DEMOCRATIC PARTY POLITICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
IN CALIFORNIA, 1962-1976

John Roger Boas
Democratic State Central Committee Chairman, 1968-1970

Charles H. Warren
From the California Assembly to the Council on Environmental Quality, 1962-1979:
The Evolution of an Environmentalist

Interviews Conducted by
Sarah Sharp
in 1982

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DURING ROBERT REAGAN'S YEARS AS GOVERNOR, IMPORTANT CHANGES BECAME EVIDENT IN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. HIS ADMINISTRATION MARKED AN END TO THE PROGRESSIVE PERIOD WHICH HAD PROVIDED THE DETERMINING OUTLINES OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND POLITICAL STRATEGY SINCE 1910 AND THE BEGINNING OF A PERIOD OF LIMITS IN STATE POLICY AND PROGRAMS, THE EXTENT OF WHICH IS NOT YET CLEAR. INTERVIEWS IN THIS SERIES DEAL WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO INCREASE GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY AND WITH ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATIONS DESIGNED TO EXPAND THE MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY OF THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, AS WELL AS CRITICAL ASPECTS OF STATE HEALTH, EDUCATION, WELFARE, CONSERVATION, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT NARRATORS PROVIDE THEIR PERSPECTIVES ON THESE EFFORTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE CONTINUING PROCESS OF LEGISLATIVE AND ELECTIVE POLITICS.

WORK BEGAN ON THE REAGAN GUBERNATORIAL ERA SERIES IN 1979. PLANNING AND RESEARCH FOR THIS PHASE OF THE PROJECT WERE AUGMENTED BY PARTICIPATION OF OTHER ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMS WITH EXPERIENCE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS. ADDITIONAL ADVISORS WERE SELECTED TO PROVIDE RELEVANT BACKGROUND FOR IDENTIFYING PERSONS TO BE INTERVIEWED AND UNDERSTANDING OF ISSUES TO BE DOCUMENTED. PROJECT RESEARCH FILES, DEVELOPED BY THE REGIONAL ORAL HISTORY OFFICE STAFF TO PROVIDE A SYSTEMATIC BACKGROUND FOR QUESTIONS, WERE UPDATED TO ADD PERSONAL, TOPICAL, AND CHRONOLOGICAL DATA FOR THE REAGAN PERIOD TO THE EXISTING BASE OF INFORMATION FOR 1925 THROUGH 1966, AND TO SUPPLEMENT RESEARCH BY PARTICIPATING PROGRAMS AS NEEDED. VALUABLE, CONTINUING ASSISTANCE IN PREPARING FOR INTERVIEWS WAS PROVIDED BY THE WOOSTER INSTITUTION AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY, WHICH HOUSES THE RONALD REAGAN PAPERS, AND BY THE STATE ARCHIVES IN SACRAMENTO.
An effort was made to select a range of interviewees that would reflect the increase in government responsibilities and that would represent diverse points of view. In general, participating programs were contracted to conduct interviews on topics with which they have particular expertise, with persons presently located nearby. Each interview is identified as to the originating institution. Most interviewees have been queried on a limited number of topics with which they were personally connected; a few narrators with unusual breadth of experience have been asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. When possible, the interviews have traced the course of specific issues leading up to and resulting from events during the Reagan administration in order to develop a sense of the continuity and interrelationships that are a significant aspect of the government process.

Throughout Reagan's years as governor, there was considerable interest and speculation concerning his potential for the presidency; by the time interviewing for this project began in late 1980, he was indeed president. Project interviewers have attempted, where appropriate, to retrieve recollections of that contemporary concern as it operated in the governor's office. The intent of the present interviews, however, is to document the course of California government from 1967 to 1974, and Reagan's impact on it. While many interviewees frame their narratives of the Sacramento years in relation to goals and performance of Reagan's national administration, their comments often clarify aspects of the gubernatorial period that were not clear at the time. Like other historical documentation, these oral histories do not in themselves provide the complete record of the past. It is hoped that they offer firsthand experience of passions and personalities that have influenced significant events past and present.

The Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series was begun with funding from the California legislature via the office of the Secretary of State and continued through the generosity of various individual donors. Several memoirs have been funded in part by the California Women in Politics Project under a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, including a matching grant from the Rockefeller Foundation; by the Sierra Club Project also under a NEH grant; and by the privately funded Bay Area State and Regional Planning Project. This joint funding has enabled staff working with narrators and topics related to several projects to expand the scope and thoroughness of each individual interview involved by careful coordination of their work.

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobiographical interviews with persons significant in the history of California and the West. The Office is under the administrative direction of James D. Hart, Director of the Bancroft Library, and Willa Baum, head of the Office. Copies of all interviews in the series are available for research use in The Bancroft Library, UCLA Department of Special Collections, and the State Archives in Sacramento. Selected interviews are also available at other manuscript depositories.

July 1982
Regional Oral History Office
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley

Gabrielle Morris
Project Director
REAGAN GUBERNATORIAL ERA PROJECT

Advisory Council

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Charles Benson
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Alex Sherriffs
Michael E. Smith
A. Ruric Todd
Molly Sturges Tuthill
Raymond Wolfinger

Interviewers

Malca Chall
A. I. Dickman*
Enid Douglass
Steve Edgington
Harvey Grody
Ann Lage
Gabrielle Morris
Sarah Sharp
Julie Shearer
Stephen Stern
Mitch Tuchman

*Deceased during the term of the project
On behalf of future scholars, the Regional Oral History Office wishes to thank those who have responded to the Office's request for funds to continue documentation of Ronald Reagan's years as governor of California. Donors to the project are listed below.

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John Roger Boas

DEMOCRATIC STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, 1968-1970

An Interview Conducted by
Sarah Sharp
in 1982
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INTERVIEW HISTORY

This capsule account by Roger Boas of his term as chairman of California's Democratic State Central Committee (1968-1970) provides a succinct view of stresses and strains within the state and national party during the emerging ascendancy of the Republicans under Ronald Reagan's leadership as governor. Boas was a successful San Francisco businessman and county supervisor when he became Democratic state chairman, "hoping to improve his political position."

He took the job at the request of Jesse Unruh, then powerful speaker of the state assembly, and with the encouragement of George Moscone, San Francisco assemblyman and Unruh ally who was later shot and killed while serving as the city's mayor. Boas recalls that being chairman was the "worst job I ever had." He found southern California Democrats difficult to understand and that most elected officials considered the party "an absolute joke."

And then, he adds, "There was a tremendous deficit" in the state Democratic coffers, the result of the abortive 1968 presidential campaign. After Robert Kennedy's death during the California primary that year, Unruh and other Kennedy supporters turned first to Eugene McCarthy rather than Hubert Humphrey, who eventually became the party's nominee. Although the Kennedy-McCarthy contingent maintained its strong bonding during the fall campaign, their rift with Humphrey supporters continued. "So Humphrey had a very bad reception in California from those who then had the leverage, those who were on the Kennedy delegation...He fought a campaign that came close but lost." And thus the deficit.

Former governor Pat Brown, who had his own difficulties with Unruh, and past party chair Eugene Wyman offered to help raise money to defray the deficit. Because of Boas's ties to Unruh, they were not taken up on the offer, although "I think I'd have been well-advised to have worked with those two fine people."

A lot of money-raising did go on, Boas reports with satisfaction, and a lot of registration work. "I went all over the state speaking on behalf of Democratic candidates...And we did win the legislature," in 1970. Unruh, however, lost his race for governor against Reagan, "who seemed to be doing extremely well" as the incumbent and "was very difficult to campaign against." Perhaps the outcome might have been different if the rift Boas and others describe between Humphrey and Kennedy supporters in the California Democratic party could have been healed in 1968.
Mr. Boas was interviewed in July 1982 in his office in San Francisco's City Hall. The interview follows the outline sent to him before the recording session. He seemed a bit reluctant at first, but relaxed as the session progressed and provided thoughtful insights on his experiences in California politics. A second meeting was planned, to discuss Mr. Boas's own campaigns for Congress in 1972 and for lieutenant governor in 1974, but could not be scheduled due to his other current commitments. When the transcript of the recorded session was sent to him for review, additional questions which had been planned for the second taping session were included with the transcript. The interviewer-editor included Boas's written answers to these queries in the text as Chapter III.

Gabrielle Morris
Project Director

14 October 1985
Regional Oral History Office
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California at Berkeley
Governmental History Documentation Project Interviewees

Your full name: John Regan Ross

Date of birth: 8/21/21

Father's full name: Benjamin Ross

Father's place of birth: San Francisco

Mother's full name: Jorie Kline Ross

Mother's place of birth: Cincinnati, Ohio

Where did you grow up? San Francisco

Education (grammar school, high school, college, and the location of each school):

[Space for additional information provided, but not filled out in the image]
THE 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION AND ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S CANDIDACY

[Date of Interview: July 15, 1982]##

Early Interests; Introduction to the Role of State Party Chair

Sharp: I thought we might start just by talking a bit about how you got interested in politics to begin with. That will lead us into the period when you became Democratic state central committee chairperson.

Boas: Okay.

Sharp: I wondered if your parents might have been involved in any sorts of political activities that would have intrigued you.

Boas: My father was kind of a staunch conservative businessman, Republican type. My mother was a Norman Thomas Socialist. But I got interested in politics because of World War II, which came at my time in college. I was an admirer of [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt.

Sharp: Is that what made you go into Democratic politics, that you had followed Mr. Roosevelt?

Boas: Probably. I had sort of a socio-liberal orientation, I'd say, I'd been affected by the war. I'd fought in Europe. I got into television early and we did programs eventually that dealt with social problems. So I was oriented toward the Democratic side.

Sharp: I know that you'd had that "World Press." Was that the name of the program?

###This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 24.
Boas: No. The program I did first was called "Profile Bay Area." It dealt with Bay Area problems. I did that for a year and then I left it. But that's what got me started thinking along those lines.

Sharp: Most of my questions really deal with the period that you were state central committee chairman. I did want to just bring in the fact that you were a San Francisco supervisor at the time.

What sorts of things do I need to know that would feed into your work as Democratic state chairman? Are there any items you think that need to be on the record as far as that goes?

Boas: I'll answer any questions you want. You want me to list the items now?

Sharp: I wondered what sorts of things I needed to know about your being supervisor and what sort of bearing that might have had on your work as state chairman.

Boas: Being a supervisor is really not very rewarding. Especially in a large body of the sort that they have in San Francisco. I rapidly found myself being lost in the job, which happens to most of the other supervisors. Like all supervisors, I hoped to serve my time, make a contribution, and move up the political ladder.

I had associated myself in the Bobby [Robert F.] Kennedy campaign in 1968 and, as a consequence, met a lot with and worked with Jesse Unruh, who was the statewide chairman for Kennedy. Then Kennedy got killed, of course. If that accident had not happened I'm sure my career would have been very, very much different. I'd formed a good personal relationship with Kennedy. I liked him and he liked me. As a consequence, if he hadn't had that horrible thing happen, and if he had won (as I think he would have), I'm sure my career would have been very different. As it is, he died.

Unruh came to me and said, "I'd like you to be a national committeeman." I didn't have to think twice about that. I said, "Fine." Then he came back and said, "Look, I'm in a spot, I need a state chairman. I'd like you to be state chairman."

I talked to half a dozen of my friends about the state chairman's position and they all recommended against it. They said you had to have a certain bent. You had to be a lawyer trying to build a law practice, or really love the kind of minutiae. It was not the sort of thing they thought that I would enjoy or that they had ever seen anyone enjoy, other than someone who kind of made a career out of it like Roger Kent, who did it for a long time.*

But I felt, mistakenly it turned out, that it would be a way to improve my political position above and beyond that of being a San Francisco supervisor. I wanted to do that in order to run for Congress or something of that sort.* So I accepted Unruh's suggestion that I run for state chairman. With his support it was a cinch. Thus I was elected.

I held the job for a longer term than most (1968-1970) because the legislature changed the term. I've done a lot of things in my life and it's without doubt the worst job I've ever had, and the one that I found the least rewarding of anything I have ever done. In other words, when you work, I find, you either look forward to going to work or you don't. You either like what you're doing or you do not. I've had one or two spots in my life that I haven't liked all that much, as everyone has. But that state chairman's job, there was nothing about it that ever appealed to me.

Chuck Manatt, who followed me, has made a great national career of it. He loved it from the word go.

I had no desires along those lines. Although I worked just as hard, if not harder, than Manatt, it was against the grain. I didn't enjoy what I was doing and didn't go for all the desiderata that everyone considered important.

I think I was a much better state chairman than some—for example, John Burton was a state chairman, and in my opinion, not very effective. He didn't like it either, I suspect. For me, I got in it by happenstance and it's a mistake that I wish I hadn't made.

Of course, you came in at a fairly rough time for the Democratic party, both on a national level with the assassination of Kennedy and the implications of that for the party, as well as a rough time for the party within California. The period '68 through '70 was fairly difficult with Republican majorities both in the assembly and the state senate. Of course, with a Republican president it would make, I would think, a very difficult time for you as the state chairman.

Boas: That's part of it. You're quite right. It was a time without any majority of my own party in either side of the legislature and, of course, with a Republican governor, Governor [Ronald] Reagan.

But I would say that for me being a state chairman was a part-time job. It was a full job, but it was a part-time job. I was serving San Francisco supervisor. I had a business. I was doing a

*Boas did run for the U.S. Congress in 1972.
Boas: television show. And I interspersed all this with being state chairman. I found the state chairman's role for me, psychically, thankless. There was no fun in it.

Take the present chairperson, Mrs. Nancy Pelosi. I think she's very successful at it. I think she enjoys it. It's full-time for her; she doesn't have anything else to do. So it keeps her busy. She's got the time to devote and she can enjoy the job.

In other words, the party system in California is close to being nonexistent. It's a media-run state; it was then, too. Our present governor, Jerry Brown [Edmund G., Jr.], was making his first moves in those days. Hell! He never even came into the state chairman's office. No one cared about it then as no one cares about it now.

For example, as a chief administrative officer in San Francisco I think that the problems I'm faced with here are equally difficult, at this time of retrenchment, to the problems I faced as state chairman back in the late '60s. But here I enjoy them. I like coming up and going to work. I just didn't like the job, mostly because I found it impossible to get a handle on it.

I was interested that The Bancroft Library wants to do an oral history of it, because I can't think of anything less rewarding than doing an oral history of the state chairman's job. As you can see, I'm very subjective about it.

Sharp: What we're interested in is getting your perspectives on how the party, or at least Democrats if you don't care to call it a party, were working. What they were doing? What was important? What were the main things that the Democrats were dealing with? Your perspective on those years.

The Kennedy Delegation from California; No Support for Hubert Humphrey

Sharp: But let me back you up and ask you a bit about the 1968 national Democratic scene. I know that you were very involved in it and you were on the Kennedy delegation to the Democratic national convention. Let me just start you back then and ask you how that came about, that you came to be one of the Kennedy delegation. Then we'll go on from there.

Boas: I wanted to work for Kennedy. I had a feeling I would like him. It's one of those guesses and it turned out to be a correct feeling. Having made that decision and having gotten involved in the campaign, I took it very seriously. I enjoyed it. It was a great deal of fun. That is, I felt that it was constructive and I liked the people I was working
Boas: with. And I liked the man who was running it. The man who was running it was John Siegenthaler, publisher of the Nashville Tennessean. To have any sort of position you had to be on the delegation. So I had to hammer my way on to the delegation. I was helped by Mo Bernstein, a prominent Kennedy supporter and a powerful San Francisco Democrat.

Sharp: How did you go about hammering your way into it?

Boas: I approached not only Mr. Bernstein but other key Democrats who were supporting Kennedy. I said that I wanted to support Kennedy and also wanted to be on his delegation. They were willing to help me with those who were putting the delegation together at Kennedy's request, and I was fortunate to be selected.

Sharp: Was it built on a previous relationship with Mr. Unruh?

Boas: No. He had delegated selection of the state committee to others. I simply had to find out who those others would respond to and get in touch with the right people. These included Mo Bernstein and those other Kennedy supporters I mentioned earlier. He had some leverage he could pull, and that was that. I was on the committee.

Sharp: I did send you a copy of the Kennedy delegates.* I wondered, if you took a look at it, why some of those people were likely Kennedy delegates, as opposed to McCarthy. I noticed, for example, that Joe Holsinger was on the McCarthy list but Leon Cooper was on the Kennedy delegation. I wondered if you had any sense of why people were lining up the way they did?

Boas: In those days one of the big thrusts, of course, was trying to turn the American direction away from the Vietnam war. I think that Senator Eugene McCarthy didn't appeal to a lot of people. I think, therefore, Kennedy was catching them on the ground that they wanted to go against the war, but had some feeling of reserve about McCarthy. Or, he was catching them because they thought that the Kennedy aura was so fabulous and that it would click, and that they were more pragmatic. They thought they'd have a piece of the next president. Those were really the two things that got them, without looking at the list.

There were a lot of favorite son slates in those days. I think Tom Lynch, the attorney general, had one. Hubert Humphrey had one. Vice President Humphrey was tied in with President Lyndon Johnson. The infighting was just terrible in those days. Democrats weren't talking

*See pages 5a-5c for lists of Kennedy, Lynch, and McCarthy delegates from California to the 1968 Democratic National Convention.
DEMOCRATIC PARTY
List of Candidates for Delegates to Democratic National Convention

THE FOLLOWING DELEGATES ARE PLEDGED TO ROBERT F. KENNEDY

George Leppert
Clayton O. Rost
Richard J. Wylie
Denis J. Michaud
Leo J. Ryan
John H. Bunzel
Merritt G. Snyder
Eugene R. Carbone
Efrain Anzaldua
Alan D. Becker
Robert J. Bowersox
Larry L. Berg
Bob H. Jennings
Stanley C. Hatch
Robert E. Wise
Augusta Rhone
Douglas E. Lord
Roger F. Ellington
Susan D. Verbe
Ione E. Corrigan
Alan Short
Paul William Turner
Leonard W. Porges
Albert E. Molino
Herb "Speedy" Neuman
Vincent J. Lavery
Donald R. Polly
Cesar Chavez
Arthur Arvizu
Robert M. Castle
Robert Setrakian
Vincent Thomas
Anthony M. Frank
Michael T. Harabedian
John F. McKenna, Jr.
Mrs. Susan W. Robertson
Joseph L. Wyatt, Jr.
Mervyn D. Drymally
Mrs. Yvonne M. Greene
Willard H. Murray, Jr.
Martha A. Ralph
Richard E. Vargas
Bob Moretti
Thomas Consiglio
Richard M. English
Dorothy J. Heaney
Ross M. Miller, Jr.
Carley V. Porter
Robert C. Vanderet
Ruth Berie
Edmund D. Edelman
Marilyn L. Kleiner
Mrs. Adele H. Leopold
A. Frederic Leopold
Lester A. McMillan
Manning J. Post
Thomas M. Rees
Stanley Rogers
Helen M. Stout
Frederick B. Tuttle, Jr.
Barbara Lindemann Schlei
Leon M. Cooper
Mrs. Dorothy T. LeConte
Frederick Levy, Jr.
Shirley MacLaine
Trudy Owens
Stephen Reinhardt
Glady C. Daniels
Mrs. Florence E. Song
Gary P. Townsend
Eli Chernow
Charles Edward Anderson II
Thomas Bradley
Yvonne W. Brathwaite
William L. Mitchell
Marvin Brody
William A. Masterson
Hope Mendoza Schechter
Oliver F. Green, Jr.
Mrs. Gerry B. Commons
Art Seltzer
James A. McKechnie
Harold M. Williams
S. Louis Gaines
John D. Dermody
John A. Howard
Dallas M. Williams
Rita B. Cullen
Charles L. Stone
Robert A. Knox
Mrs. Alice H. Benton
Ruben S. Ayala
Charles R. Latimer
Herbert Ray Rainwater
Alice Elinor Ashton
Frances B. Murphy
Mrs. Sara J. Hannaford
Mrs. Ruth W. Smith
Daniel L. Stack
Thomas W. Braden
Robert B. Farrell
Arthur E. Svendsen
Dr. David S. Ascher
James R. Mills
Marie C. Widman
Alfred E. O'Brien
Ramon N. Porra
Harry E. Farb
Michael I. Greer
Ray F. Russell
Vincent E. Whelan
Charles E. Whelan
Charles E. Gunn, M.D.
George Watts Williams
Mrs. Susan Marx
Pescueal S. Oliva

END OF GROUP
DEMOCRATIC PARTY
List of Candidates for Delegates to Democratic National Convention

Candidates expressing no preference

THOMAS C. LYNCH (Chairman)

Hon. Thomas C. Lynch
Hon. Charles Warren
Robert L. Coate
Hon. Edmund G. Brown
Hon. Joseph L. Alioto
Hon. James Roosevelt
Charles Luckman
Gregory Peck
Lew R. Wasserman
Edwin W. Pauley
George E. Johnson
Eugene V. Klein
Sigmund Arywitz
Hon. Billy G. Mills
Hon. Jack D. Maltester
Joseph J. Rodriguez
Nancy S. York
Gilbert W. Lindsay
Henry L. Lacayo
Walter H. Shorenstein
Arthur Henry Harwood
Mrs. Irma Rohrer
Newton Dal Poggetto
Everett A. Matzen
Hon. Harold T. (Bizz) Johnson
Frank A. Galli
Laurence W. Carr
Harlan D. Lundberg
Hon. John E. Moss
Hon. Walter W. Powers
Hon. Edwin L. Z'berg
Virna M. Cansom
Hon. Robert L. Leggett
Hon. Virgil O'Sullivan
Hon. Luther Earl Gibson
William Leshe
Adolph P. Schuman
William H. Chester
Cyril Magnin
Benjamin H. Swig
James J. Rudden
Charlotte C. Danforth
Hon. John Francis Foran
Hon. Terry A. Francois
Hon. Jeffrey Cohelan
Hon. George P. Miller
Hon. Carlos Bee
Hon. Wilmont Sweeney
Osborne A. Pearson
Fred F. Cooper
Richard K. Groulx
Abraham Kofman
Kimiko Fujii
Peter J. Allen
Hon. Ben F. Gross
Gael Douglass
Hon. Alfred E. Alquist

Mrs. Eleanor Fowle
Alan A. Parker
Mrs. Lilian C. Maynard
Clarence E. Heller
James J. Twombly
Gerald D. Marcus
Ernest H. Norback
Mrs. Marion Robotti
Morgan Flagg
Joseph J. Crosetti
Jim R. Orton
Mrs. Jane McCormick Tolmach
Lyman R. Smith
Mrs. Goldie Kennedy
Hon. Alvin C. Weingand
Hon. Jerome R. Waldie
Minot W. Tripp, Jr.
Russell R. Crowell
Carl B. Frazier
Hon. John Joseph McFall
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Hon. Cecil R. King
Hon. Chet Holifield
Hon. Augustus F. (Gus) Hawkins
Hon. James C. Corman
Hon. Edward R. Roybal
Hon. Charles H. Wilson
Hon. Ralph C. Dills
Hon. Tom C. Correll
Hon. Alfred H. Song
Hon. George E. Danielson
Col. John O. Gottlieb
Hon. Joe A. Gonvalves
Hon. William B. Greene
Hon. Leon D. Ralph
Hon. Edward E. Elliott
Sam S. Ishihara
Lionel B. Cade
Leo M. Farvey
Mrs. Carmen H. Warschaw
Joseph T. DeSilva
Clarence D. Martin, Jr.
Mark Boyar
Robert M. Brunson
Allan K. Jonas
Ab F. Levy
Mrs. Joyce A. Fadem
Stanley Beyver
Aleric D. Ortega
Marilynn K. Hofstetter
Mrs. Bella Berg

Richard E. Sherwood
Gerald J. Conway
Steve Edney
Charles W. Walker
George W. Smith
Antonia C. Tejada
Charles N. Chapman
Eric A. Lidow
Burt Kleiner
Robert William Prescott
Jack M. Ostrow
Joseph L. Alperson
Skipper Rostker
Mrs. Shirley Goldinger
Hon. Walter W. Stier
Horace S. Mays
Rose H. Boyd
Gabriel W. Solomon
Hon. Richard Nevins
Mark S. Whiting
Edward A. Hawkins
Richard H. Kentinge
Hon. Harvey M. Johnson
Mrs. Ruby J. Stidger
Dorman L. Commons
Mrs. Margaret Ann Twombly
Pat Galati
Herman Leavitt
John H. Snider
Norbert A. Schlei
George Nye, Jr.
Edwin J. Wilson
Nathan Shapell
David M. Kenick
Hon. John P. Quimby
Hon. Eugene G. Nisbet
James L. Evans
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Hon. Richard T. Hanna
Philip L. Anthony
Mark W. Hannaford
Daniel H. Ninburg, M.D.
Richard J. O'Neill
Charles G. Gant
Nikolay S. Palchikoff
Sherwood Roberts
Hon. Lionel Van Deerlin
Morris D. Goodrich
John Straza
Earl T. Pridemore
Irvin J. Kahn
R. R. Richardson
Hugh N. Wood
Abel B. Sykes, Jr.
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Mrs. Henrietta B. Benson
Dan A. Kimball
Lionel Steinberg

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George McCabe
Dr. Vitali Rozynko
Rose Nathalie Wendel
Pauline K. Abbe
Jack Halpin
John Jaekel
Ruth A. Warner
Abel Chacon
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Martin Stone
Robert Vaughn
William C. Washington
Robert Irving Weil
Maurice Weiner
Reverend Richard Weston
John T. Williams
Joseph Wolf
Carol G. Bell
Anne W. Levering
Anna Laura Myers
Dr. Fred Warner Neal
Alan A. Graham
William T. Holser
Leonard Larks
Roger Ragan
Rudolph F. Acuna
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Joseph Ball
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Cleo E. Pettis
George F. Ashton
Ralph G. Carter
Mabel Ann Gunderson
Leslie Irene Rice
Dixon Gayer
Patricia Ann Nelson
Richard W. Petherbridge
Mariln A. Potter
Harvey Furgatch
Joseph W. Gerber
George F. Quinn
Dr. Herbert York
Simon Casady
Melvin Crain
M. Larry Lawrence
Rita Luftig
Raul Rosado
Joseph Astor
Henri Jacob
Ada M. Thompson
C. E. Castro
Dr. Eric K. Pengelley
Seymour O. Schianger
Dr. Samuel A. Sher

END OF GROUP
Boas: to Democrats sort of stuff. Basically, Kennedy got either glamorous types that he knew himself, or friends of Unruh—which is his connection with Unruh—or a fairly middle-of-the-road Democrat, who for reasons that escape me now but turned out to be right, were scared to death of Gene McCarthy as a kind of an extremely unpredictable type.

Sharp: You know, the Unruh-Kennedy connection seems unlikely to me. I don't know quite why.

Boas: I think they were unlikely because Kennedy—one had the feeling that he tended to pick political allies from a fairly top-drawer stripe. Most of the people I met that were associated with Kennedy were like that. John Siegenthaler of The Nashville Tennessean, and Bill [William H.] Orrick, who's a federal [district court] judge here now.

Whereas Jesse Unruh was more of a work-a-day political type. But I think that's what appealed to Kennedy. I think he figured that Unruh could make deals. I don't know how happy he was with Jesse. I really don't. I think the two men liked one another.

I rather gathered the impression that Unruh wasn't doing all that well in the campaign; that Kennedy's regard for him had gone down during the campaign.

Sharp: What was the immediate effect of the assassination [of Kennedy] on those people, the people who were on the delegation?

Boas: The effect was odd in that no one could comprehend it. That is, the steam had really built up in the campaign and it had had a lot of hurdles. In fact, as I recall, Kennedy got beaten in Oregon.* Yet in California, in the state where it is very hard for a traditional type of candidate to take hold, Kennedy, a traditional candidate, started to take hold. There was sort of a fraternal bond formed, at least in the northern California division, that was fantastically strong! There were meetings every other day or some such thing, where everyone would sit around and chew the fat about, "What'll we do now?" The meetings were really high power political meetings. The best I've ever seen.

All of a sudden he had been shot. The momentum didn't stop. Then all of a sudden it was announced he was dead. One didn't know what to do with oneself. We had people out here from all over the United

*Kennedy lost to McCarthy in the Oregon primary on 28 May 1968. Kennedy won in California on 4 June 1968, the same day he was shot and fatally wounded.
Boas: States working on the campaign. They were living in our houses and this and that. Everyone went to Chicago wondering where the hell he [Kennedy] was sort of an attitude. It was really odd!

Sharp: I would have thought so.

Boas: Which, I think, caused a fatal error. That is that with Kennedy gone there was no leader. Jess Unruh assumed the leadership role. I've always liked him—always enjoyed him, always liked him. I think we treated one another very well.

In fact, I still deal with him. He's the state treasurer now. We're selling bonds under his office. I like the man very much. He's bright as hell.

He did, however, have trouble assuming the leadership after Kennedy died. His mistake was that he let his hatred for Humphrey overpower his usually good thinking. Humphrey was really the only leader left, and yet Unruh decided to have nothing to do with him and to be in opposition to him. As a consequence this pushed him and all of the delegation into the McCarthy camp. This really was a terrible mistake. First of all, we had to take a loyalty oath that we wouldn't support anyone but McCarthy. That was a very negative thing to have everyone do and it created havoc in the group back there. Why should we swear to McCarthy? I think most of us would have supported McCarthy, but that was a divisive act.

More to the point, when McCarthy didn't get through the convention and Humphrey was nominated, the California delegation was in kind of a sociological shambles. I remember going over to a suite at the Hilton—being escorted in by a Chicago policeman because the students were rioting outside—to meet with Humphrey and Mayor Joseph Alioto. It got out that I had done that. God, they considered me like a Soviet spy! I said, "What the hell! Alioto has asked me to come over. Why the devil shouldn't I do it?" attitude. But it was just considered the ultimate apostasy. And Alioto also treated me like a Soviet spy. I came from the Unruh camp. The only one who was decent about it was Humphrey.

So Humphrey had a very bad reception in California from those who then had the leverage. Namely, those who were on the Kennedy delegation. We were elected and—. He fought a campaign that came close but lost. If California had voted for him, he'd have been nominated and he might have beaten [Richard] Nixon. I don't know how that would have turned out. But the course of the country would have been a good deal different.
Sharp: During that period, June through August, the period after Kennedy died and before your convention, were there members of your delegation who were working on trying to swing over to McCarthy whole hog, or at least trying to work with Mr. Unruh to begin the idea of pushing over to McCarthy?

Boas: I think that there wasn't any thought of going to McCarthy. He was not highly regarded by the delegates because the fighting got difficult between Kennedy and McCarthy. There was very little of that.

There was a very stupid waste of time on who was going on the funeral train of Senator Kennedy. That went on for weeks, maneuvering as to who could go on the train. It was an idiotic sort of an exercise.

Really, very little attention was paid to—with Kennedy dead and Nixon going to be the nominee—can Humphrey beat him? And if so, how do we support him? That's what we should have been addressing ourselves to.

Sharp: Nobody seemed to be able to do that?

Boas: As a matter of fact, the people who were trying to do it (I was elected state chairman just about then, as I recall)—

Sharp: Yes, in August.

Boas: —immediately came to me—Ben [Benjamin H.] Swig, Walter Shorenstein, Robert Coate (who'd been a state chairman), and others—saying, "For God's sakes don't screw Humphrey!"

I said, "I'm sure we won't." But I didn't realize how strong Jesse Unruh would be as a leader. He made the mistake, as I said earlier, of deciding to fight Humphrey. If he had decided differently I believe Humphrey would have been nominated and elected, and probably Unruh would have been in the cabinet and would have had a far more prestigious political career than he actually ended up with.

Sharp: And he was considered quite a leader among the Democrats in California—Mr. Unruh.

Boas: He was a very strong leader. He was very active. He had lieutenants all over the place, including Bob Moretti who then became the speaker. He was very suspicious so he kept tight ship. He was a strong leader, but he led the wrong way, by his decision to oppose Hubert Humphrey.

Sharp: What particular tasks did you have once you got to Chicago, as part of one of the delegations?
Boas: First of all I got to Chicago as state chairman, so that put me way ahead of the pack. That part of the state chairman's job was terrific. I said what a rotten job it was. Well, there was a very nice period before the actual work began (when I had to find an office and bail out from a tremendous debt in the party office), that was very pleasant. That was the role at the convention.

Again I say we all expected Bob Kennedy to show up at any moment. It was just crazy.

There were four or five people who seemed to have the leadership roles. Unruh, number one, and then Willie Brown, George Moscone, and Moretti and, I'd say, myself.

Gene Wyman, who is dead now, was a member of the delegation. I think he was the only one who voted for Humphrey. He was saying, "You know you're all committing suicide." To me he said. And he was right.

Sharp: What were you busy doing?

Boas: A lot of housekeeping items, for one: For instance, my wife and I had to find my secretary, who had been very loyal to me and worked very hard, a room at a hotel. That took a lot of time.

Jack Brooks, who became northern California chairman subsequently, couldn't get an alternate's position and couldn't get a ticket into the convention. He and a couple of his friends were very, very unhappy and we felt they needed to be taken care of. I spent time getting him tickets into the convention and trying to get a couple of guys to give up their alternate seats so that he could get on the floor.

Wally Turner of the New York Times wanted daily interviews. This sort of thing. That's how the time was spent.

They had sort of a private police force back there in the convention that monitored. You weren't supposed to move around. I forget why. Men and women in uniform. One of the women karate-chopped one of our delegates and I had to deal with the management of the private police force. Plus, at Jesse Unruh's request, trying to keep the delegation in line and have them avoid doing any politics other than those for Senator McCarthy. So that's how we spent our time.

It was hard work. I never knew about the riots in Chicago until the convention was over. I didn't even read a newspaper. Except when I walked through the Hilton and smelled the tear gas, to meet with Humphrey and Alioto.

Sharp: What was the purpose of your meeting with Mr. Humphrey and Mayor Alioto?
Boas: I was a supervisor; Alioto was the mayor. I think that Humphrey had promised Alioto serious political consideration for the vice president. I was the state chairman now. I had a good relationship with Alioto. Alioto hated Unruh, trusted me. Here was this delegation sitting there. They wanted to nominate Humphrey and they wanted to win California. So Alioto asked me if I'd meet with him and Humphrey to see if there was any way to work out the votes on the delegation.

I had the pleasant news of telling Humphrey to his face that Unruh had the thing absolutely locked up and unless he could swing Unruh around, no one would break.

Sharp: How did Mr. Humphrey respond to that?

Boas: Very nice. Alioto was very upset. "Well, what about you," he said. I said, "Look, I got to go with the guy that I've been working with. I can't break from him."

Sharp: Even though you're chairman now.

Boas: Well, no. You know. You got to go through politics with the commitments you make without changing them. I'd made my bed with Unruh. I was state chairman because of Unruh. I didn't like the position I was in but I had to stay with it. So did everybody else. And that's what I told those two men. They were plenty upset, but Humphrey was really very nice about it.

Sharp: It sounds like you must have gone away rather unsatisfied from that.

Boas: I went away just wondering. I'd never seen anything like this; all this belief that Kennedy was still there, that we were still Kennedy delegates. How can you represent a dead man? That kind of odd situation.

Sharp: When you got back to California after the convention what did the delegation do at that point? Was it a matter of beginning to work very slowly in some ways for Mr. Humphrey since he had gotten the nomination? What did you do in that regard?

Boas: I'm not comfortable with Jesse Unruh's choice of people. In other words, how you pick people is so important. He picked, to my way of thinking, odd, divisive people to have these important posts. I felt very comfortable with Willie Brown—that was an old friend—and George Moscone. I knew what motivated these men. But I had now to deal with a party structure I found that Jesse had put together, none of whom knew me or cared about me or, I think, liked me. This included Mrs. Carmen Warschaw, a very powerful Democrat with a strong personality, who was the national committeewoman; Mr. Steven Reinhardt of Los Angeles who was the southern California chairman. So, all of a
Boas: Sudden I found myself working with people that I did not know, and had had no experience with, and therefore would not have myself picked to work with.

There was an exception, a very nice woman who was the state women's chairman by the name of Mrs. Adele Leopold, who was very bright and very cooperative and wanted to be helpful and work in a harmonious fashion.

##

Communication was very difficult. You can't talk to people that you can't deal with.

Relations with the Democratic National Committee

Sharp: What sorts of national party activities did you have once you came back from the convention? Any at all?

Boas: I was faced with the immediate problem of trying to raise money. There was a tremendous deficit. I formed a good relationship luckily—it's one of these flukes—with Larry O'Brien, who was the national chairman, and with his treasurer, who was Bob [Robert S.] Strauss. Being a state chairman from California, if you even work at it at all, gives you easy entry anywhere.

So I was dealing with all these would-be presidential candidates in the future, and they were willing to come out to San Francisco. George McGovern and Birch Bayh and others that I got to know very well—stayed close to.

I went to a lot of national affairs. I attended meetings of the Democratic national committee. But in the last analysis, we were always faced with some question of funding, such as how do we raise $3,000 to pay our secretary, and so forth.

Sharp: So fundraising was one of the most important activities?

Boas: Omnivorous and omnipresent.

Sharp: I wondered how you connected up with the national committeeman at that point, who was Stephen Reinhardt, and committeewoman, who was Carmen Warschaw? I have Gerri Joseph as national vice-chairman. I had national chairman as Senator Fred Harris.

Boas: Yes, he was the national chairman. Then I think O'Brien replaced him.
Sharp: Did you have an ongoing relationship with these members of the national committee? Would they be working with you with some of the Democratic candidates in California at all?

Boas: I found them to be personally very interesting and often charming. But insofar as working with them politically, they were often quite difficult and very demanding. Fred Harris was a very nice person. He is rather odd, politically, and never got anywhere, and he appears today to be finished in politics, but he is certainly a very decent sort of a guy. O'Brien was terrific.

With Mrs. Warschaw—actually, I liked her and I think she liked me. But, God, she was an inflexible type; a terribly rich woman who was very, very difficult. Terrified everybody down there in southern California.

I never did really understand Steve Reinhardt very well. I found the southern California contingent difficult to deal with as I did not understand them at all well.
II A FOCUS IN ON STATE PARTY ISSUES, 1968

Registration, the Women's Division, the Party's Place

Sharp: To get back to some of that party work, as the chairman in an election year in '68 what sorts of activities might you have gotten into in terms of state candidates running at that time?

Boas: I got involved in voter registration a lot, a subject that doesn't interest me in the slightest. Used a very good guy who I use now a lot for the city—a fellow named Bernard Teitelbaum. He's a very good lobbyist in Sacramento. We're very good friends. And others in registration. We did a lot of registration work, a lot of money-raising work, and I went all over the state speaking on behalf of Democratic candidates. A lot of debates, a lot of television shows, and so forth. And we did win the legislature. It went Democratic, you may recall, at some point before I got out.

I spent a lot of time when Governor Reagan sort of sided with the, as I recall, billy club swingers at University of California when the riots took place. That seemed to drag the Democratic party in head first and I had to speak for it.

But the work seemed onerous, hard to control, hard to manage, and hard to target. In other words, we were down and out and in debt, and that seemed to give anybody and everybody a right to come in and tell us what to do and how to run the party. It took me a long time to find out who I just didn't have to let in the room anymore. By that time my term was almost up.

Sharp: I wondered how you might have worked with the women's division?

Boas: I had a good relationship with Eleanor Fowle, who is a lovely person. She moans and groans a little bit but she did give me very, very good
Boas: advice, as did Libby [Elizabeth Rudel] Gatov.* Those two women were fabulous. Without them I would have gone crazy. I listened to them a lot—worked with them closely and listened to them a lot.

Also I liked this Mrs. [Adele] Leopold, very much indeed. I think those were my biggest sources of strength, those three women, as I recall.

Sharp: What sorts of advice did they have for you?

Boas: How to handle some members of the party who are always so insistent and very difficult to deal with.

Sharp: What did they say?

Boas: They'd say you can send so and so, or why don't you save so and so. This and that.

Sharp: Were they instrumental in some of the voter registration work? Or what other sorts of activities might they have—?

Boas: I used Don Solem, who is now a political consultant, as an executive secretary. He did a lot of that leg work. I would sit with them and we would discuss our problems, and who would be the best sources of advice for me for these problems. That's where I think they were helpful.

There were two things I regret not doing more. I had open offers of support and help from both Pat Brown [Edmund G.] and Gene Wyman. For reasons that I can't put my finger on, I neglected them. I was very close to Tom Lynch. He and Pat Brown had had a falling out, so I stayed away from Pat. Wyman, I don't know. I was suspicious of. I think I'd have been well advised to have worked with those two fine people. They were both real pros. They really wanted to help.

[Charles] Manatt went right to Wyman—in fact, he was a protege of Wyman's—and made a great success. I'd say that was a mistake on my part.

Sharp: Alan Cranston came up pretty much the winner in terms of 1968. He was, as I remember, the only successful Democratic candidate in California, winning the U.S. Senate seat. After the dust settled in November of '68, did he come out as a leader for the party in California?

Boas: The interesting thing about Cranston is that no one gave a tinker's dam about the party. I mean absolutely no one, in public office. The only ones who cared anything about it were Jesse and Joe Alioto, both of whom were jockeying to go for the governorship and wanted to make sure they didn't get gouged. As a consequence my job required infinite caution. It was very difficult to stay in the middle between those two Democratic gubernatorial candidates, and yet it was important to be able to do so.

Other than those two fellows, and other than Alan, no one cared anything about the party. No assemblyman, no state senator, no congressman. They couldn't care less. Now, when I went to Washington, went to a congressional breakfast, called a congressman, when I called them they would always answer the phone. But to really help—to call somebody for money or something—they just wouldn't touch it.

The one who really urged me to take this thankless job of state chairman was George Moscone. He was the senate leader—they called him senate majority leader. He did try to be helpful to me, because he talked me into the job. But I'd say, "George, why don't we do something to strengthen the party?"

He said, "Christ! That damn party, no one gives a damn about it!" That was the truth. Moretti considered it an absolute joke, for instance.

Cranston took it seriously. I don't know whether it was because of his sister [Eleanor Fowle], or because he just believes in party apparatus. He really took it seriously. I went to Washington on a piece of legislation a few months ago. We were chatting. In fact, Walter Stoessel, Jr., who has been running the State Department, and I were in Cranston's office together and I said, "The thing that sticks out in my mind, when I was in that job, you're one of those who thought it really meant something. No one else thought it meant diddley."

Sharp: Why was he different?

Boas: I don't know.

Sharp: Why doesn't anybody else like the party?

Boas: I think the only way that the party can be of great importance in a state like California is the way that Manatt approached it. He made an alliance with the then Speaker Moretti. He made connections with corporations that needed legislative favors.

But, for example, I ran for Congress in '72. I got one of my largest contributions from the party—from Manatt. I think he was a very effective kind of a party operator. I think he is an excellent national chairman.
Boas: So, I think under Manatt with that money available to candidates they'd pay some attention. But a fellow who is in public office is not going to pay attention to anything except a vehicle that can help him, other than an occasional politician, once in a while, like Cranston.

A Note on Richard Nixon's Election

Sharp: Can you tell me what you think the impact of Nixon's election was on Democratic politics in California in '68? Do any words come to mind that sort of describe it?

Boas: He pre-empted most of the action. You take away that he's an odd type, odd, unpleasant type—just don't concentrate on that at all, his tapes and his cursing and his guards and these [people] in uniforms and all that sort of stuff—he moved in with very, very substantive stuff. He moved immediately to end the war in Vietnam, or reasonably immediately. He got those negotiations going. He brings in Henry Kissinger and makes a power out of him. Inflation started getting out of control, he did something that industry hated—he put in wage and price control. He made the rapprochement with China. So he was moving properly in Asia, properly with Vietnam, probably properly economically speaking, detente with the Soviet Union, containing inflation. Not making too many mistakes. It was devastating.

Sharp: Just didn't expect that from a Republican president?

Boas: Well, you take President [Ronald] Reagan now. He's been devastating, too, except his systems haven't been working. His heavy defense expenditure and big tax cuts have thrown everything into a tailspin. But there wasn't any tailspinning with Nixon. The foreign policy was brilliant.

So the concentration in California on those days was of a different sort and it wasn't the sort that really got votes. It was on civil liberties. It was on the emasculation of the California Rural Legal Assistance Act; on the emasculation of the National Legal Assistance Program. That's where it seemed to hurt. Nixon had Donald Rumsfeld whacking away at all those programs.

Those were Nixon's Achilles' heels and the fact that he was such a damn fool when the break-in took place. Everything else, he was moving pretty well. So was Reagan moving pretty well.

For Democrats in California in, really, disarray, once the momentum started toward the Paris peace talks they didn't even have Vietnam to talk about anymore. It was rough.
Building Up the Party; Reapportionment

Sharp: What seemed important for the Democrats to focus on, then, in '68 at the end after November?

Boas: It was all internal and in-house. The focus in those days was on something that most people didn't even care about—reapportionment, reapportionment, reapportionment. Let's get control of that legislature. Let's control reapportionment. You know, Nixon won hands down in 1972.

Sharp: I sent you a copy of this letter that I found in Ann Eliaser's papers.* It's a Democratic Women of the Bay Area letter setting up a mid-April 1969 conference in Sacramento. I wondered if you remembered that at all, or its meaning?

Boas: One of the many miserable events that I no doubt left my family to attend. No, I don't happen to remember this one.

Sharp: Because your wife is on here.

Boas: Yes, I noticed that.

Sharp: I wondered how she might have gotten involved in the Democratic Women—?

Boas: She was dragged in on all this stuff. Hell, I wasn't home for two and a half years! It changed my life to this extent. After this I did campaign for Congress, on a long campaign. Lost in '72. Boy, I'd had it, primarily because of how it was affecting my relationship with my family. So they rejiggered the district that I ran in to make it really very, very easy for a Democrat. By then I didn't even want to touch it anymore.

This was probably a decent meeting. Most of the meetings in Sacramento I remember as meetings wherein I would have had a series of very friendly, harmonious, constructive meetings with the Mexican

*See letter on following page. Readers may wish to see Eliaser's oral history, From Grassroots Politics to the Top Dollar: Fundraising for Candidates and Non-profit Agencies, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1983. Eliaser's interview is part of an extensive project on California Women Political Leaders.
March 11, 1969

Dear Friend:

You haven't heard from us in a while because we, as well as the entire Democratic Party, have gone through a period of soul searching and reorganization.

Now - looking ahead - the Democratic State Central Committee is planning a mid-April conference in Sacramento. The three day meeting will deal with ways of re-structuring and expanding the base of the Democratic Party in California - ways by which the voices of our young people and minority groups may finally be heard in Party policy. Hopefully, programs will be developed to provide for full Party participation for the thousands of fresh and dedicated faces which emerged for the first time in the Kennedy and McCarthy crusades of 1968.

Some of our youth and minority leaders have suggested that their people simply cannot attend the Sacramento Conference because they can't afford it. We need them!

Will you help by sending $2, $5, $10, or $25, so that our organization may assist in underwriting what may be the most useful, refreshing and hopeful program our Party will develop this year?

You will be pleased to know that our group assisted in raising $20,000, for the Cranston Senatorial Campaign, paid one full time salary, and provided untold volunteer hours toward ultimate victory.

Some of our members have worked 'round-the-clock to raise approximately $7,000, for the George Miller III special election on March 25 for the State Senate seat in Contra Costa County now vacant due to the untimely death of our good friend and great Democrat, George Miller, Jr. (Incidentally, much help in precinct work and money is still needed there.)

Thanks in advance for your continuing support of these essential matters - and best personal regards -

Ann Alanson

Checks to: Democratic Women of the Bay Area, please
and we've moved to:
1275 Greenwich Street, Apt. 502
Boas: American representative prior to the meeting. Then we'd go to Sacramento and have an open meeting, and they would attack—a merciless, personal attack. "This man is not fit to be chairman" sort of stuff. The meeting would be over and then they'd say, "Come have a drink."

Sharp: What was that all about?

Boas: Never figured it out, except I am a little less trusting with them now.

Sharp: This sort of action was an attempt just to build the party back up again, I guess?

Boas: Yes. This was an attempt to rebuild the party, that didn't have any base. We didn't have the legislature and we didn't have the governorship.

Sharp: Who was helping you in all of these attempts to build the party back?

Boas: Certain segments of labor—the United Automobile Workers, the Marine Cooks and Stewards. Labor was always there to help. The old party war horses—Roger Kent. I got a very nice sendoff, initially, given to me by Ben Swig, Adolph Schuman, and Joe Alioto, who had a big lunch, or dinner, for me. They sent telegrams to about 150 people, not telling them it was a fund raiser, and signed by Alioto, saying come and be our guest at the Fairmont Hotel in the Pavilion Room. All these folks arrived; there were almost no refusals. Candlelights and everything. It must have been a dinner.

Then Mr. Swig got up and said, "I don't want to take much of your time; I want you to enjoy your dinner. Let's spend three minutes and raise $100,000 for Roger." You could almost hear a groan of agony, that they'd been double-crossed. I think they raised about $18,000 or $20,000. That's what got me off the pad. At any rate, they were helpful.

I got a pretty decent reception around the state. People thought that, you know, I had some guts to take this miserable job.

Sharp: You were the underdog at this time?

Boas: Yes, underdog at the time. Everyone was very nice to me by and large. Everyone except one chap, the northern California chairman. God, he was a divisive chap! [Joseph] Holsinger. He was creating all kinds of problems.

Sharp: He was part of the CDC [California Democratic Council], I understand.
Boas: I don't know where the hell he came from. Interview him and seal him for thirty years! He's dynamite.

Sharp: He is good?

Boas: Oh, terrible. [laughter] I don't know where the hell he came from and all. He ran for Congress. I think he got about three votes out of ten down there in San Mateo.

Sharp: So the party, in '68 and '69, you are telling me that there were certain leaders. Mr. Unruh was still considered quite a leader.

Boas: He was running for governor, you see. All of a sudden his leadership role is compromised. He was a candidate.

Jerry Brown [Edmund G., Jr.] tried to insert himself. I did deal with Jerry a little bit, on the race for Secretary of State. Pat Brown tried to insert himself. I wish to God I'd embraced him. Libby Gatov and Eleanor Fowle were very evident, as was Ann Eliaser.

I remember it as a pretty lonesome road. I'd have to go back into the records and see who the devil was helping. Probably Don Solem and John Atkinson, and others who followed him would remember better than me. God! All I did was hit that damn horn.

There's a fellow, a lawyer in town. Every time I called him he'd send me four or five thousand bucks. A fellow named Atherton Phleger. His father had been [President Dwight D.] Eisenhower's counselor at the State Department—something like that. You know, a few fellows like that always would come through. Why, I don't know.

Sharp: They were some of the unstated backers at this point?

Boas: Yes. They were terrific.

Sharp: It sounds like you would have better relationships, perhaps, with some of the backers than the major lights, the major political folks.

Boas: Right.

We did some successful fund raisers. Madeline Day, who's a big professional fund raiser now, did most of them for me. She used to insist that every fund raiser have an orchestra. We'd work our fannies off for months on these bloody things. But our profits went to pay for the damned orchestra.

These are my remembrances of being state chairman.  

##
III. REAPPORTIONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGNING

[The interviewer-editor sent Mr. Boas a written list of additional questions, along with the original transcript, to answer. These questions and his answers follow.]

Reapportionment

Sharp: You mentioned that after 1968, reapportionment was a major focus for the Democratic party in California. What could be done before 1970 to influence reapportionment?

Boas: The idea was to elect as many Democrats to the assembly so it would control the assembly and be able to control the apportionment program.

Sharp: Was there a special role for Jesse Unruh in this? Or, for others you recall?

Boas: I don't recall a role for Unruh. George Moscone had a major role as did Tom Bradley and Bob Moretti and all of the county chairmen.

Sharp: Did you have feelings about how the legislature should have been reapportioned? What were they?

Boas: I felt that people like Bernard Teitelbaum, Henry Waxman, and others had a very good plan of reapportionment.

Sharp: Were efforts at state and congressional reapportionment synchronized somehow?

Boas: Yes. The state legislature and the congressional delegation maintained strong liaison with those handling reapportionment.

Sharp: There seemed to be a special position for San Francisco in the 1970 reapportionment issue. The county was to split one congressional seat with Marin County and to lose one assembly seat (same as Alameda County). How did you see these issues?
Boas: It was very difficult. We were going from a big assembly district to a small one and we were splitting one congressman. It made us feel very uncomfortable.

1970 Campaigns

Sharp: When we met last, you mentioned both Mayor Alioto and Unruh as two of the Democratic candidates for governor in the pre-primary period in 1970. Do you recall when Alioto dropped out? Reasons?

Boas: I'm not sure why Joe Alioto dropped out. My memory is not that good on the question. I have a hazy recollection that it may have had something to do with the fact that he was debilitated and busy with the problem of dealing with the allegations that he was connected with the Mafia, and then with his suit against Look magazine.

Sharp: Were you able to make some efforts to assist Unruh in the pre-primary period? What were they?

Boas: I met with Jesse Unruh's people and tried to be as helpful as I could in the pre-primary period. He needed introductions in northern California and needed to meet various people that I knew and he wasn't familiar with, and I arranged those introductions for him.

Sharp: How was the party mobilized to support Unruh after the primary? If not the party, who were main supporters?

Boas: I'm not sure how Unruh's supporters were mobilized in the general election. I do recall that most of the people who were traditional Democratic "moneybags" had been for Humphrey, and as a consequence were not favorable to Unruh.

Sharp: Main issues for the Democratic gubernatorial campaign in 1970? Wrong candidate? Not enough money? Still too much infighting within the party as residue from 1968? Could you comment on the experience of campaigning against the incumbent Governor Reagan and his campaign strategies?

Boas: My main recollection of the issues in 1970 were that it was a question of helping those who were disadvantaged: the illegal aliens, the Mexican-American workers, and the like. In other words, the main thrust against Governor Reagan, who was very popular, and who seemed to be doing extremely well, was to show that he really was not helpful to the poor and the downtrodden. Governor Reagan was very difficult to campaign against, as I recall.
Sharp: You mentioned that the UAW was helpful in building up the party after 1968. Can you assess their efforts in the 1970 gubernatorial campaign?

Boas: I do not remember.

1971 Democratic State Central Committee Positions

Sharp: I would like to have your perspectives on the 1971 election of new state party officers, especially the race between Chuck Manatt and Leon Cooper. Which groups within the party favored each man? Whom were you favoring? Why?

Boas: As the outgoing chairman I tried to be absolutely objective and not to favor any candidate. Chuck Manatt was supported by John Tunney and I believe by Nelson Rising of Los Angeles and by Tom Bradley. Leon Cooper seemed to have very shallow support. I don't remember who was supporting Leon, but I think he had no one of any prominence.

Sharp: Ann Eliaser and Jack Brooks were vying for the northern California vice-chair. Factors important in this election? What about Eliaser's concern that volunteers have a say in the party's policies?

Boas: In the northern California race for vice-chairman, a race I also stayed out of, the general thrust seemed to be that as money had been so difficult for the party, that it was important to put someone in office who could help financially. Thus, Jack Brooks, who was a big contributor and well connected to all the big contributors, loomed as a very natural sort of a candidate and won quite easily, as I recall. Furthermore, George Moscone was supporting Jack Brooks and that was a very important endorsement in this particular race.

Sharp: Did the elections of Manatt and Brooks represent a push away from a party dominated by the legislature?

Boas: The election of Brooks didn't really represent very much one way or another. He tried very hard, and I believe successfully, to keep the northern California office well financed, and in this he did a good job. As a straight political operator, my impression was that Jack Brooks really didn't get involved in routine politics.

However, Chuck Manatt was quite different. He in fact brought the party closer to the legislature—just the opposite of pushing away. Manatt had a close alliance with the speaker of the assembly, Bob Moretti. The mutual cooperation between Manatt and Moretti was extremely helpful. Manatt helped Moretti strengthen his financial base in the legislature and helped the Democrats strengthen their overall
Boas: financial base. In turn, Moretti gave legislative consideration to some of Manatt's people who were making the contributions, so the closeness was much greater between the party and the legislature under Manatt.
TAPE GUIDE - John Roger Boas

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Charles H. Warren

FROM THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 1962-1979: THE EVOLUTION OF AN ENVIRONMENTALIST

An Interview Conducted by Sarah Sharp in 1982
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INTERVIEW HISTORY

In this set of interviews Charles Warren discusses his involvement in Democratic party politics in California and the development of his legislative interests after he was elected to the assembly in 1962. In addition, Warren recalls his 1977 appointment as chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) by President Jimmy Carter.

When Warren was elected to the assembly there was much less interest in so-called environmental issues than there is in the 1980s. Warren points to Edwin Z'berg's leadership in toughening the regulation of forest practices in California while he was chairman of the Assembly Natural Resources Committee in the early 1960s, as raising Warren's own consciousness about such matters. However, as Warren recalls the beginning of his interest in energy conservation legislation, his own personal evolution as an environmentalist, much like other legislators and many other Californians, was very slow:

Despite my service with the Z'berg and similar committees, I was not at all educated in the principles and policy implications that were uncovered as we examined California's energy future. However, I had the commitment of the newly converted and felt that what we were learning had far ranging implications for policy makers and for society, and that it was important to acquaint decision makers and society generally to those implications. These implications led me to identify specific resource issues that needed attention and to which I should devote my legislative time and experience.

With the 1976 enactment of Warren's bill AB 1575, which established the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, California led the nation with what "was the first successful effort by any governmental jurisdiction to deal with the energy problem in any of its aspects." As he reminisces further, Warren enjoyed personal satisfaction as well as some puzzlement at his success: "Among a small circle, I became a minor celebrity and received credit which I did not deserve for things which I did not fully understand... [c]ertainly I had environmental concerns, but I'd given such concerns only limited thought and attention."

The interviewer-editor held taping sessions with the interviewee on 14 July 1983 and 31 January 1984. Both sessions were conducted in the offices of Warren's consulting firm, Charles Warren and Associates, which specializes in resource and environmental issues, located near the Capitol in Sacramento. The present manuscript is a greatly revised version of the original transcript; Mr. Warren added much new material as well as made many grammatical changes during his review of the transcript.

Sarah L. Sharp, Ph.D.
Interviewer-Editor

April 1986
Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library
Regional Oral History Office
University of California
Room 486 The Bancroft Library
Berkeley, California 94720

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please print or write clearly)

Your full name: Charles Hugh Warren
Date of birth: April 26, 1927
Place of birth: Kansas City, Mo.
Father's full name: Doniphon Boyd Warren
Birthplace: Pleasanton, Kansas
Occupation: Mechanic
Mother's full name: Dorothy Gertrude Sisson
Birthplace: Mound City, Kansas
Occupation: Retail Sales
Where did you grow up?: Kansas City, (Kansas)
Present community: Sacramento, Calif.
Education: B.A., UC Berkeley; J.D. Hastings
College of Law
Occupation(s): Attorney - Consultant
Environmental & Environmental Issues
Special interests or activities: Global, national & state
resource, environmental & population issues.
B I O G R A P H Y

Charles Warren

Charles Warren is an attorney and an Adjunct Professor at the University of California at Davis in its Department of Environmental Studies. He heads his own consulting firm, Charles Warren and Associates, which specializes in resource and environmental issues. His clients have included committees of Congress and the state legislature, private corporations, and public interest organizations.

For a period of three years, from 1977 through 1979, Mr. Warren was in government service in Washington D.C. where he was Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, a cabinet level position in President Carter's administration. While there, he was responsible for a number of resource and environmental initiatives dealing with such far ranging subjects as agricultural land preservation, water resource development, toxic waste disposal, alternative energy development, nuclear safety, and the Global 2000 Report, among others.

During his Washington years, Mr. Warren led U.S. delegations to numerous international meetings and conferences, including the

OFCU Environmental Ministers Conference
1979, Paris, France

U.N. Environmental Program, Governing Group
1979, Nairobi, Kenya

U.N. Water Conference
1977, Mar del Plata, Argentina

Before serving in Washington, Mr. Warren was a member of the California legislature where, at various times, he chaired the committee on Resources, Energy and Land Use, the committee on Energy and Diminishing Materials, and the committee on the Judiciary.
While in the legislature, he authored a number of major programs dealing with resources and the environment, including the

Energy Conservation and Development Act
Nuclear Safeguards Acts
Timberland Tax Reform and Preservation Act
California Coastal Act
Utilities Lifeline Act

He was the founder and charter chairman of the Energy Task Force of the National Conference of State Legislatures and during President Ford's administration was a member of the Environmental Advisory Committee of the then Federal Energy Administration.

Mr. Warren has received a number of community service awards, including the National Top Hat Award of the Business and Professional Women of America, the Legislator of the Year Award of the Planning and Conservation League, and the National Distinguished Achievement Award of the Sierra Club.

Among the advisory committees on which Mr. Warren has served are those for the

Department of State, Office of Science and Technology
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
Department of Commerce, Oceans and Atmospheric Administration

Mr. Warren and his wife Audrey live in Sacramento, California.
I EARLY CAREER CHOICES AND ELECTION TO THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY
[Interview 1: July 14, 1983]##

Sharp: The first questions are just a few biographical ones. We always want to know a little bit more about our interviewees. Then we'll get more into the political work.

We can start with Kansas City. I grew up in Kansas City, too, so I'm a little familiar with your home territory.

I thought you might just start by telling me a little bit about your life, how long you were in Kansas City, and the kind of family life you had.

Warren: I was born in Kansas City, Missouri, as I indicated when I answered the questionnaire. My parents both came from small farm communities in Kansas, and shortly after their marriage moved to Kansas City, where I was born. We moved from Kansas City, Missouri, to Kansas City, Kansas, which is where we were when my memory becomes a little more secure. I attended elementary school in a suburban community of Kansas City, Kansas, called Crestline Gardens. The elementary school was called Junction Grade School, as I recall. It was a small school, and the people were not well-to-do, certainly. In fact, they were poor, as my family was. We lived in Kansas City, Kansas, and I continued to attend that elementary school until age ten or eleven or so. We moved again to Kansas City, Missouri, where I finished elementary school, the last two years of elementary school, by attending Horace Mann Elementary School.

 Probably the only striking event during the elementary school period is that I had the misfortune to be advanced two grades, so that when I graduated from elementary school and went into high school I was rather young and immature.

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 55.
Warren: After graduating from elementary school, my parents moved to the city of St. Joseph, Missouri, which is up river about sixty miles. I entered high school and attended the first year and a half there. It was Benton High School. We then returned to Kansas City, Missouri, where I finished my high school education at Paseo High School. I was fifteen when my class graduated, the war was on, and most of my classmates had to leave for military service. I was too young for military service, too poor to attend college, and, in fact, my academic career in high school did not indicate that a college career would be worthwhile.

So I went to work for a steel fabricating company in North Kansas City called the Standard Steel Works, which at the time made gasoline tankers for the military. I worked in the warehouse, and it was rather hard work. Somewhere along the line I decided that work that arduous was not for me. So I decided to get myself out of it. I began by attending night school at a junior college in Kansas City.

I took drafting with the idea that I might become a draftsman and thereby escape the rigors of physical work. I also took a mathematics course. While at night school, I learned of an opportunity for young men my age to enlist in the military early for the purpose of attending school. This concerned the army specialized training program and the navy V-12 program.

I took the qualifying exam at the junior college and was accepted into the army specialized training program. On my seventeenth birthday I was at Ft. Riley, Kansas, where I was outfitted and sent to Kansas State University at Manhattan, Kansas. There I was put into an accelerated engineering program, where despite military discipline and isolation, I was exposed to the academic world of the college. And I performed very well.

During the first quarter, some of us were given an opportunity to be examined for admission to a program being formed in Japanese language and area training. I took the exam, was one of the twelve at Kansas State who qualified, and, after some reflection, accepted entrance into the program. The reflection concerned the probability that the engineering program at Kansas State University would close; the European invasion having occurred, it was thought, correctly, that most of us there would be sent to Europe on our eighteenth birthday. Although I was still seventeen, and going overseas was no immediate concern to me, I was concerned about the fact that the engineering program would be closed down. I didn't know what would happen to me.

So, I accepted admission into the Japanese language and area program. I was sent to Yale University, where I was exposed to the educational amenities of the Ivy League system and to a well rounded, although accelerated, program. I was at Yale for four quarters, during the last of which I turned eighteen.
Warren: It was a requirement of the program that we be sent to basic training following our eighteenth birthday. I took my basic training at Camp Roberts here in California. It was my first exposure to California.

During basic training, the [atomic] bomb fell, Japan surrendered, and my training was cut short. I was transferred to the University of Minnesota to complete my language and area training. After three months at the University of Minnesota, I was sent overseas to Japan where I was stationed for about a year.

Following my discharge, I returned to California to attend the University of California at Berkeley. I received over two years credit for my army studies. I received my BA degree and then went on to study law at Hastings College of Law in San Francisco.

During this period I became interested in politics. I became a member of the San Francisco Young Democrats, where I met Phil [Phillip] Burton, Yori Wada, now president of the UC regents, Joe Holsinger, who is administrative assistant to the Superintendent of Public Instruction; what's his name?

Sharp: The new one?

Warren: Yes.

Sharp: Bill Honig.

Warren: Yes, Bill Honig. Phil and I became quite close. I assisted him when he was chairman of the San Francisco Young Democrats and succeeded him to that position. Phil later became northern chairman of the YDs and I succeeded him to that position as well. During this time we met many Democrats from all parts of the state.

Locally in San Francisco we were united in our opposition to Bill Malone, who was then the chairman of the San Francisco Democratic county committee, whom we characterized with some enthusiasm as boss.* I'm not quite sure we were correct, compared to what bosses have been like in other cities, but we were enthusiastic and I don't think we caused him much consternation.

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*Readers interested in William Malone may see an edited and partially reviewed transcript of a lengthy interview with him deposited in the papers of Helen Gahagan Douglas in The Bancroft Library. Malone was interviewed by Malca Chall in 1978 as part of a ROHO oral history project on Douglas.
Warren: One of the more important things about that experience, was that I became involved very actively in the formation of the California Democratic Council. I was the first chairman of the San Francisco County California Democratic Council and committed to voluntarism in politics.

Sharp: How did all of this lead up to your running for the assembly in 1962, then?

Warren: During the time I was chairman of the San Francisco chapter of the California Democratic Council, I finished law school, passed the bar, and joined a law firm in San Francisco which represented labor organizations. Labor law was a field which I wanted to practice as a lawyer. Later, I had an opportunity to join a larger law firm in Los Angeles, and, for a number of reasons, I decided to move.

I also decided to withdraw from political activity and to attempt to become a journeyman lawyer. For a few years in Los Angeles I made no effort to get into politics at all.

One day, a friend of mine from San Francisco, Dick Tuck, introduced me to two of his friends, one of whom, Art Wexler, was on the staff of then speaker of the assembly, Jesse Unruh. This was in 1961, and the legislature had just been reapportioned. Apparently, Dick Tuck had told Art Wexler of my political activities in San Francisco and suggested to him that I might become a candidate in a district then represented by a Republican incumbent who was a retired police captain and thought to be invulnerable.

As a result of that meeting, and more out of a spirit of adventure than anything else, Dick, Art Wexler, and I began a campaign in what was then the 56th Assembly District in Los Angeles.

Art Wexler managed my campaign. We won the primary and went on to defeat rather handily the Republican incumbent, Chet Wolfrum. I was the only Democrat to defeat an incumbent that year.

Sharp: Yes, I was going to ask you about that.

Warren: By a fairly good margin.

Sharp: I thought we would come back to the energy issues, especially, that you were involved in while there, but I'd like to first get a few notes about some of your early legislative interests that you just might have brought with you, either special matters for the district, or your own projects.

Warren: They were essentially the problems of any large metropolitan area. Because of a personal commitment and district requirements, I was interested in many of the civil rights proposals then being considered, from the
Warren: fair housing law to the anti-discrimination statutes. I was interested in air quality issues, because my district included parts of downtown and was very much affected by the smog. Transportation issues were important to me, because they were important to the district. So air quality, transportation, and civil rights, were the principal areas of concern to me early in my legislative career.

Sharp: Did you meet Alan Cranston while you were working in San Francisco and for the CDC up there, or was that later--once you got into the assembly? I was wondering about Mr. Cranston.

Warren: Yes, I knew him when I was in San Francisco, because, of course, he was the first chairman of the California Democratic Council. I did not know him well. But I did know him, yes.

Sharp: I was just beginning to piece together how you might have met some of the so-called leading Democrats for the state, Mr. Unruh, Mr. Cranston, Pat [Edmund G. Sr.] Brown, of course.

Warren: I guess among those that went on to fame and fortune, Alan was the first one I met. I met Unruh only after I became a candidate for the legislature. Art Wexler, being on his staff, took me in to see him shortly after the decision was made for me to run. Unruh was not particularly excited about my being a candidate after he found out about my political activities in San Francisco.

Sharp: Somewhat another side of the party?

Warren: Yes, I had no idea, but he was quite suspicious of anybody who had a CDC background. For the first time, I became aware of the extent of the tension that existed in the Democratic party. I am trying to recall my reaction to it--I don't think I viewed Jesse Unruh as a Bill Malone-type figure, but when I sensed his concern about my ties with northern California and northern Californians, we began to part politically. Although he gave me some support and encouragement during the campaign, we did not become close.
I'd like for us to change tracks right now and skip to the '66 period and talk strictly about politics for a while. Then we'll come back to your work in the assembly.

By all reports, the tension within the Democratic party might have crested in 1966 with your election as chairman of the Democratic state central committee. I thought we might talk about that in some detail and put what was going on in the party sort of in perspective, especially with a new governor coming in, and a Republican governor at that.

I had a copy of your announcement in July of '66. So between July and August, there was considerable activity on the part of different people within the party, I suppose, working towards your winning, and working towards Carmen Warschaw's winning. But first of all, let's start with what all led up to your producing a statement on July 11, 1966, that says you have decided to run for the chair.*

Except for the period I was in the Young Democrats and active in the CDC, I had given little thought to the formal state party operation. However, during the first few years I was in the legislature, it became obvious that there was a growing division in the Democratic party, which I thought was a serious one. On one side there were those who were members or supporters of the California Democratic Council; mostly from northern California, they tended to be a little more liberal and, perhaps, a little more idealistic. On the other side were those who opposed the California Democratic Council believing it represented the ruin of the Democratic Party; mostly from southern California, they tended to be more conservative, and, perhaps, a little more pragmatic.

*See following pages for press statement.
Statement to Press
By Charles Warren
Assemblyman, 56th District
Los Angeles, Calif.

July 11, 1966

I have called this press conference to announce that I am a candidate for State Chairman of the Democratic Party.

As you know, it is the duty and the responsibility of the State Chairman and other officers to conduct the campaign for the party and for all of its nominees. These officers will be elected by the Democratic State Central Committee at its meeting in Sacramento on August 13th. Between now and then, I will be talking with all Democrats about what our party has to do to win in November.

At the outset we Democrats must recognize that this year's campaign is going to be a tough one, perhaps tougher than ever before. To be successful, we must have a unified party - with all its resources mobilized.

Fortunately, we have excellent candidates. The Democratic record of accomplishments over the past eight years is unparalleled. Our program for the future is well designed to serve the people of California.

But our candidates, our record and our program can only be successfully presented to the voters by a party which is prepared to do its job and equipped to do it.

For too long now, the Democratic Party has relaxed in the comfort of a high Democratic registration majority. Throughout the state approximately 57% of all voters are registered Democratic. And while the Democrats have been relaxing, the Republicans have been effectively working and organizing and (more)
Statement to the Press
By Charles Warren
July 11, 1966

even winning elections. Frankly, for their organizational efforts they must be given credit.

What this means is that Democrats must get out and work in every political district, up and down the state. It is the job of the State Chairman to see that this is done. As State Chairman, I will see that it is done.

I realize it will not be easy.

First, Democratic organizations and affiliated groups must be brought together. Once again, they must learn the importance of unified effort. Last week, Governor Brown and Speaker Unruh publicly recognized the importance of unity. While unity at the top is needed, to be truly effective, unity must be restored to every level of political activity. I believe I can do this.

As State Chairman, I will represent no specific individual or intra-party group. Nor will I be the spokesman for any philosophy hostile to that of the Democratic Party. I will be able to do this as I have not involved myself in party feuds nor have I attacked any party official or officeholder. As in the past, I will work with every person and all groups.

Secondly, not only must the Democratic Party be unified, but it must be more effective. I can tell you from personal experience that a lot of work must be done to have a successful campaign. Our local candidates and their friends should not be expected to do everything themselves. Unfortunately this is true in too many instances. The Democratic Party must prepare itself
to assume its share of the campaign burdens.

Thirdly, I want to see the party assume greater responsibility for raising campaign funds. The cost of campaigning has skyrocketed. Our candidates are not wealthy men. They need help. And this help should come from the Democratic Party.

I sincerely believe that a unified Democratic Party which is willing to get out and do the work and raise the money for our committee can win in November.

I also realize the State Chairman can not do this by himself. But I believe I can assemble a working team of Democrats all so-called "factions" to work with me and the State committee to get the job done.

# # # # #
Warren: As it happened, this wing was nominally headed by Jesse Unruh, whose close friend and ally was Carmen Warschaw. In fact, I think at one time they had tried to form a rival club movement.

Also, during my early years in the legislature, opportunities to work in the legislature were limited. I was assigned an out-of-the-way office and given committee assignments which were rather prosaic and uninspiring. The Democratic caucus in the legislature was dominated by Speaker Unruh and his close allies, to an extent, which made me somewhat resentful, chafing, I guess. And I suppose, maybe, bored.

Also, I was witness to what I thought was improper conduct on the part of Mr. Unruh's group in dealing with Governor [Pat] Brown. I was an admirer of Governor Brown and supported him. There were times when I thought the Democratic leadership in the assembly conducted political and governmental affairs in a way to embarrass Governor Brown, in a way which would cause him not to seek re-election for a third term, and to thereby give Mr. Unruh an opportunity to become the Democratic candidate for governor. In other words, they were playing high stakes with the incumbency of a Democratic governor, which I found disturbing.

When I learned that there was going to be a Democratic state central committee meeting and the new state chairman would be Carmen Warschaw, I saw the consequences of that being counter to many of the things that brought me to politics in the first place.

##

Warren: So, one morning while driving to the capitol, I decided that, what the hell, I might as well become a candidate for state chairman and see what mischief I could create. I did not believe I would be successful, but I did think that my concerns should be discussed, and perhaps thereby the consequences of what I felt would flow from a Warschaw victory might be minimized.

Sharp: A couple of questions come to mind. At this point, should we make some notes about relationships that you had with Don Bradley or Roger Kent, or--?

Warren: You can if you wish. Having made that decision, the first person I happened to see that morning was Senator George Miller [Jr.], whom I admired, and to whom I told my decision. Senator Miller was not an admirer of Unruh and had strong ties to the club movement. That's why I told him. He said, "Fine. Take off." So I proceeded to contact those who I felt might be helpful. Many of them were in the state senate. There were a few in the assembly. Of course nobody really wanted to politically quarrel with Jesse.

Sharp: Sure.

Warren: The same was true for most of the congressmen, and most of the state officers, except for Alan Cranston and Glenn Anderson. So from the
Warren: state senators, Alan Cranston and Glenn Anderson, I tried to organize a campaign against Warschaw. Most of those contacted were somewhat dubious. This was particularly true of Phil Burton, then in Congress, with whom I discussed my plans.

Sharp: Because it seemed locked up.

Warren: Yes. He wasn't sure I was being at all prudent. Initially, he did not get directly or openly involved; nevertheless, he became helpful towards the end. Not so for Alan Cranston, Glenn Anderson, George Miller and some of the others.

Because I was able to show some initial strength, I was able to freeze the involvement of congressmen particularly, in terms of their getting involved in the race. Once the contest appeared to be real, even elected officials who were committed to Warschaw became hesitant to instruct their appointees whom to support.

It was generally understood that although candidates for public office, whether the nominee or incumbent appointed their representatives to the state committee, they let them make their own decisions. As a practical matter, the only decision they had to make was who shall the state chairman and officers be. And candidates don't like to tell their supporters how to vote. Most of them may express their wishes, but they usually let their appointees decide. Well, that was the weakness in the process I decided to take advantage of. During my campaign I bypassed the elected officials and the nominees, and I went to their state committee appointees. I met with them personally and in caucuses up and down the state. I told them why I was running, that I felt the party was rent and divided, that Warschaw would make it worse, and that I could establish a consensus and save the Democratic party from this terrible fate.

Sharp: Let me just stop you for a second. There is a note that I had seen that at least Don Bradley and Steve Reinhardt were perhaps shopping around for someone who would oppose Mrs. Warschaw.

Warren: That may be. Well, I don't know. I knew Don Bradley. I'd known him for a long time. He was one of those with whom I had worked in San Francisco. We had been rather close. He was the administrative assistant to then Congressman Shelley when I first met him.

Stephen Reinhardt was my brother-in-law. We had practiced law together. We were close personal friends. So we had that close personal, indeed family tie, and we were of the same mind.

I don't attribute my initial decision to either Reinhardt or Bradley, but it is true that once the decision was made, they helped.

Sharp: There are some issues that I wanted to talk about right at the convention, but I'm wondering if you have additional details that might
Sharp: add up to an important chronology between early July and August 13th, a little over a month that transpired—if there was anything else important that we need to talk about in terms of your campaign before we actually discuss the convention?

Warren: I don't have memories of any specific events except before the public announcement of my candidacy, Fred Dutton called and angrily denounced me and my plan, arguing that my candidacy would be a disservice to Pat Brown.

Sharp: Because of his ongoing campaign?

Warren: Yes. Brown had made a commitment to support Warschaw. Brown was then a candidate for re-election and I attributed Dutton's call to a desire to demonstrate publicly that Brown could control his own party. And that's legitimate. Because I was, in fact, opposing the wishes of the governor in whose cause I thought I had been laboring. But I was too far along by that time to back down, and I suppose maybe too stubborn. I don't know. Or I felt that Pat Brown would deal over the future of the Democratic party if he thought it would improve his re-election chances. As I say, I understood what his interest was, I just did not want to go along.

The only other recollection I have is going about the state meeting with delegates and discussing party matters with them.

Sharp: Your plans for the party and that sort of thing?

Warren: Yes.

Sharp: You had to do some fund raising, then, I would imagine, to fuel the campaign, or not so much?

Warren: I don't recall spending much money. It was really low budget; just a lot of talking.

Sharp: About the convention, then—

Warren: I really didn't think my candidacy would become as controversial as it did.

Sharp: Really?

Warren: Yes. I didn't want to make that much of a deal of it.

Sharp: It is treated by historians of Democratic politics as a big deal, and from the notes that I've seen of the convention, it was a considerable—

Warren: It became a big deal.

Sharp: Yes, a very big deal. Your victory was not overwhelming by any means.
CLASHES ON MAJOR ISSUES MARK CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC SESSIONS

By GENE DENNIS

SACRAMENTO — The stalemate of California's Democratic party over its convention Nov. 18-20 in San Francisco promises to continue over the next few weeks, with the party split along liberal and conservative lines.

On Wednesday, the delegates to the state convention in San Francisco were divided over the issue of how to elect the party's next national chairman. The convention was called to order by the state chairman, Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., who announced that he would run for a third term as governor.

The convention, which met Wednesday, was attended by 1,700 delegates from all over the state. They were addressed by speakers from both sides of the issue, and a vote was taken on the question of whether to hold a separate convention to select the party's national chairman.

The vote was 600-400 in favor of holding a separate convention, with 600-400 against.


I. CARMEN WARESCHEN

by the International Control Commission.

2. The support for any treaty government and recognition of Vietnam's right to self-determination.

3. Failure to bring the issue of Vietnam before the convention, said Hill, "could conceivably lead to a defeat in November."

The resolution reached the floor late Sunday afternoon. Only Rep. Philip Burton and Rep. J. J. H. Brown of San Francisco and a third member of the committee had a chance to speak in favor of the resolution before Assemblyman Alan Ryan (D-SF)botched it by moving to refer it back to committee.

The manner in which the Vietnam issue was handled in committee and on the floor was a mixed blessing from supporters of the resolution.

We must get out the word that the United States is not in Vietnam, and the Administration's policy in Vietnam is not in the interests of the people of this country, "Brown said.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

The convention, "I will move immediately to name its members and call upon the people to support it."

It did not appear approval was forthcoming.

Other resolutions were introduced by Reps. Dean Duvall and Richard J. Lofgren (D-SF) on behalf of a group of delegates from the San Francisco area.

The convention, "It was an attempt to capture the values in what is being called the "white backlash," that is an anti-war politics.

The issue was raised again during the next day's meeting of the central committee meeting.

Terry Francon, a San Francisco lawyer, introduced a resolution which would amend the platform to include specific support for the Lomax Act. His proposal met with a loud chorus of approval and was adopted. It is not clear whether the governor will proceed with his proposal despite the success.

"We are betrayed," another committee member, "I don't know how to get back to the district and ask people to vote for the war."

Others were impressed by the breadth and depth of the war resolution.

A vigorous supporter of the resolution, consumerilesman, was Thomas Slomper, Congress committee candidate in the First C.D., who had defeated peace candidate Philip V. Drath in the primary.

Liberal discontent was expressed by a weak platform resolution, and the Governor's equivocation on the Vietnam Act — California's controversial unfair housing law which was repealed by Proposition 1 in 1966 — was by the state Supreme Court in 1966.

The Rumford Act became a model for the war, when the Republican party ig- nited a series of futile and unfruitful attempts to stop the bill. The Los Angeles Times called it a fair resolution.

When the Governor addressed the convention Sunday he proposed passing the act. "I thought it was a fair resolution," he said. "I thought it was a fair resolution, but I was wrong."

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Demonstrator national commit-
tee chairman Eugene Wyman
registered a protest against
the, reports that the ultra lib-
eral element in the Demo-
crats was losing ground.
Worse, or so it was report-
ed, was the apparent com-
plete control the party and the
Democratic State Central Commit-
tee leader. And Warren's clos-
est political advisors are the
young state lawmakers. Wyman
condemned the ultra liberals as
"the probable leader of the
ultra-liberal bloc in the As-
sembly."

Specifically, the Beverly
Hills attorney accused me of
writing a biased and one-sided
account of what happened in
Sacramento as the Demo-

nists took the lead in the

Democratic State con-
servative and central commit-
tee meeting.

"There is no real basic differ-
ence in the ideology of
Warren and Mrs. Warschaw.
People said the dramatic
testimony of Mrs. Warschaw
that she is a political philoso-
pher, as Wyman pointed out,
that Warren is a political
philosopher rather than a
liberal."

In the bitter contest,
Warren won the chance
decision of the Assembly.
Mrs. Warschaw, State
Rep. Norman S. Miller and
Congressman Charles Warren
former chairman of the
Democratic State commit-
tee, all endorsed the liberal
candidate, Wyman.

When Wyman insisted
that "the conservatives are in
control of the party appar-
eatus," he raised a couple of in-
triguing questions. Either he
thought (1) Warren and the
assemblies, which is the other
named candidates are

Wyman himself and other
himself and endorsed the

WYMAN'S DENIAL DICE ANALYSIS

BY JUD SAKER

Ithe Democrat

The second hypothesis has
been proven inaccurate over
and over again. Warren is ad-
mittedly, ad-libbed, and prob-
eliberals in the Demo-
cratic party, As. Rep. Miller
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WARTEN LIBERAL

It was reported that the
governor voiced for Caren-
men, and that he named
the liberal candidates in
Sacramento, legislation and

CAST BY PROFY

Actually, the governor's
vote was cast by proxy,
according to reliable informa-
tion. The governor was not
present during the vote.

The proxy was cast by Don
Dutson, the governor's
campaign manager and re-
publican candidate for the

Los Angeles Herald-Examiner
21 August 1966
Warren: Four votes.

Sharp: Yes, four votes. Do you have a sense of exactly how the votes were decided? I mean, is it as simple as your convincing enough people that you were a better person for the job, or is there quite a bit more?

Warren: I'm not sure I won; I think Carmen Warschaw lost. She is a very talented, energetic, and wealthy woman, who has been generous in making those resources available to Democratic candidates. One would think that with all those resources, an upstart candidacy such as mine would have no chance. But history shows that it did. So I think that maybe it wasn't so much that I won, because I really had very little to offer at the time, but that Carmen lost it.

Sharp: It was a matter of her power somehow sort of eclipsing of its own? It was just time for another person or another attitude? People were fed up with her or anything as obvious as that?

Warren: I think it was a question of manner and style. She delighted in criticizing and attacking some Democratic candidates and organizations, such as the CDC. It was no secret that she opposed the club movement, volunteers in politics. She came more from the big money school of politics and had kind of a patronizing attitude toward the party and its philosophy. I think that was resented by some, recognized as an unacceptable philosophy by others.

Sharp: There's one issue, that of the written versus voice balloting. I had understood that you were in favor of a written ballot, and Mrs. Warschaw was in favor of a voice ballot?

Warren: That's correct. I don't know if she was in favor of a voice or not. I've forgotten how that came about, or how the decision was made. I did know that I felt this enmity toward Carmen personally would result in some votes being cast against her, votes which would not be cast if open.

Sharp: Right. I had gotten that from a very lengthy set of interviews that we did with Roger Kent.* A very interesting figure in terms of California Democratic politics.

Warren: I've never been close to Roger, indeed did not know him well, but I sensed that perhaps he was also one of those in northern California who was helping me, for reasons of his own, of course. But I think, again, because of his concern about Carmen. Is that--?

Sharp: Well, yes. Mr. Kent looms out there as one of the older Democratic leaders, and very clearly a northern Californian. In the oral history, he makes a statement that he and you and others both supported the secret, the written balloting. I don't think he goes as far as to say because it would allow some people to vote against Mrs. Warschaw who otherwise would be unable to do so. But he does put himself with you in saying that you and he both supported the written ballot.

Warren: What reason did he give?

Sharp: He doesn't really give any reason. That's why I then brought it to you, to see if he was someone whom you sought guidance from as an older—.

Warren: No. I'd been in politics of this kind enough to know that when your opponent has commitments from most of the delegates, that the only way--your only chance is to give those delegates an opportunity to vote contrary to that commitment. And Carmen had most of the commitments. She had the commitments of 80 percent of the elected officials. That's not insignificant. I thought that the only way that situation could be—

Sharp: Broken?

Warren: Broken or reduced in terms of significance, was to go for a secret ballot, yes.

Sharp: What about Carlos Bee? He was in the assembly at the time and was—

Warren: Speaker pro tem.

Sharp: Speaker pro tem, yes.

Warren: Oh, I think that he was with Unruh and Warschaw. Most definitely. I'm surprised that you ask.

Sharp: Well, just because of his position at the convention.

I had also seen a note that Mr. Bee had been instructed to support you in some way, and I thought I would ask.

Warren: I never heard of that. Maybe his delegates did. But I don't know even who would instruct him.

Sharp: It was a very oblique reference that I found.

Mr. Burton, Phil Burton, is an important force at the convention from some of the notes that I had seen. At least he looks that way on paper. More, I think, because some of the issues, the platform issues that were debated, like the anti-Vietnam stance and what Gerald Hill
Sharp: was working on.*

Would this be a good point to say a little bit more about Phil Burton and his role within the party in this period, more than you've already discussed?

Warren: Given any conference or convention or indeed an accidental forum of Democrats at which Phil was present, he was always a significant force.

He came to the contest rather late, as I recall. But in the few days available to him after he had given thought to my candidacy, and decided that I had a chance, he played a very significant role in firming up votes and persuading people who were still undecided.

Phil was a strong voice, but not a dominating voice. His supporters were very much in the minority at the convention. He was viewed with some suspicion by other elected officials. He had been somewhat isolated in the legislature and was viewed as a maverick, I think, by some of his congressional colleagues. Nevertheless, those who knew him well and worked closely with him became very committed to him, and these he could persuade, and did.

And, of course, he took credit for my election because of the four votes margin. He always insisted that he persuaded six people, and that I owed my victory to him.

Sharp: But from what you've described for the past twenty minutes, it was somewhat broader than that.

Warren: Broader than that, yes.

Sharp: The issues--

Warren: Let me interrupt. One thing that needs to be underscored, because it has relevance in the ensuing years, was that my sincere, rather naive, and ingenuous purpose in running was to avoid party ruptures. I wanted to keep the party open for a strong volunteer movement and the Democratic Council. I did not want to rid the party of any person or organization. I thought I could do that.

Even accepting help from Phil, I recognized that Phil had a maverick reputation and determined that I could not, as state chairman,

*Gerald Hill was the current president of the California Democratic Council in 1966. He wanted the convention to adopt a resolution which asked for a cessation of bombing in North and South Vietnam and other items. Philip Burton spoke in favor of the resolution.
Warren: be Phil Burton's chairman. My purpose was to keep everybody in the party. I wanted to be a peacemaker. I wanted to reduce the level of factionalism that I felt existed. That was a strong, sincere belief on my part.

Sharp: But, from the written documents that exist from the convention, there was a clear ideological divisiveness that is there, in the sense of Mr. Hill and the CDC resolution presented against the Vietnam war, which obviously people would understand that not everybody was going to really jump right on that--.

Warren: That's right. That's when the issue surfaced. I mean that political ramifications of the issue began to be felt.

Sharp: Let's just start at the beginning with that. Why is it that you were even talking about the Vietnam war at a state Democratic convention that supposedly is concerned with only state matters?

Warren: I don't believe I was. Nevertheless, the Vietnam war was surfacing as an issue. Politically it would be the folks in the club movement who'd be among the first to give voice to the growing concerns about our involvement in that war. I think that this convention was probably one of the early opportunities available to them to--

Sharp: Voice it.

Warren: --to voice those concerns. I'm not quite sure that at that time I was among those. I don't say that with any source of pride. I just don't remember. What I'm saying is, I did not campaign on the Vietnam war or any resolution or anything.

As I recall it, I was very distraught that the subject came up, because I saw it having a very divisive potential, an issue which would transcend all others. And sure enough, afterwards my rather puny efforts to keep the party together were unable to overcome the divisions caused by the Vietnam war.

Sharp: There is another issue (then we'll get on to some other party matters) that did have specific impact on California in '66 as a campaign issue, and that was the Rumford Act. This was brought up at the convention, and sides were taken. I wondered what your perspective was on that as an issue at the convention.

Warren: I was a very strong supporter of the Rumford Act.

Sharp: Mr. Brown, unfortunately, was not apparently forceful enough in his defense of the act and his support of the act.

Warren: One is tempted to say that is a characteristic of members of the Brown family, but one more correctly should say that is a characteristic of governors.
Sharp: At least incumbent ones, yes. [laughter]

Let's just branch out a little bit and talk something about the implications for your work--okay, you've won as state chair, and unfortunately or fortunately, so has Mr. Reagan. What are the implications, then, for your work as state chair, having come in at a time when a Republican has just been elected?

Warren: The implications were devastating. We had no statewide officeholder with whom we could work. Brown lost. Cranston lost. Everybody but Thomas Lynch lost. So there were no major political figures with whom the party could work. The club movement was becoming interested in and consumed by the Vietnam war issue. There were only three people of strength available--well, more than three. We had the president [Lyndon Johnson]. We had Jesse Unruh, who remained speaker. And we had Tom Lynch. Those were the people available to restructure and perhaps rebuild the Democratic party.

Fundraising fell off, particularly from those who contributed because of favors they could get from the government. Gene Wyman's fundraising capability was significantly reduced although he remained national committeeman.

So, all of a sudden, the party in California found itself defeated, without funds, and confronting an issue of dominant proportions involving a president of the United States, who was a member of the same party as his critics. So that was a rather difficult combination of events.

##

Sharp: Did you have a plan of how you wanted to use those two years, then? You've talked about the first reasons that you wanted to be state chair, and that was to try and bring the party together. Did that really seem like a workable plan?

Warren: That was my plan, and much of my time was spent trying to do that. I held meetings in almost every county of the state. I met with members of the county central committees, members of the state central committeee, representatives and members of all Democratic organizations in each county, in an effort to build the party from the ground up, so to speak. At the same time, my plan was to hold fund-raisers using the president and vice president and popular out-of-state senators such as the Kennedys. It was my plan that through a series of dinners and other fund-raising events, enough money would be raised to permit the basic party machinery to continue in existence and perhaps provide some local strength until such time as external events could prove more propitious.

In the county by county effort, the Vietnam war dominated discussions far more than party unity. In fact, in many instances, party unity became a term of derision by those who were concerned about the Vietnam war. They felt that an appeal to party unity was an appeal to lessen one's opposition to the war. Frankly, I was somewhat torn;
Warren: [laughs] that was a very understandable view. So at a time when I was trying to keep the party together, the counter currents were just too strong.

Sharp: Could you say something about the role of the women's division in this period?

Warren: We had Eleanor Fowle, the sister of Alan Cranston, and Jane Tolmach, both fine people, who worked vigorously and hard. I'm not sure what else I can say.

Sharp: The women's division acts sometimes rather invisibly in any political party. We have done quite a bit of interviewing with some of the Republican women's division people, so we're always really interested in the perceptions of others who are heads within the party of the work that the women were doing and their effectiveness, just what they were doing and how they were doing and how they were working towards either unity or at least holding the party together. So that was the basis of that question.

Warren: I don't think I can comment very much. I don't know if you intend to meet with Eleanor Fowle or Jane Tolmach at all. But I think those questions could be best put to them. I just recall that they did everything they could to be helpful and were both competent, able and committed people.

The Candidacies of Robert F. Kennedy and Hubert H. Humphrey

Sharp: When we push towards the end of your term as state chair and your turning it over to Roger Boas, it brings in a whole other layer of Democratic activity, the 1968 Democratic national convention, the [Thomas] Lynch delegation, and the assassination of Robert Kennedy and Mr. Humphrey's candidacy, which followed. Maybe we could just spend a few minutes sort of bridging that whole difficult period and talking about how different the party seemed when you handed it over to Mr. Boas in '68 than from '66 when you came in.

Warren: Well, you know, the word that keeps recurring is that it was rather chaotic. I was a close friend of Humphrey's, an admirer throughout his career. I was as certain as everybody else about the plans of [Lyndon] Johnson to seek re-election, and had to recognize the possibility of those plans. I was personally unwilling to have a public break with the president. I think I acted in a way I might not have acted if I hadn't been state chairman. Again, because I think I was still driven by the need for party unity.

Sharp: Mr. Johnson decided in March, 1968, not to run for re-election.
Warren: I think the Lynch delegation had already been formed and was the Johnson delegation.

Sharp: Yes.

Warren: It was the (quote) "the party" (close quote) delegation.

Sharp: Here's the list of Lynch delegation members.*

Warren: And I don't know--when did Kennedy announce?

Sharp: It was before then, I know.

Warren: I can't recall, either. As is obvious, the Lynch delegation has most of the elected officials, the party officials, and activists. With some exceptions, one of whom, obviously, was my friend [Phil] Burton. I don't see him there on this list. I don't see Unruh there. I don't know who else without going down the list, but nevertheless, the Lynch delegation was an attempt to assemble as many of the party stalwarts as could be assembled.

Sharp: How soon did you know? Did you know before the general public knew that Mr. Johnson was withdrawing?

Warren: No.

Sharp: Was there an immediate reaction on your part and Mr. Lynch's part?

Warren: No. At that time, party concerns were no longer significant. The question was, what the hell is going to happen to the country? Since the divisions were such that Johnson was not a viable candidate for re-election, the question then became how does the country get itself out of this mess? Political or party concerns certainly were not on my mind at the time. By then the whole exercise had become insignificant.

Sharp: There are a couple of questions that come to mind about your going to the convention after Mr. Kennedy's assassination, and about the delegations there, who were in anguish over what had happened. I guess there are some interesting recollections of Mr. Unruh at the convention, some difficulties that he might have had in dealing with the fact that his candidate [Robert Kennedy] was not there.

Warren: He may have had some personal difficulties. That's certainly understandable. But as I recall, he conducted himself with credit.

Sharp: Let me be more specific. One of the reports that I had read had

*See following page for this list.*
DEMOCRATIC PARTY
List of Candidates for Delegates to Democratic National Convention

Candidates expressing no preference
THOMAS C. LYNCH (Chairman)

Hon. Thomas C. Lynch
Hon. Charles Warren
Robert L. Coate
Hon. Edmund G. Brown
Hon. Joseph L. Alioto
Hon. James Roosevelt
Charles Luckman
Gregory Peak
Low R. Wasserman
Edwin W. Pauley
George E. Johnson
Eugene V. Klein
Sigmund Arywitw
Hon. Billy G. Mills
Hon. Jack D. Malteser
Joseph J. Rodriguez
Nancy S. York
Gilbert W. Lindsay
Henry L. Lacayo
Walter H. Shorenstein
Arthur Henry Harwood
Mrs. Irma Rohrer
Newton Dal Poggetto
Everett A. Matzen
Hon. Harold T. (Bizz) Johnson
Frank A. Galli
Laurence W. Carr
Harlan D. Lundberg
Hon. John E. Moss
Hon. Walter W. Powers
Hon. Edwin L. Z'berg
Virna M. Canson
Hon. Robert L. Leggett
Hon. Virgil O'Sullivan
Hon. Luther Earl Gibson
William Leshe
Adolph P. Schuman
William H. Chester
Cyril Magnin
Benjamin H. Swig
James J. Budden
Charlotte C. Danforth
Hon. John Francis Foran
Hon. Terry A. Francisco
Hon. Jeffery Cohelan
Hon. George F. Miller
Hon. Carlos Bee
Hon. Wilmont Sweeney
Osborne A. Pearson
Fred F. Cooper
Richard K. Groulx
Abraham Kolman
Kimiko Fujii
Peter J. Allen
Hon. Ben F. Gross
Gaei Douglass
Hon. Alfred E. Alquist
Mrs. Eleanor Fowle
Alan A. Parker
Mmes. Lillian C. Maylard
Clarence E. Heller
James J. Twombly
Gerald D. Marcus
Ernest H. Norback
Mrs. Marion Robotti
Morgan Flagg
Joseph J. Crosetti
Jim R. Orton
Mrs. Jane McCormick Tolmach
Lyman R. Smith
Mrs. Goldie Kennedy
Hon. Alvin C. Weingard
Hon. Jerome R. Walld
Minot W. Tripp, Jr.
Russell R. Crowell
Carl B. Frazier
Hon. John Joseph McFall
Joseph A. Barkett, M.D.
Mrs. Margaret C. Blackmer
Alan H. Strauss
Hon. B. F. Sisk
Hon. Hugh M. Burns
Hon. George N. Zenovich
Simon Marootian
Hon. Cecil R. King
Hon. Chet Holifield
Hon. Augustus F. (Gus) Hawkins
Hon. James C. Cerman
Hon. Edward R. Roybal
Hon. Charles H. Wilson
Hon. Ralph C. Dills
Hon. Tom C. Carrell
Hon. Alfred H. Song
Hon. George E. Danielson
Col. John O. Gottlieb
Hon. Joe A. Gonsalves
Hon. William B. Greene
Hon. Leon D. Ralph
Hon. Edward E. Elliott
Sam S. Ishihara
Lioel B. Cade
Leo M. Harvey
Mrs. Carmen H. Warschaw
Joseph T. DeSilva
Clarence D. Martin, Jr.
Mark Boyar
Robert M. Brunson
Allan K. Jonas
Abe F. Levy
Mrs. Joyce A. Fadem
Stanley Beyer
Alicio D. Ortega
Marilynn K. Hofstetter
Mrs. Bella Berg
Richard E. Sherwood
Gerald J. Conway
Steve Edney
Charles W. Walker
George W. Smith
Antonia C. Tejada
Charles N. Chapman
Eric A. Lidow
Burt Kleiner
Robert William Prescott
Jack M. Ostrow
Joseph L. Alperson
Skipper Rostker
Mrs. Shirley Goldinger
Hon. Walter W. Stierne
Horace S. Massey
Ross H. Boyd
Gabriel W. Solomon
Hon. Richard Nevins
Mark S. Whiting
Edward A. Hawkins
Richard H. Keatinge
Hon. Harvey M. Johnson
Mrs. Ruby J. Stidger
Dorman L. Commons
Mrs. Margaret Ann Twombly
Pat Galati
Herman Leavitt
John H. Snider
Norbert A. Schlei
George Nye, Jr.
Edwin J. Wilson
Nathan Shapel
David M. Kentuck
Hon. John P. Quimby
Hon. Eugene G. Nisbet
James L. Evans
Harry E. Reynolds
Hon. Richard T. Hanna
Philip L. Anthony
Mark W. Hannaford
Daniel II. Ninburg, M.D.
Richard J. O'Neill
Charles G. Gant
Nikolay S. Palechikoff
Sherwood Roberts
Hon. Lionel Van Deerlin
Marris D. Goodrich
John Straza
Earl T. Pridemore
Irvin J. Kahn
R. R. Richardson
Hugh N. Wood
Abel B. Sykes, Jr.
Hon. John V. Tunney
Mrs. Henrietta B. Benson
Dan A. Kimball
Lionel Steinberg

END OF GROUP
Sharp: indicated that Mr. Unruh had attempted to stop the California delega-
tion from supporting Mr. Humphrey's candidacy. I don't know for what
reason. Some blocking on his part, of accepting Mr. Humphrey as a
candidate to support.

Warren: He was not an enthusiastic Humphrey supporter. I think he still was
depressed and dejected because of Robert Kennedy's assassination, and
found it difficult to turn over or to direct that everything be turned
over to Humphrey's forces. I think he more or less left people alone.
Consequently, the lack of enthusiasm that members of the Kennedy dele-
gation felt in supporting Humphrey surfaced, and there was nothing to
dissuade, to counter, that feeling.

So it might be argued that inasmuch as many of those delegates
were friends and associates of Unruh, that Unruh could have led them in
supporting Humphrey and did not do so. That might have had some validity.
But he did not actively work against Humphrey. I think he just let del-
egates do what they wanted. And since most were Kennedy supporters they
found it difficult to support Humphrey, given the nature of the cam-
paign they had just gone through.

It was a very sad and distressing period. Maybe memory is fail-
ing me, but I do not remember Jesse conducting himself in a manner that
one could legitimately criticize.

Sharp: Can you make some notes about the Humphrey campaign in California after
the convention?

Warren: At this time I personally was quite dispirited. In Chicago, I went
outside. This was my first convention, and it was just a terrible,
terrible experience. I left the convention hall, finding it very un-
comfortable, and went out into the streets and saw what was happening.
As a result of what I saw and experienced, as soon as I cast my ballot
for Humphrey I left Chicago.

Sharp: Before it was over?

Warren: Before it was over. It was something with which I just did not want
to be associated. I think that was probably one of the events which
led to my receding commitment to the Democratic party. Because there
were aspects of it that I witnessed that I did not find attractive.
Because of that experience, I did not become involved in the presiden-
tial campaign.

I was asked to be a chairman of the Humphrey campaign in Califor-
nia, and I declined because I didn't think I would do a good job. I
don't think that was a very commendable attitude to have, but it was a
real one, in that I just didn't feel that I could do a job. So I was
not active in the Democratic campaign and can give you no personal in-
sights about that period.
Sharp: It sounds like just an incredible ordeal.

Warren: Oh, it was. Probably one of the unhappiest periods of my political life. I was trapped and I did not know how to get out of it. I still think about the ethics of the situation. I don't know if I did right. I've sometimes thought I should have resigned. But then people would say, "See, I told you so. Here's the person who campaigned on uniting the party, and look what he's done. He's torn it apart." So that was really a tortuous period and an experience which I was well aware of and glad to be rid of at the end.

I terminated my interest in party politics. I didn't much care after that.

Sharp: Yes, it was a fast sort of trial by fire, to come in a not so auspicious way having a Republican governor, and to have it end in a far more tragic and real episode.

Warren: Reagan wasn't bad. He didn't cause me any distress. I mean, as governor. The election of Reagan did and the defeat of Pat Brown. But my relationship with Reagan was a very good one, given the nature of our roles. He was very friendly toward me when we met. In fact, we worked well together on some legislative matters.
III AN OVERVIEW OF ENERGY CRISIS POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA, 1971-1976

Sharp: What I'd like to do is to set us up for next time, to talk in much more detail about some of the energy issues and the conservation matters. We could talk some about your more recent work with the U.S. Supreme Court decision, because I sense that it came out of some of the work that you started while you were in the assembly. But to begin, as sort of an overview, I thought I might get you to give me your perspective just on the energy crisis in California.

What exactly was the energy crisis as you saw it, and some of the major problems that you began to see which needed to be addressed?

Warren: All right. After my unhappy experiences with party politics, my interest in political matters declined and my interest in legislative matters increased. In 1971, a new committee, the Assembly Planning and Land Use Committee was formed. It was a small committee. I believe it was formed in order to give a Republican, Paul Priolo, a chairmanship. I went on the committee as a member because I had some general interest in its subjects.

During 1971, the major electric utilities in California, PG&E, Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electric, advised legislative leaders that unless the state took certain action, in the foreseeable future there would be shortages of electricity with resulting brownouts and blackouts of indefinite duration. The problem, they advised, was that regional and local governments were making it increasingly difficult to site power stations, particularly those which were fueled with uranium. They succeeded in having legislation introduced in the senate which established a state power plant siting process which would pre-empt the jurisdiction of local governments and regional agencies. The legislation was approved by the senate and came to the assembly where it was referred to the Planning and Land Use Committee for consideration. The committee members were reluctant to approve the legislation but felt the problem posed by the utility representatives was such that they should know more about it.
Warren: So the committee referred the legislation and its subject matter to interim study. Ordinarily when bills are referred to interim study, they are dropped from further consideration. But in this case, the committee felt that a sincere interim study was indicated. We sought and obtained some grant foundation money, and money from the assembly contingency account to fund a contract with the Rand Corporation group in Santa Monica to look at California's electrical energy system and future.

Rand at the time was particularly interested in conducting a study of this kind, because until then most of their work had been for the military departments. They wanted to expand their analytical research into the non-military policy arena. This was the first opportunity they had to do so.

I was asked by Priolo to chair a subcommittee on energy which would be responsible for the Rand study. There were two other members of the subcommittee, Priolo himself and Leo McCarthy. In October of '72, the subcommittee received the Rand report. I was so startled by its findings that my life was changed. Essentially, what we learned from Rand, I set forth in the California Journal article.*

First, we learned that California's demand for electricity was growing at an annual rate of some 7.5 to 8 percent and that all electric utilities projected that the demand for electricity in California would continue at this rate for the next twenty years. This annual rate of growth meant that if demand was to be accommodated that is if there were to be no blackouts, then the supply of electricity would have to double every ten years. Second, we learned that the traditional means of generating electricity were becoming increasingly scarce and more expensive, principally the fossil fuels natural gas and low-sulfur crude oil (low sulphur being necessary to meet air quality standards). Third, we learned the utilities planned to generate additional supplies of electricity using nuclear power plants. At the time, few people had concerns about nuclear generation of electricity, believing that it was a blessing of the Atoms for Peace program and would result in the availability of electricity too cheap to meter. However, the fourth thing we learned from the Rand study was that there was growing concern about relying on nuclear generator technologies and about the wisdom of relying on nuclear generation to the extent California utilities thought necessary. Rand suggested the implications of such reliance should be

Warren: better understood before the utilities were encouraged by state pre-emption of plant siting jurisdiction to embark on such a course.

So in the spring of '73, the energy policy subcommittee began a series of hearings on the findings and recommendations of the Rand study. The hearings were lengthy, time consuming, and adversarial. Frequently, I was the only member at the hearings. As chairman, it was my job, and indeed, it became my consuming interest, to better understand the problem.

As a result of those hearings, it became clear to me that it would be imprudent to rely on nuclear to the extent that the utilities then planned. It also became clear to me that it was politically impossible to make a case against nuclear in order to justify a program of energy conservation and energy alternatives development.

So, without mentioning nuclear power, but relying on the significant land use and water requirements of siting and operating the additional one hundred large power plants the utilities projected might be necessary in California by the year 2000, we wrote legislation which proposed significant changes in our state's energy policies. Briefly, we proposed a new state energy agency which would conduct independent forecasts of demand for electricity, adopt conservation measures in all electricity consuming sectors, and encourage the development of alternative energy resources, specifically solar and geothermal.

We also recognized there was some merit in the utilities' suggestion that some local decision-making authority should be pre-empted. What resulted was an energy conservation and development legislative proposal, which, with incredible prescience and a great deal of luck, anticipated many of the energy related issues that would soon appear on our nation's energy agenda.

##

The legislation I drafted, AB1575, passed the assembly narrowly but was stalled in a senate policy committee. However, I amended its provisions into a related senate bill authored by Senator Alquist--SB282. It was passed by the assembly and sent back to the senate floor where my amendment was concurred in by a margin of one vote. I thereupon left on a trip to Europe, not knowing what its fate with Governor Reagan might be. I remember calling from London to learn that Reagan had vetoed the bill.

A few days later, I was in Piraeus, at the yacht harbor, where I saw what appeared to be the entire U.S. Mediterranean fleet at anchor. When I returned from a three-day trip to the Greek Islands, the fleet was gone. The Mideast war had begun. Arab members of OPEC announced an oil embargo. Suddenly, energy became a political concern.

When I got back to California, I was contacted by some of Governor Reagan's staff people. They recognized in their search for an
Warren: energy policy that the measure which had just been vetoed had considerable merit.

Then began extended negotiations with the governor's staff, and with the governor personally. We met in the governor's conference room for a period of several weeks; we had meetings with utility representatives, legislative staff, and agency officials.

The governor agreed to use the provisions of SB 283, the bill he had vetoed, as a draft for our discussions. We reviewed its provisions line by line. When there was a factual disagreement, we checked to see what was correct; when there was a policy disagreement, we discussed the policy implications of the changing nature of California's energy requirements. Throughout, utility representatives who had urged the original veto were obliged to participate and to defend their version of the facts and their opposition to the proposed policy changes; frequently they had difficulty in defending either. Gradually, we worked our way through the draft measure. When we concluded, the governor not only said he would support the bill but insisted that reluctant utilities who had participated in the discussions do the same.

The governor's support was at some political cost to himself. I recall a staff person who had been given responsibility for energy policy resigned and Lieutenant Governor Ed Reinecke who was campaigning for governor publicly announced his opposition. But Reagan kept his word.

I amended the agreed provisions into my AB1575 which as I said earlier was stalled in a senate policy committee. With the governor's help, it was approved by the committee and, by a margin of one vote, by the full senate.

I think kindly of Reagan for his efforts and suspect that he has since regretted his decision because of the antinuclear implications of the bill.

All in all, however, AB1575 has withstood the test of time very well. It was the first to challenge the policies of energy inefficiency of the utilities and to point out that energy planning by the utilities was devoted more to maximizing profits than to the public's interest in a rational and reasonable energy program. It did this by establishing a state energy agency responsible for energy demand by forecasting, energy conservation and efficiency standards, development of alternative and renewable energy supply systems, and simplifying and shortening the process for siting power plants.

Its antinuclear implications stemmed from its objectives of more realistic estimates of electricity demand, reduced demand due to conservation and energy efficiencies, and electricity generation by alternative systems.
Warren: And all that was hoped has come to pass. Not too long ago, California utilities were planning to build as many as eighty nuclear power plants by the year 2000; today there are no plans for building nuclear power plants in California.

Two years after the passage of my AB1575, I had an opportunity as chairman of the Assembly Resources, Energy, and Land Use Committee to address the nuclear issues directly. David Pesonen and some of the other folks who had followed our research into nuclear technologies when we were working on AB1575 were subsequently able to qualify Proposition 15 for the June, 1976 primary ballot. This proposition would have outlawed the construction of nuclear power plants and phased out the operation of those already constructed.

After the proposition qualified by an initiative petition, my committee scheduled over sixteen days of hearings in order to publicly inquire into all the nuclear concerns generally and the merits of the proposition specifically. As a result of these hearings, bills were written to declare a moratorium on further construction of nuclear power plants until certain specified safety concerns were eliminated. All but one of these bills passed and a nuclear moratorium was declared for California. These bills were legally challenged by the California utilities but were sustained by an unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, as a result of our success with AB1575, I was invited by the National Conference of State Legislators to form and chair a national energy policy advisor group. This was done. Later, as a result of the activities of the national advisory group I was asked to and did become an advisor to the Federal Energy Administration which President Nixon had formed and which William Simon then chaired. From such activities, I became acquainted with a number of talented people in Washington, D.C., and throughout the country working on energy, resource, and environmental issues.

Back in California, I expanded my areas of interest from energy to other resource issues in an effort to determine if there were other instances where existing and traditional programs and policies were no longer in the public interest.

On my own I attended the United Nations Conference on Food. I was dismayed by what I learned and witnessed. There was an appalling lack of understanding of the implications of population growth in major portions of the world. The principal proposal to deal with long-term starvation was food aid programs. As one might expect, this proposal came from and was supported by representatives of grain exporting regions, including a number of U.S. Senators from the Midwest. Ignored were the need to reduce the rate of population growth in resource-scarce regions, to preserve and restore agricultural
Warren: croplands, and the damaging effect unlimited food aid would have on a region's indigenous agriculture.

On my return from the UN food conference, my committee undertook to prepare a report on the economic and environmental implications for the world, the United States, and California, of accommodating the demand for food, energy, and other resources by a global population which was doubling in size every thirty to thirty-five years andquesting for the benefits of industrialization. This report—a Handbook on Population and Resources—was released in 1975.*

I also introduced legislation to preserve California's prime agricultural lands, to restructure forestry programs to eliminate incentives to premature and inefficient logging, and to protect California's coastal regions and their unique amenities. All these efforts were successful except AB15, my bill to preserve prime agricultural land, was defeated by a senate policy committee after being approved by the assembly.

Obviously, my energy experience involved me in a number of resource and environment subjects to an extent far greater than in the past. It opened up new areas of interest for me. It's an interest that has dominated my life since.

Legislatively, 1976 was a good year for me, but it required using almost all the goodwill I had with my associates in the senate and in the assembly. I got a number of good bills passed, including the nuclear safeguard bill, but almost all were highly controversial and the political costs of supporting them were high for my colleagues.

It was fortunate for me that I then had an opportunity to go to Washington with the [Jimmy] Carter administration as chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality.

Sharp: I guess I'd like to back you up a little bit and talk a little more at length about Mr. Reagan, because he and his workings within his own administration are two of the major interests.

Can you summarize what his initial objections were to your bill, SB283, as it was presented in 1973, how he changed his mind, and the basis for his changing his mind? I mean was it strictly a too much regulation—?

Warren: Well, I don't remember ever seeing a veto message. I'm not sure that there was one. I don't think the veto was a seriously considered one; not enough to warrant a message. The utilities bitterly opposed it, of course. And it was opposed by those who were the traditional supporters of the Republican party. So I think his reaction was,

*See the appendix for a copy of the "Forward" and "Conclusions" from the handbook.
Warren: "This is what they want, so I will do it," you know, without really understanding the subject or issues involved. And, as I say, it did not surprise me. I thought, frankly, I might be able to sneak it by; but that didn't happen.

I did not have a sufficiently broad political consensus for the bill. There were very few people who know what I was doing or the significance of what I was doing. The utilities knew, of course, because they were to be directly and adversely affected. Although, I did hope that by giving them some of the siting pre-emption they sought, I might keep them neutral, but I was unsuccessful. They fought it all the way.

Then, of course, energy was not an issue of the moment. Nobody was discussing it. Only after the October '74 war and the Arab oil embargo did everybody say, "What the hell is this all about?" I just happened to be in a position to have an answer to the question. Also, I was in a position to control what took place in the legislature on the issue. Reagan people, I think wisely, concluded that I was the person with whom they had to deal. And they dealt with me. In fact, I think I was able to influence government's policies on energy more than anyone. I was more involved in the subject than even Reagan's advisors were.

I had a new approach to energy policy while everybody else was still committed to the old. I had determined that the old approach was probably the worst thing we could do and that a whole new set of values had to be put in place if the state was going to have any chance of dealing with energy problems rationally and effectively.

Sharp: It brings up a couple of different questions. The influences on Mr. Reagan, whether it was Mr. [Norman B., "Ike"] Livermore, who was head of Resources Agency at the time, John Tooker, who was legislative assistant, if he was involved at all, Don Livingston, who was his planning--

Warren: Very helpful. Don Livingston was one of the keys.

Sharp: In providing a forum to sit down and deal with it?

Warren: Yes, I do not recall the position Don held on the governor's staff, but I do recall it was an influential one. Don was not an ideologue. He believed government had a purpose and that those responsible for government should do the best they could to serve that purpose ably and well. Don provided an open mind; he learned quickly and he was able to apply what he learned to government's purpose. He saw to it that meetings were scheduled, that necessary government officials attended, and that the discussions were relevant to the issue. He provided the forum.

Sharp: Was Mr. Reagan at all of these several weeks of sessions?

Warren: From time to time, he came in. He did not attend all of them, because there were a number of them. We had the chief executive officers of the utilities. We had agency heads. We had my staff. We went through my proposal point by point. When we'd come to a point that was
Warren: disputed, we would argue that point. Then the Reagan people would indicate what they found acceptable, and then we'd move on. Usually they brought the utilities right along.

Sharp: There are a couple of other things. The issue of the commission itself, the energy commission that was to be set up.* What about its powers vis-à-vis the PUC [Public Utilities Commission]?

Warren: I was, and still am, suspicious of the PUC and its operations. I think it mostly does what is wanted by the utilities that they're obliged by the state constitution to regulate.

Sharp: That's the scuttlebutt--

Warren: It's more than scuttlebutt, let me assure you.

Sharp: That's the on-the-street attitude about the PUC.

Warren: Yes. It was certainly true then, and I'm not so sure that much has changed since, despite the best efforts of some members to institute change. The utilities and the Reagan people tried to convince me to give to the PUC many of the powers I wanted institutionalized but I absolutely refused. I would not do that. As I indicated, I felt strongly that the PUC was part of the problem and not part of the solution.

Sharp: Now, the PUC had come up with some ideas for energy conservation.

Warren: Not by then.

Sharp: Well, I think it was Vernon Sturgeon who was PUC president at the time when your bill was being discussed and who had come up with some very minimal sort of suggestions about conservation, all voluntary, no more night time athletic events, that sort of thing.

Warren: Oh, yes. This was after the embargo. All right. Fine. If you want to call that a PUC program. I thought it was ridiculous. It didn't do anything.

Sharp: By today's standards, it seems a low-key response. But apparently, I had thought that they had come up with some somewhat stronger recommendations as well, so they weren't totally oblivious to the problem, but were not putting real teeth into their recommendations.

*The full title was The State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission.
Warren: Again, these were reactions to the embargo. They were not considered policy changes. It was not till later that the PUC began to undertake policy reviews, and then I think only in response to the pressures that the California Energy Commission put on them. We could not, in establishing the new energy commission, give it PUC powers, because the powers of the PUC derived from the constitution, and we could not legislatively affect those. What we did in a number of instances was to provide for the California Energy Commission to do some analysis and make recommendations to the PUC. We did so in order to inform the public what was involved in a particular issue and the consequences which would flow if the PUC failed to follow the recommendations.

As a result, and also in response to current events, the PUC began to change. And it has changed. It has altered its rate structure somewhat. It has given some incentives toward energy conservation. It is trying to encourage development of alternative energy. But they're still fighting over what is avoided cost. You have to have an avoided cost determination if you're going to have any independent production of alternative energy. So, even today, on very vital issues, the PUC is certainly laggardly.

Sharp: What about Mr. Reinecke's council, the Energy Planning Council?

Warren: It never had a plan. Reinecke opposed the signing of the bill. His view was that we should go to the dessert and grow jojoba, a plant he thought would produce energy. I don't know what else the Council did. It may have proposed subsidy programs for traditional energy resource development.

Sharp: But it was not a basic effort and a basic shift?

Warren: No.

Sharp: What I'd like to do the next time we meet is to talk more about some of the issues that automatically surround energy conservation. One of them is on the nuclear plant sitting, with emphasis on nuclear and the issues of public concern and everything that grew as a result of the decision to encourage or, at least have more nuclear plant sitings in California.

I'd like to get some input from you on other sorts of topics you think that we need to discuss, along with nuclear plant siting, with respect to the whole area of energy conservation, so we do it in as thorough a way as we can. You can give those to me now, or you can think about them and send them to me in a letter.

Warren: I think we could spend a little more time discussing the energy related issues, certainly.

But I think that if at all possible, I'd like to spend a few moments on the broad implications of what was learned from our energy experience. Are there other resources where the traditional methods of development and use need to be reconsidered or reviewed or altered?
Warren: I think there are.

The whole population-resource-environmental effects linkages need to be better understood. I think they are not well understood today. One of my principal objectives in going to Washington was to initiate the "Global 2000" report.*

I'd like to discuss how my experience with energy policy led to consideration of population-resources linkages and maybe go through preparation of the California Handbook and the "Global 2000" report. I don't know if they are of interest. It may not be within your project.

Sharp: Part of it is in the sense that it's a discussion of how your efforts in the assembly in energy expanded. So we could certainly spend some time on some of the other bills that you mentioned, AB15 for one.

Warren: By the way, I'm not sure that I would support AB15 today. But that's another story.

Sharp: [laughs] Okay. But I think it's of interest, just because it's such a pressing concern for the nation, for the rest of the world, and it comes out of the California experience. I think that is real important.

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*The full title of this report is, "The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century," and was prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State, released in 1980. See the appendix for a copy of the "Major Findings and Conclusions."
IV INTRODUCTION TO TOUGHENING NATURAL RESOURCES REGULATION: EDWIN Z'BERG'S LEADERSHIP

[Date of Interview: January 31, 1984]#

Sharp: I thought we'd start by talking about your earliest natural resource interest. I had seen a note that I mentioned to you in the letter about your interest in getting the Forest Practices Act toughened up. That was, from what I could tell, one of the first natural resource issues that you got involved in. I don't know if you remember it.

Warren: I remember being involved, or let me put it this way—I remember being concerned about forest practices in California and the fate of the California forests, largely because of the efforts of Ed [Edwin L.] Z'berg, who was chairman of the Assembly Natural Resources Committee when I first served on the committee. He had a strong interest in forest policy. I can't recall a legislative session without some effort by him to deal with forest-related issues. Almost every session, the committee toured the various forested regions in northern California to inspect examples of timber harvesting and to determine what, if any, undesirable effects were being experienced as a result of such practices.

Early on, Ed and his staff worked on legislation to deal substantively with his concerns, and the result was the Forest Practices Act, which required timber harvesting plans to be filed by loggers before cutting; it also required the plans to be approved by licensed professional foresters. I think that was probably one of his more significant contributions to the improvement of forestry practices in California.

But it occurred to some of us that regulation of that kind, while beneficial, was unable to cope with the strong economic incentives that caused loggers to harvest inefficiently. So later in Ed's career, he and the committee began to explore the possibilities of economic incentives to discourage undesirable practices and to encourage desirable practices.
Warren: At the time of Ed's death we were looking into the consequences of taxation policy. We had learned that county taxation policies frequently caused loggers to log immature forests in order to avoid property taxes. That is, it was a fairly common practice for county assessors to assess and tax forested areas that were no more than twenty years in age. Many trees do not mature until they are older than twenty years. This was the practice we were trying to avoid.

The result was a timber tax reform law, which the staff was working on at the time Z'berg died. This work was completed after I became chairman and was subsequently passed in 1976.

I think it's one of the more significant and perhaps overlooked resource remedial programs that the legislature has enacted. In a number of respects. It encourages resource efficient management decisions and designates and preserves areas for commercial forest growth. I think it has resulted in less controversy and confrontation in the legislature over forest management. The number of complaints, as far as I can tell, have diminished, and the intensity of the debate has muted.

Sharp: There were a couple of examples—this was 1972. Z'berg was still chair, and it was AB2346, which prohibited the use of certain kinds of logging equipment that created erosion and stream disturbance. I had seen a note that the committee and the bill had had quite a bit of opposition from the California Forest Protection Association—John Callaghan is the name that I took down. Could you talk just a little bit more about the opposition to these kinds of bills that were creating new regulation of the industry.

Warren: I can't specifically because, frankly, I don't recall the details of that particular effort. I do recall that we were concerned with the effects of logging operations on streambeds and the destruction of our fish hatcheries, particularly the use of heavy equipment in those streambeds; we were also concerned about the industry's failure to keep a buffer along the streams in order to prevent erosion into the streams; we were concerned about the soil effects of dragging logs by heavy tractors to the trucks for transport, in fact, the soil compaction effects of logging roads themselves. But most of our efforts to deal with those practices were successfully resisted by the industry. It did not want to be told how to conduct its business. I can't recall other details of the dispute.

Sharp: Could you say something about the transition or evolution that the committee went through? Originally this committee was Natural Resources, Planning, and Public Works, as I understand it. Then the committee changed to Natural Resources and Conservation. Is that right?

Warren: I can't give you the early history. I just remember it as the Natural Resources Committee.
It was simply an administrative change, or what effect it really had.

I suspect that the change came about more as a result of a change in the speakership. This was when, sixty—?

I think the change was before '69. There was a gap in our California legislative handbooks, so I couldn't really nail it down. But it was between '67 and '69, so if that means Robert Monagan was coming in and doing some changes, or really what it meant, I don't know.

I paid no attention to it, frankly; I can't tell you.

By 1970 George Milias was the chair. In 1970 the members were Bob Wood, E. Richard Barnes, March K. Fong, W. Don MacGillivray, Patrick McGee, Don Mulford, Alan Sieroty, Vincent Thomas, Jesse Unruh, Floyd Wakefield, and yourself, which is a pretty wide spectrum of ideas and partisanship. I wondered if you recalled any changes in the committee with Milias as chair.

Only in the intensity of effort. I remember George Milias as a fairly moderate, sincere, and concerned legislator. I'm not sure that his interests in natural resource issues were as intense as Z'berg's; in fact, I'm sure they weren't. So the committee did not involve itself in as many matters during George's chairmanship as it had during the time Z'berg was chairman. However, Ed continued to serve as vice chairman. The chief committee consultant was changed; personnel did not. Jim Pardue was Ed Z'berg's chief committee consultant. With the change in chairmen, Pardue lost his position but not his job. He remained on committee staff but was replaced by another staff person as chief consultant. It was friendly conversion. I suppose feelings were hurt, but careers were not interrupted or ruined as frequently occurs when the principle "to the winner belongs the spoils" is invoked.

The change had a minimal effect on committee operations. Regulated groups were, I think, more welcome, and their problems given more credence by Milias. But certainly the change was not on the scale of a [James] Watt supplanting a Cecil Andrus as Secretary of the Interior. It was a change between individuals who shared the same concerns but viewed them with varying degrees of intensity and commitment. I think that description is fair.
V WARREN'S OTHER LEGISLATIVE INTERESTS: FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AND THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAM

Sharp: I thought we might digress just for a few minutes and then go back to more of your natural resource concerns and talk about your work on the Assembly Committee on Energy and Diminishing Materials, but could we just talk about a couple of other interests that you had--some employment bills that you worked on in this period, and then the state's public defender program, which was enacted in 1971. There were a couple of bills maybe you could put some perspective on, both in 1970--AB98, requiring compulsory arbitration of disputes over salaries, pensions, and fringe benefits for policemen and firemen; the other one, AB22, extending the Fair Employment Practices Act to cover discrimination based on sex to employers with five or more employees. I was interested to know why you might have gotten involved in these kinds of bills, what particular interest they were to you, and just what you remember about them.

Warren: One of my earliest assignments when I was elected to the legislature was to serve on the Governor's Advisory Commission on the Status of Women. I was among the first members of the commission and was the assembly representative. It was at a time when there was growing interest on the part of women in what has since become the feminist or women's rights agenda. It was a fairly well-funded and active commission which held hearings throughout the state enabling the various women's organizations to present their views on the role of women in society. At the end of the first round of hearings, one of the principal objectives that seemed to be shared by most of those organizations concerned the fact there was considerable discrepancy in earnings between the sexes performing the same work. To correct that condition became the Commission's principal political objective, and I authored a number of bills to accomplish that objective.

All my bills were bitterly resisted by employers and for the first three years, our efforts were unsuccessful. It was not until the fourth year that my legislation--AB22--finally passed into law.
Sharp: I had seen a note about Senator Donald Grunsky's opposition. He was chair--

Warren: --Of the Senate Finance Committee.

Sharp: He wanted an amendment to extend the protection to men. From what I had understood, George Moscone had then offered some amendments to restore it. So there was quite a bit of compromising and amending that went back and forth, and eventually it was restored to the original intent of the bill. But I wondered if you recall any of that.

Warren: I really don't. Now that you mention it, I do recall those efforts being made, but my recollection is that the bill ultimately passed as we wanted it.

Sharp: Right. Some of this leads up to the '72 efforts to get the state to ratify the ERA [Equal Rights Amendment]. I wondered what your perspective was on trying to get both houses to pass it.

Warren: Frankly, my original view was that the ERA, insofar as it concerned California, was probably not needed—that is, most, if not all, of the objectives sought by the ERA had been accomplished in California.

However, those of us who felt this way were persuaded by the argument that it was desirable to extend California's protections to all the states and that ERA was a desirable way of doing so. I recall California was one of the first, if not the first, of the states to approve the ERA. I also recall it was done fairly quickly and without much opposition. Although there were expressions of concern, I don't recall there being major opposition to its passage.

Sharp: There were some skirmishes. There were some conditions that people wanted to attach to passing the ERA in California. One was granting a minimum wage and other employee benefits exclusively to men as they had been granted to women to somehow sort of keep things even. But it was an interesting political incident because there were these conditions that people wanted to attach. That's really what I wondered if you remembered at all.

Warren: It's difficult to recall specific skirmishes involving a particular proposal because most proposals of major significance involve skirmishing. The legislature consists of a hundred and twenty members; at the time ERA was considered all but one were men. So the fact that there were skirmishes is not surprising, but in no case do I recall the skirmishes significant to the extent the outcome was ever in doubt.

Sharp: Maybe we could just take a few notes on the public defender program.
Sharp: My notes show that it was AB1419 in 1971.* It was done somewhat in connection with the Judicial Council. They had been supportive of having it passed. Assemblyman James Hayes had had a bill in 1970; it was AB497. Then it became 1419 one year later. I wondered why you had gotten involved in it. From what I could see, you were fairly deeply involved in it.

Warren: I think that was because I was chairman of the Judiciary Committee--##

Warren: --and was convinced that establishing a state public defender's office was probably a better way to insure indigent representation than the traditional practice of court-appointed attorneys. It seemed to be a desirable means of providing what the U.S. Supreme Court was telling judicial systems they must provide, and that was indigent representation.

Sharp: There were fairly obvious bases of support--the State Bar; the attorney general Evelle Younger supported the bill, as did the ACLU, California Public Defenders Association, and a couple of other groups.

Warren: My recollection is that the opposition was principally based on funding and a feeling on Reagan's part that traditional means should not be quickly discarded. That is, he believed, as I recall it, that the bar, in its volunteer programs and efforts, adequately provided representation to those who were truly indigent, and that there was no need to provide representation on a more systematic basis. His opposition reflected a hostility, which he continues to exhibit, to new programs or to expanded government programs. I think Reagan has a fairly basic, deep-rooted feeling that the eleemosynary impulses of society should be allowed to provide the services he views as charitably in nature.

Sharp: It was about this time that he was involved in working to de-fund the California Rural Legal Assistance program.**

Warren: That was part of it, right.

*Interested readers also may see "Dismantling OEO Clouds the Outlook for the State's Programs for Providing Needy with Free Legal Aid," Ann Morris, California Journal, March 1973.

**See also "California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA): Survival of a Poverty Law Practice," Michael Bernett and Cruz Reynoso, Chicano Law Review, vol. 1, 1972, pp. 1-79, for a detailed account of this episod
Sharp: I have wondered for a long time, because that stands out as something you can really grab onto to point to Mr. Reagan's concerns vis-à-vis not wanting to see certain groups be represented as other groups might be—. Does this pretty much fit in with that?

Warren: I think so, yes. You know, Ed Meese, I suspect, was involved in that effort, as he is involved in the effort today to curtail the federal legal services program. Again Reagan's people believe that many of the legal aid programs are used for purposes other than to provide individuals with legal representation, and that persons who in fact require legal representation should have their needs met by legal aid or by private law firms performing community services.

I see the same pattern, the same philosophy, in his presidency as in his period as governor in California. I think that philosophy is the essence of the major debate between him and Congress today on the budget and its deficits.

He recognizes as well as Congress does that the budget deficit is a major problem, and I think his determination to cut government services is causing him to refuse to compromise with Congress on reducing those deficits. He's saying, "Cut services" and they're saying, "Impose taxes." But he won't impose new taxes because he knows that if he does, unwanted services will continue to be provided. I think that's a basic philosophical dispute and the failure to resolve or compromise it is the cause of the record deficits this country is incurring.
 VI SPREADING THE WORD: THE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND DIMINISHING MATERIALS

Sharp: We can go back now to looking at some of the resource questions and how the assembly and you started to work with them. I thought we might get a few notes on the Assembly Committee on Energy and Diminishing Materials. I have a few questions just to start off with about the history of the committee, how it came about, and whose interests really brought it about. Then we could talk about the Handbook on Population and Resources that was published in 1975.*

Warren: Before we discuss resource and environmental matters, you might be interested in another rather significant program I was able to develop during the time Reagan was governor. That was the 911 emergency telephone service system for the entire state. No comparable program exists in any other state. It will be completed in 1985 after expenditures of some $137 million during the last ten years.

This program, which I initiated and developed, was signed into law by Governor Reagan in 1973. The key to his approval was the fact I was able to persuade him to impose a one half percent surcharge on telephone bills to fund the program. Despite his pledge not to raise taxes, he decided a surcharge was acceptable.**

The Energy and Diminishing Materials Committee was a new committee which was formed at my request and which succeeded the energy subcommittee, which was a part of the Assembly Planning and Land Use Committee. As mentioned earlier, the Planning and Land Use Committee was formed in 1971, and was assigned responsibilities of the County

*See appendix.

**See following pages for a description of the 911 program and its operation in California.
9-1-1
IN CALIFORNIA

By
W. B. "Bill" Brandenburg
9-1-1 Program Manager
State of California, Office of Telecommunications

9-1-1

Nine-One-One is a three-digit telephone number people can remember to replace seven-digit numbers they don’t remember. It is important to keep in mind that 9-1-1 is simply that—a telephone number—nothing more, nothing less. The main advantage of 9-1-1 is that it will eliminate time in the total emergency response cycle between the detection of an event and the arrival of assistance to that event.

The single emergency number concept received its first nationwide publicity in the United States from an article by Congressman Edward Roush of Indiana, which was published by Parade Magazine in 1967.

Prior to 9-1-1, a high percentage of emergency calls were handled by telephone company long distance operators. The telephone operator’s primary function is the answering and servicing of thousands of "0" dialed calls placed daily by telephone users. Thousands of calls answered include, but are not limited to, long distance person-to-person, collect, credit card, third-party billing, and emergency calls.

When an operator receives an emergency call, he/she must interrogate the caller to find out what is happening. This is very difficult for many long distance operators, as their area of responsibility almost invariably covers many cities, counties, and special districts; and many times, callers are not aware in what jurisdiction they reside.

After the operator has interrogated the caller and has determined to the best of his/her ability the proper responding agency, he/she must then dial the same seven-digit number that the caller should have dialed in the first place.

As a result of the many problems encountered with thousands of seven-digit emergency telephone numbers used throughout the United States, an effort to establish a universal, easy-to-remember emergency telephone number was broached in the fall of 1967. Members of the President’s Commission on Civil Disorders expressed their interest in the matter to the Federal Communications Commission. In addition, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice also resolved that “whenever practicable a single emergency telephone number should be established at least within the metropolitan areas and, eventually over the entire United States.”

Subsequently, the FCC Defense Commissioner explored the problem in depth with AT&T and the result was the announcement by AT&T on January 12, 1968, to offer 9-1-1 as the universal emergency telephone number throughout the United States.

It is the above events that lead to the California program and the desire to provide its citizens with a single emergency number for all emergency services.

The idea of a California statewide emergency telephone number was conceived in 1972 when Assemblyman Charles Warren introduced legislation that would require all public safety agencies be accessed by emergency telephone number 9-1-1.

When Mr. Warren wrote this legislation, he worked closely with, and got the support of, the agencies that his legislation would affect through the League of California Cities, County Supervisors Association of California and the telephone industry serving the State. It was Mr. Warren, with the support of these organizations, who proposed the legislation that was to become California law. The legislation passed both houses and was signed by Governor Reagan, and became law in March, 1973. This was the first timetable legislated and attached to the installation of 9-1-1 in the United States.

An overview of the California law is as follows:

- Declares a single number for police, fire, emergency medical and ambulance.
- Defines "public agency" as all state, city, county, city and county, municipal corporation, public district, or public authority which provides such emergency services.
- Defines "public safety agency" as a functional division of a public agency which provides firefighting, police, medical, or other emergency services.
- Defines terms descriptive of emergency telephone services such as "Direct Dispatch Method", "Relay Method", "Transfer Method" and "Referral Method" which would fall under either "basic system" or "sophisticated system" as used in the article.
- Provides statewide 9-1-1 calling by December 21, 1985.
- Provides that every system will have at a minimum, law enforcement, firefighting, emergency medical/ambulance.
- States that systems shall have separate numbers for non-emergency calls.
- Provides that systems utilize at least three of the methods of response (Direct Dispatch, Relay, Transfer and Referral).
- Requires that pay telephones provide non-coin dialing of 9-1-1 and the telephone company operator.
- Requires in areas where more than five percent of the population speak a specific primary foreign language that translation for that language be available.
- Provides for translation arrangements of teletype devices for the deaf (TDD) at all public safety answering points.
- Directs the Office of Telecommunications to consult with applicable State agencies, public safety associations and the telephone industry.
- Provides for technical and operational standards.
- Agencies are to submit tentative plans by January 31, 1984, final plans by October 31, 1978, and reports in lieu of plans if 9-1-1 is already implemented.
- Specifies compliance enforced via "judicial proceedings."

Subsequent legislation provided funding for the Program. It was the intent that the overall program be State-funded and not impact local agencies. As a result, the State program is funded by a one-half of one percent surcharge on non-competitive intrastate telephone service which is collected by the State through the telephone utility companies. The surcharge rate can be adjusted administratively.
up to, but not to exceed, three-quarters of one percent as required. This gives the State the flexibility to meet the funding requirements of the Program.

When the Program got underway, approximately ten years ago, 9-1-1 service arrangements available were very basic. The sophistication of today's technology was still to come, so 9-1-1 system configurations were conceived on an entirely different basis as compared with today. In the early days of the State's program, the most monumental problem facing State and local planners was one of local agency boundaries versus telephone central office boundaries.

There was only one local agency (the City of Alameda) whose boundaries were 100 percent co-terminus with the telephone company central office boundaries. All other local agencies had boundary alignment problems. Selective routing was still on the drawing board (the national trial to be installed in Alameda County, California, would be in 1978) and could not be relied on to meet the requirements of the State's program. As a result, the program was forced to plan with basic equipment and large quantities of personnel.

Essentially, the 9-1-1 calls would be routed to a PSAP where the interrogation would take place. After the location and the type of emergency were identified, the call would take place. After the location and the type of emergency were identified, the call would be identical to what the telephone company operators were doing prior to 9-1-1 with the exception that, generally, calls would be answered on a priority basis. Of course, some PSAPs could perform direct dispatch of calls but still a large number of calls would require transfer.

This type of 9-1-1 system would satisfy State law, but would be very expensive overall and slow in operation, taking into consideration the vast number of public safety agencies and telephone central offices involved. As a result, the State of California, in concert with local agencies and the telephone utility companies, forecasted what the overall program requirements were for 9-1-1 to more effectively serve the most populated state in the country. The group wanted to take advantage of the latest technology available and have the best possible, most complete system(s) at the least amount of
Shown above are the Data Management system computers that are used to provide the selective routing database and store telephone numbers and address information which, subsequently, provides ALI. This system was modified this last summer with the latest generic program available from Western Electric.

overall cost. First, Selective Routing was studied to eliminate the costly human transfer of calls to the proper agency; in other words, computerize local agency boundaries to align with telephone central office boundaries. Now the PSAP would receive only those calls that originate within its area of responsibility. However, since the PSAP is generally the law enforcement agency, a 20 percent (average) call volume increase to that PSAP had to be considered that would be transferred to subsequent agencies, i.e., fire depts., emergency medical/ambulance, California Highway Patrol. In the larger agencies, this still inflicted a workload increase that would necessitate additional personnel. In order to offset this additional workload, it was conceived that if the interrogation process of the primary PSAP calls could be minimized and expedited, this would more than offset the additional workload impact brought about by the transfer requirement.

The two features that would accomplish this workload offset were ANI (Automatic Number Identification) with fixed-button and/or selective transfer, and ALI (Automatic Location Identification). Costing analyses were performed for these services on a statewide basis versus additional personnel cost. The results were the ANI and ALI would, overall, be more cost-effective and provide both the citizens of California and the PSAPs a far superior 9-1-1 configuration. Other advantages would be the control of prankster calls.

For the past ten and one-half years, Bill has been employed with the State of California, Office of Telecommunications, as the 9-1-1 Program Manager.

As Manager of the 9-1-1 Emergency Telephone Program, Bill is responsible for managing the overall program, identifying resource needs, and insuring achievement of program goals. He maintains liaison with local government and telecommunication industry representatives; reviews and approves emergency telephone system plans; assists local government in complying with State laws; conducts meetings and conferences of emergency communications activities; and prepares reports for the Governor, the Legislature and the Department of Finance.

Bill oversees a staff of 13 people with an annual budget of $33 million for implementation and ongoing costs of the statewide program.

Prior to his employment with the State of California, he was employed with Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company for approximately twelve years, the latter six years of which he was Account Manager for city/county government, Alameda County, State of California.

It was while Bill was in this position that he reviewed the requirements of LEAA (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration) and AT&T's (American Telephone and Telegraph Company) inquiry for a trial site for the installation of the first 9-1-1 system to employ selective routing. Bill submitted a proposal that Alameda County be the trial site. After review, it was accepted and became the national site for the first system to employ selective routing.

Prior to this appointment, Bill was assigned as an Account Representative in the business telephone and data market.

Before his employment with Pacific Telephone, Bill was employed with Standard Oil of California; attended college, and served a four-year enlistment with the U.S. Coast Guard.

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(Continued on Page 48)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . .

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information (a person yells in the telephone “fire” and hangs up). In addition, those agencies with CAD (Computer Aided Dispatch) systems could interface the ANI and ALI to these systems, enhancing them even further. The first ANI/ALI CAD interface system installed in the United States was in the city of Costa Mesa when Orange County (California) activated 9-1-1 in April, 1982. This system has proven most effective, both in operation and cost, and many other agencies with CAD are following suit.

At the present, approximately 80 percent of the State’s population will be able to be covered with E 9-1-1. The remaining 20 percent of the State is more rural and will be served with Basic 9-1-1 with transfer and called party control features. For these systems, the State will assist financially for additional personnel required to transfer calls to subsequent agencies.

To meet the requirements of the law, the State has established an interpretation bureau that provides foreign language translation service. In addition, TDDs (Teletype Device for the Deaf) are being added to the bureau, so that all citizens have access to 9-1-1. To be sure that all citizens’ telephones are covered, mobile 9-1-1 was recently activated with the cooperation of the California Highway Patrol. This service was outlined in the March, 1983 issue of the APCO BULLETIN, page 54. The State’s ongoing advertising contribution to local agencies are 9-1-1 decals for emergency vehicles and 9-1-1 stickers for telephones. In 1973, the State Office of Telecommunications published a Systems Standard and Planning Guidelines Manual to assist local agencies in the development of their systems.

The Manual provided 9-1-1 orientation, guidance for planning and implementation, operating considerations, system standards and was prepared with the assistance of local planners and the telephone industry.

Over the last 10 years, the Manual has been periodically revised to reflect the latest developments of 9-1-1 technology and any changes in the State’s 9-1-1 program. Since the program is now in the operational or implementation stage, the Manual has been totally revised to reflect the operational and funding aspects of the program.

The local agency system designs are performed jointly by personnel of the State’s 9-1-1 Program, serving telephone companies and the local agencies. After the system is designed, it is then costed and submitted to the State by the local agency along with a system description and cost justification.

The State approves the system by signature, sending an approved copy back to the agency. The agency sends a copy of the approved plan to the serving telephone company and this serves as an order. The telephone company then acknowledges the order giving an expected in-service date to the local agency. The same procedures apply to additions after a system is implemented.

Local agency-initiated moves or changes are paid for by the agency. The State only pays a system installation charge once. However, the State will continue to pay the recurring approved charges.

The following is an outline of the State’s funding program for both Basic and E 9-1-1 systems. The items of service are in quantities to provide a 0.01 grade of service.

**BASIC SYSTEMS - Primary PSAP**
- Incoming 9-1-1 lines including distinct tone, called party hold and forced disconnect.
- Central office identification.
- Optional called party control features i.e., ringback and switchhook status.
- Incoming 7-digit line group (local Central Office, no FEX).
- Line hold and line lights.
- Common control equipment (KTS, ACD, call sequencers, etc.)
- Telephone sets (as involved with primary interrogation and dispatch positions only - not supervisory or backup positions).

*Incoming 7-digit line group (local Central Office, no FEX).*
*Line hold and line lights.*
*Common control equipment (KTS, ACD, call sequencers, etc.)*
*Telephone sets (as involved with primary interrogation and dispatch positions only - not supervisory or backup positions).*

**Advertising**
- Decals for emergency vehicles.
- Stickers for telephones.

**Personnel**
That percentage of operating personnel cost (non-supervisory) represented by the number of calls transferred versus total number of calls handled by that PSAP (including non-emergency).

**Example:**
- Total calls per log: 8,996
- 9-1-1 calls transferred: 856
- Ratio: 9.515%
- $70,487.56
- (total personnel cost) x 9.515% = $6,706.89

**E 9-1-1 WITH ANI AND ALI**

**Primary PSAP**
- Incoming E 9-1-1 lines including idle tone and forced disconnect.
- Incoming 7-digit line group (local Central Office, no FEX).
- Line hold and line lights.
- Common control equipment (KTS, ACD, call sequencers, etc.)
- Telephone sets (as involved with primary interrogation and dispatch positions only - not supervisory or backup positions).
- Transfer and relay arrangement to subsequent agencies (fire depts., CHIP, etc.)
- ANI
- ALI

**Logging TTYs**

**Subsequent Agencies (Secondary PSAP)**
- Incoming 9-1-1 lines or 7-digit transfer-to lines.
- Incoming 7-digit line group (local Central Office, no FEX).
- Line hold and line lights.
- Common control equipment (KTS, ACD, call sequencers, etc.)
- Telephone sets (as involved with primary interrogation and dispatch positions only - not supervisory or backup positions).

**Advertising**
- Decals for emergency vehicles.
- Stickers for telephones.

**Personnel**
There is no personnel reimbursement with systems employing ANI and ALI. It has been demonstrated that these two features greatly accelerate the overall interrogating process which more than offsets the additional time required to transfer calls to subsequent agencies.

The enthusiasm for 9-1-1 in California is demonstrated here by the City of San Diego’s PSAP staff.
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Warren: and Municipal Government Committee and the Natural Resources Committee; that is, issues concerning the planning responsibilities of local government were given to the Planning and Land Use Committee.

It was a small committee. It was chaired by Paul Priolo, a Republican. I was asked to be one of the Democrat members in order to provide the committee with a Democratic majority. Priolo was one of the few Republicans then given a committee chairmanship.

It was the Planning and Land Use Committee to which the California electrical utilities complained about local land planning being used to hamper power plant siting. A senate bill designed to pre-empt local land use jurisdiction over power plant siting led to out contracting with the Rand Corporation of Santa Monica to do a study of California's electrical energy future. To receive their report, a three member Subcommittee on Energy Policy was formed and I was asked to be chairman.

The efforts of the subcommittee led to the enactment first of SB282, which, as you will recall, was vetoed by Reagan in the latter part of 1973. Then in January of '74, the Subcommittee on Energy Policy was expanded to a full policy committee, called the Committee on Energy and Diminishing Materials. It was created primarily to handle energy related issues. However, in a discussion with then speaker Bob Moretti, I asked for authority to determine whether some of the principles developed in our energy work might apply to other resource questions. So we had some discussion how that could be done without infringing on the jurisdiction of other committees. We finally came up with the awkward phrase "diminishing materials." I felt that would enable me to explore the other resource questions that I wanted.

In any event, it was as chairman of the Energy and Diminishing Materials Committee I conducted the negotiations which resulted in the passage of the Warren-Alquist Act [AB1575].

Sharp: The handbook that was written contains a lot of statistical analysis of what is happening to the major resources in California, laying it out plainly. It was the work of the Institute for Applied Research, which was what?

Warren: Oh, it consisted of some folks from UC Davis, and is not around any more. One of the Institute's members was Bill Bryant, today a county supervisor in Sacramento. The project was designed to identify what we meant by "diminishing materials" and to put energy related principles and insights into focus insofar as other resources were concerned.

With our energy and diminishing materials experience, we began to link resource issues with population and demographic and environmental issues. Consequently, in order to tailor the handbook to our jurisdiction and without expanding it too much, we came out with a
Warren: report on population, resources, and environment.

Sharp: Was the handbook actually written for members of the legislature, or for a wider audience?

Warren: It was written for the members of the legislature primarily but we printed courtesy copies for maybe a hundred others. My thought was to have the first publication released in bound form and provide key members of the legislature with a looseleaf volume so it could be supplemented and periodically updated as time and further study permitted. However, I must say that the book was not received with great enthusiasm or interest by anybody at all.

Sharp: People didn't stop you in the halls and say, "I didn't know that was happening"?

Warren: No. And we were unable to find funds to publish copies for general distribution. I think in total there were no more than five hundred copies printed if that.

Sharp: In some of the conclusions, the ideas for legislation are implicit—energy conservation programs, even some population control programs—but in many cases they aren't. I wondered if you had thought of quite a few different ideas for legislation as a result of the study, or if you had some in mind even before the study was done and published?

Warren: The purpose of the book was not to develop specific legislative proposals, but rather to serve as a learning and educating tool for me, members of my committee, and hopefully others.

Despite my service with the Z'berg and similar committees, I was not at all educated in the principles and policy implications that were uncovered as we examined California's energy future. I was low on the learning curve. However, I had the commitment of the newly converted and felt that what we were learning had far ranging implications for policy makers and for society, and that it was important to acquaint decision makers and society generally to those implications. These implications led me to identify specific resource issues that needed attention and to which I should devote my legislative time and experience.

One of these issues was preservation of prime agricultural land. My interest in agricultural land was fostered by events at the U.N. Food Conference in Rome, about which we've already talked. This interest led me to introduce AB15 in 1975 which proposed preserving the state's prime agricultural land by limiting its conversion to other uses. Although it passed the assembly, it was defeated in the senate in 1976.
Warren: Another resource issue I wanted to examine but over which my committee had no authority, was water resource demand and development. I did not know what to do, but I had a strong feeling that what we were doing was probably as wrong as what we had been doing with electrical energy. I wanted to re-analyze the whole range of our established water policy.

I was able to convince the Assembly Rules Committee to allot me $500,000 to fund a water resources study, despite the fact water was not within my committee's jurisdiction. That money was used to commission a study by the Rand Corporation focused on water resources.

Meanwhile, my committee continued its work on energy policy issues, mainly the growing concern of people about the safety of nuclear technology. I must confess, there has always been in my mind a question whether some of our developing insights were correct. I'm still not sure. However, I have always resolved any question or doubt by concluding that these insights had such far-ranging policy implications that it was imperative they be fully explored and debated.

Today I'm still sorting things out in my mind. For example, I'm not at all sure that today I would be as concerned about the preservation of agricultural land in California as I was in the past. It is not as big a problem in California as it is elsewhere, say, in Sahel in Africa. On the other hand, I am firmly convinced that most of our insights are accurate, that there are serious assaults on our resources and environment as a result of inadequately considered population and industrial growth policies. Again using agricultural land as an example, it may be the problem is not so much its loss but its degradation. There is starvation in the world today. But it is due not so much to a quantitative loss of farmland than to a qualitative loss.

But beyond that, as the pressures mount throughout major regions of the world, there will occur even more environmental loss. The "coal miner's canary" for today's society is our wildlife. Due to population growth, we are rapidly losing habitat; forests are being cut; wetlands are being filled--mostly for the purpose of developing agricultural land.

Warren: When I was working on AB15, opponents used to argue, "Look, there is more agricultural land in production today than ever before. Why are you concerned about this?" I finally realized that there was more agricultural land in production because of the destruction of a number of other resources whose importance was being overlooked. And these other resources, for me at least, had a value which far exceeded the values reflected in many of our current programs and policies which contribute to their destruction or degradation.

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VII THE QUESTION OF SAFEGUARDING NUCLEAR POWER

Warren: We were talking earlier about the Natural Resources Committee. When Ed Z'berg died, I was asked to chair an expanded committee. The Energy and Diminishing Materials Committee was collapsed; also, the Planning and Land Use Committee, a new committee, the Resources, Land Use, and Energy Committee combined the jurisdiction of three former committees—Natural Resources, Planning and Land Use, and Energy 'and Diminishing Materials. It was a marvelous committee, no question about it. It had broad jurisdiction, able staff, and interested members. It had good speaker support. However, some of the other legislators viewed us as strange people doing strange things. Which is not to say they were all unsympathetic, although some were quite hostile. The work of the committee was frequently bitterly contested, and its successes were accomplished only by narrow margins.

Sharp: What were some of the other successes?

Warren: To start off, of course, the nuclear moratorium bills.

Sharp: Okay, that's really where we're going anyway.

Warren: Then there was the timber tax reform and preservation law. By the time we finished with it almost everyone recognized the merit of its provisions. We managed to convert a bill of great controversy into one of acclaim.

Sharp: That's '76?

Warren: Yes, that was a '76 bill. Another subject which took much of our time—we did not originally intend to become involved in the issue—was coastal protection. The term and existence of the Coastal Commission established by Proposition 20 in 1972 were expiring. If the Coastal Commission and its program, were to continue, the legislature had to act in 1976. The backers of Proposition 20 and the commission decided their effort to enact coastal legislation in the senate. They drafted a bill and recruited a good author, Senator [Anthony] Beilenson,
Warren: to carry it. However, their effort failed. Frankly, I had anticipated the effort would fail and had made tentative plans to become involved. When it failed, we became involved—with successful results. So that year—1976—we were responsible for enacting the timber tax reform and preservation law; the coastal protection act, the nuclear moratorium laws, and moving AB15 out of the assembly. But as has been said, AB15 ultimately lost in a senate policy committee.

Sharp: The nuclear power question—it seems like there are lots of little subtopics within the nuclear power question—the issue of plant siting, which we've talked about some, the issue of plant safety and the destructive possibilities if plants are not made and maintained safely, and then the issue of disposal of wastes. Those are some of the topics. And then support for the establishment of nuclear power plants, and those who would oppose having plants in California.

We might center on Proposition 15 in 1976, the Nuclear Safeguards Act, which did not pass as a proposition but passed as your bill a little bit later in the year.* I think it's important to talk about because the proposition, as a lot of ballot propositions are, was a focal point for support or opposition for the particular issue that the proposition addresses. Maybe we could just start with how you might have worked on the ballot initiative, if you did, and then go through its defeat and come out the other side and talk about the bill that was passed.

Warren: Again, a better person to ask might be Dave Pesonen. We first met when the energy policy subcommittee was holding hearings on the implications of relying on nuclear technology to meet California's electricity demands. At the time he was associated with a group opposed to nuclear power. We discussed what could be done to address the questions and issues which our hearings were uncovering. One of us suggested that the next step would have to be some kind of an initiative process as the level of awareness of such issues was then too low for it to act reasonably. The result was Proposition 15. I was not personally involved in the effort to draft or qualify Proposition 15.

We realized that the effort, to be successful, would require a major shift in opinion by most Californians on who still believed that nuclear fission was a very desirable means of generating electricity. We felt this would require a major effort to explain the serious questions about nuclear which deserved public attention.

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Warren: So, upon the qualification of the initiative, my committee began extended hearings on nuclear full cycle and technology. Those hearings continued for fifteen weeks. Expert witnesses from all over the country attended and participated. We had some of the foremost experts involved in the nuclear debate nationally as witnesses. We made an effort to interest the press in what we were learning.

The result was, I believe, we informed members of the committee about the serious concerns of nuclear technology, and through them our colleagues in the legislature.

While developing a legislative response to nuclear concerns, particularly those which we thought were significant, we suggested to the nuclear industry that I and members of the committee would not endorse the initiative if they did not oppose our program. An understanding of this nature was reached. I don't know if they could have prevented the passage of our program. They seem to think they could have, perhaps they could. In any event, I do not think the initiative would have passed whether the legislature acted or not. All in all, I thought it was a good show with good results. I think Dave Pesonen is the one you might want to talk to if you haven't already.

Sharp: No, I haven't, but I would like to. It's certainly an issue that's very important in California.

With respect to some of the different state agencies who would have had some direct contact with plant siting, the role of the Resources Agency comes to mind, and how it might have been involved somehow in either opposition to the bills or opposition to the initiative itself, if you might have heard from them or exactly what their role might have been. I wonder if that was anything that you recall.

Warren: I paid no attention to the agencies. Was it Claire Dedrick who was then Resources secretary?

Sharp: I'm pretty sure it was.

Warren: They were just not players, not in the matters we were then considering. I don't recall them being involved.

Sharp: We did some interviews with Ike Livermore, who was Resources secretary during Mr. Reagan's administration, and the Resources Agency was involved somewhat in early period; but I didn't know really how that all shifted with the new commissions and so on that had been established during the [Edmund G.] Brown, Jr. years, if the role of the Resources Agency went up or decreased.

Warren: Not in the development of the nuclear moratorium laws. By then, of course, we had the Energy Commission, and the role of the Resources
Warren: Agency, to the extent that it had a role in the nuclear matter or even plant siting, was significantly reduced. I don't think it was much of a player anymore.

Sharp: What about the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the successor to the AEC, the Atomic Energy Commission?

Warren: We considered the Atomic Energy Commission part of the problem. The testimony of witnesses about the AEC and its activities caused our concerns to become more intense, because such testimony indicated the industry was not being regulated in the public interest; that, in fact, the AEC had become the handmaiden of the industry it was charged to regulate. For example, the AEC refused to consider a whole range of safety-related and other siting issues involved in the development of commercial technology.

I'm not sure human institutions are capable of regulating this technology, as a matter of fact. But I do know that what we had was not and what we have now is not. Because there remain a whole host of safety issues which have not been satisfactorily addressed—as we are learning each day.

Sharp: By '79, three years down the road, the grassroots opposition to nuclear power in California had increased a lot. Groups like Abalone Alliance, just a whole host of anti-nuclear power groups were really on the increase and had some direct evidence of real problems, especially after Three Mile Island and the problems that were there.

Along with this increase in opposition to nuclear power is the increase in opposition to the use and development of nuclear weapons. It seemed to me as if one's consciousness was led from one to the other.

What we're really getting to is talking about the U.S. Supreme Court case that you were involved in in terms of nuclear power in California that you had mentioned much earlier.

But I wondered if you could just talk a little about the climate of opposition to and the support of nuclear power in California, how that sort of grew through the next several years, if you remember very much about it.

Warren: The event which triggered the growth of national concern over commercial nuclear development was Three Mile Island. This event involved a loss-of-coolant and partial fuel core meltdown at the Three Mile Island power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. It occurred in late March, 1979, at a time where many people were lining up to see the movie "The China Syndrome" which dealt with a partial core meltdown at a fictional plant. Three Mile Island seemed to validate for most people in the country the concerns of those hostile to nuclear technology had been expressing. Then, I suppose people tend to associate, albeit
Warren: erroneously, the image of a mushroom cloud with a breakdown at a commercial nuclear plant. Although the events are completely dissimilar, nevertheless the association does exist. It's not a fair or rational association, except that it does make the case that society is dealing with a technology that is quite complicated in whatever form—commercial or weapon form—and may be beyond society's ability to control.

Now, there have been a number of episodes in recent years of failures in nuclear technology, and as operating plants have matured more problems have become apparent. And as these failures and problems multiply, the technology becomes increasingly suspect. Or at least American technology becomes more suspect. Whether or not we'll see a change in patterns and attitudes, I don't know. I do not believe the battle is over by any means, because alternative nuclear technologies may prove to be more acceptable. But certainly the nuclear technology with which we are familiar in this country is in trouble. For example, San Onofre One, the nuclear power plant in southern California, did not operate for many months. And the reason why it did not operate may be extremely expensive to repair. Diablo Canyon may come on line, but only at a very high cost to consumers and shareholders.* The action by the NRC in the last month, refusing to permit a recently completed plant, has to cause the industry to become nervous.

But eventually, I think the adverse economics of nuclear technology will cause utility managers to be very chary of opting for nuclear generation in the decades ahead. I don't see utility managers doing it anymore. So what was a political issue for many is now an economic issue for utility managers. As we get over current site-specific controversies, such as the Abalone Alliance with Diablo Canyon and the Clamshell Alliance with the Seabrook, New Hampshire plant, I think that the issue will fade away, mainly because there will be no more battles to be won, the war will be over.

Sharp: What about, then, the United States Supreme Court case that you mentioned to me?

Warren: The nuclear industry and utility managers, including their many lawyers, believed there was no role for a state in the many decisions involved in siting, constructing, and operating nuclear power plants. Acting on such belief, they decided to challenge California's three moratorium statutes on the basis the state lacked jurisdiction. However, such arguments were soundly and roundly rejected by the Supreme Court. That decision had to have disturbed the industry.

Sharp: What's the name of the case?


Sharp: Was the decision in '83?


Sharp: Why did you decide to get involved in working on the case? I'm not really sure about your connection with it.

Warren: I was only involved in that I gave testimony describing the background and the legislature's intent in drafting and enacting the moratorium statutes. I suppose it was because of the testimony of myself and others that the Supreme Court ruled as it did. But I was not involved in any other way than that.
VIII THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT

Sharp: That leads us to talking about really a different level, your work on the Council on Environmental Quality, which is the last big topic that I wanted to cover with you. I have down that you were on it 1977 to 1980. Is that right?

Warren: Through September of '79.

Sharp: Maybe we could just start at the very beginning and you could talk about what all led up to your being appointed to the council, and what your work with the council as chairman was.

Warren: After the enactment of AB1575 in California, which was the first successful effort by any governmental jurisdiction to deal with the energy problem in any of its aspects, other state and federal energy officials in Washington became curious about what we were doing in California. We had a head start on almost everybody else. One result was that the National Conference of State Legislators formed a new committee on energy policy and I was asked to serve as chairman. Also about this time the Federal Energy Administration formed an advisory group, and I was asked to be a member. The advisory group was very active and it gave me an opportunity to visit Washington D.C. quite frequently to meet with energy officials.

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Warren: Our success in passing [AB]1575 caused people outside California to shrug their shoulders in disbelief we were able to get the bill passed and signed by Governor Reagan.

Among a small circle, I became a minor celebrity and received credit which I did not deserve for things which I did not fully understand. I was considered an environmentalist, but I'm not sure I was deserving. Certainly I had environmental concerns, but I'd given such concerns only limited thought and attention. I was considered an energy expert, yet my knowledge and experience were in a very limited area of the field. So my expanded activities were a
Warren: learning process and given my new interest in these matters and my growing commitment to these kinds of issues, it was a process I particularly welcomed.

Then when the nuclear moratorium laws were passed, the same people shook their heads in disbelief and wondered, "What the hell is going on out in California?" Shortly thereafter, I was invited to be a member of an energy advisory group that Jimmy Carter assembled after he had been nominated. I think some folks back east who had worked for Carter and who knew me recommended I be on the group. The only meeting of the group with Carter took place at his mother's Pond House in Plains, Georgia. I also wrote two or three memos for the campaign but I don't know what was done with them. However, after the election President Carter asked me to become a member of his administration, and I did.

I met with President Carter on inauguration day, a few minutes after his arrival at the White House. We chatted for a few minutes in the Oval Office and he asked me if I had given any thought to what I wanted to do in Washington D.C. I told him that I thought I could serve best in a position involving environmental policy and suggested I be appointed to chair his Council on Environmental Policy and that the position be given cabinet rank. He agreed and sent me to Hamilton Jordan's office for the paperwork.

Sharp: What was the council supposed to do? What was its main task?

Warren: The council was established in 1970 as a part of the National Environmental Policy Act, and it was to serve as an environmental policy advisor to the president and to Congress. It was also supposed to prepare an annual report on the status of the nation's environment and to serve as a research group in dealing with environmental policy. The act was passed during President [Richard] Nixon's administration and signed by him. The first chairman, appointed by Nixon, was Russell Train. It helped Congress and the Nixon-Ford administrations develop a number of the environmental laws subsequently passed, and was viewed as a respectable, objective, almost nonpartisan policy voice in Washington.

Russell Train, of course, went on to become the first administrator of EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], which CEQ recommended be created.

By 1977, CEQ was viewed as a fairly significant, non-political, cabinet-level, policy-making organization. Few people had heard of it; few people have heard of it today.

When I first learned of CEQ and its responsibilities, I thought how it would be very nice to do—without having any hope of ever becoming involved in its work. So when President Carter asked me
Warren: what I wanted to do, and I said, "I want to be chairman of CEQ", I'm not sure he knew what it was.

Sharp: Did he just say, "Oh, okay"?

Warren: [laughs] That's just about it. He told me, "Well, write me a memo and tell me what it does." Throughout, he was very sympathetic, very supportive, and strongly motivated to support environmental goals and objectives.

The first significant thing we did was, to obtain permission to prepare a presidential message on the environment. For the first several months of 1977, we worked with major federal governmental agencies to assemble what became President Carter's environmental program.

The environmental message was issued on May 23, 1977 from the White House. It was a very comprehensive statement of environmental goals. The development process of the message is interesting in terms of the political science of resolving interagency disagreements at the federal level.* One small part of the message pertained to the question I had long pondered, that is about population, resource requirements, and environmental effects. I wanted to take a look at such questions globally, from the global perspective. One of the provisions of the environmental message gave CEQ the responsibility, along with the State Department, of conducting that global assessment. That assessment became known as the Global 2000 project.**

An important feature in the environmental message was, in addition to the range of legislative proposals and administrative initiatives, the president gave to the Council on Environmental Quality the authority to monitor federal agency implementation of the message. Then finally, the president told CEQ to report back to him in two years, on the extent of compliance by federal agencies with his environmental goals. So, in combination that gave CEQ the powers of the presidency to deal with other federal agencies on environmental issues.

As I said, it is an interesting political science lesson to learn how federal agencies fight each other, because battles in Washington—they're not so much with Congress or the other party [laughs], it's among an administration's own people.

Sharp: Among the agencies.

*Copies of the message and issue memorandum to President Carter have been deposited with this interview in The Bancroft Library.

Warren: That's right. By that action: letting us write the message and set forth his program, giving us authority to enforce his program, and then letting others know we would be reporting back to him; the president made us a major player in the corridors of power among all the agencies—the State Department, Defense, EPA, whatever. We were involved. It was a very exciting time. It was a nice time to be involved in environmental issues. For the Global 2000 project we created a task force which I chaired. Patsy Mink, who was an assistant secretary of state, served as my co-chair. We retained Gerald Barney, who had just finished an environmental report for the Rockefeller Foundation, to conduct the study and to write what eventually became known as the Global 2000 report. My personal opinion is that the report is one of the more lasting accomplishments, one of the more significant accomplishments, of the Carter administration. It has received considerable attention internationally and is constantly referred to as a document worth reviewing.

While our major purpose was the report itself we also wanted to test the forecasting capability of the United States government. I had in mind our California handbook, and the question: "Is all this right or wrong?" I knew that in California we worked with very elementary expertise and few resources. In Washington, I decided I would try to assemble the resources of the federal government, the government of the United States, the single most powerful and able government in the world, and learn what its expertise and resources could provide. So, the report while written by CEQ, reflects the data, analysis, and forecasting of various federal agencies. It has been criticized as a document prepared by CEQ zealots, but it really was not. It's a reflection of the forecasting capability of key federal agencies. Now, to the extent such forecasts are wrong, then to such extent are the data and analyses used presently by federal agencies incorrect!

Yet, the battle goes on, you know. One of the things that Herman Kahn was doing at the Hudson Institute before his death was writing a book to disprove Global 2000. A lot of people all over the world have made similar attempts. But none of them have been successful or persuasive.

Sharp: Because it's too gloomy?

Warren: Well, its implications are rather stark. It is a gloomy document, but it's not a document without hope. It identifies and describes some very disturbing trends, but these trends are capable of human management. It says we damn well better understand these trends in order to make sure our management efforts are truly corrective, that they correct rather than aggravate.

What I learned early on, right from the start, was that while some resource shortages could be dealt with by a technological fix or
Warren: an innovation, sometimes the fix or innovation created problems which surpassed the problem that was to have been solved. This may be what causes people to be disturbed with the Global 2000.

For example, to what extent should we rely on a very sophisticated technology such as nuclear fission or fusion to relieve energy shortages?

To what extent should we count on intensive application of toxic and other chemicals of the green revolution to relieve food shortages in regions where populations are growing rapidly? We are beginning to see trouble spots in Norman Bourlag's technological approach to food production. One can go on.

All the Global 2000 is saying, in my opinion, is that we should examine those options very, very carefully before we are forced to embrace them. Actually, it says more than that. I guess fundamentally it says: Let's not get ourselves into that kind of a Hobson's choice situation.* And saying so implies we examine such causes as population growth and industrialization.

I suppose if one worked his way back through the interactions of population growth and industrialization, one eventually would get to what I think is the root problem there. If a solution is to be found, I suspect it will involve cultural-religious attitudes. Technology and innovation are important but alone will not provide the prosperity and social harmony all peoples seek. Without more benign cultural and religious attitudes, I'm just not quite sure that society is capable of making the basic adaptations or adjustments to avoid the Global 2000 projections.

Sharp: You mean our changing our ideas about what's important to us?

Warren: Well, it's changing our ideas about interhuman relationships and about relationships with other forms and with the world itself.

Some people suggest or think that the Global 2000 and other efforts are against innovation, against technology, and that's just not true. It's against some innovation and some technology, but in fact it depends on innovation and technology to provide acceptable options. Conservation of energy, conservation of resources, preservation of species, cannot be accomplished without innovation and new technology. So to that extent, that's very desirable.

Some people also interpret Global 2000 as against material improvement in the quality of human life, and that's not all true. Just the reverse.

My own view is that even development of new systems and new technologies for such desirable purposes as recycling resources more

*John Hobson was an English economist.
Warren: efficiently using resources, may be unable to prevent the loss of amenities essential to social well being. That's when I get into the ethical-cultural-religious issues involving the role of the human species in relation to the universe, the world, nature, and other life forms. I think if we could improve those relationships, then other problems would tend to disappear, would kind of sort themselves out.
IX THINKING LIKE AN ENVIRONMENTALIST

Sharp: Did you think about any of these things early on, when you were still in California wondering about the forest practices?

Warren: No. [pauses]

Sharp: Because I would be interested to have us sort of end with whatever thoughts you have on the evolution of your own thinking, based on some of the stuff we've talked about today, starting on a very, very limited basis and trying to do something about the forest practices, to entirely worldwide considerations, from the perspective that you had sitting as chairman of CEQ, because it's a long way.

Warren: Oh yes, and frankly I feel I'm not there yet; I'm still wondering.

Sharp: Like you sort of had the experiences before you could--

Warren: Exactly. When I became chairman of CEQ, I had the reputation of being an environmentalist but, in fact, I only had a general interest in the environment. Actually, I was taught to become an environmentalist at CEQ. I became an environmentalist because that was my job.

Only after becoming chairman and working with issues at CEQ, did my interest in environmental issues develop into my becoming an environmentalist. By that I mean, few other issues are of concern to me now. Today, I could not serve in the legislature and deal with the range of issues that confronts every member; they're just of no interest to me anymore.

I've been trying to sort out in my mind why this is so and how to deal with it in terms of policy, that is to determine the policy implications of what my experience and intuition suggest are true. It's curious that my experience and intuition ultimately resulted in my becoming an environmentalist. Today, I feel the same commitment to environmental causes as I once felt for other issues and causes.
Warren: What troubles me now is how can those who share that commitment accomplish significant policy change. Which is not to say that change has not occurred; such change has occurred and is occurring. But my feeling is that our environmental changes will be deficient until we are able to take them to a level, an order of magnitude deeper than the level we are at present. That's what I would like to work on next.

For example, and I'll cut this short, if I was to relive the time I was preoccupied with agricultural land preservation, I believe my approach would be quite different. Instead of seeking to preserve agricultural land I would be more concerned with the fact that population growth is what drives the need for more food and the need to preserve agricultural land to produce that food.

And that the quest for additional agricultural land results in the destruction of certain of the world's amenities, which we classify today as environmental—Such things as forests and wetlands. Why are forests and wetlands important: Because they're life-giving, They support other life forms.

Sharp: Birds.

Warren: --all habitats in which other life forms live. Now, one may ask, is that bad? Why should we care about other life forms? I think that we should care for other life forms, just as a matter of natural stewardship. Somehow, an answer "why we care" has to be developed.

Meanwhile, until we can develop that answer, why do humans want a world population of eight billion going on twelve billion people? I do not see what purpose there is in the human species multiplying itself to the extent presently projected.

Frankly, I would rather have fewer humans on earth if it would mean the preservation of all other life forms. If the growth of human numbers means the destruction of other life forms, and I think it does, then I think the quality of life including our own will be diminished considerably. We will have lost something, something which cannot be offset by additional billions of people on earth.

How do you deal with the policy implications of that concept? How do you even talk about it? I don't know. It's hard.

Now one can say, well, we ought to be concerned with such things because of their ultimate effect on our own human societies—that is, carbon dioxide, acid rain, deforestation, desertification, contaminated air and water, and so on, are harmful to humans. Well, that's one way of doing it, and that's the way we've been doing it.
Warren: But I find that approach only partly acceptable; I would like to find a more basic and compelling reason for dealing with such issues. Because such issues pose problems which are capable of being addressed by a technological fix.

What I would like to see, in addition to a technological fix, is a reformed set of human values and ethics. I don't know how to do that. I haven't fully explored how, but that's what I would like to do.

For the moment, I am content with letting Global 2000 play out. There are organizations that exist to study and deal with its implications and to inform others about such implications. The report will have some impact, and twenty years from now, it will be viewed as one of the more significant contributions of the Carter administration.

Sharp: It certainly was a remarkable document to look at and see what information was available in one volume to marshal certain kinds of arguments against excesses in the use of energy and other resources. Some of the arguments for corrections were obvious, about what things we could do, but it was very revealing just to see it, to see it all together.

Warren: It should be updated I think, about every ten years. I hope a future administration will re-establish CEQ, and that updating the report will become one of its prime functions. I say, our effort was very basic, which is to say it certainly deserves review and correction.

Sharp: I've used up a lot of your time.

Warren: I don't know how to tie this in with your study of the Reagan years, except to conclude by saying that one of the things Reagan did in Washington was to weaken CEQ considerably. [chuckles]

Sharp: What are they doing now?

Warren: Nothing! It just exists. They've got their three members. They have no staff. They do not put out an annual report anymore. But it's still there. I have talked with its present chairman, Allen Hill. The fact CEQ still exists, even on paper, means that a future administration can—

Sharp: —Bring it out.

Warren: Correct.

Transcriber: Sam Middlebrooks
Final Typist: Valerie McFarlane
## TAPE GUIDE -- Charles H. Warren

### Interview 1: July 14, 1983
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If the earth must lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it owes to things that the unlimited increase of wealth would extipate from it, for the mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger but not happier or better population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that they will be content to be stationary, long before necessity compels them to it.

John Stuart Mill
Principles of Political Economy

The spirit of Parson Thomas Malthus remains irrepressible. As religious fundamentalists once rejected his "struggle for existence" theory extended by Darwin into "natural selection", so now do economic fundamentalists dismiss his concepts of constraints on population size extended by systems analysts to a suggestion of general limits to growth.

It is no longer permissible to defer consideration of the consummate gluttony with which we are devouring the finite resources of the earth. The "posterity" for whose survival John Stuart Mill expressed such concern may well consist of those whom each of us today knows and loves. There is no longer time to tolerate the belief that future generations will accommodate our folly. Ours is the generation that must respond to its own folly.

We are at the beginning of an epoch marked by events unanticipated by most and characterized by all as "crises": food, energy, inflation, unemployment, and environment among others. As each crisis is viewed as a separate event bearing scant relation to the others, the problems are parceled out to bureaucracies which respond with their conventional wisdom and conventional solutions.

The confluence of these events may be more than coincidental. It may be a harbinger of a radical change in man's relationship with his earth. Such events may be manifestations of a critical stage reached in the continued exponential growth in the consumption of resources. Conventional wisdom, unattuned to these underlying changes, may then not relieve but aggravate the problems.

These particular questions are laden with controversy. Are we facing shortages in usable energy, mineral, and food resources? Are we approaching a pollution crisis brought on by our own gluttony? Are we confronted with an uncontrollable explosion of humanity? If so, when and under what circumstances? Even though these may be problems of global scale, neither the United States nor California will be isolated from their effects. The world has become a seamless, interdependent web--through communications, through trade. What then will be the implications of these problems for California and the United States? What, if anything, should be done now?
To aid us in reflecting upon such matters we have engaged the services of the Institute for Applied Research. In this handbook they have compiled some of the most relevant data bearing on population and resource consumption questions. They have not selected data which supports only one point of view; rather the data on all sides of each question are presented even if that required the inclusion of conflicting information. The data is arranged to present the world, national, and state situation in each of five critical areas: population, food, energy, minerals, and pollution. The reader is invited to use this handbook as a means both to form his own judgements on these issues and to weigh the judgements of others.

In two companion reports the Institute has presented in a concise fashion the results of their preliminary analysis and identification of (1) the impacts on California of the global population and resource trends projected by the Institute and (2) potential responses appropriate for California. A comprehensive treatment is contained in Population and Resources: A Policy Focus for California. Because of the importance of population growth as a determinant of global resource problems, a separate report, entitled The Population Predicament: A Perspective on Reducing Fertility, considers in more detail projections of world population size and the prospects for slowing the growth rate.

In my view, population growth coupled with increasing per capita consumption of resources conspire to inflict on people everywhere and on governments at all levels one crisis after another. The real question is whether we have the understanding and the will to respond. If we do not, one must wonder along with John Stuart Mill, to what condition "necessity" will compel us.

Charles Warren, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Diminishing Materials
CONCLUSIONS

POPULATION

- Rapid population growth worldwide is an extremely recent (twentieth century) phenomenon in the age of mankind. Much of it is due to rapid decreases in mortality rates in the less developed areas of the world without commensurate decreases in birth rates.

- Historically, as nations developed, the growth rate has declined due to reductions in birth rates and stabilizing death rates (at low levels). Declines in birth rate, however, always lag behind declines in death rate. Thus, decreasing population growth in developing nations has been achieved only over long periods of time.

- It is now generally accepted that death rates everywhere will be brought to the lowest levels which available knowledge, means, and other circumstances permit. A very sudden cut-down of birth rates to the levels already reached by the death rates is entirely improbable. Enormous future increases in the numbers of mankind are therefore a virtual certainty, unless disasters occur on a hitherto unimaginable scale.

- Even if the U. S. were to maintain its currently low fertility rate (1.9), the population of the U. S. would continue to increase for another 70 years because of the disproportionately large number of young persons in the population resulting from the post-war "baby boom".
CONCLUSION SUMMARY (Continued):

POPOPULATION (Continued)

• The population growth rate of California has been steadily declining over the past two decades. If a total fertility rate of 2.1 were maintained in conjunction with an annual net in-migration of 50,000, the population of California would not exceed 26 million in the year 2000.

FOOD

• Only 30% of the earth's land surface is composed of tillable land. Even with great increases in agricultural productivity, the required supply of this land may be exhausted in the early 21st Century.

• The greatest potential for expansion of arable land exists in Africa and Latin America. The costs of this expansion in terms of reclamation and energy will be great.

• Demands for increased food production will cause persistent upward pressures on fertilizer prices. This will have stifling effects upon the use of high yielding, fertilizer intensive "Green Revolution" crops, especially in developing countries.

• The heavy usage of pesticides is providing diminishing returns. Europe uses 82.5% less pesticide than Japan (the world's heaviest user of pesticides), but it has an agricultural yield only 37.5% less than Japan's.
CONCLUSION SUMMARY (Continued):

FOOD (Continued)

- U. S. agriculture is experiencing diminishing returns in terms of food output per units of energy input. The efficiency for corn of food energy output versus energy input declined 11% from 1950 to 1970.

- Since 1956, per capita agricultural production in developed countries has increased 23%. In the same period, the per capita production in less developed countries increased only 5%.

- The gross contribution of agriculture to the U. S. balance of payments increased 80% in the interval 1969-1972. Agricultural products are essentially the only non-military export commodities which may be potentially expanded to alleviate U. S. balance of payments deficits caused by imports of petroleum.

MINERAL RESOURCES

- As shortages of minerals develop, the prime symptom will be steadily increasing prices for the minerals rather than sudden depletion.

- Due to both U. S. and world wide inadequacy of reserves, the prices of copper, lead, mercury, tin, tungsten, and zinc can be expected to significantly increase over the near future.
CONCLUSION SUMMARY (Continued):

MINERAL RESOURCES (Continued)

- The limited reserves of mercury pose a crucial problem, since there are no substitutes for mercury in critical applications.

- Minerals for which the U. S. has a large import dependency and whose imports are potentially subject to export embargoes include chromium, manganese, nickel, and the platinum group metals.

ENERGY

- 75% of world energy supply comes from non-renewable fossil fuel sources.

- In 1973, the United States imported 36.6% of its oil requirements. Of these imports, only 13% were from the middle east.

- By 1972, approximately 13% of the ultimate world reserves of petroleum had been depleted. At the current production growth trends, world reserves would be depleted in under 70 years. Thus, under this scenario, petroleum would no longer be used as a fuel source beyond 2025.

- By conservative estimates the U. S. has exhausted about 50% of its crude oil and natural gas reserves and will exhaust them fully early in the next century.
CONCLUSION SUMMARY (Continued):

ENERGY (Continued)

- Under business as usual attitude and an $11/bbl price for oil, the U. S. would have a 26.5 billion dollar annual outflow for oil in 1977. Under a joint policy of conservation and accelerated domestic production (or energy source substitution), the dollar outflow could be reduced to zero by 1985.

- An effective energy conservation program would produce a saving of 1.5 to 2.5 millions of barrels of oil per day (9-17% of 1973 consumption).

- Use of nuclear power is generally projected as an increasingly important energy source of the future. Recent trends in financing difficulties, problems with construction lead times, licensing delays and especially more evident safety problems seriously jeopardize these projections.

POLLUTION

- The levels of pollution will increase by the year 2000, unless an active abatement policy, significantly more comprehensive than current controls, is pursued.

- Electric energy generation systems will produce sharply rising environmental impacts in future decades. Most of these impacts are beyond technically feasible control.
CONCLUSION SUMMARY (Continued):

POLLUTION (Continued)

- Huge projected increases in carbon dioxide concentration (from burning of fossil fuels) and thermal waste could produce dramatic climatic changes.

- Deposits of lead are exponentially increasing on a global wide basis.

- If government projections of installed nuclear generating capacity in the United States materialize, there will be exponential increases in quantities of nuclear wastes both stored and released to the atmosphere.

- Waste heat released in the Los Angeles basin currently amounts to about 5% of the total solar energy absorbed on the ground and is projected to reach 18% by the year 2000. This heat is already having an effect upon the local climate.
Major Findings and Conclusions

If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now. Serious stresses involving population, resources, and environment are clearly visible ahead. Despite greater material output, the world’s people will be poorer in many ways than they are today.

For hundreds of millions of the desperately poor, the outlook for food and other necessities of life will be no better. For many it will be worse. Barring revolutionary advances in technology, life for most people on earth will be more precarious in 2000 than it is now—unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends.

This, in essence, is the picture emerging from the U.S. Government’s projections of probable changes in world population, resources, and environment by the end of the century, as presented in the Global 2000 Study. They do not predict what will occur. Rather, they depict conditions that are likely to develop if there are no changes in public policies, institutions, or rates of technological advance, and if there are no wars or other major disruptions. A keener awareness of the nature of the current trends, however, may induce changes that will alter these trends and the projected outcome.

Principal Findings

Rapid growth in world population will hardly have altered by 2000. The world’s population will grow from 4 billion in 1975 to 6.35 billion in 2000, an increase of more than 50 percent. The rate of growth will slow only marginally, from 1.8 percent a year to 1.7 percent. In terms of sheer numbers, population will be growing faster in 2000 than it is today, with 100 million people added each year compared with 75 million in 1975. Ninety percent of this growth will occur in the poorest countries.

While the economies of the less developed countries (LDCs) are expected to grow at faster rates than those of the industrialized nations, the gross national product per capita in most LDCs remains low. The average gross national product per capita is projected to rise substantially in some LDCs (especially in Latin America), but in the great populous nations of South Asia it remains below $200 a year (in 1975 dollars). The large existing gap between the rich and poor nations widens.

World food production is projected to increase 90 percent over the 30 years from 1970 to 2000. This translates into a global per capita increase of
less than 15 percent over the same period. The bulk of that increase goes to
countries that already have relatively high per capita food consumption.
Meanwhile per capita consumption in South Asia, the Middle East, and
the LDCs of Africa will scarcely improve or will actually decline below pre-
sent inadequate levels. At the same time, real prices for food are expected to
double.

Arable land will increase only 4 percent by 2000, so that most of the in-
creased output of food will have to come from higher yields. Most of the
elements that now contribute to higher yields—fertilizer, pesticides, power
for irrigation, and fuel for machinery—depend heavily on oil and gas.

During the 1990s world oil production will approach geological esti-
mates of maximum production capacity, even with rapidly increasing petro-
leum prices. The Study projects that the richer industrialized nations will be
able to command enough oil and other commercial energy supplies to meet
rising demands through 1990. With the expected price increases, many less
developed countries will have increasing difficulties meeting energy needs.
For the one-quarter of humankind that depends primarily on wood for fuel,
the outlook is bleak. Needs for fuelwood will exceed available supplies by
about 25 percent before the turn of the century.

While the world’s finite fuel resources—coal, oil, gas, oil shale, tar
sands, and uranium—are theoretically sufficient for centuries, they are not
evenly distributed; they pose difficult economic and environmental prob-
lems; and they vary greatly in their amenability to exploitation and use.

Nonfuel mineral resources generally appear sufficient to meet projected
demands through 2000, but further discoveries and investments will be
needed to maintain reserves. In addition, production costs will increase with
energy prices and may make some nonfuel mineral resources uneconomic.
The quarter of the world’s population that inhabits industrial countries will
continue to absorb three-fourths of the world’s mineral production.

Regional water shortages will become more severe. In the 1970–2000
period population growth alone will cause requirements for water to double
in nearly half the world. Still greater increases would be needed to improve
standards of living. In many LDCs, water supplies will become increasingly
erratic by 2000 as a result of extensive deforestation. Development of new
water supplies will become more costly virtually everywhere.

Significant losses of world forests will continue over the next 20 years
as demand for forest products and fuelwood increases. Growing stocks of
commercial-size timber are projected to decline 50 percent per capita. The
world’s forests are now disappearing at the rate of 18–20 million hectares a
year (an area half the size of California), with most of the loss occurring in
the humid tropical forests of Africa, Asia, and South America. The projec-
tions indicate that by 2000 some 40 percent of the remaining forest cover in
LDCs will be gone.

Serious deterioration of agricultural soils will occur worldwide, due to
erosion, loss of organic matter, desertification, salinization, alkalinization,
and waterlogging. Already, an area of cropland and grassland approximately
the size of Maine is becoming barren wasteland each year, and the spread of desert-like conditions is likely to accelerate.

Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and ozone-depleting chemicals are expected to increase at rates that could alter the world’s climate and upper atmosphere significantly by 2050. Acid rain from increased combustion of fossil fuels (especially coal) threatens damage to lakes, soils, and crops. Radioactive and other hazardous materials present health and safety problems in increasing numbers of countries.

Extinctions of plant and animal species will increase dramatically. Hundreds of thousands of species—perhaps as many as 20 percent of all species on earth—will be irretrievably lost as their habitats vanish, especially in tropical forests.

The future depicted by the U.S. Government projections, briefly outlined above, may actually understate the impending problems. The methods available for carrying out the Study led to certain gaps and inconsistencies that tend to impart an optimistic bias. For example, most of the individual projections for the various sectors studied—food, minerals, energy, and so on—assume that sufficient capital, energy, water, and land will be available in each of these sectors to meet their needs, regardless of the competing needs of the other sectors. More consistent, better-integrated projections would produce a still more emphatic picture of intensifying stresses, as the world enters the twenty-first century.

Conclusions

At present and projected growth rates, the world’s population would reach 10 billion by 2030 and would approach 30 billion by the end of the twenty-first century. These levels correspond closely to estimates by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences of the maximum carrying capacity of the entire earth. Already the populations in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Himalayan hills of Asia have exceeded the carrying capacity of the immediate area, triggering an erosion of the land’s capacity to support life. The resulting poverty and ill health have further complicated efforts to reduce fertility. Unless this circle of interlinked problems is broken soon, population growth in such areas will unfortunately be slowed for reasons other than declining birth rates. Hunger and disease will claim more babies and young children, and more of those surviving will be mentally and physically handicapped by childhood malnutrition.

Indeed, the problems of preserving the carrying capacity of the earth and sustaining the possibility of a decent life for the human beings that inhabit it are enormous and close upon us. Yet there is reason for hope. It must be emphasized that the Global 2000 Study’s projections are based on the assumption that national policies regarding population stabilization, resource conservation, and environmental protection will remain essentially unchanged through the end of the century. But in fact, policies are beginning to change. In some areas, forests are being replanted after cutting. Some nations are taking steps to reduce soil losses and desertification. Interest in
energy conservation is growing, and large sums are being invested in exploring alternatives to petroleum dependence. The need for family planning is slowly becoming better understood. Water supplies are being improved and waste treatment systems built. High-yield seeds are widely available and seed banks are being expanded. Some wildlands with their genetic resources are being protected. Natural predators and selective pesticides are being substituted for persistent and destructive pesticides.

Encouraging as these developments are, they are far from adequate to meet the global challenges projected in this Study. Vigorous, determined new initiatives are needed if worsening poverty and human suffering, environmental degradation, and international tension and conflicts are to be prevented. There are no quick fixes. The only solutions to the problems of population, resources, and environment are complex and long-term. These problems are inextricably linked to some of the most perplexing and persistent problems in the world—poverty, injustice, and social conflict. New and imaginative ideas—and a willingness to act on them—are essential.

The needed changes go far beyond the capability and responsibility of this or any other single nation. An era of unprecedented cooperation and commitment is essential. Yet there are opportunities—and a strong rationale—for the United States to provide leadership among nations. A high priority for this Nation must be a thorough assessment of its foreign and domestic policies relating to population, resources, and environment. The United States, possessing the world’s largest economy, can expect its policies to have a significant influence on global trends. An equally important priority for the United States is to cooperate generously and justly with other nations—particularly in the areas of trade, investment, and assistance—in seeking solutions to the many problems that extend beyond our national boundaries. There are many unfulfilled opportunities to cooperate with other nations in efforts to relieve poverty and hunger, stabilize population, and enhance economic and environmental productivity. Further cooperation among nations is also needed to strengthen international mechanisms for protecting and utilizing the "global commons"—the oceans and atmosphere.

To meet the challenges described in this Study, the United States must improve its ability to identify emerging problems and assess alternative responses. In using and evaluating the Government’s present capability for long-term global analysis, the Study found serious inconsistencies in the methods and assumptions employed by the various agencies in making their projections. The Study itself made a start toward resolving these inadequacies. It represents the Government’s first attempt to produce an interrelated set of population, resource, and environmental projections, and it has brought forth the most consistent set of global projections yet achieved by U.S. agencies. Nevertheless, the projections still contain serious gaps and contradictions that must be corrected if the Government’s analytic capability is to be improved. It must be acknowledged that at present the Federal agencies are not always capable of providing projections of the quality needed for long-term policy decisions.

While limited resources may be a contributing factor in some instances,
the primary problem is lack of coordination. The U.S. Government needs a mechanism for continuous review of the assumptions and methods the Federal agencies use in their projection models and for assurance that the agencies' models are sound, consistent, and well documented. The improved analyses that could result would provide not only a clearer sense of emerging problems and opportunities, but also a better means for evaluating alternative responses, and a better basis for decisions of worldwide significance that the President, the Congress, and the Federal Government as a whole must make.

With its limitations and rough approximations, the Global 2000 Study may be seen as no more than a reconnaissance of the future; nonetheless its conclusions are reinforced by similar findings of other recent global studies that were examined in the course of the Global 2000 Study (see Appendix). All these studies are in general agreement on the nature of the problems and on the threats they pose to the future welfare of humankind. The available evidence leaves no doubt that the world—including this Nation—faces enormous, urgent, and complex problems in the decades immediately ahead. Prompt and vigorous changes in public policy around the world are needed to avoid or minimize these problems before they become unmanageable. Long lead times are required for effective action. If decisions are delayed until the problems become worse, options for effective action will be severely reduced.
The preceding sections have presented individually the many projections made by U.S. Government agencies for the Global 2000 Study. How are these projections to be interpreted collectively? What do they imply about the world's entry into the twenty-first century?

The world in 2000 will be different from the world today in important ways. There will be more people. For every two persons on the earth in 1975 there will be three in 2000. The number of poor will have increased. Four-fifths of the world's population will live in less developed countries. Furthermore, in terms of persons per year added to the world, population growth will be 40 percent higher in 2000 than in 1975.

The gap between the richest and the poorest will have increased. By every measure of material welfare the study provides—per capita GNP and consumption of food, energy, and minerals—the gap will widen. For example, the gap between the GNP per capita in the LDCs and the industrialized countries is projected to grow from about $4,000 in 1975 to about $7,900 in 2000. Great disparities within countries are also expected to continue.

There will be fewer resources to go around. While on a worldwide average there was about four-tenths of a hectare of arable land per person in 1975, there will be only about one-quarter hectare per person in 2000 (see Figure 11 below). By 2000 nearly 1,000 billion barrels of the world's total original petroleum resource of approximately 2,000 billion barrels will have been consumed. Over just the 1975-2000 period, the world's remaining petroleum resources per capita can be expected to decline by at least 50 percent.

Over the same period world per capita water supplies will decline by 35 percent because of greater population alone; increasing competing demands will put further pressure on available water supplies. The world's per capita growing stock of wood is projected to be 47 percent lower in 2000 than in 1978.

The environment will have lost important life-supporting capabilities. By 2000, 40 percent of the forests still remaining in the LDCs in 1978 will have been razed. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide will be nearly one-third higher than preindustrial levels. Soil erosion will have removed, on the average, several inches of soil from croplands all over the world. Desertification (including salinization) may have claimed a significant fraction of the world's rangeland and cropland. Over little more than two decades, 15-20 percent of the earth's total species of plants and animals will have become extinct—a loss of at least 500,000 species.

Prices will be higher. The price of many of the most vital resources is projected to rise in real terms—that is, over and above inflation. In order to meet projected demand, a 100 percent increase in the real price of food will be required. To keep energy demand in line with anticipated supplies, the real price of energy is assumed to rise more than 150 percent over the 1975-2000 period. Supplies of water, agricultural land, forest products, and many traditional marine fish species are projected to decline relative to growing demand at current prices, which suggests that real price rises will occur in these sectors too. Collectively, the projections suggest that resource-based inflationary pressures will continue and intensify, especially in nations that are poor in resources or are rapidly depleting their resources.

The world will be more vulnerable both to natural disaster and to disruptions from human causes. Most nations are likely to be still more dependent on foreign sources of energy in 2000 than they are today. Food production will be more vulnerable to disruptions of fossil fuel energy supplies and to weather fluctuations as cultivation expands to more marginal areas. The loss of diverse germ plasm in local strains and wild progenitors of food crops, together with the increase of monoculture, could lead to greater risks
of massive crop failures. Larger numbers of people will be vulnerable to higher food prices or even famine when adverse weather occurs. The world will be more vulnerable to the disruptive effects of war. The tensions that could lead to war will have multiplied. The potential for conflict over fresh water alone is underscored by the fact that out of 200 of the world's major river basins, 148 are shared by two countries and 52 are shared by three to ten countries. Long standing conflicts over shared rivers such as the Plata (Brazil, Argentina), Euphrates (Syria, Iraq), or Ganges (Bangladesh, India) could easily intensify.

Finally, it must be emphasized that if public policy continues generally unchanged the world will be different as a result of lost opportunities. The adverse effects of many of the trends discussed in this Study will not be fully evident until 2000 or later; yet the actions that are necessary to change the trends cannot be postponed without foreclosing important options. The opportunity to stabilize the world's population below 10 billion, for example, is slipping away; Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, has noted that for every decade of delay in reaching replacement fertility, the world's ultimately stabilized population will be about 11 percent greater. Similar losses of opportunity accompany delayed perceptions or action in other areas. If energy policies and decisions are based on yesterday's (or even today's) oil prices, the opportunity to wisely invest scarce capital resources will be lost as a consequence of undervaluing conservation and efficiency. If agricultural research continues to focus on increasing yields through practices that are highly energy-intensive, both energy resources and the time needed to develop alternative practices will be lost.

The full effects of rising concentrations of carbon dioxide, depletion of stratospheric ozone, deterioration of soils, increasing introduction of complex persistent toxic chemicals into the environment, and massive extinction of species may not occur until well after 2000. Yet once such global environmental problems are in motion they are very difficult to reverse. In fact, few if any of the problems addressed in the Global 2000 Study are amenable to quick technological or policy fixes; rather, they are inextricably mixed with the world's most perplexing social and economic problems.

Perhaps the most troubling problems are those in which population growth and poverty lead to serious long-term declines in the productivity of renewable natural resource systems. In some areas the capacity of renewable resource

Figure 11. Arable land per capita, 1955, 1975, 2000.
systems to support human populations is already being seriously damaged by efforts of present populations to meet desperate immediate needs, and the damage threatens to become worse.\(^1\)

Examples of serious deterioration of the earth's most basic resources can already be found today in scattered places in all nations, including the industrialized countries and the better-endowed LDCs. For instance, erosion of agricultural soil and salinization of highly productive irrigated farmland is increasingly evident in the United States,\(^2\) and extensive deforestation, with more or less permanent soil degradation, has occurred in Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia.\(^3\) But problems related to the decline of the earth's carrying capacity are most immediate, severe, and tragic in those regions of the earth containing the poorest LDCs.

Sub-Saharan Africa faces the problem of exhaustion of its resource base in an acute form. Many causes and effects have come together there to produce excessive demands on the environment, leading to expansion of the desert. Overgrazing, fuelwood gathering, and destructive cropping practices are the principal immediate causes of a series of transitions from open woodland, to scrub, to fragile semiarid range, to worthless weeds and bare earth. Matters are made worse when people are forced by scarcity of fuelwood to burn animal dung and crop wastes. The soil, deprived of organic matter, loses fertility, and the ability to hold water—and the desert expands. In Bangladesh, Pakistan, and large parts of India, efforts by growing numbers of people to meet their basic needs are damaging the very cropland, pasture, forests, and water supplies on which they must depend for a livelihood.\(^4\) To restore the lands and soils would require decades—if not centuries—after the existing pressures on the land have diminished. But the pressures are growing, not diminishing.

There are no quick or easy solutions, particularly in those regions where population pressure is already leading to a reduction of the carrying capacity of the land. In such regions a complex of social and economic factors (including very low incomes, inequitable land tenure, limited or no educational opportunities, a lack of non-agricultural jobs, and economic pressures toward higher fertility) underlies the decline in the land's carrying capacity. Furthermore, it is generally believed that social and economic conditions must improve before fertility levels will decline to replacement levels. Thus a vicious circle of causality may be at work. Environmental deterioration caused by large populations creates living conditions that make reductions in fertility difficult to achieve: all the while, continuing population growth increases further the pressures on the environment and land.\(^5\)

The declines in carrying capacity already being observed in scattered areas around the world point to a phenomenon that could easily be much more widespread by 2000. In fact, the best evidence now available—even allowing for the many beneficial effects of technological developments and adoptions—suggests that by 2000 the world's human population may be within only a few generations of reaching the entire planet's carrying capacity.

The Global 2000 Study does not estimate the earth's carrying capacity, but it does provide a basis for evaluating an earlier estimate published in the U.S. National Academy of Sciences' report, Resources and Man. In this 1969 report, the Academy concluded that a world population of 10 billion "is close to (if not above) the maximum that an intensively managed world might hope to support with some degree of comfort and individual choice." The Academy also concluded that even with the sacrifice of individual freedom and even with chronic near starvation for the great majority, the human population of the world is unlikely to ever exceed 30 billion.\(^6\)

Nothing in the Global 2000 Study counters the Academy's conclusions. If anything, data gathered over the past decade suggest the Academy may have underestimated the extent of some problems, especially deforestation and the loss and deterioration of soils.\(^7\)

At present and projected growth rates, the world's population would rapidly approach the Academy's figures. If the fertility and mortality rates projected for 2000 were to continue unchanged into the twenty-first century, the world's population would reach 10 billion by 2030. Thus anyone with a present life expectancy of an additional 50 years could expect to see the world population reach 10 billion. This same rate of growth would produce a population of nearly 30 billion before the end of the twenty-first century.\(^8\)

Here it must be emphasized that, unlike most
of the Global 2000 Study projections, the population projections assume extensive policy changes and developments to reduce fertility rates. Without the assumed policy changes, the projected rate of population growth would be still more rapid.

Unfortunately population growth may be slowed for reasons other than declining birth rates. As the world's populations exceed and reduce the land's carrying capacity in widening areas, the trends of the last century or two toward improved health and longer life may come to a halt. Hunger and disease may claim more lives—especially lives of babies and young children. More of those surviving infancy may be mentally and physically handicapped by childhood malnutrition.

The time for action to prevent this outcome is running out. Unless nations collectively and individually take bold and imaginative steps toward improved social and economic conditions, reduced fertility, better management of resources, and protection of the environment, the world must expect a troubled entry into the twenty-first century.
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Sarah Lee Sharp

B.A., University of California, San Diego, 1971, with major in history.

M.A., University of California, San Diego, 1975, with major field in United States history; Teaching Assistant in Comparative Americas, 1972-1975.

Ph.D., University of California, San Diego, 1979, with major field in United States history; dissertation entitled, "Social Criticism in California During the Gilded Age."
