming and crying in children by their regulations are wrong in doing so, for they are a help to
growth, since they are in a manner gymnastic exercises to the body. It is holding the breath that gives strength to men when taking hard exercise, and exactly the same is the case when children strain their voice. Managers of education must take care of the way that children pass their time, both generally and also particularly, that it shall be as little as possible in company with slaves; for children of this age, and till they are seven, must of necessity be brought up at home. It is therefore good to keep them even at this tender age from hearing or seeing anything low. It is as a general rule the duty of the legislator to banish all foul language from the state, as he would anything else that is bad; for from glibness in saying what is bad it is but a short step to doing the same. Above all then should he keep such away from the young, that they may never speak or hear words of such a character. Supposing that any person be found openly saying or doing anything forbidden, if he be of free birth, but not yet promoted to a seat at the public mess, we should punish him with ignominy and the scourge; and if he be of an older age with loss of his freeman’s rights, because he has
shewn the character of a slave. And as we forbid the utterance of words of this bad character, it is clear that we must also forbid the sight of pictures or writings that are indecent. Let our rulers then take great care that there be nothing, either statue or painting, that suggests indecent actions, except in the temples of some gods to whom the law actually gives the attribute of jesting. Besides (the young need not see these as) the law allows those who have reached a more advanced age to do honour to the gods in behalf of themselves, their children, and their wives. The younger generation, too, must be forbidden by law to see the performance of either satirical or comic pieces until they reach the age at which they will be allowed to join the public mess and take strong drink, and when their education shall have made them one and all safe from the bad effects which such spectacles can have.

In this book we have given only a cursory account of these matters. Later on we must, with greater attention, decide more fully, after raising the question in the first place whether we should make these regulations or should not, and how they should be
made. But to suit the present point of our treatise we have mentioned them, as it was absolutely necessary we should do. For perhaps there was some wisdom in something similar that Theodoros the tragic actor used to say. He never allowed any actor, however poor, to come on the stage before himself, saying that the audience always adapted themselves to what they heard first. This same rule applies also to associations with men and things, for we all like first impressions best. For this reason we should make young people strangers to things bad, especially if they produce vice or ill-feeling.

When the first five years are passed, for the two next—that is, till they are seven—our children must be spectators of what they will afterwards have to learn to do themselves. There are two periods in accordance with which we must divide education—first, from the age of seven till puberty; secondly, from puberty till the age of twenty-one. Those who divide ages by sevens are not wrong in the abstract, but we must follow the division which Nature draws; for it is the object of art generally, and therefore of education, to
fill up what Nature leaves incomplete. We must therefore con-
sider, in the first place, whether we should adopt any particular
system of education; secondly, whether it is best to make the
supervision of our children public or private (as it is now in most
states); and thirdly, what character this supervision should take.
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